RESEARCH PAPER 00/33 : The Presidential 23 MARCH 2000 Election and Future Prospects

Pre-term presidential elections are due to take place in Russia on 26 March 2000, following the surprise resignation of . The strong favourite to win is Yeltsin’s nominated successor, acting President .

This paper looks at the candidates and examines the prospects for Russia in the post-Yeltsin era. The conflict in is covered in Library Research Paper 00/14, The Conflict in Chechnya.

Tim Youngs

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ISSN 1368-8456 Summary of main points

• Pre-term presidential elections are due to be held in Russia on 26 March 2000, following the surprise resignation of President Boris Yeltsin on 31 December 1999. A second round run-off will be held on 16 April if no candidate secures more than 50 per cent. • In accordance with the constitution, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin was elevated to acting President following Yeltsin’s resignation. He is now the strong favourite to win the election. Opinion polls show around 50 per cent support for Putin, which may be enough to secure outright victory in the first round. • Putin is something of a political unknown in Russia. A former officer in the Foreign Intelligence Service of the KGB, he entered the Yeltsin administration in 1996 and rose rapidly to become head of the internal security service, the FSB. • He was nominated Prime Minister in August 1999 following the sacking of Sergei Stepashin. Putin’s national standing rose rapidly, boosted by his youthful image, his tough response to the crisis in the North Caucasus, and the strong showing in the December 1999 parliamentary elections for the pro-government Unity grouping he had endorsed. • Putin has pledged to restore law and order and combat corruption, while promising to protect human rights and freedom of speech. Critics claim he intends to embark on a pattern of authoritarian market reform in the mould of Pinochet. • The main challenge to Putin comes from the Communist leader, Gennadi Zyuganov, who lost to Yeltsin in the second round of the 1996 presidential election. The nine other candidates probably lack sufficient national backing to mount a credible campaign. • Despite an upturn in the economic outlook during late 1999, due mainly to buoyant oil prices, the longer-term prospects remain bleak. Regardless of the outcome of the election, the next will find himself severely constrained by economic realities and the need to retain the backing of international financial institutions.

CONTENTS

I Background 7

A. The Resignation of Boris Yeltsin 7

B. Vladimir Putin as Acting President 7

C. Relations with the New Duma 8

II The Presidential Elections 9

A. The Candidates 9

1. 10 2. 10 3. 10 4. Aleksei Podberezkin 10 5. Vladimir Putin 10 6. Yuri Skuratov 12 7. 12 8. 13 9. Grigori Yavlinsky 13 10. 13 11. Gennadi Zyuganov 13 III The Prospects for Russia 15

Appendix I – Results of the 1996 Presidential Election 17

Appendix II – Results of the 1999 Parliamentary Election 18

RESEARCH PAPER 00/33

I Background

A. The Resignation of Boris Yeltsin

In a surprise television announcement on 31 December 1999, Boris Yeltsin declared he was resigning as President, six months ahead of the scheduled expiry of his term. Yeltsin said he was stepping down to allow a new generation of political leaders to take the country into the next century, declaring: “Russia must enter the new millennium with new politicians, new faces, new intelligent, strong and energetic people.”1

He apologised to the Russian people for the mistakes and failures made during the painful economic and political transition of the 1990s, saying:

I ask you to forgive me for not fulfilling some hopes of those people who believed we would be able to jump from the grey, stagnating, totalitarian past into a bright, rich and civilised future in one go. I myself believed in this. But it could not be done in one fell swoop. In some respects I was too naïve… I am leaving. I have done everything I could. I am not leaving because of my health, but because of all the problems taken together.2

President Bill Clinton responded to the news of the resignation by declaring that historians would regard Yeltsin as “someone who guided Russia to the point of democracy”. Prime Minister Tony Blair praised Yeltsin for making the world “more stable and secure”, adding:

He has steered his country through a most difficult and painful transition from communism to democracy. At every critical moment, his decisions have reinforced the process of reform, and made Russia a closer partner of the west, both politically and economically.3

The Finnish government, acting on behalf of the European Union, expressed its appreciation of Yeltsin’s role in ending Russia’s isolation and said it was confident the presidential elections would proceed in a democratic and legal fashion.

B. Vladimir Putin as Acting President

In accordance with the constitution, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin was designated acting President, pending fresh elections to be held within three months. On assuming office, he paid tribute to Yeltsin’s role during the transition from Communism and pledged to defend his predecessor’s legacy:

1 Financial Times, 1 January 2000 2 ibid. 3 ibid.

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Freedom of speech, freedom of conscience, freedom of mass media, and property rights – all those basic elements of a civilised society will be safely protected by the state.4

As Putin himself acknowledged, the timing of Yeltsin’s resignation appeared designed to enhance his chances of securing victory in the March election, thereby ensuring a smooth transition of power. This latter point was of particular importance given the mounting allegations of financial impropriety among the Yeltsin entourage: Putin’s first act in his new role was to sign a decree granting Yeltsin immunity from any possible criminal prosecution.

C. Relations with the New Duma

Putin’s promotion to acting President came just weeks after the elections to the lower house of parliament, the Duma, on 19 December 1999. In contrast to the previous opposition- dominated Duma, the newly elected lower house appears to have a more pro-reform hue. Backed by strong media support and endorsed by Putin, the Unity electoral bloc, an amorphous grouping that was formed barely two months before the election, garnered a surprising 23 per cent of the vote, making it the second largest grouping behind the Communists. The results from the Duma election are included in Appendix II.

Predictions that Unity would combine with the reformist Union of Rightist Forces to create a strong pro-government bloc within parliament failed to materialise. In mid-January it was announced that Unity had formed an alliance with the Communist faction and divided up most of the key parliamentary posts between them. The move prompted condemnation from several parties, with former Prime Minister Yevgeni Primakov denouncing the deal as “a total collapse of democracy” and a “desecration”.5 Other factions adopted a wait-and-see attitude, perhaps interpreting the alliance as a temporary ploy to fragment the Communist challenge to Putin in the presidential election.

Within the administration itself, Putin replaced several prominent figures, including Yeltsin’s daughter Tatyana Dyachenko, who had acted as an adviser to her father. He also promoted the reformist finance minister, Mikhail Kasyanov, to the sole post of Deputy Prime Minister, essentially elevating him to acting Prime Minister prior to the March election.

4 Financial Times, 1 January 2000 5 Reuters, 19 January 2000

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II The Presidential Elections

The election on 26 March will be the second time have voted for a president since the dissolution of the in December 1991. The last presidential election took place in June and July 1996 when Yeltsin defeated his Communist challenger, Gennadi Zyuganov, in a second round run-off. The full results from the 1996 election are included in Appendix I.

If no candidate wins more than 50 per cent in the first round of the forthcoming election, a second round run-off between the two highest placed candidates will take place on 16 April. The new president will be elected for a four-year term and will take office 30 days after the publication of the final official results by the Central Electoral Commission.

A. The Candidates

A total of eleven candidates were registered for the election prior to the deadline of 13 February 2000. The two leading contenders are Vladimir Putin and the Communist Party leader, Gennadi Zyuganov, who lost to Yeltsin in 1996. The remaining nine candidates represent a broad range of political views, but appear to lack sufficient backing to challenge the two front-runners.

The main absentee from the campaign is Yevgeni Primakov, who topped the opinion polls during the autumn. Primakov’s standing was undoubtedly damaged by the poor showing of his Fatherland-All Russia bloc in the Duma election and was dealt a fatal blow in early January 2000 when several of the bloc’s regional governors declared they would be supporting Putin.

With one week to go prior to the elections, opinion polls suggested Putin might secure an outright victory in the first round. The acting President enjoys between 48 and 52 per cent support against 19 to 21 per cent for Zyuganov.6 Given Putin’s clear lead in the polls, some commentators warn that the main threat to the acting President may come from voter apathy, particularly if the electorate considers the vote a foregone conclusion. A turnout of less than 50 per cent would invalidate the election and force a re-run.

6 Financial Times, 21 March 2000

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The full list of candidates is as follows:7

1. Umar Dzhabrailov

Umar Dzhabrailov, an ethnic Chechen born in 1958, is deputy director-general of the Radisson-Slavyanskaya Hotel in . Although he is not a member of any political party, he is closely linked to the influential mayor of Moscow, Yuri Luzhkov. He has called for an “undivided and strong Russian state”, and argues the Chechen conflict should be resolved diplomatically.

2. Stanislav Govorukhin

Film director and writer Stanislav Govorukhin (b1936) is running as an independent candidate, despite his prominent role within the Fatherland-All Russia Party of Yevgeni Primakov and Yuri Luzhkov. Govorukhin agreed to run only once Primakov withdrew from the race. He is highly critical of the pro-Putin bias in the official media.

3. Ella Pamfilova

A prominent figure in the pro-democracy movement in the 1980s and early 1990s, Ella Pamfilova (b1953) is the first female candidate to stand for president. Pamfilova publicly recognises she cannot win, but believes she will be able to influence the debate by expounding her vision for the country.

4. Aleksei Podberezkin

Elected to the Duma in 1995, Aleksei Podberezkin (b1953) served as deputy chairman of the Committee for International Affairs, but failed to secure re-election in 1999. Podberezkin now heads the conservative Spiritual Heritage movement and argues that his nomination “can consolidate patriotically-minded people who care about Russia’s future”.8

5. Vladimir Putin

Vladimir Putin has been portrayed in the media as something of an enigma. Born in 1952, he studied law at Leningrad State University, prior to entering the Foreign Intelligence Service of the KGB in 1975. He spent a number of years in East Germany before returning to Leningrad in the late 1980s. In 1990 he became an advisor to Anatoli Sobchak, the reformist mayor of Leningrad (later St Petersburg) and was subsequently elevated to first deputy chairman of the local government. Sobchak’s defeat in the 1995 gubernatorial elections led Putin to resign from the St Petersburg administration.

7 The following section draws heavily on ’The Russian Presidential Election’, BBC Monitoring Report, March 2000 8 ’The Russian Presidential Election’, BBC Monitoring Report, March 2000

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He entered the Kremlin in June 1996 as the deputy head of the Kremlin Property Department, which, critics allege, was at the heart of official corruption within the presidential entourage. He was subsequently promoted to deputy head of the Presidential Administration in March 1997. The following year he was again promoted to become director of the Federal Security Service (FSB), the internal security arm of the former KGB. In March 1999 his responsibilities were widened to include the post of secretary of the presidential Security Council.

Putin rose to national prominence in early August 1999 when Yeltsin named him acting Prime Minister in place of Sergei Stepashin, a move that was approved by the Duma on 16 August. His relative youth and energy, coupled with his decisive response to the escalating crisis in Dagestan and Chechnya, transformed him within a few months from a virtual political unknown to the most popular politician in the country.

Putin’s political leanings have been the subject of considerable debate, both in Russia and internationally. Support for his campaign has come from representatives across the Russian political spectrum, all of whom claim Putin as their own. It remains to be seen whether such ambiguity is primarily due to the necessities of political campaigning.

His carefully worded, yet rather vague, programme, outlined in late December 1999, calls for the establishment of a strong state to restore law and order (characterised by Putin as a “dictatorship of the law”) and to act as the engine for economic reform and technological development. He offers a sober assessment of the country’s ills, arguing that Russia alone is responsible for its current plight, and emphasising the need to re-establish Russia as a great power, but based on economic rather than military prowess.9

Some observers have expressed concerns over Putin’s commitment to democracy, citing his call for an increased role for the security services and the alleged brutality of the campaign in Chechnya. It is feared that his pledges to impose a sense of moral order in society and to strengthen the state may override his commitment to human rights and freedom of speech, although opinion polls suggest Russians may be willing to accept such a trade-off.10 John Thornhill argues that Putin

…appears to have a very expedient, Leninist interpretation of what morality means: everything that serves the interests of his revolution is moral; everything that hinders it is immoral.11

Others dismiss such fears as unfounded. Putin’s close associate in St Petersburg, the late Anatoli Sobchak, insisted in an interview shortly before his death that he had no doubts about

9 Financial Times, 5 January 2000 10 According to a survey by the Russian Centre for the Study of Public Opinion, 72 per cent cited civil order as the most important issue in Russia today “even if achieving that order means limiting some civil liberties and compromising democratic principles.” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 4 February 2000 11 Financial Times, 18/19 March 2000

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Putin’s democratic intentions, declaring: “I find it funny to read accusations that he will be a future Pinochet.”12 Instead, he argued that Putin represented a new generation of “conservative liberal” politicians who realised that only a strong state could ensure the proper functioning of democratic society and market economy.13

Throughout his low-key campaign Putin has enjoyed strong support from much of the media, provoking allegations of bias from opponents. He has also received substantial financial backing from influential magnates, known as ‘oligarchs’, who financed Yeltsin’s re-election campaign in 1996.

Putin’s standing has also been boosted by expressions of support from Western leaders. In mid-February President Clinton declared: “Based on what I have seen so far, I think the United States can do business with this man.”14 During a visit to St Petersburg, Prime Minister Tony Blair, the first Western head of government to meet Putin, said the acting President was

…highly intelligent with a focused view of what he wants to achieve in Russia… Given what Russia has been through and given the economic task of reconstruction, it's not surprising he believes in a Russia which is ordered and strong but also democratic and liberal.15

6. Yuri Skuratov

Born in 1952 Yuri Skuratov served as Prosecutor-General between 1995 and 1999. He was closely involved with an investigation into alleged financial impropriety on the part of Yeltsin’s family and associates before his sudden resignation on “health grounds” in February 1999. The resignation, although endorsed by Yeltsin, was not accepted by parliament, prompting a stand-off between the executive and the legislature. In mid-March 1999 Russia TV showed a film of a person “who strongly resembles” Skuratov involved with two prostitutes, prompting accusations from Skuratov of attempted blackmail on the part of the authorities. His campaign for the presidency is based on a pledge to combat corruption at the highest level.

7. Konstantin Titov

Born in 1944 Konstantin Titov is the of the Samara region and board chairman of the liberal . He is strongly critical of Putin and has argued against the use of military force in Chechnya. He has also sought to undermine the image of Putin as a strong man capable of pushing through market reforms in the mould of General Pinochet.

12 Financial Times, 18/19 March 2000 13 ibid. 14 BBC News web site at http://news.bbc.co.uk, 14 February 2000 15 Financial Times, 13 March 2000

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His candidacy has prompted a split within the Union of Right Forces: part of the Union - the Democratic Russia party – has endorsed Titov, while the remainder of the grouping has decided to support neither Putin nor Titov.

8. Aman Tuleyev

The Governor of the Region and an ethnic Kazakh, Aman Tuleyev (b1944) briefly held the post of minister of co-operation with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), but resigned in 1997. A candidate in the presidential elections in 1991 and 1996, his campaign is based on a desire to redress the balance of power between Moscow and the regions.

9. Grigori Yavlinsky

Grigori Yavlinsky is the chairman of the broadly liberal movement. Born in 1952 Yavlinsky was elected to the new Duma in 1993. He contested the presidential election in 1996, gaining 7.41 per cent of the first-round vote. A strong opponent of the first military campaign in Chechnya, Yavlinsky became increasingly critical of Yeltsin, arguing that the President had exhausted his political potential. He suffered a heart attack in 1998. Yabloko’s weak showing in the Duma election of December 1999 (5.9 per cent) has probably damaged his chances of making a major impact in the March presidential poll.

10. Vladimir Zhirinovsky

Vladimir Zhirinovsky (b1946) has been the leader of the nationalist-xenophobic Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) since its foundation in 1990. Since his party’s strong showing of 23 per cent in the 1993 Duma election, which provoked widespread international consternation, his ability to attract the protest vote has declined significantly. Standing in the 1996 presidential election, he secured just 5.7 per cent of the vote, while his party, renamed the ‘Zhirinovsky Bloc’ after disputes over registration, gained only six per cent in the December 1999 Duma election.

He supports the military campaign in Chechnya, although he believes it should be conducted in a more ruthless manner.

11. Gennadi Zyuganov

Gennadi Zyuganov is seen as the one candidate capable of challenging Putin. Born in 1944, he joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1966, rising to become deputy head of the CPSU ideology department in 1989. With the formation in June 1990 of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), Zyuganov was elected secretary of the Central Committee. He became a vocal critic of , but was away on holiday during the August 1991 attempted coup.

During the constitutional crisis in the autumn of 1993 he condemned the disbanding of parliament by Yeltsin, but called on both sides to refrain from violence. He was subsequently

13 RESEARCH PAPER 00/33 elected to the new Duma in December 1993 and became chairman of the CPRF parliamentary faction. In the 1996 presidential election he secured a first-round vote of 32.04 per cent, but lost to Yeltsin in the second round by 53.82 to 40.31 per cent.

He blames Yeltsin for causing the break-up of the Soviet Union and reducing the population to poverty. His campaign pledges include raising state employees’ salaries, pensions and the minimum wage; financing free healthcare and education; and cutting apartment rents, electricity and transport charges. His critics argue that there is little substance to Zyuganov’s policies and question how he intends to fund such pledges.16

The main advantage enjoyed by the Communists is their significant nation-wide grass-roots organisation. Zyuganov is hampered, though, by his party’s failure to broaden its shrinking support base and overcome its image as a party of the older generation based on nostalgia for the Soviet past. Zyuganov has also refrained from strongly criticising Putin, partly due to the Communists’ post-election alliance with the pro-Putin Unity party. It is possible that the Communists may be hoping for a significant role in a future Putin administration.

16 Financial Times, 21 March 2000

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III The Prospects for Russia

Eight years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia is still in the throes of a major economic and political transition. Some, not insignificant, progress has been made during that period. The hand-over of power to acting President Putin has occurred in accordance with the constitution, despite predictions from some quarters that Yeltsin might seek to remain in office beyond the expiry of his legal term in June 2000. Broadly speaking, human rights and freedom of speech have been upheld, albeit with the conspicuous exception of the two conflicts in Chechnya.

Fundamental difficulties remain, however, not least in the economic sphere.17 During the 1990s living standards for the majority of Russians have plummeted, with almost one fifth of the population living in extreme poverty. Although the short-term economic outlook has improved in recent months, primarily due to a sharp increase in revenue generated by high oil prices, the longer-term situation remains uncertain and serious structural problems need to be addressed. While some progress has been made in economic and financial reform, Russia lacks the basic institutional and legal framework required for a modern functioning market economy. The main priorities will be to overhaul the outmoded taxation system and regulate the rather anarchic banking system.

The election of a new parliament may assist in this process of reform, although during the Yeltsin era

…parliamentary opposition to reform was only ever part of the problem. More important has been the grip of the new oligarchy on the economy, and the corruption and weakness of the Russian state system.18

After Yeltsin’s election victory in 1996, his administration became increasingly co-opted by the oligarchs, a group of financial and media magnates who are widely believed to have used their position and influence to conduct massive fraud and misappropriation. Despite pledges from Putin to root out such corruption, some observers believe that, were Putin to win the election, he too would find himself beholden to the interests of the oligarchs, who are financing his campaign.

One key indicator of the incoming President’s intentions and political authority will be his choice of Prime Minister and cabinet. The Yeltsin period was characterised by frequent sackings of cabinet ministers and Prime Ministers as the President sought to protect his own position by playing competing factions off against one another. Such manoeuvrings, while ensuring Yeltsin retained his position of political dominance, were not conducive to effective government.

17 The economic and political situation in Russia during 1999 is covered in greater detail in Library Research Paper 99/87, The Prospects for Russia, 8 November 1999 18 ‘The Putin regime in Russia: towards authoritarian reform’, Strategic Comments, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Vol. 6 Issue 1, January 2000

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Another challenge for the incoming President will be the ongoing conflict between federal forces and rebel fighters in the secessionist north-Caucasian republic of Chechnya.19 Following the fall of the republic’s capital in early February 2000, the fighting has moved to the mountainous areas in the south as Russian forces attempt to isolate and destroy rebel formations. Chechen units continue to inflict heavy casualties on the federal troops: in early March around 80 elite paratroopers were reportedly killed in one ambush.

Although public opinion remains solidly in favour of the campaign at present, a prolonged and costly campaign could erode support over time. If Moscow intends to remain in Chechnya in the longer term it will need to retain a substantial military presence. Too small a garrison would be incapable of containing the remaining rebels, while a large-scale presence would be financially difficult to sustain.

On the international front, Russia will continue to depend heavily on financial assistance from the IMF, EBRD and World Bank, and needs, therefore, to maintain reasonable relations with the Western governments that control these institutions. A return to the pro-Western tendencies of the early 1990s is extremely unlikely: it seems reasonable to expect a continuation of the more recent trend whereby often stridently anti-Western Russian rhetoric is used to mask a more pragmatic policy of engagement. Nonetheless, areas of dispute are likely to continue to arise, not least over US plans to develop a ballistic missile defence system and the possible expansion of NATO to include the Baltic States.20

The main focus for the new President, however, will continue to be the numerous domestic difficulties facing the country. Yeltsin’s successor as President will face a considerable challenge in balancing the need to rebuild society and establish law and order, without resorting to the authoritarianism that has characterised Russia throughout most of its history.

19 For more detail on the conflict in Chechnya, see Library Research Paper 00/14, The Conflict in Chechnya, 7 February 2000. 20 ‘The Putin regime in Russia: towards authoritarian reform’, Strategic Comments, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Vol. 6 Issue 1, January 2000

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Appendix I – Results of the 1996 Presidential Election

First Round Second Round Presidential Election: 16 June and 3 July 1996 Results (%) Results (%) Boris Nikolayevich Yel’tsin 35.3 53.8

Gennadiy Andreyevich Zyuganov 32.0 40.2

Aleksandr Ivanovich Lebed’ 14.5 -

Grigoriy Alekseyevich Yavlinskiy 7.3 -

Vladimir Vol’fovich Zhirinovski 5.7 -

Others 3.8 -

Source: Elections Around the World web site at http://www.agora.stm.it/elections/russia.htm

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Appendix II – Results of the 1999 Parliamentary Election

No. of Seats Election: 19 December 1999 % (Total 450)

Communist Party of the Russian Federation KPRF 24.3 113

Inter-Regional Movement Unity MEDVED 23.3 72

Fatherland All Russia OVR 13.3 66

Union of Right Forces SPS 8.5 29

Zhirinovsky Blok (Liberal Democratic Party BZ (LDPR) 6.0 17 of Russia)

Yabloko Yabloko 5.9 21

Communists-Workers’ Russia-For the KTS 2.2 - Soviet Union

Women of Russia ZhR 2.1 -

Pensioners’ Party, pensioners PP 2.0 1

Our Home is Russia NDR 1.2 7

Russian Party for the Defence of Women RPZZh 0.8 -

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State Duma Election: 19 December 1999 (cont.) % Seats

Congress of Russian Communities and KRO-DYB 0.6 1 Movement of Y. Boldurev

For Citizen’s Worth ZGD 0.6 -

Stalinist Bloc for the Soviet Union SB 0.6 -

All-Russian Political Movement in Support DPA 0.6 2 the Army

Peace. Labour. May MTM 0.6 -

Bloc of General Andrei Nikolaev and AN/SF 0.6 - Academician

Russian All People Unity ROS 0.4 -

Party for Peace and Unity PME 0.4 -

Russian Socialist Party RSP 0.2 1

Movement of Patriotic Forces-Russian DPS-RD 0.2 - Cause

Conservative Movement of Russia KDR 0.2 -

All Russian Political Party of People VPPN 0.1 -

Spiritual Legacy DN 0.1 -

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State Duma Election: 19 December 1999 (cont.) % Seats

Socialist Party of Russia SPR 0.1 -

Social-Democrats SD 0.1 -

non-partisans - - 106

Source: Elections Around the World web site at http://www.agora.stm.it/elections/russia.htm

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