The Space Congress® Proceedings 1978 (15th) Space - The Best Is Yet To Come

Apr 1st, 8:00 AM

Problems Faced by Early Space Transportation Planners

John L. Sloop Bethesda, Maryland

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Scholarly Commons Citation Sloop, John L., "Problems Faced by Early Space Transportation Planners" (1978). The Space Congress® Proceedings. 1. https://commons.erau.edu/space-congress-proceedings/proceedings-1978-15th/session-1/1

This Event is brought to you for free and open access by the Conferences at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Space Congress® Proceedings by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Problems Faced by Early Space Transportation Planners

John L. Sloop Bethesda, Maryland

ABSTRACT

The problems faced by early planners of U.S. little attention given to the return trip space boosters up to Saturn are described until the papers of Sanger and Bredt who beginning with early space flight proposals, discussed hypervelocity winged vehicles extending through the golden age of rocket that returned to earth by skip-glide paths. technology during the 1950s, and following (2) the reactions to Soviet space accomplish­ ments. The problems a mixture of sorting out futuristic conceptions, settling differ­ SPACE ACTIVITIES AND ATTITUDES, 1945-49 ences over what was technically feasible, and gaining political and public acceptance- Although Goddard flew the first liquid could have their counterparts today. propellant rocket in 1926, the practical­ ity and potential of liquid rockets was not convincingly demonstrated until the mass INTRODUCTION produced German war weapon, the A-4. The "A 11 series plan extended to A-9, a winged The solutions to problems of space trans­ vehicle for increasing range by a skip- portation depend now, as in the past, on a glide path. In 1945, the A-4's chief engi­ melding of what is desired with what is neer, Wernher von Braun, excited the imag­ technically feasible and what is econom­ ination of many with his views on future ically and politically acceptable. In this space possibilities including multi-stage paper, past problems and some solutions in piloted vehicles orbiting the earth. 'He space transportation will be discussed by was the first to speak of practical space recounting some selected activities up flight from a position of recognized and through the 1950s.(1^ impressive rocket accomplishments but even so, acceptance was limited. The future of That space transportation is desirable and rockets beyond A-4 capability received a feasible has been proclaimed for a long mixed reception among U.S. Government offi­ time. Indeed, it is inseparable from any cials in 1945-46. At one extreme was the manned space flight proposal, of which there optimism of forward-looking Gen. H 0 H.Arnold, were many prior to World War II ranging from chief of the Army Air Forces who, with the the frivolous to scientific analyses. The advice of a group of aeronautical experts first of the scientific was a paper by headed by TTieodore von Karman, forecast that Tsiolkovskiy who in 1903 developed the strategic bombers would eventually be re­ theory of rocket flight and described a placed by long-range ballistic missiles; at manned rocket using liquid hydrogen-oxygen. the other extreme was the pessimism of con­ He was followed by Goddard, who combined servative, highly respected Dr. Vannevar theory with experiment; by Oberth, who ex­ Bush, head of the Office of Scientific panded rocket theory and suggested inno­ Research and Development, and Dr. Jerome vations used today; and by Valier, who was Hunsaker, chairman of the National Advisory prolific in ideas for peaceful space explo­ Committee for Aeronautics (NACA)., both of ration. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, whom saw long-range rocket missiles as Valier and Tsiolkovskiy ,^ independently began impossible for many years to come, at best." developing the thesis that the way to the One of 'the chief reasons for such pessimism, stars was the gradual increase in the capa­ was the values of the exhaust velocity and bility of the airplane from atmospheric to the ratio of full to empty mass of interplanetary the A-4. flight. There was, however, Anyone familiar with the Tsiolkovskiy

V14 equation which relates these to vehicle lubrication. This technology was shelved as velocity could see that appreciable improve­ attention turned to more conventional pro- ments in both would be necessary to increase pellants for missiles. its range, and these improvements appeared hard to achieve. Space enthusiasts might The third activity was vehicle tests by brush such problems aside but the key people Convair to obtain better rocket structural controlling government purse strings re­ data. Convair engineers, like others, were mained unconvinced. In this kind of envi­ greatly hampered by the lack of structural ronment, rocket research and development data beyond the A-4. To fill this need, proceeded at a relatively slow pace. The Karl Bossart proposed to build and fly ten Army showed the most initiative in ballistic test vehicles incorporating some ideas for missiles and organized a strong team headed reducing, structural or empty mass. The by von Braun. Mid-level Navy men started a program began in 1947 but funding was soon project for a satellite to be boosted into cut and the number of vehicles reduced to orbit by a single stage using hycjrogen- three. These were flown at White Sands oxygen but it never received strong support during the latter part of 1948. The ve­ at top Navy levels and faded by 1948. '^' hicles contained three features: very light­ Despite the optimism of Arnold, the Air weight tanks which were thin-walled and Force blew hot and cold on rocket missiles pressure stabilized, a concept proposed, by and satellites. Analyses of satellites and Oberth in the 1920s but independently con­ boosters were conducted by Douglas-Rand in ceived by Bossart; elimination of the insu­ 1945-46 for the Air Force and contracts (the lation jacket for liquid oxygen to save MX series) were started for missiles in weight; and use of swiveling nozzles* first three ranges up to 8000 kilometers. By the used by Goddard, to control the pitch and. end of 1946,however, international and yaw of the vehicle. The flight tests were national events resulted in the Air Force not an outstanding success but. none of the switching emphasis from rocket to air- problems were caused by the three features, breathing propulsion, and this was not re­ all of which were incorporated into the versed until the early 1950s. Atlas, the first U.S.ICBM.(6) To sum up to 1950, there were a number of SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES proposals for space flight but little acceptance. Rocket engine performance was Among the R&D activities during the second relatively low with durability and reli­ half of the 1940s were three that were sig­ ability uncertain. Vehicle empty mass was nificant for their later impact on space still relatively high and many improvements transportation. One was the continued were needed to increase range. More flight interest in rockets by Rand analysts after data were needed. In short, there was too completing initial studies for the Air Force little experience and confidence in rockets and during the period of emphasis on air- to create much serious interest in space breathing propulsion. By 1949, when the Air flight. A stronger motivation was needed Force again asked Rand to examine satellites, and it did not come until the first part of they had prepared an extensive report on the the 1950s. potentialities of rockets including long- range ballistic missiles, an important plan­ ning step towards the intercontinental bal­ MISSILE DEVELOPMENT .AND SPACE PROPOSALS listic missiles (ICBM) of the 1950s. Samuel Hoffman, president of North American The second activity was experiments sponsor­ Aviation's Rocketdyne division that first ed by both the Air Force and Navy on liquid developed, large U.S. rocket engin.es., saw the hydrogen-oxygen, conducted at Ohio State first half of the 195 Os as preparation for University, Aerojet Corporation, and the Jet ballistic missiles and space travel., and the Propulsion Laboratory of the California second half as development of ICBMs and the Institute ' ' of Technology. Although the start of the space age* Gen. Bernard work was done with small rockets and not Schriever, who managed the Air Force's carried very far, the results indicated that missile developments during the 1950s* saw high exhaust velocities could be attained, 'the decade as the golden age of advancing regenerative cooling with liquid hydrogen rocket techno logy **? * was possible, liquid hydrogen could be pump­ ed, and the pump's ball bearings could run The decade began with space enthusiasts directly immersed in liquid hydrogen without apparently no closer to their goal than

1-18 before and with air-breathing propulsion flight by pointing out its many problems favored over rockets for long-range mis­ in an article in Life magazine:"Space, Its siles. Weapons development and scientif­ Enough to Make the Blood Boil."(Life, Aug. ic interests, however, brought rapid 31. 1953). Among engineers who urged changes by mid-decade. The military caution in making overly optimistic space swung back to rocket missiles in 1953-54 proposals, was Milton Rosen, director of when a breakthrough in thermonuclear the Viking sounding rocket program, who weapon development indicated that a much knew the practical problems from first­ smaller payload than heretofore thought hand experience. In several meetings, he necessary about 700 kilograms would be spoke on the "margin of error," where he effective for strategic use. In 1954 the pointed out that small decreases in rocket Atlas ICBM was selected for intensive propellant flow or thrust could make big development and within a year there were differences between predicted and actual two ICBMs and two intermediate range bal­ performance. In 1955, he and von Braun listic missiles (IRBM) under development clashed puBlicly. The event was the second by the Air Force and Army. Funding jump­ symposium on space flight at the Hayden ed from $3 million in 1952-53 to $161 Planetarium of the American Museum of million in 1954-55 and continued to rise. Natural History where von Braun was sched­ uled to present a step-by-step development The stepped-up military missile develop­ approach and Rosen was to follow with a ment spurred space enthusiasts also. A "down-to-earth" view. The coordinator, number of proposals and fascinating des­ Willey Ley, wanted to drop Rosen's paper criptions of things to come appeared in for fear that it would turn people away technical meetings and the media. One of from space flight, but von Braun took the the most noteworthy was the series of opposite view: a good argument would create articles in Colliers by von Braun and interest. He was right, for the session front pages of New York news- J others in 1952-54 which was later publish­ made the (10) ed as a book*' 8 ' On the technical side papers and the cover of Time magazine. were papers dealing with all aspects of space transportation including not only the vehicle with its propulsion, structure, HELP FROM SCIENTISTS and guidance systems but also the hazards man might experience in space such as In 1953, space advocates got a big break high accelerations at take-off, weight­ when the use of satellites to study space lessness, hard vacuum, meteorites, and phenomena was recommended by a group of radiation. Attention to the return phase scientists planning the International Geo­ of flight also increased; winged, rocket- physical Year (IGY) activities to start in powered vehicles were discussed indepen­ mid-1957. The idea of a satellite for dently by Nonweiler (1951), von Braun scientific research gained government ac­ (1952-54), Ehricke (1952-54). Romick ceptance and by mid-1955 both the Soviet (1954), and Crocco (1954),^' Crocco en­ Union and the United States announced plans titled his paper "The Crucial Problem in for IGY satellites. Astronautics:Recovery of Multistage Ve­ hicles." He argued that economics dictat­ ed that each stage be a complete flying SPACE BECOMES AN ACCEPTABLE WORI) machine capable of ascending into space and returning safely to earth. His pro­ The U.S. plans for a scientific satellite posal of a step-by-step increase in were limited to a very modest effort and flight capability was reminiscent of included the development of a special Valier and Tsiolkovskiy. The problem in launch vehicle the Vanguard. The vehicle the mid-1950s, however, was that all the development, managed by the Navy, was not big money and priority and hence tech­ to interfere in any way with the high nology were focused on expendable mil­ priority military missile developments. In itary missiles. fact, during the following years, emphasis on missile development was so great that a In the midst of all the mounting optimism general anti-space attitude developed among and effort to gain political and public U.S. Government officials. Anyone pro­ support for space flight, there were some posing a government program that mentioned with a different view. One was Jonathan space was inviting a budget cut. A typical Leonard, science editor of Time magazine, example of this attitude was Schriever's who ridiculed the prospects of space experience after a talk he gave at a rocket

1-16 meeting in San Diego in February 1957 in including Saturn, reflected their belief which he mentioned that the missile pro­ in relatively heavy, massive structures. gram was creating a foundation for space. The light Bossart tanks, however, were a The following day he received a telegram breakthrough in the problem of building from Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson light vehicle structures and played an ordering him never to use the word"space" important role later in gaining accept­ again in any of his speeches. '^' This ance for the use of low-density liquid attitude changed overnight, of course, hydrogen in upper stages. when Sputnik flew in October. By the time of Sputnik there were six U.S. missiles under development Jupiter, by the Army; LARGE ENGINES AND RELIABILITY Polaris, by the Navy; and Thor, Atlas, Titan, and Minuteman by the Air Force Although missiles received top priority, and all were larger and had greater pay- the Air Force far-sightedly supported load capability than the U.S. satellite R&D on larger engines, obviously with booster, Vanguard. Funding for the mis­ manned space flight in mind. In 1955, siles was $1.3 billion in 1954-57 and was Rocketdyne received an Air Force contract still climbing. President Eisenhower and on the feasibility of an engine of 1.3 the Department of Defense kept these mis­ meganewtons (300,000 Ib thrust), the E-l, sile programs strictly on surface-to- but it was never built. The same year, surface military requirements, much to the Rocketdyne announced that a single engine disappointment of space enthusiasts. developing 4.5 meganewtons (1 million Ib thrust) was feasible. In 1956, a panel of the Air Force's Scientific Advisory FEASIBILITY OF THIN-WALL TANKS Board recommended a study of engines of 22 meganewtons, far larger than any The first Atlas flew in 1957 and the currently planned. In 1958, the Air flight, generally regarded as a failure, Force awarded Rocketdyne a contract for was really a great success for demonstrat­ the preliminary design of a 4.5 mega- ing the feasibility of Bossart 's thin-wall, newton engine, designated the F-l. Later pressure-stabilized tanks incorporated in in the year, NASA took over the project, the missile. During the first flight, the increased the desired thrust to 6.7 mega­ exhaust flames severed a control cable in newtons, and held another competition the engine compartment causing the missile which Rocketdyne won. A development to tumble violently while still in the contract for the engine began in January atmosphere. In spite of the very heavy 1959. aerodynamic loads imposed on the tanks and structure, they held a convincing During the development of the ICBM and sight to many. Some engineers, however, other rocket engines during the 1950s, remained unconvinced and prominent among a recurring problem was a phenomenon them were members of von Braun's team at called combustion instability or com­ the Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA) , bustion pressure oscillations. These who were as conservative in their designs oscillations greatly increased heat as bold in space proposals. Later, when transfer and quickly burned out normally- Atlas was selected for Mercury flights, cooled engines. A great amount of the ABMA engineers kidded Bossart: "My research was done on combustion oscil­ God, John Glenn is going to ride in that lations but general understanding re­ contraption? He should be getting a medal mained limited. The ICBM, engines over­ just to sit on top of it before he takes came this problem and became reliable, off.* Once, during a visit of ABMA but during F-l engine development in the engineers to San Diego, Bossart and his early 1960s the problem rose again. It associates decided to show them just how was eventually solved but combustion tough the Atlas skin was. They pressurized instability was generally regarded, as one a rejected Atlas tank and invited their of the biggest threats to reliability visitors to knock a hole in it with a during engine development, and testing. sledge-hammer. One tried and the instant rebound of the hammer from the undamaged surface narrowly missed taking an ear HIGH ENERGY PROPELIAMTg off. * ' The ABMA engineers remained un­ convinced about thin-wall, pressure- The first and, major liquid prope 11 ant stabilized tanks and all of their designs, combination used in the IRBMs and ICBMs 1-1? was jet fuel (kerosene)-liquid oxygen, tanks sharing a common bulkhead and it and performance was reasonably high. has been one of the most successful During the 1950s, however, there was con­ stages in the space program. siderable interest in liquid propellants capable of producing higher performance, During development of the hydrogen-oxygen but none appeared suitable for military RL-10, combustion instability problems missiles where readiness and logistics were not encountered. The principal were major factors. In 1950, researchers engineer, Richard Mulready, independently at the NACA Lewis laboratory chose liquid conceived the idea of operating the hydrogen as a promising high-energy fuel hydrogen pump's ball bearings immersed in and planned to extend the technology of liquid hydrogen. This was the same the 1940s, but research was hampered by concept shown to be feasible at Ohio State the lack of an adequate liquid hydrogen University a decade earlier, indicating supply. This problem was overcome by the once again that similar innovations spring mid-1950s and experiments were conducted from more than one source. on the regeneratively cooled engines of a practical size. The laboratory's asso­ ciate director, Abe Silverstein, became TURMOIL AND ORDER. 1958-59 enthusiastic about the potentiality of using liquid hydrogen for high-altitude The 1958-59 period was one of great space aircraft as well as rockets. His famil­ planning activity, competition among iarity with hydrogen from Lewis experi­ government groups for a role in space, ments with both rockets and aircraft was and the emergence of the basic space to play an important role in a key decision transportation "stable" of boosters that in late 1959, to be discussed later. has served the space program well. The Russian space accomplishments in 1957-58 In a separate activity, Clarence Johnson, made it amply clear that their boosters famed aircraft designer, completed his had greater space payload capability development of the U-2 and became inter­ than U.S. vehicles. There was a popular ested in the possibility of using liquid outcry in the United States, aided and hydrogen in an advanced aircraft to sur­ abetted by space enthusiasts, to catch up pass the U-2's altitude performance. He and surpass the Russians. Thus, foreign proposed this to the Air Force in early competition, with attendant fears of 1956 and the Air Force became very inter­ losing technological and defense advan­ ested. A special project was established tages, did what years of previous space . and over a hundred million dollars was proposals had failed to do: gain political spent over the next two years on various and public support for more than a aspects of hydrogen fueled engines and minimal space program. aircraft, including financing the con­ struction of three sizeable hydrogen The low-budget, low-priority Vanguard liquefiers. Although liquid hydrogen program was plagued with development proved to be reasonably easy to handle, problems at the time of Sputnik, and in Johnson became disillusioned over the air­ November the Army was given permission to craft 1 s range and logistic problems. The prepare a back-up vehicle. The following project faded in 1958 but its Air Force month turned out to be a low point for managers proposed to use the technology U.S. space plans. After Sputnik, Vanguard and facilities to develop a hydrogen- received the full glare of U.S. public fueled rocket. This became the RL-10 attention and the launch of its third engine developed by Pratt & Whitney and was test vehicle in December was a disaster. initiated in August 1958. Independent of The von Braun team, who had been studying the Air Force's hydrogen aircraft project, large launch vehicles since 1956, chose Krafft Ehricke proposed a hydrogen-oxygen that month to submit an ambitious proposal upper stage for Atlas for space applica­ to the Department of Defense entitled tions. The proposal, made in late 1957, "A National Integrated Missile and Space was not selected for development until Development Program" but it received August 1958. Powered by two RL-10 engines, little attention. Also in the same the Centaur became the first upper stage month, the Air Force made a move towards to use liquid hydrogen-oxygen, the same a space role by establishing a directorate combination advocated by Oberth in the of astronautics headed by Brig. Gen. 1920so Like the Atlas, Centaur used Homer Boushey, but it was abolished three Bossart's thin-wall, pressure-stabilized days later on curt orders from President

. 1-18 Elsenhower, then in Paris. Boushey had of nine ICBM engines for the same total the dubious honor of heading the shortest- thrust. The fifth generation included lived office in the Air Force. ( l - larger vehicles 13 to 26 meganewtons, with high-energy chemical and nuclear The U.S space picture brightened in early upper stages. The same month, Silverstein, 1958 with the successful launching of a member of the Stever committee and von Explorer I and Vanguard I. In this atmos­ Braun's working group, and head of NACA phere of success, ABMA revised and re- space activities, submitted a rather submitted its proposal in March. It modest budget request for a start on the listed eleven space boosters ranging from booster program. Included were funds for the Vanguard and ABMA's Juno I to a a large engine development, a cluster of second generation orbital carrier of two existing engines, and work on high-energy stages, both recoverable, with a payload chemical upper stages the latter for of 23,000 kilograms. The report became unmanned flight. enmeshed in a web of other space planning activities. In February, the Department While NACA was planning a space program, of Defense established the Advanced ARPA had acquired an aggressive group of Research Projects Agency (ARPA) as the experts who moved quickly towards large focal point for all military space and boosters. One, Richard Canright, believed other advanced projects. In its initial that a cluster of existing ICBM engines planning, ARPA included scientific satel­ was the fastest way to build a large lites but in early April, this was changed booster and further, that multiple engines by Presidental directive; the NACA was to would enhance reliability. Canright con­ become the nucleus of a new civilian space vinced the von Braun team of the value of agency proposed to Congress the same month. this approach rather than their favorite design using four proposed E-l engines. In an earlier bid for a space role, NACA In August 1958, ARPA directed the Army and organized a space technology planning ABMA to develop the first stage of a large committee headed by Dr. T. Guyford Stever. booster using the multiple engines, first The committee organized seven working called Juno V and later Saturn I. Also in groups, on of which was on vehicles August, as previously mentioned, ARPA headed by von Braun. In April, von Braun's directed the Air Force to start development eager staff jumped the gun on the working of a hydrogen-oxygen engine and the group by submitting an "interim" report Centaur upper stage for Atlas. to the Stever committee that was essen­ tially the same report, even to the title, In January 1959, NASA and the Department as submitted earlier to the Department of of Defense presented a joint report on a Defense. In addition to the space vehicles, national space vehicle program to the the report proposed an ambitious space National Aeronautice and Space Council and program including a 50-man, permanent the President. In the report, the current space station; flights to the moon; and vehicles Vanguard, Jupiter C, Juno II and interplanetary expeditions to Mars and Thor-Able were criticized as being Venus. When the report reached quiet, hurriedly assembled under pressure, not conservative NACA headquarters all hell very reliable, and not suitable for future broke loose and the report quickly acquir­ space needs. A series of general purpose ed a tag forbidding it to leave the vehicles, with an estimated useful life of premises. ABMA asked permission to dis­ 5 years, were described: Atlas-Vega, Atlas- tribute the report but NACA gave permission Centaur, Juno V (Saturn I), and Nova. Two only if each copy bore a disclaimer that other vehicles were mentioned, the all- it was not an official NACA document. Von solid propellant Scout for small payloads Braun soon got his working group together, and Atlas-Hustler fox military missions, however, and it included members from NACA In the months to come, NASA dropped Atlas- the military, and industry. Their final Vega in favor of Atlas-Centaur and the report, in July, contained a vehicle military replaced Atlas-Hustler with Atlas- program of 15 boosters in 5 generations Agena. of development. The first three gener­ ations were based on on-going missile Juno V, DoD's large vehicle, was shown developments. The fourth generation was with two configurations in the report, ABMA's Juno V with four Rocketdyne E-l differing only in the third stage. The engines developing 6.8 meganewtons, with initial third stage was to use kerosene- an alternate configuration of a cluster oxygen like the two lower stages but

1-19 would be later replaced by a hydrogen- He also questioned the need for Saturn in oxygen stage using' the Pratt & Whitney view of the Air Force's plans for Titan C. engines under development. York was able to win Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy to his view and he sent ARPA a message that he was cancelling Nova was NASA's large vehicle concept Saturn.^ ' ARPA tried to save Saturn by which would use four F-l engines in its offering it to the Air Force but this did first stage and one in the second stage. not succeed. The remaining alternative The third and fourth stages would use was to transfer Saturn to NASA which ABMA hydrogen-oxygen engines. NASA saw Nova had successfully resisted for some time as a means for transporting man to the even though the transfer was favored by surface of the moon and returning him both the Secretary of Defense and the " safely to earth. President.

One of the problems facing government York's critical assessment of the military planners was not so much a lack of ideas role in space forced an issue that had for space transportation but how to select been simmering for some time: how many the best, consistent with the overall objec­ large space boosters could the Nation tives of the national space effort. In afford to develop? York established a this respect, the rest of 1959 was a tur­ review committee with himself and NASA's bulent period for large booster proposals Hugh Dryden as co-chairmen to consider but the issues were resolved by the end the three large boosters: the Army's of the year. Saturn, the Air Force's Titan C, and NASA's Nova. Agreement was quickly Events during the spring and summer of reached that only one should be developed 1959 were frustrating for military plan­ and Saturn emerged as the winner. Titan ners of large space boosters. Work pro­ C was shelved and Nova was considered too ceeded at ABMA on the first stage of far in the future to be competitive with Saturn I, but a decision could not be Saturn. York agreed and began negotiat­ reached on Saturn's upper stages, partic­ ing for the transfer of ABMA to NASA: in ularly after the Army began to consider the October, President Eisenhower approved Air Force's Titan as a second stage. The the transfer by executive order. Air Force wanted no part of this, for not only would it divert some Martin effort Remaining unsettled after the selection away from the Titan missile, it would also of Saturn was its upper stage config­ bring the Army into its contractor territory. urations. ABMA abandoned its initial The Air Force offered to manage the develop­ proposal to use Titan as the second stage ment of a Titan as a second stage for when further study of the long, slender Saturn but the Army wanted no part of that configuration indicated severe struc­ arrangement. Another pertubation was Air tural bending load problems. A second Force plans for a larger version of a stage with a larger tank diameter than Titan, called Titan C, which would boost a Titan I but using Titan's engines was winged vehicle into a skip-glide path. This proposed. NASA favored using hydrogen- was Dynasoar, the first U.S. project initi­ oxygen and pushed for the development of ated for a manned winged vehicle for even­ a 668 kilonewton hydrogen-oxygen engine tual flight into orbit and return. that had been under study for some time. This engine, with a higher thrust spec­ While the intramural wrangling over Titan ified, was the J-2 and its development as a second stage for Saturn was going on, started in early 1960. a much worse problem for Saturn arose. Dr. Herbert York, newly appointed to the Depart­ In December 1959, with the issue of ment of Defense's highest position in re­ Saturn's upper stages still unresolved, search and development, began taking a NASA's Richard Horner appointed a NASA- hard look at large boosters and military DoD "team" headed by Silverstein to make space plans. He believed that even after recommendations on Saturn upper stages several years of effort the military had and a Saturn development plan. Von Braun, not made a case for manned space flight. a member of the team, initially argued He saw such flights as NASA's mission and strongly for using tried and proven ABMA's emphasis on large booster develop­ kerosene-oxygen engines in the second ment as seriously interfering with the stage. Silverstein, however, was con­ Army's primary mission of ground warfare. vinced not only from his own experience

1-20 and judgment but also by Saturn analyses innovations and bold, sound decisions if by Eldon Hall that all upper stages needed to overcome major obstacles; sound should use liquid hydrogen-oxygen. This engineering and management, to develop was a very bold view at the time, for the and fly reliable space vehicles; and life only project underway using hydrogen- support and protection systems to ensure oxygen was Centaur and it was in the early that astronauts can fulfill their role stages of development. Silverstein won during the mission. von Braun and others on the team to his view and in mid-December the team recom­ mended that the first and follow-on REFERENCES Saturns use liquid hydrogen-oxygen in all paper are based on re­ the upper stages.' ^' Also recommended was (1} Parts of this by the author for a a "building block" approach for upper search conducted Hydrogen as a Pro- in which, for example, the second larger study:Liquid stages to be published stage of the first Saturn could be used ulsion Fuel, 1945-195.?* without modification as the third stage of by NASA. a larger, follow-on Saturn. The follow-on Silver Bird Saturn turned out, after a number of con­ (2) Sanger-Bredt, Irene,"The May 1973,p!66. figuration studies, to be Saturn V. Thus Storv,"Spaceflight,v!5,n5, decision of the Silverstein the basic Phases of to use hydrogen-oxygen and the (3) F. Zwicky,"Report on Certain committee F-U-3RE, development approach of multiple use of War Research in Germany,"Report (NASA stages were key factors in the timely Hq.AMC, Wright Field, Jan.1947 development, performance, and reliability History Office). of Saturns I and V. (4) R. Cargill Hall, "Early U.S. Satellite & Culture 4(Fall To sum up the 1950s, there were many Proposals," Technology Propulsion,"an imaginative descriptions of space missions 1963); J.C. Hunsaker,"Jet Academy of Sci., and some realistic proposals. These address before the Nat. raised sparks of interest but not suffi­ 23 Apr. 1946 (NASA History Office). cient flame to support a project until Proposals; scientists provided the reason and moti­ (5) Hall, "Early U.S. Satellite vation. The use of space for science La Jolla, brought political and public acceptance (6) Interview with K.J. Bossart, of a very modest space effort until Calif., 27 Apr. 1974. foreign competition stimulated a large Engines of the space program. Space transportation was (7)Samuel K. Hoffman,"Rocket Bernard Schriever,"Thor, able to get a rapid start by using 1950*s," and Gen. AIAA Panel"Rocketry in missiles and technologies developed during Atlas, and Titan," 28 Oct. 1971, the decade. Competition between government the 1950's,"Washington, Report 36; portions in groups, coupled with political and public NASA Historical Aeronautics, vlO/nlO, will, became the crucible for ensuring the Astronautics and emergence of a strong and sound program. Oct. 1972. Innovations, such as those by Bossart, and Oct.25,1952,Feb.28,1953, Mar. bold decisions, such as the one by ( Q ) Colliers, 1953, Jun.27,1953; Apr. Silverstein to use hydrogen-oxygen in all 7, 1953;Mar. 14, the Space Frontier Saturn upper stages, allowed quantum jumps 30,1954? see also: Across York: Viking,1953. in technology and the development of suc­ ed. Cornelius Ryan, New cessful vehicles. (9) R.F. Nonweiler,"Descent from Satellite Orbits Using Aerodynamic Braking" Jour. ;T Nov. In conclusion, the lessons of the 1950s British Interplanetary Soc.,v10,n6, and those by can apply to future successful space 1951,p.258. Nonweiler's paper Romick, and Crocco are projects. They need the right mix of: von Braun, Ehricke, R.,"A History of realistic proposals of what can be done abstracted by Krull, Alan 1 Jet Propu1sion, and the benefits to be derived, in order the Artificial Satellite/ to create enthusiasm and desire; timely v26,n5 Part 1, May 1956. and realistic plans in tune with political, Travel," economic, and social interests, to gain (10) "Second Symposium on Space of Nat. acceptance; research and technology, to Hayden Planetarium, Amer. Museum make developments feasible, augmented by History, N.Y., Oct. 1953 ed. L.J.Carter,

1-21 Jour, Brit. Interplanetary Soc.,vl2,1953; also remarks by von Braun and Rosen at AIAA panel on "Rocketry in the 1950's," Washington, Oct. 28,1972, NASA Hist. Rep. 36.

(11) Remarks by Gen. Schriever at AIAA panel on "Rocketry in the 1950*3."

(12) Interview with K.J. Bossart, La Jolla, Calif.,27 Apr. 1974; group interview with Grant Hansen, K.E. Newton, Deane Davis, Donald Heald, and K.J. Bossart, Convair Aerospace Div., General Dynamics, San Diego, Calif., 29 Apr. 1974.

(13) Interview with Maj.Gen. Donald L. Putt, USAF(ret),Atherton, Calif.,30 Apr.1974.

(14)Dr. Herbert F. York, UCLA, San Diego to Dr. Eugene M. Emme, NASA, Washington, 10 June 1974; ARPA "Saturn Chronology," ARPA Files, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Md.(NASA History Office).

(15) "Report to the Administrator, NASA,on Saturn Development Plan by Saturn Vehicle Team,"15 Dec.1959 (NASA History Office).

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