Oil Spills in Your Backyard & Opportunities for Citizen
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Written Testimony of Shanna Devine Worker Health and Safety Advocate
Written Testimony of Shanna Devine Worker Health and Safety Advocate, Public Citizen’s Congress Watch Division Before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce Environment and Climate Change Subcommittee On “Mismanaging Chemical Risks: EPA’s Failure to Protect Workers” March 13, 2019 Dear Chairman Tonko, Ranking Member Shimkus, and Members of the Subcommittee, Thank you for holding this crucial hearing on the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) failure to protect workers from chemicals risks. I serve as the worker health and safety advocate for Public Citizen, a national consumer advocacy and public interest organization with more than 500,000 members and supporters. Since 1971, Public Citizen has advocated for stronger health, safety and consumer protection measures, as well as curbs on corporate wrongdoing. I previously worked as an investigator for the Government Accountability Project, a whistleblower protection and advocacy organization, where I led a multiyear dispersant whistleblower investigation. The investigation, which I understand is ongoing, examined worker health impacts from chemical exposure during the Deepwater Horizon disaster.i I worked firsthand with whistleblowers, and this testimony incorporates lessons learned by those brave individuals, who should be the pioneer witnesses providing a foundation for dispersant oversight. EPA’s failure to adequately regulate dispersants – toxic chemicals used in an unprecedented manner in response to the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster – is a tragic example of the agency’s failure to protect workers under its implementation of the Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety Act, which made significant amendments to the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA). While this is by no means the only chemical that EPA has failed to protect workers from, several unique factors make it particularly timely for congressional oversight. -
An Interdisciplinary Model for the Development of Alabama Oil Sands
AN INTERDISCIPLINARY MODEL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF ALABAMA OIL SANDS by DANIEL EDWARD SMITH III RICHARD A. ESPOSITO, COMMITTEE CHAIR BENNETT L. BEARDEN SCOTT BRANDE MICHELLE V. FANUCCHI BERRY H. (NICK) TEW, JR. A DISSERTATION Submitted to the graduate faculty of The University of Alabama at Birmingham, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA 2018 Copyright by Daniel Edward Smith III 2018 AN INTERDISCIPLINARY MODEL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF ALABAMA OIL SANDS DANIEL EDWARD SMITH III INTERDISCIPLINARY ENGINEERING ABSTRACT In July 2013, a memorandum of understanding (MOU) was signed by the Governors of the states of Alabama and Mississippi to jointly conduct a comprehensive geologic, engineering, and legal assessment of oil sands resources associated with the Hartselle Sandstone formation including the identification of environmental best practices associated with developing these resources. Pursuant to the MOU, the Geological Survey of Alabama (GSA) began a limited geological evaluation of the potential development of Alabama’s oil sand resources. This dissertation compliments those GSA efforts by identifying and assessing environmental and social sustainability risks associated with the potential development of Alabama’s oil sands within the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 31010 risk management standard framework to provide an interdisciplinary sustainability risk management strategy that considers the inter-related disciplinary aspects of regulation, technology, and sustainability to address the environmental best practices component of the MOU. The bitumen extraction technologies currently being used to recover bitumen from geological formations that are most like the Hartselle Sandstone are proprietary and confidential. Furthermore, currently available bitumen extraction technologies have not been tested on Hartselle Sandstone oil sand deposits. -
2012 Corporate Citizenship Report Letter from the Chairman and CEO
2012 CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP REPORT Letter from the Chairman and CEO Welcome to the 2012 Corporate Citizenship Report. Our commitment to operating in an environmentally incident. When working to ensure operational Our commitment — to our employees, shareholders responsible manner is anchored in our integrity, our goal is to manage risk to avoid and the communities and countries where we work Environmental Policy. Our approach starts with incidents such as these. But it is also important — to operate safely and responsibly starts with our gaining a thorough understanding of the local that if they do occur, we have the competency planning, management and accountability systems. It surroundings. This understanding is critical to our and the capability to respond and a process to flows from the expertise and diligence of thousands performance. We discuss this process on page 17. integrate lessons learned into future operations of employees and contractors around the world. to reduce the risk of reoccurrence. Each day, it is their integrity, attention to detail and We also recognize the importance of understanding concern for the local communities in which they and managing the environmental and social risks Building Stakeholder Trust live and work that shape our culture of safety and associated with climate change. ExxonMobil is Industry must work to build stakeholder trust. drive our citizenship and operational performance. taking steps to reduce our own greenhouse gas With every new technological advance comes a Their efforts — and commitment to continuous emissions, investing more than $330 million this renewed obligation to address public questions improvement — are what we highlight in this report. -
Diary of a Disaster: 6 Months in the Gulf What It’S Like to Respond to an Environmental and Democratic Crisis—And Where We Go from Here
Diary of a Disaster: 6 Months in the Gulf What it’s like to respond to an environmental and democratic crisis—and where we go from here. by Riki Ott America awoke the morning of April 21 to learn that BP’s well, the Deepwater Horizon, had blown out in the Gulf of Mexico and was on fire. Eleven men were dead. BP began dumping dispersants (toxic chemicals that sink oil) into the Gulf and lies into the media. I had left Alaska on February 10 for another round of national talks on the democracy crisis and how we can take back our government... from the corporations. My phone went berserk with media requests. Lisa Marie, my assistant and friend, asked when I was going down to the Gulf. “I’m not,” I said. She knew better. For both of us, it was déjà vu. During the Exxon Valdez oil spill 21 years earlier in Alaska, Lisa Marie had worked with traumatized children and families. She worked for several years as a board member and volunteer for the Cordova Family Resource Center. With my doctorate in marine pollution, I became a spokesperson for the commercial fishing industry, testifying in the state legislature and Congress for stronger spill prevention measures and working to ban dispersants, and then starting the Copper River Watershed Project to help the community recover from long-term socioeconomic impacts. Lisa Marie knew I needed time to process my own memories that surged afresh with BP’s blowout, the inept government-industry response, and the lies. It took me a week to come out of my foxhole. -
Hearing Order OH-001-2014 Trans Mountain Pipeline ULC (Trans Mountain) Application for the Trans Mountain Expansion Project (Project)
Hearing Order OH-001-2014 Trans Mountain Pipeline ULC (Trans Mountain) Application for the Trans Mountain Expansion Project (Project) Written evidence of Dr. Rikki Ott Name of North Shore No Pipeline Expansion (“NSNOPE”) intervenor: Table of contents 1. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 2 1.1 Scope of work .................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined. 1.2 Statement of qualifications ............................... Error! Bookmark not defined. 1.2.1 Education ............................................ Error! Bookmark not defined. 1.2.2 Experience .......................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. 1.2.3 Qualification of Opinions ..................... Error! Bookmark not defined. 2. Impacts to Worker Health & Wildlife from Oil Spills Error! Bookmark not defined. 2.1 State of Knowledge Before the BP DWH Disaster .......... Error! Bookmark not defined. 2.2 State of Knowledge from the BP DWH Disaster ............. Error! Bookmark not defined. 3. Impacts to Public Health from Oil Spills ................... Error! Bookmark not defined. 3.1 Reports from the BP DWH Disaster ................ Error! Bookmark not defined. 3.2 Reports from Dilbit Disasters in the U.S. ......... Error! Bookmark not defined. 4. Opinion on Health Risk from Oil Spills in Urbanized Areas .. Error! Bookmark not defined. 4.1 The Risk of a Spill ........................................ 28Error! Bookmark not defined. 4.2 The Consequences of a Spill ........................... Error! Bookmark not defined. Appendix A Curriculum vitae of Riki Ott, PhD ........ Error! Bookmark not defined. Page 1 1 1.0 Introduction 2 1.1 Scope of Work 3 1. This is the written evidence of Dr. Riki Ott filed on behalf of the intervener North 4 Shore No Pipeline Expansion (NSNOPE) to address human health impacts and 5 risks of oil spills. 6 7 2. -
Of 18 Jennifer Stock, Riki Ott ______
March 1, 2010, oc030110.mp3 Post Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Page 1 of 18 Jennifer Stock, Riki Ott _________________________________________________________________________________________________ Jennifer Stock: You’re listening to Ocean Currents, a podcast brought to you by NOAA’s Cordell Bank National Marine Sanctuary. This radio program was originally broadcast on KWMR in Point Reyes Station, California. Thanks for listening! (Music) Jennifer Stock: And welcome to this month's edition of Ocean Currents, a show where we talk about the blue part of our planet, the ocean. We talk about natural history, conservation, research, exploration, and ways for us land-based folks to learn more and get involved. My name is Jennifer Stock and I bring this show to you from NOAA's Cordell Bank National Marine Sanctuary, one of three amazing and unique marine sanctuaries off the central California coast here off of Point Reyes. So, let's get to it. A few months back, my guest today appeared in Point Reyes Station as a guest at a showing of a film that really touched me deeply. Riki Ott is a marine biologist and author and activist and she talked about her experience living in Alaska and surviving the long legacy of the Exxon-Valdez oil spill in 1989. She not only survived it, but led her impacted town out of it's most trying times. Riki is featured in the film called Black Wave that brings attention to what really happens during these dark days. Riki was a commercial salmon fisher-ma’am and while living in the devastation of the oil spill on many levels, she chose to do something about it and that she did. -
Sound Truths and Exxon Myths-- the 15 Year Dark Anniversary of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill and Beyond Information Sheet
Sound Truths and Exxon Myths-- The 15 Year Dark Anniversary of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill and Beyond Information Sheet Prepared by Alaska Forum for Environmental Responsibility and Alaska Community Action on Toxics How Much Oil did the Exxon Valdez Spill? I was not the only one who heard 11 million gallons was the low-end estimate of spill volume and 38 million gallons was the high-end estimate during my first 24 hours in Valdez after the spill. A year later, two separate newspaper accounts reported volumes up to 27 and 38 million gallons (Hennelly 1990; Spence 1990). One article (Hennelly 1990) reported that the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC) contracted Caleb Brett to do tank soundings to estimate the volume spilled, but Caleb Brett refused to make public documentation of its findings, citing its employer-client relationship with Exxon. I found that the Alaska Department of Law later obtained the Caleb Brett documents during a separate investigation of the spill volume in preparation for a civil lawsuit against Exxon over damages to wildlife and habitat. When this lawsuit was settled in 1991, the State of Alaska shelved its investigation. In 1994, in response to public requests, the state released its investigation files to the Alaska Resources Library and Information Services (ARLIS) in Anchorage, Alaska (AK Department of Law 1991, attached). According to Caleb Brett’s report (1989), the Exxon Valdez left the tanker terminal in Port Valdez on 23 March 1989 with 53.04 million gallons of oil on board. The tanker grounded on Bligh Reef around midnight. -
Bakkenlink Dry Creek to Beaver Lodge Pipeline Environmental
BakkenLink Dry Creek to Beaver Lodge Pipeline EA Appendix A BakkenLink Risk Assessment and Environmental Consequences Analysis May 2016 BakkenLink Risk Assessment and Environmental Consequence Analysis Dry Creek to Beaver Lodge Pipeline Prepared for: BakkenLink Pipeline LLC Prepared by: Stantec Consulting Services Inc. May 2016 CONFIDENTIAL DATA CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT HAS BEEN REDACTED DUE TO HOMELAND SECURITY ISSUES AND BAKKENLINK’S CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT WITH THE PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION Sign-off Sheet This document entitled BakkenLink Risk Assessment and Environmental Consequence Analysis was prepared by Stantec Consulting Services Inc. for the account of BakkenLink Pipeline LLC in support of the Bureau of Land Management. Any reliance on this document by any third party is strictly prohibited. The material in it reflects Stantec’s professional judgment in light of the scope, schedule and other limitations stated in the document and in the contract between Stantec and the Client. The opinions in the document are based on conditions and information existing at the time the document was published and do not take into account any subsequent changes. In preparing the document, Stantec did not verify information supplied to it by others. Any use which a third party makes of this document is the responsibility of such third party. Such third party agrees that Stantec shall not be responsible for costs or damages of any kind, if any, suffered by it or any other third party as a result of decisions made or actions taken based on this document. Prepared by (signature) Taylor Robinson Reviewed by (signature) Nicole Peters Approved by (signature) Janie Castle Copyright © 2013. -
Toxicity Or Performance In, Natural Environments Where Products May Be Used
About Dispersants Persistent Myths and Hard Facts Updated 3/8/21 by Dr. Riki Ott, ALERT, a project of Earth Island Institute About Dispersants1 Dispersants are mixtures of solvents, surfactants, and additives that are designed to break apart slicks of floating oil and facilitate formation of small droplets of oil in the water column to enhance dispersion and microbial degradation, according to the oil industry and the EPA. Dispersants are used in oil spill response to make the oil disappear from the water surface—but the oil and the dispersants don’t magically go “away” after use. The U.S. National Contingency Plan (NCP or Plan) governs our nation’s oil and chemical pollution emergency responses. The first NCP, in 1970, advocated mechanical methods to remove and dispose of spilled oil, but it allowed for use of chemical dispersants if they were listed on the NCP Product Schedule. For over a decade, dispersant use was restricted; it wasn’t until the mid-1980s that the Plan began to shift to include more chemical treatment measures and requirements. 1994 updates to the Plan included provisions for expedited and preauthorized use of dispersants, as government and industry acted to anticipate and avoid public opposition to dispersant use during future spills––a public relations “lesson learned” from the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil disaster. During the 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon oil disaster response, unprecedented amounts of dispersants were used at the surface and subsurface wellhead, over an unprecedented duration of nearly three months, leading to unprecedented amounts of oil deposition on the ocean floor. -
Changes to the ARRT's Oil Dispersant Guidelines for Alaska
Changes to the ARRT’s Oil Dispersant Guidelines for Alaska 4-5 Briefing for PWSRCAC Board of Directors –January 2015 ACTION ITEM Sponsor: Linda Swiss Project number and name or topic: 600 Oil Spill Response Planning Program 1. Description of agenda item: This informational item is intended to brief the Board on the current status of changes to the “Oil Dispersant Guidelines for Alaska.” Replacement of the guidelines was proposed by the Alaska Regional Response Team (ARRT) in the fall of 2013 with a new document entitled “Dispersants Authorization Plan.” The ARRT, a combination of federal and state agencies that share responsibilities for managing and setting public policy for oil and chemical spill responses in Alaska, is in the process of updating dispersant use policy in Alaska. To accomplish that effort, changes have been proposed to the Alaska Federal/State Preparedness Plan for Response to Oil and Hazardous Substances Discharges/Releases (“Unified Plan”). This plan is jointly written by the U.S. Coast Guard, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation, and members of the ARRT. The draft Dispersant Authorization Plan can be viewed on the ARRT’s website at: http://alaskarrt.org/Documents.aspx?f=9. After release of the t plan in late 2013, the ARRT conducted outreach activities throughout several communities in Alaska. PWSRCAC submitted the attached comments dated February 4, 2014. Comments were also submitted by several other stakeholders including: • City of Cordova • Lawrence Anthony Earth Organization • Coalition to Ban Toxic Dispersants • Alaska Big Village Network • Alaska Inter-Tribal Council • Alaska Community Action on Toxics • Cook Inletkeeper • Kachemak Bay Conservation Society • Pegasus Environmental Solutions • Center for Biological Diversity • Native Village of Eyak • Riki Ott • The Ocean Foundation • Donna Schantz • Amanda Bauer 2. -
Not One Drop Betrayal and Courage in the Wake of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill 1St Edition
NOT ONE DROP BETRAYAL AND COURAGE IN THE WAKE OF THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL 1ST EDITION Author: Riki Ott Number of Pages: --- Published Date: --- Publisher: --- Publication Country: --- Language: --- ISBN: 9781933392585 DOWNLOAD: NOT ONE DROP BETRAYAL AND COURAGE IN THE WAKE OF THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL 1ST EDITION According to almost every single person on the case, that is except Enbridge, this oil spill is and I quote "huge for an inland spill". Are you kidding me? Why are we even allowing Enbridge to maintain a working pipe system? They have had not 1 not 2 but something in the range of one-hundred or more incidents. Sound Truth and Corporate Myth. We are marking four decades of the Environmental Era and forecasting the future. Apr 24, Chelsea Green Pub. Apr 22, Sisters Press, Cordova, AK. OCS Study. BOEM Department of the Interior. Bureau of Ocean Energy Management. Then let's consider the twenty-eighth amendment to the Constitution of the United States: the separation of corporation and state. The movement has already begun. US Edition U. Coronavirus News U. HuffPost Personal Video Horoscopes. Terms Privacy Policy. Part of HuffPost Environment. All rights reserved. Tap here to turn on desktop notifications to get the news sent straight to you. It is wrong when it tends otherwise. Riki Ott is the right person--at the right place--at the right time. Her expertise as an author and as a marine toxicologist alerts us to the true cost of our addiction to oil--not just monetary cost, but ecological cost. Democracy and the planet are at stake. -
Automated PDF File
® ... PROTECTING THE COOK INLET WATERSHED & THE LIFE IT SUSTAINS Homer — P.O.nletKEEPE Box 3269, Homer, AK 99603 — (907) 235-4068 Anchorage — 308 G St., Ste. 219, Anch. AK 99501 — (907) 929-9371 [email protected] www.inletkeeper.org Summer 2007 Massive Coal Mine Lands Chuitna River on “Most Endangered Rivers” List I Salmon, Mercury & Climate Change …and BIG COAL! R n April 17, local groups, Native Alaskans and fishermen joined Cook Inletkeeper and otherO groups at a press conference in Anchorage to announce the Chuitna River’s selection as one CONTENTS Massive Coal Coal Mine Lands Chuitna of the nation’s top ten “Most Endangered Rivers” River on “Most Endangered Rivers” List 1 for 2007. The national river protection organiza- Inletkeeper Leads Efforts to Protect Salmon in Changing Climate 1 tion, American Rivers, annually produces the list of ANote From Your Cook Inletkeeper 2 most threatened waterbodies, and it selected the Inletkeeper to Challenge Weak Chuitna based on the imminent threats posed to it Oil & Gas Dumping Permit 3 by the proposed Chuitna coal strip mine. The Oil Tankers Finally Get Needed Tug Support in Cook Inlet 4 Chuitna coal strip mine would, if fully developed, Lower Cook Inlet Oil & Gas Project destroy over 30 square miles of prime moose and Inletkeeper Bob Shavelson addresses Anchorage Press Heeds Local Concerns 4 Conference on Chuitna Coal Mine bear habitat from a pristine watershed 45 miles A l Alaska Coal Group Takes Shape to a s Press for Sensible Energy Options 5 west of Anchorage, near the communities of k a Inletkeeper Report Helps Prompt Tyonek and Beluga on the west side of Cook Inlet.