The United States Air Force Expeditionary Center ❙ 6 Airpower from the Ground up Maj Gen Kip L

2010-1 OutsideCover.indd 1

l, Spring 2010 Spring l, a Journ ower P ce a

Air & Sp & Air SPINE Spring 2010 Spring Capt Bryan M. Bell,Capt USAF M. Bryan Maj Eric D. Trias, PhD, USAF C Maj Brad W. Borke, USAF Commands Combatant among Aircraft Piloted Remotely of Allocation Global O Dynamic Sr Col Yao Yunzhu, People’s Liberation Army of China C Brig Gen Michael USAF Boera, R. Building Afghanistan for Airpower C The Lt Col Ralph Muli, J. USAF Col Mark Loeben, USAF L. Col Murrell F. Stinnette, USAF Maj Gen Self, Kip L. USAF Up Ground the from Airpower E U The x hina’s P yber This,yber C peditionary C peditionary ombined P Air nited States Air Force Force Air States nited erspective on N erspective yber That . . . So W .So That yber enter perations ower Transitionower Force uclear Deterrence hat? Volume XXIV, 1 No. 1/27/10 9:43:26AM 2010-1 InsideCover.indd 1 requestsand SpacePowerJournal a courtesy line. without part If permission. they are reproduced, the Articles in this edition may be reproduced in whole or in government. US the of departments or agencies other University,or Air Command, Training ofDefense, and Education Air Department Force,the Air of sanction official the carrying as construed be not should and authors the of the in implied or expressed opinions and views The defense. national of matters other and readiness, structure, force strategy, doctrine, military on thinking innovative of stimulation and presentation Air States United the for forum open an the as serve to designed is It of Force. journal professional the is quarterly, published 10-1, Publication Recurring Force The Professional Staff Deputy Chief,Professional Journals Chief, Professional Journals Director, AirForce Research Institute Commander, AirUniversity and Training Command Commander, AirEducation Chief ofStaff, USAirForce Ann Bailey, Prepress Production Manager L. SusanFair, Illustrator Daniel M.Armstrong,Illustrator Tammi K.Long,EditorialAssistant W.Marvin Bassett,ContributingEditor Capt LoriKatowich Maj DarrenK.Stanford Gen JohnA.Shaud,USAF, Retired Lt GenAllenG.Peck Gen StephenR.Lorenz Gen NortonA.Schwartz Air and Space Power Journal Power Space and Air (ISSN 1554-2505), Air 1554-2505), (ISSN are those are Journal Air at http://www.airpower.au.af.mil. at Visit e-mail: http://www.aetc.randolph.af.mil Air and Space Power Journal Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6026 AL AFB Maxwell Air andSpacePowerJournal

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SPINE 1/27/10 9:42:03AM Spring 2010 Volume XXIV, No. 1 AFRP 10-1

Senior Leader Perspectives

The United States Air Force Expeditionary Center ❙ 6 Airpower from the Ground Up Maj Gen Kip L. Self, USAF Col Murrell F. Stinnette, USAF Col Mark L. Loeben, USAF Lt Col Ralph J. Muli, USAF

The Combined Air Power Transition Force ❙ 16 Building Airpower for Afghanistan Brig Gen Michael R. Boera, USAF

China’s Perspective on Nuclear Deterrence ❙ 27 Sr Col Yao Yunzhu, People’s Liberation Army of China

From the Editor

Honoring Dr. David Mets for His Many Years of Service to Air and Space Power Journal ❙ 31 Capt Lori Katowich, USAF, Deputy Chief, Professional Journals

Features

Global Dynamic Operations ❙ 75 Allocation of Remotely Piloted Aircraft among Combatant Commands Maj Brad W. Borke, USAF Remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) are a significant, yet limited, resource available to combatant commanders. To enhance mission management of this resource on a global scale, the author introduces a concept called global dynamic operations and proposes that RPA assets need not be restrained by geographic location of dedicated aircrews, as are most other assets.

Cyber This, Cyber That . . . So What? ❙ 90 Maj Eric D. Trias, PhD, USAF Capt Bryan M. Bell, USAF Are the leaps in cyberspace technology a revolution in military affairs or simply another set of tools for commanders? The authors argue that adding cyber operations does not require a significant shift in current doctrine, only an evolution.

2010-1 Contents.indd 1 1/27/10 1:25:37 PM Departments

32 ❙ Ricochets and Replies

35 ❙ The Merge Improving Cost-Effectiveness in the Department of Defense ...... 35 Col Drew Miller, PhD, USAFR Achieving a Cost-Effective Balance in the Department of Defense: Concurrent and Proportional Recapitalization of the Air National Guard ...... 48 Lt Col W. Mark Valentine, ANG Maj Sean Frederick Conroy, ANG

61 ❙ Views & Analyses A Cyber Proving Ground: The Search for Cyber Genius ...... 61 Lt Col Kristal L. M. Alfonso, USAF The Resurgence of Russian Interests in Central Asia ...... 67 Lt Col Scott G. Frickenstein, USAF

101 ❙ Waypoints P-51 Escorts: Legend or Myth? ...... 101 Dr. David R. Mets

108 ❙ Book Reviews Hablan los generales: Las grandes batallas del conflicto colombiano contadas por sus protagonistas ...... 108 Glenda Martinez Osorio, ed. Reviewer: Lt Col Paul D. Berg, USAF Barbarossa: The Air Battle, July–December 1941 ...... 109 Christer Bergström Reviewer: Maj Paul Niesen, USAF, Retired F-100 Super Sabre at War ...... 110 Thomas E. Gardner Reviewer: Kenneth P. Katz Dawn over Baghdad: How the U.S. Military Is Using Bullets and Ballots to Remake Iraq ...... 110 Karl Zinsmeister Reviewer: Cadet Fourth Class Samuel Major

2010-1 Contents.indd 2 1/27/10 1:25:37 PM Korea: A Lieutenant’s Story ...... 111 Gen Robert C. Mathis, USAF, Retired Reviewer: Chaplain, Maj Matthew P. Franke, USAF Boeing versus Airbus: The Inside Story of the Greatest International Competition in the Business ...... 112 John Newhouse Reviewer: Dr. Frank P. Donnini, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, Retired Aircraft Carriers: A History of Carrier Aviation and Its Influence on World Events, Volume I: 1909–1945 ...... 113 Norman Polmar in collaboration with Minoru Genda et al. Reviewer: Lt Col Richard J. Hughes, USAF Planetary Landers and Entry Probes ...... 114 Andrew J. Ball, James R. C. Garry, Ralph D. Lorenz, and Viktor V. Kerzhanovich Reviewer: Dr. Rick W. Sturdevant Highest Traditions: Memories of War ...... 116 Tony Lazzarini Reviewer: Lt Col Daniel J. Simonsen, USAF, Retired French Strategic and Tactical Bombardment Forces of World War I ...... 116 René Martel; Allen Suddaby, trans.; and Steven Suddaby, ed. Reviewer: Maj William E. Fischer Jr., USAF, Retired Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam ...... 117 Zahid Hussain Reviewer: Dr. David R. Mets Iraq and Back: Inside the War to Win the Peace ...... 118 Col Kim Olson, USAF, Retired Reviewer: Capt Patrick Dierig, USAF Science in Flux: NASA’s Nuclear Program at Plum Brook Station, 1955–2005 ...... 119 Mark D. Bowles Reviewer: Thomas F. Saal Diplomacy and War at NATO: The Secretary General and Military Action after the Cold War ...... 120 Ryan C. Hendrickson Reviewer: Dr. David A. Anderson, Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, Retired Into That Silent Sea: Trailblazers of the Space Era, 1961–1965 . . 121 Francis French and Colin Burgess Reviewer: Lt Col Christopher J. Rodel, Wisconsin Air National Guard

2010-1 Contents.indd 3 1/27/10 1:25:37 PM Learning to Love the Bomb: Canada’s Nuclear Weapons during the Cold War ...... 123 Sean M. Maloney Reviewer: Dr. John H. Barnhill Forgotten Continent: The Battle for Latin America’s Soul . . . . . 124 Michael Reid Reviewer: Dr. Gabriel Marcella SECDEF: The Nearly Impossible Job of Secretary of Defense ...... 125 Charles A. Stevenson Reviewer: Dr. Gary Schaub Jr.

127 ❙ Mission Debrief

2010-1 Contents.indd 4 1/27/10 1:25:38 PM Editorial Advisory Board

Gen John A. Shaud, PhD, USAF, Retired, Air Force Research Institute Lt Gen Bradley C. Hosmer, USAF, Retired Col J. Douglas Beason, PhD, USAF, Retired, Los Alamos National Laboratory Dr. Alexander S. Cochran, Office of the Chief of Staff, US Army Prof. Thomas B. Grassey, US Naval Academy Lt Col Dave Mets, PhD, USAF, Retired, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (professor emeritus)

Board of Reviewers

Col Ronald K. Bartley, USAFR Mr. Charles Tustin Kamps Air University USAF Air Command and Staff College Lt Col Eric Braganca, USAF Dr. Tom Keaney Naval Air Station, Patuxent River, Maryland Johns Hopkins University Dr. Kendall K. Brown Col Merrick E. Krause, USAF, Retired NASA Marshall Space Flight Center Department of Homeland Security Col Steven D. Carey, USAF, Retired Col Chris J. Krisinger, USAF, Retired Daphne, Alabama Burke, Virginia Dr. Clayton K. S. Chun Dr. Benjamin S. Lambeth US Army War College RAND Dr. Mark Clodfelter Mr. Douglas E. Lee National War College Air Force Space Command Dr. Conrad Crane Dr. Richard I. Lester Director, US Army Military History Institute Eaker College for Professional Development Col Michael D. Davis, USAF Mr. Brent Marley Defense Attaché Redstone Arsenal, Alabama Col Dennis M. Drew, USAF, Retired Mr. Rémy M. Mauduit USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Air Force Research Institute Maj Gen Charles J. Dunlap Jr., USAF Col Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF, Retired The Pentagon West Chicago, Illinois Dr. Stephen Fought Dr. Daniel Mortensen USAF Air War College (professor emeritus) Air Force Research Institute Col Richard L. Fullerton, USAF Dr. Richard R. Muller USAF Academy USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Lt Col Derrill T. Goldizen, PhD, USAF, Retired Dr. Bruce T. Murphy Westport Point, Massachusetts Air University Col W. Michael Guillot, USAF, Retired Col Robert Owen, USAF, Retired Montgomery, Alabama Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University Dr. John F. Guilmartin Jr. Lt Col Brian S. Pinkston, USAF, MC, SFS Ohio State University The Pentagon Dr. Amit Gupta Col Bob Potter, USAF, Retired USAF Air War College Air Force Research Institute Dr. Grant T. Hammond Dr. Steve Rothstein Dean, NATO Defence College Colorado Springs Science Center Project Dr. Dale L. Hayden Lt Col Reagan E. Schaupp, USAF Air Force Research Institute Air University Dr. Thomas Hughes Col Richard Szafranski, USAF, Retired USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Toffler Associates Lt Col Jeffrey Hukill, USAF, Retired Lt Col Edward B. Tomme, PhD, USAF, Retired Air Force Research Institute Sci-Ops Consulting Lt Col J. P. Hunerwadel, USAF, Retired Dr. Christopher H. Toner LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education USAF Air Command and Staff College Col Mark P. Jelonek, USAF Lt Col David A. Umphress, PhD, USAFR, Retired The Pentagon Auburn University Col John Jogerst, USAF, Retired Dr. Harold R. Winton Navarre, Florida USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies

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2010-1 Board of Reviewers.indd 5 1/27/10 1:26:02 PM The United States Air Force Expeditionary Center Airpower from the Ground Up

Maj Gen Kip L. Self, USAF Col Murrell F. Stinnette, USAF Col Mark L. Loeben, USAF Lt Col Ralph J. Muli, USAF

he American Expeditionary Force was created in 1917 as the first unit capable of significant over-the-horizon global power projection of US forces. Ninety years later, the US Air Force Expeditionary Center (USAF EC) received its commission as a training Tcenter of excellence for expeditionary operations. Between 1917 and today, everything—yet nothing—has changed in the world of expeditionary operations. That is, although the time

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USAF photo

Expeditionary Airmen of the 96th Aero Squadron, American Expeditionary Force, 1918

required to project global power over the to project power in air, space, and cyber- horizon has shrunk from months to hours, space has advanced significantly, but at the the enabling engine of that force projection core remains the requirement to build the remains the same: military and civilian pro- foundation of that airpower projection from fessionals suitably trained and equipped to the ground up. On the bookshelf of the Air support the endeavor. The Air Force’s ability Force’s advanced training capabilities, the

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01-SLP-Self.indd 7 1/27/10 1:28:49 PM USAF EC serves as the bookend comple- couriers remain on the cutting edge of in- ment to the US Air Force Warfare Center dustry innovation.2 This significant invest- (USAF WC), the former focusing on air- ment leverages a relatively stable workforce power from the ground and the latter em- that operates within a rather well-defined phasizing airpower from above. Key to both delivery grid. Obviously more dynamic, the bookends of this bookshelf is the ability to military workforce moves through the force evolve with the speed of change and thus structure with greater velocity than personnel remain relevant to Airmen charged with in commercial industry. For example, FedEx over-the-horizon global power projection. operates from 375 airports worldwide, The USAF EC’s relevance lies in providing whereas Air Mobility Command (AMC) op- advanced training for expeditionary Airmen erates from 1,162.3 Notably, over 90 percent to support the joint fight and to develop the of the airports utilized by AMC lie outside tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) the structured en route system. The ability that today’s expeditionary combat support to operate off the established en route grid (ECS) mission needs to project airpower and cover the last tactical mile of the sup- from the flight line to the front line, from ply chain in uncertain environments distin- the ground up. guishes AMC from FedEx or other commer- Well-documented studies have correlated cial carriers. The combined effect of training with organizational performance. operating in austere and uncertain environ- Commercial industry considers training a ments with a more transient work force is key part of “employee engagement,” and the imperative that motivates relevant and studies show that highly engaged firms with timely training. In a commercial enterprise, robust employee training programs increase failing this imperative results in diminished their operating income by upwards of 20 income. For the military, failure means re- percent over less engaged firms with poor duced over-the-horizon maneuver speed, a emphasis on employee training.1 The impact lack of in-transit visibility, and insufficient of training on operating income obviously combat-support logistics. Success, on the has a direct correlation to earnings per other hand, comes with the capability to share and, ultimately, shareholder satisfac- provide timely global-reach laydown, which tion. It comes as no surprise to military pro- ultimately creates the foundation we need fessionals that training is a valuable tool for to win battles and save lives. The USAF EC improving performance and building equity enables success through timely and rele- in an organization and its mission. For most vant training. This article offers insight into of us, this point is not so much an epiphany the design of the USAF EC, discusses how as it is a blinding flash of the obvious. How- this design contributes to enabling the ef- ever, in the face of cost cutting and reduced fects of its two schools, and shows how operating budgets, it is worth reemphasiz- those effects are integrated across the spec- ing that training (or employee engagement) trum of the ECS mission in building air- is a front-end load that we must support in power from the ground up. order to generate desired operational outcomes and effects. Just as we update computer hardware and software to improve The Design of the US Air performance, so must we continually update the “grayware” of our Airmen, keeping Force Expeditionary Center: them trained, current, and engaged. From the Flight Line Commercial cargo carriers such as FedEx to the Front Line fully understand the importance of keeping their grayware up to date, investing more Located at Joint Base McGuire-Dix- than $2,500 annually per employee to en- Lakehurst, New Jersey, the USAF EC part- sure that maintainers, cargo specialists, and ners with the Air Staff, Air Education and

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Training Command (AETC), and the USAF vanced training only, largely conducted at WC to provide a disciplined training process one of two Air Force centers of excellence— that teaches the right skills at the right the USAF WC at Nellis AFB, Nevada, or the time across the expeditionary enterprise. USAF EC at Fort Dix. These centers report The center offers 82 in-residence courses directly to their operational major com- and 16 Web-based training courses, graduat- mand headquarters—Air Combat Command ing more than 17,000 students annually. and AMC, respectively—for resourcing of their advanced training, an arrangement Two Schools from the Ground Up that reflects the core competencies of each command. The USAF EC brings together a wealth of expertise from dozens of specialties to provide accountable, up-to-date instruction The Multiplying Effect of Advanced Training across the spectrum of mobility and expedi- By having experts use lessons from today’s tionary skills. Because of the wide variety of fight to teach future experts, we produce a demands on ECS training and the huge multiplying effect on advanced training, swath of responsibility for which AMC and bolstering the argument for independent the Air Force are tasked, instruction runs centers of excellence outside the realm of the gamut from mission qualification to foundational training. The integration of graduate-level academic programs. Composed current TTPs, taught by professionals with of a mobility operations school (MOS) and recent experience, into the training envi- an expeditionary operations school (EOS), ronment results in a timely and highly ef- the USAF EC meets both the steady-state fective construct for training and education. training requirements for advanced mobility In addition to incorporating current and training and the need for rapidly emerging, relevant TTPs into JIT training, the USAF war-fighter-centric, just-in-time (JIT) expe- EC training model efficiently cross-utilizes ditionary skills training (fig. 1). core-competency skill sets and common infrastructure. For example, when the cen- Mobile and Expeditionary ter teaches the mission-orientation course Neither equipped nor organized to provide for an air base opening, in addition to aerial foundation training (which remains within porters, mobility doctrine specialists, and the scope of AETC), the USAF EC offers ad- mobility command and control (C2) professionals, it employs security forces, intelligence analysts, civil engineers, and communications specialists while leveraging access "JSQPXFS GSPNUIF to advanced training ranges. The same Air- (SPVOE6Q men who teach advanced contingency skills also facilitate Eagle Flag, a realistic ECS training event similar in design to the USAF #VJMEJOH 'SPNUIF WC’s Red Flag exercise. 1BSUOFSTIJQT 'MJHIU-JOFUP UIF'SPOU-JOF Enabling Effects of the Mobility

+*5GPS+&5 Operations School: Flight Line to Forward Operating Base Figure 1. The production circle of expeditionary training: the USAF EC provides JIT for joint expe- The MOS is the sole source of C2 training ditionary taskings (JET) for all air mobility operations in both the

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01-SLP-Self.indd 9 1/27/10 1:28:50 PM intertheater and intratheater missions. ing in deployment planning and execution, Graduates are trained in the full range of preparing these individuals to execute the operations from deployment planning, full spectrum of duties across the deploy- through deployment execution and moni- ment-through-redeployment continuum. toring, to highly effective automated sys- This training develops critical thinking tems and total asset visibility. skills for performing predeployment, execution, reception, and redeployment duties. Deployment Planning Automated Systems and Total Asset The MOS meets the need for enduring mo- Visibility across the Spectrum bility training with such offerings as the Aerial Port Operations Course, Mobile Com- The MOS also trains Airmen to master the mand and Control Leadership Course, and automated systems that ensure in-transit Maintenance Supervision and Production visibility / total asset visibility (fig. 2). At the Course, as well as upper-level programs tactical level, the USAF EC trains installa- such as the Advanced Logistics Readiness tion deployment officers and unit deploy- Officer Course and Advanced Study of Air ment managers to load and transfer all ma- Mobility, a one-year Intermediate Develop- teriel and personnel data accurately into mental Education program granting a mas- in-transit-visibility systems. Additionally, ter’s degree in logistics to future mobility the center provides training at the opera- leaders. Through its array of contingency tional level on extracting data from these response (CR) training courses, the MOS systems, thus ensuring C2 of logistics over also serves as the command, control, and all materiel and the flow of personnel into a communications (C3) schoolhouse for CR theater of operations. forces. The MOS’s advanced training enables CR Airmen to effectively deploy and employ the most modern mobile C3 equip- Enabling Effects of the ment and systems, providing the closing Expeditionary Operations School: link in the C3 chain at in-theater aerial ports of debarkation. If the MOS did not The Last Tactical Mile from train this robust set of CR C3 capabilities, the Forward Operating Base both the C3 and in-transit-visibility systems to the Front Line would be blind at the forward-deployed end of the spectrum. With this vital training, The EOS concentrates on field craft and however, the link is closed, extending the the practical application of ECS, which al- fidelity of the distribution process far into lows our Airmen to survive and operate in the theater. diverse, uncertain environments. Many EOS field courses focus on military opera- Deployment Execution and Monitoring tions in urban terrain, convoy operations, and training in countering improvised ex- Through lecture, demonstration, perfor- plosive devices, utilizing fully instrumented mance, and exercises, the MOS shapes the ranges. Additionally, several EOS courses logistician, installation deployment officer, prepare Airmen in our security forces to and unit deployment manager to assume meet the rapidly growing demands for their their roles in the deployment/redeploy- capabilities. These include such courses as ment process using the latest C2 systems. Tactical Security Element, Phoenix Warrior, Courses for the installation deployment of- Military Working Dog, and Phoenix Raven ficer and unit deployment manager, as well (a highly specialized course for small secu- as the Advanced Logistics Readiness Officer rity forces teams that protect aircraft and Course, provide significant, in-depth train- aircrews at remote, poorly protected air-

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Figure 2. Over 1,400 Mobility Airmen are trained annually at the USAF EC to provide worldwide logistics C2 and total asset visibility for AMC.

fields around the world). The EOS also acts in mission success and individual surviv- as the exercise-control function for Eagle ability. The continuum of training guarantees Flag, an Air Force chief of staff exercise that that the expeditionary enterprise has the allows the CR community to practice its appropriate level of expertise yet conserves base-opening capabilities in a real-time, resources to assure maximum effectiveness. hands-on scenario. The school supplies not As part of the Air Force’s capability in only observer-controllers to monitor and agile combat support, ECS has developed direct the exercise, but also the opposing rapidly in the past 15 years. Both the CR forces and actors who pose as local nation- and en route communities have evolved als. The end effect is a realistic and relevant with supporting wing-organization con- training environment that replicates the structs (CR wings and air mobility opera- conditions of today’s fight. tions wings) that enhance the mobile and fixed en route system, which in turn sup- The Joint Fight and the Joint Enabler ports the war fighter’s logistics reachback. The expeditionary enterprise begins at ac- Every Airman a Joint Enabler cession for every Airman. The expansion of basic military training and advanced train- As the Air Force continues to respond to ing in JIT contingency skills ensures that emerging missions in the combat support we reach every Airman with the appropriate arena, it is imperative that Airmen acquire level of education, creating personnel who and maintain skills necessary to survive are expeditionary in nature and effective by and operate in uncertain and rapidly chang- design. JIT predeployment training must be ing environments. A small, agile center of relevant to the contingency and build upon excellence that teaches the most up-to-date basic skills learned by all Airmen. This ad- TTPs and adapts quickly to maximize the vanced training provides the greatest payoff readiness of our ECS forces is crucial to at-

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01-SLP-Self.indd 11 1/27/10 1:28:51 PM taining success in today’s fight and meeting Effects of the tomorrow’s challenges. Graduates of EOS field courses, such as Combat Airman Skills Train- Joint Tactics Squadron: ing, are trained at a level that allows them to The Integrator operate in sync with US Army and US Marine Corps units. The skills imparted by the USAF The Air Force’s role in the joint fight has EC’s cadre of instructors prepare Airmen to evolved considerably in recent years, and, become value-added joint enablers. as a service, we continue to develop new The effect produced from establishing an competencies in the ground-combat-support Air Force center of excellence for expedi- arena, joint expeditionary taskings, and IW/ tionary training is nothing less than Airmen BP. Airmen continue to advocate and maxi- standing shoulder to shoulder with joint mize the advantages of airpower inherent partners on the front line. Whether deployed in these capabilities, as long as those Air- to fulfill joint expeditionary taskings, such men are the product of a disciplined, ac- as advising or building the capacity of part- countable training process in a curriculum ner nations, or to provide combat support to that continually adjusts its TTPs to remain traditional Air Force missions at bases relevant to today’s and tomorrow’s fight. As around the world, Airmen deserve the best we continue to build airpower from the training and preparation available. Without ground up, we must remain aware of the USAF EC and its advocacy for the expe- emerging threats, catalog our capabilities, ditionary Airman, we risk sending person- and improve our training in real time. nel forward without the proper training to As part of the journey to build a better survive and operate—and we ultimately expeditionary Airman, the USAF EC is mov- lose the legitimacy of a true joint partner. ing toward a disciplined and comprehensive TTP capability for ECS Airmen. With the Beyond the Wire establishment of a joint tactics squadron The Air Force already possesses unique ex- (JTS) within the USAF EC’s EOS (expected pertise in many expeditionary skills that in early 2010), we will have moved the Air will prove critical to growing US military Force significantly closer to closing the gap missions such as irregular warfare (IW) and between our highly trained aircrews and building partnerships (BP). Planned modifi- our ECS Airmen. cations to CR groups that call for adding a BP mission send a strong signal that the Air Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures and Force is ready to leverage a valuable mobility Lessons Learned: Avoiding Lessons Observed capability to meet current and future missions. The USAF EC’s EOS has the capability The 561 JTS at the USAF WC has enjoyed to integrate IW/BP scenarios into training much success in validating tactical lessons and exercises—including Eagle Flag, which learned in the flying community and turn- has traditionally served as a training ground ing them into codified TTPs. Leveraging the for CR groups to practice their base-opening Air Force’s weapons officer establishment to mission. The Air Force’s IW tiger team has provide subject-matter expertise, the 561st already acknowledged that IW and BP mis- has cemented its place as the premier tac- sions frequently require types of agile com- tics squadron in the service and the single bat support capabilities resident in the CR focal point for capturing tactical-air lessons groups. That same team wants to develop learned. Unlike the highly evolved air tac- processes for tracking and managing Air- tics practiced by the USAF WC, many ECS men with IW- and BP-related skills.4 Many training-improvement processes were sim- of these Airmen will have received their ply a two-way exchange between quality training at the USAF EC. assurance and training.5

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Under its charter, the USAF EC is tasked dures has often been self-contained, lacking to gather, refine, disseminate, and serve as cross talk among specialties. Without the the repository for expeditionary-skills les- single-gatekeeper function that the new JTS sons learned and TTP development.6 A new will provide, many agile-combat-support USAF EC squadron will fulfill this task for communities have experienced limited suc- the Air Force’s ECS forces. Although the cess in validating their own TTPs and have USAF WC has a robust TTP process for avia- had virtually no perception of new enemy tors, our ECS forces currently do not have a TTPs observed by friendly forces in the single, central point for capturing tactical area of responsibility. The ECS JTS will col- lessons learned. laborate with the entire training community to ensure the integration of tactical lessons The Blood of Those before Us into predeployment training for ECS forces and the use of those lessons during Air Establishing a JTS will link ECS training Force exercises to further validate their ef- and standardization as well as provide valid fectiveness in a combat environment. current tactics to our trainers, allowing Through benchmarking processes currently them to deliver timely, up-to-date instruc- employed at the USAF WC, the USAF EC’s tion and resulting in better, more prepared new JTS will create a circular exchange of Airmen for the combatant command. As a information among trainers, validators, and focal point for entry of lessons learned into practitioners. the TTP development process, that squadron will prove crucial to the successful implementation of those lessons. Our goal is Conclusion documenting enduring TTPs for future war- riors and, ultimately, saving lives by never The design of the USAF EC concentrates making a deadly mistake twice—literally, on building airpower from the ground up by we learn from the blood of those who providing agile-combat-support Airmen served before us. Knowing the validated with the necessary advanced training to en- and effective Air Force TTPs, as well as able global power projection and success in those of our enemies, is essential for surviv- the joint fight. Agile mobility is a unique ing and operating in the combat environ- core competency of all Airmen, who are ment. This process enables our forces to steeped in the knowledge of operating in plan for and against a rapidly evolving the third dimension of air and space. The threat, adapting current tactics to a chang- MOS emphasizes mastering the spectrum of ing environment. At the USAF EC, training global reach from the flight line to the for- venues use enemy TTPs to test and prepare ward operating base, whereas the EOS con- counter-TTPs for the crucible of combat. cerns itself with refining and developing Tactics evolve and mission requirements the field craft (TTPs) to take us the last tac- change rapidly, so training must also evolve tical mile to the front line in the mobility to ensure that our Airmen truly “train like continuum. The JTS will synchronize and they fight,” excelling on today’s battlefield update the combined effects of the two and in tomorrow’s challenging scenarios of schools, with a unique and focused objec- hard and soft power. tive of melting the titanium cylinders of functional excellence and creating a com- The Glue That Binds munity of practice that facilitates the exchange of TTPs across the skill sets of agile- Until now, the various agile-combat-support combat-support Airmen. functional communities had stovepiped The USAF EC has the ultimate effect of their respective efforts in standardization; presenting Airmen fully prepared to en- furthermore, the integration of new proce- able the joint mission at the right time

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01-SLP-Self.indd 13 3/15/10 9:17:37 AM with the right training. This was the charge from Gen John J. Pershing to Col Billy Mitchell over 90 years ago, when the American Expeditionary Force was created, and it is the charge of the chief of staff of the Air Force to the USAF EC today. Although everything has changed and nothing has changed, the requirement to build airpower from the ground up remains the thread that ties it all together from the flight line to the front line. ✪

Notes

1. Ramesh Kumar Singam, “Training at the Frontline, Success at the Bottom Line,” Today’s Manager, August–September 2007, http://www.entrepreneur .com/tradejournals/article/167431703.html (accessed 22 August 2009). 2. Ibid. 3. “FedEx Express Facts,” FedEx, http://about .fedex.designcdt.com/our_company/company _information/fedex_express?referer=www.clickfind .com.au (accessed 22 August 2009); and Col Keith Moncrief, USAF, chief, Air Transportation, AMC, interview by Col Murrell Stinnette, 1 September 2009. 4. Lt Col Thomas Livingston, AF/A5R-Q, Minutes of the Irregular Warfare Task Force Virtual Telecon- ference, Headquarters US Air Force, Washington, DC, 20 May 2009. 5. Maj William Rondeau, “Black Knights Resur- rected: 561st Joint Tactics Squadron Prepares Force, Captures Today’s Tactical Issues,” Nellis AFB, NV, 8 June 2007, http://www.nellis.af.mil/news/story .asp?id=123056044 (accessed 22 August 2009). 6. Gen Norton A. Schwartz, chief of staff, US Air Force, to commanders of all major commands and commander of USAF Expeditionary Center, memo- randum, subject: United States Air Force Expedition- ary Center Charter, n.d., http://www.expeditionary center.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-090306 -128.pdf (accessed 22 August 2009). Library of Congress

Gen John Pershing, General Headquarters, Chaumont, France, 1918

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Maj Gen Kip L. Self General Self (USAFA; MS, University of Southern California) is the director of operational planning, policy, and strategy, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Requirements, Head- quarters US Air Force, Washington, DC. He previously served as commander, US Air Force Expe- ditionary Center, Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey. The general has held a variety of flying assignments as a helicopter and fixed-wing instructor pilot. His staff assignments include political-military planner on the Joint Staff and country director in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He has also served as deputy director of operations at Headquarters Air Mobility Com- mand. He has commanded at various levels, including the squadron, group, and wing. The general was commander of the 314th Airlift Wing and installation commander for Little Rock AFB, Arkansas. He served as special operations mission commander in support of Operation Joint Endeavor, and he deployed as director of mobility forces in support of Operation Enduring Free- dom. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, he was commander of a global mobility task force in Southwest Asia. A command pilot with more than 4,000 hours in UH-1, T-38, C-141B, C-17, and C-130 aircraft, General Self is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Air Command and Staff College, and Air War College.

Col Murrell F. Stinnette Colonel Stinnette (BA, Virginia Military Institute; MPA, Shippensburg University; MSS, Army War College) is the vice-commander, US Air Force Expeditionary Center, Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey. He has commanded an airlift squadron, an expeditionary operations group during Operation Iraqi Freedom, an air mobility operations group, and an air base wing. His staff experience includes Headquarters US Air Force, Headquarters Air Combat Command, Headquarters Air Education and Training Com- mand, and Headquarters Air Mobility Command. Prior to his current assignment, he served as the deputy commander, Third Air Force, Ramstein AB, Germany. He is a master navigator with more than 5,000 flying hours in the C-130. Colonel Stinnette is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, and the Army War College.

Col Mark L. Loeben Colonel Loeben (BA, George Washington University; MSS, Syracuse University) is the Individual Mobilization Augmentee to the commander, US Air Force Expeditionary Cen- ter (USAF EC), Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey. He advises the commander and key staff on policies, procedures, and unit-training recommendations relative to the Air Force Reserve Command. He participated in Operations Allied Force and Noble Eagle and has deployed in support of Operations Southern Watch, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom. He recently served as acting vice-commander of the USAF EC. A command pilot, he has over 4,700 hours in the T-37, T-38, C-141B, and KC-10A. Colonel Loeben is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, and Air War College.

Lt Col Ralph J. Muli Lieutenant Colonel Muli (BS, Daniel Webster College; MS, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University) is the chief of expeditionary combat support tactics, techniques, and procedures, US Air Force Expeditionary Operations School, US Air Force Expeditionary Center, Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey. He has served as a C-130 navigator; weapons officer; operations officer; chief, 621st Contingency Response Wing Standardization and Evaluation; member of the instructor cadre for the USAF Weapons School C-130 Weapons Instructor Course; and chief of airlift training, Headquarters Air Mobility Com- mand. He has supported Operations Northern/Southern Watch, Enduring/Iraqi Freedom, and Joint Task Force Nomad Fire. Lieutenant Colonel Muli is a graduate of Squadron Of- ficer School, Air Command and Staff College, and Air War College.

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01-SLP-Self.indd 15 1/27/10 1:28:53 PM The Combined Air Power Transition Force Building Airpower for Afghanistan

Brig Gen Michael R. Boera, USAF

hat does “airpower” mean in the that they seek to defeat. The aspects of air- struggle for Afghanistan’s future? power other than kinetic strike, though, are WAn objective perspective of what often the most quickly forgotten in debate. airpower is and what it can deliver is diffi- This other face of airpower carries bal- cult to find in the US armed forces—rare is loting materials to outlying areas of Af- the informed military leader who ap- ghanistan, granting elections a chance to proaches the topic without a strong ideo- have broad credibility throughout the logical bent. Gen Stanley McChrystal, the country. It affords battlefield mobility to top US commander in Afghanistan, recently indigenous troops, allowing confrontation said that “air power contains the seeds of with and defeat of insurgents. This kind of our own destruction.”1 His accusation was airpower provides mobility to Afghan citi- not without merit in his intended context, zens, filling logistical gaps that the budding coming as it did after a missile attack on a commercial market struggles to meet. It residential compound. Because air strikes welcomes young people into the service of can kill innocent civilians as well as enemy their nation, giving them a reason to strive combatants, the kinetic effects of airpower for excellence in working for government sometimes aid the efforts of the insurgency organizations that have awakened to new,

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promising days after three bleak decades Three goals motivate and structure this of uninterrupted armed struggle. article. First, I want to share the importance In any discussion of “airpower” in Af- of airpower in Afghanistan’s future. Second, ghanistan, there is reason for caution in I wish to outline the activities with which painting all of its forms with a single broad the CAPTF assists the ANAAC throughout brush. Evidence for airpower’s effectiveness Afghanistan. Third, I would like to share exists in one of the most exciting and re- some of the important, impending develop- warding endeavors in which the US Air ments in the realm of Afghan airpower. The Force and its joint-service partners partici- evidence suggests that airpower is critical to pate today. Most people know that an inter- Afghanistan’s struggle for a peaceful exis- national coalition is partnering with the na- tence and that our recent progress puts Af- tion of Afghanistan. The shared goal calls ghanistan on the verge of an airpower for strengthening Afghanistan’s national in- breakthrough, though one quite different stitutions while reducing the influence and from the image that airpower conjures in capabilities of insurgents who want to see the minds of many military leaders. that country returned to a state of chaos. Fewer people know about the full range of actions that our Airmen are contributing Airpower in Afghanistan toward lasting security in Afghanistan. Air- power capabilities rising from their efforts The ongoing struggle in Afghanistan is a are sowing the seeds of a brighter future there. counterinsurgency (COIN) fight. In a sum- The Combined Air Power Transition mary of lessons learned from studying wars Force (CAPTF), part of the international against terrorists and insurgents, airpower community’s effort to rebuild Afghanistan’s scholars James Corum and Wray Johnson national institutions, features three support- remind us of some important lessons that ing pillars that focus on governance, secu- must shape our approach in Afghanistan. rity, and socioeconomic development.2 The first is that a comprehensive strategy— International agreements have established allocating diplomatic, political, military, the United States as the lead nation for in- and economic resources to attain a political stituting reform in Afghanistan’s security goal—must drive the overall effort.5 The forces, and the CAPTF is part of the mili- CAPTF is positioned for success in that retary organization led by the United States spect because it touches on every element and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization of a linked grand strategy. Our close men- (NATO) that works with Afghanistan’s mili- toring relationships with Afghanistan’s gov- tary and police leaders to develop sustain- ernment and military leaders give us in- able security capabilities.3 The command’s sight into the political and social challenges mission is straightforward: work alongside here. We channel resources provided by the Afghan soldiers and airmen to help build a international community to increase mili- “strong, capable, and sustainable” Afghan tary capability, and we have a hand in en- National Army Air Corps (ANAAC) that will suring good stewardship of those resources. meet Afghanistan’s security requirements.4 This resulting increase in military capability The ANAAC is an essential part of the Afghan bolsters the legitimacy of the Afghan gov- National Army (ANA), which will play a ernment and at the same time enables it to pivotal role in Afghanistan’s fight to provide provide better security for the population. security for its citizens as long as armed in- Thus, the building of Afghan airpower ca- surgency remains a threat. pacity that the CAPTF facilitates reaches

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02-SLP-Boera.indd 17 1/27/10 1:29:12 PM across all strategic areas and furthers the have exhibited an ability to anger civilian political goal at the heart of COIN success. populations and give public-relations victo- A second lesson applied by the CAPTF in ries to insurgents. The unfortunate circum- Afghanistan is that support aviation—airlift stances that unfolded in Kunduz when and battlefield mobility, for example—is of- Taliban insurgents hijacked two petroleum ten the most important role that airpower tanker trucks offer a recent reminder of this can play in this type of conflict.6 As discus- conundrum.11 The natural remedy is to pro- sion of our ongoing activities will show, the vide Afghanistan with an organic airpower CAPTF focuses its present efforts almost capability. The ANAAC’s ability to deliver entirely on providing exactly those capabili- its own Afghan soldiers to the fight will re- ties, via both fixed- and rotary-wing plat- duce the demand for air strikes conducted forms. Just a few moments of looking at the by outside air forces. This, in turn, compro- geography of Afghanistan, with population mises the insurgents’ claim that the govern- centers isolated from each other by tall ment is a puppet of the West, even as the mountains and harsh deserts, reveal the ANA undermines the ability of the Taliban, wisdom of concentrating on airlift. al-Qaeda, and other groups to conduct attacks. Afghanistan’s landlocked position in Even with excellent battlefield mobility, Southwest Asia and its isolated geographic airpower’s kinetic-strike capability retains a regions make it a “natural” air power.7 role in battling insurgency. In the Afghan Mountain ranges and desert expanses di- COIN arena, however, the politics of the vide the country, isolating its urban centers, struggle dictate that indigenous capabilities and robust road networks do not exist. The become much more valuable to overall vic- lack of ground infrastructure has been a tory than those of any outside nation. On challenge since efforts to rebuild Afghani- this front, the ANAAC is working to train stan began. NATO nations have realized that forward observers who, from positions on tactical airlift and helicopters are necessary the ground, can clear and coordinate air- to support the provincial reconstruction borne fires. Their first milestone calls for teams that do most of the infrastructure re- acting as observers for Mi-35 attack helicop- building in Afghanistan.8 In the CAPTF, we ters, interfacing with live-fire missions on have observed that the capabilities afforded ranges around Afghanistan (fig. 1). The by tactical airlift are vital to the elected CAPTF is assisting with the challenges of leaders of Afghanistan, giving these officials instituting close-coordination procedures their only opportunity to forge meaningful that will work on the Afghan battlefield and cooperation and trust in the federal government across the disparate regions of the country. Afghanistan is a natural air power because it cannot function as a modern state without the mobility that airpower alone can provide. Next, the CAPTF takes to heart the lesson that “aerial campaigns that target insurgents and terrorists located in or very near population centers are generally counterproductive.”9 They are doubly so when the enemy’s most effective information-operations tactic involves drawing attention to the national government’s reliance on “occupiers and infidels.”10 Even with the United States’ CAPTF / Department of Defense (DOD) photo ability to conduct so-called surgical strikes, the best-intentioned ground commanders Figure 1. An Mi-35 on a live-fire training mission

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that will eventually include fixed-wing at- are pursuing ends that will prove sustain- tack platforms. For the same reason that able after outside advisors depart.14 indigenous ground troops are better than Fifth, we understand that “joint opera- foreign troops, an ANAAC enabled to con- tions are essential for the effective use of duct its own COIN battles from the air will air power.”15 The CAPTF’s position within mean lasting stability of a kind that does NATO’s training and mentoring forces af- not come with outside military involvement. fords us the chance to shape the ANAAC in A fourth lesson from Corum and Johnson a way that complements the development maintains that a “low-tech” approach to air- of the larger ANA it supports, because we power can have dramatic, positive effects in interact with the individuals who mentor COIN.12 Although the Western world in gen- the leaders and future leaders of the ground eral, and America in particular, traditionally army. We have the opportunity to help Af- favor high-tech military solutions, this ap- ghanistan forge an air corps capable of inde- proach will not work in Afghanistan. As the pendent action—and to do so in a way that school-building mountaineer Greg Mortenson ensures growth commensurate with the learned in his personal efforts to advance army it supports. Our actions will produce a peace, the patience of Afghan culture is flexible, strategically and tactically capable staggering by our standards. Sometimes we air force that gives critical support to need to “listen to the mountains” and accept ground troops. the fact that modest capability built with Efforts to cultivate Afghanistan’s air- patience represents the most effective way power stretch beyond jointness, embracing to leave Afghanistan with enduring air- the efforts of several coalition partners. At power capability.13 Current operations and the Kabul International Airport alone, training use airframes familiar and well members of no fewer than 36 nations eat suited to Afghanistan, including Mi‑17 and together every day at the dining facility. A Mi‑35 helicopters along with the fixed-wing Spanish commander currently oversees the An‑32 airlifter (fig. 2). The C-27 Spartan, installation, with this responsibility rotating which is joining the air fleet, offers in- among the NATO nations. Belgians provide creased airlift, battlefield mobility, and in- and demonstrate ground security to the strument flight but esemblesr the An‑32 in ANA. Czech operational mentors assist Af- its simplicity and ruggedness; moreover, ghan helicopter crews as they learn to be- our Afghan partners are comfortable operat- come more effective in combat. The ing it. In building up capability to employ CAPTF, in addition to its mentoring efforts, these airframes, the CAPTF and the ANAAC strives to break down barriers so that coalition involvement with Afghan security forces can expand even further. Finally, it is evident in the CAPTF that airpower “provides the flexibility and initiative” that insurgents normally enjoy in the COIN battle.16 The need for the involvement of ground troops in COIN will never go away, but certain functions of airpower— airlift, battlefield mobility, and light attack—are a terrific force multiplier in that fight. With responsive airpower available, force requirements of 20 to 25 soldiers for every 1,000 indigenous residents—com- CAPTF/DOD photo monly considered the gold standard for Figure 2. An An-32 aircraft at Kabul International COIN—may shrink substantially, allowing a Airport relatively small force to conduct effective

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02-SLP-Boera.indd 19 1/27/10 1:29:13 PM operations against insurgents.17 Having set rain, and the An‑32, a fixed-wing airlifter, is forth the case for why the CAPTF’s role in capable of short-field takeoffs and landings developing airpower in Afghanistan is so on unimproved surfaces. Daily operations important, I will now address our current for these aircraft include personnel move- collaborative activities with the ANAAC. ment, medical transport, and cargo delivery. Some capabilities that we tend to take for granted in the West have recently sprung to Current Airpower Development life in the ANAAC and will become a bed- rock foundation for the further develop- By training, assisting, and mentoring the ment of a professional Afghan military. Let ANAAC, the CAPTF seeks to create sustain- me relate an example. able capacity in four areas, but our goals In late September 2009, two ANA soldiers transcend these easily quantified lines of wounded in the Kandahar province arrived operation. At first glance, our efforts (1) in Kabul on an An‑32. ANAAC flight medics build the supply of aircraft available to the transferred the soldiers to National Military force, (2) create a trained, motivated, and Hospital medics on the ramp at Kabul and talented group of airmen for the force, (3) helped load the patients onto an Mi‑17 con- build and improve airfields and related in- figured with litters for aeromedical trans- frastructure throughout Afghanistan, and port. The soldiers arrived at the National (4) concurrently support ongoing opera- Military Hospital, their care uninterrupted tions critical to Afghanistan’s survival as a and provided completely by Afghan air- nation. Most importantly, we seek to embed crews and medical personnel.18 The ability improved institutional processes, command to provide care of this quality to the ANA’s and control (C2) functions, and a culture of soldiers builds confidence and trust among training throughout the ANAAC, inter its members. Our continued mentoring and weaving them into Afghan military culture investment in such capabilities will enable across the four mission areas upon which Afghan security forces to recruit and retain we focus. I will briefly highlight our ongoing the best and brightest of Afghanistan’s ris- activities in each of these areas. ing generation, preventing recruitment by Unsurprisingly, airlift capabilities have insurgent organizations. dominated the ANAAC’s aircraft build thus To continue building on the success en- far. Afghanistan’s terrain and the need to abled by airpower, we must recognize the support ground forces engaged in a COIN importance of one particular event occur- fight justify this concentration. The work- ring right now in the CAPTF and the horses of the ANAAC fleet are the Mi‑17 (fig. 3) and An‑32. A utility helicopter, the ANAAC with respect to the aircraft build— Mi‑17 is ideally suited to high-altitude op- the delivery of refurbished C‑27 aircraft (fig. erations in Afghanistan’s mountainous ter- 4). Delivered directly from Italy since No- vember 2009, the aircraft adds a pallet-and- roller cargo system, airdrop system, and dedicated medical-evacuation capability to the existing fleet of short- and unimproved- field aircraft in the inventory. The C‑27 will eventually become the core of Afghanistan’s fixed-wing airlift fleet. The coalition military- training mission to Afghanistan has facilitated the refurbishment of eight aircraft to be delivered through fiscal year 2010, with 18 aircraft planned for delivery by 2012.19 Combined Security Transition Corps-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) photo The development of the rotary-wing fleet Figure 3. An Mi-17 delivers ANA troops. is no less dynamic. The fleet of Mi‑17s

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CSTC-A photo Figure 4. A C-27 Spartan refurbished for the ANAAC

grows every month, and the Mi‑35 attack the CAPTF engages, and it will have the helicopter has conducted successful live- most enduring impact. Our efforts span all fire training missions at ranges throughout levels of the ANAAC organization, with Af- Afghanistan in recent months. The Mi‑17 ghans and Americans collaborating on fleet, critical to battlefield mobility and everything from C2 decision-making pro- medical transport missions, is a reliable cesses to the best way to load cargo on an mode of transport for government officials. An‑32. American mentors offer advice It is slated to more than double in size by adapted to the Afghan way of doing busi- 2013. The Mi‑17’s reliability, high-altitude ness, with a keen eye for carrying out the capability, compatibility with neighboring mission and ensuring safety. nations, and availability of maintenance as- Subject-matter experts on every function sets make it the right helicopter for Afghan- performed at a US Air Force flying wing are istan.20 Building a robust rotary-wing fleet in Afghanistan offering training, advice, and for Afghanistan is a good bet for sustainable mentoring. From civil engineers to airfield capabilities in the ANAAC because helicop- managers, Americans work with Afghans to ters will remain essential for movement in share experiences and develop best prac- the nation’s rugged terrain. tices for Afghan airpower. The first Afghan It is not enough merely to provide air- loadmaster class in over 30 years finished a craft for the ANAAC. To have an effective three-month course of training in July 2009, force, we must foster the development of certifying eight basic loadmasters and pre- skilled and motivated airmen. This is the paring them for transition to the C‑27.21 Ad- most difficult and rewarding effort in which ditionally, intensive training in the English

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02-SLP-Boera.indd 21 1/27/10 1:29:14 PM language allows aircrews and other Afghans institute new means of C2 is in constant who must function in the international tension with a limited fleet of aircraft, a flight system to perform there with safety never-ending list of urgent missions, and a and competence. Our mentors and instructors combat-operations tempo that can never come from all military branches and in- stand down for a “reset.” clude civilian contractors. The largest group Besides day-to-day combat and other mili- lives and works in Kabul, but the CAPTF tary operations, the flying on the CAPTF’s oversees a group at Kandahar Air Field and radar scope that receives the most attention detachments in all regions of Afghanistan. today includes support of national elec- Training and mentoring does not occur tions, the annual Muslim hajj to Mecca, and just in Afghanistan. In July 2009, 30 An‑32 increased levels of flight training—particu- pilots traveled to the Defense Language In- larly for the Mi‑17. The ANAAC supported stitute in San Antonio, Texas, for intensive the main 2009 Afghan election superbly, training in the English language. They will and its assets were retained without hesita- follow this with an instrument flight-training tion to support a planned runoff election. course and C‑27 transition training.22 De- Although a candidate’s late withdrawal spite the sometimes substantial language caused cancellation of the runoff, Afghan and cultural barriers, Americans and Af- Mi-17s diligently carried balloting materials ghans who work with each other report a around the country, ready for a second sense of satisfaction, mutual respect, and round. The ANAAC provides airlift for Mus- accomplishment as they partner to com- lim pilgrims in remote areas to regional air plete missions and build a better ANAAC. transport hubs in Afghanistan. Because of This progress is evident among any group the cultural importance of the hajj, this sup- of mentors and Afghans who work together port makes the ANAAC a valued institution every day. Everyone is on the same team. in the eyes of all Afghans. In 2009 the hajj Trained aircrews, support personnel, and occurred in late November, when the start aircraft are effective only with a robust air- of winter weather put extra strain on an al- field structure within which to operate. The ready difficult logistical undertaking. CAPTF is consolidating its headquarters at Although flight training is a normal sus- the Kabul Afghanistan International Air- tainment function of any air force, the port, improving synergy with the ANAAC unique demands on the ANAAC make allo- and the newly established International Se- cating resources dedicated to training a dif- curity Assistance Force Joint Command, ficult proposition. Because many of the also at the airport. In addition to develop- regular pilots in the ANAAC have years of ment at Kabul, air facilities in Kandahar, flight experience, training sometimes re- Jalalabad, Shindand, Herat, Gardez, and ceives less priority than the urgent opera- Mazar-e-Sharif benefit from planning and tional missions demanded by Afghanistan’s construction facilitated by the CAPTF. On 5 current COIN struggle. By increasing the October 2009, the Kandahar Air Wing cele- numbers of aircraft available, increasing the brated its official establishment. Affiliated pool of available pilots, and establishing with the ANA’s 205th Corps, Kandahar joins training centers in Afghanistan, the CAPTF the Kabul Air Wing as the second wing es- is helping the ANAAC build a culture of tablished in the nation since 2001. training that prioritizes regular proficiency Operations constitute the CAPTF’s fourth requirements as an integral part of safe and and final area of mission concentration. Be- effective military flight operations. cause flight operations have never stopped It is evident that much is taking place in Afghanistan, the expression “building the right now in Afghanistan to advance the airplane while flying it” is an apt descrip- development of airpower capability. Each tion of the CAPTF and the ANAAC’s team program reveals several places where more effort. Our desire to increase training and resources and capabilities would do im-

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measurable good. The next section pro- Plans to expand the aviation infrastruc- vides a glimpse of plans for the CAPTF and ture throughout Afghanistan are likewise the ANAAC. ambitious. The recent establishment of the Kandahar Air Wing is a good omen for future development of flying units around the Flight Plan for the Future country. By 2016 Afghanistan should take As we move forward, I want to empha- pride in permanent ANAAC detachments at size the absolute necessity for the CAPTF’s Mazar-e-Sharif, Jalalabad, Gardez, and plans to embrace the plans of Afghani- Herat. Along with an air wing and training stan’s military and political leaders. It is center at Shindand and the existing air critical that we do not impose on Afghani- wings at Kabul and Kandahar, these will stan an air corps patterned after our own function as the backbone of an ANAAC that US Air Force. We have made progress in will have substantial capability on call in convincing Afghan leaders that an empow- every region of the country (fig. 5). ered, centrally commanded organization is As we consider these exciting plans for an effective way to control airpower, but the ANAAC’s growth, it is difficult to over- an existing culture of close control by se- state the importance of patience. As two nior leaders over all decisions means that well-known experts in Afghanistan COIN change in this aspect of military culture put it, “The hosts doing something tolerably

It is critical that we do not impose on Afghanistan an air corps patterned after our own US Air Force.

will come slowly at best. Further, the fre- is often better than foreigners doing it netic pace at which US Airmen restructure well.”24 In our zeal to help Afghanistan de- their own organizations is itself anathema velop its airpower, we must never outstrip to Afghan culture and would thus prove the ability of our hosts to adapt and learn unsustainable. With those caveats in mind, new ways of doing things for themselves. several promising developments for the Failure to appreciate this constraint turns ANAAC loom just over the horizon. our “help” into an obstacle and means that In the area of aircraft procurement, the blood and treasure will have been spent in ANAAC will continue to develop its Mi‑17 vain. On the other hand, patience that leads and C‑27 fleets. Moreover, we are looking at to new capabilities internalized by the next possible additional rotary- and fixed-wing generation of Afghan airpower operators trainer aircraft and a light attack platform. and leaders will become the kind of invest- Concurrently, the number of trained opera- ment that leads to victory in this complex tors and support personnel in the ANAAC theater of war. will grow to complement the additional air- Along with cultivating patience and per- frames. Current plans envision enlarging severance, the COIN warrior in Afghanistan the overall fleet size from 43 to 154 aircraft must grasp the essential art of understand- while increasing the number of personnel ing the realm of the possible. Readers fa- from the current 2,700 airmen to over 8,000 miliar with Corum and Johnson’s argument by 2016.23 about airpower in COIN efforts will recog-

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02-SLP-Boera.indd 23 1/27/10 1:29:15 PM Figure 5. ANAAC facilities in 2016. (From CSTC-A/CAPTF.)

nize the premise that “small wars are intel- pool of technology-savvy recruits able to fill ligence intensive” and may wonder about potential billets. More importantly, the Af- the airpower focus on intelligence, surveil- ghan military as a whole needs an opportu- lance, and reconnaissance (ISR) as it re- nity to develop and internalize institutional lates to Afghanistan.25 The COIN fight here processes that would make a technologi- is certainly intelligence intensive, and the cally enabled intelligence system worth its Afghan military excels at collecting and cost. Pushing ISR in the mold of the US exploiting human intelligence. Fused with military on Afghanistan now would do the high-tech platforms available to coali- more to dismantle an excellent existing hu- tion partners, the collective ISR effort in man-intelligence capability than it would Afghanistan has yielded hundreds of suc- build a viable new system. cessful operations. Despite this synergy, rushing to give Af- ghanistan a computer-based, high-tech in- Conclusion telligence infrastructure of the kind used by industrial nations would be misplaced right Corum and Johnson have noted that now; training efforts would be wasted. In- “small wars are long wars.”26 A constant re- stead, Afghanistan needs time to build a ality that must inform any strategy for Af-

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ghanistan is the possibility that the COIN on its feet.”28 Involvement of the CAPTF struggle here may well outlast the staying in building airpower for Afghanistan by power of Western governments. According mentoring Afghan airmen is a textbook to Nathaniel Fick and John Nagl, “Some of effort in building capacity for a partner the best weapons do not shoot.”27 Develop- nation. The new capabilities being in- ing security capabilities within Afghanistan stilled in the ANAAC will form an endur- rather than attempting to wear down a de- ing legacy. The new “eagles” soaring over termined insurgency from without is itself a Afghanistan will secure internal national kind of domestic development, enabling security even as they prevent foreign ter- more visible measures such as making rorists’ exploitation of that country’s re- available electricity, water, jobs, and educa- mote regions.29 Together, these profession- tion. The two observations together suggest als and their committed mentors will that the best investments we can make in forge demonstrable, sustainable advances Afghanistan are those that allow people to in capabilities and capacities for Afghani- provide security and good governance for stan’s security forces. Some oft-forgotten themselves after outside involvement has aspects of airpower have great potential to run its course. carry the nation into an era of peace and As a recent historical account chal- stability. This is a victory for the whole lenges us, America needs to “solidify vic- world, and we are excited to be at the tory within a chaotic political environ- heart of it in the CAPTF. ✪ ment” by helping Afghanistan “get back

Notes

1. Dexter Filkins, “Stanley McChrystal’s Long stan)] (Bonn, Germany: United Nations, 5 Decem- War,” New York Times Magazine, 14 October 2009, ber 2001). The term security forces refers to both the http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/18/magazine/ military (MoD) and the police (MoI) in Afghani- 18Afghanistan-t.html (accessed 17 November 2009). stan. Formally, the United States is the lead nation 2. Afghanistan National Development Strategy for military reform per an Afghan Security Assis- [ANDS], 1387–1391 (2008–2013): A Strategy for Secu- tance Meeting in Geneva on 17 May 2002, but it also rity, Governance, Economic Growth and Poverty Re- undertakes a substantial police-reform effort along- duction (Kabul: Government of the Islamic Republic side the European Union’s Police Mission for Af- of Afghanistan, 21 April 2008), i, http://www.ands ghanistan (EUPOL). .gov.af/ands/final_ands/src/final/Afghanistan%20 4. Brig Gen Michael R. Boera, USAF, CAPTF, National%20Development% (accessed 17 November Kabul, Afghanistan, predecisional draft briefing, 2009). The ANDS serves as Afghanistan’s Poverty subject: Afghan National Army Air Corps, 2009. Reduction Strategy in accordance with its World 5. James S. Corum and Wray R. Johnson, Air- Bank Country Assistance Strategy. See also “Bank power in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terror- Publication 2.11 – Country Assistance Strategies” ists (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, (Washington, DC: World Bank, June 2005), http:// 2003), 425–26. web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/ 6. Ibid., 427. EXTPOLICIES/EXTOPMANUAL/0,,contentMDK 7. Colin Gray called the United States a natural :20064541~isCURL:Y~pagePK:64141683~piPK:6414 air power. Many of the geostrategic factors that 1620~theSitePK:502184,00.html (accessed 17 No- underpin Gray’s claim about the US predilection for vember 2009). airpower also apply to Afghanistan. Among these 3. The most important of these is the “Agree- are Afghanistan’s continental geography, its geo ment on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan political isolation, and its lack of sea power. The pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Gov- technological base and nuclear-deterrent capability ernment Institutions” [Bonn Agreement (Afghani- attributed in Gray’s US list obviously do not apply to

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02-SLP-Boera.indd 25 1/27/10 1:29:16 PM Afghanistan today. See Colin S. Gray, Explorations in insurgent population in Afghanistan is unknown, Strategy (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996), 85. the population-based ratio makes better sense. See 8. Andy Nativi, “Afghan Airpower,” Aviation Nathaniel C. Fick and John A. Nagl, “The U.S. Week and Space Technology 160, no. 4 (26 January Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field 2004): 48–49. Manual: Afghanistan Edition,” Foreign Policy, no. 9. Corum and Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars, 170 (January/February 2009): 46. 428. 18. TSgt Misti Adams, USAF independent duty 10. “From Insurgency to Insurrection,” Economist medical technician, 438th Air Advisory Group, 392, no. 8645 (22 August 2009): 22. Kabul International Airport, interview by the au- 11. Nicholas Kulish and Judy Dempsey, “Ger- thor, 12 October 2009. many Defends Decision on Afghan Airstrike,” New 19. Boera, briefing. York Times, 8 September 2009, A4. 20. Ibid. 12. Corum and Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars, 21. Lt Col Mark Hersant, USAF, “Afghan C-27A 430. Program Takes Flight,” Air Force Link, 3 September 13. Greg Mortenson and David Oliver Relin, 2009, http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id= Three Cups of Tea: One Man’s Mission to Fight Terror- 123166178 (accessed 17 November 2009). ism and Build Nations—One School at a Time (New 22. Ibid. York: Viking, 2006), 149. 23. Boera, briefing. 14. Histories of the Afghan Air Corps report that 24. Fick and Nagl, “U.S. Army / Marine Corps “the helicopter [was] the single most important Counterinsurgency Field Manual,” 46. weapon in the Soviet-Afghanistan war”; they also 25. Corum and Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars, reveal that An-32s and An-26s have been closely 434. intertwined in the struggle to carve order out of 26. Ibid., 435. chaos within the government and military leader- 27. Fick and Nagl, “U.S. Army / Marine Corps ship since the fall of the Taliban. See “A Short His- Counterinsurgency Field Manual,” 45. tory of the Afghan Air Force, 1919–2009,” unpub- 28. Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military His- lished draft (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Force Historical tory from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban Research Agency, 2009). (New York: Da Capo Press, 2002), 325. 15. Corum and Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars, 29. Translation of the official Dari motto of the 433. ANAAC recruiting initiative: “Be an Eagle for Af- 16. Ibid., 434. ghanistan.” Boera, briefing. 17. Other force-structuring ratios put the ideal number at 10 soldiers for each insurgent. Since the

Brig Gen Michael R. Boera General Boera (BS, University of Colorado–Boulder; MA, Central Michigan Univer- sity; MSS, Air War College) is commanding general, Combined Air Power Transition Force, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, Kabul, Afghanistan, and commander, 438th Air Expeditionary Wing. Prior to his current assignment, he was deputy director for operations at US Pacific Command. He has served on a major command and combined air operations center staff, and has commanded a fighter squadron, cadet group, fighter operations group, wing, and the 613th Air and Space Operations Center. During Operation Allied Force, General Boera led his F-16CJ squadron in the first attack in Serbia. Additionally, he led his squadron on deployments in support of Operations Southern Watch, Northern Watch, and Deliberate Forge. A command pilot with more than 5,500 flying hours, he has flown 160 combat missions in the F-16. He also deployed in support of Operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm, Provide Comfort, and Unified Assistance, the tsunami humanitarian-relief effort in South Asia. General Boera is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Army Command and General Staff College, and the Air War College.

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02-SLP-Boera.indd 26 1/27/10 1:29:17 PM Senior Leader Perspective

China’s Perspective on Nuclear Deterrence Sr Col Yao Yunzhu, People’s Liberation Army of China

y topic is about China’s perspective until the late 1980s or early 1990s, when on deterrence, but before I deal China’s drive toward defense modernization with the topic, I must point out inspired academic debate, did deterrence Mthat for a long time in the Cold War, China gain acceptance as a key concept in strate- strongly opposed the concept of nuclear de- gic studies and lose its pejorative sense. terrence, which, as so frequently used by However, even though the term remained the US government, had carried with it taboo for some time, the logic of deterrence such derogatory connotations as “nuclear has always played a major role in Chinese blackmail,” “nuclear coercion,” “nuclear nuclear thinking. To facilitate understand- containment,” and “nuclear threat.” And ing, I explain China’s nuclear policy, mak- China, as the country most frequently ing use of US deterrence terminology, and threatened by nuclear attack, was under- compare China’s deterrence thinking with standably reluctant to use such a term.1 Not that of the United States.

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03-SLP-Yao.indd 27 1/27/10 1:29:35 PM China’s No-First-Use Policy Indicates rence as a key component into its nuclear strategy and alliance policy, both during the That It Applies Pure Deterrence and Cold War and even today. I disagree with Deterrence by Punishment the notion that extended deterrence helps nonproliferation by relieving allies of the The most important element of China’s need to develop their indigenous nuclear nuclear policy is renunciation of the first- arsenals, thus reducing the number of nu- use option. By adopting a no-first-use policy, clear states. In my view, extended deter- China has to base its deterrence on retalia- rence is first and foremost a defense com- tion, not on denial. Therefore it must de- mitment used to strengthen an alliance, velop retaliatory second-strike capabilities with nonproliferation a by-product of this instead of nuclear war-fighting capabilities commitment rather than a predesigned ma- and doctrines. Studying the nuclear thinking jor mission. Very few of America’s allies of earlier Chinese leaders like Mao Zedong face threats today that can be dealt with and Deng Xiaoping, we find that neither only by US extended nuclear deterrence; man considered nuclear weapons usable on rather, US conventional military means can the battlefield in the same way as conven- easily satisfy their defense requirements. tional means. Moreover, neither believed Additionally, extended deterrence promotes that nuclear wars could ever be fought and proliferation by motivating declared or po- won in a measured and controlled way. tential enemies of the United States and its Such thinking differs from that of American allies to possess nuclear weapons as asym- nuclear strategists who have explored many metric means to offset US conventional su- possible forms of nuclear conflict and have periority. If we are serious about creating formulated complex, complete theories of conditions for a nuclear-free world, as Presi- nuclear war fighting, including limited war, dent Obama has suggested, the policy of theater nuclear operations, and escalation extended nuclear deterrence should be control. among the first to change.

The Self-Defensive Nature of China’s China’s Nuclear Policy Seeks Nuclear Policy Means That It Carries Deterrence at the Grand Strategic Out Central Deterrence but Not and Strategic Levels, Not at the Extended Deterrence Operational and Tactical Levels China preserves nuclear capabilities only Chinese leaders mainly consider nuclear to deter nuclear-weapon states from launch- weapons a political instrument for employing nuclear attacks against its homeland. ment at the level of grand strategy, not as a China neither provides a “nuclear umbrella” winning tool for military operations. The to, nor accepts one from, any other coun- concept of “what wins, deters” does not try. Its opposition to the policy of extended guide China’s nuclear thinking. China has nuclear deterrence—the practice of nuclear- not stratified nuclear operations into strate- weapon states’ providing nuclear umbrellas gic, operational, or tactical levels. China to their non-nuclear-weapon allies—attests perceives a nuclear strike against its terri- to the self-defensive nature of that policy. tory—whether with high- or low-yield war- China has clearly indicated that it will nei- heads, causing either great or small losses— ther deploy nuclear weapons on foreign ter- as the attack that invokes its counterattack. ritory nor allow foreign nuclear weapons The American practice, by comparison, in- into China. By comparison, the United corporates nuclear war fighting into strate- States has incorporated extended deter- gic, campaign, and tactical operations. For

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03-SLP-Yao.indd 28 1/27/10 1:29:36 PM Senior Leader Perspective

example, theater operational plans China Depends More on (OPLAN) like US Pacific Command’s OPLAN 5077 (the OPLAN for military con- Uncertainty for Its Deterrence Than flict in the Taiwan Strait) have annexes on Any Other Nuclear-Weapon State nuclear operations. By introducing the matter of uncertainty, I try to preempt any questions on China’s opaqueness regarding the structure and size China’s Nuclear Arsenal at the of its nuclear force. For a state adopting a Minimum Level Can Be Interpreted no-first-use policy and intending not to to Some Extent as the Minimum- waste too much money on unusable weapons, dependence on opaqueness to bring Deterrence Posture about greater deterrent value is a wise choice. One can achieve deterrence through At this point, let me alter the meaning of the certainty of prospective costs outweigh- the concept of nuclear deterrence some- ing prospective gains, as well as through the what by giving it some Chinese characteris- uncertainty in cost/gain calculations. De- tics. Chinese minimum deterrence means terrence works not only to reverse the ene- that the role played by nuclear weapons in my’s original intention, but also to prevent national security should be minimized. him from forming such an intention for China would use nuclear weapons only lack of information. Comparing China with against nuclear attack and only for second- the United States, one sees that the former strike purposes. Accordingly, the arsenal places more emphasis on taking advantage must be kept at the minimum level needed. of uncertainty in implementing deterrence, In China’s official documents, “lean” and while the latter realizes more deterrence “effective” are the two adjectives used to de- value by a show of force. scribe the nuclear arsenal. To keep the arsenal lean, China has to exercise restraint in developing nuclear weapons; to keep the Lastly, China’s Nuclear Policy arsenal effective, China has to modernize it Has Remained Constant to ensure credibility after a first nuclear strike. Furthermore, Chinese strategists re- Here, I want to make the point that China’s gard the concept of minimum deterrence as perspective on nuclear deterrence has not a relative one, defined not only by quantita- changed very much since the start of the tive criteria but also by the survivability of twenty-first century. The 1960s and 1970s nuclear weapon systems and the credibility had been the most crises-ridden years for China. Since then, China’s security environ- of counterattack. Some researchers in the ment has improved steadily. However, several United States have concluded that, based on new factors complicate China’s nuclear cal- its modernization effort, China is shifting culations. First, it has more nuclear neigh- from a minimum- to a limited-deterrence bors than before. Second, the Taiwan Strait posture, whereby China could use nuclear has become a potential flash point that weapons to deter both conventional and nu- might drag two nuclear states into military clear wars—and even to exercise escalation conflict. And third, the deployment of US control in the event of a conventional con- ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems frontation. However, we must remember threatens the credibility of China’s deter- that the basic logic of China’s nuclear think- rence and the strategic stability between ing conceives of nuclear weapons as a de- the United States and China. In spite of terring, not a winning, instrument against these new developments, we can see no other such weapons. substantial change in China’s declared nu-

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03-SLP-Yao.indd 29 1/27/10 1:29:36 PM clear policy and no deviation from the basic served China’s national interest for nearly deterrence logic in which it believes. Sev- half a century. eral reasons may account for this lack of ✯ ✯ ✯ ✯ ✯ change. First, the multilateral-deterrent re- In conclusion, China will continue to lationship that China forms with all nuclear- apply deterrence at the grand strategic weapon states can readily accommodate level, to base its pure and central deter- new nuclear neighbors. Second, deterrence rence on a retaliatory second-strike capa- applied at the strategic level, if credible, can bility, to depend more on uncertainty for deter nuclear use against China in peace better deterrence effect, and to modernize and even in conventional conflict. Third, its nuclear arsenal by keeping it more sur- the BMD system may result in a reassess- vivable, penetrating, and secure. ✪ ment of force structure and size, but not in the abandonment of a policy that has best

Note

1. China has been repeatedly threatened with (including Beijing) if it launched another offensive nuclear attacks and might be nearer to such an attack in 1953 during the Korean War. The Taiwan Strait than any other country in the world. During the crisis of 1958 once again saw China threatened by Korean War, General MacArthur urged the Truman US nuclear weapons. Top Soviet military leaders administration to drop atom bombs on China. Dur- considered launching a preemptive strike against ing the French-Vietnamese War, President Truman China with a “limited number of nuclear weapons” and British prime minister Churchill consulted on during the Sino-Soviet border clash in 1969. See “A several occasions, agreeing that the Allies would Chronology of Nuclear Threats,” Science for Demo- support US use of atom bombs on China in case the cratic Action 6, no. 4 / 7, no. 1 (October 1998), Chinese intervened on the side of Vietnamese http://www.ieer.org/ensec/no-6/threats.html (ac- troops. The Eisenhower administration threatened cessed 24 September 2009). to use nuclear weapons against key areas in China

Sr Col Yao Yunzhu, People’s Liberation Army of China Senior Colonel Yao (MA, Foreign Languages Institute, People’s Liberation Army; PhD, Academy of Military Science), a member of the 10th National People’s Con- gress of China (2003–7) and of the 17th Chinese Communist Party Congress, is a senior researcher of the Asia-Pacific Office, Department of World Military Studies, Academy of Military Science. She joined the People’s Liberation Army in 1970, serving as an enlisted member, a staff officer, an instructor, a researcher, and both a deputy director and director of a research office. She spent one year in the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, United Kingdom, as a visiting scholar and two months in the United States as an Eisenhower Exchange Foun- dation Fellow. Senior Colonel Yao has published books and has translated books, articles, and papers on international military and security issues, US military affairs, Asia-Pacific security issues, cross-strait relations between China and Taiwan, and Korean Peninsula security issues. Her works include Post-War American Deterrence: Theories and Policies, On Asia-Pacific Security Strategy (author of chapters), and 20th Century Strategic Legacy and the World through Chinese Scholars (author of chapters). She was elected one of the “Top Ten Outstanding Chinese Women” in 2007.

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03-SLP-Yao.indd 30 1/27/10 1:29:37 PM From the Editor

Honoring Dr. David Mets for His Many Years of Service to Air and Space Power Journal Capt Lori Katowich, USAF, Deputy Chief, Professional Journals

r. David Mets, a researcher at the opment. Dr. Mets continues to provide guid- Air Force Research Institute and ance and expertise to the Journal staff on a a member of Air and Space Power variety of topics. Journal’s Editorial Advisory Board, After a brief stint as a professor of his- Dis retiring. A diplomatic- and military-history tory and international relations at Troy icon, he has been an integral part of ASPJ State University–Florida Region, Dr. Mets for over 35 years. returned to Air University in the 1990s as a Dr. Mets’s contributions to the United professor at the School of Advanced Air- States military began in 1946 when he en- power Studies (now the School of Advanced listed in the US Navy and eventually earned Air and Space Studies) at Maxwell AFB an appointment to the Naval Academy. After where he taught for 14 years. He has been a graduating in 1953, he traded his fins for military defense analyst and researcher wings and accepted a commission in the US with Air University’s College of Aerospace Air Force. During his flying days, he served Doctrine, Research and Education and the as an instructor navigator, instructor pilot, Air Force Research Institute since 2006. and aircraft commander; flew over 900 A noted expert in and advocate for air- C-130B sorties in Vietnam; and commanded an AC‑130 squadron in Thailand. Dr. Mets power, Dr. Mets has published five books: has guided the scholastic achievements of NATO: Alliance for Peace (1981), Land-Based numerous military professionals throughout Air Power in Third World Crises (1986), Mas- his career, serving as an instructor of diplo- ter of Airpower: General Carl A. Spaatz matic and military history at both the US (1988), The Air Campaign: John Warden and Air Force Academy in the 1960s and the US the Classical Airpower Theorists, revised edi- Military Academy in the 1970s. tion (1999), and, most recently, Airpower Prior to his retirement from active duty and Technology: Smart and Unmanned Weap- in 1979, Dr. Mets served as editor of Air ons (2009). University Review, a predecessor of ASPJ. He On behalf of the ASPJ staff, past and pres- is well known for his “Fodder for Your Pro- ent, we thank Dr. Mets for his many years fessional Reading” series of articles, which of service and dedication to both the Air combined book reviews in specific catego- and Space Power Journal and the United ries and related those to professional devel- States Air Force. ✪

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2010-1 From the Editor.indd 31 1/27/10 1:26:23 PM We encourage you to e-mail your comments to us at [email protected]. We reserve the right to edit your remarks.

A PERFECT STORM OVER Summer 2009; ASPJ-Chinese, Fall 2009) is NUCLEAR WEAPONS interesting, I feel that the author largely bases his argument on service sectarianism. I read the article “A Perfect Storm over Nu- I must, therefore, disagree with his reasoning. clear Weapons” (Fall 2009), and Vice Adm To determine whether or not ownership Robert Monroe is quite correct. I also believe of an asset correctly belongs to a specific that America’s concept of deterrence must branch of service, one must examine the change significantly to meet the variety of first and foremost criterion—necessity. Cur- threats that will emerge in the twenty-first rent field operations indicate that the US century. The old deterrent strategy of the Army is in dire need of organic remotely Cold War is not adaptive enough and re- piloted aircraft (RPA) that perform a variety quires an overhaul. When we redefine and of tactical-level missions such as intelli- redevelop deterrence and what it means, gence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; the nation can then apply it to emerging communication relaying; targeting; search- nations such as Iran and North Korea. ing; or even ad hoc, direct air-land attacks. Furthermore, there must be an endeavor to In light of this fact, one cannot conclude combine nonproliferation efforts into this that “the Army’s decision to develop and strategy to provide a more robust means of field organic theater-capable [RPAs] is not in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons; the best interest of the US military” simply moreover, if countries do obtain them, they because the latter has only a “limited supply will know what to expect from the United of these high-demand assets” (pp. 89–90). States if they wish to employ them. As such, Indeed, I find such reasoning faulty. America’s ICBM force will need “calibrating” This situation brings to mind the enact- to ensure that our deterrent is not a paper ment of the US National Security Act of tiger and can effectively deter potential ag- 1947. At the time, the newly established Air gressor nations that range from nonstate Force viewed the Army’s organic aviation actors to reemerging superpowers. The forces in a similar manner. However, we United States first needs to develop the should not forget that the Army artillery’s right strategy and then build the right force urgent need for organic aviation assets gave to make the strategy work. When we get the birth to Army aviation. If we follow the rea- strategy of “layered deterrence” right, we soning of the author, we might reach the can make our ICBM force fit the strategy. conclusion that US Army aviation should Ultimately, the right strategy that imple- merge with the Air Force, based on the logic ments the right force will win the day. Why? of limited supply and high demand. Our nation desperately requires a “recali- The Army and Air Force should not be bration” of our nuclear deterrent strategy. rivals over the ownership of limited RPA Lt Col Scott Edwards, USAF assets. Rather, the solution for meeting the Air Force Fellow, Oak Ridge National Laboratory Army’s high demand for RPA assets from the Air Force lies in redetermining the THE ARMY’S “ORGANIC” UNMANNED scope of the two services’ operation and AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS function, identifying and maximizing their strong capabilities, filling the necessity gap Although Maj Travis A. Burdine’s article between them, and creating an integrated “The Army’s ‘Organic’ Unmanned Aircraft joint operational environment. Systems: An Unhealthy Choice for the Joint Although Major Burdine proposes a solu- Operational Environment” (ASPJ-English, tion, it is unrealistic and lacks operational

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2010-1 Ricochets.indd 32 1/27/10 1:26:44 PM Ricochets & Replies

substance. Aware of the fact that “the Army Although the KC-10 is an exemplary will not abandon the Sky Warrior Program” tanker platform, its design has many ineffi- (p. 97), the author does make a good point cient limitations—for example, the number- by dividing RPA capabilities based on “task two engine on the tail represents a mainte- complexity” and “ease of automation” (see nance challenge when it is time to repair or fig. 4 of the article, p. 98). I would go one replace an engine three stories high. The ad- step further and divide the functionality of ditional labor, time, and equipment required the services. That is, the Army assumes the to work on this engine are excessive com- preponderance of responsibilities relating to pared to the investments necessary for work- management of RPAs / remotely piloted ve- ing on a wing-mounted engine. Much like hicle systems at the tactical level; the Air the vast majority of aircraft used in the com- Force focuses on the strategic level; and mercial realm, both the Boeing and Northrop both services share responsibility for the Grumman tankers have easily maintainable operational level. wing-mounted engines. Creation of a truly integrated operational Additionally, the KC-10 design utilizes a environment requires that the services flight engineer who represents the systems purge sectarianism from their mind-set and expert in terms of operating the aircraft. consider asset allocation and management Much in the same way modern avionics re- primarily in terms of operational necessity. placed the navigator, modern aircraft are replacing the flight engineer. Automation al- Li Yanxu Beijing, China lows for the elimination of an additional crew position while increasing payload capability. FedEx, the second-largest owner of AIR FORCE TANKER AIRCRAFT: DC-10 aircraft, is currently upgrading its OVERHAUL THE FLEET! DC-10-30 fleet. This modification automates the flight engineer position, allowing the Air-to-air refueling is at the heart of our Air company to reduce manpower while in- Force doctrine. Without it, the Air Force creasing overall payload capability. Both the would not be able to wage war. Nuclear de- Boeing and Northrop Grumman tankers have terrence, rapid global reach/power, and eliminated this position with automation. close air support are examples that barely The Boeing 767 and the Airbus A330, the scratch the surface of the missions and ca- two more efficient aircraft competing to be- pabilities that benefit from air-to-air refuel- come the next Air Force tanker, are in wide ing. The aircraft that implement this price- use all across the world, not only in the ci- less capability are growing old, and vilian sector but also in the military sector. maintenance costs are continuing to rise. Boeing has contracts to provide Italy and Either Boeing (Boeing 767) or Northrop Japan with four KC-767 tanker aircraft each. Grumman (Airbus A330) will replace the According to the Airbus military Web site, KC-135 Stratotanker as soon as the Air Force “A330 . . . has won all international tanker successfully negotiates a contract. Some in- competitions with contracts signed by the dividuals support a “split tanker buy” as a governments of Australia, Saudi Arabia and solution to avoid lengthy protests from the the [United Arab Emirates].” The ability to losing bidder. This option has my support involve coalition partners increases dramati- because, in addition to replacing the KC-135, cally when countries use the same equip- it is also time to replace our fleet of ineffi- ment. Purchasing both aircraft would foster cient wide-body KC-10 Extender tankers. international partnerships, ease current Air The logical solution is to pursue the pro- Force tanker shortfalls by employing allied curement of two modern air-to-air refueling tanker support in future conflicts, and allow aircraft already in use and employed by our individuals of the US Air Force to promote international partners. partnership in exchange programs.

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2010-1 Ricochets.indd 33 1/27/10 1:26:44 PM It is time to overhaul and replace the Air and purchasing two new modern tanker air- Force tanker fleet. The KC-10 is an ineffi- craft will modernize our 1950s and early cient aircraft in terms of maintenance and 1980s fleet, align our capabilities with those additional aircrews. Cargo companies like of our allies, and bring the backbone of our FedEx still use the civilian version, but even Air Force into the twenty-first century. they are modifying their aircraft to reduce Maj Ryan Aerni, USAF manpower and increase cargo capabilities. Travis AFB, California Retiring the KC-10 along with the KC-135

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2010-1 Ricochets.indd 34 1/27/10 1:26:45 PM The Merge

In air combat, “the merge” occurs when opposing aircraft meet and pass each other. Then they usually “mix it up.” In a similar spirit, Air and Space Power Journal’s “Merge” articles present contending ideas. Readers are free to join the intellectual battlespace. Please send comments to [email protected].

Improving Cost-Effectiveness in the Department of Defense Col Drew Miller, PhD, USAFR*

n signing the latest and largest Depart- ness’s profit-and-loss spreadsheet to replace ment of Defense (DOD) budget, which the current practice of decision making Icut the Air Force’s F-22 and the Army’s without clear criteria. Another great plague Future Combat Systems, Pres. Barack on military cost-effectiveness is our “stove- Obama proclaimed, “We can’t build the 21st- piped” approach to planning, programming, century military we need unless we funda- and budgeting with changing bases for the mentally reform the way our defense estab- analysis and no chain of accountability or lishment does business.”1 Reforming the penalty paid, either for cost overruns or DOD and achieving more businesslike cost- poor performance relative to plans. Donald effectiveness—long-standing goals for the Rumsfeld, former secretary of defense, esti- DOD—are often rejected as impossible mated that 25 percent of the DOD’s spend- since the military is not a for-profit busi- ing is wasted.3 ness. Lack of a profit bottom line, however, The Air Force and DOD can improve does not prevent the DOD from attaining their cost-effectiveness with some practical the cost-effectiveness that many nonprofit reforms, including adopting and consistently government and military organizations en- using our version of business’s ubiquitous joy. Management consultant Peter Drucker profit-and-loss spreadsheet to realize the called one nonprofit organization, the Salva- tremendous benefit that businesses enjoy tion Army, “by far the most effective organi- from having a common, widely used, and zation in the U.S.” He noted that “no one understood means of analysis and decision even comes close to it with respect to clarity making. By employing a simple multiple cri- of mission, ability to innovate, measurable teria decision making (MCDM) tool such as results, dedication, and putting money to the one developed by RAND, which uses maximum use.”2 commercial spreadsheet software, the DOD One of the biggest hurdles to improving could reap the advantages of improved analy- the DOD’s cost-effectiveness is the lack of a sis, enhanced accountability for results, and simple, consistently used means of decision more cost-effective resource management.4 making. The department needs a standard Nearly all corporate business decisions decision support system (DSS) akin to busi- are made using a spreadsheet, the “ubiqui-

*The author is an individual mobilization augmentee to the commandant of cadets, US Air Force Academy. He has advised and participated in resource-management decision making for the Department of Defense as a consultant with the Institute for Defense Analyses (a federally funded research and development center) and as a program manager in the DOD’s Business Management Modernization Program. He has also worked as a manager in Corporate Planning and Development at ConAgra and as vice president and president in several midsize firms.

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01-Merge-Miller.indd 35 1/27/10 1:30:05 PM tous” “core piece of software” that “is utterly system that enables real accountability and pervasive . . . [and] integral to the function consequences for measurable results. Profit, and operation of the global financial sys- return on investment (ROI), discounted tem.”5 The familiarity and constant use of cash flow, or net present value are just the the income-statement spreadsheet as a chosen metrics for making decisions and common language and tool enable much tracking results. To establish cost-effective better analysis and decision making in busi- management and decision making, the ness organizations. The DOD, however, has DOD can use corresponding means to busi- no common format or DSS, using only ness’s nine enablers of cost-effectiveness PowerPoint as a support tool. The depart- (see table). ment makes its decisions on billion-dollar The DOD has been working for a decade programs with a horrible lack of consis- to adopt “capabilities based planning,” a tency and quality, without adequate trans- common framework for planning and man- parency of estimates and analysis, and with aging resources. Many resource-management no record of the criteria and rationale used processes in the Pentagon are now using or to provide accountability. Unsurprisingly, trying to use capabilities as the equivalent this results in poor cost-effectiveness. of a profit bottom line. The most important factor in cost- Most enablers of cost-effectiveness have effectiveness for business is not profit but a been used successfully in some parts of the

Table. Enablers of cost-effectiveness

Business Department of Defense 1. Profit: the bottom line on profit and loss, the 1. Capability: the key criteria, the common metric; common metric reach maximum mission capability, ideally with the flexibility to apply across many scenarios and mission areas 2. ROI (adding in the balance sheet the consequence of 2. Capability ROI: the basis for programming, budgeting, asset costs) and acquisition decisions 3. Accurate cost data 3. Activity-based costing 4. Spreadsheet as the common format for decision 4. MCDM DSS as the common DOD format making 5. “Lines of business” and “profit centers” with profit/ 5. Capability delivery group—a fully costed DOD ROI goals and a responsible, accountable manager operating unit or agency that is the basis for planning, budgeting, and operations 6. A chain of accountability—the same organizational 6. Capability delivery group—a fully costed DOD entity/manager responsible for planning, budgeting, operating unit or agency that is the basis for planning, and operational/fiscal execution budgeting, and operations 7. Operating company/division competition for 7. Capability delivery groups compared with MCDM resources (corporate or investor funding) DSS compete for funding in planning, programming, and budgeting process 8. Accurate, near-real-time profit/ROI reports 8. Improved budget execution and performance reporting using MCDM DSS 9. Consequences for achieving ROI objectives—or not 9. Consequences for outcomes, achieving Capability ROI promises and MCDM DSS claims – For the firm: success, survival – Performance weighed in next round of budget competition for the capability delivery group – For the individual: receiving bonuses, retaining job – Personal ratings and bonuses

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DOD. Others, like capability delivery groups MCDM DSS has the flexibility to cover a wide (CDG) and “Capability ROI” would be new variety of objectives and can be used in all innovations. Achieving cost-effectiveness of the department’s resource-management requires all nine enablers; however, without decision making. A very flexible tool, Dyna an integrating framework like Capability Rank can support the systems approach (as- ROI, managed via a common MCDM DSS, suring consideration of a broad range of al- pulling all enablers of cost-effectiveness to- ternative programs and strategies), decision gether in the DOD is probably impossible. analysis (a structured, disciplined analysis), Despite the optimization goals of plan- and game theory (consideration of adversar- ning, programming, budgeting, and execu- ies’ reactions), weighing cost as a criterion, tion (PPBE), the DOD’s current resource and then using operations-research models management fails to optimize either mili- and simulations for measuring performance. tary capability or cost-effectiveness. As the The DynaRank spreadsheet accommodates Air Force’s former budget chief, Maj Gen application of a wide range of analysis tech- (now Gen) Stephen Lorenz explained, “It niques and information across a diverse rewards advocates who are the most adept range of decision criteria.8 Developed by at articulating increases in spending but RAND analysts Dr. Paul Davis and Dr. Richard sometimes punishes programs that can pro- Hillestad, DynaRank has been used to ad- duce savings. Even worse, it lacks funda- dress the highest-level strategy/major-force mental measures of value on which to base decisions down to decisions on what system decisions. . . . Management processes cur- best accomplishes a mission. rently in place provide little incentive to The DynaRank “scorecard” (fig. 1) shows reduce costs and only limited accountability four options for carrying out the mission of for those costs.”6 prompt global strike. Options or alternatives appear in rows. Goals, objectives, and criteria to consider (organizable in a hierarchy Better DOD Decision Making with high-level goals on top and lower-level and Cost-Effectiveness Require a objectives, along with criteria to measure them, below) appear in columns. The ratings Standardized, Consistently Used, of alternatives entered in the cells may be Multiple Criteria Decision very detailed, objective data where appropriate or just subjective judgments on a Support System scale of one to five. Users can vary the Having just one widely used DSS facili- weight applied to the criteria and the differ- tates better analysis and decision making ent opinions on ratings to do sensitivity and improves accountability because the analysis for seeking options that consis- promised results are clearly recorded in a tently rank highest in aggregate score. format that everyone can understand. A This illustrative MCDM scorecard com- business will also use the same software pares four options (in rows) for improving throughout the organization, with a very the capability of prompt global strike. The limited, controlled family of software. The columns list criteria for comparing the op- DOD, however, with more than 4,000 differ- tions, starting at the top with five high-level ent business information-technology sys- criteria: elimination of the current threat tems, loses billions annually through this (destruction of a target), dissuasion of fu- wasteful lack of standardization.7 Losses ture threats (likely effect of this force from poor decision making due to lack of a change on an opponent’s actions), strategic standard DSS and cost-effective manage- agility (preference for options that not only ment framework are probably much higher. help with prompt global strike for counter- Although the DOD cannot use an income ing threats from weapons of mass destruc- statement as its primary DSS, the DynaRank tion but also have value in other situations),

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01-Merge-Miller.indd 37 1/27/10 1:30:06 PM $PMPS#MBOL$FMMT Prompt Global Strike Improvement Options High Color Value Current NOTE: Future Threat illustrative, fake Threats Top-Level Elimination data, criteria, options Dissuaded Measures 100 Low Color Value High Costs to Impact on Midlevel Target Collateral Prompt WMD Opponents Terrorist Measures Destruction Damage Response Threats to Counter Recruiting 0 Cost-Effectiveness Weight Hardened, Deeply Base-Level Buried Surface Mobile Civilian Execution Measures Target Storage Missiles Casualties Time 1 Goal

(SBQI 'MBH Base Case Row Option No. Type Option

Force Enhanced Structure B-2 1 1 Modiﬁcations 1 F/A-18 with Force Enhanced 1 2 Structure JDAM 1 Cruise Missile Operations Submarine 1 4 Patrols 1

Force Conventional 1 3 Structure ICBMs 1 ICBM = Intercontinental Ballistic Missile JDAM = Joint Direct Attack Munition WMD = Weapon of Mass Destruction

Figure 1. DynaRank scorecard for prompt global strike

political/diplomatic acceptability, and cost. bomber modifications scored highest, and These high-level criteria are then broken the conventional-warhead ICBM lowest. down into subobjectives or measurable cri- The shades of gray help identify high- and teria scored on a 0–100 scale. low-ranking scores. Clearly, the conven- The small number next to each criterion tional ICBM option did poorly in the “strate- is the weight. Here, seven “points” appear at gic agility” area. However, changing the the top criteria level, so cost, with a weight weight on strategic agility from three to of two, provides about 30 percent of the total zero (eliminating it as a criterion), alters score. Users can also adjust weights on how the lower-level criteria add up. For example, the scores but not the rankings of options: this analysis places more emphasis on de- the bomber is still first, and the conven- stroying hardened, deeply buried targets. tional ICBM last. This reflects the real value The MCDM scorecard then adds the of the MCDM DSS approach—testing differ- weighted criteria scores and ranks them. In ent views, ratings, and criteria weights to this example, the option for enhanced B-2 identify consistently superior options.

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Weight or Strategic Political/Diplomatic Minimum Agility Acceptability Cost Score Weight Future Year Multi- Congress- Key Defense Life-Cycle Mission ional Allies’ World Program Capability Scenarios Capability Support Support Opinion Budget Cost Weight

Major WMD Theater Peace- Homeland Overall Threat War keeping Defense Score Weight Aggregate

Though simple, the MCDM DSS can “con- objectives. RAND’s Davis and Hillestad call tain” and weigh the effects of very detailed for using this tool “in a dialogue with deci- analysis. For example, the estimates of col- sionmakers, allowing them to select the em- lateral damage under the criterion of cur- phasis on criteria, observe the implications, rent threat elimination come from detailed and iterate the weighting . . . to study the models of likely civilian casualties. Execu- implications of emphasis.”9 Proper selection tion time for the criterion of prompt re- of goals, objectives, and evaluation criteria sponse may be based on detailed studies or is vital to using this DSS successfully. All general estimates. The MCDM DSS can use parties involved in the process need to subjective judgments for criteria, such as question the criteria, weights, and metrics— views of key allies or world opinion. Like an Excel spreadsheet in business, the DOD which is feasible if it is a common format decision maker can “drill down” to find out and a process familiar to everyone. The ex- what analysis and data generated the score. ample of using MCDM in the GPS program The DynaRank MCDM DSS is not in- cited on the next page shows how a careful, tended to “model” a decision or “compute” transparent process can prove very helpful. an answer thoroughly. Rather, it is a flexible, One of the key criticisms levied by the Gov- capable tool designed to help consider the ernment Accountability Office on the Army’s objectives of a decision and analyze (as well now-cancelled Future Combat Systems pro- as shape/alter) alternatives to best meet gram had to do with the fact that the con-

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01-Merge-Miller.indd 39 1/27/10 1:30:07 PM Successful Use of MCDM in the Department of Defense

Military planners needed to choose between a variety of options with varying performance and costs for new global positioning system (GPS) technology. They also had to consider commercial users of GPS who had some conflicting objectives. What could have been a very difficult and contentious decision-making process ended up yielding a unanimous, amiable decision as a result of using an objective, quantifiable MCDM approach. Using “Value Focused Thinking” and the “Analytic Hierarchy Process” (both elements of MCDM), they identified key performance measures for comparing alternatives. For each high-level “goal,” they identified second-tier “functions” and third-tier “tasks,” ending up with 48 measures. Different GPS customers were interviewed to obtain their recommended weights for criteria. Each group had 100 points to allocate to the various functions that the GPS system would perform. This approach offered the following advantages: • Identified the measures and data most important to collect and analyze • Persuaded people through analysis • Highlighted some counterintuitive results and trade-offs • Mitigated bias by focusing the decision on performance measures Key players said that the results were “surprising and gratifying” and key to getting different GPS user communities to agree unanimously on an alternative. See Lt Col Lee Lehmkuhl, Maj David Lucia, and Col James Feldman, “Signals from Space: The Next-Generation Global Positioning System,” Military Operations Research 6, no. 4 (2001): 5–18.

tractor, not the Army, developed objectives use DynaRank in the Pentagon: a three-star and evaluation criteria. officer told me that it was too complex and Once users make a decision after this detailed for senior executives. In business, “dynamic” look at (1) the different weights however, executives look at far more com- on objectives, (2) the review of ratings if plex financial models and spreadsheets, disagreements or uncertainty occurs (per- usually “drilling down” into details to probe haps rated by different groups), and (3) the for bad assumptions to better understand changes to some of the assumptions or rat- key issues. There was no time to teach ings, then they can save the MDCM score- them how the DynaRank DSS worked, he card selected as best and use it to document argued. Instead, staffers briefed and leaders the decision and the performance results approved a multi-billion-dollar program expected. This is precisely how the income change based on multicolor PowerPoint statement is used in business. It is not just slides, not multicriteria analysis. The lack for planning a line of business and then of a standard DSS for the DOD greatly hin- submitting a budget for it. Once approved, ders the rigorous analysis and decision- the “plan” income statement is not left bur- making reviews common in business—and ied in a PowerPoint briefing (à la the DOD) vital for instituting cost discipline and effec- but is compared frequently to the “actuals” tiveness. Some “operations research” ana- to see how managers execute the plan—and lysts in the DOD do use MCDM, though to hold them accountable for results. (see the sidebar, above). I saw the damage in the DOD from the RAND analysts have used MCDM for de- lack of a ubiquitous DSS tool like the busi- cades to brief senior decision makers; the ness income spreadsheet when I tried to author and his partner used the DynaRank

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MCDM tool to analyze a difficult issue in Despite the DOD’s size and diversity, we Iraq and brief Gen David Petraeus. His staff can use a flexible DSS consistently in re- warned that it was too much and too tech- source management. Governments run on nical to brief, but we insisted. General standard systems.12 DynaRank could work Petraeus concurred with the analysis, noted in the Joint Capabilities Integration and De- that he liked the methodology, and asked us velopment System (JCIDS) and in PPBE to publish the study.10 processes as both the main analysis tool The diversity and enormity of the DOD and DSS to make key resource-management does not preclude use of a common DSS— decisions. The DynaRank MCDM DSS just as businesses in diverse industries all would provide a record to track perfor- use a profit-and-loss system with the same mance, support accountability, do program basic format. Clearly, a need exists for in- evaluation, and learn from mistakes. This is corporating multiple objectives and criteria especially important in the DOD since both into the DOD resource-management DSS, military and civilian leaders tend to change but the DynaRank MCDM offers plenty of every two to three years. flexibility to handle the department’s diver- A common, consistently used, widely sity of issues. understood MCDM DSS offers many other An MCDM DSS would allow the Office of advantages: the Secretary of Defense (corporate) to dictate certain objectives/criteria that every- • Identification of issues and areas of one must consider, along with flexibility for disagreement that do not matter. Using different services and agencies at lower an MCDM DSS to input opposing views levels to add criteria relevant to them. For on ratings and criteria often shows that example, the DOD policy of “cost as an in- irreconcilable differences are irrelevant dependent variable” was adopted to encour- to the decision because some scores age more attention on “cost-performance change but not the overall ranking. 11 tradeoffs to achieve savings.” The MCDM • Elimination of “groupthink.”13 When DSS example for prompt global strike (fig. 1) users write down subjective ideas and showed two cost metrics, included as inde- fuzzy criteria in a DSS and rate them, pendent variables or criteria for the deci- they find it easier to “see” questionable sion. Persuading the DOD to really do cost assumptions and to challenge them by trade-offs has not happened due to prob- questioning the rating rather than lems noted later in this article and the lack questioning some forceful speaker in a of a DSS like DynaRank that facilitates and verbal discussion or PowerPoint briefing. can force the consideration of cost as an independent variable. In the absence of a • Reduction of common human errors in mandated DSS with mandated use of cost as decision making such as the “danger a criterion in MCDM, a bureaucracy (actu- inherent in all analytic approaches, . . . ally a collection of often-competing bureau- the tendency to close on strategies pre- cracies) like the DOD won’t change. maturely: to skip past the creative but This MCDM tool is also a great way to uncomfortable stage of inventing new help the department consider risk. It allows models or strategies.”14 The discipline, adding (and mandating) the consideration transparency, and rigor that a DSS of several different defense-planning sce- helps to impose are critical because of narios and types of conflict. (See the four the innate tendency to judge probabili- different scenarios depicted in fig. 1.) The ties, emotions, and irrationality resulting scorecards are also an exceptional poorly—overreacting to new informa- tool for doing sensitivity analysis—compar- tion and a host of other inadequate ing alternatives across “worst case” as well “seat of the pants” decision-making as “expected” cost and performance estimates. practices.15

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01-Merge-Miller.indd 41 1/27/10 1:30:08 PM • Enabling of faster interagency decision by operational units—precludes account- making during a crisis.16 Different ability, hinders analysis and decision mak- agencies can independently rate the ing, and yields poor cost-effectiveness. This courses of action and then compare in article proposes a new construct for con- the event of major disagreements in ducing PPBE that would provide the consis- ratings or criteria weights. tency and accountability needed for cost- • Simplification of conducting audits, effective resource management in the DOD. checking decisions, and doing program The department shifted to capabilities- evaluations by having objectives, crite- based planning in 2001 to emphasize build- ria, ratings, and alternatives clearly ing more flexible forces with a better likeli- laid out. hood of success in responding to a wide range of uncertain future threats. A 2002 • Assistance in breaking down “stove- report to the DOD’s Senior Executive Coun- pipes” that lead to duplication and cil noted many problems in implementing waste. The common language, soft- capabilities-based management due to the ware, and formats enable better col- lack of a DSS and an integrated frame- laboration and information sharing. work.17 In 2004 the Joint Defense Capabilities Business rarely starts with a blank Study (the“Aldridge Study”) called for a spreadsheet. “ ‘capabilities culture’ that simultaneously 18 The DOD may never achieve the cost- considers costs and needs.” DOD decisions effectiveness of a Procter and Gamble or may affect dozens of military capabilities General Electric, but it can do much better and deal with over 100 types of DOD orga- than its current situation. To bring focus on nizations and military units, all budgeted costs and capabilities and to improve the via thousands of program elements—the state of analysis and decision making, the building blocks of the PPBE process. To in- department needs to mandate use of one tegrate capability-management efforts and MCDM tool as a standard DSS for resource- drive cost-effectiveness improvements, the management decision making. DOD needs decision making based on Ca- pability ROI—analyzing, deciding upon, and tracking issues via the MCDM scorecard Implementing Cost-Effective, based on capability delivery groups. Capabilities-Based Management A new construct, CDGs allow PPBE to replace the ineffective practice of trying to in the Department of Defense budget by 6,000 program elements (primarily The Planning, Programming, and Budget- weapon systems) and hundreds of organiza- ing System has changed little since Robert tional budgeting entities. Operational units McNamara served as secretary of defense, such as the fighter wing (fig. 2) would serve though it is now called PPBE, with the as the basis of CDGs. The costs of headquar- added “E” for “execution”—a goal of devot- ters and supporting elements would be al- ing more attention to looking at how we ac- located to CDGs using activity-based cost- tually spend money and, hopefully, reach ing. The DOD would plan, program, and desired objectives. Different offices may budget by CDGs, which are based on the manage different parts of PPBE in a series primary operational units used to execute of stovepiped processes, but there must be a operations and budget. Doing so would single basis for analysis and decisions—a yield a much better link between capabili- single entity for PPBE. The current pot- ties planning, programming, budgeting, and pourri of thousands of program elements performance reporting. CDGs would be a and constantly changing programming con- much better entity for data feedback on structs—and then budgeting and execution budget execution and accountability.19

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5IFUPUBMDPTUTGPSEFMJWFSJOHUIFDBQBCJMJUZPGBGJHIUFSXJOH &YBNQMFTPG$%(T JODMVEFEJSFDUDPTUTPGUIFPQFSBUJPOBMVOJU JOEJSFDUDPTUTGPS r'JHIUFS8JOH UIFVOJUTQFSTPOOFMBOEJOGSBTUSVDUVSF BOEBMMPDBUFETVQQPSUDPTUT r$BSSJFS4USJLF(SPVQ r.BSJOF&YQFEJUJPOBSZ'PSDF Other CDGs r"SNZ4USZLFS#SJHBEF Fighter Wing CDG Other CDGs Other CDGsDirect Costs: r.BKPS%FGFOTF*OUFMMJHFODF $367 Direct Costs: Direct Costs: "HFODZ*OUFMMJHFODF.JTTJPO Direct Costs:XX YYYYYY PE 1F F-16 Direct PE XX YYYYYY PE XX YYYYYY PE *OEJSFDU$PTUT Allocated Support Costs: 2A Force Installations $35 $32 $12 AWACS Space Navigation Air Operations Center XXXX 2M Central Medical $15 $35 $120 XXXX 2P Personnel Admin. JSTARS Communication System X Tankers XXXX XXXX 2T4 Individual Training An F-16 PE alone cannot deliver any capability. 2T5 Transition Training XXXX F-16 PE = Input? Output?

XXXX 2U Department Mgmt. An F-16 CDG (with allocated support/infrastructure) deliveries capability. F-16 CDG = Outcome XXXX 2V Other Infrastructure

AWACS = Airborne Warning and Control System JSTARS = Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System PE = program element Figure 2. The capability deliver group, a key part of transforming planning, programming, budgeting, and execution into an accountable, cost-effective, capabilities-based resourcing system

Capabilities-based management using serve as a line of business with real ac- Capability ROI focuses on fulfilling capabil- countability and strong incentives to mini- ity needs established through the JCIDS mize costs to compete better against other process, balancing risks across mission ar- CDGs and win funding (fig. 3). eas. The early part of this process now The federal government is pushing per- largely ignores cost-effectiveness. Cost con- formance reporting, but setting goals and siderations arise later at the “analysis of al- measuring outcomes are not enough to pro- ternatives” stage, often limited solely to duce good management in the DOD be- expensive options designed without cost- cause there is no chain of accountability to effectiveness in mind. The lack of an easy- hold a specific organization or its leader re- to-use, widely understood “spreadsheet-like” sponsible for results. Rather, we have DSS makes it difficult to consider cost is- • numerous plans at many organiza- sues early in the JCIDS. To design more tional levels, cost-effective capability options, the DOD must involve budget and cost experts earlier • program analysis by weapon system or in the JCIDS process, using the common for some capability, MCDM DSS with cost as a criterion and • a budget-by-component organization focusing on a Capabilities ROI “bottom line” structure that often does not match a at the start of the process. weapon system / program or operational CDGs would compete in PPBE program/ unit that delivers the capability, and budget reviews, with the Office of the Secre- tary of Defense selecting CDGs with the • failure to weigh/consider/budget for best ROI to fill priority gaps. CDGs would all the associated support/infrastruc-

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01-Merge-Miller.indd 43 1/27/10 1:30:09 PM #VTJOFTTFTBSFDPTUFGGFDUJWFCFDBVTFUIFZIBWFBi$IBJOPG"DDPVOUBCJMJUZuPOFQFSTPO JODIBSHFPGBOESFTQPOTJCMFGPSBMMQSPDFTTFT GSPNQMBOTUISPVHIFYFDVUJPOBOESFQPSUJOH

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Figure 3. Chain of accountability

ture costs that should rise or fall, based PowerPoint briefing do not leave a usable on changes in other DOD organiza- “scorecard” to compare plans and promises tions’ use of them. to results. A weapon system doesn’t operate on its own, and the mishmash of new ac- So when results are disappointing, what do quisition programs, old program elements, we blame? and operating organizations yields confu- • Bad plans? sion and cover.20 It’s an ideal system for avoiding blame. One organization plans, • Wrong programming, analysis, or others acquire equipment and systems, an- promises? other office does the budgeting, and then • Inadequate budget? different operating units execute the budget. Combining this diffusion of functional and • Poor execution of great plans and operational decision makers with the lack budgets? of a standard, consistent spreadsheet por- Unless the same organization is the basis trayal of “this is what you promised to do / for the planning, programming, budgeting, this is what you’ve actually done” allows and operational/budget execution, there perfect deniability. Former DOD officials— can be no accountability for delivering including Anthony Cordesman, now with promised results. Instead, we have a budget- the Center for Strategic and International focused process with incentives to over- Studies—note that the department “has promise on performance and fully spend been locked into a ‘liar’s contest’ at the level every penny budgeted. of defense contractors, program managers, The DOD’s reliance on PowerPoint and every military service, and the Office of the seat-of-the-pants decision making, with Secretary of Defense where no one is really planning, programming, and budgeting by held accountable.”21 different organizations and managers, yields Many pieces of a capabilities-based man- no accountability and poor cost-effectiveness. agement system for the DOD are develop- Decisions made and “documented” via a ing, but without CDGs and an overarching,

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common tool for analysis and decision mak- mon DynaRank DSS is more important than ing like DynaRank, they won’t survive or waiting for a perfect, precise, or complete achieve integration and cost-effectiveness. system. It will be difficult to set up and cal- Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) and culate capabilities-based ROI across hun- US Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) have suc- dreds of the DOD’s CDGs. But if we roll out cessfully used activity-based cost account- and enforce a standard analysis and MCDM ing and capabilities-based planning and DSS, the huge analysis, planning, program- budgeting.22 AFMC succeeded in lowering ming, and budgeting staffs in the depart- unit costs and persuading “cost centers” to ment can do this. Results will improve rap- spend less than their budget, in favor of idly as they share lessons learned from better cost-effectiveness.23 USAFE imple- using a common approach and DSS. mented capabilities-based programming.24 Finally, we must dispel the belief that But without a commonly used DSS, a con- the DOD is simply too big, complex, and sistent basis for analysis and accountability diverse to lend itself to cost-effective man- at all stages of PPBE, and all nine enablers agement. It surely is big, but multinational of cost-effectiveness, these isolated efforts corporations with more diverse lines of will not succeed. business than the DOD’s and operations in Building accountability and incentives to over 100 countries manage to consolidate save budget rather than fully spend a bud- business systems and use common DSS ap- get won’t happen unless spending is tied to proaches cost-effectively. The DOD has

Finally, we must dispel the belief that the DOD is simply too big, complex, and diverse to lend itself to cost-effective management.

the operating entity (CDG) that competes multiple objectives and criteria to consider in the PPBE process, using Capability ROI. in its decisions, and an MCDM DSS is It is critical that we base the costs used in clearly essential. RAND’s Dr. Paul K. Davis CDG competition in PPBE not on what the concludes that “it is possible to go from the CDG claims it can deliver in cost-effectiveness high concepts of grand strategy down to the performance, but on what it actually cost nitty-gritty issues of economic choice using the CDG to perform in the past year of bud- one intellectual framework. There is no get execution. This will give operating units / guarantee that this process of working up CDGs the incentive not to “use it or lose it” and down the ladder of choice will be easy. but to underspend their budgets to attain a But it is both feasible and desirable—given higher Capability ROI and position them- strong management, good will, and partici- selves for better success in upcoming CDG pation by senior leaders of the defense budget competitions. Supporting services community.”25 and agencies will also have incentives to cut This MCDM DSS, using CDGs and a Ca- spending and lower costs or face operating- pability ROI framework for decision making, unit customers that reject their support will never perfectly capture all the issues (and thus allocated costs) as too expensive and information that might be considered for the capability they add. in DOD resource management. Nor will it Commitment to initiate a process of stop the political interference and problems CDGs and Capability ROI as the basis for injected by congressmen who push their DOD resource management using a com- favorite weapon systems and pork projects.

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01-Merge-Miller.indd 45 1/27/10 1:30:10 PM But explicitly laying out and organizing the Many successful chief executive officers multiple objectives, showing the uncertain- have worked in the Pentagon. Some generals ties, using a common approach for measur- have been hired to manage and improve ing different types of military capability, logistics in business.26 We have very capable, estimating metrics even when very subjec- dedicated military and civilian employees tive, and recording the final rationale for working these issues, but they are fatally the decision in a spreadsheet for account- handicapped by the lack of a common DSS ability will improve analysis and cost- such as the business income statement and effectiveness. The overall approach out- spreadsheet. Efforts to make the DOD cost- lined here offers a good way to do the effective will not succeed until the struc- “dynamic” analysis that RAND’s Davis and ture and framework for decision making are Hillestad advocate to let decision makers transformed into a consistent process with take the intuitive shortcuts and simplifica- the same organizational entity used in all tions they use to make difficult prioritiza- steps of PPBE. Our fighting men and tion, risk, and trade-off decisions. The women and taxpayers need to recover some MCDM DSS, CDG, and Capability ROI ap- of the estimated 25 percent of wasted DOD proach proposed in this article is not per- spending. It is long past time for rigorous fect, but no other contender exists now, use of an MCDM tool as part of a Capability other than business as usual. It is vital that ROI–managed, accountable, and cost- we pick some improved approach and re- effective Department of Defense. ✪ quire everyone in the DOD to use it for Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan analysis and decision making. With widespread and common use, great improvement in the system will come over time.

Notes

1. William Matthews, “Obama’s Partial Victory: Tool (PAT): Theory, Methods, and Reference Manual Minus Some ‘Wasteful Projects,’ U.S. Spending Bill (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009), http://www.rand Remains Massive,” Defense News, 2 November 2009, .org/pubs/technical_reports/2009/RAND_TR756 http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4354391 .sum.pdf (accessed 14 December 2009). (accessed 14 December 2009). 5. Russ Banham and Sam Knox, “When Do Com- 2. Quoted in Robert A. Watson and Ben Brown, panies Outgrow Their Spreadsheets?” CFO Research The Most Effective Organization in the U.S.: Leader- Services, 1 June 2004; Robert Kugel, “A Better ship Secrets of the Salvation Army (New York: Crown Spreadsheet Alternative,” Intelligent Enterprise, 20 Business, 2001) (see book cover). May 2005, http://intelligent-enterprise.information 3. See NBC Nightly News, 10 September 2001, week.com/showArticle.jhtml;jsessionid=D321T4AWB http://icue.nbcunifiles.com/icue/files/icue/site/ 2TRLQE1GHRSKH4ATMY32JVN?articleID=163106301 pdf/3551.pdf (accessed 14 December 2009). (accessed 14 December 2009); and Grenville J. Croll, 4. A not-for-profit corporation or “think tank,” “The Importance and Criticality of Spreadsheets in RAND developed the original Planning, Program- ming, and Budgeting System methodology and the City of London,” European Spreadsheet Risks MCDM tools for the DOD’s use. See Richard J. Interest Group, 2005, [4], http://arxiv.org/pdf/ Hillestad and Paul K. Davis, Resource Allocation for 0709.4063v2 (accessed 14 December 2009). the New Defense Strategy: The DynaRank Decision- 6. Maj Gen Stephen R. Lorenz, Lt Col James A. Support System (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1998), Hubert, and Maj Keith H. Maxwell, “Linking Re- http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/ source Allocation to Performance Management and MR996/ (accessed 14 December 2009); and Paul K. Strategic Planning: An Air Force Challenge,” Aero- Davis and Paul Dreyer, RAND’s Portfolio Analysis space Power Journal 15, no. 4 (Winter 2001): 34–35,

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http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/ sourcing and Execution to Satisfy Joint Capabilities apj01/win01/win01.pdf (accessed 14 December 2009). (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 7. “Strategic Planning and Budgeting Domain 2004), B-12, http://www.worldcat.org/wcpa/oclc/561 Overview Briefing,” DOD Business Management 34236?page=frame&url=http%3A%2F%2Fpurl.access Modernization Program, August 2004. .gpo.gov%2FGPO%2FLPS52753%26checksum%3Df2bf 8. See Hillestad and Davis, Resource Allocation for e7764aba17f961c9c53aed657ee2&title=&linktype= the New Defense Strategy. digitalObject&detail= (accessed 15 December 2009). 9. Ibid., 38. 19. Drew Miller, “Using DynaRank for Effects- 10. Mason Brooks and Drew Miller, “Inside the Based Operations and Capabilities-Based Tradeoff Detention Camps: A New Campaign in Iraq,” Joint Analysis” (presentation to the Military Operations Force Quarterly, 1st Quarter 2009, 129–33, http:// Research Society Symposium, US Military Academy, www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i52/ West Point, NY, June 2005). 25.pdf (accessed 14 December 2009). 20. Ibid. 11. David S. C. Chu and Nurith Berstein, “Decision- 21. Anthony H. Cordesman and Paul S. Frederiksen, making for Defense,” in New Challenges, New Tools Is Defense Transformation Affordable? Cost Escalation for Defense Decisionmaking, ed. Stuart E. Johnson, in Major Weapons Programs (Washington, DC: Center Martin C. Libicki, and Gregory F. Treverton (Santa for Strategic and International Studies, 27 June Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), 26, http://www.rand.org/ 2006), 4, http://www.comw.org/rma/fulltext/ pubs/monograph_reports/MR1576/MR1576.ch1.pdf 0606cordesman.pdf (accessed 15 December 2009). (accessed 14 December 2009). 22. Michael Barzelay and Fred Thompson, Effi- 12. “Limitation of Systems,” Bob Behn’s Public ciency Counts: Developing the Capacity to Manage Management Report 3, no. 9 (May 2006): 1–2, http:// Costs at Air Force Materiel Command (Arlington, VA: www.ksg.harvard.edu/thebehnreport/May2006.pdf IBM Center for the Business of Government, August (accessed 14 December 2009). 2003), http://www.businessofgovernment.org/pdfs/ 13. See Irving L. Janis, Groupthink: Psychological barzelay_report_fms.pdf (accessed 15 December Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascos, 2d ed., rev. 2009); Sean Wilson, USAFE/A5PE, “USAFE POM Pro- (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982). cess,” PowerPoint Briefing, 2003; and Robert Millman, 14. Henry Mintzberg, The Rise and Fall of Strate- USAFE/A5PE, “FY07 APOM Capability Program De- gic Planning: Reconceiving Roles for Planning, Plans, liverables,” PowerPoint Briefing, 2003. Planners (New York: Free Press, 1994), 185. 23. Barzelay and Thompson, Efficiency Counts. 15. For a good summary of these common decision- 24. Lorenz, Hubert, and Maxwell, “Linking Re- making errors, see Herbert A. Simon and Associates, source Allocation”; and Philip J. Candreva, “Ac- “Report of the Research Briefing Panel on Decision counting for Transformation,” Armed Forces Comp- Making and Problem Solving,” in Committee on troller 49, no. 4 (Fall 2004): 11, http://web.ebscohost Science, Engineering, and Public Policy, Research .com/ehost/viewarticle?data=dGJyMPPp44rp2%2fd Briefings 1986: Report of the Research Briefing Panel V0%2bnjisfk5Ie41%2beK8%2bTnjqzj34HspOOA7eny on Decision Making and Problem Solving (Washington, WK%2borUmzpbBIrq%2beSa6ws064qrY4v8OkjPDX7 DC: National Academy Press, 1986), 17–35, http:// Ivf2fKB7eTnfLujtUqvr7NRr6a1PurX7H%2b72%2bw www.netlibrary.com/urlapi.asp?action=summary& %2b4ti7hfLepIzf3btZzJzfhruntEi3qrFKs5zkh%2fDj34 v=1&bookid=14732 (accessed 15 December 2009). y75uJ%2bxOvqhNLb9owA&hid=101 (accessed 15 16. Drew Miller, Institute for Defense Analy- December 2009). ses, Using Decision Trees as a Decision Support Sys- 25. Paul K. Davis, “Uncertainty-Sensitive Plan- tem for EBO Analysis and Rapid COA Analysis and ning,” in New Challenges, New Tools, 155, http:// Selection, 2003. (Available from the author at www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1576/ [email protected]) MR1576.ch5.pdf (accessed 15 December 2009). 17. “Report to the Senior Executive Council on 26. For example, Lt Gen William Gus Pagonis, Streamlining Decision Process,” item no. 20, Defense USA, director of logistics during the Gulf War of Planning Guidance, 2004–9, October 2002. 1991, was hired by Sears in 1993 to fix its logistics 18. Department of Defense, Joint Defense Capa- system. He retired from Sears in 2004 as president of bilities Study: Improving DoD Strategic Planning, Re- its logistics services.

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01-Merge-Miller.indd 47 1/27/10 1:30:11 PM Achieving a Cost-Effective Balance in the Department of Defense Concurrent and Proportional Recapitalization of the Air National Guard

Lt Col W. Mark Valentine, ANG Maj Sean Frederick Conroy, ANG*

When Desert Storm kicked off, we had some great capability within the Air National Guard and the A-7 platform. But the active duty [Air Force] was not flying the A-7, and they were concerned with getting the top-of-the-line weapons in the fight, and we were not asked to participate. That seems to me to be a great waste of money. It makes no sense to have a platform that you’re not going to use in war. —Lt Gen Harry Wyatt Director, Air National Guard 29 July 2009

he Department of Defense (DOD) is offs in traditional strengths to enable engaged in the final stages of its Qua- growth in new areas.2 Today’s zero-sum drennial Defense Review (QDR), fiscal environment makes such actions dif- Tduring which it seeks to identify likely na- ficult. The debate surrounding the structure tional security challenges and associated of the Air Force’s current fighter force pro- response options to better guide future US vides a prominent example of a traditional defense investments. Each service has strength’s receiving attention as a likely worked tirelessly to justify and advocate “bill payer” due to perceived limitations in programs that pursue US strategic aims. For today’s counterinsurgency conflicts. Cur- the Air Force, the primary goals have in- rent decision makers, however, have cre- cluded rebalancing the force to increase competencies in irregular warfare and rein- ated a false dichotomy. Freeing resources vigorating its nuclear enterprise.1 Through for emerging mission sets does not neces- these efforts, the Air Force seeks to better sarily have to come at the expense of the contribute to ongoing conflicts in Iraq and future structure of the fighter force—if the Afghanistan and increase the effectiveness Air Force can maintain the structure in a of the US nuclear deterrent. more efficient manner. By leveraging and Strategy is an art of making choices investing in the proven, cost-effective Air among exclusive options, and the Air Force National Guard (ANG), the Air Force can is developing a strategy to manage trade- realize these efficiencies.3

*Lieutenant Colonel Valentine, a pilot in the 113th Wing (DC Air National Guard), is chief of the Air National Guard Strategic Studies Group. Major Conroy, a member of the 159th Fighter Wing (Louisiana Air National Guard), is an action officer in the Air National Guard Strategic Studies Group.

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Thirty percent of the Air Force’s current tion, chief among them the quantity of fight- fighter fleet resides in the ANG, which main- ers needed to execute existing operational tains the majority of air sovereignty alert plans, the steady-state security posture, and (ASA) sites, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, ASA operations. Although most people sitting ground alert and patrolling the skies agree that the new fighter requirement will above the United States, tracking potentially decrease, they differ on the necessary level.7 hostile targets and other targets of interest, The Air Force’s obligation to prepare for including civilian aircraft in distress.4 Addi- two simultaneous major combat operations tionally, ANG fighter units execute de- (MCO) is among the principal considerations ployed missions as full partners in the air for emerging strategic guidance.8 Further and space expeditionary force. ANG air- influencing reductions in the fighter force craft, however, are the oldest in the fighter are assumptions that we are not likely to fleet and among the last scheduled for re- conduct even a single MCO against a con- placement with fifth-generation fighters like ventional force and that improvements will the F-35.5 Thus, the ANG shoulders the ma- make each aircraft more capable.9 jority of institutional risk of losing aircraft Current US plans maintain that we must with the consequent loss of capability and have 2,250 fighters to avoid a high-risk sce- relevance. Without a change in the recapi- nario, based on Air Force assets supporting 10 talization plan, the Air Force stands to lose two MCOs. The current QDR may replace a majority of the most cost-effective portion the two-MCO construct, but with no defini- of its fighter portfolio, with an associated tive guidance to the contrary, we retain the loss in capability. This article presents a so- assumption that two MCOs will continue to lution by means of concurrent and propor- drive fighter requirements. However, ac- tional recapitalization of ANG resources. knowledging strategic uncertainties and the fact that newer aircraft will enjoy increased capabilities and efficiencies, we assume The Fighter Gap Debate that the nation does not incur high risk until the force structure falls 20 percent below Grounded in the trade-off discussion above, the currently defined requirement. There- one debate focuses on the sufficiency of the fore, we assume that the Air Force’s fighter current fighter force to meet national objec- needs lie between 1,800 and 2,250 aircraft.11 tives. The terms fighter gap or fighter bathtub As demonstrated later, however, even a represent the difference between the fight- substantial reduction in overall fighter re- ers the nation needs (to execute its strategy) quirements will not significantly alter the and those it will have in the future.6 Three existence or magnitude of a capability gap primary variables govern the existence for the ANG. and/or extent of the fighter gap: the fighter With the need defined, the next question requirement, the efficacy of the existing becomes how long our current fleet will fleet, and the procurement plan for replace- last. Although each type of fighter aircraft ment aircraft. has an advertised service life measured in Ultimately, the national military strategy hours, several factors complicate the pro- and force-planning construct determine our cess of defining actual life expectancy. The fighter requirements. The impending QDR first is knowledge that service life deter- will inform both of these. Framing the de- mined by the vendor or system program bate is the fundamental question of how office is not a “magic number” beyond many fighters the United States needs to which the aircraft will cease to exist. Rather, fulfill its strategic objectives. Notwithstand- the number represents that point at which ing Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’s the engineering community expects the av- comments on the quality of the emerging erage aircraft to require expensive physical fighter fleet, many factors affect this ques- overhauls such as bulkhead replacements

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02-Merge-Valentine-Conroy.indd 49 1/27/10 1:30:28 PM and wing changes. Risk planners should ing the existence and magnitude of a capa- therefore think of service life as an eco- bility gap. We assume no change in the cur- nomic threshold beyond which the costs of rent F-35 procurement schedule—1,763 maintaining and refurbishing an aircraft aircraft at a rate of 80 per year starting in will exceed the expected value of doing so. 2015, with deliveries beginning in 2017. Most readers will have faced a similar Assumptions for the three major vari- dilemma when deciding to replace an old ables described above (requirement, service car. In many scenarios, owners stare at a life, and procurement) prove useful in illus- six-digit odometer and weigh the expected trating the Air Force’s current fighter struc- costs and benefits of keeping the old car ture (fig. 1). The upper horizontal line indi- versus purchasing a new one. Sometimes— cates the currently stated requirement of if the car stops working, for example—they 2,250 aircraft, and the lower horizontal line have no choice. Facing a huge repair bill, indicates the 20 percent reduction (1,800), owners decide that a newer, more reliable mentioned above. This figure illustrates vehicle is the best use of their money. With- that the service has done an admirable job out a breakdown scenario, they must rely of mitigating risk in the near term and faces on the best advice of their mechanics to com- only a minor capability gap beyond 2024. pare the expected costs of maintaining the But figure 1 does not show how the ma- vehicle with those of purchasing a new one. jor variables affect the ANG’s fighter portfo- The discussion of service life becomes lio. Using the same assumptions, we con- more complicated when we acknowledge sider the ANG’s fighter force structure (fig. that many fighter aircraft operate at vari- 2). Here, the light area represents existing ance with the engineering assumptions legacy or fourth-generation aircraft (A‑10s, about service life. For that reason, planners F-15s, F-16s), and the dark area depicts ex- and system program offices apply correc- isting and projected fifth-generation aircraft tion factors to original estimates that trans- (F‑22s and F-35s). Fielding plans for the late actual flying hours (AFH) into equiva- F-35, which recapitalize six active compo- lent flying hours (EFH). Again, the car nent (AC) wings (with 72 aircraft each) be- analogy is useful in demonstrating this con- fore recapitalizing the first ANG squadron cept. All of us are familiar with used-car lit- in 2019, have a significant effect on the fig- erature that advertises a high-mileage car as ure’s dark area.13 Significantly, the illustra- having “highway miles,” a claim that attempts tion assumes that as active units receive to communicate to the would-be buyer that F-35s, their newer F-16s (primarily block 40 the vehicle is in better condition than one and 50 variants) will cascade down to the would judge, based solely on the odometer. ANG to recapitalize older aircraft. Although the regression methods used to Figure 2 indicates an ANG fighter gap derive the relationship between AFH and beginning in 2010 and becoming more pro- EFH lie beyond the scope of this article, nounced through 2015–16, when newer leg- EFH is a more reliable indicator of actual acy aircraft arrive from recapitalized AC aircraft age and thus emerges as the best units. The fact that the ANG operates the predictor of aircraft age-out. Therefore, the large majority of the oldest Air Force fighter authors use EFH in this article as the pri- aircraft accounts for the drastic difference mary indicator of aircraft age.12 between figures 1 and 2. Following the cur- The number and rate at which the ser- rent Air Force recapitalization plan, which vice receives new aircraft constitute the fi- calls for the AC to realize almost 500 F-35s nal variable that defines the fighter gap is- before the ANG sees its first one, means that sue. The total number of aircraft purchased the legacy fighter force will age out prior to is an important variable in the long term. In the fielding of a replacement aircraft. For the near term, however, the procurement the ANG, therefore, the fighter gap becomes rate becomes the critical factor in determin- a scenario wherein it will retire aircraft due

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Figure 1. Structure of the Air Force’s fighter force. Data on aircraft age is based on the Reliability and Maintainability Information System’s June 2009 update. The darkest shades in the bottom of the chart represent fifth-generation aircraft (F-22s and F-35s). The multiple lighter shades represent various models of legacy aircraft (F-16s, F-15s, A-10s). (From National Guard Bureau / Strategic Planning.)

Figure 2. Structure of the Air National Guard’s fighter force. (From National Guard Bureau / Strategic Planning.)

02-Merge-Valentine-Conroy.indd 51 1/27/10 1:30:29 PM to age faster than replacements can support pated in enforcing the Balkans no-fly zone even a reduced requirement. and in Operation Allied Force. Moreover, The solution first requires the Air Force to when Operation Enduring Freedom kicked acknowledge the ANG’s shift from a strategic off in 2001 and Operation Iraqi Freedom in reserve to an operational force. Later, the so- 2003, ANG units participated from day one, lution requires concurrent and proportional deploying 236 of the Air Force’s 863 aircraft fielding of new systems between the AC and (27 percent), 92 of them fighters (31 percent reserve component (RC). Although the ratio of the total fighters). Over 7,200 air guards- will vary across different mission-design se- men deployed for the opening phase of ries and/or functional areas, fielding new Iraqi Freedom, representing 11 percent of systems in the AC and RC concurrently will the 64,246-strong Air Force contingent.18 mitigate the ANG’s inventory problems and In some cases, the ANG took the lead in preserve the most cost-effective portion of force presentation. Several guardsmen from the Total Force’s fighter structure. operational units, the ANG, and the Air Force Reserve Test Center were instrumental in developing new tactics, tech- The Evolving Air National Guard: niques, and procedures for integrating Missions emerging fighter capabilities with US and coalition special operations forces. These The ANG has always performed as both a efforts led to the creation of the 410th Air strategic reserve and an operational force, Expeditionary Wing, an entirely ANG-led delivering critical capability to the US defense wing that integrated ANG, Air Force, and strategy by filling the gap when mission re- Royal Air Force (British) units. The 410th quirements exceed the Air Force’s force conducted counter-theater-ballistic-missile structure. Starting in 1953 and continuing missions (a strategic priority of the com- after the end of the Cold War, the ANG per- bined force commander) and provided di- formed air defense missions (the historic rect support to teams of special operations precursor to ASA) to protect the United forces in western Iraq.19 States from an air threat. This tasking even- The wars in the Middle East have wit- tually involved every ANG fighter squadron.14 nessed the continual presence of the ANG, Driving this mission was the inability of the which has provided fighters; airlift; air refu- AC to man the mission sufficiently while eling; search and rescue; special operations; concurrently meeting overseas commit- and intelligence, surveillance, and recon- ments.15 Thus, the Cold War period demon- naissance in five different manned and un- strates the use of the ANG as a strategic re- manned platforms alongside active duty serve that provided a capability shock counterparts constantly since 2001. The absorber even as it conducted operational ANG currently provides 25 percent of both missions instrumental to homeland defense.16 remotely piloted vehicle sorties and pro- Critical ANG integration did not end with cessing, exploitation, and dissemination ser- the thawing of the Cold War. After Saddam vices to the joint force.20 In addition, ANG Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, the United air operations groups, medical groups, secu- States mobilized for war, sending hundreds rity forces squadrons, and civil engineering of Air Force assets and thousands of personnel squadrons have all deployed in support of to the Persian Gulf, including 12,456 ANG overseas contingency operations. Finally, guardsmen.17 During the 12 years following after the attacks of 11 September 2001, the the Gulf War, almost every fighter unit in nation tasked the ANG to restart the ASA the ANG deployed to the Middle East to en- mission; currently, it operates 16 of the 18 force the no-fly zones in northern and ASA sites. Clearly, as the chief of staff of the southern Iraq—many on multiple occa- Air Force stated, “The Air National Guard is sions. Additionally, ANG fighters partici- indispensible. . . . [It] is integral to the total

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force. . . . The scale has tipped to the Air Block 30s in its inventory the ANG still has National Guard as an operational reserve.”21 Block 25 and 30 F-16 squadrons. The increased operational use of reserve The F-22, however, presents an illustra- forces culminated in Department of De- tive case. Air Force procurement of 381 fense Directive (DODD) 1200.17, Managing F-22s to fulfill the requirement (reduced the Reserve Components as an Operational from the 750 called for originally) would Force, signed by the secretary of defense on have greatly alleviated the acute issue of 28 October 2008. This document recognizes ANG recapitalization. Concepts proposed the RCs as part of the Total Force, emphasiz- for equipping the ANG with the F-22 in- ing that “it is DoD policy that . . . the RCs cluded a plan that would have better sup- provide operational capabilities and strate- ported air defense operations by replacing gic depth to meet U.S. defense require- older aircraft in the four corners of the 25 ments across the full spectrum of conflict” United States. As it stands, only two while providing a “connection to and com- ANG units will fly the F-22. The Virginia mitment of the American public.”22 ANG now flies it in a classic association with an AC unit at Langley AFB, Virginia. In this type of association, the Air Force The Evolving Air National Guard: maintains possession of the aircraft, and ANG personnel fly and maintain it along- Materiel side the AC owners. The Hawaii ANG will Acknowledging use of the RC as an op- receive hand-me-down F-22s during fiscal erational force, however, has not translated year 2012 with traditional unit ownership into a concomitant procurement strategy. of the airframes. Since its inception, the Air Force has con- The F-35 program further illustrates the tinually acquired new aircraft and equip- need for concurrent and proportional re- ment, passing the old (and generally infe- capitalization. The plan to recapitalize cur- rior) models to the RC. For example, as the rent ANG fighters follows the pattern out- AC upgraded its second-generation F-102s lined above, and the operational risk shouldered by the ANG renders the plan and F-106s to third-generation F-4s, it dangerously slow. According to the Gov- passed the older aircraft—those with lim- ernment Accountability Office, 11 of 18 ited ability to support existing war plans—to ASA units will age out prior to receiving the ANG for single-mission tasking in air new aircraft.26 The current F-35 fielding defense. Once the fourth-generation fight- program may be proportional in the long ers came on line (F-15s and F-16s), those run (fig. 3) since the percentage of fighter F-4s went to the ANG. Recapitalization of force structure in the AC and RC is roughly the fighter fleet in this manner is indicative equal at the beginning and end of the proof the now-outdated notion of the ANG as a gram, but it is decidedly not concurrent mere strategic reserve. since in the near term the RC loses a dis- Nevertheless, the trickle-down pattern proportionate percentage of aircraft. The continues as the Air Force recapitalizes or chief risk for the ANG, therefore, lies in inactivates squadrons. For example, AC the possibility of the Air Force’s curtailing F-16s progressed from Block 10 to 15, 25, 30, the F-35 program short of reaching the goal 40, and 50, yet only one ANG unit currently of 1,763 aircraft. flies the Block 50.23 F-15Cs/Ds replaced These fears are not unfounded. If his- F-15As/Bs, and the F-15E production line tory is a guide, then actual F-35 procure- ended with all of the jets in AC squadrons.24 ment will likely involve far fewer aircraft In seven AC squadrons, F-22s replaced than the 1,763 currently planned.27 With F-15Cs, many of which flowed to the ANG. the exception of the F-117, the United Even though the AC has no Block 25s or States has drastically reduced its planned

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02-Merge-Valentine-Conroy.indd 53 1/27/10 1:30:30 PM Impact The impending ANG fighter gap is a symptom of a larger problem—suboptimal fielding decisions on behalf of the DOD and Air Force. As demonstrated earlier, these plans, based on the outdated perception of the RC as solely a strategic reserve, typically replaced RC equipment with hand-me- down equipment from the AC as the latter received newer systems. As illustrated above, the Total Force has abandoned the notion of the RC as a simple strategic reserve or single-mission air defense force; rather, the AC increasingly uses the RC as an operational force and shock absorber for surging demands. In most contemporary cases, the RC is an instrumental part of the frontline fighting force. Yet, even though use of the RC has steadily increased, funding and equipping of the force follows the historical paradigm. According to Secretary of the Air Force Michael B. Donley and Chief of Staff of the Air Force Gen Norton A. Schwartz, “Our Figure 3. Percentage of fighter force in the active FY10 budget proposal accelerates the integra- and reserve components. (From National Guard tion of our Guard and Reserve components Bureau / Strategic Planning.) into new and emerging mission sets, including unmanned aerial systems, F-22 and F-35 missions. By considering Air National Guard acquisition of low-observable aircraft. The and Air Force Reserve Command for inclu- F-117 program saw 59 operational aircraft sion in emerging mission areas and basing purchased following a planned procure- strategies, we capitalize on the experience and ment of 20.28 The B-2 and the F-22 programs, however, saw 20 for 132 and 187 unique skill sets that our Air Reserve Compo- 29 nents contribute to the Total Force” (emphasis for 750, respectively. If a reduced buy 31 occurs, with a consequent delay in the added). Despite such Total Force language ANG’s recapitalization, the ANG cannot highlighting the critical and indispensible sustain current missions, including ASA. contribution of the RC, the AC has yet to The Air Force’s need for the RC as an op- match words with action—especially in the erational force presents the nation with a realm of recapitalization. Ostensibly done dire situation—one analogous to an era to maintain equities in the AC—perceived when the ANG flew outmoded aircraft by senior leaders as the most accessible and neither credible enough to deter the na- responsive part of the force—recapitalization tion’s enemies nor able to defeat them if plans based on anachronistic notions of a deterrence failed. As Secretary Gates said, strategic reserve hurt the Total Force in sev- “The role of the National Guard in Ameri- eral ways.32 For the RC, these plans predict- ca’s defense has transformed from being a ably reduce the component’s access to the strategic reserve to being part of the pool newest equipment, ultimately reducing its of forces available for deployments.”30 ability to carry out its missions at home and

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abroad. The post-9/11 buildup to Iraqi Free- Block 30 F-16s with older Block 25 models dom offers a telling example of this condition. from another unit. The New York congres- At that time, the ANG operated most of the sional delegation responded quickly with Block 30 F-16s. These aircraft lacked critical the statement quoted above. Essentially the capabilities for delivering precision-guided New York representatives held every active, munitions increasingly desired by com- Guard, and Reserve F-16 hostage until they manders for Operations Northern and received a commitment to upgrade the Southern Watch. Unable to receive targeting 174th Fighter Wing. The language that ulti- pods from the AC due to budget priorities, mately became part of the act was less se- the ANG ultimately defined its own require- vere, but the delegation got its message ment for a precision air-targeting system, across: in 2002 the 174th received later- which led to procurement of the Litening II model F-16s, as well as the Sniper Advanced advanced targeting pod, funded by the Na- Targeting Pod, and retired the Block 25s.35 tional Guard.33 Additionally, the ANG solved Members of Congress are willing to en- a dearth of data-link capability by fielding gage when they see constituents negatively the Situational Awareness Data Link. These affected by bureaucracy. As ANG aircraft systems enabled the ANG Block 30 fleet to age and become less relevant against in- provide necessary capabilities to combatant creasingly sophisticated global threats, Con- commanders, leading to significant ANG gress will likely act, and the results will sat- participation in ASA, Enduring Freedom, isfy only the locals. Procurement of the and Iraqi Freedom. Without these National F-15E Strike Eagle offers another example. Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas delivered 209 Guard purchases, the ANG’s capabilities 36 deficit would have rendered it less effective F-15Es between 1987 and 1994. Sales then as an operational force. shifted to foreign buyers. During the 1996 to For the AC, reduced RC capabilities re- 2001 funding cycles, threatened with a ter- quire that it shoulder a greater burden in mination of the F-15 production line (and terms of missions and tasks. Additionally, loss of 5,000 jobs), Congress forced an addi- recapitalization plans based on historic notional 36 F-15Es on a reluctant Air Force. tions threaten the AC’s control over its own During 1999, Congress funded five addi- acquisition and force-structure programs by tional F‑15Es even though the Air Force had not requested any.37 Of the $220 million ap- invoking the ire of interested parties such propriated for these aircraft, $70 million as Congress. Evidence of this occurs in the came from a reduction in the maintenance following example of legislative language: budget.38 None of the funds provided in title III of this Current, similar examples threaten the Act may be obligated for F-16 aircraft modifi- Air Force’s ability to reap cost savings from cations until the Secretary of the Air Force the early retirement of legacy systems. submits a report to the congressional defense Such savings could provide funds to boost committees detailing a plan to assign, no later F-35 production significantly or develop than the first quarter of fiscal year 2002, F-16 emerging missions.39 If the Air Force is con- Block 40 aircraft, or later model F-16 aircraft, to Air National Guard units which were de- vinced that the future of the fighter force ployed to Operation Desert Storm.34 lies with the F-35, can it afford to accept new F-16s or even a 4.5-generation fighter Only two ANG F-16 units deployed to like the F/A-18E Super Hornet? Operation Desert Storm, one of them the Additionally, the ANG is home to some 174th Fighter Wing, New York ANG. Follow- of the most experienced pilots in the Air ing their return from the Middle East, both Force. The current recapitalization plan units received later-model F-16s. During allows ANG aircraft to age out prior to re- 1999, ostensibly to open a training base at placement, effectively reducing aircraft another Guard base, the 174th swapped its inventory below the level needed to sus-

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02-Merge-Valentine-Conroy.indd 55 1/27/10 1:30:30 PM tain pilot proficiency. The ANG is a store- mitment on the part of the Air Force to house of flying experience that allows the agree to a desired AC/RC fighter force mix Air Force to retain expertise while develop- and apportion the corresponding percent- ing new pilots. Without aircraft, severe age to each component each year. This is consequences such as a loss of experience not necessary early in the program since caused by reduced pilot absorption ripples the majority of aircraft must be coded for across the Total Force, and initiatives de- testing and training. For example, assuming signed to capture the efficiencies of the that the current ANG-to-AC proportion re- ANG come to an abrupt halt. Even a pro- mains constant (approximately one to portional recapitalization arrives too late to three), a production of 80 operational air- save the real value of the unit—its people craft should see 24 of them programmed to and their experience. DODD 1200.17 man- recapitalize ANG units, with the remaining dates cross-component assignments inte- 56 flowing to the Air Force. Additionally, to grating the AC and RC. The current recapi- meet the understandable desires of over- talization plan negates this integration for seas units, the service could generate more the entire fighter community unless the operational units faster by initially recapi- Air Force concurrently equips both compo- talizing squadrons in units of 18 versus 24 nents with similar capabilities.40 aircraft.43 Once each scheduled squadron The final AC issue becomes one of cost- has reached the 18-aircraft threshold, the effectiveness and efficiency. Specifically, Air Force could revisit locations where it both the Government Accountability Office desires 24 aircraft. and the Commission on the National Guard The Total Force benefits when the ANG and Reserves have found that the average can better execute its responsibilities as an ANG unit operates at approximately 25 per- operational force and support the Air cent of the cost of its AC counterpart.41 Force’s surge requirements. To ensure that Comparing the capabilities that the ANG the ANG retains this ability, it must main- provides to the Total Force (30 percent) to tain interoperable equipment, which re- its portion of the overall Air Force budget (6 quires concurrent and proportional fielding percent) presents further evidence of the of new weapons systems. This article dem- efficiencies of the ANG.42 Admittedly, these onstrates that immediately commencing figures do not reduce the cost of procuring concurrent and proportional recapitaliza- F-35s, but planning their beddown in the tion of the RC will allow the Air Force to Air Force’s most cost-efficient franchise continue to use the RC as it has done during seems a prudent move, based on current the past 19 years. fiscal realities. Concurrent and proportional recapitalization also benefits the service in terms of creating a trickle-down effect for the future Conclusion: and the possibility of preventing another Concurrent and Proportional ANG capability gap 40 years from now. Contemporary recapitalization choices af- Recapitalization Will Minimize fect future recapitalization. Concurrent and and/or Eliminate the Negative proportional recapitalization today prevents Effects of the Current Plan future leaders from facing the same problem tomorrow. The Air Force can attain the twin goals of The authors recognize the inevitable concurrency and proportionality without criticism that this article will engender, additional monetary investment. It needs likely leading to claims that an outmoded only the imagination and will to create a ANG fighter mafia is seeking to maintain a new road map that addresses the concerns foothold in a dying mission area. This is discussed above. Critical to this map is com- not the case, however, since the authors

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merely seek the most efficient manner of numbers of fighters required to meet the fulfilling national security objectives. Con- nation’s security objectives. By definition, current recapitalization is neither a new this study should be informed by the final nor an unusual concept with respect to the QDR recommendations and emerging na- AC and RC. In fact, it has occasionally tional military strategy. Next, the Total been the norm in the airlift community. Force—that is, all of the services—must ar- As early as 1979, the ANG recapitalized rive at a common definition of service life, C-130A aircraft with brand-new, off-the- especially with the fielding of the triservice assembly-line C-130Hs.44 F-35. Moreover, in this area, the addition of The director of the ANG recently stated reliable costing data for Service Life Exten- that the Air Force—therefore the ANG—will sion Programs (SLEP) and modernization operate fewer fighters in the future.45 This programs would offer leaders better infor- is a given; however, the ANG should main- mation with which to make investment tain its fighter-force equities in proportions decisions. Before embarking on a SLEP, similar to the presidential budget prior to given the emerging threats, Air Force lead- fiscal year 2010 (approximately one-third). ers must determine how long the existing Additionally, the concurrency and propor- legacy fighter fleet will remain relevant. tionality arguments made in this article ap- Such a determination informs both the ply to procurement efforts outside the cur- SLEP and modernization programs. Fi- rent fighter debate. Specifically, the concepts nally, this article highlights the need to de- described should extend to recapitalization termine the appropriate force-structure plans that will soon emerge for the C-130 mix between AC and RC forces. Previous and KC-X, as well as current discussions on studies have done an admirable job of dis- the Air Force’s transition of all MQ-1s to the cussing the variables that affect such a ANG to create room for AC procurement of mix, but more research is necessary re- newer MQ-9s. garding the particulars of how this mix should vary among mission sets and how steady-state, deploy-to-dwell ratios should Areas for Future Study affect the percentages. ✪ The Air Force should conduct a new op- Washington, DC erational analysis to better identify specific

Notes

1. House, Department of the Air Force, Presentation sonnel: DOD Needs to Establish a Strategy and Im- to the House Armed Services Committee, United States prove Transparency over Reserve and National Guard House of Representatives, Fiscal Year 2010 Air Force Compensation to Manage Significant Growth in Cost Posture Statement, the Honorable Michael B. Donley, (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, Secretary of the Air Force, and General Norton A. 2007), 21, 41; and US Commission on the National Schwartz, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, 111th Guard and Reserves, Transforming the National Guard Cong., 1st sess., 19 May 2009, http://www.posture and Reserves: Final Report to Congress and the Secre- statement.af.mil/. Hereafter Fiscal Year 2010 Air tary of Defense (Arlington, VA: Commission on the Force Posture Statement. National Guard and Reserves, 31 January 2008), 65–68. 2. Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes, eds., 4. “The Air Force in Facts and Figures,” Air Force Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy Magazine 92, no. 5 (May 2009): 48, http://www.airforce (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, -magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2009/May 2004), 292. %202009/0509cover.aspx (accessed 10 December 2009). 3. Several sources point to the cost-effectiveness 5. The claims made in this article have their ba- of the ANG, compared to similar Air Force units. See sis in the latest F-35 fielding plans of Air Combat US Government Accountability Office, Military Per- Command. Recent initiatives by the Strategic Basing

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02-Merge-Valentine-Conroy.indd 57 1/27/10 1:30:31 PM Executive Steering Group, led by Assistant Secretary 2,250 fighters is under review. “Air Force Need for of the Air Force, Installations, have indicated that F-35s Is under Review,” Government Executive, 3 June several ANG bases are candidates for F-35 fielding. A 2009, http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0609/ listing as possible candidate bases, however, does not 060309cdpm1.htm (accessed 11 December 2009). constitute a definitive commitment on behalf of the 12. Each vendor and/or system program office Air Force to address ANG recapitalization needs. has a different AFH-to-EFH correction factor for 6. Given the limited size of the forces available, each specific model of aircraft. even with fifth-generation capability, the United 13. For the purposes of this article, the term AC States would have trouble deterring or defeating a refers to the regular Air Force. The term reserve com- determined and growing Chinese fourth-generation ponent (RC) indicates both the ANG and Air Force fighter threat supporting a Taiwan Strait expedition. Reserve. The term Total Force includes both the AC See Frank Camm et al., Managing Risk in USAF Force and RC. Planning (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009), http:// 14. There were 70 ANG fighter squadrons at the www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND time. _MG827.pdf (accessed 10 December 2009). 15. Susan Rosenfeld and Charles J. Gross, The Air 7. John A. Tirpak, “Fighter of the Future,” Air National Guard at 60: A History ([Arlington, VA]: Air Force Magazine 92, no. 7 (July 2009): 22–27, http:// National Guard, 2008), 9. www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/ 16. Throughout the Cold War, the Air Force had Pages/2009/July%202009/0709cover.aspx (accessed the capacity to maintain a dedicated home-station 10 December 2009). alert force in addition to its “wartime” force structure 8. Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense since it had 36 fighter wing equivalents. This option Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April no longer exists because capacity diminished rapidly 2001 (as amended through 19 August 2009), http:// to 20 fighter wing equivalents after the Cold War. See www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/m/10567 Adam J. Hebert, “Eighty-Six Combat Wings,” Air .html (accessed 9 September 2009). Force Magazine 89, no. 12 (December 2006): 25–29, 9. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates asks, http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/ “Where on earth would we do that?” Robert M. Gates, Pages/2006/December%202006/1206wings.aspx (ac- “A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon cessed 22 September 2009). for a New Age,” Foreign Affairs 88, no. 1 (January/ 17. Rosenfeld and Gross, Air National Guard at February 2009): 34. 60 , 16. 10. The reduction of F-22s from 381 to 183 (now 18. Gen T. Michael Moseley, Operation Iraqi Free- 187) reflected an acceptance of moderate risk in dom—By the Numbers (Shaw AFB, SC: US Central favor of low risk. See Norton A. Schwartz (remarks, Command Air Forces, 30 April 2003), 3, http://www Defense Writers Group, Washington, DC, 17 Febru- .globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2003/ ary 2009), http://www.airforce-magazine.com/ uscentaf_oif_report_30apr2003.pdf (accessed 17 Sep- DWG/Pages/default.aspx (accessed 10 December tember 2009). 2009). Presumably, the same argument holds true 19. Ibid., 4. about any reduction of the overall Air Force fighter 20. Personal communication with National fleet requirement below 2,250 aircraft (assuming Guard Bureau, Directorate of Intelligence, Surveil- that the F-35 buy proceeds at the planned 1,763 air- lance, and Reconnaissance, 29 October 2009. craft). “The Air Force position remains that a 2250 21. Gen Norton A. Schwartz (remarks, 131st An- combat aircraft inventory is the required force.” See nual Meeting of the National Guard Association of Senate, Lt Gen Donald J. Hoffman, SAF/AQ, and Lt the United States General Conference, Nashville, TN, Gen Daniel J. Darnell, AF/3/5, Presentation to the Sen- 12 September 2009). ate Armed Services Committee, Airland Subcommittee: 22. Department of Defense Directive (DODD) Aviation Programs, 110th Cong., 2d sess., 9 April 2008, 1200.17, Managing the Reserve Components as an Op- http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2008/ erational Force, 29 October 2008, 1, 2, http://www April/Hoffman-Darnell%2004-09-08.pdf (accessed 6 .dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/120017p.pdf October 2009). The House debated a reporting re- (accessed 10 December 2009). quirement based upon a projected shortfall of the 23. “Lockheed Martin F-16CJ/DJ Block 50D/ “2,200” requirement. See National Defense Authoriza- Block 52D Fighting Falcon,” Jane’s Information Group, tion Act of 2010, HR 2647, 111th Cong., 1st sess., Con- http://www.janes.com/articles/Janes-Electronic gressional Record 155 (25 June 2009): H7265. -Mission-Aircraft/Lockheed-Martin-F-16CJ-DJ-Block 11. Chief of Staff of the Air Force Gen Norton A. -50D-Block-52D-Fighting-Falcon-United-States.html/ Schwartz testified that the Air Force’s plan to field (accessed 11 December 2009).

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24. “United States—Air Force [Order of Battle]” Color of Money’ ” (Washington, DC: NGAUS, 2009), Jane’s Information Group, http://www8.janes.com/ 4, http://www.ngaus.org/ngaus/files/ccLibrary Search/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janes Files/Filename/000000004992/NGAUS%20101%20 data/binder/jwaf/jwafa297.htm@current&page Resourcing%20the%20National%20Guard.pdf (ac- Selected=allJanes&backPath=http://search.janes cessed 16 September 2009). .com/Search&Prod_Name=JWAF&keyword= 34. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, #toclink-j0011040007747 (accessed 29 October 2009). 2001, HR 4576, 106th Cong., 2d sess., Congressional 25. Senate, Statement of Hon. Michael W. Wynne, Record, 7 June 2000, sec. 8110, H4010, http://www Secretary of the Air Force, U.S. Senate, Subcommittee .globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2000 of the Committee on Appropriations, 110th Cong., 2d _rpt/hr4576-h.htm (accessed 10 December 2009). sess., 12 March 2008, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 35. The following is the final language in the act: pkg/CHRG-110shrg11069104293/html/CHRG-110shrg “SEC. 132. REPORT ON MODERNIZATION OF AIR 11069104293.htm (accessed 29 October 2009). NATIONAL GUARD F-16A UNITS. The Secretary of 26. Davi M. D’Agostino, Homeland Defense: Ac- the Air Force shall, not later than February 1, 2001, tions Needed to Improve Management of Air Sover- submit to Congress a plan to modernize and up- eignty Alert Operations to Protect U.S. Airspace (Wash- grade the combat capabilities of those Air National ington, DC: US Government Accountability Office, Guard units that, as of the date of the enactment of 2009), 27, http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/ this Act, are assigned F-16A aircraft so that those LPS114056 (accessed 11 December 2009). units can be deployed as part of Air Expeditionary 27. Already, emerging strategy proposals are Forces.” Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authoriza- advocating reduced F-35 procurement. Thomas P. tion Act of 2001, Public Law 106-398, 106th Cong., 2d An Air Force Strategy for the Long Haul Ehrhard, sess., 30 October 2000. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary 36. “Boeing F-15E Eagle,” Jane’s Information Assessments, 2009). Group, http://www.janes.com/articles/Janes-All 28. Barry Watts, The F-22 Program in Retrospect, -the-Worlds-Aircraft/Boeing-F-15E-Eagle-United CSBA Backgrounder: Strategy for the Long Haul -States.html (accessed 11 December 2009). (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary 37. United Press International, “F-22 Endures Assessments, August 2009), 11, http://www.csba Cut, F-15 Gets Funds,” 7 October 1999. online.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/B.20090908 38. Sgt Jon Soucy, USA, “Wyatt Says Air Guard Faces .F-22_Program_in_Re/B.20090908.F-22_Program_in Capitalization Issues,” National Guard News, 29 July _Re.pdf (accessed 11 December 2009). 2009, http://www.ng.mil/news/archives/2009/07/ 29. Ibid. 072909-Wyatt.aspx?src-rss (accessed 3 September 2009). 30. Senate, Statement on DOD Challenges Submit- ted to the Senate Armed Services Committee by Secre- 39. The following language was debated in the tary of Defense Robert M. Gates, 111th Cong., 1st sess., House version of the National Defense Authorization 27 January 2009, http://www.defenselink.mil/ Act for fiscal year 2010: “Not later than 90 days after speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1337 (accessed 22 the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense September 2009). shall submit to the congressional defense commit- 31. Fiscal Year 2010 Air Force Posture Statement. tees a report on 4.5 generation fighter aircraft pro- 32. Albert A. Robbert, William A. Williams, and curement. The report shall include the following . . . Cynthia R. Cook, Principles for Determining the Air Force (6) A discussion regarding the availability and feasi- Active/Reserve Mix (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), bility of F-35s in fiscal years 2015 through fiscal year 11, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/ 2025 to proportionally and concurrently recapitalize 2007/MR1091.pdf (accessed 11 December 2009). the Air National Guard” (emphasis added). In addi- 33. The National Guard made this purchase us- tion to the report on 4.5-generation aircraft, the ing the National Guard and Reserves Equipment House debated language both prohibiting the retire- Account and specific congressional additions to the ment of “any fighter aircraft pursuant to the Combat National Defense Appropriations Act. The National Air Forces restructuring plan” and requiring that “at Guard determined that the planned AC-to-RC cas- least $344,600,000 shall be expended for continued cade of low-altitude navigation and targeting infrared operation and maintenance of the 249 fighter air- for night (LANTIRN) pods did not add sufficient craft scheduled for retirement in fiscal year 2010 capability to the ANG’s F-16 fleet. DOD policy now pursuant to such restructuring plan.” National De- restricts such purchases to the parent service. Na- fense Authorization Act of 2010, H7265, 7300. tional Guard Association of the United States, 40. DODD 1200.17, Managing the Reserve Compo- “NGAUS 101: Resourcing the National Guard or ‘The nents as an Operational Force, enclosure at 10.i.

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02-Merge-Valentine-Conroy.indd 59 1/27/10 1:30:32 PM 41. US Government Accountability Office, Mili- 43. Acknowledging the capability increase of tary Personnel, 21, 41; and Commission on the Na- fifth-generation aircraft over their fourth-generation tional Guard and Reserves, Transforming the National cousins gives an additional boost to the concept of a Guard and Reserves, 65–68. standard AC squadron size of 18 aircraft. See Hebert, 42. The 30 percent capability is the ANG’s total “Eighty-Six Combat Wings.” aircraft inventory (1,213) divided by AC’s total air- 44. Rosenfeld and Gross, Air National Guard at craft inventory (3,990). The 6 percent figure comes 60 from an analysis of the ANG budget and the total , 14. Air Force budget. For a complete breakdown of the 45. Lt Gen Harry M. Wyatt, director of the Air Na- analysis, see Commission on the National Guard tional Guard (remarks, 131st Annual Meeting of the and Reserves, Transforming the National Guard and National Guard Association of the United States Gen- Reserves, 65n2. eral Conference, Nashville, TN, 13 September 2009).

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A Cyber Proving Ground The Search for Cyber Genius

Lt Col Kristal L. M. Alfonso, USAF*

he search for cyber leadership has thought that great military genius could not followed standard military protocols: arise without the “paradoxical trinity” of officers with proven worth in their war; specifically, violence, chance, and sub- Trespective fields have risen to senior ranks ordination to policy govern war and its mili- and assumed leadership positions in the tary leaders.2 “cyber mission.” Success in the traditional The advent of the cyber domain, how- war paradigm, however, does not necessarily ever, defies Clausewitzian notions of mili- equate to success in the cyber realm. Nor tary genius and challenges traditional ap- does military genius based on Clausewitzian proaches to command. For example, the parameters necessarily manifest itself as physical violence inherent to war does not cyber genius. exist within the cyber realm. Nor do the de- I propose a new approach to unlocking mands of traditional war: strength, physical potential cyber genius, not on a Clausewitzian courage, and the ability to cope with violent battlefield but within the cyber realm itself. death. The concepts of cyber and virtual This approach derives loosely from the Army’s conflicts, unfortunately, seem too abstract Aberdeen Proving Grounds and involves for many military leaders to comprehend. development of a comparable Cyber Prov- Instead, their responses remain consistent ing Ground (CPG) system. CPGs could al- with previous approaches to revolutions in low the US military and other government military affairs (RMA): deny the revolution, agencies to discover untapped talent capa- operate as before, and apply tried and true ble of leading and defending America’s in- doctrine of past successful models to the terests in the cyber realm. I do not suggest RMA (e.g., one need only look at the evolu- that Clausewitzian genius is no longer ap- tion of the Air Force). In cyberspace the US plicable in an age of cyber warfare, only military has focused on domination and de- that it is not necessarily transferable from nial, based on the success of current air, physical battlefields to cyberspace. Cyber land, and sea doctrines, instead of consider- genius does not depend upon the trinity of ing more adaptive approaches that could war, and the US military should not use warrant greater successes but at much Clausewitzian standards to search for the greater risks. Napoléon of cyberspace. Carl von Clausewitz defined genius as “a very highly developed mental aptitude for a Where Is the Next Bobby Fischer? particular occupation” and used it to differ- Clausewitz identified only two true mili- entiate between competent and great military geniuses: Napoléon Bonaparte and tary commanders.1 Although genius is an Frederick the Great. Both men demon- easy trait to describe, Clausewitz asserted strated the necessary coup d’oeil, or strate- that it was exceedingly rare and emerged gic insight, and the determination that, ac- only during the violence of warfare. He cording to Clausewitz, defined military

*The author is deputy chief, Engagement Division, Air Force Research Institute, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

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01-VA-Alfonso.indd 61 1/27/10 1:30:58 PM genius; however, without actual wars to re- Palmer notes that the object is the veal their genius, neither may have secured “knowledge that reside[s] . . . somewhere . . . his place in history.3 War is a relatively rare in physical or conceptual space, as de- occurrence since most states regard it as a scribed by the ‘facts’ ”; the experts are “people last resort of political discourse between trained to know these objects in their pris- nations. Therefore, potential military genius tine form without allowing their own sub- may go undiscovered since very few large, jectivity” to affect the description of the ob- modern wars have occurred to test a multi- ject. The amateurs are “people without tude of military commanders. training . . . who depend on the experts” to In contrast, cyberspace offers numerous gain knowledge, and the baffles occur be- opportunities to discover genius. Instead of tween the transmissions, serving as the lens seeking rare opportunities to demonstrate through which knowledge flows from the this trait, prospects can develop and engage expert to the amateur but usually not in rein virtual warfare to challenge their abilities verse.5 This model follows the hierarchical as potential cyber leaders. Unfortunately, model ingrained in the modern US military current military leaders and the military system and its education system—one that cyber system in which they operate ignore creates tremendous difficulties for any at- novel ways of discovering leadership abili- tempt to educate and develop personnel by ties and genius. Rather, they adhere to tradi- using new methods that depart from the tional methods of leadership development, traditional teacher-student or expert-amateur promotion, and command selection as the model. With regard to cyberspace knowl- only appropriate means for determining edge and experience, though, the paradigm combat leaders.4 Although some services has reversed itself: individuals traditionally have attempted to adopt more innovative considered amateurs or students, based on approaches to recruiting and training (e.g., age and experience, have become the ex- America’s Army and the Air Force MyBase), perts. Considered digital or net natives, a Western approach to imparting knowledge members of the younger generation, who remains inherent in these approaches. Ac- have grown up surrounded by and using cording to Dr. Parker Palmer, the dominant the Internet and associated platforms, are model of truth telling and truth knowing actually teaching members of the older gen- involves four major elements (see figure). eration, who are digital or net immigrants. Thus, regarding cyber education, Depart- ment of Defense (DOD) leaders must directly challenge the bureaucratic traditions currently embodied by the military services 0CKFDU in order to adopt innovative education and training techniques that recognize this shift in the knowledge structure. Similar to civil- &YQFSU #BGGMFT ian organizations that face challenges to their traditional hierarchy, the DOD must “break down deep-rooted biases that inhibit [it] from seizing opportunities to open up innovation.”6 Biases within the DOD’s mili- "NBUFVS "NBUFVS "NBUFVS "NBUFVS tary command and control structure are obvious, beyond the traditional education model employed by the services; that is, Figure. Elements of truth telling and truth know- officers must meet certain education, age, ing. (Adapted from Parker J. Palmer, The Courage to personal comportment, and physical re- Teach: Exploring the Inner Landscape of a Teacher’s quirements in order to be considered for Life [San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1998], 103.) command positions. Within each of the ser-

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vices, demands for combat experience also motely piloted aircraft systems employed limit the pool of potential commanders: by the Air Force, Army, and Navy establish fighter pilots dominate Air Force leadership, the military’s level of comfort with using infantry officers dominate Army leadership, cyberspace to enhance performance and and blue-water ship commanders dominate mission effectiveness. The CPG could take Navy leadership. Given such self-imposed the military applications of cyberspace to a restrictions on potential leaders, the rarity higher level by incorporating other compo- of Clausewitzian genius comes as no sur- nents within the US government. prise. These stringent standards should not Just as participants in the virtual world apply to the cyber domain simply because known as Second Life interact with other they hinder the DOD’s ability to discover players via financial and educational appli- and develop cyber genius.7 cations, so could personnel from multiple The demand for experts in the highly agencies interact within military, financial, competitive, continuously evolving world of policing, educational, and infrastructure computer programming, engineering, and applications. For example, as members of cyber applications remains extremely high.8 the military engage in operations such as The task of finding cyber genius and exper- counterinsurgency, State Department par- tise continues to confront civilian organiza- ticipants can simultaneously involve them- tions as well as government institutions. In selves in establishing government infra- light of this high demand and the challenges structure. As the CPG adapts to inputs from of finding and hiring people with the re- participants, it can create new challenges quired expertise, any organization seeking for military and State participants. In this to remain competitive must adapt innova- example, if military actions taken by DOD tive methods for acquiring and retaining personnel result in collateral damage at a this talent. The military, which needs this nearby school, both the military and State expertise to remain effective in its national individuals will have to seek a means to security mission, must seek alternatives to overcome backlash from the local population. traditional recruiting and education methods This example illustrates a CPG’s most that will facilitate the discovery and maturing obvious benefit: freedom to evaluate a variety of cyber genius. If properly developed and of participants continually. In the search for nurtured, CPGs not only could mitigate the the next cyber genius, a CPG could allow rarity of genius and provide one method to the DOD to test both nonmilitary and mili- develop it but also could produce a number tary participants—at minimal cost and with of additional benefits. Like the agoras or much-needed interagency engagement.11 A marketplaces of ancient Athens, modern CPG could quickly cull marginal or inept “ideagoras” “make ideas, inventions, and sci- participants and promote the more capable entific expertise around the planet accessible.”9 ones. With each increasing level of diffi- Based on the concept of an ideagora, culty, the system could narrow the advanc- CPGs could make diversity of thoughts and ing fields while simultaneously evaluating ideas an asset to the DOD and other agen- new candidates at introductory levels. A cies. The ideagora potential inherent in the system similar to the “Elo” rating system CPG could provide the next evolution of used in the analog strategies of games like Goldwater-Nichols.10 Instead of having to chess and Go could track competitors, rank- train and practice in the real world at great ing and bracketing them against each other expense, participants from a multitude of within the CPG. Participants would receive government agencies could interact and points based on their performance, which train within the CPG, which could easily be in turn would elevate, sustain, or demote a joint military system. The Army’s use of a them to the appropriate level of challenge. “first person shooter” gaming system to re- Within the world of chess, the Elo rank- cruit new personnel and the current re- ing system has largely mitigated the as-

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01-VA-Alfonso.indd 63 1/27/10 1:30:59 PM sumptions of genius built upon physical run at all in order to possess genius in the successes. In order to reach the level of virtual realm created by this system. Clausewitzian genius in the more traditional domains of warfare, one would have to demonstrate physical capability in addi- Violence Is Inherent in the tion to the mental agility required of coup Traditional System of War d’oeil. Someone with perceived physical Clausewitz posited that violence is the weaknesses, such as paralysis or even traits 13 associated with gender, could be dismissed “first-born son of war.” Because of this in- outright without any examination of his or trinsic violence, a military genius must pos- her mental ability simply because of the sess both physical and moral courage. physical demands of traditional warfare. Cyberspace, however, does not embody or Chess, however, like other games of strategy, employ violence in the traditional sense. Destruction can occur, but it is neither per- relies upon the mental agility and ability of 14 the player to predict an opponent’s future manent nor unrecoverable. Destruction in cyberspace, therefore, does not equate to moves and has no correlation to physical death and defeat. Unlike physical war, cyber capability. The demands of cyber operations space is not only the medium but also the more closely relate to the rigors of competi- message.15 Media theorist Marshall McLuhan tive chess than to the rigors of physical suggested that advanced technological com- combat. In a CPG, the system could mea- munication mediums, such as the Internet sure participants on their performance, or telecommunication systems, have similar to the evaluation of chess players. evolved into their own messages to share Failure to learn and adapt could result in with the world. Furthermore, McLuhan the- an initial denial of “genius” level, but that orized that evolutions in communication would not necessarily end the scenario or systems would lead to the creation of a challenge. The participant could continue global network or village.16 An enemy can- to interact with and improve the system as not permanently destroy cyberspace or both producer and consumer, or prosumer, a 12 eliminate a cyber opponent because they term coined by strategist Don Tapscott. have become too entrenched in McLuhan’s Even though a participant may initially fall global village, with layers of redundancies short of genius-level rating, feedback from and ever-increasing dependencies on the the CPG could remediate deficiencies of the cyberspace system. This lack of violence individual or group and encourage improved and death enables potential commanders to decision-making processes for future con- do something that Clausewitz deemed im- flicts on the cyber battlefield. possible: purposely discover, learn, and de- In contrast to simulated traditional war velop genius. games, which fail to replicate the real expe- The initial opportunity to develop cyber rience of war, virtual war games will be genius could occur during development of nearly identical to actual cyber warfare. the CPG system. A CPG truly attractive to a Thus, the military can safely examine both variety of participants would need to em- cyber offensive and defensive tactics in an brace cutting-edge, “massively multiplayer isolated network environment, an ability online role-playing game” (MMORPG) tech- that can enable the development of both nology with real-world implications and ap- “attack” and “defense” geniuses. Further, plications. The US government needs to re- virtual fighting within the CPG would not cruit software developers on par with make the same physical demands on par- Blizzard or Nintendo programmers in order ticipants. In the CPG system, it will not to develop a viable CPG. It could do so by matter how far or fast someone can run; in using the “Goldcorp Challenge.”17 That is, fact, he or she may not have to be able to DOD leaders could propose the challenge of

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developing a viable CPG on par with the puter programmers has exploited, a learning MMORPG World of Warcraft or the virtual system “should immediately extrapolate and world Second Life, offering a lucrative cash simulate an idea, offering the user a vision reward along with an implementation con- of new worlds and possibilities of his or her tract for the winning format. During the de- own thinking.”22 The CPG would give partici- velopment stage, an integrated product pants a chance to learn, individually or in team could be established to allow both groups, and would rank them, based on their DOD and non-DOD personnel to exchange abilities, while continually expanding its ca- ideas and concepts. The process could re- pabilities. The process could continue as sult in increased understanding among all long as the US government employs the sys- parties as well as an interesting and effec- tem, offering US leaders various options for tive simulation. dealing with potential cyber threats. Context The notion that one can learn genius re- would shape content within the CPG, limited sembles Alan Kay’s theory that manipulation only by human imagination. The CPG could of “ideas through the medium of the com- enable humans “to create things that could 18 puter would transform the way one thinks.” or couldn’t, should or shouldn’t, exist.”23 Through a CPG system’s iterative process, participants would learn from the system and from one another—a method of teaching Conclusion and learning posited by Palmer in which the “amateurs” learn about the “object” from Within the cyber realm, virtual reality each other, allowing them to become “know- replaces the physical realm, and the tradi- ers” instead of remaining amateurs.19 Com- tional knowledge structure has shifted. Vio- munities of participants or knowers could lence, the most obvious aspect of traditional exchange ideas and information in efforts to war, does not dominate cyberspace conflict. overcome CPG challenges in this ideagora. Younger generations possess the knowledge The mass collaboration among participants and experience in cyber applications that and CPG developers would benefit the indi- senior leaders and commanders often lack. viduals involved, their respective organiza- CPGs allow commanders to wage actual cy- tions, and the system itself. ber war with near-instantaneous feedback As technology advances, a CPG could on successes and failures, speed, clarity, evolve into an artificial intelligence system and coup d’oeil while tapping into the expe- and thus become another form of cyber ge- riences and knowledge of their younger nius in its own right. As the system interacts subordinates. Genius could reveal itself with human participants, the CPG could through this iterative process of in-depth adapt to human responses and craft even more study of past performances, tests, and evalu- challenging scenarios. Again, the chess world ations. CPGs would allow for continuous has already demonstrated this possibility assessment of potential cyber commanders with the development of IBM’s Deep Blue and mitigate the physical demands of tradi- computer, which defeated world chess cham- tional warfare. Similar to the Elo system of pion Garry Kasparov in 1997, the first time a chess ranking, the CPG could assign rank- computer had beaten a top-ranked human ings to participants, based on their perfor- competitor.20 (The Elo system had ranked mance within the system. Without physical Kasparov number one in the chess world.) constraints, genius could arise from various This concept, known in the gaming world as backgrounds. Younger, physically or men- “botting,” already exists as prosumer gamers tally handicapped, elderly, or overweight develop code to allow automated systems to people; a collection of individuals; or artifi- engage in game play and maximize the hu- cial intelligence itself could all develop man participant’s performance.21 As Kay has their own genius beside able-bodied mili- theorized and as this new generation of com- tary or nonmilitary leaders. Encouraged

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01-VA-Alfonso.indd 65 1/27/10 1:30:59 PM and embraced by their senior leaders, tinuously evaluate personnel who over- younger generations can step forward to come challenges more effectively while become subject-matter experts. improving the performance of all partici- The cyber realm frees humanity from pants. Just as Clausewitzian genius could physical realities associated with traditional arise only on battlefields, so can cyber ge- war. Within cyberspace, death is not final. nius emerge only within the cyber realm. The discovery of cyber genius does not de- Thus, the search for that genius should take pend upon actual war; CPGs using an Elo- place not on the battlefield but within the styled ranking system could quickly discern cyber domain itself. ✪ between commanders with and those without cyber coup d’oeil. CPGs could also con- Maxwell AFB, Alabama

Notes

1. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. 11. Adam Brate, Technomanifestos: Visions from Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: the Information Revolutionaries (New York: Texere, Princeton University Press, 1976), 100. 2002), 217. 2. Ibid., 89. 12. Tapscott and Williams, Wikinomics, 132. Don 3. Clausewitz used the French term coup d’oeil Tapscott is chief executive of New Paradigm, a think (“glance”) to refer to “the quick recognition of a truth tank and strategy consulting company. that the mind would ordinarily miss or would perceive 13. Clausewitz, On War, 99. only after long study and reflection.” Ibid., 102. 14. See Martin C. Libicki and Rand Corporation, 4. Paul T. Mitchell and the International Conquest in Cyberspace: National Security and Institute for Strategic Studies, Network Centric Information Warfare (New York: Cambridge Warfare: Coalition Operations in the Age of US University Press, 2007). Military Primacy (London: International Institute 15. Brate, Technomanifestos, 195. for Strategic Studies, 2006), 35. 16. Ibid., 198. 5. Parker J. Palmer, The Courage to Teach: 17. Tapscott and Williams, Wikinomics, 9. The Exploring the Inner Landscape of a Teacher’s Life (San Goldcorp Challenge involved efforts by Goldcorp to Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1998), 102–3. extract gold from a dying gold mine in Ontario. In 6. Don Tapscott and Anthony D. Williams, 1999 Rob McEwen, chief executive officer of that Wikinomics: How Mass Collaboration Changes company, placed all of the geological information Everything (New York: Portfolio, 2006), 112. from the mine on the Internet and offered $575,000 7. Mitchell and the International Institute for in prize money to anyone who could figure out how Strategic Studies, Network Centric Warfare, 35. to access the remaining gold. The contestants’ 8. Tapscott and Williams, Wikinomics, 56. identification of 110 substantial deposits of gold 9. Ibid., 98. transformed Goldcorp from a $100 million company 10. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of to one worth $9 billion. Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 brought 18. Ibid., 173. numerous changes to the DOD in an attempt to 19. Palmer, The Courage to Teach, 102. mitigate interservice rivalries by clarifying the roles 20. Dylan Loeb McClain, “Once Again, Machine of the service chiefs and the chairman of the Joint Beats Human Champion at Chess,” New York Times, Chiefs of Staff. Established because of failures of the 5 December 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/ services to communicate effectively during the 12/05/crosswords/chess/05cnd-chess.html?_r=1 botched attempt to rescue the Iranian hostages in (accessed 1 December 2009). 1979 and the invasion of Grenada in 1983, the act 21. Most MMORPGs, like World of Warcraft, have elucidated the lines of communication between the rules against botting since it gives certain players an services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. unfair advantage over others, particularly in player- Some individuals contend that we need a Goldwater- versus-player realms. Nichols II to help streamline communication 22. Brate, Technomanifestos, 173. between the DOD and other government agencies 23. Ibid., 177. such as the State Department, Department of Energy, and the Central Intelligence Agency.

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The Resurgence of Russian Interests in Central Asia Lt Col Scott G. Frickenstein, USAF*

n the blogosphere, across the air gained very little clout since Central Asians waves, and in print, many people perceived a disconnect between Russia’s have opined about how the Obama “walk” and “talk.” The era of Yeltsin’s suc Oadministration should approach Afghani cessor, Vladimir Putin, witnessed both en stan, Iran, North Korea, and numerous hanced focus and rigorous reassertion of other international and domestic chal Russian authority in the region. For each of lenges. Despite the air base eviction notice these three periods, this article analyzes the from Kyrgyzstan in February 2009, how security, economic, and political aspects of ever, there has been very little public dis Russian foreign policy toward Central Asia course about Central Asia. Practitioners and and concisely assesses the results of Rus scholars of airpower realize that access to sian efforts. Before concluding, it discusses the region is essential to ongoing operations two important developments during Dmitry in Afghanistan. Since Russia has extensive Medvedev’s presidency, a period of assertive experience in Central Asia and seeks to Russian foreign policy that is still unfolding. play a greater role there, analyzing the evo lution of its policy toward Central Asia is an important precursor to developing US policy Historical Development for the region. Indeed, both architects of The term Central Asia typically refers to future engagement strategies and Airmen the five former Soviet Republics of Kazakh who ultimately operate within the parameters stan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, of such partnerships should seek to grow in and Uzbekistan. Russian tsars had con their understanding of the nuances of Cen quered the region by the late nineteenth tral Asia. This article does not recommend century.1 The Great Game continued as approaches for US policy—instead, it pro Russia vied with the British Empire for vides historical understanding to inform greater strategic influence in Central and policy formulation and execution. South Asia.2 Attempting to integrate Central In order to analyze Russia’s policy toward Asia into their own imperial realm, the Rus Central Asia effectively, one must first under sians invested heavily in transportation stand the Soviet and Russian historical legacy infrastructure and agriculture; under the in the region. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, “integration and absorption USSR, Russia was initially indifferent— advanced with new vigor.”3 During the So borderline irritated, in fact—toward Central viet period, the region’s republics supplied Asia. Not surprisingly, the region’s fledgling resources, served as places of exile, and nations looked for help elsewhere as they hosted sites for nuclear testing, the develop ventured out of the Soviet nest. Russia soon ment of biological weapons, and space became aware that it had lost a great deal of launches.4 In 1991 leaders of the Central influence in the region, but in the latter Asian republics declared independence half of Pres. Boris Yeltsin’s tenure, it re from the Soviet Union.5 Since then, rela

*The author is a branch chief on the Joint Staff (J8).

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02-VA-Frickenstein.indd 67 1/27/10 1:31:18 PM tions among the Central Asian nations have Russia’s Policy toward Central typically been “limited or frosty,” and some nations are “outright hostile” toward each Asia in the Early 1990s other.6 These relatively young nations often From the time the Soviet Union collapsed assume the position of “client states in re in 1991 to the mid-1990s, Russia was preoc spect to their former master” even though cupied with revolutionary internal reforms they are “wary of Moscow’s neo-imperial and intensely focused on joining Europe. ambitions.”7 Regional experts attribute Rus Consequently, Yeltsin had no apparent 12 sia’s lingering influence more to the mix strategy for Central Asia. A top Kazakh of ture of proximity, history, and shared cul ficial recalls how Russia “turned its back on ture than to adept foreign policy.8 Central Asia, seeing it as an obstacle to its quest to join Europe”; Jos Boonstra, European During the new Central Asian nations’ Union–Central Asia Monitoring Project co first decade of independence, US interests chair, concurs that Russia felt Central Asia in the region included the security of weap was a “nuisance that restricted Moscow.”13 ons of mass destruction (WMD), internal Russia’s lethargic security, economic, and reforms, and energy. The United States im political policies toward Central Asia during mediately began ensuring the security of this period embody its annoyance; a sum the enormous former Soviet WMD complex; mary of the results of these policies reveals throughout the 1990s, the United States that Russia reaped what it sowed. committed billions of dollars in aid to the Russia’s security and military coopera region, primarily aimed at political and tion with Central Asia in the early 1990s market reforms.9 But other than Central was typified by very limited rhetoric and Asia’s “loose nukes,” the United States even less action. Russia became obligated to lacked “major interests” during the 1990s; several Central Asian states via the Tashkent Collective Security Treaty of 1992, but in Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott practice drastically downsized its military said the United States did not intend to cooperation.14 Russia’s regional border manage regional security and would be con troops and Tajikistan-based 201st Motor Rifle tent “if the region remained free of great Division were obvious exceptions; that said, 10 power domination.” these remnants could neither prevent civil Following 9/11, US interests shifted sig war in Tajikistan nor curb the flow of drugs nificantly. Toppling the Taliban became the traveling north from Afghanistan.15 Thus, priority, so America sought Muslim part despite Moscow’s announcement of a new ners in the Taliban’s “backyard.” In prepara regional “Monroe Doctrine,” Russia “was tion for Operation Enduring Freedom, the neither welcome as a big brother nor ca United States pursued overflight, landing, pable of playing the role of the regional 16 and basing rights in Central Asia. Basing hegemon.” Further demonstrating policy rights were secured at Manas International incoherence, Russia assumed the USSR’s Airport near the Kyrgyz capital and at an treaty obligations toward Afghanistan but turned its back on the “Afghan problem,” old Soviet air base near the Uzbek towns of setting the stage for civil war.17 Karshi and Khanabad, 90 miles from the 11 Yeltsin’s early economic policies toward Afghan border. US interests during the Central Asia were even more destructive Central Asian nations’ second decade have than his dissolution of Russia’s southern de been predominantly related to terrorism, fense buffer zone. Shock therapy architect with earlier interests in nonproliferation, Yegor Gaidar forced the Central Asian im development, and natural resources de pediment out of the ruble zone in 1993, creasing in prominence. leaving the fledgling countries without cur

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rency.18 While such Russian state practices in 1996. His aim of restoring Russia’s re wreaked havoc, newly formed private Rus gional influence (known to many as “the sian companies (e.g., LUKoil, etc.) vigor Primakov doctrine”) took precedence over ously pursued business arrangements in integration with the West.25 Russia gradually Central Asia, especially in the area of natu took more interest in the region, perhaps in ral resources.19 reaction to the Central Asian nations’ ongoing Russia’s indifference also pervaded its efforts to forge new international relation political relationships with Central Asia. In ships “out of necessity.”26 In fact, Primakov stead of capitalizing on the Commonwealth wrote that the West was “actively working to of Independent States (CIS) as a means for prevent Russia from having a special role” developing cooperation among its former in the former Russian republics and accused republics, Russia perceived the CIS merely the West of blocking Russian attempts at a as a tool for overseeing the dissolution of rapprochement with the region.27 the USSR.20 Furthermore, Russia ignored Developing its slight reawakening toward Kazakh president Nursultan Nazarbayev’s Central Asia in the latter half of the 1990s, attempt to form a Eurasian Union in 1994.21 Russia made limited attempts to boost secu The proverb “no gardener, no garden!” rity and defense cooperation with Central aptly describes the results of Russia’s policy Asia. During this time, Islamic radicals had of indifference toward Central Asia in the taken control of the Chechen Republic and early 1990s. Due to Russia’s virtually non the Taliban had gained control in Afghani existent cultivation in the security, eco stan, so Russia had become more aware of nomic, and political realms, it effectively radical Islam’s threat to its national secu lost the region. The states of Central Asia, rity.28 The link between Russia and Tajiki lacking military and economic strength and stan grew slightly stronger when the Tajiks rapidly losing faith in Russia, actively informally granted Russia a basing agree sought “external guarantors of regional se ment for the 201st Motor Rifle Division.29 curity and foreign assistance.”22 In 1994 the By the end of 1999, however, border guards countries enrolled in the North Atlantic were virtually phased out of Kyrgyzstan, Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Partnership and Russian advisers had left Turkmenistan. for Peace (PFP) program. In 1995 the de Adding insult to injury, Uzbekistan pulled fense ministers of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, out of the Collective Security Treaty, feeling and Uzbekistan formed a joint council to that Russia had not helped stem the Taliban assist in coordinating their PFP efforts and tide.30 On the whole, Russia’s security role constituted the Tsentrazbat (Central Asian declined and mainly centered on “the sale Battalion) to conduct PFP training.23 Rus of military supplies, a peace-keeping con sia’s significantly reduced level of access to tingent . . . and coordination with these Central Asian natural resources—something states over anti-terrorist measures.”31 it had taken for granted in Soviet days—and Russian efforts to achieve the Primakov heightened awareness that the nations were doctrine in the economic realm were aimed “throwing off the mantle of the ‘little primarily at hydrocarbon transport. Moscow brother’ ” soon convinced Russia that this asserted its “right” to transport Central Asian “garden” needed a “gardener.”24 hydrocarbons across Russian territory and opposed efforts to bypass Russia.32 But other than limited oil-export collaboration with Russia’s Policy toward Central Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, Russia did not Asia in the Late 1990s concentrate on strengthening economic coop eration—in fact, overall trade volume de During the mid-1990s, Russia’s foreign creased below the level of the early 1990s.33 policy took a new direction under new for Similarly, Russia made very little effort eign minister Yevgeny Primakov, appointed in the realm of multilateral cooperation

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02-VA-Frickenstein.indd 69 1/27/10 1:31:19 PM with Central Asia during this period. Rela ority and a zone of Russian national inter tions became strictly bilateral since the CIS ests,” reflecting the Russian belief that had “become ineffective” after accomplish “while the Americans are here now, we are ing its purpose of conducting the former in the region for ever.”40 In the Putin era, republics’ “civilised divorce.”34 Russia’s only Russia began aligning its words regarding multilateral success story was the resolu the need for close cooperation with its actions tion of the Tajik civil war in cooperation but did not achieve unequivocal success. with Iran and Uzbekistan.35 Russia’s activism in the realm of military In sum, despite new leadership in the and security cooperation in the Putin years Foreign Ministry, Russia failed to strengthen heralds an aspiring hegemon awakening its position in Central Asia in the late 1990s. after a long hibernation—attempting to “make Scholars attribute Russian shortfalls to lack up for lost time” and frustrated with outside of consensus among senior leadership, nu influences in its domain. In April 2000, Rus merous policy inconsistencies and contra sia led members of the Collective Security dictions (due to the rapid turnover of prime Treaty in creating rapid-reaction forces to ministers late in Yeltsin’s tenure), and eco combat terrorism; in 2001 Russia estab nomic and military weakness.36 Russia did lished the Kyrgyz branch of Moscow’s CIS not fully grasp the importance of the region Anti-Terrorism Center.41 Following 9/11, Putin to its long-term security or economic inter justified American presence in the region ests. Regional experts Vladimir Paramonov as a helpful defense against the Taliban and and Aleksey Strokov assert that Russian the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan—clear leaders essentially “had it backwards” by threats to Russian interests.42 Roy Allison thinking that in order to strengthen its posi explains that Russia’s initial acquiescence to tion in Central Asia, Russia first needed to US presence soon devolved into a “sense of “recover its international status.”37 Not sur grievance and zero-sum thinking” among prisingly, the Central Asian nations contin elites concerned about Russia’s “strategic ued to lose faith in Russia. They did not ap displacement” from Central Asia.43 He cites preciate how Russia’s lofty pronouncements Russia’s opening of Kant Air Base in Kyrgyz regarding its intentions for Central Asia stan in October 2003 as “the most promi were rarely converted into sensible actions; nent example of the Russian interest in re furthermore, they recognized Russia’s eco constituting at least some trappings of a nomic and military weakness and contin forward security zone in Central Asia under ued to rely on their own limited internal the mantle of collective security.”44 Russia resources and external relationships.38 also seized the moment when Uzbek-US re lations soured in the wake of the Andijon massacre, signing a “Treaty on Allied Rela Russia’s Policy toward Central tions” with Uzbekistan in November 2005.45 Asia under Putin Under Putin’s leadership, Russia also re asserted its economic interests in Central Under Putin’s leadership, Russian policy Asia, especially regarding hydrocarbons. toward Central Asia markedly changed Allison contends that Russia views these from the rhetoric largely unaccompanied resources as “both a strategic asset and a by actions of the 1990s to a more deter strategic instrument.”46 As an asset, Central mined, proactive approach. Boonstra ex Asian hydrocarbons are vital for Russia’s plains that Russia perceives the 1990s as trade with Europe, the main importer of merely a “brief interval of lack of influence” Russian energy resources.47 For example, in the region against the broad historical gas exports from Turkmenistan and Uzbeki timeline including Imperial Russia and the stan supplied Russia’s domestic market at Soviet Union.39 Putin affirmed that Central very low prices, enabling Russia to sell its Asia “constitutes a major foreign policy pri Western Siberian gas to Europe at much

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higher prices (e.g., $100 per 1,000 cubic me progress, Uzbekistan joined in 2006.55 The ters versus $250 per 1,000 cubic meters).48 SCO was formed after 9/11 when Uzbeki With regard to viewing hydrocarbons as stan joined the “Shanghai Five” countries an instrument, Russia’s monopoly on export (China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and pipelines enables Moscow to pressure Cen Tajikistan). The Shanghai Five was origi tral Asian states to yield control of their hy nally formed to help “demilitarize the bor drocarbons. The 2007–30 plan published by der between China and the former Soviet Russia’s Institute of Energy Strategy unam Union,” but the SCO has pursued a much biguously states that “Russian control over a broader agenda, including terrorism, trade, large share of Central Asian gas needs to be and trafficking.56 Russia collaborated with maintained.”49 Stephen Blank, professor of China to use the SCO to curb US influence national security at the US Army War Col in Central Asia, flying in the face of air lege, contends that Russia’s recent claim power’s ability to contribute to coalition op that it has no imperialistic intentions in erations in Afghanistan. In 2005 Russia ex Central Asia does not mesh with the facts. pressed its discomfort with American air That is, its pipeline monopoly allows Mos bases (Karshi-Khanabad and Manas) by en cow to pay far below market price for gas; couraging the SCO to demand that the Russian unwillingness to invest in the in United States develop a timeline for its dustry prevents suppliers from competing withdrawal from the region.57 on a global scale; and attempts by suppliers Russian policy toward Central Asia under to diversify export routes are seen as “a Putin had mixed results. On the one hand, 50 threat to [Russian] vital interests.” Foreign Russia regained some of the confidence lost Minister Sergei Lavrov has even threatened during Yeltsin’s tenure through its more stable, to use “every conceivable economic pressure 58 51 pragmatic, and well-funded policies. Cater tactic” against uncooperative CIS regimes. ing to Central Asian autocrats’ heartfelt vul The Russians also reasserted influence in nerability in light of Saddam Hussein’s Central Asia by establishing and actively overthrow and Georgia’s Rose Revolution, participating in several multilateral organi Russian policy makers portrayed their “im zations. Boonstra explains that the Kremlin age as a traditional, reliable partner.”59 On perceived stability in Central Asia as a guar the other hand, Russia’s consistent, paternal antor of Russian national security and in istic attitude toward its “unequal partner[s]” tended to build stability through a “variety has been harshly criticized by some of the of regional organisations that overlap in region’s leaders.60 Furthermore, scholars membership and purpose.”52 The Collective have noted that Russia perceived the geo Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Eur strategic importance of the region too nar asian Economic Community (EurAsEc), rowly—as a mere tool for reviving its great- and Shanghai Cooperation Organization power status and securing its energy supply.61 (SCO) exemplify Russian attempts to meet this objective. Formed in 2002, the CSTO has its roots in Recent Developments the Tashkent Treaty of 1992, mentioned above.53 Paramonov and Strokov’s review of Putin protégé Medvedev took up his Russia’s leadership of CSTO activities from mentor’s mantle in May 2008. Putin has 2002 to 2007 provides ample evidence in played an active role in foreign policy from support of other scholars’ assertions that his current position as prime minister, so Russia used the CSTO as a counter to NATO.54 Russia’s ongoing activist stance toward Cen Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, tral Asia can be seen simply as a continua and Tajikistan signed the EurAsEc Treaty in tion of the policies of his presidency. Since 2000 to facilitate trade among member na the Medvedev presidency is still arguably in tions; after observing EurAsEc’s substantial its infancy, it is too early to fully analyze

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02-VA-Frickenstein.indd 71 1/27/10 1:31:20 PM the results of Russian policy toward Central definitely after Russia invaded NATO part Asia under his leadership. Nonetheless, a ner Georgia in August 2008.67 brief examination of his “Foreign Policy In light of Russia’s statements in support Concept” (FPC) and an assessment of Rus of the Afghanistan mission (such as those sia’s recent ambivalent posture toward op found in the FPC and elsewhere) and the erations in Afghanistan will prove useful to realization that Russia is a primary benefi US policy makers. ciary, US policy makers are frustrated by The July 2008 FPC, a document similar Russian efforts to impede US- and NATO-led in nature to the US national security strategy, efforts. Following Russia’s undisguised in resounds with Russia’s perceived resurgence volvement in convincing the Kyrgyz to evict in both global aspirations and responsibili the United States from Manas Air Base, par ties near abroad. The FPC asserts a “real liamentarian and Putin loyalist Igor Barinov capacity to play a well-deserved role glob acknowledged that the Kremlin “shares ally” as one of the “influential centers in the many goals with Washington” but expressed modern world.”62 One of Russia’s chief for both bitterness over “the attitude that NATO eign policy objectives, per the FPC, is “to takes” and regret that little “attention had promote good neighborly relations with bor been paid toward Russia’s opinion.”68 Secre dering States, to assist in eliminating the tary of Defense Robert Gates responded existing hotbeds of tension and conflicts in that the Russians were “trying to have it the regions adjacent to the Russian Federa both ways,” making “positive noises about tion . . . and to prevent emergence of the working with us” but “working against us in 63 new ones.” terms of that airfield.”69 Another primary objective, according to Recent developments indeed confirm the FPC, is to pursue partnerships aimed at Russia’s reassertion of a “zone of influence” stability—the essence of Putin’s multilateral in this portion of the former Soviet Union.70 efforts, discussed above. The CSTO, EurAsEc, Andrei Serenko, cofounder of a Russian and SCO are specifically mentioned as in think tank focused on Afghanistan, confirms struments for ensuring mutual security and that “Russia wants to be the only master of combating widespread threats such as “ter the Central Asian domain” and “to the maxi rorism, extremism, drug trafficking, trans mum extent possible [will] . . . mak[e] national crime, and illegal migration” in the 64 things difficult for the U.S.—in making the CIS. In its section on “International Eco transfer of American forces into Afghanistan nomic and Environmental Cooperation,” be dependent on the will of the Kremlin.”71 the FPC describes Russia’s interest in en Exhibiting its penchant for having the last ergy security and its goal of strengthening word in the region, in the wake of the even “strategic partnership[s] with . . . leading tual Manas-eviction rollback, Russia rattled producers” in order to ensure secure tran Uzbekistan by announcing plans to open a sit.65 Such verbiage is consistent with Rus CSTO base at Osh in southern Kyrgyzstan.72 sia’s demonstrated willingness to play hard ball in the energy domain. The FPC acknowledges Russia’s percep Conclusion tion of the “deepening crisis in Afghanistan” as a “threat to the security of the . . . CIS Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, boundaries” and describes Russia’s intent to Russian policy toward Central Asia has pro cooperate with multilateral organizations to gressed from passive and annoyed to active prevent spillover effects and resolve the sit and engaged. Early in the Yeltsin years, uation.66 Prior to the release of the FPC, Russia concentrated on conducting domes Russia had expressed interest in discussing tic reforms and integrating with the West; Afghanistan via the NATO-Russia Council the new Central Asian nations, in turn, lost framework, but this effort was shelved in confidence in Russia and pursued new part

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nerships. Russia paid slightly more attention and energy interests. Mindful of the evolu to Central Asia during the late 1990s, but tion of Russia’s Central Asia policies, armed economic weakness and policy inconsisten with an appreciation for Russia’s historic cies prevented meaningful progress. Under sense that the region is in its “zone of influ Putin, Russia demonstrated its “ultimate in ence,” and attentive to Russia’s zero-sum tention” for the Central Asian nations— thinking regarding areas near abroad, US namely, to “limit [their] sovereignty . . . and leaders and airpower practitioners will be expand control over their foreign policies.”73 better prepared to craft and implement mu Medvedev’s FPC and recent actions in Cen tually agreeable, contextually sound strate ✪ tral Asia confirm both Russia’s hegemonic gic policy for Central Asia. aspirations and its intense focus on security Washington, DC

Notes

1. Jim Nichol, Central Asia’s New States: Political Press, 2007), 177, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Books/ Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests, sc.pdf (accessed 7 December 2009). Issue Brief for Congress, IB93108 (Washington, DC: 9. Eugene Rumer, “A New World Order?” Carnegie Congressional Research Service, 1 April 2003), 1, Reporter 3, no. 4 (Spring 2006): 9, http://www http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/19497 .carnegie.org/pdf/carnreporterSp06.pdf (accessed 7 .pdf (accessed 7 December 2009). December 2009). 2. Alisher Ilkhamov, “Russia Lures Uzbekistan as 10. Ibid., 9–10. Its Strategic Satellite in Central Asia,” Russian 11. Jim Nichol, Uzbekistan’s Closure of the Analytical Digest 29 (16 October 2007): 8, http://kms2 Airbase at Karshi-Khanabad: Context and .isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/RESSpecNet/43854/ Implications, CRS Report for Congress, RS22295 ipublicationdocument_singledocument/873470F7-33D2 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 7 -470E-A9F1-7764437F7903/en/Russian_Analytical October 2005), 1–2, https://www.policyarchive.org/ _Digest_29.pdf (accessed 7 December 2009). bitstream/handle/10207/4245/RS22295_20051007 3. Ibid. .pdf?sequence=1 (accessed 7 December 2009). 4. Marat E. Shaikhutdinov, “Central Asia: 12. Dr. Vladimir Paramonov and Dr. Aleksey Developing the Region in the Vortex of the Strokov, The Evolution of Russia’s Central Asia Policy Geopolitical and Geoeconomic Antagonisms of the (Shrivenham: Defence Academy of the United World Powers,” American Foreign Policy Interests 29, Kingdom Advanced Research and Assessment Group, no. 1 (January/February 2007): 46, http://www June 2008), 1, http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/ .informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a77284 Files/ISN/92594/ipublicationdocument_single 9580&fulltext=713240928 (accessed 7 December 2009); document/7CBDD98D-FDF3-49DB-82FD-B62DE5CE and Murray Feshbach, Ecological Disaster: Cleaning 81C3/en/08_June.pdf (accessed 7 December 2009). Up the Hidden Legacy of the Soviet Regime (New York: 13. Shaikhutdinov, “Central Asia,” 46; and Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1995), 65–66. Boonstra, “Russia and Central Asia,” 70. 5. Ilkhamov, “Russia Lures Uzbekistan,” 8. 14. Paramonov and Strokov, Evolution of Russia’s 6. Jos Boonstra, “Russia and Central Asia: From Central Asia Policy, 2–3. Disinterest to Eager Leadership,” EU-Russia Centre 15. Ibid., 3. Review 8 (October 2008): 72, http://www.eu-russia 16. Rumer, “New World Order?” 5. centre.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/review 17. Paramonov and Strokov, Evolution of Russia’s _viii_final_13_10.pdf (accessed 7 December 2009). Central Asia Policy, 2. 7. Ilkhamov, “Russia Lures Uzbekistan,” 8. 18. Ibid., 3; and Shaikhutdinov, “Central Asia,” 46. 8. Joseph McMillan, Eugene B. Rumer, and 19. Confidential source, interview by the author, Phillip C. Saunders, “Engaging Other Major Powers,” 16 March 2009. in Strategic Challenges: America’s Global Security 20. Paramonov and Strokov, Evolution of Russia’s Agenda , ed. Stephen J. Flanagan and James A. Schear Central Asia Policy, 2, 4. Turkmenistan is not a (Washington, DC: National Defense University member of the CIS.

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02-VA-Frickenstein.indd 73 1/27/10 1:31:20 PM 21. Ibid., 4. usawc/Parameters/08spring/blank.pdf (accessed 7 22. Ibid., 6. The authors note that Tajikistan was December 2009). an exception to this “search for external partners.” 51. Ibid., 79. 23. Ibid. 52. Boonstra, “Russia and Central Asia,” 72. 24. Ibid., 7. 53. Paramonov and Strokov, Evolution of Russia’s 25. Ibid. Central Asia Policy, 13. 26. Boonstra, “Russia and Central Asia,” 70. 54. Ibid., 14; Blank, “Strategic Importance of 27. Paramonov and Strokov, Evolution of Russia’s Central Asia,” 78; and Boonstra, “Russia and Central Central Asia Policy, 8. Asia,” 75. 28. Ibid. 55. Paramonov and Strokov, Evolution of Russia’s 29. Ibid., 11. Central Asia Policy, 13. 30. Jim Nichol, Central Asia: Regional 56. Andrew Scheineson with Lionel Beehner and Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests, CRS Preeti Bhattacharji, “The Shanghai Cooperation Report for Congress, RL33458 (Washington, DC: Organization,” Council on Foreign Relations, 24 Congressional Research Service, 21 September 2009), March 2009, http://www.cfr.org/publication/10883/ 7, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33458.pdf shanghai_cooperation_organization.html (accessed (accessed 7 December 2009). 7 December 2009). 31. Jennifer D. P. Moroney, “Building Security in 57. Eugene B. Rumer, “China, Russia and the Central Asia: A Multilateral Perspective” in In the Balance of Power in Central Asia,” Strategic Forum 223 Tracks of Tamerlane: Central Asia’s Path to the 21st (November 2006): 1, 3, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/ Century, ed. Daniel L. Burghart and Theresa Strforum/SF223/SF223.pdf (accessed 7 December 2009). Sabonis-Helf (Washington, DC: National Defense 58. Paramonov and Strokov, Evolution of Russia’s University Press, 2004), 345, http://www.ndu.edu/ Central Asia Policy, 18. CTNSP/tamerlane/Tamerlane-Chapter16.pdf 59. Allison, “Strategic Reassertion,” 279. (accessed 7 December 2009). 60. Jim Nichol, Central Asia’s Security: Issues and 32. Paramonov and Strokov, Evolution of Russia’s Implications for U.S. Interests, CRS Report for Central Asia Policy, 9. Congress, RL30294 (Washington, DC: Congressional 33. Ibid., 12, 8. Research Service, 29 January 2008), 48, http:// 34. Ibid., 9–10. opencrs.com/document/RL30294/2008-01-29/ 35. Ibid., 8. download/1013/ (accessed 7 December 2009). 36. Ibid., 11; and Nichol, Central Asia, 7. 61. Paramonov and Strokov, Evolution of Russia’s 37. Paramonov and Strokov, Evolution of Russia’s Central Asia Policy, 18. Central Asia Policy, 11. 62. “The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian 38. Ibid., 9–10. Federation,” 12 July 2008, http://eng.kremlin.ru/ 39. Boonstra, “Russia and Central Asia,” 70. text/docs/2008/07/204750.shtml. 40. Shaikhutdinov, “Central Asia,” 47; and Roy 63. Ibid. Allison, “Strategic Reassertion in Russia’s Central 64. Ibid. Asia Policy,” International Affairs 80, no. 2 (March 65. Ibid. 2004): 277, http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/ 66. Ibid. cgi-bin/fulltext/118753931/PDFSTART (accessed 7 67. Boonstra, “Russia and Central Asia,” 73. December 2009). 68. Clifford J. Levy, “Poker-Faced, Russia Flaunts 41. Nichol, Central Asia, 8. Its Afghan Card,” New York Times, 21 February 2009, 42. Allison, “Strategic Reassertion,” 279. WK3, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/22/weekin 43. Ibid., 278. review/22levy.html (accessed 7 December 2009). 44. Ibid., 287. Other analysts have speculated 69. Ibid. that Kant is merely a counter to Manas. 70. Ibid.; and confidential source, interview by 45. Nichol, Central Asia, 8. the author, 20 February 2009. 46. Allison, “Strategic Reassertion,” 290. 71. Levy, “Poker-Faced,” WK3. 47. Ilkhamov, “Russia Lures Uzbekistan,” 9. 72. “Kyrgyzstan: Russia Seeks Second Military 48. Ibid. Base in Central Asian Nation, Rattling Uzbekistan,” 49. Nichol, Central Asia, 32n101. Eurasianet.org, 13 July 2009, http://www.eurasianet 50. Stephen Blank, “The Strategic Importance of .org/departments/insightb/articles/eav071309.shtml Central Asia: An American View,” Parameters 38, no. (accessed 7 December 2009). 1 (Spring 2008): 75, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ 73. Ilkhamov, “Russia Lures Uzbekistan,” 11.

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Maj Brad W. Borke, USAF

The range of military aviation is being extended so rapidly that the Atlantic will be cancelled out as a genuine obstacle within two years, the Pacific within three years. After that, in five years at the outside, the ultimate round-the-world range of 25,000 miles becomes inevitable. At that point, any nation will be able to hurl its aerial might against any spot on the face of the globe without intermediary bases. By the same token every country will be subject to assault from any direction anywhere in the world. The blows will be delivered from home bases, regardless of distance, with all oceans and bases in between turned into a no man’s land. —Alexander P. de Seversky Victory through Air Power, 1942

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The Potential and the Problem when available. A future scenario is quickly approaching in which all geographic COCOMs One of the most valuable attributes of can execute remotely piloted RSO aircraft airpower is its flexibility—the inherent ability operations—a capability that will require a to project power dynamically across large global mission-management construct to swaths of an operational area. Airpower’s employ the global RPA enterprise effectively. capability to operate in three dimensions, Maintaining such a construct for re- coupled with increased platform speed and motely piloted RSO aircraft operations has range, enables commanders to reallocate the strategic value of providing national de- airpower over great distances. Flexibility is cision makers a mechanism to dynamically exponentially enhanced when applied translate changing strategic priorities into within a command and control (C2) con- forces and capabilities. According to Joint struct involving remotely piloted aircraft Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, (RPA) flying remote split operations (RSO).1 Such remotely piloted RSO missions pro- The SecDef [secretary of defense], with assistance from the CJCS [chairman of the Joint vide a unique capability unlike any other in Chiefs of Staff], determines where the US mili- history—the ability to “virtually” move RPA tary should be focused and where the nation aircrews between aircraft and across the can afford to accept risk. Continually assess- globe in minutes. In this sense, these air- ing the relative importance of the various the- crews are a resource that the US military ater operations remains imperative. Inte- can assign, apportion, and allocate in a grated planning, coordination, and guidance manner similar to its handling of traditional among the Joint Staff, combatant command- forces and capabilities. ers (CCDRs), and OGAs [other government US Central Command (CENTCOM) has agencies] ensures that changing strategic pri- executed RSO allocation of theater-based, orities are appropriately translated into clear planning guidance and adequate forces and virtual RPAs since 2003—specifically, in Op- their associated capabilities for CCDRs.4 erations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Free- dom.2 In these operations, an aircrew con- Furthermore, dynamic allocation of RPA trolling an RPA in either Afghanistan or Iraq aircrews maximizes resources, enabling terminates control of that platform and es- them to better respond to changing mission tablishes data-link control with another requirements among multiple COCOMs. such aircraft in the other theater of opera- This allocation construct can help achieve a tion. The entire transfer process can be degree of global strike and global, persistent completed in minutes. This capability en- surveillance capability as a form of power ables CENTCOM to flex RPA aircrews projection due to its ability to reallocate re- among multiple theaters in response to dy- sources, irrespective of space.5 The Qua- namic and changing mission requirements.3 drennial Defense Review Report of 2006 em- This resource-allocation model provides a phasizes power projection as critical to microcosm of the possibilities for employ- providing leadership with a broader range ing RPA aircrews at the operational and of military options in response to twenty- strategic levels. first-century security threats.6 A problem The next evolutionary step calls for allo- does exist, however. cating virtual RPA aircrews on a global Specifically, although the technology for scale, executed among combatant com- remotely piloted RSO aircraft affords the po- mands (COCOM). Although CENTCOM cur- tential to achieve a level of power projec- rently contains the preponderance of re- tion, we currently do not have either an or- motely piloted RSO aircraft operations (and, ganization or a construct to take advantage hence, the requisite associated mainte- of these capabilities. As a process, Global nance and bandwidth), all other geographic Force Management (GFM) allows leaders to COCOMs seek to employ these resources create capabilities that operational com-

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manders need to implement the national of Joint Forces Command, designated as the defense strategy. Force management “seeks primary joint force provider for conven- to integrate new and existing human and tional forces, including remotely piloted technical assets from across the Joint Force RSO aircraft resources. That command uses and its mission partners to make the right guidance developed and approved by the capabilities available at the right time and Global Force Management Board to recom- place.”7 However, current GFM organiza- mend global sourcing solutions to the chair- tional structures, policies, and processes man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the sec- involved in global force allocation are not retary of defense, who is the final authority designed (nor were they ever envisioned) to in the GFM allocation process. conduct dynamic inter-COCOM allocation. Furthermore, current GFM organizational Attributes command structures, policies, and procedures are highly centralized and bureau- The GFM allocation process consists of two cratic, thereby inhibiting the speed with methods—rotational force allocation in sup- which remotely piloted RSO aircraft can be port of the COCOM’s annual force needs dynamically reallocated across the COCOM’s and emergent force allocation in support of geographic boundaries. Finally, policy and the COCOM’s emerging or crisis-based re- processes are organized along static and ar- quests. An eight-step process, emergent tificial COCOM boundaries that hinder dy- allocation focuses on satisfying requests for namic inter-COCOM resource allocation of forces (RFF) or capabilities (RFC) within a remotely piloted RSO aircraft. 120-day timeline. To initiate the emergent This article uses global dynamic opera- allocation process, COCOMs submit an tions (GDO), a unique, nondoctrinal term to RFF/RFC to the Joint Staff, which validates describe a futuristic concept of conducting these requirements and assigns them to a dynamic allocation of RPA aircrews in a joint force provider. As the joint force pro- global distributed operations architecture, vider for conventional forces, Joint Forces focusing on reallocation of aircrews, not Command evaluates alternative sourcing platforms.8 For our purposes, the proposed solutions and generates a recommendation GDO concept encompasses organizational, to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff policy, and process initiatives. In order to and secretary of defense. Resources are maximize the current and future capabili- allocated upon the secretary’s approval. ties of remotely piloted RSO aircraft, we When the RFF/RFC process is not practical must develop complementary command due to time considerations, policy permits structures, policies, and processes. the use of a voice order of the commanding officer (VOCO) to allocate forces. Decisions concerning both rotational Global Force force and emergent force allocation are driven by established national priorities, as Management Allocation stated in the guidance of employment of GFM seeks to align force assignment, ap- forces (GEF), whose priorities are based on portionment, and allocation methodologies the mission. Prioritization is important in in support of national defense strategy, joint a resource-constrained environment. As a force availability requirements, and joint primary resource used for intelligence, sur- force assessments. All functions of GFM af- veillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) opera- fect the GDO concept, but GFM allocation tions, RPAs are a well-recognized low-density, most directly and significantly affects GDO high-demand (LD/HD) asset. The US Air because resources are employed and trans- Force’s concept of operations for theater ferred among COCOMs within this func- ISR notes that “because ISR is conducted by tion. Inherent to GFM allocation is the role low-density, high-demand . . . assets and

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personnel, it is one of the few military op- requests are viewed as the exception, not erations that must prioritize among multiple the norm. Conversely, GDO will make time- plans and strategies both globally and within critical reallocation requests the norm, not a theater.”9 Priority-based allocation is a the exception. critical requirement for LD/HD RPA assets. Regarding policy, use of the VOCO is the Despite recognition of the need for priority- most responsive allocation model offered based allocation, GFM emergent allocation by GFM at present. The VOCO has dele- does not blindly follow a static priority list gated authority to execute all functions of when allocating RPA resources. GFM subject- the eight-step emergent allocation process. matter experts attempt to bring both art and However, the VOCO should be used only science to the allocation process, applying when time limitations make the standard art through creative problem solving as a process impractical. Granted, this policy means of seeking synergies among capabili- adequately supports rotational force- ties in order to provide more effective RPA allocation requirements, but it fails to operations. A plan may be designed in a acknowledge the frequency and tempo in- manner that allocates resources to a lower- herent in the execution of some GDO con- priority requirement. Consider the follow- structs. Furthermore, the current policy ing example: Priorities dictate that COCOM process is overcentralized—an untenable X be routinely allocated a high percentage situation, given the volume of dynamic al- of RPA resources. COCOM Y has few RPAs locations possible through a GDO construct. allocated; however, reallocating resources The MOU/MOA policy is also unrealistic from X to Y will disproportionately increase in a GDO construct. That policy works best the percentage of capability in Y but only when conducted between no more than two slightly decrease X’s capability. In such a COCOMs for preplanned missions in order situation, the allocation will be discussed. to limit the level of complexity. GDO, how- Memoranda of understanding/agreement ever, is an inherently complex construct in (MOU/MOA) between combatant command- that it supports multiple COCOMs simulta- ers offer another mechanism for reallocating neously and on a continuous basis against resources among COCOMs. They typically ad hoc, unplanned tasking. Thus, applying come into play when a combatant com- the MOU/MOA policy approach for a GDO mander needs a resource for a specific event concept is unworkable. GFM policies must and/or time; however, MOUs/MOAs can be developed that give a global mission- also cover routine/reoccurring missions. If management entity the responsibility and combatant commanders cannot reach ami- authority to execute a GDO concept based cable terms, the secretary of defense can on the GEF’s priority. Complementary to override/direct allocation, as necessary. this change is the need to alter the way priorities are communicated. Deficiencies The GEF must articulate its priorities more clearly, with the mission and intent The organizational structure, policy, and better defined in order to support the dy- processes of current GFM emergent alloca- namic allocation of RSO RPAs. Current pri- tion do not satisfy the global, dynamic re- orities are too broadly defined and do not quirements for the allocation of RPA air- provide mission managers the level of fidelity crews. From an organizational perspective, needed to conduct dynamic allocation be- the VOCO position (designed to handle a tween competing requirements. For in- limited number of dynamic, time-sensitive stance, if counterterrorism is a high-priority allocation requests on a nonroutine basis) is mission maintained by multiple COCOMs, inadequate for handling the potentially then the GEF’s priorities must adequately high volume of requests that the GDO con- communicate mission and intent, enabling cept would generate. Ad hoc, time-sensitive global mission managers to exercise profes-

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sional judgment in deciding which COCOM global mission management—a function has the higher-priority counterterrorism carried out by the service’s DCGS wing op- mission. This level of fidelity is not re- eration center (WOC).11 quired under traditional GFM allocation As the nerve center for executing C2 and policy because manned assets are not re- mission management of the Air Force’s sponsive enough to force a dynamic alloca- DCGS global PED, the WOC is responsible tion decision. However, due to the flexibility for reconciling tasking and guidance with offered by a GDO concept, COCOMs will PED capacity resident throughout the likely seek opportunities for RPAs to exe- worldwide Air Force DCGS enterprise. The cute their high-priority targets. Therefore, WOC not only conducts preplanned alloca- clearly articulated priorities with mission tion but also, during execution, dynamically and intent give the necessary guidance to allocates PED across the Air Force DCGS exercise priority-based allocation in a dy- enterprise. In making allocation decisions, namic, global environment. the WOC assesses mission impact, identifies The organizational structure, policy, and idle capacity, reconfigures network systems processes of GFM emergent force allocation (if required), monitors maintenance status, fail to satisfy GDO concept requirements. and identifies “fix” actions. In 2007 it reallo- Air Force–distributed intelligence and cated 20 percent of tasked sorties, based on global air mobility operations—two well- changing requirements, node capacities, established mission areas—deal with global and/or network issues.12 force allocation. The Air Force’s Distributed Maintaining adequate situational aware- Common Ground System (DCGS) enter- ness and target knowledge for the tasked prise conducts global distributed intelli- area of operation represents one of the chal- gence operations routinely, similar to those lenges of conducting global distributed op- conducted according to the GDO concept, erations. The Air Force realizes tremendous and Eighteenth Air Force’s tanker airlift efficiencies by using all of its available control center (TACC) executes intertheater worldwide DCGS resources. However, ana- reallocation decisions of global air mobility lysts face significant obstacles in maintain- forces. Some aspects of these two entities ing proficiency across the numerous dispa- may translate to a GDO concept. rate and unrelated environments from which targets emerge. To help mitigate this operational reality, the Air Force DCGS has Air Force Distributed structured itself along “focus areas.” Identi- Common Ground System fying the core Air Force distributed ground system site as the “subject-matter expert” As the Air Force’s primary intelligence for each particular area helps build resident planning, collecting, processing, analysis, target depth while leveraging the Air Force and dissemination system, the DCGS is a DCGS enterprise as a whole. network-centric, global enterprise com- Even though the WOC has responsibility prised of multiple distributed ground sys- for global mission management of the Air tem sites operating worldwide.10 Just as the Force’s DCGS PED, it does not maintain op- GDO concept seeks to dynamically allocate erational control (OPCON) of the respective RPA aircrews among COCOMs in support of distributed ground system sites that com- national tasking, so does the Air Force prise the enterprise.13 Rather, these sites re- DCGS execute dynamic allocation of intel- main under OPCON of their respective geo- ligence processing, exploitation, and dis- graphic COCOMs.14 This break in C2 semination (PED) resources among CO- authority complicates the WOC’s ability to COMs in support of national tasking. The execute its global mission-management complexities involved in the Air Force’s functions. Efforts to establish a joint task DCGS distributed operations require robust, force for global management of PED in or-

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der to provide GFM for the PED function mission-management entity has value in could extend to the DCGS elements of all optimizing LD/HD resources. Priority- military services that conduct PED within based allocation is essential in reconciling the overall DCGS enterprise, thereby pro- competing theater requirements. Dynamic viding unity of command and effort.15 intertheater reallocation demands the em- powerment of global mission management with formal tasking authority. Organizing Eighteenth Air Force Tanker distributed sites along subject-matter- Airlift Control Center expert focus areas in order to build habitual relationships with supported units fur- Like the Air Force’s DCGS, the service’s ther enhances effectiveness. Presenting air mobility maintains a global responsi- forces through a mix of functional and geo- bility that requires it to execute global graphically based models not only facili- force allocation. Multiple common users tates intertheater reallocation but also pro- compete for limited air mobility forces, vides dedicated capability to theater necessitating priority-based allocation. A commanders. A global mission-management fixed air and space operations center, entity exercising centralized control is best Eighteenth Air Force’s TACC serves as the postured to balance this mix. The GDO organizational mechanism used to execute concept draws from these lessons as it this priority; it “plans, coordinates, sched- seeks to optimize the global enterprise ules, tasks, and controls air mobility mis- executing remotely piloted RSO missions. sions worldwide.”16 The TACC exercises centralized command of global air mobility forces in order Emergence of Global to conduct approved intertheater allocation quickly.17 Normally, US Transporta- Dynamic Operations tion Command, rather than a geographic A futuristic concept, GDO seeks to attain commander, retains the preponderance of a degree of power projection by dynami- these forces. Air and space forces that cally allocating RPA aircrews to areas de- concurrently support more than one fined by national priority. It does so by ex- COCOM, such as those involved in air mo- ploiting two unique operational bility, are best organized under a func- characteristics of RSO RPA technology: (1) 18 tional organizational structure. However, the ability to allocate RSO RPA aircrews a small portion of global air mobility across vast distances in minimal time and forces are assigned to geographic com- (2) the capability to employ RPAs indepen- manders in support of high-priority, dently of dedicated aircrews. emerging requirements.19 When a COCOM requires additional forces of this type, the Concept of Operations chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may convene a joint transportation board to Assuming requisite bandwidth and de- adjudicate the situation and reallocate re- ployed footprint, current RSO technology sources. The secretary of defense approves enables the “virtual allocation” of RPA air- all reallocations, and the TACC executes crews across the globe with unprecedented from this approved reallocation.20 speed. Unlike traditional force-allocation Examination of the Air Force’s DCGS models that allocate platforms, the GDO and Eighteenth Air Force’s TACC teaches concept allocates aircrews—a departure valuable lessons regarding global force al- from the usual procedures that allocate re- location and distributed operations. The motely piloted RSO aircraft capability per performance of the WOC and TACC sug- mission and/or combat air patrol.21 The gests that maintaining a centralized global GDO concept also exploits multiaircraft

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control, an existing technology that enables Policy changes also occur regarding a single ground-control station to control command authorities and relationships. multiple RPAs. In such operations, a single Because the GDO concept views RPA air- pilot can actively control one RPA while crews as a resource that can be assigned, monitoring others.22 apportioned, and allocated apart from the Multiaircraft control technology, enabled aircraft, it is both possible and desirable to by RSO virtual allocation, permits aircrew separate OPCON of the aircrews from that allocation in two different configurations: of the aircraft in order to achieve maxi- active or monitored mission status. In the mum flexibility. In a proposed GDO envi- former, an RPA sortie employs with a dedi- ronment, a functionally oriented, global cated aircrew, whereas a monitored mission mission-management entity has OPCON of employs with an aircrew that operates two the preponderance of RPA aircrews, which or more RPAs (see figure).23 This type of are considered an attached force to the unique employment construct forms the supported geographic COCOM.25 When al- foundation of the GDO concept: dynamic located to a geographic COCOM, such air- allocation of active and monitored RPA missions. crews remain under tactical control of the combatant commander for the duration of Organization and Policy the tasked mission.26 The geographic combatant commander has both OPCON and Organizationally, the GDO concept calls for tactical control of RPAs and associated in- establishment of a robust global mission- theater support resources.27 However, the management entity to execute rotational GDO concept allows for assignment of a and emergent force allocation of RPA air- portion of RPA aircrews to a geographic crews across COCOMs, based on national COCOM, as the situation demands. This priority as defined in the GEF. In the GDO overall construct is similar to distributed concept, global mission management has intelligence operations and the use of formal authority to provide unity of com- global air mobility forces that involve orga- mand for joint-force RPA aircrews that nizing and commanding resources along a would otherwise be employed piecemeal mix of functional and geographic lines.28 among disparate COCOMs. It is also postured to provide unity of effort for multi Allocation Processes for Rotational Forces national and interagency RPA operations. Therefore, global mission management in a Proposed GDO processes involved in GFM GDO construct seeks high degrees of uni- rotational and emergent force allocation are fied action through the dynamic allocation articulated in the form of active and moni- of active and monitored RPA missions.24 tored RPA missions. The GDO concept pro- The GDO concept advocates significant vides predictable RPA capability to combat- policy changes, the most notable of which ant commanders by employing a portion of transfers RPA resource authority from the active and monitored RPA missions in a pre- secretary of defense to the GDO global mis- scribed, rotational force-allocation structure. sion manager—a change essential for the In accordance with traditional GFM policy, success of GDO. Experience with the Air rotational forces are allocated to a combat- Force’s DCGS indicates that global mission ant commander, typically for a specified management requires formal authority period of time. With traditional rotational when it executes dynamic, priority-based force allocation of manned platforms, this allocation in a resource-constrained envi- structure trades flexibility for predictability. ronment. Formal authority also yields the However, the active and monitored RPA tools to conduct allocation art when solving mission structure provides flexibility and complex allocation problems. predictability because, within a GDO con-

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struct, RPA aircrew resources can be tailored Rotational force allocation conducted in a to specific rotational-force requirements. GDO model also offers the opportunity to The GDO concept provides for the effec- create a “strategic reserve” of RPA aircrews. tive and efficient allocation of rotational After the minimum number of aircrews are forces. In a notional GDO example, COCOM allocated to rotational force requirements, X employs 10 RPA aircrews to operate 10 five RPA aircrews remain untasked and active RPA missions (see table). COCOM Z available for emergent allocation (see table). employs four RPA aircrews to execute 13 National decision makers and global mis- RPA missions, based on COCOM require- sion management may view this complements. Using the traditional GFM model, ment of aircrews as a strategic reserve available for full-time, flexible employment, COCOM Z would have absorbed 13 RPA air- based on dynamic, changing national priori- crews to support 13 RPA missions, even ties, thus obviating the need to reallocate though the requirement could have been aircrews from their assigned COCOM task- satisfied with four RPA aircrews in a moni- ing. Therefore, national decision makers tored mission status. The GDO concept re- achieve a degree of flexibility while combat- treats from the one-size-fits-all allocation ant commanders retain predictability of construct currently employed by GFM and their rotational resources of RPA aircrews. precisely applies LD/HD RPA resources This allocation model mirrors those in when and where needed. This concept—the Iraqi Freedom whereby operational-level essence of “requirements-driven alloca- echelons retain a portion of RPA assets in tion”—illustrates how the military can real- order to respond to emerging, ad hoc re- ize economy of force in terms of RPA air- quirements, while tactical echelons receive crews at the strategic level. predictable RPA capability.29 This model is

Table. Global dynamic operations of remotely piloted aircraft: rotational and emergent force- allocation response to crises

Rotational Force Allocation (Steady State) Emergent Force Allocation: Single Crisis Minimum no. of COCOM Active/Monitored Missions COCOM Precrisis Allocation Crisis Allocation aircrews required* 10 Active 10 Active X 10 X Unchanged 0 Monitored 0 Monitored 5 Active 5 Active Y 6 Y Unchanged 4 Monitored 4 Monitored 1 Active 1 Active 6 Active Z 4 Z crisis 12 Monitored 12 Monitored 12 Monitored Total minimum aircrews required 20

Total RSO RPA enterprise aircrews available 25 Remaining aircrews available for emergent allocation 5 Emergent Force Allocation: Multiple Crises COCOM Precrisis Allocation Crisis Allocation 10 Active 15 Active X crisis 0 Monitored 4 Monitored 5 Active Y 0 missions 4 Monitored} *Aircrew manning for monitored missions is calculated using a 1 Active 6 Active Z crisis multiaircraft control ratio of one aircrew per four RPAs. 12 Monitored 12 Monitored

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also representative of a force tasked in a As exercised in a GDO model, emergent “general support” role, supporting combat- forces are subject to priority-based alloca- ant commanders as a whole but not any tion. RPA aircrews tasked with low-priority particular theater. targets in a particular COCOM may be allo- The number of strategic reserve resources cated to a COCOM that maintains higher- can be adjusted, based on the level of vola- priority targets.31 On the one hand, this al- tility expected both near term and midterm. location model has the advantage of A large number of RPA aircrews may be “ap- guarding against theater-scale “penny pack- portioned” for emergent allocation if crises eting” of RPA aircrews, whereby a lower- are expected in multiple COCOMs, thereby priority COCOM may seek to husband its necessitating flexible, dynamic, inter-COCOM allocated RPA resources in response to com- allocation. However, if the security environ- peting, higher-priority COCOMs. On the ment is such that dynamic shifts in re- other hand, it requires a high level of risk sources between COCOMs are not expected, mitigation. In situations calling for realloca- then fewer RPA aircrews can be apportion of resources from a COCOM, global tioned for emergent allocation and more mission management must work aggres- committed to rotational force requirements. sively to leverage the global enterprise in The ratio of active and monitored missions order to mitigate the loss of resources while can also be adjusted, based on the avail- maximizing potential opportunities. ability of RPA resources and mission re- When conducting GDO-based emergent quirements. These concepts are similar in allocation, global mission management ex- function to theater-based air apportion- ecutes the role of force provider, not force ment, which entails adjusting the level of employer, and adheres to the tenet of cen- air effort, as articulated by varying airpower tralized control, decentralized execution.32 30 missions according to the situation. In a complex operating environment, lower- level commanders know best how to em- Allocation Processes for Emergent Forces ploy RPA forces in a tactical context. There- Similar to its effect on rotational force allo- fore, in a GDO concept, the global mission cation, the GDO concept also revolutionizes manager provides RPA aircrews, but theater emergent force allocation by enabling un- commanders employ them in an active/ precedented flexibility and responsiveness monitored mission configuration tailored to for dynamic, inter-COCOM allocation in their operations. Throughout the spectrum single and multicrisis environments. Emer- of operations, mission management must gent force allocation seeks either to allocate view itself as a supporting entity, respon- RPA aircrews made available as a result of sible for the success of the supported the- rotational force allocation or to use formal ater commander. tasking authority to allocate aircrews from In order to increase responsiveness, one COCOM to another. In terms of the sce- transparency, and access for combatant nario depicted in the table, the five aircrews commanders, the GDO model procedurally made available from rotational force alloca- allows COCOMs to submit time-sensitive tion are dynamically allocated to COCOM RFFs directly to global mission manage- Z. Furthermore, due to multicrisis requirement. With its delegated authority from the ments, the scenario shows how global mis- secretary of defense, global mission man- sion management operating in a GDO con- agement is postured to make responsive struct can reallocate aircrews from COCOM allocation decisions, based on GEF priori- Y to COCOM X, leaving the former with no ties. This effectively moves execution op- RPA aircrews outside the theater. This dem- erations out of national-level staffing orga- onstrates the potential beneficial and ad- nizations and into the hands of an verse effects of priority-based allocation. operationally oriented organization.

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Challenges themselves (remotely piloted platforms, aircrews, communications equipment, and Even though the GDO concept promises great advances in the allocation of RPA air- maintenance facilities) are finite and must crews, significant challenges threaten to be increased in proportion to the level of limit its effectiveness, the foremost of power projection desired. The GDO concept which involves COCOM “ownership” of assumes the availability of these resources. those aircrews. Geographic COCOMs will Complexity induced by the expanding likely want to retain OPCON of RPA air- global RPA enterprise will prove problematic crews rather than cede the preponderance for global mission management. The prolif- of such control to a functional command. eration of RPA platforms and capabilities, To reconcile this challenge, the GDO con- sensor capabilities, networked C2, and joint cept must show that support can be more service and multinational partners adds ca- beneficial than ownership. Similar to opera- pability to the enterprise but also compli- tions involving distributed intelligence and cates mission management.33 Horizontal global air mobility, GDO leverages the en- integration between interdependent enti- tire force rather than a smaller, theater- ties, such as the RPA and DCGS enterprises,

The GDO concept’s ability to realize power projection depends upon the pre-positioning of RPA resources in/near respective theaters of operation, a scenario that poses two challenges: access and resource availability.

based force. Such global sourcing and joint must limit seams as both expand in size and interdependence provide geographic com- scope. Vertical integration among strategic, manders greater capability. Ultimately, operational, and tactical echelons will blur GDO performance will become the key in as linkages become more diffuse. building trust with the geographic COCOMs. RPA aircrew training, theater familiariza- The GDO concept’s ability to realize tion, and tactical integration represent an- power projection depends upon the pre- other hurdle. Each theater maintains its positioning of RPA resources in/near re- own unique operating environment in spective theaters of operation, a scenario terms of organization, policy, procedures, that poses two challenges: access and resource availability. Launch and recovery and operating culture. RPA aircrews must elements for remotely piloted RSO aircraft have the mental agility to flex between en- must be located in proximity to the target vironments, maintaining proficiency in area. Even as the capabilities of these air- each theater. Furthermore, those aircrews craft increase in terms of speed, range, and tasked with supporting multiple theaters of duration, access of the launch and recovery operation in different COCOMs must con- elements will remain a critical employment tend with the need to develop habitual rela- consideration. Moreover, the elements tionships with supported units.

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Recommendations batant commanders. In essence, this concept gives them employment options The GDO concept requires an organiza- (which the current GFM construct fails to tional structure that provides unity of com- provide) when formulating strategy, as they mand and effort, independent of service seek to reconcile ends, ways, and means. and COCOM bias. A functional joint task Traditional GFM organization, policy, and force’s organizational structure, empowered procedures are not designed to satisfy this with formal authority to make timely real- requirement at a tempo generated by the location decisions between COCOMs, satis- dynamic allocation of RPA aircrews. The fies these requirements. Establishing and GDO concept proposes bold changes to tra- assigning a GDO joint task force under US ditional force allocation in order to bridge Strategic Command (STRATCOM), which this gap. As noted by the Quadrennial De- commands eight other functionally based, fense Review Report (2006), “The principles globally oriented missions that conduct of transparency, constructive competition daily planning and execution for their re- to encourage innovation, agility and adapt- spective primary mission areas, would offer ability, collaboration and partnership the same sort of orientation needed for should guide the formulation of new strate- launching and sustaining the proposed gic processes and organizational struc- GDO mission.34 tures.”36 The GDO concept is guided by this As a global distributed operation networked among multiple federated partners, spirit of innovation. the GDO concept facilitates robust horizon- Even though this concept seeks bold change, it remains pragmatic—grounded in tal, lateral, and cross-department informa- 37 tion flows. In this environment, command the shared tenets of air and space power. and sensors tend to decouple from tradi- The allocation of RPA aircrews is centrally tional command authorities.35 This opera- controlled and decentrally executed, using tional environment requires fluid, dynamic, flexible and versatile methods. Centralized, and adaptable command authorities and global mission management helps to ensure relationships. The military must develop the concentration of purpose, priority, and and implement doctrine, policies, and pro- balance necessary to maximize LD/HD RPA cedures in order to realize these ends and resources. A mix of allocation art and sci- foster a further degree of organizational ence produces synergistic effects in order to trust among the services. attain persistence in the forms of surveillance and global strike. Regardless of how the GDO concept con- Conclusion tributes to the global mission management of RPAs, future efforts must continue to Strategy decides the time when, the seek optimum solutions in areas of dy- place where, and the forces with which namic inter-COCOM allocation, adaptive the engagement is to be fought, and command relationships, and net-centric through this threefold activity exerts global mission management. The National considerable influence on its outcome. Defense Strategy of 2008 reminds us that —Carl von Clausewitz “implementation of any strategy is predi- cated on developing, maintaining and, According to Clausewitz, strategy should where possible, expanding the means re- determine the timing and placement of quired to execute its objectives within bud- forces. The GDO concept offers national get constraints. . . . The challenges before decision makers a mechanism to dynami- us will require resourcefulness and an inte- cally translate changing strategic priorities grated approach that wisely balances risks into globally postured RPA forces for com- and assets.”38 ✪

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Notes

1. “Split operations are a type of distributed op- near or real-time. Persistent surveillance facilitates erations. The term describes those distributed opera- the prediction of an adversary’s behavior and the tions conducted by a single C2 entity that is sepa- formulation and execution of preemptive activities rated between two or more geographic locations. A to deter or forestall anticipated adversary courses of single commander must have oversight of all aspects action.” JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of of a split C2 operation.” Air Force Doctrine Docu- Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001 (as ment (AFDD) 2-8, Command and Control, 1 June amended through 19 August 2009), 416. Power pro- 2007, 47, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service jection is “the ability of a nation to apply all or _pubs/afdd2_8.pdf (accessed 21 September 2009). some of its elements of national power—political, “Distributed operations occur when independent or economic, informational, or military—to rapidly interdependent nodes or locations participate in the and effectively deploy and sustain forces in and operational planning and/or operational decision- from multiple dispersed locations to respond to making process to accomplish goals/missions for crises, to contribute to deterrence, and to enhance engaged commanders.” Ibid., 46. “The system[’s] . . . regional stability.” JP 1-02, Department of Defense components include the necessary equipment, data Dictionary, 426. communication links, and personnel to control and 6. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial employ a remotely piloted aircraft. The remotely Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: Office of the piloted aircraft is composed of six components: the Secretary of Defense, 6 February 2006), v–vii, http:// aircraft, payloads, data communication links, www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203 ground control stations, ground support equipment, .pdf (accessed 15 September 2009). and ground operators.” Joint Unmanned Aircraft 7. Department of Defense, Force Management Systems Center of Excellence, Joint Concept of Opera- Joint Functional Concept, version 1.0 (Washington, tions for Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 2d ed. (Creech DC: Department of Defense, 2 June 2005), 1, http:// AFB, NV: Joint Unmanned Aircraft Systems Center www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/fm of Excellence, November 2008), GL-11. _jfc_v1.doc. 2. To date, theater-based, virtual RSO RPA alloca- 8. This article borrows the term Global Dynamic tion has been conducted only in CENTCOM due to Operations from Col Allan W. Howey’s paper of the the fact that the preponderance of medium-altitude same name (Maxwell AFB, AL: Airpower Research RSO RPAs has supported Enduring Freedom and Institute, College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research Iraqi Freedom since 2003. and Education, Air University, April 2001), http:// 3. Situations that may precipitate a reallocation handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA391117. Colonel Howey’s of RSO RPAs include, but are not limited to, chang- concept envisions a centrally controlled or coordi- ing priorities, weather implications, and communi- nated air and space campaign that employs glob- cations availability. ally capable low density / high demand (LD/HD) 4. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations, 17 air and space assets in a global, multitheater envi- September 2006 (change 1, 13 February 2008), I-2, ronment. This article, however, uses GDO differ- http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_0 ently, envisioning global, dynamic reallocation of .pdf (accessed 14 September 2009). RPA resources. 5. Global strike is “responsive joint operations 9. US Air Force, “Theater ISR CONOPS” (Wash- that strike enemy high value / payoff targets, as an ington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 4 January integral part of joint force operations conducted to 2008), 2. gain and maintain battlespace access, achieve other 10. AFDD 2-9, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Re- desired effects and set conditions for follow-on deci- connaissance Operations, 17 July 2007, 33, http:// sive operations to achieve strategic and operational www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/afdd2 objectives.” Department of Defense, Global Strike _9.pdf (accessed 21 September 2009). Joint Integrating Concept, version 1.0 (Washington, 11. Located at Langley AFB, VA, the WOC pro- DC: Department of Defense, 10 January 2005), 2-1, vides global mission management for the US Air http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/jic.htm. Force DCGS enterprise, including active duty and Persistent surveillance is “a collection strategy that Air National Guard DCGS units. emphasizes the ability of some collection systems 12. The WOC reallocated 953 of 4,696 sorties in to linger on demand in an area to detect, locate, 2007. characterize, identify, track, target, and possibly 13. Operational control is “the authority to per- provide battle damage assessment and retargeting in form those functions of command over subordinate

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forces involving organizing and employing com- 26. Tactical control is “command authority over mands and forces, assigning tasks, designating assigned or attached forces or commands, or mili- objectives, and giving authoritative direction tary capability or forces made available for tasking, necessary to accomplish the mission.” JP 1-02, that is limited to the detailed direction and control Department of Defense Dictionary, 398. of movements or maneuvers within the operational 14. Each Air Force distributed ground system site area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks is under the operational control of its respective assigned.” JP 1-02, Department of Defense Diction- intelligence group, subordinate to a numbered air ary , 537. force, which directly supports a COCOM’s Air Force 27. In-theater resources entail the launch and component commander at the operational and tac- recovery element, which includes the aircrews, air- tical levels. craft, maintenance, and communications resources. 15. Col Kimberly Sievers, division chief, Intelli- 28. AFDD 2, Operations and Organization, 57. gence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Global 29. Raymond T. Odierno, Nichoel E. Brooks, and Force Management, USSTRATCOM/JFCC-ISR, 2006– Francesco P. Mastracchio, “ISR Evolution in the Iraqi 2009, to the author, e-mail, 8 April 2009. Theater,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 50 (3d quarter 16. AFDD 2-6, Air Mobility Operations, 1 March 2008): 51–55, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq 2006, 8, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service _pages/editions/i50/14.pdf (accessed 21 September _pubs/afdd2_6.pdf (accessed 21 September 2009). 2009). Partial apportionment shows a balance of ISR 17. Ibid., 13–15. assets—allocation not entirely based on either or- 18. AFDD 2, Operations and Organization, 3 April ganic control or centralized priority. In partial ap- 2007, 45–46, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service portionment, a portion of RPA capability is retained _pubs/afdd2.pdf (accessed 21 September 2009). by a higher echelon in order to respond to emerging 19. AFDD 2-6, Air Mobility Operations, 11–12. requirements without tapping into assets allocated 20. Ibid., 72. to lower echelons. 21. In the context of RPA operations, a combat 30. Apportionment (air) is “the determination air patrol describes an RPA mission sortie. Current and assignment of the total expected effort by per- force management communicates RSO RPA capa- centage and/or by priority that should be devoted to bility in terms of the number of such patrols as- the various air operations for a given period of signed to a theater. That is, COCOM X has 10 MQ-1 time.” JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary, 40. Predator combat air patrols assigned, meaning that 31. “Prioritization—Because operational needs it may execute 10 Predator missions for the stated for intelligence often exceed intelligence capabili- period of time. ties, prioritization of collection and analysis efforts 22. Joint Unmanned Aircraft Systems Center of and . . . ISR resource allocation are vital aspects of Excellence, Joint Concept of Operations, III-6. The intelligence planning. Prioritization offers a mecha- operational trade-off in a multiaircraft-control con- nism for addressing requirements and effectively struct is that monitored missions may be less tacti- managing risk by identifying the most important cally responsive than active missions. The advan- tasks and applying available resources against those tage is that such a construct enables employment of tasks.” JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 June 2007, xiv, a larger number of platforms per RPA aircrew than http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp2_0 would be possible in a 1:1 manning model. .pdf (accessed 21 September 2009). 23. The terms active mission and monitored mis- 32. “Centralized control of air and space power is sion were developed and first used during initial the planning, direction, prioritization, synchroniza- multiaircraft-control operations conducted at Nellis tion, integration, and deconfliction of air and space AFB, NV, in 2006. capabilities to achieve the objectives of the joint 24. “The term ‘unified action’ in military usage force commander. . . . Centralized control maxi- is a broad term referring to the synchronization, mizes the flexibility and effectiveness of air and coordination, and/or integration of the activities of space power; however, it must not become a recipe governmental and nongovernmental entities with for micromanagement, stifling the initiative subor- military operations to achieve unity of effort.” JP 1, dinates need to deal with combat’s inevitable uncer- Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 2 tainties. Decentralized execution of air and space May 2007 (incorporating change 1, 20 March 2009), power is the delegation of execution authority to xii, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/ responsible and capable lower-level commanders to jp1.pdf (accessed 21 September 2009). achieve effective span of control and to foster disci- 25. Ibid., IV-3. Attached forces are those that are plined initiative, situational responsiveness, and temporarily transferred to a joint force. tactical flexibility. It allows subordinates to exploit

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opportunities in rapidly changing, fluid situations.” Command (JIOWC), and USSTRATCOM Center for AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 17 November 2003, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (SCC- 28, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/ WMD). “Functional Components,” United States afdd1.pdf (accessed 21 September 2009). Strategic Command, http://www.stratcom.mil/ 33. “The future direction of UAS [unmanned air- functional_components/ (accessed 17 April 2009). craft system] C2 is to move away from point-to-point 35. David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka, and Frederick data links to network data links to facilitate more P. Stein, Network Centric Warfare: Developing and collaborative and ‘common use’ of UAS. NATO de- Leveraging Information Superiority, 2d ed. rev., CCRP fines five different Levels of Interoperability (LOI) Publication Series (Washington, DC: DOD C4ISR that identify the flexibility in control for all active Cooperative Research Program, February 2000), 120, UAS. The most robust LOI, Level 5, enables opera- http://www.dodccrp.org/events/12th_ICCRTS/CD/ tors to pass full control of the aircraft and/or pay- library/html/pdf/Alberts_NCW.pdf. load from one operator to another. This capability 36. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadren- permits users from different military Services and nial Defense Review Report, 1. government agencies to operate other Service agency UA platforms within a given UAS constella- 37. The tenets of air and space power include tion.” Joint Unmanned Aircraft Systems Center of centralized control and decentralized execution, Excellence, Joint Concept of Operations, III-6, 7. flexibility and versatility, synergistic effects, persis- 34. STRATCOM’s functional components include tence, concentration of purpose, priority, and bal- JFCC-Global Strike (JFCC-GS), JFCC-Space (JFCC- ance. AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 27–33. SPACE), Joint Task Force-Global Network Operations 38. Department of Defense, National Defense (JTF-GNO), JFCC-Network Warfare (JFCC-NW), Strategy (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, JFCC-Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC-IMD), JFCC- June 2008), 18, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 2008NationalDefenseStrategy.pdf (accessed 17 April (JFCC-ISR), Joint Information Operations Warfare 2009).

Maj Brad W. Borke Major Borke (Miami University; MPA, University of Texas at San Antonio; MSSI, National Defense Intelligence College; MOS, Marine Corps University) is a contingency planner with US Africa Command. He formerly served as the senior intelligence officer for the 432d Wing, Creech AFB, Nevada, responsible for the wing’s intelligence operations in support of global MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper strike and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations. Major Borke is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, National Defense Intelligence College, and Marine Corps University’s School of Advanced Warfighting.

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You have to know the past to understand the present. —Carl Sagan

evolutions in warfare rarely take Air Force’s air and space (and cyberspace) place in one’s lifetime. Rather, an functions. evolution based on the innovative When the chief of staff and secretary of R the Air Force added cyberspace to the ser- use of available technology and human in- genuity steadily occurs.1 Is the ubiquity of vice’s mission statement in December 2005, cyberspace operations and technology such it became powerfully clear that the Air a revolution? Perhaps. However, any revolu- Force was serious about its role in providing tion should not compel us to leave behind capabilities in cyberspace operations to the joint fight.2 As a result, the Air Force com- lessons learned from the age before cyber- munity, along with its counterparts in other space. Assiduous students of warfare will services, has been busy developing support- still find that books on military history, the- ing documents and guidance to define and ories of war, doctrines, and publications on focus what the fledgling mission area past conflicts are invaluable. Cyberspace means to the force. Cyberspace is every- does not change the principles of war or the where we turn; it is an essential part of our tenets of airpower from the Airman’s per- daily mission and activities. However, we spective. At an even more granular level, must remember that our fundamental func- only minor changes are required to the US tions as an Air Force have not changed.

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13-Feature-Trias-Bell.indd 90 1/27/10 1:32:08 PM This article endorses the idea that cyber [that] should be grounded in, and informed operations may be conducted in all war- by, experience, historical knowledge, and fighting domains: air, space, cyberspace, the work of the universal theorists, most land, and sea. In addition, despite the im- especially Carl von Clausewitz and Sun maturity of cyberspace operational doc- Tzu.”4 Air Force strategists are struggling to trines, the doctrines from air and space re- create doctrinal principles for cyber warfare main relevant and applicable to the in the form of Air Force Doctrine Docu- cyberspace domain. Cyber operations are ment (AFDD) 2-11, “Cyberspace Opera- just another set of tools in the commander’s tions,” now several years in draft. However, toolbox. Although cyber operations have we must be careful to derive cyber doctrine distinct ways of achieving effects, from an and strategy from the proven methods of Air Force perspective they are similar to previous documents and must examine how other air and space operations that support we can employ cyberspace operations in air and space (and cyberspace) functions. support of Air Force functions. Known and established cyber operations The Air Force functions defined in provide war fighters with viable options to AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, are those kinetic means. This article highlights the specific responsibilities that enable the ser- role of cyber operations in supporting the vice to fulfill its legally established roles as air and space functions. noted in Title 10, United States Code, sec- Lastly, we add a new function, counter tion 8013. The operational functions listed cyberspace, to the 17 Air Force functions in the table are the “broad, fundamental, (see table). Past Air Force doctrine has used and continuing activities” of air, space, and different nomenclature but has not made cyberspace power.5 “They are not neces- the importance of countercyberspace com- sarily unique to the Air Force . . . but to- pletely clear until recently. For this reason, gether they do represent” how the service the new function necessitates adjustments fulfills its assigned missions.6 The follow- to the existing information operations (IO) ing sections address each of the air and function to account for duplication. By space functions, discussing how cyber- showing that cyber operations are just an- space operations can provide the same ef- other set of tools, we can integrate previ- fects and serve as the appropriate founda- ously defined supporting operations in an tion for cyberspace doctrine. initial development of cyberspace operations doctrine. Eventually, a more concrete Air Force cyberspace doctrine will evolve as Strategic Attack prescribed by lessons from history and future events. The goal of strategic attack is to apply Doctrine is an integrated collection of force systematically against enemy centers lessons learned from experiments, exer- of gravity in order to produce the greatest cises, and past engagements that we accept effect for the least cost in dollars and lives.7 as the best practices for conducting warfare.3 As illustrated by Col John Warden’s five Still in their infancy, cyberspace operations strategic rings, these centers may be mate- consequently lack the history of experience rial (infrastructure) or nonmaterial (popu- vital for establishing sound doctrinal state- lace support) in nature. He further advo- ments. Dr. David Lonsdale remarked that cates attacking the three elements of “new or developing methods of warfare re- command—information gathering, decision quire doctrinal and theoretical development making, and communication (e.g., bombing

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Function General Definition Air and Space Example Cyber Tasks Strategic Attack Systematic application of force Destroying leadership, Attack on supervisory against enemy centers of gravity power, and communication control and data hubs acquisition and Internet traffic

Counterair, Operations conducted to attain Air interdiction, close Manipulating Counterspace, and maintain a desired degree of air support, suppression databases, images, Counterland, superiority within a domain while of enemy air defenses, power/controls of a Countersea denying an adversary use of that jamming satellite up/ weapon system same domain downlink frequencies

Information Actions to support commanders’ Influence operations, Manipulation of Operations ability to assess the operational electronic warfare, Web content, e-mail environment and enhance their military deception, “leaflets” observe-orient-decide-act loop counterintelligence

Airlift, Air Refueling, Activities that extend the reach of Intratheater airlift, Messaging e-mail, Web Spacelift personnel and materiel in order to operational support airlift, pages, remote network provide rapid, functional, flexible, deployment launch administration timely, and responsive options

Intelligence, Activities that contribute to U-2s, remotely piloted Search engines, Surveillance and the creation of the intelligence aircraft, national assets, network enumeration, Reconnaissance preparation of the battlespace human intelligence honey pots, packet in order to provide commanders sniffing detailed knowledge that helps them better understand and know the enemy

Special Operations Operations that use mobility in Special reconnaissance, Address masking, denied territory, surgical firepower, psychological operations, Internet cafes, botnets and special tactics to conduct counterterrorism low-visibility, covert, or clandestine military actions

Combat Support, Actions that enable the war fighter Aircraft maintenance, Net-centric operations, Command and to focus on and successfully carry air and space operations command and control, Control, Combat out those operations related to the center, global positioning and network terrain Search and Rescue, above functions system satellites, National packets Navigation and Oceanic and Atmospheric Positioning, Weather Administration satellites Services

Countercyberspace Operations conducted to attain Bombing server buildings Software exploits and maintain a desired degree of cyberspace superiority by destroying, degrading, denying, deceiving, disrupting, or exploiting the enemy’s cyberspace capability

Derived from Air Force Doctrine Document 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 17 November 2003, 39–58, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/afdd1.pdf (accessed 8 December 2009).

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Iraq’s communications infrastructure dur- Counterair, Counterspace, ing Operation Desert Storm, as shown on Cable News Network).8 Counterland, Countersea The cyberspace domain provides adver- These operations are conducted “to at- saries a new environment to conduct offen- tain and maintain a desired degree of supe- sive and defensive operations. In addition, riority” within any of the physical domains cyber operations offer the means to expe- by destroying, degrading, denying, deceiv- dite other operational functions previously ing, disrupting, or exploiting the enemy’s conducted through other domains. “In the capability within that same domain.12 They effort to influence—whether focused on an are characterized by actions that are either individual, an organization, or an entire so- offensive or defensive in nature. Offensive ciety—cyberspace is a key operational me- counteroperations inhibit the enemy from dium via which ‘strategic influence’ is con- exploiting a particular domain to his advan- 9 ducted.” However, considering modern tage.13 One goal of offensive counterair in- organizations’ and nations’ dependence on volves destroying the enemy’s offensive air the world’s cyberspace infrastructure, new and missile assets before he can do the sources of vulnerabilities are tempting tar- same in order to establish freedom from at- gets for strategic attack, especially from an tack for friendly forces. Defensive counter- asymmetric form of warfare. operations “preserve US/friendly ability to Over the past few years, the ability to use exploit” a domain in order to protect cyber operations as an avenue for strategic friendly capabilities.14 During Operation attack has become evident. In 2007 the Iraqi Freedom, coalition forces conducted a Idaho National Laboratory for the Depart- defensive counterspace operation to destroy ment of Homeland Security simulated a cy- an adversary’s “ground-based global posi- ber attack on a test power station. The simu- tioning system (GPS) jammers to preserve lation demonstrated an exploitation of a freedom to employ GPS-aided munitions by software vulnerability in Supervisory Con- friendly forces.”15 trol and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, US military assets across all operational the computer systems that control electric, domains are infused with cyber technolo- water, and chemical plants throughout the gies, as is the case for most modern militar- United States. Designed with minimal secu- ies. The Quadrennial Roles and Missions Re rity protection, many of these systems review Report of January 2009 outlines the main vulnerable to cyber attacks. Even ter- Department of Defense’s (DOD) desire to rorist organizations are interested in the seek “strategic, operational, and tactical vulnerabilities of strategic systems like cyberspace capabilities that provide . . . SCADA.10 Examples include the virtual shut- warfighting effects within and through the down of the Estonian government via its cyberspace domain that are synergistic with Internet infrastructure and the Russian/ effects within other domains.”16 Cyber- Georgian conflict of 2008, during which related tools and operations have become Russian military forces orchestrated a wave commonplace, if not prerequisites, in mili- of cyber-related operations against Georgia tary operations. Systems such as data links prior to an invasion. Coordinated through a shared among platforms and command and Russian online forum, the online assault control (C2) centers, the Blue Force Tracker appeared to have been prepared with target utilized by the US Army, and GPS-aided lists and details about vulnerabilities. The carrier-landing technologies employed by cyber attacks were carried out before the the US Navy have changed the execution of two countries engaged in a five-day ground, specific operations. However, they exist to sea, and air war.11 support the same service functions.

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Hackers have already demonstrated their and infrared regions of the spectrum. Tradi- ability to break into the DOD’s and contrac- tional EW operations conducted by aircrews tors’ networks.17 Gaining access to C2 data- over the past 50 years are considered non- bases on the Internet presents an opportu- cyber by entire communities.19 “In Opera- nity to affect the timing of launching forces tion ALLIED FORCE . . . multi-service capa- from garrison, the direction they take, and bilities were combined in the form of ‘jam their actions upon arrival. A successful to exploit,’ demonstrating how opponent breach of weapon system communication/ communications users can be herded to fre- data-link architectures would easily allow quencies which intelligence may collect and us to disrupt the enemy’s ability to execute exploit.”20 IO often consists of nonkinetic his mission. Infiltration of the enemy’s cyber- actions to defend our decision cycle and enabled systems would also let us manipu- influence the adversary’s, but it can also late his operating picture or influence the take the form of physical attack against tan- delivery of electric power or the operation gible information infrastructures. of satellite control systems. The offensive counterinformation activities of PSYOP, military deception, and information attack all have a place in the cyber Information Operations realm. Well-trained cyber forces can influence enemy decision cycles by presenting As defined by AFDD 2-5, Information Op misleading Web content or even changing erations, IO exists to support commanders information presented by reputable sources. in determining the situation, assessing Defensive counterinformation activities such threats and risks, and making timely and as information assurance and operational- correct decisions. Reliance upon accurate security protocols are already in place at information and its speed of travel make all Air Force installations, some in non dominating the information spectrum more cyber form. important than ever. Currently, IO consists of influence operations, network warfare operations, and electronic warfare (EW) op- Airlift, Air Refueling, Spacelift erations.18 With the advent of cyberspace operations, it is apparent that network war- Airlift, air refueling, and spacelift extend fare operations fall under this new concept. the reach of personnel and materiel to pro- However, a debate continues over the future vide rapid, functional, flexible, timely, and of EW. After the publication of a doctrine responsive options necessary to apply stra- for cyberspace operations, AFDD 2-5 must tegic global power to various crisis situations be revised to incorporate these changes. worldwide. Airlift capabilities are vital for This does not mean that the two are mu- delivering expeditionary forces and infra- tually exclusive. IO can be conducted in the structure with minimum delay.21 These as- cyberspace domain, as it has been for de- sets link theaters and locations within the cades in other operational domains. How- same theater. Air refueling broadens the ever, not all IO can be considered cyber- range of employment options available to space operations. For example, influence the joint force commander. It enables operations seek to achieve effects resulting fighter, bomber, cargo, and rotary aircraft to in a change in the enemy’s observe, orient, operate from bases safe from attack and decide, act loop. Traditional means include conduct multiple missions without having dropping leaflets or using human messen- to return to base when they are low on fuel. gers to conduct psychological operations Spacelift deploys space systems to establish (PSYOP). EW operations seek to achieve ef- operational capability, sustains failed satel- fects across the electromagnetic domain, lite constellations or replaces failing satel- including radio frequencies as well as optical lites, and augments constellations to in-

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crease capability when the demand of giving us an opening to collect required in- current global operations is on the rise.22 telligence easily. Network enumerating, an- These three functions are characterized other activity of cyber ISR, involves scan- by their ability to increase the range of mili- ning an adversary’s networks for tary assets and deploy materiel to the fight. vulnerabilities in his security architecture, They are a measure of our capacity to proj- allowing us to build plans for exploiting ect air and space power abroad. Operations those networks during wartime. Addition- within the cyberspace domain achieve the ally, establishing decoys within our own same effect with information as the pay- networks grants US cyber forces a facility load. Cyberlift occurs regularly among com- for learning the type of information that puters connected via the Internet or other our enemies look for and the techniques network infrastructures. That is, packets of they employ for undermining our security data pass over Ethernet cables and wireless protocols. By utilizing packet sniffers, we connections as messages communicated can capture and analyze packets that travel among users. Network administrators who our networks. All of these activities allow frequently push patches and software up- us to characterize enemy capabilities with dates are exercising cyberlift operations. our cyber means, thus providing additional Images and intelligence information are information to the IPB. Once inside our ad- communicated globally. Just as airlift, air versaries’ networks, we can leverage cyber- refueling, and spacelift are the physical as- ISR operations to conduct IPB. sets of our forces, so are cyberspace operations the information enablers. Cyberlift permits the precision delivery of informa- Special Operations tion. Getting the right information to the right person at the right time is critical in Special operations use airpower opera- today’s operational environment, whether tions to conduct actions that include, but for conducting time-sensitive targeting or are not limited to, unconventional warfare, air-dropping supply pallets to locations “out- special reconnaissance, PSYOP, and counter side-the-wire.” The logistics behind focused terrorism.24 The difference between special information flow represents a challenge operations and conventional operations lies that we can answer by using appropriate in the degree of physical and political risk, cyberlift tactics, techniques, and procedures. overtness, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed opera- Intelligence, Surveillance, tional intelligence and indigenous assets.25 The inherently clandestine nature of spe- and Reconnaissance cial operations parallels the ease of con- Information collected by intelligence, ducting stealthy cyber operations. In 2007 surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) as- cyber attacks assailed the nation of Estonia. sets, such as the U-2 Dragonlady, satellites, Newspaper, banking, and governmental and/or undercover personnel, contributes agencies were subjected to a distributed to creation of the intelligence preparation denial-of-service attack by almost one mil- of the battlespace (IPB), which provides in- lion computers enslaved by cyber terrorists. formation to commanders to help them un- National servers, routers, and switches were derstand and know the enemy.23 The easiest, flooded with traffic and rendered essentially and often most overlooked, way to conduct useless. Many fingers pointed to the Rus- cyber ISR is merely to make use of Internet sian government. Attacks poured in from all search engines. Operations-security prac- over the world, but computer security offi- tices to safeguard critical information are cials say that some of the attackers were often disregarded or loosely implemented, identified by their Web addresses, many of

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them Russian and some from Russian state tion and positioning function enables mili- institutions.26 However, a major issue with tary forces to maneuver precisely, synchro- network attacks has to do with pinpointing nize actions, locate and attack targets, and the source. As Dr. Martin Libicki notes, locate and recover downed Airmen. Weather “One will not be able to make reasonable services offer timely and accurate informa- attribution unless the attacker virtually an- tion regarding the space and atmospheric nounces its role.”27 Thus, one cannot re- environments. This information is critical spond without reasonably attributing the in timing, planning, and conducting air and attacks. Even then, the attacks may come space operations, thus influencing “the se- from allies or one’s own systems.28 This lection of targets, routes, weapon systems, bodes well for those able to exploit the vul- and delivery tactics.”34 nerabilities of their enemies without leav- Cyberspace operations enable these func- ing a cyber trail. tions, and communication over the cyberspace domain facilitates them. For the most part, precise navigation and timing rely on Combat Support, Command and the cyberspace domain for signal transmis- Control, Combat Search and Rescue, sion and dissemination of GPS data. Net- centric operations have made way for con- Navigation and Positioning, and tinued, efficient support of war fighters Weather Services from bed, bullets, and beans to the C2 elements required. The weapon system repre- Combat support, C2, combat search and sented by the Air Force air and space opera- rescue (CSAR), navigation and positioning, tions center consists of hundreds of servers and weather services are the backbone of running various information systems, each the previously mentioned air and space one operating in cyberspace. power functions. Without the success of these functions, other functions cannot and will not succeed. Combat support is the Countercyberspace product of successful logistical, medical, and force-support operations, whose syn- We propose the following definition for ergy with other operations is essential for countercyberspace: a function consisting of creating combat capability across the range operations to attain and maintain a desired of military endeavors.29 C2 encompasses degree of cyberspace superiority by the destruc motivating forces into action to carry out tion, degradation, or disruption of an enemy’s the mission (command) and regulating capabilities to use cyberspace. This definition those same forces to execute operations is similar to those of the other counter aligned with the commander’s intent (con- domain functions listed above. Although it trol).30 Effective C2 enables the joint force does include the requirement of superiority commander to utilize available Air Force within the domain, this differs considerably platforms at the right place and time, de- from how we view air or space superiority. spite the fog of war, and degrade the ene- The draft version of AFDD 2-11 defines my’s capability to intercede.31 CSAR is the cyberspace superiority as “the degree of ad- method that the Air Force uses to support vantage possessed by one force over an- joint personnel recovery in “uncertain, de- other that permits the conduct of opera- nied, or hostile environments.”32 Personnel tions in cyberspace at a given time and recovery operations are essential to sustain- place without prohibitive interference by ing unit morale, preserving critical combat the opposing force.”35 Air and space superi- resources, and preventing the enemy from ority is characterized by freedom of action gaining intelligence.33 By providing accurate and simultaneous freedom from attack. location and time of reference, the naviga- Freedom of action is a characteristic of cy-

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berspace superiority; however, due to the deer the Iraqi fighters’ communication sys- ubiquitous nature of the Internet, freedom tem. Former Bush administration officials from attack cannot be assured and thus is involved with the decision to execute the not a requirement for cyberspace superiority. attack “credit the cyberattacks with allowing An appropriate summary of cyberspace su- military planners to track and kill some of periority would be “freedom of action the most influential insurgents,” eventually 38 through attack” (i.e., the ability to act even helping turn the tide of the war. while under attack and after an attack). Gen Both physical and cyber operations may produce the same direct effect in support of Kevin P. Chilton, commander of US Strate- the countercyberspace function, but they gic Command, concluded that “we went out have varying levels of indirect effects that in our mission-oriented protective posture must be considered. On the one hand, like (MOPP) gear and fixed airplanes, loaded air- any other attack, strikes against structures planes, and flew airplanes. We conducted housing physical cyber assets have the po- operations in a hostile environment. That’s tential to result in collateral damage. On the what operating under attack in cyberspace other hand, attacks through cyberspace is going to be like.”36 We can be certain that against cyber assets can also result in cas- cyberspace will remain a contested environ- cading collateral damage. The fear of such

We propose the following definition forcountercyberspace: a function consisting of operations to attain and maintain a desired degree of cyberspace superiority by the destruction, degradation, or disruption of an enemy’s capabilities to use cyberspace.

ment, but this should not constrain our side effects had kept American leadership ability to operate within the domain. from pulling the trigger of cyber weaponry. As a function, countercyberspace is com- Prior to the recent US invasion of Iraq, prised of various types of cyber and non- DOD leaders considered a plan to disable cyber-related operations. For example, if the the Iraqi banking network. However, they desired effect is to disrupt Internet service, subsequently abandoned it after determin- then physical attack or destruction of cyber- ing that it could also hinder the French related equipment (e.g., routers and build- banks so closely tied to Iraqi institutions ings housing Internet service providers) can and could potentially migrate to the other be considered operations in support of allies, including the United States.39 countercyberspace. The effect also may be We must give serious consideration to delivered in the form of a software exploit employing a cyber “munition” because it is to disrupt legitimate Internet traffic from not usually destroyed during an attack. flowing properly. Consider one unclassified Once released, such a weapon is easy to example. In May 2007, Pres. George W. Bush capture. Cyber forces can then deconstruct ordered the National Security Agency to and analyze its code to determine appropri- conduct a cyber attack against cell phones ate countermeasures for future attacks and and computer networks that Iraqi insur- for use as a weapon against its sender.40 To gents used to plan roadside bombings.37 The attain cyberspace superiority, we must execute agency’s efforts helped US forces comman- successful offensive, defensive, and mainte-

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nance operations through network attack, tional experiences in cyberspace, the Air network defense, and network operations, Force must use its experience in other war- respectively, in order to attain the level of fighting domains in order to develop sound control required to operate unimpeded while doctrine. After all, cyberspace operations preventing the enemy from gaining advan- support the same functions as air and space tage from the use of cyberspace.41 Elevating operations. As former secretary of the Air countercyberspace operations as an Air Force Michael W. Wynne wrote, “All aspects Force function will help provide focus and of air war will have some equivalent role in set boundaries for the service and joint cyber war.”44 With the advent of cyberspace community. operations, some changes do need to take place, to include differentiating cyberspace operations from IO. Further, a new counter- Conclusion cyberspace function should be added to Any cyberspace operational doctrine underscore its importance as a separate Air must take into account the similarities be- Force function in the cyberspace domain. tween and relationships with air and space As Lonsdale points out, “Although cyberspace operations. Many people agree with the has a part to play in all of the dimensions, it draft cyberspace operations doctrine’s state- does not fundamentally alter anything of ment that the cyberspace domain is a man- real significance in strategy. Thus, like the made virtual domain. Further study reveals air dimension before it, cyberspace affects 45 its natural similarities to the other domains, the grammar of war, but not its logic.” as defined by the electromagnetic spectrum With time, our experience in conducting environment. Viewing the cyberspace do- cyberspace operations and working in the main as the fifth dimension (to air, land, cyberspace domain will grow and become sea, and space), more people conclude that embedded in our daily operations; we will it is no different than the other four dimen- accept those operations in the same way we sions, where we develop and use man-made do air and space operations. Cyberspace technology to enter, maneuver, and exploit doctrine will evolve so that we can translate those domains.42 In addition, the unique ideas into practice in the most effective way characteristics of the cyberspace domain possible. In the meantime, we must exam- dictate how we operate within it. ine and learn from the similarities and dif- Cyberspace is a loaded term that invokes ferences among air, space, and cyberspace various definitions from different organiza- operations in support of air, space, and tions and people.43 Having limited opera- cyberspace functions. ✪

Notes

1. “Observers constantly describe the warfare of 2. Hon. Michael W. Wynne, “Flying and Fighting their own age as marking a revolutionary breach in in Cyberspace,” Air and Space Power Journal 21, no. 1 the normal progress of methods of warfare. Their (Spring 2007): 3, http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/ selection of their own age ought to put readers and airchronicles/apj/apj07/spr07/spr07.pdf (accessed listeners on their guard. . . . It is fallacy, due to igno- 8 December 2009). rance of technical and tactical military history, to suppose that methods of warfare have not made con- 3. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air tinuous and, on the whole, fairly even progress.” Force Basic Doctrine, 17 November 2003, 3, http:// Cyril B. Falls, A Hundred Years of War (London: www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/afdd1.pdf Duckworth, [1953]), 13. (accessed 8 December 2009).

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4. Dr. David J. Lonsdale, “The Impact of Cyber- aspects of EW, but EW serves four other Domains— space on Strategy,” High Frontier 5, no. 3 (May 2009): Land, Sea, Air and Space—that also need to achieve 23, http://www.afspc.af.mil/shared/media/document/ Spectrum Control. Within the Joint Service, the pre- AFD-090519-102.pdf (accessed 8 December 2009). vailing sentiment would indicate that EW will in- 5. AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 39. deed remain an articulated mission area to exercise 6. Ibid., 39–40. the critical care for and protection of the Spectrum, 7. AFDD 2-1.2, Strategic Attack, 12 June 2007, 2, and not to be assimilated by any new peer mission http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/ area, such as Cyber.” Lt Col Jesse Bourque, “Does EW afdd2_1_2.pdf (accessed 8 December 2009). + CNO = Cyber?” Journal of Electronic Defense 31, 8. Col John A. Warden, The Air Campaign: Plan- no. 9 (September 2008): 34. ning for Combat (Washington, DC: National Defense 20. AFDD 2-5, Information Operations, 11 January University Press, 1988), http://www.au.af.mil/au/ 2005, 23, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/DIME/ awc/awcgate/warden/warden-all.htm (accessed 8 documents/afdd2-5InformationOperations.pdf (ac- December 2009). cessed 8 December 2009). 9. Dr. Dan Kuehl, “From Cyberspace to Cyber- 21. AFDD 2-1, Air Warfare, 22 January 2000, 17, power: Defining the Problem,” in Cyberpower and http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/ National Security, ed. Franklin D. Kramer, Stuart H. afd2_1.pdf (accessed 8 December 2009). Starr, and Larry K. Wentz (Washington, DC: Potomac 22. Ibid., 18–19. Books, 2009), 6. 23. Ibid., 20–21. 10. Kim Zetter, “Simulated Cyberattack Shows 24. AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 53. Hackers Blasting Away at the Power Grid,” 26 Sep- 25. AFDD 2-7, Special Operations, 16 December tember 2007, Wired, http://www.wired.com/threat 2005, 3, http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/afdd level/2007/09/simulated-cyber/ (accessed 8 Decem- 2-7.pdf (accessed 8 December 2009). ber 2009). 26. Ian Traynor, “Russia Accused of Unleashing 11. Brian Krebs, “Report: Russian Hacker Forums Cyberwar to Disable Estonia,” Guardian, 17 May Fueled Georgia Cyber Attacks,” Washington Post, 16 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/ October 2008, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ may/17/topstories3.russia (accessed 1 July 2009). securityfix/2008/10/report_russian_hacker_forums_f 27. Dr. Martin Libicki, “Deterrence in Cyber- .html (accessed 8 December 2009). space,” High Frontier 5, no. 3 (May 2009): 18, http:// 12. AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 41. www.afspc.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD 13. AFDD 2-1.1, Counterair Operations, 1 October -090519-102.pdf (accessed 8 December 2009). 2008, 5, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service 28. Shane Harris, “The Cyberwar Plan,” National _pubs/afdd2_1_1.pdf (accessed 8 December 2009). Journal Magazine, 14 November 2009, http://www 14. AFDD 2-2.1, Counterspace Operations, 2 August .nationaljournal.com/njmagazine/cs_20091114 2004, 3, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service _3145.php (accessed 14 November 2009). _pubs/afdd2_2_1.pdf (accessed 8 December 2009). 29. AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 47. 15. AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 43. 30. AFDD 2-1, Air Warfare, 14–15. 16. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Roles 31. AFDD 2-8, Command and Control, 1 June and Missions Review Report (Washington, DC: De- 2007, 4–6, http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/ partment of Defense, January 2009), 16, http://purl afdd2-8.pdf (accessed 8 December 2009). .access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS108437 (accessed 8 Decem- 32. AFDD 2-1.6, Personnel Recovery Operations, 1 ber 2009). June 2005, 10, http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/ 17. Associated Press, “Hacker Forces 1,500 Penta- shared/media/epubs/AFDD2-1.6.pdf (accessed 15 gon Computers Offline,” 21 June 2007, http://www December 2009). .msnbc.msn.com/id/19358920/ (accessed 15 August 33. AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 57. 2009). 34. AFDD 2-1, Air Warfare, 24. 18. Joint Publication 3-13, Information Opera- 35. AFDD 2-11, “Cyberspace Operations,” draft, 4 tions, 13 February 2006, and DOD Directive 3600.01, February 2008, 13. Information Operations, 14 August 2006, more spe- 36. Gen Kevin P. Chilton, “Cyberspace Leadership: cifically list electronic warfare, computer network Towards New Culture, Conduct, and Capabilities,” operations, psychological operations, military de- Air and Space Power Journal 23, no. 3 (Fall 2009): 10, ception, and operations security as the five core ca- http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/ pabilities of IO. apj09/fal09/fal09.pdf (accessed 8 December 2009). 19. “Simply stated, EW is not part of Cyberspace. 37. Harris, “Cyberwar Plan.” Cyber is a customer of EW. It certainly uses limited 38. Ibid.

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39. Ibid. puter systems, and embedded processors and con- 40. Ibid. trollers.” Air Force doctrine defines it as “a domain 41. AFDD 2-11, “Cyberspace Operations,” draft, characterized by the use of electronics and the elec- 13–17. tromagnetic spectrum to store, modify, and ex- 42. Kuehl, “From Cyberspace to Cyberpower,” 4. change data via networked systems and associated 43. In a Deputy Secretary of Defense memoran- physical infrastructures.” AFDD 2-11, “Cyberspace dum of 12 May 2008, the DOD defines cyberspace as Operations,” draft, 1. “a global domain within the information environ- 44. Wynne, “Flying and Fighting in Cyberspace,” 8. ment consisting of the interdependent network of 45. Lonsdale, “Impact of Cyberspace on Strategy,” information technology infrastructures, including 21. the Internet, telecommunications networks, com-

Maj Eric D. Trias Major Trias (BS, University of California–Davis; MS, Air Force Institute of Technology [AFIT]; PhD, University of New Mexico) is an assistant professor of computer science in the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering at AFIT, Wright- Patterson AFB, Ohio. He enlisted in 1988 and was nominated for the Air Force Twelve Outstanding Airmen of the Year award in 1994. In 1998 he received his commission through the Airman’s Education and Commissioning Program and Officer Training School. As a communications officer, he has served operationally at Osan AB and Camp Humphreys Army Installation, Republic of Korea, and at the Distributed Mission Operations Center, Kirtland AFB, New Mexico. He is a graduate of Squadron Officer School and Air Command and Staff College. Major Trias’s current research interests include knowledge discovery and data mining, information systems security, digital forensics, and various cyberspace-related topics.

Capt Bryan M. Bell Captain Bell (BS, University of Florida) is studying for a master of science degree in space systems in the Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics at the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT), Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. In 2005 he received his commission through the Reserve Officer Training Corps and joined the space and missile operations career field. Prior to attending AFIT, he served with the 7th Space Warning Squadron, Beale AFB, California, as a missile warning crew commander and instructor. He is a graduate of the Air and Space Basic Course. Upon graduation from AFIT, Captain Bell will serve as the officer in charge of component plans, US Strategic Command Joint Intelligence Center, Fort Meade, Maryland.

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P-51 Escorts Legend or Myth?

Dr. David R. Mets*

s recently as the fall of 2009, a dis- tional security policy was strictly defensive. tinguished lecturer at the US Air The B-17 (fig. 1) at first was sold as a Force’s Air War College repeated a weapon for coastal defense—part of the rea- “truth”A that has been with us for 60 years. son for calling it the “Flying Fortress.” This So strongly held, it has seldom, if ever, been stance prevented any public debate on the questioned. This assertion arises, I suppose, bombing of advanced industrial societies, from historians’ common tendency to go and any such idea was bound to receive a into the record with the question “Why cold reception by the Army General Staff. were they so dumb?” or “Why were they not as smart as the present generation?” The revealed “truth” holds that interwar Airmen were so hypnotized by their own strategic bombing wisdom that they failed to reasonably predict that bombers would require fighter escorts to survive and that such fighters were technologically feasible. What were the real reasons why such luminaries as Kenneth Walker, Haywood Hansell, Carl Spaatz, and Claire Chennault (yes, Mr. Fighter Pilot himself) all concluded that the idea of escort fighters for long-range bombers was impractical—desirable, but impractical?1 USAF photo Is it possible that it was not ignorance but Figure 1. B-17 logic that made them so conclude? Technology in 1935 National Policy in 1935 In the interwar period, many of the Postwar critics sometimes do not con- homes in rural areas lacked electricity. sider the context in which the air planners Many still had neither telephones nor in- worked. Airmen of the prewar period had door plumbing. Even radio was a novelty. been living in a strictly isolationist society Anyone working in un-air-conditioned since 1920 at the latest. The public and Montgomery, Alabama, would have re- most politicians were firmly persuaded that quired a miracle of foresight to predict the America would never again commit itself to advent of radar in five years and to under- a European war especially. Thus, US na- stand its implications.

*The author is professor emeritus at Air University’s School of Advanced Air and Space Studies and recently retired as a military defense analyst at the Air Force Research Institute, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. His most recent work is Airpower and Technology: Smart and Unmanned Weapons (Praeger, 2009). He wishes to make the following acknowledgment: “I received important help in the preparation of this article from Dr. Richard Muller of the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies; any remaining faults with the article are entirely my own responsibility.”

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01-Waypoints-Mets.indd 101 1/27/10 1:32:31 PM USAF photo Figure 2. B-10

In 1932, when strategic bombing theory was in its genesis, the first all-metal mono- plane fighters and bombers came on the line. The B-10 (fig. 2) had no external wing bracing, an enclosed cockpit, and retractable landing gear. Its wing was stressed to somewhere around 3 Gs. That bomber’s contemporary fighter, the P-26 (fig. 3), had external wire bracing for its wings, an open cockpit, and fixed landing gear. Its wings were stressed for something like 6 Gs. To anticipate that the United States could USAF photo develop a cantilever wing that strong, yet thick enough to accept retractable landing Figure 3. P-26 gear and machine guns in three years or so would have been extraordinary. As it was, the P-26 could hardly fly faster than the B-10, and the aircraft took a long time to get to bomber altitude because of its slow rate of climb.2

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Drop-Tank Idea in 1935 one improbable approach. But counting on a short war can prove foolhardy. In 1925 Billy Mitchell wrote about drop tanks used in World War I.3 P-12s flying from Selfridge Field, Michigan, to Washing- Ambassador’s Reports during ton in the interwar period frequently used external tanks to extend their range. The the Battle of Britain idea was not unique.4 We all know how the Battle of Britain turned out. At the time, American Airmen Escort Fighter Requirements did not. Joseph Kennedy, our ambassador to Great Britain, reported that the British Generic requirements for escort fighters were likely to go down. Spaatz, Gen included long range, maneuverability equal Henry “Hap” Arnold’s observer in Eng- to that of the enemy’s interceptors, arma- land at the time, predicted that Britain ment about equal to the adversary’s, and at would stand.6 Moreover, in 1940 Arnold’s 5 least equal speed. We needed a sufficient agents told him that the German twin- number of them to distract the interceptors engine Me 110, designed as an escort long enough for the bombers to escape. Be- fighter, was a failure in the battle, even cause escort pilots had to master cruise- requiring escorts of its own to survive.7 control techniques, superior navigation Whom could we believe? That fall, Win- skills over unfamiliar territory, and basic fighter maneuvers, they required more ston Churchill called the outcome the training than their interceptor counterparts. “Narrow Margin.” Keeping in mind that At the end of the battle, if an interceptor Germany was still allied with the USSR, pilot ran out of gas, he might be able to would a second Battle of Britain in 1941 dead-stick his craft to a safe landing, or at have the same outcome? If Stalin did not least parachute to his home. But escort pi- predict the Nazi onslaught in Barbarossa, lots had to have enough fuel to reach why should American Airmen do so? In friendly territory plus a reserve in case they Mein Kampf, Hitler himself had criticized encountered fog over East Anglia. The extra the kaiser for having permitted a two- fuel requirements alone seemed to guaran- front struggle in World War I.8 tee that the escort would be heavier and less agile than the interceptor. Finally, escort pilots needed at least the same training Motives for B-36 as interceptor pilots in instrument landing. Development Plans After France fell in May 1940, and dur- Requirements for Doctrinal and ing the Battle of Britain, the US Army Air Technology Planners Forces (USAAF) began plans for the B-36 program.9 Why would American Airmen No nation or military service has infinite push for a 10,000-mile bomber if they resources. Yet, especially on the defensive, a vast number of possible dangers exist. could reasonably predict the availability Thus, planners must almost inevitably select of numerous B-17 bases in East Anglia a limited number of scenarios for which within range of Berlin? Many Fortresses they can prepare, compelling them to plan could be built for the price of one B-36. for the most probable occurrences rather Was it conceivable that the bombers than all possibilities. That is why 9/11, Pearl headed for Berlin would have to depart Harbor, Barbarossa, and Inchon succeeded— from North America? Would drop tanks in the short run. The aggressor can plan for for fighters then do the job?

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01-Waypoints-Mets.indd 103 1/27/10 1:32:31 PM “Lessons” of the Battle of Britain? sign. It did test out but very late in the game. Still, the originals were not sufficient. Long after the war, Hansell remarked It fell to Maj Thomas Hitchcock, the US air that it was fortunate that theorists at the Air attaché in England, to fly one with the Allison Corps Tactical School (ACTS) had not fore- engine. He speculated that retrofitting the cast the coming of radar because it would aircraft with a Rolls-Royce Merlin would sig- have caused them to abandon the strategic nificantly improve its performance. That bombing idea, with unfortunate results.10 As idea proved successful and completed the improbable as it seemed to most people, package—but the major was not a part of radar did come, and Spaatz and others the official development structure.12 learned about it during the summer of 1940. By then, the Air Corps had a huge investment in strategic bombing theory and the The Trouble with German Fighter development of four-engine bombers. The Development during Wartime? implications of radar for air defense were only dimly perceived, and it was possible to The P-35 and P-36 flown by the Air Corps write off Germany’s failure to bad tactics, in the mid-1930s had internally braced wings, poor aiming, insufficient bomb loads, light closed cockpits, and retractable landing defensive armament, and undersized bomb- gear. The Luftwaffe and Italian air force still ers. In any event, escort fighters clearly used biplanes. However, Germany passed seemed inadequate for the Luftwaffe. the United States with the Messerschmitt Bf 109 in 1937.13 But after the war started, German fighter development was some- P-51 Design: what arrested. First, reasoning that development of new designs reduced production, Science or Dumb Luck? Hitler mandated that no new aircraft be The glib lecturer of the twenty-first cen- undertaken without the assurance that they tury speaks of the Mustang design solution could come on the line within two years, as though it were obviously inevitable and thinking that the war would be over by should have come much sooner. But that is then. According to some of the surviving open to question because some fortuitous Luftwaffe veterans, though, when the tide elements occurred in its development. At turned, Hitler was taken with the idea that first, neither the Air Corps nor USAAF had Germany should focus on bombers in order a hand in the program. Before Pearl Harbor, to punish the oncoming Allies. Supposedly, North American Aviation had rapidly put he intervened at a critical moment in the together the early design in response to a development of the Me 262 jet to try to British requirement, originally considering transform it from an interceptor to a fighter- 14 the aircraft a ground-attack bird—the A-36.11 bomber. When a few got on the line to- Powered by Allison engines, the first mod- ward the end of the war, they outclassed the els had neither the fuel economy nor power P-51, but it was too late. The numbers of the sufficient for the Berlin escort mission. The Allied forces were simply overwhelming. National Advisory Committee for Aero Thus, the success of the Mustang escort de- nautics had conducted experiments in wind pended in part on bad technological deci- tunnels with various designs during the sions made in Germany—something that 1930s, but the laminar flow wing was not the Allies hardly could have counted upon. fully tested until 1938. The British ordered the Mustang with a laminar flow wing but Ultra hedged with a contract requirement that if it did not test out, then the company had to The P-51 got on the line in numbers in rapidly convert to a more conventional de- January 1944. By then, P-47s, bomber gun-

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ners, and Russians had killed a good many died to seize an escort base at Iwo Jima, of the Luftwaffe’s original fighter pilots. halfway to the target.15 Fuel shortages limited the number of training hours the Germans could give to the replacements. The average experience level Parasite Fighters and the B-36 among interceptor pilots was declining rap- The 10,000-mile bomber came on the idly. Knowing this from reading German line shortly after World War II. Where mail through Ultra intelligence, USAAF would we get escorts for it? The Navy ham- commanders deliberately started launching mered the B-36 program because the bird bomber raids, notwithstanding their aware- allegedly was so slow that the new jets ness that the targets were socked in. This would kill it easily. Yet early jets were noto- action flushed the fledgling interceptor pilots, rious fuel burners. How could the 36s be many of whom died without ever coming in escorted? We tried parasite fighters, but a contact with the Americans. Insufficiently bomb bay filled with a fighter cannot carry trained, they had to make low-ceiling in- bombs. B-36s could tow F-84s, but that did strument approaches and land tail-dragger not help their own range.16 fighters on icy runways. Some days more of them were killed by accidents than by P-51s. Could anybody at the ACTS in 1935 have Theory behind Selection possibly imagined that outcome? of the B-47 and B-52 Part of the reasoning for converting to P-51 with 1935 Bomber versus jet bombers maintained that they would P-51 with 1944 Bomber? penetrate enemy air defenses because of their high speed. Their velocity would Recollect that both aerodynamic and en- make deflection shots impractical, and gine technologies were on the steep parts interceptor attacks would almost always of their development curves in the 1930s become stern chases—during which they and 1940s. Prewar planners were neces- would be vulnerable to tail guns. But jet sarily dealing with abstract scenarios. bombers also guzzled fuel. The possibility Teaming up the P-51 with bombers of ear- of air-to-air refueling was well known be- lier generations on a route of limited dis- fore World War II, but providing a fleet of tance worked. Those planners had based tankers sufficient for the attack on Ger- part of their thinking on the performance many would prove too much even for the of the contemporary B-10s and P-26s of the American economy. In those days, 1932 era. But when the Mustangs escorted bomber crews had to make 25 (or later, bombers of their own generation—B-29s 35) trips to Germany. But now, because of (fig. 4)—they did not succeed. Drop tanks nukes, the new theory assumed that the no longer sufficed. Six thousand Marines war would be over in two or three days; thus, overall attrition would be acceptable with unescorted jet penetration.17 But who in his right mind in 1935 or even 1941 would have predicted the appearance of a city-busting bomb in 1945? In the end, all of the B-52s lost in combat went down to fire from the ground. For a while in the early 1950s, Strategic Air Command did have some fighter escort units, but they USAF photo had disappeared by the end of the Eisen- Figure 4. B-29 hower administration.

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01-Waypoints-Mets.indd 105 1/27/10 1:32:32 PM Conclusions waffe training would go to the dogs, the German people could endure the burning In our adolescence, we had a rather of Hamburg and Dresden yet go back to fac- strong tendency to conclude that our par- tory work, and on and on. To do so would ents’ generation was pretty dull—and, by have required predicting that a whole host extension, all earlier generations. But the of interdependent miracles would occur. difficulty in stamping out either smoking or Planners can only hope that their guesses teenaged driving under the influence is are closer to reality than those of their en- proof enough of one generation’s similarity to its predecessors. It is all too easy to look emies and that their system can adapt to the appearance of sudden miracles more out of context at the problems of past gen- 18 erations and conclude that they were much rapidly than can their enemies’. simpler than ours. Only when we become Pierre Beauregard in 1861, Adolf Hitler in parents ourselves do we realize that the dif- 1939, and Isoroku Yamamoto in 1941 all ficulties are more complex than we had banked on a short war. Their offensive imagined. So, too, when we become com- strategy might well have worked if their manders ourselves, we discover that the dif- short-war assumption had held. It enabled ficulties of planning are more complicated them to concentrate their forces against a than we had thought. dispersed enemy who did not know the Military planners of a nation with a de- time and place of the attack and had to plan fensive strategy cannot know the future. for several locations. But when their wars They cannot plan for all possibilities. To do did not fit the assumption, their enemies so may well guarantee weakness every- had time to work it out. If Hitler’s assump- where. The luminaries at the ACTS in 1935 tion of two years had proved valid, then the hardly could have guessed that Hitler would P-51 would have come three years too late. soon start a war, the laminar flow wing The P-51 solution owed as much to inter- would succeed, radar would come within dependent, fortuitous events as to the wis- five years, the aircraft carrier that was the dom of the wartime generation. According British Isles would survive, Hitler would attack Russia before Britain was finished, to H. L. Mencken, “There is always an easy solution to every human problem—neat, Japan would end US isolationism, the Rolls- 19 Royce Merlin engine would turn an attack plausible, and wrong.” Carl von Clausewitz plane into an effective dogfighter with supe- himself tried to teach us that war is the rior range, Hitler would retard fighter devel- province of uncertainty, fog, and chance. opment, Germany would not go to full mo- Would it be more becoming of us to recog- bilization until 1943, the Norden bombsight nize that the leaders of the interwar period would not have pinpoint accuracy, Ultra did about as well as could be expected, would enable wonderful intelligence, Luft- given the complexity of the times? ✪

Notes

1. Martha Byrd’s Chennault: Giving Wings to the Force History, 1983), 217, which shows that the idea Tiger (University, AL: University of Alabama Press, persisted up to the coming of the war. 1987) is the least partisan work on Chennault and 2. John W. R. Taylor, ed. and comp., Combat Air- craft of the World, 1909 to the Present (London: Ebury his “struggles” at Maxwell Field; see also Wesley Press and Michael Joseph, 1969), 527, 453; and Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Haywood S. Hansell Jr., The Air Plan That Defeated Air Forces in World War II, vol. 6, Men and Planes Hitler (Atlanta: Higgins-McArthur / Longino & (1955; new imprint, Washington, DC: Office of Air Porter, 1972), 18.

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3. William Mitchell, Winged Defense: The Devel- 10. Maj Gen Haywood Hansell, interview by the opment and Possibilities of Modern Air Power—Eco- author, Hilton Head, SC, 14 December 1982. nomic and Military (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 11. Craven and Cate, Men and Planes, 219. 1925), 169. 12. Ibid.; and R. Cargill Hall, ed., Case Studies in 4. Craven and Cate, Men and Planes, 218, ex- Strategic Bombardment (Washington, DC: Air Force plains that we further pursued the idea before Pearl History and Museums Program, 1998), 210–11. Harbor as a means of extending the ferrying range 13. Taylor, Combat Aircraft, 182. of aircraft to save on seaborne shipping. 14. After the war was over and both Hitler and 5. That would be true for fighter-on-fighter com- Goering were gone, the survivors may have tended bat, which involved violent maneuvering requiring to blame all they could on them. However, unreliable a high rate of fire in order to maximize the prob- engines and a cautious Luftwaffe leadership evi- ability of hitting the target. However, for fighter-on- dently caused the late appearance of the jet. See bomber combat, toward the end of the war, the Ger- “Messerschmitt Me 262A Schwalbe,” National Mu- mans felt compelled to increase calibers on some of seum of the Air Force, http:/www.nationalmuseum their interceptors so that once a round hit, it had to .af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=509 (accessed 7 be robust enough to damage the more heavily con- October 2009). structed bombers. Further, the higher calibers en- 15. Elmer B. Potter, ed., Sea Power: A Naval His- abled fighters to stand outside the range of the tory, 2nd ed. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, bombers’ guns and take more careful aim. Thus, 1981), 348–49. they increased the probability of kill once a round 16. A less-far-out idea regarding parasite fighters hit, but the slower rate of fire and lesser ammuni- involved carrying a jet F-84 relatively close to the tion supply reduced the probability of hitting. US target, launching it for a high-speed reconnaissance escorts’ targets were seldom bombers; in any event, run, and then recovering it in a safe area for the they were equipped with a superior gun and espe- return trip home. See Marcelle Size Knaack, Post– cially with great ammunition. Moreover, the lower World War II Bombers (Washington, DC: Office of Air calibers had a flatter trajectory than the large guns, Force History, 1988), 38–39. which also helped in the air-to-air battle. See AVM 17. We began development of postwar refueling John R. Walker, RAF, Air Superiority Operations (Lon- to extend the ranges of B-29s and B-50s. Even with don: Brassey’s, 1989) for a clear explanation of aer- the availability of overseas bases, the reciprocating- ial battle. I am also indebted to Dr. Richard Muller engine bombers did not have the range required to for that clarification. deliver nuclear weapons to targets in the USSR. At 6. Carl A. Spaatz, “Leaves from My Battle of Brit- first, we used converted bombers (KB-29s and ain Diary,” Airpower Historian 4, no. 2 (April 1957): KB-50s). In the probe-and-drogue method—the early 66–75; and Carl Spaatz to Henry Arnold, letter, 31 system—the fuel flow through the hoses was too slow July 1940, Spaatz Collection, Manuscripts Division, for large-capacity bombers, so we developed the Library of Congress, Box 7. boom system for them because it permitted faster 7. Derek Wood with Derek Dempster, The Narrow transfers. When it became clear that the B-36 was Margin: The Battle of Britain and the Rise of Air too slow for effective penetration, tankers became Power, 1930–1940 (1961; new imprint, Washington, imperative for refueling the jet bombers, whose con- DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1990), 29. sumption was higher but whose speed facilitated 8. Writing in jail in the early 1920s, Hitler safe passage through defenses. Clearly, the use of makes no secret of his ambition to expand eastward, reciprocating-engine tankers was inefficient because hoping for the cooperation of England, which would they could not reach jet altitude. Yet jet tankers were have the whole world outside the continent to itself. so much more expensive that we used the KC-97 into Although he puts principal blame for Germany’s the 1960s, sometimes with auxiliary jets under its defeat in World War I on a betrayal within that wings. Knaack, Post–World War II Bombers, 118n, country, especially on the Jews, he also is critical of 130–31n, 168n, 175. the foreign policy that forgot the paramount prin- 18. This idea has many fathers, one of the main ciple that one should not take on more than one ones Michael Howard. See his “Military Science in enemy at a time. Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, trans. an Age of Peace,” Chesney Memorial Gold Medal Ralph Manheim (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1943), lecture, 3 October 1973, reprinted in Journal of the 256, 892, 894, 898, 925, 950, 965. Royal United Services Institute 119 (March 1974): 3–11. 9. Taylor, Combat Aircraft, 455, 464; and Craven 19. H. L. Mencken, A Mencken Chrestomathy and Cate, Men and Planes, 244. (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1949), 443.

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01-Waypoints-Mets.indd 107 1/27/10 1:32:33 PM Valencia, who penned two chapters, observes that “in guerrilla warfare, nothing can remain fixed or stable. Mental, physical, and method- ological flexibility constitute a true principle” (p. 62). Because Colombian insurgents often fill power vacuums in remote regions, sometimes serving as de facto local governments for decades, Colombian military leaders understand the need for an integrated civil-military strategy. Regarding one operation, General Valencia says that “the plan’s emphasis would be on the combi- nation of civil and psychological actions, which would have priority over any combat operation” (p. 45). When Colombian forces entered rebel- controlled areas, local residents often hesitated to confide in them until convinced that the gov- Hablan los generales: Las grandes batallas ernment would stay and provide basic services. del conflicto colombiano contadas por sus Cultural awareness is as essential in Colombia as protagonistas edited by Glenda Martinez it is anywhere else, but Colombian COIN forces Osorio. Grupo Editorial Norma (http://www have the advantage of operating in their own .carvajal.com.co/CarvajalIng/empresas-eng/ country. Nevertheless, the Colombian military grupo-editorial/grupo-principal.html), Bogotá, struggled many years to adapt. Reflecting on the Colombia, 2006, 340 pages, $12.50, ISBN failed Operation Marquetalia against the FARC in 958049312X. 1964, Gen José Bonnet philosophically remarks, “Without knowing it at that moment, a new Despite its title, not all of this anthology’s au- army was born there, a modern army” (p. 108). thors are generals, but they all give revealing, Airpower proved essential in Colombian firsthand accounts of Colombia’s violent cam- COIN campaigns. During operations against paigns against guerrillas, drug lords, and other communist guerrillas in the 1960s, Colombian outlaws since the early 1960s. A prologue by Dr. Air Force C-47 transports landed troops on an Alfredo Rangel comments on the 14 chronologi- open field, float planes landed troops on a river, cally organized chapters. Referring to the Fuerzas and other aircraft dropped leaflets urging resi- Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) dents not to support the guerrillas. In 1990 heli- insurgency, Rangel notes, “That guerrilla copters and fighter-bombers participated in an group has always demonstrated an immense intense air-ground assault against the FARC’s capacity to survive, resist, and persist, but a Casa Verde stronghold where Gen Humberto weak ability to definitively tilt the political and Correa wished for even more airpower because military balance to its side” (p. 35), an assess- “we found ourselves short of helicopters, a con- ment one might make of many insurgent groups. siderable number of them having taken hits However, his remark that “the city is by its own while landing troops” (p. 214). International co- nature a dangerous place for clandestine and operation figured prominently. US officials sup- irregular groups” (p. 14) might amuse veterans plied information about the immense “Tranqui- of urban warfare in Baghdad. Chapters 2 and 3 landia” cocaine factory hidden in the jungle and describe Colombian military manhunts to find gave the Colombians the aircraft they needed to incredibly violent criminals. The author of chap- capture it. When the FARC attacked Mitú, a re- ter 11 is an anonymous undercover agent who mote town beyond helicopter range of the nearest cooperated with US officials to intercept cell- Colombian base, guerrillas hid in a hospital and phone calls and use unmanned aerial vehicles to schools where aircraft could not easily bomb track down leaders of Cali drug cartels. Chapter them due to worries about collateral damage. 12 is an ordinary soldier’s bizarre account of how The Colombian military arranged to use a FARC guerrillas wiped out his unit and held him nearby Brazilian air base as a staging area for a prisoner for years, an ordeal that literally drove helicopter assault. The ensuing Operation Angel him insane. Flight marked a watershed for the Colombian Readers will find many familiar nuggets of Air Force, which implemented “the policy of counterinsurgency (COIN) wisdom. Gen Álvaro centralized control-decentralized execution . . .

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in order to increase reaction speed” (pp. 290–91). sheer scale of the endeavor—in terms of man- Gen Yair Perdomo comments that “never . . . power as well as battle frontage—the ferocity of prior to that moment in Colombian history, had this fight from its start in June 1941 gives Bar- we fully appreciated the importance of the logis- barossa claim to its own distinct pedestal. tical system for aircraft operating at distances As we’ve studied Barbarossa’s air and land greater than one hundred miles” (p. 302). operations in our profession, we know of the This thought-provoking book contains both problems the Germans faced with logistics; the strengths and limitations. The chapters seem constantly changing objectives as Hitler focused relatively candid; however, General Valencia is on Moscow and then Leningrad and then Kiev, clearly defensive about his unit’s role in killing as well as others over the course of the war; the renegade priest (and family friend) Camilo Torres, Russian winter; and the battle of attrition, for who had joined a rebel group. The general sub- which the Germans were not prepared. Less well sequently fended off repeated government in- known, perhaps, is the fact that the Germans quiries, a communist backlash, and even an as- had not anticipated that the Soviets would prove sassination attempt. Such episodes make readers so determined, well organized, and highly moti- wonder how much suffering the Colombian gov- vated—traits for which history has certainly ernment could have avoided by maintaining given the Soviets credit. enough presence in remote areas to prevent hos- In Barbarossa: The Air Battle, July–December tile groups from becoming deeply entrenched. 1941, author Christer Bergström gives what I The book says little about right-wing paramilitary consider a very readable and well-researched groups, but the absence of a chapter about the account of the first six months of the battle. The manhunt for notorious drug baron Pablo Escobar book isn’t just a dry narrative of activities and is most surprising. There is no index, but the battle losses. Quite the contrary, Bergström goes maps are helpful. An abstract and brief author to great lengths to relate the battles and activi- biography begin each chapter, but they contain ties to specific people. It’s this personal touch, errors. Chapter 13’s abstract refers to Operation coming from diaries, logbooks, and other un- Angel Flight of 1998 as the debut of the AC-47 printed (unpublished) records, that sets Barbarossa gunship, but chapter 9 describes using those apart from most other chronicles of historical planes eight years previously. Overall, readers battles that I’ve read. will be impressed with the Colombian military’s Throughout the book, the reader follows indi- perseverance. Anyone interested in the mili- viduals such as Oberst Werner Mölders from the tary’s role in COIN and counterdrug operations time he becomes a 100-count ace until his death would find Hablan los generales instructive. several months later in an accident. The reader will possibly chuckle at fighter pilot Major Lt Col Paul D. Berg, USAF Hannes Trautloft, who, while touring the Ger- Maxwell AFB, Alabama man front lines near Leningrad, comes under attack by Soviet fighters and exclaims, “Where the hell are our fighters?” (p. 86). Bergström also takes the reader into the Soviet pilots’ world, Barbarossa: The Air Battle, July–December where the amazing feats of airmen such as Ley- 1941 by Christer Bergström. Ian Allan Pub- tenant Mikhail Garam and Leytenant Aleksandr lishing (http://www.ianallanpublishing.com/ Pavlichenko come to light. In a moment of battle home.php), Riverdene Business Park, Molesey field humor that illustrates the Soviets’ severe Road, Hersham, Surrey KT12 4RG, United lack of training and desperation as they fought to Kingdom, 2007, 144 pages, $49.95 (hardcover), defend Moscow, the reader will smile at Mladshiy ISBN 1857802705. Leytenant Boris Kovzan’s tale of hacking down a German aircraft with his own propeller. Kovzan There are a few battles of World War II that had to force-land his MiG-3 as a result. His re- one could certainly call epic. Among them are sponse to his commander as to why he’d used the invasion of the Normandy coastline in 1944; only half of his ammunition but had resorted to the invasion of Iwo Jima; and the Battles of Brit- the taran (air-to-air ramming) to bring down his ain, Midway, and the Coral Sea. Operation Bar- opponent: “I don’t know how to shoot!” (p. 107). barossa, Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union, Without a doubt, the fighting on the German is no less an epic struggle. But in several respects, Eastern Front was bitter. The author drives Barbarossa stands on its own. Aside from the home the point that this was a war fought be-

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2010-1 Book Reviews.indd 109 1/27/10 1:24:01 PM tween probably the two most motivated armies commendable description of the aircraft, with in the world at the time, with opposing ideolo- comparisons to its contemporaries—the F4D gies as a driving force (summarized on p. 115). Skyray and the MiG-19. Moreover, the author The accounts that Bergström lays out throughout uses illustrations from technical orders to illus- Barbarossa serve to illustrate this bitterness. trate many points. Unfortunately some of these Skill and valor on both sides also played a illustrations are too small to be easily read, at significant part in these first six months of com- least by this reviewer’s eyes. The book also in- bat. The author cites some very good analysis cludes an abundance of photographs of the F-100, showing that Germany’s reliance on its techno- many in color, and describes its service in the air logical advantage did not always fare better than forces of Denmark, France, Taiwan, and Turkey. numbers of troops. Even as early in the conflict One would expect a book whose title contains as the last months of 1941, the Soviets were able the phrase “at War” to concentrate on the aircraft to begin closing the technology gap (examples in combat. The book does offer fascinating de- abound—the T-34 tank and the Il-2 Shturmovik scriptions of two specialized uses of the F-100 in among them). the Vietnam War—on Misty forward air control- Barbarossa is well worth the read. Bergström’s ler and Wild Weasel missions. Alas, it includes account made me feel like I was reading the barely any descriptions of the aircraft’s bread- play-by-play of a key match; at times, I found and-butter combat missions—close air support myself almost pulling for one side and then the and battlefield interdiction in South Vietnam. other as the author relayed both sides’ dire day- Also missing is any mention of combat that the by-day struggles for air superiority. We all know F-100 saw in service with France, Taiwan, and how the match turned out. Bergström gives us Turkey. Although not actual combat, other notable much better insight into why this battle front operational roles of the F-100 included sitting on evolved the way it did. Barbarossa is insightful, quick-reaction alert with nuclear weapons and informative, and a pleasure to read. flying air shows in the colors of the Thunderbirds and Skyblazers aerial demonstration teams. Many Maj Paul Niesen, USAF, Retired F-100s ended their lives as remote-controlled Scott AFB, Illinois target drones, shot down as part of training and test activities. Gardner covers these significant roles only in passing or not at all. F-100 Super Sabre at War is at least the third F-100 Super Sabre at War by Thomas E. Gardner. popular history of this aircraft to be published Zenith Press (http://www.zenithpress.com), recently. The other two (F-100 Super Sabre in Ac- 729 Prospect Avenue, P.O. Box 1, Osceola, tion by Larry Davis and David Menard, and a Wisconsin 54020, 2007,128 pages, $19.95 (soft- lengthy article by Jon Lake in International Air cover), ISBN 0760328609. Power Review 11 [Winter 2003]) are better works. I recommend that readers wishing to learn about Few aircraft have made their appearance un- this significant fighter take a look at one or both der as auspicious circumstances as the North of the alternatives instead. American F-100 Super Sabre. Designed by the same team responsible for the legendary P-51 Kenneth P. Katz Mustang and the superb F-86 Sabre, the F-100 Longmeadow, Massachusetts was the world’s first production fighter capable of flying at supersonic speeds in level flight. In service, however, the F-100 never lived up to the standards set by its illustrious predecessors. Dawn over Baghdad: How the U.S. Military Is Early examples proved exceedingly hazardous to Using Bullets and Ballots to Remake Iraq by fly. By the time the aircraft’s problems were Karl Zinsmeister. Encounter Books (http:// solved, later and better fighters had entered ser- www.encounterbooks.com), 900 Broadway, vice. The F-100 eventually settled into the role of Suite 400, New York, New York 10003, 2004, 237 a fighter-bomber, in which it provided solid ser- pages, $25.95 (hardcover), ISBN 1594030502; vice in the Cold War as well as the Vietnam War $16.95 (softcover), ISBN 1594030901. and into the 1980s. Thomas E. Gardner’s F-100 Super Sabre at War Since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the future is an uneven work. Its good points include a of that country and its people remains uncertain.

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Security is a serious issue in most regions, civil- United States and points out that the insurgents ian casualties remain high, and basic amenities represent only a small percentage of the Iraqi such as electricity and running water are still population. However, he also relates how the considered a privilege. Nearly 4,000 American Iraqi people do not follow the same moral code troops have died fighting for their country, and a as do Americans and predicts that the road to a majority of the American public wants to bring successful and effective democracy will be a its Soldiers home. However, in Dawn over Baghdad, long one with many challenges along the way. Karl Zinsmeister points out that there is hope for Zinsmeister finishes with a powerful assess- the Iraqis and that the suffering and loss of US ment of how the United States needs to continue troops are necessary to win the war on terror. its fight in Iraq and uses the conflict as grounds The author’s travels throughout Iraq with dif- to reassess who America’s true allies are. He ferent Army divisions provide an insightful look points out that the world’s perception is that the into today’s fighting military men and women. US population is not willing to endure a long-term His book reveals the stories of numerous modern- overseas conflict and that by continuing the war day American heroes and gives a firsthand ac- in Iraq, America is proving that belief wrong. count of what daily life is like in tumultuous Iraq. Overall, Dawn over Baghdad is an inspiring Zinsmeister accompanied Soldiers to local Iraqi account of the US military’s actions in Iraq. How- political meetings and elections, insurgent searches, ever, no book is perfect, and Zinsmeister’s work and even raids on villages and houses. With his does have a few flaws. At times, he seems too straightforward style and everyday prose, he optimistic and is easily satisfied with only slight paints an accurate picture of what it is like to be majorities in his polling. Also, his writing ap- an American Soldier and an Iraqi civilian in Iraq. pears random and scattered, but he does a good Zinsmeister introduces his time in Iraq by job of tying his points together at the end of each first describing his high admiration and respect chapter. Unfortunately, the book is somewhat for the members of today’s armed services. His dated, but his preface, written in 2005, addresses numerous accounts of specific Soldiers instill some of the more recent developments. pride in both the United States and its military. I highly recommend Dawn over Baghdad to any Such sentiments are most evident when he American who wishes to read a straightforward states that and informative book about the war in Iraq—and it’s easy for critics on both the left and the right to especially to anyone who will be deploying to Iraq convince themselves that the United States is a in the near future. Zinsmeister not only provides a decadent society, that our young people have gone multitude of insightful information but also creates soft, that we will never produce another generation a great feeling of pride in the reader. The author like the men who climbed the cliffs at Normandy makes it clear that the US Soldiers who have died on D-day. That judgment, I’m here to report, is as in Iraq deserve our respect and admiration as well wrong as wrong can be. We’ve got plenty of soldiers as our gratitude for willingly fighting the war on in uniform today whom Americans can trust with terror in the Middle East so that we do not have to any responsibility, any difficulty, any mortal chal- fight it in our own backyards. lenge (p. 19). The bulk of Dawn over Baghdad focuses on Cadet Fourth Class Samuel Major the wide array of activities that US Soldiers are Rice University performing, from helping Iraqis decide what should be done with Saddam’s abandoned buildings, to sitting in on city council meetings to ensure that local politicians are making wise deci- Korea: A Lieutenant’s Story by Gen Robert C. sions. Clearly, US Soldiers are taking on Mathis, USAF, retired. Xlibris (http://www2 unfamiliar assignments. The Soldiers’ ability to .xlibris.com/bookstore/index.asp), Inter adapt to these unpredictable situations increases national Plaza II, Suite 340, Philadelphia, the level of respect they deserve. Pennsylvania 19113-1513, 2006, 162 pages, Beyond creating an immense amount of rev- $27.89 (hardcover), ISBN 1-42570-548-0; erence towards American troops, Zinsmeister’s $17.84 (trade paperback), ISBN 1-42570-547-2. narrative also creates a sense of hope in Iraq that is missing in American media reports. He In this short snapshot of a biography, Gen describes how the majority of Iraqi people favor Robert Mathis recounts his experiences as a a government structure similar to that of the young officer in Korea from 1950 to 1951. A

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2010-1 Book Reviews.indd 111 1/27/10 1:24:02 PM reader can’t help imagining that he is sitting be- “It is hard not to believe that God has a strong side the author, who recounts story after story, hand in all that we do” (p. 148). It’s refreshing to recalling memories of years gone by. Numerous read about a humble four-star fighter pilot. anecdotes of friends and family and of his train- Korea: A Lieutenant’s Story is just that—one ing at West Point and Willie Field all serve to set man’s story about the early years of his life. the stage for the few small joys and many great While some books are made into audio versions losses the Korean War would bring to this young these days, this one seems as though it started man. Some accounts seem insignificant as the that way: “Okay, General, when I press ‘record,’ pages go by, but they were all important memo- tell me about your time in Korea.” ries for General Mathis, looking back over a lifetime of military service. Chaplain, Maj Matthew P. Franke, USAF In those two short years, Robert Mathis held a Washington, DC wide variety of jobs. He flew the F-80 in Korea as one of the Air Force’s first jet fighter pilots. Hav- ing graduated from West Point in 1948, he also put his soldiering skills to work as a forward air Boeing versus Airbus: The Inside Story of controller (FAC), both on the ground and as an the Greatest International Competition in airborne FAC in the T-6 Mosquito. Mathis even Business by John Newhouse. Alfred A. Knopf suffered through serving as a general’s aide for a (http://www.randomhouse.com/knopf/ few months. home.pperl), 1745 Broadway, New York, New On 26 November 1950, Mathis was directing York 10019, 2007, 272 pages, $26.95 (hardcover), air strikes at night when the Chinese massively ISBN 1400043360; 2008, $14.95 (trade paper- overran his FAC position. Despite being shot in back), ISBN 1400078725. the chest, he charged back through the Chinese lines to rejoin his own lines and avoid capture at In the early 1990s, a visitor to the Boeing com- all costs. His gallantry that night earned him a pany’s main aircraft-assembly plant near Seattle, Silver Star. Washington, would enter a huge, multiwing build- What does the book have to offer the reader? ing and see in every direction brand-new com- Besides a peek into the day-to-day life of a mod- mercial aircraft under construction. Standing out est American hero, there are other takeaways. in the crowd were the 747 jumbo passenger jets Mathis was joint before anyone ever used the with both US and foreign airline logos already word to describe interservice operability. As a fighter pilot in the one-year-old Air Force, he painted on the fuselages of the ones nearing com- saw airpower as a way of helping his 1948 West pletion. It was an impressive sight and a vivid Point classmates who had their boots on the testimony to the world’s then-largest aircraft pro- ground. Mathis also points out lessons that he ducer and America’s biggest exporter. learned along the way as a young officer: the Today, Boeing’s fortune has changed. No longer wisdom in seeking counsel from good noncom- can it claim dominance as the premier manufac- missioned officers, remembering who got him turer of both commercial and military aircraft. where he was, the frustration and benefits of Put into perspective, the venerable 747 is becom- additional duties, overcoming obstacles along ing a bit dated. It’s hard to imagine, but the first the way, the value of moral courage, and the versions went into airline service more than 40 high price of military service paid by many of years ago. his friends. Although there is limited domestic competi- The book shows Robert Mathis as a man with tion for profitable airplane contracts, overseas few pretenses. He was an all-American boy from business is a different story. A single company Texas who wanted to serve his country as a mili- stands out—Airbus, a European consortium of tary pilot. He volunteered for duties since he nationally backed industries with headquarters believed that doing so would help save the lives in France. No new aircraft has attracted more of others. While recounting the hardships he en- attention than the company’s monstrous A380, dured, he is quick to acknowledge the many which made its long-awaited debut in 2007. people who suffered worse than he—and the Granted, the 747 is a big jumbo, but the A380 is a many who did not return from the war in one superjumbo. The issue becomes whether either piece. After numerous accounts of close calls aircraft-development-and-production corporation with death, he simply credits his guardian angel: will be the overall winner if it concentrates on a

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single large airplane—a 747 major-upgrade global supply chain, quality of some outsourced model for Boeing or the A380 for Airbus. work, and start-up issues at the Seattle-area fac- Trying to make sense of all this is John New- tory have challenged the Boeing team. Despite house, an accomplished foreign-policy analyst these problems, delivery of the first aircraft for the New Yorker, a senior adviser in the Clin- should still occur in 2010. Orders numbering ton administration, and a prolific author whose 800-plus make it the best-selling new airplane in book The Sporty Game is a classic study of the Boeing’s long history. Overall, the industry aviation industry. Boeing versus Airbus, his latest shows Boeing with a backlog order exceeding work, provides useful insight into how these dy- 3,400 airplanes of all types, which the company namic corporations perform in the arena of high- projects will take over five years to fill. stakes airplane development and production. Airbus is obviously relying on sales of the Part of Newhouse’s extensive research consists A380—reportedly sold out through 2011—to set of conducting interviews throughout the indus- the large-jet standard. It delivered 10 aircraft in try with individuals at all levels, representing 2009 after being almost two years late with the both the present and the past. Besides the usual discussions with senior management at Boeing first delivery to Singapore Airlines. Airbus is also and Airbus, the book includes a good sampling working on other airplanes in the A300 series, to of lower-level inside views from design engi- include redesigning the A350 to compete with neers and factory workers, as well as from out- Boeing’s 787 for the lucrative long-haul market side financial and economic analysts who focus and developing several smaller passenger-size on the airplane business. airplanes in the A300 series for the short- to mid- Noteworthy is Newhouse’s assessment of the range markets. The industry carries Airbus with strengths and weaknesses of the top-level bosses a healthy order backlog. It has almost the same at each of the corporations. More often than not, number of airplanes on order as Boeing—also individuals who rise to senior positions are great over 3,400—and figures to take at least six years engineers and technicians. However, consistent to fill them. decision making, calculated risk taking, and the During the next few decades of the twenty- ability to direct adjustments to changing condi- first century, many of the world’s commercial tions at the corporate level are not always their airplanes will be upgraded or replaced in tradi- strongest qualities. Also surprising is the fairly tional and emerging markets. Observers can ex- rapid turnover of executives in key positions. pect Boeing and Airbus to remain at the fore- Maybe that’s business as usual in the airplane front, fighting for global business opportunities. industry, but some of the resulting mismanage- Readers who have an interest in the aviation in- ment, which helps contribute to various trou- dustry should take a look at Boeing versus Airbus. bles—as well as a series of corporate scandals— Despite a tendency to wander that sometimes leaves lasting impressions. makes it difficult for the reader to follow, the Before the reader assumes that everything is newest Newhouse effort offers a timely and in- lost, recent public announcements give positive formed perspective on the highly turbulent air- updates to the issues at hand. In 2007 the two plane business. rivals won more than 2,750 airplane orders combined—a record number. These remaining Dr. Frank P. Donnini manufacturers of big and medium airplanes Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, Retired have the desirable position of wrestling to get Newport News, Virginia new models to the airlines lining up to buy them, to include a noticeably growing demand from Asian carriers. Boeing is developing and pushing sales for several airplanes in its 700 series that support Aircraft Carriers: A History of Carrier Avia- multiple ranges, short to long. In fact, orders for tion and Its Influence on World Events, the new 787 Dreamliner—the company’s first Volume I: 1909–1945, rev. ed., by Norman new model since the 777 in 1995—give the plane Polmar in collaboration with Minoru Genda et one of the industry’s most successful launches al. Potomac Books (http://www.potomac ever. Shortfalls among suppliers and slow progress booksinc.com), 22841 Quicksilver Drive, on the assembly line have delayed the debut of Dulles, Virginia 20166, 2006, 576 pages, the technologically advanced 787. The extended $34.97 (hardcover), ISBN 1574886630.

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2010-1 Book Reviews.indd 113 1/27/10 1:24:03 PM The first volume of Norman Polmar’s Aircraft War II, highlighting the number of aircraft fer- Carriers provides a detailed history of the devel- ried to Malta. opment of these ships that professional officers, This book is extremely relevant to Airmen aviation enthusiasts, and historians alike can insofar as it gives them another historical vista appreciate. An updated version of the first edition, on the rise of airpower as well as a primer on published in 1969, this iteration serves as a com- carrier operations. Many of the tactics, tech- panion to volume two, which covers 1946–2006. niques, and procedures used in carrier opera- Beginning with the initial concept of an “air- tions today had their origins in World War II. craft carrying ship” by French inventor Clement Any Airman with an appreciation of airpower Ader and ending with the triumph of naval air- history will want to read Aircraft Carriers. power at the conclusion of World War II, this However, one portion might rankle Airmen: extraordinarily well researched and documented the description of Gen Billy Mitchell. Painting a text offers readers an extensive analysis of distinctly partisan portrait of Mitchell, Polmar is American, British, French, and Japanese carrier fairly dismissive of the sinking of the Ostfriesland, development and operations. Polmar collabo- implying—much like naval “shoes” of the day— rated with aviators such as Minoru Genda (Japa- that properly manned, the battleship would have nese Air Self Defense Force, formerly a captain survived. Several pages later, the author ac- in the Imperial Japanese Navy), Capt Eric Brown knowledges that “General Mitchell was a great of the Royal Navy (who flew from HMS Audacity, success to the development of the aircraft carrier the world’s first escort carrier), and over 50 other because he forced the Navy to take serious no- professional aviators and scholars. tice of aviation and embrace its own air arm” (p. The study begins with the early days of car- 45). Given that Navy leadership at the time held rier development, from Eugene Ely flying off the carrier aviation in low esteem and that “battle- USS Birmingham (14 November 2010 marks the ship admirals” ruled well until 7 December 1941, 100th anniversary of naval aviation), and moves one might offer a different rendering of Polmar’s analysis of General Mitchell: all Airmen, includ- through World War I (which saw the introduction ing naval aviators, can understand Billy Mitchell’s of the first “true” carrier, HMS Furious) to the drive and determination to improve the status of postwar era. During the interwar period, the air- American aviation. craft carrier evolved rapidly—a period that Polmar covers very well. However, the bulk of Aircraft Lt Col Richard J. Hughes, USAF Carriers deals with World War II. Robins AFB, Georgia The author recounts carrier aviation’s early successes (Taranto, Pearl Harbor, and Coral Sea) as well as its failures (readily addressing both the U-boat threat and the loss of HMS Courageous and Planetary Landers and Entry Probes by HMS Glorious). He provides an extensive review Andrew J. Ball, James R. C. Garry, Ralph D. of operations in the Mediterranean, highlighting Lorenz, and Viktor V. Kerzhanovich. Cambridge the resupply of aircraft to the island outpost of University Press (http://us.cambridge.org), 32 Malta. The two chapters on Atlantic operations Avenue of the Americas, New York, New York deal primarily with early British operations and 10013-2473, 2007, 362 pages, $138.00 (hard- support to D-day. The rest of the work is an cover), ISBN 0521820022; $111.00 (e-book). exhaustive recounting of lightning-fast Pacific operations, from Pearl Harbor to the Japanese A quartet of exceptionally qualified engineers surrender in Tokyo Bay (an event directly sup- and scientists, two in the United Kingdom and ported by 1,000 carrier-based aircraft—and 429 two in the United States, has collaborated to pro- B-29 Superfortresses). duce an important reference for industry profes- Brilliant, rare photographs illustrate the rise sionals, academic researchers, and graduate stu- of these massive vessels; they also provide in- dents working in the fields of planetary science, sight into the development of carrier aircraft. Ad- aerospace engineering, and space-mission devel- ditionally, the book offers detailed analysis of opment. Their textbook, Planetary Landers and the composition of the carrier air wing and the Entry Probes, draws from more than 45 years of effect of improved technology (catapults, radar, operational history—over 100 missions—to de- communications, etc.) on naval operations. De- liver between its covers a fairly concise overview tailed appendices outline carrier losses in World of the wide range of design and flight issues spe-

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cifically associated with these types of vehicles, sion of destructive-impact probes, such as Luna 2 as opposed to Earth-orbiting satellites, planetary in 1959 or Deep Impact in 2004, occupies less orbiters, or flyby spacecraft. Drawing examples than two pages but enables the reader to under- from over 30 different designs for landers and stand how crashing a vehicle onto another world entry probes used in lunar and planetary mis- can yield an abundance of useful scientific data. sions since the early 1960s, the authors discuss A plethora of tables, drawings, charts, and key engineering aspects usually ignored by tradi- references to sources for additional information tional texts on spacecraft engineering: landing makes this section of the book more interesting systems, parachutes, planetary protection, and to a larger audience possessing limited technical entry shields. Regardless of any particular mis- knowledge or comprehension. sion’s success or failure, Dr. Ball and his col- In part 3, the authors drill to another level of leagues pull examples from space programs detail by presenting seven case studies of par- worldwide to explain the broad range of chal- ticular spacecraft, each selected because its pro- lenges and the surprising variety of solutions gram team faced and overcame an unusual chal- chosen to meet stated requirements. lenge in the vehicle’s design or mission. From Planetary Landers and Entry Probes includes the Surveyor lunar soft-landing vehicles (1966–68) three parts, the second and third parts shorter to Spirit and Opportunity (the Mars exploration and more narrowly focused than their predeces- rovers [2004–present]), spacecraft designers sors but all complementing each other. While needed a “judicious mixture” of caution and in- serving as a guide to basic technological principles novation to deliver even the possibility of a suc- specific to landers, penetrators, and atmospheric- cessful mission (p. 312). Successful performance entry probes, the first part also points readers of the Huygens probe through Titan’s atmosphere toward more technical, supplementary sources in 2005 depended on balancing conservatism of information. Avoiding minutiae, the authors and novelty in structural design, descent control, provide an overview of problems and solutions and scientific instrumentation. Other studies for each subsystem or mission phase. The 14 examine the Galileo probe, Mars Pathfinder and chapters in this part cover mission goals and sys- its Sojourner rover, the Deep Space 2 Mars micro- tem engineering; launch, cruise, and arrival; en- probes, and the Rosetta lander known as Philae. try and descent through an atmosphere; descent Investigation of why the Deep Space 2 micro- to an airless body and arrival at a surface; thermal probe mission failed, aside from technical rea- control; power systems; communication and sons, exposed programmatic deficiencies—“a tracking; radiation protection; surface activities; rushed schedule, changing goals and inadequate structures; and contamination of spacecraft and testing” (p. 298). Rosetta, which aims to accom- planets. An especially interesting chapter deals plish the first-ever controlled landing on a comet with planetary balloons, aircraft, submarines, nucleus in 2014, underwent a significant reorien- and cryobots. After studying part 1, readers tation of its mission in 1992 due to financial and should have a basic comprehension of the com- programmatic difficulties. Collectively, these last plexities surrounding the design of interplanetary seven chapters cover an amazing variety of static probes and landers. and mobile elements for missions to worlds with Part 2 offers a collection of significant infor- and without atmospheres, and worlds with low- mation about more than 30 previously launched and high-gravity environments. or planned near-term “atmosphere/surface” ve- At first glance, members of the Air Force hicles—from the first Soviet Venera and Mars community might think that Planetary Landers entry probes to the upcoming Phoenix and the and Entry Probes deals with a realm so far be- Mars Science Laboratory—and their missions. yond their Earth-orbiting focus that it could not The authors divide these vehicles into six catego- contain useful information or insight. It would ries, based on the way each encounters an atmo- be a mistake, however, to make such a hasty sphere or surface: destructive-impact probes; judgment. This volume can expand one’s con- atmospheric-entry probes; pod landers, which ceptual understanding of spaceflight, thereby land initially in any orientation; legged landers, enabling Air Force space planners, engineers, which have a landing gear; payload-delivery and scientists to better grasp potential deficien- penetrators, which decelerate in the subsurface cies in their own programs. The more extensive for payload emplacement; and small-body sur- one’s knowledge of the cultural and technical face missions, in which the vehicle operates in a history of spaceflight, especially of the ap- low-gravity surface environment. Their discus- proaches and lessons learned from varied mis-

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2010-1 Book Reviews.indd 115 1/27/10 1:24:04 PM sions over five decades, the better one’s compre- ners, who all shared a special bond and a desire hension of present and future challenges. Even not to let their brothers down. “Knowing that when advances in science and engineering death could take all of us at the same instant might seem to render decades-old accomplish- bound us together stronger than any known ments irrelevant or outdated, it remains impor- metals” (p. 132). Mr. Lazzarini describes the tant for spacefarers to understand in the broad- range of emotion he experienced, from his reluc- est sense the foundations on which they build. tance to look at wounded soldiers so that he could remain emotionless and focused on his Dr. Rick W. Sturdevant job, to the adrenaline rush of setting down in a Peterson AFB, Colorado hot landing zone under enemy fire. With doors open and machine guns firing, door gunners had a life expectancy of 20 seconds in these zones. Utilizing short chapters to cover individual Highest Traditions: Memories of War by Tony descriptions or missions, the book makes for a Lazzarini. Voyager Publishing, P. O. Box 669, very easy and exciting read that offers an excel- Larkspur, California 94977, 2003, 151 pages, lent introduction into a door gunner’s personal $18.95 (hardcover), ISBN 9781891555022. view of the birth of helicopter warfare and the Vietnam War. The two photo sections comple- “Your word, your action, your machine gun is ment the book’s descriptions. It is also a great who you are. Period” (p. 29). These simple yet companion to other studies that focus on specific powerful words set the tone for Tony Lazzarini’s details of the helicopter’s participation in and Highest Traditions: Memories of War, which re- effect on specific battles during the war. Easily counts the author’s experiences as a door gunner perused in one day, Highest Traditions is defi- on an Army UH-1 Huey helicopter during the nitely worth reading. Vietnam War (1966–68). As a member of very highly decorated “A” Company, 25th Aviation Lt Col Daniel J. Simonsen, USAF, Retired Battalion (“the Little Bears”), Mr. Lazzarini took Ruston, Louisiana part in over 250 missions, which included routine “ash and trash” supply, medical evacuation, transport of VIP celebrities and flag officers as well as ground troops, and the somber task of French Strategic and Tactical Bombardment transporting the dead. Highest Traditions is filled Forces of World War I by René Martel, with exhilarating stories of claymore mines get- translated by Allen Suddaby, and edited by ting caught on the Huey’s landing skids, inadver- Steven Suddaby. Scarecrow Press (http:// tently landing in a minefield, taking off in tight www.scarecrowpress.com), 4501 Forbes Bou- jungle openings, and flying clandestine “spook levard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706, missions” in black, unmarked UH-1s. 2006, 504 pages, $60.00 (softcover), ISBN Rather than relate an exacting day-by-day, 081085662X. mission-by-mission, blow-by-blow, gory description of his two tours, the author describes more On 3 August 1914, the German ambassador to memorable missions in more general terms, Paris declared his nation’s reason for commenc- yielding a personalized description of everyday ing offensive military operations: simply to re- life for a helicopter door gunner. Armed with taliate for the French aerial bombardment of M-60 machine guns, the gunners quickly recog- Nürnberg. By that evening, however, the Ger- nized the flaws of their weapons: potential jams, mans had changed their tune: aerial bombing of overheating barrels, and limited ammunition. unidentified targets in Baden had set the cata- They eliminated these problems with battlefield clysm into motion! Of course, neither assertion innovation: placing a C-ration can on the belt was true, but the fact that aviation was even feed to reduce the rate of fire and replacing the mentioned in the realpolitik of the day perhaps ammunition-storage cans with boxes five times foretold its impending military importance in larger. Proudly, the author points out that, in the war to end all wars. over 250 missions, his gun never jammed. Originally published as L’Aviation Francaise de The book reaches a high point with its de- Bombardement (Des Origines au 11 Novembre 1918) scriptions of the various daily, routine activities on the eve of the second Great War, René Martel’s and emotions of typical Vietnam War door gun- classic work remains the definitive assessment

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of what had been the world’s largest aerial- participant might skew objectivity, Martel at bombardment force. A respected interwar histo- times leaves readers frustrated. Although the rian, Martel had also served as an observer- author lauds, among others, Commandant Joseph bombardier in obsolete Voisin aircraft during the Vuillemin’s prudence, Lieutenant Dagnaux’s conflict. As such, he writes from the perspective bravery, and the indomitable spirit of Comman- of combat experience; he also does so with aca- dant Louis de Goys (the “father of French bom- demic rigor, utilizing memory, published mem- bardment aviation”), he does not allow personal oirs, and a thorough examination of official reflection on controversial topics such as the French war records. bombing of civilian targets. Perhaps because Chapters chronologically review the develop- Martel’s “sole pre-occupation is to study and to ment of French aerial bombardment throughout understand” (p. 308) French aerial bombardment the war years 1914–18. An opening snapshot of in order to “sift out lessons and information” (p. prewar experimentation in aerial bombardment 308), he sees no need to offer a conclusion at the helps set the context for what follows. Martel end of the book—the facts stand on their own. closes with topical discussion of the specific Even Martel’s attacks against German general challenges faced by the French navy’s use of Ernst von Höppner’s memoir accounts of aerial bombardment aviation as well as joint Anglo- operations appear based primarily on academic French efforts along the Eastern Front and over challenges to their authenticity rather than on is- the Dardanelles. There is no summary or con- sues of personality. clusion. The editor has added limited but useful World War I aviation buffs know well the ex- photographs of bomber variants flown by the ploits of the fighter pilots, regardless of nationality. French, and the translator has provided paren- Although Georges Guynemer, Roland Garros, thetical information that clarifies or expands and René Fonck are regaled alongside Manfred upon the text. von Richthofen, Eddie Rickenbacker, Oswald Within weeks of the near catastrophe on the Bölcke, Albert Ball, and Billy Bishop, those who Marne, Commanding Gen Joseph Joffre signed flew less glamorous but equally dangerous mis- headquarters note S23 authorizing aerial bom- sions in those heady days of aviation’s infancy bardment, with escadrilles (squadrons) V14 and have earned their place in the Great War pan- V21 becoming the first bomber units. Martel ob- theon of heroes. René Martel offers such recog- serves that throughout October 1914, on average, nition. Although a participant, the author does the French were dropping daily by airplane not offer a personal memoir and does not write 50,000 antipersonnel fléchettes (steel darts)—the for the casual reader. French Strategic and Tactical only suitable airborne projectiles available in Bombardment Forces of World War I is a dense, large numbers. By April 1915, there were 12 well-written, and well-researched book that should dedicated bomber squadrons organized into four be on the shelves of serious World War I aviation groups, all flying the Voisin Pusher. Although scholars. As such, the Suddabys have done a quickly outclassed, the Voisin, with various great service, long overdue, in opening Martel’s modifications and the ability to fly at night, was classic tome to an English-speaking audience. a “robust and solid machine” (p. 28) that remained an integral part of French bomber opera- Maj William E. Fischer Jr., USAF, Retired tions until the armistice. The author well Westland High School, Galloway, Ohio chronicles subsequent evolutions in bomber aircraft, ordnance, organization, and operations. Not surprisingly, the rapid incorporation of aviation into the order of battle was not without hu- Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Mili- man cost. Martel recalls that “nervous fatigue” tant Islam by Zahid Hussain. Columbia Uni- (p. 41) had appeared in even the best aviators by versity Press (http://www.columbia.edu/cu/ the end of 1915 as Fokker’s synchronized, forward- cup), 61 West 62nd Street, New York, New York firing machine gun significantly changed air-war 10023, 2007, 232 pages, $24.95 (hardcover), dynamics to favor the nimbler pursuer. ISBN 978-0-231-14224-3; $18.95 (softcover), Martel writes from what he calls a “scientific” ISBN 978-0-231-14225-0. perspective, seeking to provide readers with only the “incontestable facts” (p. 306) of French bom- If there be an air warrior in the readership of bardment operations. Because he regularly Air and Space Power Journal who needs any con- avoids areas where personal bias as a wartime vincing that US foreign policy in the Islamic

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2010-1 Book Reviews.indd 117 1/27/10 1:24:05 PM world is complex and dangerous, he or she can rule, but it appears that they are utterly opposed get a good view of it in Frontline Pakistan. It will to radical Islam and to military rule. If that were be hard enough for readers accustomed to Eng- not enough, there has been a perennial issue lish to make any sense out of it because of un with India over Kashmir, and Musharraf was able familiarity with the names of Pakistani places to contain that up to a certain degree, but this and persons, but the labyrinth of politics and situation is fully capable of boiling over into a religion in a region that hovers near anarchy will disaster for Pakistan’s leaders—and for the persuade just about anybody of the dilemmas United States. Since our campaign in Afghanistan facing decision makers everywhere. against the remnants of the Taliban and al-Qaeda It appears that Zahid Hussain is well qualified is highly dependent upon our relationship with in attempting to give us a picture of the situation. the Pakistani government, that means trouble. A journalist who provides material to the Times Few Americans know much about Pakistan of London, Newsweek, and the Wall Street Journal, and its surrounding region, and this book will he possesses a good writing style. Clearly, Hussain certainly not make one an instant expert on the is an expert on the region and has had access to subject. However, it is readable and will serve as some difficult-to-find sources. He organizes his a useful introduction to the problems of the area. work in topical chapters and in a more or less I therefore recommend it for a moderately high chronological order. The political landscape is place on the air warrior’s reading list. cluttered with military, religious, power-seeking, nuclear-smuggling, and drug interests that yielded Dr. David R. Mets an almost impossible problem for former president Maxwell AFB, Alabama Pervez Musharraf, who was trying to survive between many mutually hostile domestic groups and the pressures of international politics. I fear that the reader seeking a coherent pic- Iraq and Back: Inside the War to Win the ture of what Pakistan and Afghanistan are about Peace by Col Kim Olson, USAF, Retired. Naval is doomed to frustration. Both countries have Institute Press (http://www.usni.org/naval long seemed ungovernable, partly due to the fact institutepress/index.asp), 291 Wood Road, that the central governments have had very lim- Annapolis, Maryland 21402, 2006, 256 pages, ited powers over the regional and local interests. $26.95 (hardcover), ISBN 1591145279. I suppose that the main idea of the book is that there is likely trouble ahead for the United States In Iraq our military continues the struggle since Pakistan has been a principal ally during against an obstinate insurgency; simultaneously, the global war on terror, but that is largely a re- our nation fights a war of public opinion over sult of President Musharraf’s having sided with what went wrong in 2003 and how we must the United States, very much against the tide in overcome those early deficiencies to defeat de- his own homeland. That cannot go on forever, mocracy’s enemies. Though an interesting and according to Hussain, and I suppose that he enjoyable read, Iraq and Back—more a memoir thinks the only possible solution is to permit real than a scholarly tutorial—raises more questions democracy in Pakistan. However, given the than answers. The author, Col Kim Olson, seems strength of the local warlords and the growing an intelligent, family-oriented, and confident power of radical Islam, that would be a miracle. patriot eager to help transform a nation from In addition to that, Musharraf was faced with a tyranny to democracy. tough problem of nuclear proliferation. Pakistan The book seems to stray from the subject sug- followed India into the elite group of nuclear gested by the title, which leads one to believe states, but its control of nuclear secrets has been that Olson provides a guide to counterinsurgency defective, and its people have been involved in and techniques for success based upon her expe- serious underground nuclear proliferation. If rience. Instead, the reader will enjoy the tale of that were not enough, he was also utterly depen- a woman overcoming the “good ole boy” network dent upon the loyalty of his military, and that is of Air Force aviation in the early 1980s, eventu- a little shaky since the latter has an affinity for ally commanding an operational flying squad- some of the radical Islamic groups, who are ron, rising to the rank of colonel, working for the against secular government. Joint Staff, and volunteering for the job of execu- Hussain does not get into the character of the tive officer to Lt Gen Jay Garner, US Army, re- “liberal” Pakistani groups advocating secular tired, director of the Office of Reconstruction

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and Humanitarian Assistance in Iraq. Candidly stroke of a pen. Instead, it will take time and a written, full of emotion, and deeply introspec- “win the people” mentality (p. 174). tive, Iraq and Back brings many important lead- Readers will quickly adjust to the fact that this ership lessons to the forefront, while barely book is more memoir than anything else. They skimming what leadership could have done better will also ask what is going on in the war. While to ensure success in rebuilding the infrastructure Olson offers her own account, one wonders what and security of post-Saddam Iraq. It offers even the 3rd Infantry Division and US Marine Corps less scrutiny of the current insurgency. forces were doing on the drive to Baghdad. In Olson, readers find a leader who gets out An interesting, emotional, and personal nar- from behind her desk and wants to meet people. rative of Colonel Olson’s journey, Iraq and Back Although others in the position could have hidden would be a great read for any young woman who behind that desk, she (along with General Garner) wants to pursue a career in the military or avia- was shaking hands with village elders and city tion in general. It also allows the reader to see leaders while the battle raged. She shows us the the other side of war. Though our forces are daunting task of being among the first genera- technologically and militarily superior in current tion of female Air Force pilots and having the conflicts, US military personnel who read this tenacity and endurance to reach her potential. book will find that it takes more than firepower The author critiques many shortcomings in to win a war. the reconstruction of Iraq, such as the lack of Capt Patrick Dierig, USAF security for key nodes in infrastructure (power Hurlburt Field, Florida plants, sewage plants, etc.) and for protecting those nodes, once repaired. But she offers little insight on how to do it correctly. Introducing a variety of important subjects, Olson displays re- Science in Flux: NASA’s Nuclear Program at sounding evidence that economic sanctions Plum Brook Station, 1955–2005 by Mark against Iraq failed completely. While the com- D. Bowles. National Aeronautics and Space mon people lacked basic necessities, Saddam Administration (http://history.nasa.gov/ continued to build marble-laden palaces (p. 91). series95.html), Washington, DC 20546-0001, The most important topic introduced in this 2006, 279 pages, $25.00 (hardcover). Available book is the tension and mistrust among the Shia, free from http://history.nasa.gov/sp4317.pdf. Sunni, and Kurd leaders on the Council of Seven—the initial de facto government organized In the early 1940s, knowing that World War II by General Garner to bring discussion and rec- was imminent, the US government built 77 onciliation to the forefront. Although it was nec- contractor-operated ordnance facilities scattered essary to bring these groups together, forging around the country. Thirty-four of them were alliances between groups who have despised “works” that produced powder, explosives, and each other for years is—and continues to be—a chemicals, and 43 were “plants” that fabricated challenging task (p. 98). and assembled materials such as tanks, guns, The most touching episode in Iraq and Back is and small-arms ammunition. One of these facili- the story of Christian girls and Muslim boys ties, the Plum Brook Ordnance Works near San- similar to, as the author notes, “an Iraqi Romeo dusky, Ohio, encompassed 9,000 acres obtained and Juliet.” After an “informant” alerts coalition by eminent domain from farmers who, for the forces of a kidnapping, Olson travels with an most part, felt it their patriotic duty to accept the assault force that will attempt a rescue of two government’s “fair” offers. “kidnapped” females. Questioning of the youth After the Japanese surrendered to the Allies reveals that the kidnapping is in fact a clash of on 17 August 1945, production of explosives at cultures. Actually, the Christian girls, in love with Plum Brook came to a halt, and roughly 900 the Muslim boys, were hiding from their fathers. people were suddenly out of work. The land lay Both cultures had forbidden them to marry. This fallow until 1955 when the government, con- story demonstrates two critical points in counter vinced that the Soviet Union had an atomic air- insurgency. First, it is difficult to distinguish plane, allotted funds for a program known as friend from foe in a civil war or in counter Nuclear Energy for the Propulsion of Aircraft. insurgency operations. Second, the United States The Air Force and the Atomic Energy Commis- will not change the mind-sets of people with the sion selected the National Advisory Committee

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2010-1 Book Reviews.indd 119 1/27/10 1:24:06 PM for Aeronautics’ (NACA) Lewis Research Center, benefit of the doubt, I have to think this was not adjacent to Cleveland Hopkins Municipal Air- deliberate obfuscation since I’m sure he knows port, to conduct the propulsion studies, and in that some parts of the facility, including the September 1956 they began construction of a world’s largest thermal vacuum chamber and a new and powerful nuclear test reactor (different hypersonic wind tunnel, are still very much in than a nuclear power reactor) on the Plum business (verifiable by visiting the Web site Brook site about 50 miles northwest of Hopkins. http://www.nasa.gov/centers/glenn/test The NACA morphed into the National Aero- facilities/plumbrook.html). nautics and Space Administration in 1958, and it Because the book is written in layman’s took 15 years and untold millions of dollars to terms, I learned a great deal about nuclear fis- build and operate the reactor, with much testing sion and how a reactor works. I recommend Sci- also devoted to Nuclear Engines for Rocket Vehicle ence in Flux for inclusion in the libraries of all Application and the Space Nuclear Auxiliary Pro- Air Force bases, especially those involved in mis- gram. When it became clear that atomic power sile launches and the exploration of air and for airplanes would never be acceptably safe and space, and in every public library in Erie and that liquid and solid chemical propellants had adjoining counties in Ohio. supplanted atomic power for rockets, the government saw no reason to continue nuclear testing Thomas F. Saal at Plum Brook, pulling the plug early in 1973. North Ridgeville, Ohio Despite doing so, it eventually cost more to de- activate the reactor than it had originally cost to build it. Here the author, Mark Bowles, takes the government to task, explaining that his book’s Diplomacy and War at NATO: The Secretary title is a deliberate double entendre, not only General and Military Action after the relating to flux as a rate of flow of nuclear par- Cold War by Ryan C. Hendrickson. Univer- ticles passing through space but also reflecting sity of Missouri Press (http://www.umsystem the constant changes in political climate that led .edu/upress), 2910 LeMone Boulevard, Co- to huge wastes in money, manpower, and time. lumbia, Missouri 65201, 2006, 184 pages, He hopes that the future mission to Mars, which $34.95 (hardcover), ISBN 0826216641; $16.95 will employ atomic power, might give Plum (softcover), ISBN 0826216358. Brook Station a new lease on life but fears that our politicians will inevitably repeat the mis- Research on the North Atlantic Treaty Organi- takes of the past. zation’s (NATO) post–Cold War transformation Bowles interviewed 38 people who worked at devotes little analysis to the secretary-general Plum Brook, listing them alphabetically in the position and implicitly downplays the signifi- appendix with their job titles (but not the years cance of NATO’s post–Cold War military opera- devoted to said jobs) and quoting them liberally tions. Recognizing the notable absence of schol- throughout the text as he elaborates on issues of arly literature on NATO’s secretaries-general management, morale, public opinion, safety, and during this period, Ryan Hendrickson investi- scientific gains—some with humor, all with in- gates their evolving impact on the alliance, par- sight. There are also four pages of organizational ticularly regarding the use of force. Only those charts with the names of more people than I secretaries-general who led after the Cold War could count who undoubtedly will want to buy oversaw NATO’s use of military force. this book as a testimonial to their service there. Employing an analytical framework that he Also in the appendix we learn in 12 brief credits to Michael G. Schechter, the author exam- paragraphs that the reactor wasn’t the only test ines the first four of five post–Cold War secretaries- site at Plum Brook Station—completed in its en- general and the roles they played in moving the tirety in the 1960s for a total cost of almost $121 alliance toward military action. Hendrickson million. Although not specified, this amount theorizes that the NATO military instrument re- more than likely does not include payroll. The mains relevant and that the secretaries-general author cites total construction costs for each of who have served since the end of the Cold War these other on-site facilities but refers to them in have significantly affected NATO policy, trans the past tense, seeming to imply that they are no national unity, and the use of military force. longer operational—further proof of government Upon completion of a concise yet substantive extravagance and incompetence. Giving him the historical overview of the creation of the office

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of secretary-general, the author dedicates the and the secretary-general’s viewing the alliance remaining chapters to comparative case-study from similar ideological perspectives. analysis of the first four people who held this Hendrickson concludes this fine work with position after the Cold War. Although not alike summarized findings, offers a comparative as- (and thus making for imperfect comparisons), sessment of effective diplomatic leadership in the cases examined are suitably relevant to meet NATO, and provides policy recommendations the author’s objective. Each chapter focuses on for the improvement of transnational tensions the role that each secretary-general played in surrounding the office of secretary-general. Of contemplating the use-of-force option (e.g., particular note, he emphasizes the tremendous Manfred Worner—Bosnia; Willy Claes—Operation political challenges faced by the office of secretary- Deliberate Force against Bosnian Serbs; Javier general in promoting consensus if the US prefer- Solana—Operation Allied Force bombings of Ser- ence for “coalitions of the willing,” rather than bia; and Lord George Robertson—post-9/11 de- NATO-supported military operations, remains fense measures for the protection of Turkey). the norm. Personal interviews of key diplomats and NATO This rich yet concise book is very reader- policy makers, coupled with the use of profes- friendly. Diplomacy and War at NATO is most sional literature, provide a sound basis for the suitable for those individuals interested in Ameri- comparative analysis. can foreign policy and NATO’s post–Cold War Each of the chapters dedicated to the secretaries- history and politics, those destined to work directly general begins with the process—the behind-the- or indirectly with NATO, and scholars and stu- scenes geopolitical posturing and consensus dents of political science / international affairs. building that led to their elections. Moreover, the author goes on to describe how their profes- Dr. David A. Anderson sional and national backgrounds shaped their Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, Retired approaches in leading NATO. This backdrop Fort Leavenworth, Kansas alone makes the book an interesting read. One of the many intriguing insights provided in the book occurs in the chapter addressing Secretary-General Javier Solana. In light of his Into That Silent Sea: Trailblazers of the vocal opposition to Spain’s joining NATO in 1982 Space Era, 1961–1965 by Francis French and to the stationing of American military bases and Colin Burgess. University of Nebraska in Spain, this Spaniard later led NATO expansion Press (http://www.nebraskapress.unl.edu), into the former Eastern Bloc states. Finding suf- 1111 Lincoln Mall, Lincoln, Nebraska 68588- ficient legal basis without United Nations ap- 0630, 2007, 402 pages, $29.95 (hardcover), proval, he advocated and oversaw NATO’s mili- ISBN 0803211465. tary response to Yugoslavian (Serbian) president Slobodan Milosevic’s acts of aggression against A tediously researched yet never tedious book, Kosovo Albanians. Furthermore, Solana aggres- Into That Silent Sea offers a wonderful, in-depth sively secured member states’ support for the look at the people of the early American and So- operational/targeting plan of Gen Wesley Clark, viet space programs. Readers looking for a techni- supreme allied commander, Europe (SACEUR), cal treatise full of statistics, velocities, and orbital- which ultimately led to the capitulation of Ser- mechanics equations will not find them here. bian forces in Kosovo. This is a book about people, and in the long run, In all cases, Hendrickson’s comparative analy- people are more fascinating than machines. sis supports his theory. Although the position of The authors have done meticulous research secretary-general has limited formal authority in on each of the Mercury and Vostok astronauts the alliance, each leader utilized an assortment and cosmonauts, as one would expect. While of diplomatic tactics and alliance tools to make most Americans have at least a passing famil- an impact on major political and military decisions iarity with Alan Shepard and John Glenn, and at NATO. The author’s findings clearly demonstrate probably know the name Yuri Gagarin, this that different personalities and diplomatic styles book introduces us to the other great characters employed by the secretaries-general seemed to who were their contemporaries. Far from being work equally well in promoting consensus, depend- state-controlled automatons, the early Soviet ing upon the circumstances. Furthermore, his cosmonauts were a diverse and fascinating findings highlight the importance of the SACEUR’s bunch, from the complicated yet publicity-

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2010-1 Book Reviews.indd 121 1/27/10 1:24:07 PM friendly Gagarin to the brash Gherman Titov; search—a fact that he never bothered to mention the poetic Pavel Popovich; the strong, decisive to his subjects, lest he lose them. Alexei Leonov; and the also-media-friendly-but- Into That Silent Sea also excels at setting not-terribly-well-qualified first woman in space, many records straight on issues both large and Valentina Tereshkova. small. First, regarding the naming of the space- Neither were the Americans a homoge- craft, most textbooks tell the story that Alan neous group. The Mercury Seven were as dif- Shepard named his capsule Freedom 7 for (1) ferent from each other as the Soviets were: the freedom represented by America (thus tak- Shepard, the tough, intimidating type; Gus ing a subtle jab at the Soviets), and (2) the Grissom, the quiet, consummate professional; seven Mercury astronauts. The first part was Glenn, the all-American boy; Scott Carpenter, true, but in reality Shepard used the number in the poet; Wally Schirra, the jokester; Deke reference to his ship’s being the seventh off the Slayton, the autocratic boss; and Gordon Cooper, assembly line. However, the reported version the young hotshot who proved his mettle in a made a good story, so no one bothered to cor- near-disastrous mission. rect it for decades. Use of the number seven as The book really shines, however, in two ma- a naming convention in Mercury stuck, adding jor ways: introducing the reader to many of the to the myth. personalities of the era who are not well Second, contrary to the portrayal of Grissom known, and serving as a “myth buster” by cor- as a nervous, even panicky, man in the movie recting many of the misconceptions about the The Right Stuff, he was perhaps the most dedi- early space programs. In the first case, Burgess cated and professional of all the astronauts. The and French tell us of Dee O’Hara, a young lady authors thoroughly and completely debunk the who became not only the nurse to the astro- insinuation that Grissom panicked and blew the nauts but also their closest confidante. The men hatch on his Mercury spacecraft after splash- down. In fact, it is important to remember that felt safe discussing anything with her, espe- NASA had so much confidence in his abilities cially matters that might make a flight surgeon that he was selected to command the first ground them. In return she would dispense ad- Gemini mission, making him the first man to fly vice and promise not to reveal anything to the in space twice. (To be fair, he was named com- doctors that wasn’t clearly mission critical or mander after Shepard, the original commander, life threatening. She served in that capacity was medically disqualified.) Grissom also com- from the beginning of Mercury through the manded the first Apollo mission, which, of early years of the space shuttle. course, ended in the tragic fire on the launch- Another unsung hero—Jim Lewis, the heli- pad. Years later, chief astronaut and crew- copter pilot who tried in vain to save Grissom’s scheduling czar Deke Slayton wrote in his auto- Liberty Bell 7 from sinking—would later work on biography that had Grissom not died, very likely the Gemini program in Houston, including Gris- the first footprints on the moon would have been som’s Gemini 3 flight. He was, of course, devas- Gus’s, not Neil Armstrong’s. tated by Grissom’s death in the Apollo 1 fire, not- Last, there’s the matter of the Soviets’ alleged ing the irony that Gus was nearly killed by a technological advantage since they achieved so hatch that opened too quickly and actually killed many firsts. True, they did put the first man in by one that didn’t open quickly enough. space, and they were first with two manned Also interesting is the tale of Miss Wally spacecraft in orbit simultaneously, first with a Funk, one of the “Mercury 13”—a group of woman in space, first with a three-man crew, women who were more or less misled into think- and first with a space walk; however, the Soviets ing they were being considered for the astronaut did so at terrible risk to human life and for the corps. By participating in a series of tests at the sake of publicity. For example, Tereshkova—not Lovelace Clinic in New Mexico, they believed exceptionally well qualified to be an astronaut— that NASA was considering sending a woman performed less than spectacularly during her into space, despite the fact that it was choosing flight. Spacewalker Leonov nearly died when his only test pilots. Dr. Randy Lovelace put the space suit pressurized to the point that he could women through the physical screening program not reenter the capsule, and he had to nearly for astronauts, creating the impression that they completely deflate it to get back in. Further, the were in the running for spaceflight. However, first three-man crew managed to perform its this was nothing more than his personal re- mission only by using an earlier capsule modi-

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fied to make more room by removing the ejec- nation as well as decontamination procedures. tion seats; the crew also flew without space suits. In the 1950s, Canada provided more than its In summary, Into That Silent Sea offers an ex- share of North American defense, with a burden cellent profile of the people who captured the ranging between 20 and 25 percent of the fighter world’s attention in the early 1960s. As incredible force deployed against potential Soviet attack. as the machines were that took these men and (Canada has a population only one-tenth that of women into space, that’s not the most interest- the United States.) Further, Canada developed ing part of the program. After all, the story of some of its own aircraft as well as an engine for space exploration is ultimately a human one. the US-built Sabre that was superior to that used in American models. As late as 1959, Canada Lt Col Christopher J. Rodel was developing the Arrow, an airplane capable Wisconsin Air National Guard of delivering a nuclear payload. When Canada accepted that the primary goal of North Ameri- can defense was the protection of Strategic Air Command bases, the Canadians wrote off their Learning to Love the Bomb: Canada’s Nuclear industrial and population centers to enable that Weapons during the Cold War by Sean M. command’s bombers to have time to launch a Maloney. Potomac Books (http://www preemptive or quickly reactive strike against .potomacbooksinc.com), 22841 Quicksilver Soviet bombers and, later, missiles. Drive, Dulles, Virginia 20166, 2007, 400 pages, So there is more to the story than just Canada’s $29.95 (hardcover), ISBN 978-1-57488-616-0. tagging along as the United States developed and implemented various defenses during the Cold When the Cuban missile crisis exploded, War arms race. This book is in part the story of a Pres. John F. Kennedy and Canadian premier small country struggling after World War II to John Diefenbaker, the men ultimately respon- establish its sovereignty after many long years sible for the defense of North America, were under Great Britain. Another aspect is wounded having a personal set-to and not speaking to pride due to US economic and cultural intru- one another instead of working together against sions into Canadian life. There were also budget the threat of Soviet nuclear missiles. The epi- constraints under both liberal and conservative sode typifies the often difficult relationship be- governments, neither of which in the early tween Canada and the United States. Canadian- 1960s had a consensus regarding nuclear weap- US relations were delicate after World War II, ons on Canadian soil. particularly with the United States unwilling to Unlike the US Defense Department, the Ca- trust its ally with nuclear information and Canada nadian counterpart always had to be cost con- regarding its larger neighbor as a cultural and scious. On the other hand, Canadian constraints economic imperialist. Both militaries needed meant that in practice Canadians followed where one another, however, for there was no effective the United States led, whether for overflights of defense against the Soviet threat unless they Canadian territory, storage of US missiles at worked together. Goose Bay, or technological change. More often Learning to Love the Bomb deals with the Ca- than not, the Canadians ended up with US nadian struggle to find an appropriate way of equipment since it was cheaper (and, on occa- living with its need for but dislike of American sion, because the United States refused to pro- nuclear weapons during the Cold War. One vide information sufficient to allow Canada to might feel tempted to write this book off as pe- develop compatible nuclear arms). When the ripheral to contemporary Air Force concerns. Diefenbaker government decided to kill the After all, as everyone knows, Canada has largely homegrown Arrow platform in 1959 because US enjoyed a free ride with regard to defense, and weapons systems were cheaper, 25,000 Canadian the United States has taken almost the entire industrial workers lost their defense jobs, and burden. Or so it seems. The story is not quite Canadians had no Canadian-made air defense that simple. capability. Dependency on US forces dealt a Canada provided a significant input to the blow to Canadian pride and sovereignty—always British nuclear program during World War II. major issues in the delicate relationship between Canadians produced several technical firsts, par- the two nations. ticularly in designs for naval vessels that re- The work abounds in acronyms since, after duced the impact and degree of nuclear contami- all, it deals with the military. For instance, “The

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2010-1 Book Reviews.indd 123 1/27/10 1:24:08 PM Soviets had SOXMIS in the British sectors of Forgotten Continent: The Battle for Latin NORTHAG, while SMLM-B was in Baden-Baden America’s Soul by Michael Reid. Yale Uni- and SMLM-F was located in Frankfurt” (p. 342). versity Press (http://www.yale.edu/yup), P.O. English translation: the Soviets had spies in the Box 209040, New Haven, Connecticut 06520- British part of Germany. Acronym lovers can 9040, 2007, 400 pages, $30.00 (hardcover), translate SACEUR, SACLANT, BOMARC, and ISBN 0300116160. CINCNORAD, as well as many others. The author’s attention to detail shows in his Michael Reid, editor of the “Americas” section careful description of the various types of air of the Economist, has written an exceptionally wings and basic characteristics of the various timely analysis of Latin America’s social and weapons and platforms, including the differ- economic performance in the last decade. The ences between versions developed for Canadian, fact that Yale University Press published it is a US, and other North Atlantic Treaty Organization strong recommendation—and the book does not forces. Although the necessary chapter on the disappoint the reader. The title reflects the es- developing organizational structure is a labor to sential thesis: in spite of its enormous potential get through, it shows an evolving bureaucracy in terms of resources and human talent, Latin that is exceedingly complex and cumbersome, America, once the most advanced region of the developing world, has been forgotten and has with many layered and overlapping functions fallen behind other developing regions because (both internal and external to Canada, as well as it failed to achieve sufficient progress in improv- both formal and informal). ing the conditions of its people. As the result of The author also makes clear his anger and frustration and the fact that some 40 percent of frustration at the slow rolling and deception of the population lives in poverty, the political the Diefenbaker government that, he argues, force of populism is attracting attention among delayed implementation of the nuclear agree- the underclass in a number of countries, notably ments between Canada and the United States for Venezuela, Argentina, Bolivia, and Ecuador. three years. Nuclear Canadian forces came only Populism, which takes many forms, both liberal after the near disaster of the Cuban missile cri- and conservative, seeks to empower the powerless sis, during which Canadian forces handled north- and redistribute wealth quickly. Antidemocratic, ern defense while the United States shifted it concentrates political power in the executive planes, ships, and submarines to the blockade. branch, and its historical record suggests that it For at least 20 years, Canadians have believed will once again fail. Despite this record, democ- that they never had a nuclear force, merely a US racy survives and, amazingly, has sunk deeper nuclear presence on Canadian soil. This lengthy roots in Latin America. Reid underlines this fact work should put to rest that misconception. It constantly in this fast-paced book. documents the years of deliberation and negotia- Venezuela serves as an example of the allure tion in the Eisenhower and Kennedy administra- of populism. Underwritten by vast petroleum tions—for Canadians the St. Laurent, Diefenbaker, income, chavismo (a form of populism named and Pearson governments—that finally gave after Pres. Hugo Chávez) has reached a high American nuclear weapons to Canadian forces level of support among Venezuelans because of between 1963 and 1968. To clinch the argument, the failure of predecessor governments to channel it provides a chapter on the Canadian alert pro- wealth to improve the conditions of the vast cedures and weapons safeguards as well as the underclass. Though chavismo may have already nuclear force structure in NATO, the Atlantic, reached its apogee, the continuing, depressing and North America during the 1960s. socioeconomic conditions of poverty and social Overall, the style is clear, and the coverage exclusion threaten the legitimacy of democracy good. The documentation is thorough, and the in a number of countries. Here, Reid is at his charts and other illustrations enhance the text. best, drawing on his impressive observations as Learning to Love the Bomb may not be indispens- a journalist to draw comparisons and derive con- able for an understanding of US involvement in clusions across various countries, large and the Cold War, but it does enhance awareness that small. He possesses unlimited energy and an the United States did not fight that battle alone. uncanny reportorial eye to find profound significance in vignettes that define the compelling Dr. John H. Barnhill human condition in cities, towns, and villages. Houston, Texas His reporting also takes him to the higher

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reaches of academic organizations, the news me- worthy addition to a growing collection of writ- dia, government institutions, and diplomacy. ings on what went wrong and what should be Reid demonstrates a passion for Latin America done in Lain America. and obviously admires the region and its people. At the same time, he appreciates the enormous Dr. Gabriel Marcella impact of history, seeking constantly to connect Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania the present with the past. He is also an effective analyst of social and economic indicators, such as investment and growth patterns, writing in a style that the nonspecialist audience can under- SECDEF: The Nearly Impossible Job of Sec- stand. He deploys his talented and lively pen to retary of Defense by Charles A. Stevenson. coldly analyze the sources of the problem, the Potomac Books (http://www.potomacbooks nature of reform efforts, and what he calls “The inc.com), 22841 Quicksilver Drive, Dulles, Stubborn Resilience of Flawed Democracies” (the Virginia 20166, 2006, 224 pages, $19.96 (hard- title of chap. 11). He attributes Latin America’s cover), ISBN 978-1-57488-794-5; $13.56 (soft- failure to weak and ineffective state systems— cover), ISBN 978-1-57488-795-2. that is, to the inability of government ministries to reach the people they are supposed to serve by Drawing on his experience on four senatorial providing security, justice, and education, and staffs, the Policy Planning Staff of the Depart- by promoting vibrant economies that produc- ment of State, and faculties of the National War tively employ the maximum number of people. College and Nitze School of Advanced Interna- But state weakness is only one part of the tional Studies at Johns Hopkins University, story, according to Reid. National leaders of the Charles Stevenson has written a clear, concise, last generation embarked on a series of neolib- and readable history of the Office of the Secre- eral reforms espoused by the “Washington Con- tary of Defense (OSD) and the men who have sensus” (p. 6) (pushed by research centers and occupied it. This inexpensive volume nicely fills multinational lending institutions) to remove a gap in the literature. It is a perfectly suited tariff barriers to trade and investment and get primer for officers and civilian professionals the state out of running enterprises. But progress who need or desire to understand the OSD, in- could not be sustained because the governments cluding those pursuing professional military did not conduct additional reforms and protections education or a degree in security studies. of the most vulnerable, which would unlock Stevenson divides his work into three sec- their creativity and wealth. Accordingly, an anti- tions. In the first, he deftly discusses the origins neoliberalism backlash is now generating tensions of the OSD, its first secretaries, and its evolution between the proponents of free-market economies through the Eisenhower administration. He re- and those who advocate that the central govern- counts the origins of the secretary of defense in ment provide greater direction to the economy, Pres. Harry S. Truman’s desire to increase in- as well as redistribution of wealth schemes. Add terservice cooperation, the compromise that to this the awesome insecurity in the streets. was the National Security Act of 1947, and Indeed, criminal violence subtracts nearly 25 Truman’s revenge in appointing Navy secre- percent of gross domestic product annually. tary—and vociferous opponent of the act— This reviewer is sympathetic to this kind of James Forrestal as the first secretary of defense. writing. Reid writes well, with an engaging style The first occupants of the office struggled to as- that captures the reader. To be sure, some simpli- sert the secretary’s authority over budgets fications challenge credibility. Note, for example, (Louis Johnson, Charles Wilson, and Neil the statement that “the Catholic Church—which McElroy) and over the services (Forrestal, had blessed injustice in Latin America since the George Marshall, and Thomas Gates). The sec- moment a Dominican friar had taken a full part in retaries who focused on budgetary matters at the capture and murder of Atahualpa, the Inca— best restrained spending in peacetime but failed had an attack of conscience” in the twentieth to systemically alter the spoils system used by century (pp. 97–98). But Reid has captured the the services in the wake of the intense budget essence of the Latin American social, economic, battle between the Navy and the Air Force in and political dilemma. The only disappointment 1948. Marshall and Gates succeeded admirably: with the book is that he doesn’t offer some policy Marshall strengthened civilian authority by alternatives. Nonetheless, Forgotten Continent is a backing President Truman’s decision to fire Gen

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2010-1 Book Reviews.indd 125 1/27/10 1:24:08 PM Douglas MacArthur, while Gates shepherded the powered aircraft carrier. The lesson to be Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, which learned is that at this level, a collegial leadership strengthened his statutory authority, and issued style is more effective over the long term than a directive requiring a joint, combined, allied, or one that focuses on asserting unilateral control. OSD tour as a prerequisite for promotion to gen- Stevenson evaluates each man’s performance, eral officer. (Regrettably, that requirement was judging McNamara, Weinberger, Laird, Cohen, not written into law until the next major Defense Brown, Cheney, and Perry successes, and Reorganization Act in 1986.) Much of this his- Forrestal, Johnson, Schlesinger, and Aspin fail- tory has been forgotten, but officers and policy ures. He does not explicitly judge Rumsfeld— makers should be keenly interested in these de- perhaps reserving judgment since Rumsfeld was velopments as the US government looks to en- still in office when the book was written—but hance interagency cooperation today. groups him with the successful secretaries in his In the second section, Stevenson discusses conclusion, noting that he maintained “a close individual secretaries of defense, focusing on relationship with the president, adequate rela- their background; relations with the president, tions with key officials in Congress, and . . . ex- Congress, and the military; their operating style; cellent relations with the military leadership” (p. and the way they fulfilled their roles as Pentagon 215). His account of the secretary’s tenure seems manager, war planner, diplomat, and National to contradict most of this assessment, however. Security Council advisor. He divides them into In the final section, Stevenson pivots his three categories, characterizing Robert McNamara, analysis and discusses the various roles the sec- James Schlesinger, and Caspar Weinberger as retary must perform (manager of the Pentagon, revolutionaries; Melvin Laird, Les Aspin, and war planner, diplomat, and National Security William Cohen as firefighters; and Harold Council advisor) and evaluates how well they Brown, Richard Cheney, William Perry, and were filled by each man. These chapters are Donald Rumsfeld as team players. Finally, he notable for their clear discussions of the secre- omits from the analysis three secretaries who tary’s statutory power, the Department of De- were primarily caretakers: Clark Clifford, Elliot fense’s budgetary and planning processes, the Richardson, and Frank Carlucci. influence of the secretary and the military on Stevenson provides lucid and evenhanded American foreign policy, and their privileged evaluations of these men and their tenure. For position in national-security decision making, instance, he recounts the “McNamara Revolu- given their advantages in personnel, resources, tion” and Rumsfeld’s “Transformation” analyti- disciplined processes, and the clarity they ap- cally, refraining from the invective common in pear to bring to key issues in national security. other accounts, and focuses instead on the man- As Stevenson argues, the secretary and the mili- ner in which these men strengthened the office tary can effectively veto military action by offer- they held, the policies they pursued, and their ing professional advice against it or only unten- relations with the president, the military, and able options such as “250,000 troops, six months, Congress. He makes clear that the office sug- and $10 billion” (p. 197). gests certain behaviors whose acceptance is In all, the secretary of defense controls the more a reflection of the secretary’s operating largest agency in the government, more re- style than an affirmation of their inherent legiti- sources than most countries, and the ultimate macy. Virtually all secretaries since McNamara means of settling international disputes. That have required the service chiefs to clear their this office has not been subjected to more sys- congressional and public statements with the tematic attention is unconscionable, and OSD before their delivery, but McNamara and Stevenson’s volume is an excellent introduction. Rumsfeld drew vitriolic ire for this practice. Like This first-rate book should find its way onto Rumsfeld, Cheney personally interviewed all syllabi in professional military education and candidates for three- and four-star billets and security studies courses, the shelves of officers interested himself in the career paths of promis- and Department of Defense civilians aspiring to ing one- and two-star officers—yet drew little develop themselves professionally, and the resentment for “meddling” in personnel matters desks of congressional staff members who over- (p. 139). Like McNamara, Brown picked apart see this powerful institution. programs with systems analysis, yet was admired despite having canceled cherished programs Dr. Gary Schaub Jr. such as the B-1 bomber and another nuclear- Maxwell AFB, Alabama

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