071940601 [2008] RRTA 145 (2 April 2008)
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071940601 [2008] RRTA 145 (2 April 2008) DECISION RECORD RRT CASE NUMBER: 071940601 COUNTRY OF REFERENCE: Sudan TRIBUNAL MEMBER: Paul Fisher DATE DECISION SIGNED: 2 April 2008 PLACE OF DECISION: Melbourne DECISION: The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the applicant a Protection (Class XA) visa. STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS APPLICATION FOR REVIEW This is an application for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship to refuse to grant the applicant a Protection (Class XA) visa under s.65 of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act). The applicant, who claims to be a citizen of Sudan, arrived in Australia and applied to the Department of Immigration and Citizenship for a Protection (Class XA) visa. The delegate decided to refuse to grant the visa and notified the applicant of the decision and his review rights by letter. The delegate refused the visa application on the basis that the applicant is not a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention. The applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision. The Tribunal finds that the delegate’s decision is an RRT-reviewable decision under s.411(1)(c) of the Act. The Tribunal finds that the applicant has made a valid application for review under s.412 of the Act. RELEVANT LAW Under s.65(1) a visa may be granted only if the decision maker is satisfied that the prescribed criteria for the visa have been satisfied. In general, the relevant criteria for the grant of a protection visa are those in force when the visa application was lodged although some statutory qualifications enacted since then may also be relevant. Section 36(2)(a) of the Act provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia to whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (together, the Refugees Convention, or the Convention). Further criteria for the grant of a Protection (Class XA) visa are set out in Parts 785 and 866 of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994. Definition of ‘refugee’ Australia is a party to the Refugees Convention and generally speaking, has protection obligations to people who are refugees as defined in Article 1 of the Convention. Article 1A(2) relevantly defines a refugee as any person who: owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. The High Court has considered this definition in a number of cases, notably Chan Yee Kin v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379, Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225, Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559, Chen Shi Hai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 201 CLR 293, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Haji Ibrahim (2000) 204 CLR 1, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Khawar (2002) 210 CLR 1, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Respondents S152/2003 (2004) 222 CLR 1 and Applicant S v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2004) 217 CLR 387. Sections 91R and 91S of the Act qualify some aspects of Article 1A(2) for the purposes of the application of the Act and the regulations to a particular person. There are four key elements to the Convention definition. First, an applicant must be outside his or her country. Second, an applicant must fear persecution. Under s.91R(1) of the Act persecution must involve “serious harm” to the applicant (s.91R(1)(b)), and systematic and discriminatory conduct (s.91R(1)(c)). The expression “serious harm” includes, for example, a threat to life or liberty, significant physical harassment or ill-treatment, or significant economic hardship or denial of access to basic services or denial of capacity to earn a livelihood, where such hardship or denial threatens the applicant’s capacity to subsist: s.91R(2) of the Act. The High Court has explained that persecution may be directed against a person as an individual or as a member of a group. The persecution must have an official quality, in the sense that it is official, or officially tolerated or uncontrollable by the authorities of the country of nationality. However, the threat of harm need not be the product of government policy; it may be enough that the government has failed or is unable to protect the applicant from persecution. Further, persecution implies an element of motivation on the part of those who persecute for the infliction of harm. People are persecuted for something perceived about them or attributed to them by their persecutors. However the motivation need not be one of enmity, malignity or other antipathy towards the victim on the part of the persecutor. Third, the persecution which the applicant fears must be for one or more of the reasons enumerated in the Convention definition - race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. The phrase “for reasons of” serves to identify the motivation for the infliction of the persecution. The persecution feared need not be solely attributable to a Convention reason. However, persecution for multiple motivations will not satisfy the relevant test unless a Convention reason or reasons constitute at least the essential and significant motivation for the persecution feared: s.91R(1)(a) of the Act. In Australian law, enforcement of laws providing for compulsory military service, and for punishment for desertion or avoidance of such service, will not ordinarily provide a basis for a claim of persecution within the meaning of the Refugees Convention: see eg Mijoljevic v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 834 (Branson J, 25 June 1999) at [23] This is primarily because without evidence of selectivity in its enforcement, conscription will generally amount to no more than a non-discriminatory law of general application: see, for example Mpelo v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 608 (Lindgren J, 8 May 2000) at [33]. Whether this is the proper conclusion, however, will depend on the evidence in the particular case. The UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, for example, provides some guidance on the issue: 170. There are, however, also cases where the necessity to perform military service may be the sole ground for a claim to refugee status, ie. when a person can show that the performance of military service would have required his participation in military action contrary to his genuine political, religious or moral convictions, or to valid reasons of conscience The Court in Mehenni v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 164 ALR 192 at [19] noted that the Handbook does not suggest that that the mere requirement that a person serve, in opposition to genuine religious convictions, in itself necessarily amounts to persecution for a Convention reason. What must be demonstrated is that the punishment feared be imposed discriminatorily for a Convention reason, such as religion or political opinion, or membership of a particular social group such as “conscientious objectors”. As was stated in Mohamed v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 83 FCR 234, at 247: Persecution for failure to be conscripted is not necessarily persecution for a Convention reason. ... Imprisonment for resistance may be motivated by punishment for failing to comply with a lawful obligation to join not for a political view or arising from membership of a group. But it does not follow from this ... that in all circumstances persecution for failure to accept conscription might not amount to persecution for a Convention reason. All the facts must be considered. Whether or not an applicant is a conscientious objector, the enquiry must be directed to whether the applicant’s refusal to serve will mean that there is a real chance of discriminatory treatment for a Convention reason. Circumstances may arise where this will be the case, for instance where those imposing the punishment do so on the basis that the individuals concerned were being punished as conscientious objectors to compulsory military service; that is, on the basis of their political or religious opinion, or their membership of a particular social group: see NAEU of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 259 (Madgwick, Merkel & Conti JJ, 24 October 2002) at [18]. Similarly, selection for recruitment may be discriminatory for a Convention reason. In Applicant S v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2004) 217 CLR 387, for example, the Tribunal had accepted that the Taliban had practised ad hoc , random, forcible recruitment of young men, the only apparent criterion for recruitment being that the young men be able bodied. The High Court held that the Tribunal had erred in failing to consider whether “able-bodied young men” comprised a particular social group. However, the mere holding of a political opinion or membership of a particular social group by an applicant facing the prospect of harm (including serious harm) is not sufficient to bring that person within the Convention definition.