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Russia: the Presidential Election and Future Prospects

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Russia: the Presidential Election and Future Prospects RESEARCH PAPER 00/33 Russia: The Presidential 23 MARCH 2000 Election and Future Prospects Pre-term presidential elections are due to take place in Russia on 26 March 2000, following the surprise resignation of Boris Yeltsin. The strong favourite to win is Yeltsin’s nominated successor, acting President Vladimir Putin. This paper looks at the candidates and examines the prospects for Russia in the post-Yeltsin era. The conflict in Chechnya is covered in Library Research Paper 00/14, The Conflict in Chechnya. Tim Youngs INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE SECTION HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY Recent Library Research Papers include: 00/18 Postal Services Bill [Bill 54 of 1999-2000] 11.02.00 00/19 Unemployment by Constituency, January 2000 16.02.00 00/20 European Defence: from Pörtschach to Helsinki 21.02.00 00/21 Economic Indicators 01.03.00 00/22 The Health Service Commissioners (Amendment) Bill [Bill 15 of 1999-2000] 01.03.00 00/23 The Criminal Justice (Mode of Trial) (No. 2) Bill [Bill 73 of 1999-2000] 03.03.00 00/24 The National Lottery 08.03.00 00/25 The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Bill [Bill 64 of 1999-2000] 03.03.00 00/26 The Warm Homes and Energy Conservation Bill (Revised edition) [Bill 16 of 1999-2000] 07.03.00 00/27 The Race Relations Amendment Bill [HL] Bill 60 of 1999-2000 08.03.00 00/28 Unemployment by Constituency, February 2000 15.03.00 00/29 Unemployment by Constituency, Revised rates 15.03.00 00/30 The Countryside and Rights of Way Bill – Wildlife and Conservation Bill 78 of 1999-2000 16.03.00 00/31 The Countryside and Rights of Way Bill – Access and Rights of Way Bill 78 of 1999-2000 16.03.00 00/32 Human Rights in the EU: the Charter of Fundamental Rights 20.03.00 Research Papers are available as PDF files: • to members of the general public on the Parliamentary web site, URL: http://www.parliament.uk • within Parliament to users of the Parliamentary Intranet, URL: http://hcl1.hclibrary.parliament.uk Library Research Papers are compiled for the benefit of Members of Parliament and their personal staff. Authors are available to discuss the contents of these papers with Members and their staff but cannot advise members of the general public. Any comments on Research Papers should be sent to the Research Publications Officer, Room 407, 1 Derby Gate, London, SW1A 2DG or e-mailed to [email protected] ISSN 1368-8456 Summary of main points • Pre-term presidential elections are due to be held in Russia on 26 March 2000, following the surprise resignation of President Boris Yeltsin on 31 December 1999. A second round run-off will be held on 16 April if no candidate secures more than 50 per cent. • In accordance with the constitution, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin was elevated to acting President following Yeltsin’s resignation. He is now the strong favourite to win the election. Opinion polls show around 50 per cent support for Putin, which may be enough to secure outright victory in the first round. • Putin is something of a political unknown in Russia. A former officer in the Foreign Intelligence Service of the KGB, he entered the Yeltsin administration in 1996 and rose rapidly to become head of the internal security service, the FSB. • He was nominated Prime Minister in August 1999 following the sacking of Sergei Stepashin. Putin’s national standing rose rapidly, boosted by his youthful image, his tough response to the crisis in the North Caucasus, and the strong showing in the December 1999 parliamentary elections for the pro-government Unity grouping he had endorsed. • Putin has pledged to restore law and order and combat corruption, while promising to protect human rights and freedom of speech. Critics claim he intends to embark on a pattern of authoritarian market reform in the mould of Pinochet. • The main challenge to Putin comes from the Communist leader, Gennadi Zyuganov, who lost to Yeltsin in the second round of the 1996 presidential election. The nine other candidates probably lack sufficient national backing to mount a credible campaign. • Despite an upturn in the economic outlook during late 1999, due mainly to buoyant oil prices, the longer-term prospects remain bleak. Regardless of the outcome of the election, the next president of Russia will find himself severely constrained by economic realities and the need to retain the backing of international financial institutions. CONTENTS I Background 7 A. The Resignation of Boris Yeltsin 7 B. Vladimir Putin as Acting President 7 C. Relations with the New Duma 8 II The Presidential Elections 9 A. The Candidates 9 1. Umar Dzhabrailov 10 2. Stanislav Govorukhin 10 3. Ella Pamfilova 10 4. Aleksei Podberezkin 10 5. Vladimir Putin 10 6. Yuri Skuratov 12 7. Konstantin Titov 12 8. Aman Tuleyev 13 9. Grigori Yavlinsky 13 10. Vladimir Zhirinovsky 13 11. Gennadi Zyuganov 13 III The Prospects for Russia 15 Appendix I – Results of the 1996 Presidential Election 17 Appendix II – Results of the 1999 Parliamentary Election 18 RESEARCH PAPER 00/33 I Background A. The Resignation of Boris Yeltsin In a surprise television announcement on 31 December 1999, Boris Yeltsin declared he was resigning as President, six months ahead of the scheduled expiry of his term. Yeltsin said he was stepping down to allow a new generation of political leaders to take the country into the next century, declaring: “Russia must enter the new millennium with new politicians, new faces, new intelligent, strong and energetic people.”1 He apologised to the Russian people for the mistakes and failures made during the painful economic and political transition of the 1990s, saying: I ask you to forgive me for not fulfilling some hopes of those people who believed we would be able to jump from the grey, stagnating, totalitarian past into a bright, rich and civilised future in one go. I myself believed in this. But it could not be done in one fell swoop. In some respects I was too naïve… I am leaving. I have done everything I could. I am not leaving because of my health, but because of all the problems taken together.2 President Bill Clinton responded to the news of the resignation by declaring that historians would regard Yeltsin as “someone who guided Russia to the point of democracy”. Prime Minister Tony Blair praised Yeltsin for making the world “more stable and secure”, adding: He has steered his country through a most difficult and painful transition from communism to democracy. At every critical moment, his decisions have reinforced the process of reform, and made Russia a closer partner of the west, both politically and economically.3 The Finnish government, acting on behalf of the European Union, expressed its appreciation of Yeltsin’s role in ending Russia’s isolation and said it was confident the presidential elections would proceed in a democratic and legal fashion. B. Vladimir Putin as Acting President In accordance with the constitution, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin was designated acting President, pending fresh elections to be held within three months. On assuming office, he paid tribute to Yeltsin’s role during the transition from Communism and pledged to defend his predecessor’s legacy: 1 Financial Times, 1 January 2000 2 ibid. 3 ibid. 7 RESEARCH PAPER 00/33 Freedom of speech, freedom of conscience, freedom of mass media, and property rights – all those basic elements of a civilised society will be safely protected by the state.4 As Putin himself acknowledged, the timing of Yeltsin’s resignation appeared designed to enhance his chances of securing victory in the March election, thereby ensuring a smooth transition of power. This latter point was of particular importance given the mounting allegations of financial impropriety among the Yeltsin entourage: Putin’s first act in his new role was to sign a decree granting Yeltsin immunity from any possible criminal prosecution. C. Relations with the New Duma Putin’s promotion to acting President came just weeks after the elections to the lower house of parliament, the Duma, on 19 December 1999. In contrast to the previous opposition- dominated Duma, the newly elected lower house appears to have a more pro-reform hue. Backed by strong media support and endorsed by Putin, the Unity electoral bloc, an amorphous grouping that was formed barely two months before the election, garnered a surprising 23 per cent of the vote, making it the second largest grouping behind the Communists. The results from the Duma election are included in Appendix II. Predictions that Unity would combine with the reformist Union of Rightist Forces to create a strong pro-government bloc within parliament failed to materialise. In mid-January it was announced that Unity had formed an alliance with the Communist faction and divided up most of the key parliamentary posts between them. The move prompted condemnation from several parties, with former Prime Minister Yevgeni Primakov denouncing the deal as “a total collapse of democracy” and a “desecration”.5 Other factions adopted a wait-and-see attitude, perhaps interpreting the alliance as a temporary ploy to fragment the Communist challenge to Putin in the presidential election. Within the administration itself, Putin replaced several prominent figures, including Yeltsin’s daughter Tatyana Dyachenko, who had acted as an adviser to her father. He also promoted the reformist finance minister, Mikhail Kasyanov, to the sole post of Deputy Prime Minister, essentially elevating him to acting Prime Minister prior to the March election. 4 Financial Times, 1 January 2000 5 Reuters, 19 January 2000 8 RESEARCH PAPER 00/33 II The Presidential Elections The election on 26 March will be the second time Russians have voted for a president since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991.
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