WEEKLY REPORT 19 – 25 February 2021

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WEEKLY REPORT 19 – 25 February 2021 WEEKLY REPORT 19 – 25 February 2021 KEY DYNAMICS Health and security in the northwest ...................................................................... 2 Increased number of car bomb explosions northern Aleppo ........ 2 COVID-19 vaccines arriving in Idleb from March ............................. 2 Government grain supply ........................................................................................... 3 Russian–Turkish agreement to give grain in opposition-held areas to the Syrian government ........................................................................... 3 Russia and the SDF....................................................................................................... 4 Tensions in Ein Issa continue ..................................................................... 4 MERCY CORPS HUMANITARIAN ACCESS WEEKLY REPORT, 19 – 25 February 2021 1 Health and security in the northwest Al-Bab subdistrict. Other sources indicated that the 25th Division and the 16th Brigade, both Increased number of car bomb supported by Russia, are among the forces that explosions northern Aleppo left their positions in An-Nu’man (Ma'arrat An Nu'man subdistrict) east of Idleb, Tal al-Jarad On 19 February, a security official from the (Masyaf subdistrict) west of Hama and headed to Sultan Murad Division (a faction of the Syrian the vicinity of Al-Bab city in the northern National Army (SNA)), was killed, and twelve countryside of Aleppo. members of the division were injured after a suicide bomber detonated himself with an COVID-19 vaccines arriving in explosive belt at Division headquarters in Tal Al- Idleb from March Hawa (Ar-Ra'ee subdistrict). The Idleb Health Directorate stated that it would On 20 February, a car bomb exploded in a market begin the COVID-19 vaccination process in in Sajo (Azaz subdistrict), resulting in the injury March after receiving 120,000 doses of the of six civilians, while the SNA’s Military Police British AstraZeneca vaccine. The Directorate successfully dismantled a second car bomb. On said that 60,000 people would be vaccinated, the the same day, the SNA’s Engineering Division priority will be for medical staff, people over 60 managed to detonate a car bomb in Al-Bab city's years old, and those with chronic illnesses. center (Al-Bab subdistrict) without reported casualties. On 24 February, three civilians were According to Dr. Maram al-Sheikh, the minister wounded after a car bomb explosion in Afrin city of health in the Syrian Interim Government (SIG), (Afrin subdistrict), just one day after the killing of the initial expected allocation is for 1.7 million a man and a woman (and alleged Kurdish militias) doses to cover 850,000 people, about 20% of the while they were working on manufacturing entire population of northwest Syria. Covacs, the explosive devices inside Basuta (Afrin WHO platform set up in part to guarantee “fair subdistrict). and equitable access to vaccines for every country in the world”, has allocated more than As in previous weeks, the perpetrators are one million doses of the AstraZeneca vaccine to disputed, with Turkey pointing to Kurdish militia, Syria. WHO stated that 35–40% of vaccines while rumours of ISIS and Syrian government designated for Syria will be available during the involvement abound. The attacks last week are first half of the year, with 60–65% in the second noteworthy however because of the targeting of half. Idleb governorate and its surroundings are the SNA headquarters. The attack coincides with supposed to receive 336,000 doses, covering reports of close government military action nearly 4% of the total population, according to against Turkish-held territory in the northern WHO. countryside of Aleppo. Local media sources reported that the Syrian government sent On 23 February, the Early Warning Alert and military reinforcements to the frontlines of the Response Network (EWARN) reported 21,144 MERCY CORPS HUMANITARIAN ACCESS WEEKLY REPORT, 19 – 25 February 2021 2 cases of COVID-19 in the northwest, from distributed to improve the living conditions 92,899 tests, with the death rate currently following an agreement reached with Russia." standing at 408. The Turkish government, however, did not say who the grain will be delivered to. Government grain supply On 21 February, the Self-Administration came Russian–Turkish agreement to forth with their version of the agreement. The give grain in opposition-held head of the Economic and Agricultural Authority areas to the Syrian government of the Self-Administration, Salman Barodo, told media sources that the Self-Administration had On 18 February pro-Russian media outlets reached an agreement, with Russian mediation, reported on a Russian–Turkish agreement to giving it part of the reserve grain in the Sharkrak transport grain from silos located in Sharkrak silos. Barodo later added that 30,000 tonnes, village (Ein Issa subdistrict), under the control of most of which is barley, started being the SIG and its military branch, the SNA, to transported on 19 February and was divided Syrian government-held areas. Media sources amongst the Self-Administration, the Syrian later added that Russian forces stationed in Al- government, and the SIG. Barodo later added Hasakeh had mediated an agreement between that the agreement was motivated by the desire the SNA and Turkey on one side and the Syrian to save the remaining reserve from being spoiled government on the other, to transport part of due to poor storage conditions. the reserve grain located in the silos to government-held Aleppo. Emptying Sharkrak silos part of Russian support to the government Conflicting claims emerge regarding ahead of presidential elections? details of the agreement Syrian government areas are currently going On 19 February, the SIG’s Ministry of Defense through a bread crisis, an externality of the released a statement denying the agreement's economic and financial problems, accompanied existence and control over the silos. The by other troubles making the lives of cash- Ministry dismissed news of the deal as claims strapped Syrian citizens more difficult. Local made by "media outlets and their mouthpieces sources have reported discontent with the that do not cease to backstab us and call us Syrian government and its leadership's traitors" with the aim of "targeting the performance from pro-government and revolution and its national army." On the same opposition-leaning citizens, accusing them of day, the Turkish government issued a statement mismanagement and corruption. Indeed, the confirming the agreement stating that the "grain ruling Baath party had reportedly postponed the in the Sharakrak silos liberated from the PKK presidential election campaign's print-media in [Kurdistan Workers’ Party] terrorist early February out of fear it would be defaced organization by Operation Peace Spring is being due to the citizenry's disgruntlement. MERCY CORPS HUMANITARIAN ACCESS WEEKLY REPORT, 19 – 25 February 2021 3 Russia's efforts to provide the Syrian further explanations. Some sources indicated government with free grain are timely and could that the movements were temporary, and that a be an attempt to assist the government in small number of Russian forces withdrew abating one of its many recurring crises. This is towards Tal Elsamen but returned two days later not the first time one of the government's allies to their bases in Ein Issa. Some other sources has helped it grapple with its problems, indicate that the sudden withdrawal was a result particularly in relation to the bread crisis. On 1 of a disagreement between Russian forces and February, local sources reported that the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), who then approximately six Iranian trucks carrying flour brought in additional SDF personnel from the from Iran travelled across Iraq and entered Syria city of Ar-Raqqa. through the al-Qaim border crossing before reaching the drop-off point in Damascus city. Although local reports indicate that the withdrawal came as a result of a disagreement These deliveries reportedly occurred daily for two weeks before reducing to two per week. between the SDF and the Russian forces, after Likely, such attempts to patch up crises in Syrian the Russians requested that the administration government-held areas will continue in an of Ein Issa be handed over to the Syrian attempt to assuage disgruntled citizens, ahead of government, it is expected that the matter will the presidential elections expected to be held in be remedied in the near future. So long as the June. However, it is unlikely to be enough to Turkish threat remains in the north, then Russia resolve them considering that the core issues is likely to continue pressing for a greater Syrian remain unaddressed and that the government's government and/or Russian troop presence in key allies are suffering from financial difficulties the area, similar to the situation in Quamishli city themselves. (Quamishli subdistrict). Russia and the SDF You might have missed; Tensions in Ein Issa continue Syrian government siege on Dar’a On February 21, local media sources reported SDF siege on Syrian government that Russian forces stationed in Ein Issa and Tal Regional economies and COVID-19 Tamr (Tal Tamr district) withdrew several Depreciation, wages and affordability military vehicles carrying items and equipment from their military bases in Tal Elsamen (Be'r Al- Hulo Al-Wardeyyeh subdistrict), an estimated 20 km south of Ein Issa, without providing MERCY CORPS HUMANITARIAN ACCESS WEEKLY
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