The Interwar Years and World War II
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C HAPTE R S IXTEEN TheInterwarYears andWorldWarII TheVersailles dictates of theEntente Powers regardingthe new nation-states of “friends” and“enemies” camewith both strings attached andscantconsideration for thecollateral difficulties thatthey caused. Whether “winners” or “losers” at Versailles, the postwar Balkan states suffered almost equally in termsofnational, political, andeconomic problemsstemming from the settlements. Nationally,the problemsof the“losers” wereblatant, whilethe“winners” paid for their favored status with subsequent intense internal national problems. Politically, all reverted from outwardly Western-like liberal-democracy toward moreoverttraditional Eastern-like(Orthodoxand Islamic) authoritarian rule. Economically, all primarily remained agrarian andcommercially dependenton the West, leavingthemhighly vulnerable to Western market changes—especially theGreatDepression—and ultimately susceptibletoNazi Germany’s influence through economic assistance. Continuing National Problems: The“Winners” The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, andSlovenes wasthe most artificial European nation-state to emerge from Versailles. Contrary to the ideal ofnational self- determination,the kingdomrecognized by theEntente Powerswasconsidered somehow a single nation-state representativeofnumerous disparate groups— Albanians, Bosnian Muslims (“Bosniaks”), Croats, Hungarians, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Serbs, Slovenes, and a smatteringof others—not all of whom were South Slavsor willing participants. Recognition overtly wasbased on theCorfu D. P. Hupchick, The Balkans © Dennis P. Hupchick 2002 THE INTERWAR YEARS ANDWORLD WAR II 339 DeclarationandtheBelgrade Proclamation, but it actually was arewardtotheSerbs under theguise of Serbia’s wartimeespousal of “Yugoslavism.” Disparities in nationalist ideologyamongthethree “Yugoslav” movements duringthewar—the Pasid government, theLondon Committee, andthe“Yugoslav Group”—wereevident, but expedientcompromises in response to wartimesitua- tions led to both theCorfu andBelgrade pronouncements. Theemergence of the Slovene-led pro-Habsburg“Yugoslav Group”(1917) forced the Pasid government andtheLondon Committee to unite in defense ofanindependent postwar South Slav state. Thatunity,expressed in theJuly 1917Corfu Declaration outlining a future Yugoslav state, was noeasymatter. Neither theLondon Committee’s Ante Trumbid, a Dalmatian Croat, nor the few Slovenes in attendance werecertain thatthey spoke for the majority of their respectiveconationals—most Croats andSlovenes werewary of Serb intentions. In theStrossmayer tradition,they envisioned the future“Yugoslav”state as a decen- tralized confederation of separate nations andwere awarethat Pasid advocated “Greater Serbia” nationalism. Thespecter ofpossiblecontinued Habsburg rule, however, led them to thetablewith theSerbian government-in-exileon Corfu in hopes offinding a workablecompromise. Pasid accepted Trumbid’s demands foraconstitutional monarchy responsible to a democratically elected national assembly asthegoverning framework for the proposed postwar state, which wastoencompass all ofprewar Serbia (including Kosovo and Macedonia), Montenegro, Croatia (includingSlavonia andDalmatia), Slovenia,Bosnia-Hercegovina, andVojvodina. Hedid so, however,only because at thetimeof the meetingSerbia lacked Russian supportsince the MarchRevolution hadthrownit into internal turmoil,the Americans(crucial to Entente war efforts) favored theLondon Committee’s “Yugoslav” ideas, andcontinued Entente support was needed to regain occupied Serbia. Just astheLondon Committee wasconstrained to cut a deal with the Pasid government, so wasthe“Yugoslav Group”whenAustria-Hungary disintegrated. Without aHabsburg-led option,thegroup’s Slovene andCroat members first tried establishing a South Slav state on their own under theguise of theZagreb Yugoslav National Council.Lacking a military force, thecouncil becamedependenton the Serbs, who fielded theonly effectivetroops in the region, andultimately wasobliged to acknowledge Serbia’s righttopostwar South Slav leadership under theBelgrade Proclamation (December1918). Given thecircumstances leadingtotheBelgrade Proclamation,theSerbian government felt noobligation to honor theCorfuDeclaration’s termscalling fora confederationprovidingeachnational componentwithanauthentic voice in the state throughliberal-democraticconstitutional means. Its intentions first were displayed when,shortly after the proclamation, it declared Serbian Prince Aleksandr Karadjordjevid king-regent(1921-34). 340 THEBALKANS From thestart, Stjepan Radid’s Croatian Peasant party opposed AleksandrI’s acceptance until a liberal-democraticconstitution wascreated. Croat fearswere justified. Pasid andtheSerbian nationalists refused to relinquish their centralizing program anddelayed elections foraconstitutional assembly. TheSerb-dominated interim government passed aland reform program thatthey used to win support from Bosnian and Macedonian Muslim landownerscontrolling anumber of seats in the national assembly,who received overly generous compensationfor lands confiscated by the reforms. Even though elections for theconstitutional assembly (1921)demonstrated widespreadopposition to theSerbs’ centralism,theSerbian nationalists passed a strongly centralized state constitution that essentially copied Serbia’s prewar monarchical document. A solidified national breech between Serbs andCroats resulted. Serbian nationalists dominated thestate in every way,controllingthetop government ministries andoffices, the military’s officer corps, andthe police. King Aleksandr’s complete control over the army guaranteed thatsituation.Before WorldWar I ended, hecrushed theBlack Hand, which contested royal authority over the military,by trying andexecuting its leaderson trumped-up treason charges. Hetheninstalled a group of trusted, loyal officers(whomhecalled the “White Hand”) in its place, who placed the military unquestioningly behind Aleksandr during his subsequent reign. TheSerbs also counted on the many ethnonational differences fragmentingthe state’s non-Serb population to preclude effectiveunified majority opposition. Radid’s Croatian nationalists, theonly cohesiveopposition,committed numerous political mistakes (ill-timed boycotts of the national assembly,erratic“waffling” in political tactics) that hampered their effectiveness. TheSerbs boughtoff lesser national groupswith minorpolitical concessions and frequently resorted to traditional extralegal political tactics—bribery, police coercion,electionrigging, patronage, and legal manipulation—whennecessary.Such tactics commonly were used on the Macedonian Slavs, whom theSerbs refused to recognize asethnically different(officially callingthem “Southern [or ‘Vardar’] Serbs”). TheCroats responded with blatant andcontinuous opposition. AfterRadid was murdered in the national assembly byaradical Serb nationalist (1928), they declared all-out political war on theSerbs. A Croatian ultranationalist revolution- ary terrorist organization—the Ustase—was formed by theexpatriate Ante Pavelid. Basically an outgrowth of the Party ofPure Right, the Ustase established ties with thesimilarly terroristicBulgaro-Macedonian IMRO, withrevisionist Hungary, andwithfascist Italy. A separate Croatian “parliament” wassetupinZagreb, and King Aleksandr, raised in theOrthodoxauthoritarian cultureof the Russian tsarist court, declared aroyal dictatorship to staveoff the kingdom’s dissolution. To mollify theCroats andunite the various non-Serbs underhis rule, Aleksandr changed thestate’s nametoYugoslavia (1929), but theCroats (joined by the THE INTERWAR YEARS ANDWORLD WAR II 341 Bulgaro-Macedonians) remained adamantly opposed andthe royal dictatorship acquired noticeable anti-Croatovertones. Toweakenregional power bases, the kingdom was reorganized administratively,with ahistorical banovinas (adminis- trative regions) replacing historical provinces. Aleksandr’s heavy-handed methods eventually discredited hisdictatorship. Most non-Serbs considered theterm “Yugoslav”synonymous with “Serb.” By eliminating all partypolitics, Aleksandrlost even Serbian nationalist support. He issued anew constitution (1931)thatsuperficially lent political respectabilityand representativegovernmenttowhat remained a centralized, authoritarian, monar- chical state. By1934 the king realized that hisdictatorship had failed to solvethe national-political conflict, but before he couldend it hewas assassinated during a state visittoFrance byanUstase-connected Macedonian revolutionary in the pay ofItalian fascists. Fear ofItalian ambitions in Dalmatia briefly united some level-headed Croats andSerbs behindthe regency of Prince Pavel,who, in the nameofyoung King Petr II (1934-41), governed in continued dictatorial fashion. The honeymoon wasbrief, with theCroats again boycottingthe national assembly afterreceiving noconces- sions from theSerbs regardingtheir federalist demands (1935). TheSerb-dominated governmenttried cultural bribery to placate them—a concordatwith theVatican giving Roman Catholics wider privileges in Yugoslavia (theOrthodoxand Muslims already enjoyed legal official standing) wassigned (1937). Swift andwidespread Orthodox opposition, however, forced thegovernmenttotreatthedeal as a dead letter, reinforcingtheCroats’ displeasure. Another Balkan “winner”— Romania—emerged from Versailles asthe“Greater Romania”of the nationalists’ goals, having acquired coveted Transylvania,Banat, andBukovina frompostwar Hungary and Austria and Bessarabia from collapsed Russia. Romanian ethnic