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" 'hil il the time •hen 1/PjJp ,..., be done be/ore &heir &ime." R.olll!llT RDJ Bulletin of the THE RUSSIAN EXPLOSION Atomic Scientists MR. TRUMAN'S ANNOUNCEMENT BELIEVE the American people to the fullest extent consistent with the Vol. V Oetober, 1949 No. 10 national security are entitled to be informed of all developments in the I field of atomic energy. That is my reason for making public the following information. Editor We have evidence that within recent weeks an atomic explosion occurred Eugene Rabinowitch in the U.S.S.R. Ever since atomic energy was first released by man, the eventual devel Assistant Editor opment of this new force by other nations was to be expected. This prob account by us. Mrs. Alan Simpson ability has always been taken into Nearly four years ago I pointed out ·that "scientific opinion appears to theoretical knowledge upon which Art by Marty! be practically unanimous that the essential the discovery is based is already widely known. There is also substantial abreast of our present theoretical Board of Directors agreement that foreign research can come knowledge in time." And, in the three-nation declaration of the President of C. A. Hutchison Kenneth S. Cole the United States and the Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom and of T. H. Davies E. Rabinowitch dated Nov. 15, 1945, it was emphasized that no single nation could, A. Shils Canada, Samuel Goudsmit Edward in fact, have a monopoly of atomic weapons. John Simpson This recent development emphasizes once again, if indeed such emphasis the necessity for that truly effective and enforceable interna Director were needed, Publication tional control of atomic energy which this Government and the large majority M. Forker+ 0. of the members of the United Nations support. Board of Sponsors J. Robert Oppenheimer, Chairman THE SOVIET ANNOUNCEMENT Harold C. Urey, N SEPT. 23, Mr. Truman, President of the USA, announced that ac Vice-Chairman cording to data of the Government of the USA, during one of the recent weeks there had occurred in the USSR an atomic explosion. O Canadian H. A. Bethe Philip M. Morse Simultaneously, a similar statement was made by the British and P. W; Bridgman H.J. Muller governments. Detlev W. Bronk Linus Pauling Following the publication of these statements in the American, British press of other countries, there appeared A. H. Compton G. B. Pegram and Canadian press and also in the utterances which spread alarm among broad social circles. Rabi numerous E. U. Condon 1.1. In this connection, Tass is empowered to declare: In the Soviet Union, F. Daniels Julian Schwinger as is known, building work on a large scale is in progress; the building of L.A. DuBridge Cyril S. Smith hydro-electric stations, mines, canals, roads, which evoke the necessity of Albert Einstein Leo Szilard large-scale blasting work with the use of the latest technical means. is taking place pretty James Franck Edward Teller In so far as this blasting work has taken place and various parts of the country, it is possible this might draw atten S. A. Goudsmit V. F. Weisskopf frequently in tion beyond the confines of the Soviet Union. T. R. Hogness Sewall Wright As for the production of atomic energy, Tass considers it necessary to F. W. Loomis J. R. Zacharias recall that already on Nov. 6, 1947, Minister of Foreign Affairs of -the USSR, V. M. Molotov, made a statement concerning the secret of the atom bomb when he declared that this secret was already long ago nonexistent. This statement signified the Soviet Union already had discovered the Published monthly by the Educational Found· secret of the atomic weapon and that it had at its disposal this weapon. ation for Nuclear Science, Inc., 956 E. 58th Scientific circles of the United States of America took this statement by Midway 3-3056. Street, Chicago 37. Phone: for a bluff, considering that the Russians could not possess an Manuscripts should be sent in triplicate to V. M. Molotov Mrs. Alan Simpson at the above address. atomic weapon earlier than the year 1952. the secret Subscription and advertising servieo: All cor· They however were mistaken, since the Soviet Union possessed . respondence in regard to changes of address, of the atomic weapon already in 1947. new subscriptions, and advertising rates should As for the alarm that is being spread on this account by certain foreign be sent to 53 W. Jackson Blvd, Chicago 4, Ill. circles, there are not the slightest grounds for alarm. Subscription-$5.00 a year. Single copy-50 Soviet government, despite the existence is required for It should be pointed out that the cents. Four weeks notice future change of address: both old and new ad· in its country of an atomic weapon, adopts and intends adopting in the dresses must be given. its former position in favor of the absolute prohibition of the use of the Entry as second class matter applied for at atomic weapon. the Post Office at Chicago, Illinois, under Concerning control of the atomic weapon, it has to be said that control the act of March 3, 1879. will be essential in order to check up on fulfillment of a decision on the pro hibition of production of the atomic weapon. 261 later than the morning after our first demonstration of the existence of nu DID THE SOVIET BOMB COME SOONER clear weapons. After this, it might take other nations three or four years THAN EXPECTED? to overcome our present head start, and eight or ten years to draw even with us if we continue to do intensive How accurate were the scientists in estimating the length of work in this field. This might be all time needed by Russia to produce an atomic bomb? We here the time we would have to bring about present their predictions, following these with the forecasts of the relocation of our population and the wartime administrators of the atomic bomb project. industry. Obviously, no time should be lost in inaugurating a study of this problem by experts."2 The Atomic Scientists September, 1949 Professor Franck's comment on Pres ident Truman's announcement of the atomic explosion in the Soviet Union LEO SZILARD or about the construction of the bomb; was: but it was indicated here in earlier "There has probably been no other October, 1945 testimony that it was not the bomb occasion when we have been so unhappy The excerpt below is taken from the but the production of the fissionable ma that our prediction turned out to be Hearings before the House Committee terial which is difficult. I flatly con right." on Military Affairs, October 18, 1945. tradict that statement as far as plu MR. CLASON: "I gathered from your tonium is concerned. . . ." FREDERICK SEITZ AND statement that in a period of time, October, 1949 HANS BETHE from 21h years up, it may be possible Dr. Szilard's comments on the situa for another country, given capable sci tion today appear in his article "Shall 1946 entists and research people, plus the We Face the Facts" published in this In One World or None,3 Professors necessary elements, to develop the atom issue of the Bulletin and in the scien Frederick Seitz and Hans Bethe wrote bomb just as the United States did tists' protest against General Bedell an article entitled, "How Close Is the during that time? Smith's statement that it will take Danger?." We quote from it: DR. SziLARD: "I would say that it is Russia ten years to reach America's "How long would it take for for more likely than not that another coun level of bomb production. eign countries, other than those in try will have it in six years. In volved in the British Commonwealth, two-and-one-half it is possible; it might to go through each of the three stages not be probable." THE FRANCK COMMITIEE [of the development of the American December, 1945 June, 1945 Atomic Project] described above? The On December 10, 1945, testifying be On June 1, 1945, a committee of sci most important countries are undoubt fore the Senate Special Committee on entists! engaged in atomic bomb re edly Russia and France. . . . There is Atomic Energy, Dr. Szilard said: search at the Manhattan District lab no doubt that ... these countries have "As far as the production of pluto oratories at the University of Chicago, as much incentive to learn the facts nium is concerned, which is described wrote a memorandum directed to the about the atomic bomb as we ever in the Smyth report, any competent Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, in had.... There can be no doubt that mechanical or chemical engineer who which they warned against the first in the absence of international control use spends some time thinking about the of the atomic bomb against Japan. of the atomic bomb, the Russians will problem can see that no precision work In this memorandum, they said: try to develop the bomb in the shortest is involved · in the manufacture of "In Russia, too, the basic facts and possible time and will devote a large plutonium. implications of nuclear power were well share of their resources to this end. "The understood in 1940, and the experience design which we actually used "The United States and Great Brit did of Russian scientists in nuclear require rather narrow tolerances re ain undoubtedly contain a lion's share and high-class search is entirely sufficient to workmanship. This we enable of the outstanding scientific talent of could afford them to retrace our steps within because we have this kind a few the world at the present time. . . . of workmanship years, even if we should make every in abundance. It would be difficult to argue that any attempt to conceal them. Even if "Naturally a country like Russia we other nation or combination of nations can retain our leadership in basic need not choose just this kind of de oould have done the job faster if it had knowledge of nucleonics for a certain sign, but might prefer a design which started from the same point as we did time by maintaining secrecy as to all does not require high precision work. in 1949. On the other hand, it would the results achieved on this and asso The statement has been made before be equally difficult to argue that no ciated projects, it would be foolish to this committee by another witness that other country could have accomplished hope that this can protect us for it requires high precision workmanship, more what we have in any period than a few years. of time. such as can be provided only by a In the first place, Russia and France "If no efficient international agree few countries, such as Switzerland, to both have men of outstanding ability. ment is achieved, the race for nuclear make atomic bombs. As far as the In the second place, it should be recog armaments will be on in earnest not production of plutonium is concerned nized that during Periods 1 and 2, in such a statement 1 would have no basis This committee consisted of the following which the major portion of our advance in fact. members: James 0. Franck, Chairman, T. R. Hogness, Don Hughes, J. ]. Nixon, E. Rabino· was made, the principal work was in "I am not making any statement witch, Glenn Sea borg, J. C. Stearns, Leo Szilard. the hands of a small number of peo 2 Bulletin, I (May I, 1946), 2. about the separation of light uranium 8 New York: McGraw·Hill Book Co., 1946. ple; that is, a large number of good 262 men is not an essential factor. It is "Regarding the second phase of the suitable sources of uranium. almost certain that the reason f oreign work, we can say with safety that "Finally, we come to the design and nations did not proceed very far during there is now no risk in beginning the construction of the bomb. The design the period between 1939 and 1945 ... plans for pilot-plant operation at once. can start very early in the program, is because they could not or did not Detailed data for the production of probably relatively earlier than in our devote full attention to the matter. such units may not be available at the own development. Basic information "With respect to industrial capacity, moment. However-if, for instance, it obtained during the first two periods many of the countries mentioned are is decided to produce plutonium rather of development, through the pilot-plant far advanced. . .. Two billion dollars than to separate U-235-it is known stage, will provide the necessary knowl is by no means an excessive sum for that uranium and graphite will have to edge about the bomb dimensions and any of them in comparison with their be used in quantity. As a result, work methods that can be used to detonate national income in, let us say, five on the preparation of these materials it. This information should be avail years. Moreover, it will probably be can begin at once. Perhaps a year after able in about the fourth year, accord far less expensive to repeat our devel research in Period 1 has indicated the ing to our estimate, so that the theory opment a second time. dimensions to be used in the pilot units, of the bomb will be clearly understood "In coming to an estimate of the pilot units can be functioning. by the time the manufacturing units time required for a foreign nation to "We come next to the question of are beginning to yield the bomb mate produce the atomic bomb, we must com large-scale manufacture. The proper rial. With much of the bomb design pare not only its resources with ours sites for processing and purification of done in advance, it is unlikely that but also its starting point with our materials such as uranium and graphite there will be any major delay between starting point. Any nation which be can be carried along with the cor manufacture of material and produc gins working on the development of responding work for the pilot units. tion of the finished product. A year is the atomic bomb at the present time Some delay might be caused by the de certainly an outside limit. Altogether starts with far more knowledge than velopment of a chemical process to sep we have, therefore, a total elapsed time we possessed in 1939. arate plutonium from uranium, because of six years before bombs are avail "Consider first the advantages de such a process can probably be found able-slightly less than the time need rived from knowledge that the bomb only after the pilot plants have pro ed by us, in spite of the fact that we works. Much of the groping and specu duced sufficient material to work with. have added a year to take into account lation that was necessary during Pe Moreover, at this stage, the high devel the supposedly lesser industrial de riod 1 is now unnecessary. The incen opment of industry counts most, and velopment of other countries. tive for working very hard and on a other nations may require more time Many factors can enter to reduce large scale is provided immediately. than we did because their industry is the required time estimated here. For The greatest effort of Period 1 in our either in quality or in quantity behind one thing, we have adopted all along development was devoted to obtaining ours. Even so, we are probably putting the somewhat provincial viewpoint that scientific aid and financial backing, the figure high if we allow two years the nation engaging in the work will and all this time can now be saved. It for this period, which is about twice as be less effective than we have been, and is no longer necessary to depend upon long as the time we required. Adding this viewpoint may be entirely unjusti the vision and judgment of the men this to the three years estimated for fied. Also, it should be kept in mind of rare genius. It becomes possible to the completion of Periods 1 and 2, we that work in one or another nation reduce the total time by starting all conclude that manufacture of pluto may already be much further along three phases of the program at once. nium (or Uranium-235, or both) can than external facts would indicate. "The Smyth report provides detailed be under way in five years at the out Finally, it must never be forgotten that qualitative information on the gen side. It is clearly recognized, of course, men of genius in other countries may eral direction in which work can profit that final manufacturing can be car devise methods which are much supe ably be pushed .... Men of a far lower ried out only by a nation that has rior to our own and which would great order of genius than those who planned ly reduce the time involved; our previ the original work could undoubtedly ftll ous estimates have been based on the in the missing pages as long as they assumption that a foreign nation would are bolster~d with the positive knowl In This Issue simply copy our own pattern of at edge that the entire program is feas Did the Soviet Bomb Come tack. ible .... Sooner Than Expected 7 ...... 262 "To summarize, then, we are led by "What reduction in time results from The Atomic Explosion in Russia quite straightforward reasoning to the all the knowledge now available? The Comments by: conclusion that any one of several de Harol d C. Urey ...... 265 termined foreign nations could dupli greatest reduction will, of course, oc Frederick Seitz ...... 266 cur in the first period of development. Frederick Osborn ...... 267 cate our work in a period of about This period required three years for Leslie R. Groves ...... 267 five years. The skeptical or nationalis our own groups who worked for a large Bernard Brodie ...... 268 tic individual might at this point de part of this time without much financial Shall We Face the Facts? cide that such reasoning should have Leo Szilard ...... 269 little effect upon our foreign policy, support and without the knowledge of Forewarned-But Not Forearmed ultimate success. Having this sup Eugene Rabinowitch ...... 273 because it is possible that in five years port and the information of the Smyth The Scientific Reserve we shall be so far ahead of our pres report, it is difficult to hnagine that R. W. Gerard ...... 276 ent position that it will not matter men of the quality of Auger and J oliot A Progress Report on World Federation whether or not a foreign nation has in France and Kapitza, Landau, and Cord Meyer, Jr...... 281 our present knowledge. The Paramount Problem of 1949 Frenkel in Russia would require as Harold C . Urey ...... 283 "There are two very grave objec long as we to cover the same ground. The Illusion of World Government tions to this viewpoint. In the first Two years could easily be sufficient for Reinhold Niebuhr ...... 289 place, it is entirely possible that a for this period. eign nation will actually be ahead of
263 us in five years. In the second place, The Wartime Administrators even if we have more powerful bombs than they, our preferred position will VANNEVAR BUSH knowledge, other nations can catch be greatly weakened. For it is an up with us within a comparatively unfortunate fact that present bombs December, 1945 short period, say two years, and that are of sufficient strength, if used effec Dr. Bush testifying before the Sen assumes that other nations will make a tively and in sufficient quantity, to ate committee on December 3, 1945, really serious effort." paralyze our highly centralized indus said: "I testified before the House commit trial structure in the space of a single "I think she, [Russia] if she threw tee, in response to a direct question day. Any store of more powerful bombs her full weight into it and if she im on that point, that one nation could in our arsenals would be of little value ported freely those things which she catch up and produce a bomb, if they unless we could use them to prevent does not herself manufacture ade did it in complete secrecy, probably attack, and this seems a very remote quately at the present time, then I within from fifteen to twenty years, possibility. The existence of such bombs think in four or five years she could more likely the latter. If they did it might have an inhibiting effect in the have a plant in operation. On the without secrecy and with. a great deal sense that the enemy would fear re other hand, if she did it relying en of help from the United States an? prisals. However, if history provides tirely on her own resources and build from England and Switzerland-and any lesson, it is that fear of reprisal ing those up as she proceeded, mean I say Switzerland because she is a has never prevented a war in which ing by that that she would have to manufacturer of precision machinery the chances for quick victory are as build plants to make the parts before it could be done in five to seven years, great as they would be if an adver she could use those parts, I think it probably seven. sary decided to strike rapidly and in would take them somewhat longer, it "Now that would be catching up with full strength with atomic bombs." might take as long as twenty years, if us to where we stand today.... she did the entire process that way. October, 1949 "I would also like to point out that "Now again, if she wishes to ac Mr. Seitz's comments on the present when you say my guess may be in celerate the process by making it very situation appear on page 266 of this error-which I admit fully, natural important, all-important, in her econ issue. ly-it may be in error in the other omy and if she makes the sacrifice in HAROLD C. UREY direction. It may be that instead of her standards of living in order to this being twenty years it should be November, 1945 accomplish it at a maximum rate, it forty to fifty. A good many people who In testifying before the Senate Spe might shorten the time somewhat. I know and have been in some of these cial Committee on Atomic Energy, Pro do not think she would choose to do it countries tell me they don't think they fessor Urey said: that way because it would be uneco could ever build it, because they could "Of course, my opinion as to how nomic." long it would be is a guess on my part, never get, under their present system, but I think that we should not think men with courage enough to go in of a longer time than about five years." LESLIE R. GROVES and make the mistakes that are neces November, 1947 sary to produce such a thing as this." November, 1945 Following is an item from the New September, 1949 On November 29, 1945, General York Times of November 24, 1947: Groves made the following statement General Groves's comments on the "Dr. Harold C. Urey, American phys before the Senate Special Committee: Soviet explosion appear on page 267 icist, said today the United States will "On the basic fundamental scientific of this issue. maintain a monopoly on the atom bomb "at least" until next fall, [1948] but after that Russia may have the weap on." October, 1949 Scientists Give New Warning Dr. Urey's comment on the recent cie velopments appear on page 265 of this The New York Times of September 28, 1949, quotes General Walter Bedell issue. Smith, former ambassador to the Soviet Union, speaking of Russia's produc HARRISON BROWN tion of atomic bombs as follows: 1946 "I said a month ago at the Governors' Conference in Colorado that they "All of us must recognize that in would probably test the bomb in a few months. However, I believe that it ~11 another three years the United States take Soviet Russia at least ten years to get to the point of mass-product10n of America may not stand alone as a that we have now reached. I know that American techniques and industrial possessor of atomic bombs."4 skills are far better than the best the Soviet can offer. There is no reason IRVING LANGMUIR for the Soviet to reach, in less than ten years, the mass-production that we have November, 1945 reached now." "I put three years as about a min We, the undersigned, are aware of the problems involved in the large-scale imum. That is I put three years down production of atomic bombs. To our regret, we have to say that. the above sta~ if Russia really seriously devotes her ment, attributed by the New York Times to General Bedell Smith, has no bas1s attention to it and starts on a big in fact. scale production."r> (Signed)
'Must Destruction Be Our Destiny (New HARRISON BROWN LEO SziLARD York.: Simon and Schuster. 1946 ). Chicago, Ill. JAMES FRANCK HAROLD C. UREY • Hearings before the Senate Committee on October 1, 1949 Atomic Energy. JOSEPH E. MAYER
264 SHALL WE FACE THE FACTS? Leo Szilard Professor of Biophysics Unive1·sity of Chicago
OES anyone still remember how tentment." It will be a narrow path, THE REAL CAUSE OF THE Wendell Willkie insisted that and we had better watch our step. CONFLICT D Russia and America ought to Somewhere along that path we must negotiate the settlement of all the post find the truce that will give us a breath war issues before the war was over? ing spell. This paper is concerned only HAT is the real cause of the Rus Today we are paying the penalty for with the first leg of this journey. W sian-American conflict? Thucy having disregarded his counsel. When dides gave us the answer over 2,000 the war ended, Russia and America lost years ago when he wrote the History of their common enemy; the stage was set MAKING THE PREMISES EXPLICIT the Pelopennesian War. for a Russian-American conflict. Could Neither Sparta nor Athens wanted we have resolved this conflict if Roose OVIET Russia is a dictatorship no war; yet they went to war with each velt had lived? No one can say for less ruthless perhaps than was Hit other. They fought a terrible war which certain. ler'sS dictatorship in Germany. Does it lasted for thirty years. Sparta and Roosevelt died soon after the Yalta follow that Russia will act as Hitler's Athens did not want war, but they conference, and James Byrnes became Germany acted? I do not believe so. looked upon war between themselves Secretary of State. The Potsdam con Before the war Germany under Hit as a possibility for which they had to ference and the year that followed set ler, Italy under Mussolini and Soviet prepare. Gradually more and more the pattern of Russian-American rela Russia were all dictatorships. Germany states in Greece became the allies of the tions. "Patience and Firmness" was the under Hitler remained Germany. She one or the other. Finally there was no slogan. "Containment of Russia" was had been a militant nation before Hitler, city-state of any importance left in the policy. and she will remain a militant nation Greece which was not allied either with Athens or with Sparta. Whenever there General Marshall followed Mr. Byrnes after Hitler. It is not that the Ger as Secretary of State. By the time he mans want war, but rather that they was an opportunity for Sparta to take a step which would improve her military took office our policy was moving in a like the type of organized action which groove. The Atlantic Pact was a neces characterizes a mighty nation at war. position, Sparta took that step. When ever Athens had such an opportunity, sary consequence of the policy initiated Italy under M ussolini remained Italy and by Byrnes. would have kept her place if the other she made use of that opportunity. But every such step that Sparta took and Whether this policy was "right" or nations had shown determination to every such step that Athens took was "wrong" is not our topic here. But who thwart her aspirations in Abyssinia. of necessity a step which made war can doubt today that it is totally inade Soviet Russia is still Russia. Her policy more likely. Finally the time came when quate to cope with the problem which is Russian policy first and Communist Sparta reluctantly and regretfully de now confronts the world? policy second. It is true that Russia dominates Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, cided that war was inevitable and that and Czechoslovakia and that she is she had better make preparations in earnest. · HAVE to speak here of matters that using the Communist parties in these I lie within the scope of foreign poli countries to secure her rule. Yet she is But when the Peloponnesian War fi cy. It is with reluctance that I speak of not putting her foreign policy at the nally broke out, it did not start as a them. For the problem of peace cannot service of Communism, but rather she wa.r between Sparta and Athens. be solved within that narrow scope. The is using the Communists everywhere as Thebes, an ally of Sparta, attacked traditional aim of foreign policy is to instruments of her foreign policy. The Plataea, an ally of Athens. Thucydides prolong the peace; that is, to lengthen rulers of Russia might very well be writes: "There ;was an old quarrel be the interval between two wars. What is lieve that ultimately Capitalism will col tween the two cities, and the Thebans, the use of postponing war if we know lapse and Communism will conquer the seeing that war was inevitable, were -as we know today-that it will be all world; but that does not mean that anxious to surprise the place while the the more terrible the later it comes? Russia has a concrete plan for world peace lasted and before hostilities had What we need is not a truce; what we conquest, that she has set a timetable actually broken out." need is peace. for it, or that her day-to-day actions are Some 300 Thebans entered Plataea, But foreign policy got us into this guided by it. were defeated and taken prisoner, and mess, and foreign policy will have to get To my mind anything that Russia has the prisoners were later killed by the us out of it. We have to have a truce done in the past four years can be fully Plataeans. They were killed shortly be in order to have a chance to bid for understood as the action of a nation fore the herald sent from Athens ar peace. pursuing her national interests, guided rived in Plataea bidding her to do no Having built up a tremendous pres largely, though not solely, by strategic violence to the prisoners but to wait for sure around Russia, we dare not now considerations. instructions from Athens. Whether or suddenly release it lest we provoke an These are my premises; my conclu not Plataea, in killing the Theban pris explosion. But somehow we shall have sions must necessarily stand or fall with oners, actually violated an agreement to find a path from containment to "con- them. and broke an oath is a question that
269 up to this time has not been settled. But tion within twenty-four hours after tain other countries in VV estern Europe. the war between Sparta and Athens was the outbreak of war, and when there is As long as America is pledged to go on. nothing that America can do to protect to war in case Russia should attack or There is no reading more these cities from such a fate, we shall frightening occupy certain countries, America might and at the same time more sobering be faced with a situation which we did have to go to war in fulfillment of such these days, than the History not envisage when the Atlantic Pact of the a treaty obligation. Such a war Amer Peloponnesian War.l was concluded. ica could bring to a successful conclu The statesmen of Athens tell us that One might argue that the Atlantic sion only by ultimately invading Russia. the war was caused by Sparta, and the Pact would still offer these countries Even though America may not use statesmen of Sparta tell us that the war greater security than they would have atomic bombs first, nevertheless, large was caused by Athens, for even in those without it, since Russia, knowing that scale atomic bomb attacks against times war was regarded by the civilized the United States would go to war if American cities might occur and result world as an evil and statesmen were any of them were attacked, would be less in public pressure on the Government anxious to avert the stigma of the likely to attack them. r am willing to to bring the war as fast as possible aggressor. But Thucydides tells us that let this argument pass for the moment. to a successful conclusion. The pos "the real reason for the war was that But can anyone seriously expect the sibility of having to move American Athens' growing power threatened the French, Belgians, and the Dutch thus troops through Western Europe could security of Sparta." to accept, for the sake of a lessened not be excluded in such a contin probability Today the growing power of Russia of war, the absolute cer gency. In the absence of such an tainty threatens America's security, and the that in case of war their cities attack on us, we would be pledged to will be growing power of America threatens utterly destroyed? VVill it be respect the neutrality of Western Eu much Russia's security. Is there a solution to consolation for them to know that, rope as long as her neutrality was re some ten their problem? A solution, if there is or fifteen years after their de spected by Russia. Thus we could not one, must, of necessity, lie outside of struction, the United States may be count on moving troops through West victorious the pattern that governed the actions and might then help to re ern Europe and might have to invade of Sparta and Athens. The policy out build their cities and to reconstruct Russia through the Balkans, the Near their devastated lined in this paper lies outside of that country? East, the Middle East, or the Far East. pattern. It requires a move that will This pledge should be given, but given make our strategic position more diffi SHALL WE LET EUROPE PERISH? in the full knowledge that it will greatly cult in case of war, but at the same HAT then is the policy we ought weaken our strategic position. time it will greatly increase our chances to follow in the face of these If we pledge ourselves to any nation of avoiding war. If America and Rus W realities? It seems to me that there is to go to war in case she is attacked or sia reject moves of this type, they will only one avenue of escape that is open occupied by Russia, we should make our remain within the same pattern that to us, and this is what it is: pledge as unequivocal as possible. A governed the actions of the Greek city We pledge which we fully intend to honor states, and the result also will be ought to release those countries, the but which leaves same. who want to be released, from the obli some doubts in the gations imposed upon them by the At mind of a would-be aggressor may in lantic Pact. This does not mean that crease rather than decrease the danger WHAT ARE THE we FACTS? should abandon them to their fate. We of war. HE first question which we have to could, for instance, enter into an agree We ought to niake our pledge unequiv T examine here is whether the Atlan ment with France-to single out France ocal, but we ought to make it for a tic Pact can survive in its present for the moment-in which we unilat period of time which is reasonably lim structure. VVhat are the facts? erally undertake the following obliga ited. For we cannot forever safeguard tions: The Russians have exploded one bomb. peace by precariously balancing it with They might very well have exploded the 1. To go to war with Russia if Russia pledges of this sort. In the long run only bomb they had. But the plant should attack or occupy France; protection against aggression cannot be based on fear which was used to make that one bomb 2. In case of war to respect the neu of retaliation. It must be based on other can turn out others. VVithin a very trality of France as long as her motivations. short time, one year perhaps, the Rus neutrality is respected also by Rus Within the pattern of the new policy sians will have bombs in significant sia, except if America-in spite outlined above, we would continue to quantity-significant from the point of of having refrained from using give economic assistance to VVestern view of VVestern Europe. Will the Rus atomic bombs first-is attacked Europe. We ought even to encourage sians also have the means of delivering with atomic bombs by Russia or France, Belgium, and Holland to build these bombs anywhere in Europe? May some other nation; up a reasonable amount of armaments of their own. be they do not yet have V -2 type rockets 3. To refrain from using atomic developed to the stage where they can bombs, and strategic bombing of If these countries are armed, they carry their atomic bombs. Maybe they any kind, against France as long could speak to Russia in times of peace do not yet have bombers fast enough to as no atomic bombs are produced as follows: be able to get through without being in her territory, even though "There are no American soldiers on intercepted. But clearly the time is not France may have been forced to our territory, and there are no Ameri far off, when in case of war Russia surrender to Russia and even can installations here which would en will be in a position to deliver bombs though America may be attacked able the United States to use our coun anywhere in Western Europe and to by atomic bombs produced outside try as a military base against you in deliver them in significant quantity. of France. case of war. If America should try to If the time thus comes when Paris, We could enter into similar agree 1 A conveniently obortened version ia published Brussels, and Amsterdam face destruc- ments with Belgium, Holland, and· cer- by the Henry Regnery Company, Chie&ll'o, for the Great Books Foundation. 270' violate our neutrality, we would resist with America, Russia would have a NEUTRALIZING OTHER AREAS her. We realize that physically you are strong incentive to leave England in a The type in a position to destroy us. If you wish neutral position and thus bar the United of agreement suggested here for to occupy our country and confront us States from using England as a base of France, Holland, Belgium, and Eng land with an ultimatum, we might surrender military operations. It is true that by might be extended to some other rather than face destruction. But at the forcing England's surrender Russia Western European nations, but it is im possible same instant, America will be at war would gain the advantage of being able to provide an equal degree of protection with you." to use British ports for launching sub for all of them. Take Nor way, for instance: In peacetime Amer In case marines, but tnis would hardly be as America and Russia should ica's pledge to go to war in case Russia get entangled important for Russia as depriving in a war, France, Bel should attack or occupy Norway might gium, or Holland might speak to Russia America of the advantage of using Eng land as a base. offer some protection to Norway. In case as follows: of a war with America, however, Russia "America is pledged to respect our In the case of a Russian-American might find it to her advantage to force neutrality as long as you don't attack war, the neutrality of France, Belgium, Norway to surrender and to use Nor her with atomic bombs. If, in violation and Holland might similarly be safe wegian ports for the launching of sub of her pledge, she should attempt to in guarded against violation by Russia. marines, particularly since America vade us, we shall resist her with force would hardly land an expeditionary Whether or not Western Europe will of arms. If you wish to violate our neu force in Norway, as she might in Eng perish depends on the attitude America trality and confront us with an ultima land or France. It might very well be will take on the issue of her neutrality. tum, we might surrender rather than that in the case of a Russian-American It is a fortunate coincidence that the face the destruction of our cities. You war there would be just nothing that neutralization of Western Europe is could then occupy our country and at America could do to protect Norway required for establishing a truce, for tempt to defend it against an invasion from being forced to surrender or from reasons of simple humanity and for by American troops. But this would be being overrun. The same holds for some reasons of expediency. From this triple a most foolish thing to do, for you would other countries which are similarly coincidence, we may derive the hope be faced with the mounting resistance situated. that within a few years, the neutraliza of our population and you would not be tion of Western Europe will be an ac America cannot extend to countries able to draw on our facilities for war complished fact. in the Balkans, in the Near East, the production which we shall have de Middle East, and the Far East, the stroyed. You are better off if you leave same type of pledges which she may us alone; for if America attacks us in THE NAVIES AND AIR FORCES OF give to Western Europe. But America violation of her pledge, we are in a WESTERN EUROPE could agree to neutralize all nations much better position to defend our coun which are at present caught--as West try against an American invasion than HE present arms race might con ern Europe is caught--between the you would be." tinue for some time beyond the strategic aspirations of Russia and We have so far refrained from men neutralization of Western Europe. America; i.e., America could renounc~ tioning England. England is no less any intention which she may now have vulnerable to bombs than the rest of If it becomes necessary, we might of preparing those nations in peacetime ask Western Europe. But after the fall of Western Europe to make arrange as bases for possible future military France, England decided to fight on in ments that will make certain that their operations against Russia. the face of the heaviest odds, and she navies and air forces shall not fall into emerged victorious. England might de Russian hands in any circumstances and cide to hold out indefinitely as our ally that their facilities for war production CAN WE STOP THE ARMS RACE? and, with worse luck this time, perhaps shall not remain intact in case of a suffer utter destruction in case of war. forced surrender to Russia. Such ar HE neutralization of all those na rangements Yet England, when she realizes that will require measures taken Ttions which are at present caught her geographical position as well as the in peacetime which of necessity must be between the strategic aspirations of concentration of her population in Lon hurtful to the pride of these nations. America and Russia would remove the The don and a few other large cities make families of their naval and air force most important area of conflict in Rus her vulnerable beyond endurance, personnel, for instance, would have to sian-American relations. Yet if the might also wish to be freed from the be asked to reside outside of continental arms race is permitted to continue, and France, Atlantic Pact. If she does, we ought to Holland, Belgium, and the Brit particularly if Russian atomic bomb lend her a helping hand rather than try ish Isles. Their navies and air forces production increasingly threatens the to obstruct a development which is in would have to be given a standing order security of the United States, war will evitable. to leave for American ports in disregard ultimately become unavoidable. of any countermanding orders they Thus the question arises England, if reasonably armed, might might receive from their own govern whether, within the pattern of the new speak to Russia much the same as could ments under pressure of a Russian ulti policy France, Belgium, and Holland. She matum. Today it may not be possible to outlined above, Russia and the United might give Russia an assurance to re raise such issues with our friends in States could agree on some effective sist, if necessary with force of arms, an Western Europe without giving offense; method of international control of American invasion. but later on, when they come to recog atomic energy. By giving her com;ent and approval to nize the position in which they find International inspection must be an a position of this sort which England themselves and become reconciled to it, integral part of any such agreement if might wish to take, America could effec the issue· might well become the sub it is to be effective. Would it have tively protect England from a Russian ject of discussions and of some formal been in Russia's interest-in the con occupation. Clearly in case of a war or informal agreements. ditions which existed during the past
271 four years-to enter into any agreement Immediately after the war Western arms at the start of the war. Modern on atomic energy that provided for in Europe was weak and could have been weapons get obsolete very fast. Keep ternational inspection? overrun by the Russian army at any ing, in peacetime, a large stockpile of time. This might be true even today. them is a useless drain on any nation's During these past four years we re But we have been trying to create a economy. garded Western Europe as a base for situation in which within a few years, operations against Russia iri My thesis is that if we adjust our military Western Europe would no longer be at case of war. We were engaged in de policy to reality and adopt the proposed the mercy of Russia. We hoped to veloping long-range rockets and long new policy, the old reasons, which in the achieve this by arming Western Eu range bombers, and we built a consid past four years led us to oppose general rope and by maintaining a high level erable fleet of such bombers. In case of reduction of armaments, will no longer of armaments ourselves. We hoped that with Russia, it would have been of be valid. An over-all settlement of the war such a course of action would enable us advantage to us to know the exact loca outstanding postwar issues may thus to come to the help of Western Europe tions of the most essential Russian in become possible. Of these issues, the within a short period of time, if she dustrial installations, and it was there German problem is perhaps the most were attacked by Russia, and that West fore in Russia's interest to keep secret difficult. Its solution will remain diffi ern Europe would be able to hold out information relating to them. Thus cult even if Russia and the United all until our help arrived. the Iron Curtain was Russia's most im States were to seek it in perfect har portant strategic defense. Such stra Had we then agreed to a substantial mony. But if within the framework of tegic considerations may not have been general reduction of armaments equally the neutrality of Western Europe, a the only reasons for Russia's desire to affecting all parties, we would have left solution to the German problem and maintain secrecy, but they are valid and Western Europe at the mercy of Rus other postwar issues can be found, then sufficient reasons nevertheless. sia's enormous reserve manpower. Then, general limitations of armaments and in case of a Russian attack against the elimination of atomic bombs from International inspection, if at all Western Europe, it would have taken us national armaments will be in the in effective, is not compatible with the de a long time effectively to enter the war, terest of Russia as well as of America. gree of secrecy which Russia was anx and in the meantime Russian infantry What particular type of atomic en ious to maintain in the postwar period could have overrun Western Europe. ergy control will then be acceptable to and which she was successful in main way things are going at pres Russia? taining. In the conditions which existed But the may take it for granted that during the past four years it would not ent, we In the past America pushed for inter within a short period of time Western have been in Russia's interest to enter national management of all atomic en will be irretrievably at Russia's into any agreement limited to the con Europe ergy development, delegated to an the sense that, if she were at trol of atomic energy which provided for mercy in agency of the United Nations and con tacked by Russia, we could not possibly international inspection. trolled by a majority vote of that body. bring her assistance fast enough to pre This particular solution has some at B'ut even if ·such an agreement had vent her destruction or prevent her tractive features. But as long as the not provided for international inspec from being forced to surrender. We world remains divided between the al tion, it would still not have been in might then be prepared to neutralize lies of Russia and the allies of America, Russia's interest to be a party to it. Western Europe and to enter into an with our allies holding the majority in Under conditions such as those that agreement with Russia that will stop the United Nations, it will not be in existed in the past four years, America the arms race by eliminating atomic Russia's interest to accept such a solu could, by using Western Europe as a bombs from national armaments, put tion. the war to Russia's terri base, bring limitations on the conventional types of It is conceivable that if the present atomic tory. She could do this without arms, and provide for a substantial re trend is reversed, countries which are by using tanks, heavy bombs, merely duction of armaments in general. not allies of either America or Russia, bombers, and other guns, long-range Such an agreement would still leave and are independent both economically to conventional weapons. By agreeing Western Europe physically at the mercy and politically, may gradually become bombs from national eliminate atomic of Russia's land armies. But this does a majority in the United Nations. "In her an:naments, Russia would deprive not necessarily mean that Western Eu ternational management" might then weapon which might en self of the one rope would be in danger of a Russian become acceptable to Russia. the war to our terri able her to bring attack or invasion. Mexico is physically carry the war to In the meantime, some other form of tory. Russia can not at the mercy of the United States, but long-range bomb effective atomic energy control will have our territory by using she has no reason to fear that the United ers carrying ordinary explosives, for, to to be adopted, if any control is to be States will v~olate her integrity. The an operation would adopted at all. her, the cost of such United States has not at present any be prohibitive. motive for doing so and would hardly is that in these past four Russia My thesis have any in the future unless WOULD RUSSIA KEEP HER AGREE has steadfastly refused to to prepare years Russia were to make an attempt MENTS? consider any international agreement Mexico as a base for future military that would effectively eliminate atomic operations against the United States. HE question will be asked, can Rus bombs because, under existing condi While the level of armaments to be sia be trusted to keep any such tions, it was not in her interest to do maintained by us in peacetime would Tagreement. The answer is simple. Rus so. still have to be adjusted to the level of sia can be trusted to keep an agreement We must next turn our attention to armaments maintained by Russia and as long as it remains in her interest to an issue which is closely related: In other nations, our ability to win a war do so. We can make Russia keep an the past four years the United States would be determined by the level of our agreement if we maintain the conditions has steadfastly opposed a general re arms production during the war rather in which it will remain her interest to duction of armaments. Why? than by the level of our stockpile of cooperate rather than to abrogate the
272 make our attitude more pliable and thus facilitate agreement. FOREWARNED- BUT NOT FOREARMED Scientists have never been, and can not be .now, intent on creating public Eugene Rabinowitch hysteria. More than anyone else, they Professor of Botany believe in a calm, rational approach to University of Illinois all problems confronting humanity. However, this approach has to begin HE President's announcement of exploded somewhere in the wastes of with an open-minded appraisal of the an atomic explosion somewhere in Siberia, our writers and commentators facts; and, in taking stock of the situa the Soviet Union has been fol tell us it is an inferior product of T tion, we can see little that justifies swal lowed by a chorus of reassuring official amateur handiwork compared to the lowing of the proffered bromides. We and unofficial comments. Americans improved "Eniwetok bombs," now do not advise Americans that doomsday have been advised to be calm, to lose no "mass·produced" in America. is near and that they can expect atomic sleep, to avoid hysteria. They have been Further more, it is said, the Soviet bombs to start falling on their heads a told that this development has been ex Union, although able to make reason month or a year from now; but we pected, and consequently accounted for able facsimiles of our four-motored think they have reason to be deeply in our and political planning. ~ilitary bombers which fell into its hands dur alarmed and to be prepared for grave We have heard that the expression, ing the war, does not possess at the decisions. "atomic explosion" may not even signify present time, and will not be able to The fact that the present develop the explosion of an atomic bomb; per develop in the near future, means of haps a great catastrophe, or an act of ment has been freely predicted by no delivering atomic bombs to our shores. means proves that we are prepared to sabotage has occurred in a Soviet atomic Their planes do not begin to match our plant. meet it. As metastasis in an incurable present world-girdling, six-motored cancer, it may merely mean that the Almost unanimously our statesmen bombers or the jet bombers and rockets deadly disease is taking its foreseeable and commentators have told us that al now on the drafting boards of our en course unchecked. though the Soviet scientists may have gineers. "cracked" (or as some have insinuated, Whistling in the dark to a different HATEVER the type of the Soviet their spies may have stolen) the secret tune, some optimists suggest that now, W atomic explosion, it signifies that of the atomic bomb, the Soviet Union with their "atomic inferiority complex" the Soviet scientists and engineers have does not p.ossess another importan-t se gone, the Soviet negotiators will prove been able to produce more-than-critical cret-the know-how needed for produc more reasonable than before, and an amounts of fissionable elements (plu tion, which is available only to Amer agreement on effective atomic disarma tonium, or Uranium 235, or Uranium ican industry. ment can perhaps be reached. Some, 233), since no smaller amount will ex Therefore, we are told, the Soviet who ascribed to the American "take it plode under any conditions. In the (un production of atomic bombs has no or leave it" attitude at least a part of likely) case of an accidental explosion chance of equalling ours, particularly the blame for the deadlock of the UN of an atomic explosives plant (such as since we have had a four-year head atomic control negotiations, hope that a uranium-graphite production pile), start. Even if a "Beria bomb" has been the end of American monopoly will an explosion of sufficient energy to cause
(Continued from preceding page) HAVE tried to outline a policy be inclined to say that the cause of all agreement. It might even be wise to I which might lead to peace. It may the postwar difficulties between Amer have a provision in the agreement giv have its faults. Almost certainly it ica and Russia must be squarely laid at ing both America and Russia the right could be improved upon. But what are the doorstep of Russia. A "Thucydides" to abrogate it upon giving due notice. the alter natives? of the twentieth century to whom per This would at least serve as a reminder We could fight a preventive war haps will fall the bitter task of writing that no agreement between nations has against Russia, and there is little doubt the history of "The Downfall of the much value unless it remains in the that in the years to come this course Atlantic Civilization" might see it dif interests of the contracting parties to will be advocated in public by a few, ferently. continue the agreement. privately by many. In these past four years Russia and Let us remind ourselves at this point . Alternatively, we could pursue the America were not at war. They did not that what we are discussing here is a type of policy which we pursued the exchange shots; but they traded blows. truce and not peace. We shall not have past four years. It is a policy of Who struck the first blow? Does it peace until we create a structure in "neither war nor peace," and will ob really matter? During the first World which cooperation will be secured by viously lead to war. It will probably War the Hungarian writer, Karinthy, incentives rather than precariously en lead to war when war will be at its was sitting in his study attempting to forced by fear of punishment. We shall worst. write an essay on the causes of that not have peace until we have an or If we want to find a way out of our war, when he was interrupted by a ganized world community. present predicament, above all let us loud noise which seemed to come The Peloponnesian War occurred fif avoid self-righteousness. Let us not say from the nursery. Opening the door, he teen years after Sparta and Athens con that we made Russia a generous offer saw his five children engaged in a free cluded a peace treaty that was to last when we proposed the Baruch plan for for-all. "Who started this fight?" he for thirty. Russia and America will not international control of atomic energy. said sternly to Peter, his eldest. "It all fare any better if they conclude a truce We would not fool anyone else, but we started," said Peter, "when David hit and mistake it for a peace. might fool ourselves. Many of us may me back." 273 j\ October 3, 1949