DOCSLIB.ORG

The Role of the Presidential Representative: the North-West Federal District

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Role of the Presidential Representative: the North-West Federal District THE ROLE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL REPRESENTATIVE: THE NORTH-WEST FEDERAL DISTRICT Alexander Duka and Peter Rutland [In Peter Reddaway and Robert Orttung, (eds.) The Dynamics of Russian Politics: Putin’s Federal Reforms (Rowman and Littlefield, 2004), 53-86.] Background to the region The North West Federal District (SZFO) consists of eleven units: the city of St. Petersburg; the oblasts of Leningrad, Vologda, Murmansk, Kaliningrad, Novgorod, Pskov and Arkhangel’sk; the republics of Komi and Kareliya; and the Nenets Autonomous Okrug. It comprises 10% of the territory of the Russian Federation, and its 14.4 million inhabitants make up 10% of the population of the Russia.1 Since the founding of St. Petersburg 300 years ago, the region has served as Russia’s principal gateway to the outside world: “the window on the West” or, as cynics would have it, the “spy hole on the West.”2 This gateway role is perhaps the chief characteristic governing the priorities set before SZFO head Viktor Cherkesov. It has both a security and an economic dimension. While the security factor is paramount in two other frontier federal districts – the Southern and Far Eastern – in the Northwest both security and economic dimensions are important. From the economic point of view the region’s proximity and ease of access to Europe mean that it is an important entrepot for exports and imports. It is also second only to Moscow as a favored destination for foreign investors. From the security point of view, the region has 3,250 km of border with 7 states, 65 border crossing points, and 22 million visitors annually.3 The SZFO abuts NATO member Norway in the far north, and is home to the troubled Northern Fleet. It shares a long border with EU member Finland. Russia seized a large chunk of territory from Finland, the bulk of present-day Kareliya, at the end of World War Two, but Finland does not harbor a claim to the territory (unlike Japan, who still claim the Kurile Islands, seized in 1945). The SZFO region also abuts Estonia and Latvia, two countries whose relations with Russia are tense because of the presence of large Russian minorities who have not been granted citizenship. The region also has a frontier and active cross-border trade with Belarus. The region includes the exclave of Kaliningrad, precariously located between Lithuania and Poland and physically separated from “mainland” Russia. The geographic isolation of Kaliningrad, together with the preponderance of military facilities in that province, has made it prone to economic dislocation, crime and corruption. The question of transit for Russian citizens to and from Kaliningrad has emerged as a major bone of contention between Russia and the European Union. In preparation for Polish and Lithuanian entry to the EU, both countries are being pressed to end visa-free travel for Russians to and from Kaliningrad. Security Council Secretary Sergei Ivanov has said that Kaliningrad should not become a “besieged fortress” after the expansion of the European Union in 2003, and warned apropos of demilitarization of the region that “Russia has no obligations not to have tactical nuclear weapons in the Kaliningrad Region.”4 For these reasons, the Northwest region plays a direct and important role whenever discussion in Moscow turns to questions of border regimes, customs procedures, immigration controls and the like. Such 1 “O nekotorykh sotsial’no-ekonomicheskiykh pokazatelyakh Severo-zapadnogo regiona,” Ekspert Sevoro-Zapad, 18 June 2001, no. 11. 2 Vyacheslav Morozov, “The discourses of St. Petersburg and the shaping of a wider Europe,” Copenhagen Peace Research Institute paper no 13, 2002, on web at www.copri.dk 3 Chas Pik, 24 April 2001. 4 Itar-Tass, 24 March 2001. factors are increasingly important to Russian foreign policy as it seeks entry to the World Trade Organization and closer ties with the European Union. These issues are of direct concern to the federal center, and one can hypothesize that they are too important to be left to the vagaries of the governors of border regions. When the plans for the creation of the federal districts were being prepared, the second war in Chechnya was in full swing, and the threat of separatism was taken seriously by the new Russian president. Kaliningrad, obviously, is near the top of the list of regions that could conceivably break off from Russia, simply because of its geographical isolation.5 Hence on 13 July 2002 Putin appointed Dmitrii Rogozin as his special envoy to deal with negotiations with the EU over Kaliningrad. (Chechnya is the only other Russian region to merit a special presidential representative.) There was discussion in spring of 2001 of turning Kaliningrad into a separate, eighth, federal okrug, but this was declined by the Security Council meeting on 26 July 2001. Instead it was decided to launch a special federal program for the region, to be supervised by a deputy of the presidential representative (polpred).6 * * * * The other salient fact to bear in mind about the Northwest region is that it is the home territory of President Vladimir Putin. He spent the bulk of his career in the region, first in the KGB, then as an aide to democratic mayor Anatolii Sobchak. Putin only served in Moscow for three years, those immediately prior to his appointment as prime minister in 1999. Putin himself continues to visit Petersburg frequently, and has arranged many visits by foreign heads of state to the “northern capital.” It has now become a standard stop in either the official and unofficial parts of visits by foreign presidents and prime ministers. This was never the practice under previous Russian and Soviet leaders. Cherkesov has even spoken out cautiously in favor of transferring some capital functions to Petersburg on a permanent basis.7 The renewed national and international visibility of St. Petersburg has a significance beyond mere nostalgia. In Russia’s patronage-based politics, Putin has relied heavily on the drafting of personnel from St. Petersburg to staff his administration in Moscow.8 This implies that the region should enjoy privileged access to Putin’s ear, and correspondingly favorable treatment from the federal center. This “special relationship” was underlined by the fact that Putin appointed a close colleague and ally from the Federal Security Service (FSB), Viktor Cherkesov, to head the North-West district. Who is Viktor Cherkesov? The man chosen as presidential representative (polpred) in the SZFO district was Viktor Vasil’evich Cherkesov, a KGB veteran whose career closely parallels that of President Putin. Of all the federal district heads, Cherkesov is the man closest to Putin, personally and professionally. One of his nicknames is that he is the “second Putin.”9 Dmitrii Oreshkin argues that “Cherkesov is, without doubt, the most closely associated with the president among the [polpred] appointees. His fate was apparently 5 Oleg Odnokolenko, “Oborona Kaliningrada,” Itogi, 25 May 2001. 6 E. Ozerova, “Massivnoe polpredstvo spaset Kaliningrad,” Peterburgskii Chas Pik, 1 August 2001, no. 31; S. Chernova, “Kontroleram ne ponravilsya Kaliningrad,” Kommersant, 18 July 2001, no. 125; “Vos’mogo federal’nogo okruga ne budet,” Vesti SPB, 28 July 2001, no 85; V. Abramov, “Kaliningradskaya oblast,’” Konstitutsionnooe pravo: Vostochnoevropeiskoe obozrenie, 2001, no. 3, pp. 191-93; E. Krom, “Slyshkom malo initsiativy,” (Interview with deputy polpred A. Steanov), Ekspert Sevor-Zapad, 14 January 2002, no. 1-2. 7 Smena, 15 August 2000. 8 Konstantin Simonov, “Belyi dom na tri sem’I” [Three families in the White House] Kommersant-Vlast’, 16 March 2000; Ivan Trefilov, “Muscovites swell the ranks of the people from St. Petersburg,” Vedomosti, no. 45, July 2-4, 2001. 9 Dmitrii Pinsker, “Vtorichno legitimnyi,” Itogi, 14 November 2000. predetermined by the years spent together with Vladimir Putin at the Leningrad University School of Law.”10 Cherkesov was born on 13 July 1950.11 He finished the law faculty of Leningrad State University (as did Putin) in 1975, and after a brief spell in the procuracy he went into the KGB.12 From 1992-98 he headed the Petersburg district of the KGB (which was renamed MB, FSK and then FSB – Federal Security Service). In the 1980s Cherkesov was actively involved in the persecution of political dissidents, and in 1996 he led the case against Captain Aleksandr Nikitin, accused of espionage for his work with the Norwegian environmentalist group Belona. Nikitin was found innocent in the fall of 1999. On 26 August 1998 Cherkesov became first deputy director of the FSB with the rank of lieutenant-general, later promoted to colonel-general.13 His final job was coordinating work with the regions: one can speculate that he may have been involved with the design of the federal district reform itself.14 He is married with two daughters: his wife Natalya Chaplina is editor-in-chief of Chas Pik, a leading Petersburg newspaper. Back in spring 2000, when Putin was running for the presidency, Cherkesov took a couple of week’s formal leave from the FSB in order to campaign for Putin.15 An interview with Igor Chernyak was revealing of the awkwardness of the shift from KGB to campaigning: “Question: You are known as ‘Putin’s man,’ one of his closest confidants. How do you feel about this role? Cherkesov: I do not feel anything about it. Question: You must know him very well indeed, after all these years... Cherkesov: As I see it, Putin's style is contrary to the labels that some circles are trying to apply to him.. So all these speculations about him being a mystery man are rubbish. Question: You are playing a key part in the ‘St. Petersburg team.’ At the same time, this team is gaining dominance in the top power structures.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Testimony: the Russian Economy: More Than Just Energy?
    The Russian Economy: More than Just Energy? Anders Åslund, Peterson Institute for International Economics Testimony for the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament April 2009 1 Introduction Russia has enjoyed a decade of high economic growth because of the eventually successful market reforms of the 1990s as well as an oil boom. For the last six years, however, the Russian economy has become increasingly dysfunctional because the authorities have done nothing to impede corruption. The energy sector has been a generator of corrupt revenues, and its renationalization has concentrated these corrupt incomes in the hands of the security police elite. Russia depends on the European Union for most of its exports and imports, but no free trade agreement is even on the horizon. Investments, by contrast, are relatively well secured through international conventions. In global governance, Russia has changed its attitude from being a joiner to becoming a spoiler. The disruption of supplies of Russian gas to Europe in January 2009 displayed all the shortfalls both of the Russian and Ukrainian gas sectors and of EU policy. The European Union needs to play a more active role. It should monitor gas supplies, production, and storage. It should demand the exclusion of corrupt intermediaries in its gas trade. It should demand that Russia and Ukraine conclude a long- term transit and supply agreement. The European Union should form a proper energy policy, with energy conservation, diversification, unbundling, and increased storage. This is a good time to persuade Russia to ratify the Energy Charter. The European Union should also demand that Ukraine undertake a market-oriented and transparent energy-sector reform.
    [Show full text]
  • The Siloviki in Russian Politics
    The Siloviki in Russian Politics Andrei Soldatov and Michael Rochlitz Who holds power and makes political decisions in contemporary Russia? A brief survey of available literature in any well-stocked bookshop in the US or Europe will quickly lead one to the answer: Putin and the “siloviki” (see e.g. LeVine 2009; Soldatov and Borogan 2010; Harding 2011; Felshtinsky and Pribylovsky 2012; Lucas 2012, 2014 or Dawisha 2014). Sila in Russian means force, and the siloviki are the members of Russia’s so called “force ministries”—those state agencies that are authorized to use violence to respond to threats to national security. These armed agents are often portrayed—by journalists and scholars alike—as Russia’s true rulers. A conventional wisdom has emerged about their rise to dominance, which goes roughly as follows. After taking office in 2000, Putin reconsolidated the security services and then gradually placed his former associates from the KGB and FSB in key positions across the country (Petrov 2002; Kryshtanovskaya and White 2003, 2009). Over the years, this group managed to disable almost all competing sources of power and control. United by a common identity, a shared worldview, and a deep personal loyalty to Putin, the siloviki constitute a cohesive corporation, which has entrenched itself at the heart of Russian politics. Accountable to no one but the president himself, they are the driving force behind increasingly authoritarian policies at home (Illarionov 2009; Roxburgh 2013; Kasparov 2015), an aggressive foreign policy (Lucas 2014), and high levels of state predation and corruption (Dawisha 2014). While this interpretation contains elements of truth, we argue that it provides only a partial and sometimes misleading and exaggerated picture of the siloviki’s actual role.
    [Show full text]
  • Telecoms & Media 2021
    Telecoms & Media 2021 Telecoms Telecoms & Media 2021 Contributing editors Alexander Brown and David Trapp © Law Business Research 2021 Publisher Tom Barnes [email protected] Subscriptions Claire Bagnall Telecoms & Media [email protected] Senior business development manager Adam Sargent 2021 [email protected] Published by Law Business Research Ltd Contributing editors Meridian House, 34-35 Farringdon Street London, EC4A 4HL, UK Alexander Brown and David Trapp The information provided in this publication Simmons & Simmons LLP is general and may not apply in a specific situation. Legal advice should always be sought before taking any legal action based on the information provided. This information is not intended to create, nor does receipt of it constitute, a lawyer– Lexology Getting The Deal Through is delighted to publish the 22nd edition of Telecoms & Media, client relationship. The publishers and which is available in print and online at www.lexology.com/gtdt. authors accept no responsibility for any Lexology Getting The Deal Through provides international expert analysis in key areas of acts or omissions contained herein. The law, practice and regulation for corporate counsel, cross-border legal practitioners, and company information provided was verified between directors and officers. May and June 2021. Be advised that this is Throughout this edition, and following the unique Lexology Getting The Deal Through format, a developing area. the same key questions are answered by leading practitioners in each of the jurisdictions featured. Lexology Getting The Deal Through titles are published annually in print. Please ensure you © Law Business Research Ltd 2021 are referring to the latest edition or to the online version at www.lexology.com/gtdt.
    [Show full text]
  • The Siloviki in Putin's Russia
    Ian Bremmer and Samuel Charap The Siloviki in Putin’s Russia: Who They Are and What They Want The July 2006 meeting of the Group of Eight (G-8) major indus- trialized nations in St. Petersburg focused the attention of the international media on Russia. On issues ranging from Middle East conflict to energy se- curity, President Vladimir Putin sought to demonstrate that his increasingly self-confident government has earned its seat at the G-8 table. Coverage of the summit focused squarely on Putin—his international priorities, control over domestic politics, personal relationships with other heads of state, and leadership style. These stories created the impression that Putin is Russian politics, reinforcing the view that to understand Putin himself is to under- stand Kremlin policy. Since Putin was named acting president on December 31, 1999, ana- lysts have poured over his personal history, public statements, and writings, confidently forecasting political and economic trends based largely on their interpretations of what they found. Those who portray him as an autocrat underline his KGB background. Others point to his tutelage under former St. Petersburg mayor and liberal reformer Anatoly Sobchak or his preference for pragmatism over ideology. Recently, Western scholars unearthed his doc- toral thesis and used it to explain Russian state involvement in the energy sector.1 President George W. Bush famously contributed to this line of analysis by implying in 2001 that his “sense of the man’s soul” provided a reliable foun- dation for U.S.-Russian relations. Despite its parsimony and popularity, this approach to understanding Kremlin policy, which some have called “Putinol- ogy,” creates a misleading impression of how Russia is ruled.
    [Show full text]
  • Treisman Silovarchs 9 10 06
    Putin’s Silovarchs Daniel Treisman October 2006, Forthcoming in Orbis, Winter 2007 In the late 1990s, many Russians believed their government had been captured by a small group of business magnates known as “the oligarchs”. The most flamboyant, Boris Berezovsky, claimed in 1996 that seven bankers controlled fifty percent of the Russian economy. Having acquired massive oil and metals enterprises in rigged privatizations, these tycoons exploited Yeltsin’s ill-health to meddle in politics and lobby their interests. Two served briefly in government. Another, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, summed up the conventional wisdom of the time in a 1997 interview: “Politics is the most lucrative field of business in Russia. And it will be that way forever.”1 A decade later, most of the original oligarchs have been tripping over each other in their haste to leave the political stage, jettisoning properties as they go. From exile in London, Berezovsky announced in February he was liquidating his last Russian assets. A 1 Quoted in Andrei Piontkovsky, “Modern-Day Rasputin,” The Moscow Times, 12 November, 1997. fellow media magnate, Vladimir Gusinsky, long ago surrendered his television station to the state-controlled gas company Gazprom and now divides his time between Israel and the US. Khodorkovsky is in a Siberian jail, serving an eight-year sentence for fraud and tax evasion. Roman Abramovich, Berezovsky’s former partner, spends much of his time in London, where he bought the Chelsea soccer club in 2003. Rather than exile him to Siberia, the Kremlin merely insists he serve as governor of the depressed Arctic outpost of Chukotka—a sign Russia’s leaders have a sense of humor, albeit of a dark kind.
    [Show full text]
  • Udmurtia. Horizons of Cooperation.Pdf
    UDMURTIA Horizons of Cooperation The whole world is familiar fiber, 8th – in production of pork; or hammer out a nail for a house with the gun maker Mikhail Ka- it is among 5 major regions - fur- with your own hands to have a tra- lashnikov, motor cycles «Izh», the niture producers in Russia and ditional Udmurt wedding, to re- composer Pyotr Tchaikovsky and among 10 major regions of Russia cover physical health with help of the skier Galina Kulakova but as producing dairy and meat prod- unique mud, mineral waters and long as 20 years ago there were ucts. health-giving honey (apiotherapy) few people who were able to as- Acquaintance with future part- and spiritual health – in cathe- sociate them with Udmurtia. Now ners from Udmurtia is related to drals and at sacred springs, to re- it is just a fact in history explained business tourism. Citizens of oth- lieve stresses of the metropolitan by strategic significance of the er countries and regions of Russia city in the patriarchal tranquility Republic in the defense complex when selecting a holiday destina- of villages, to choose an educa- of Russia and its remoteness from tion will not consider our region tional institution for studying. the state borders. as a health resort or touristic cen- Udmurtia is the region of hospi- Business partner highly appre- ter along with London or Paris in table and purposeful people open ciate products manufactured in the first place. for dialogue and cooperation. the Republic and extend relations However, Udmurtia is attrac- with its manufacturers. tive not only as the industrial-in- Udmurtia produces equipment novative or educational center.
    [Show full text]
  • Power Surge? Russia’S Power Ministries from Yeltsin to Putin and Beyond
    Power Surge? Russia’s Power Ministries from Yeltsin to Putin and Beyond PONARS Policy Memo No. 414 Brian D. Taylor Syracuse University December 2006 The “rise of the siloviki ” has become a standard framework for analyzing Russian politics under President Vladimir Putin . According to this view, the main difference between Putin’s rule and that of former president Boris Yeltsin is the triumph of guns (the siloviki ) over money (the oligarchs). This approach has a lot to recommend it, but it also raises sever al important questions . One is the ambiguity embedded in the term siloviki itself . Taken from the Russian phrase for the power ministries ( silovie ministerstva ) or power structures ( silovie strukturi ), the word is sometimes used to refer to those ministrie s and agencies ; sometimes to personnel from those structures ; and sometimes to a specific “clan” in Russian politics centered around the deputy head of the presidential administration, former KGB official Igor Sechin . A second issue , often glossed over in the “rise of the siloviki ” story , is whether the increase in political power of men with guns has necessarily led to the strengthening of the state, Putin’s central policy goal . Finally, as many observers have pointed out, treating the siloviki as a unit – particularly when the term is used to apply to all power ministries or power ministry personnel – seriously overstates the coherence of this group. In this memo, I break down the rise of the siloviki narrative into multiple parts, focusing on three issues . First, I look at change over time, from the early 1990s to the present .
    [Show full text]
  • Industrial Framework of Russia. the 250 Largest Industrial Centers Of
    INDUSTRIAL FRAMEWORK OF RUSSIA 250 LARGEST INDUSTRIAL CENTERS OF RUSSIA Metodology of the Ranking. Data collection INDUSTRIAL FRAMEWORK OF RUSSIA The ranking is based on the municipal statistics published by the Federal State Statistics Service on the official website1. Basic indicator is Shipment of The 250 Largest Industrial Centers of own production goods, works performed and services rendered related to mining and manufacturing in 2010. The revenue in electricity, gas and water Russia production and supply was taken into account only regarding major power plants which belong to major generation companies of the wholesale electricity market. Therefore, the financial results of urban utilities and other About the Ranking public services are not taken into account in the industrial ranking. The aim of the ranking is to observe the most significant industrial centers in Spatial analysis regarding the allocation of business (productive) assets of the Russia which play the major role in the national economy and create the leading Russian and multinational companies2 was performed. Integrated basis for national welfare. Spatial allocation, sectorial and corporate rankings and company reports was analyzed. That is why with the help of the structure of the 250 Largest Industrial Centers determine “growing points” ranking one could follow relationship between welfare of a city and activities and “depression areas” on the map of Russia. The ranking allows evaluation of large enterprises. Regarding financial results of basic enterprises some of the role of primary production sector at the local level, comparison of the statistical data was adjusted, for example in case an enterprise is related to a importance of large enterprises and medium business in the structure of city but it is located outside of the city border.
    [Show full text]
  • The Sources of Post-Soviet Conduct
    FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE Russia Political Economy Project THE SOURCES OF POST-SOVIET CONDUCT 1 FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE The Foreign Policy Research Institute thanks the Carnegie Corporation for its support of the Russia Political Economy Project. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. © 2018 by the Foreign Policy Research Institute December 2018 COVER: Marshal Zhukov monument near Red Square in Moscow, Russia. Source: Adobe Stock FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE MISSION The Foreign Policy Research Institute is dedicated to bringing the insights of scholarship to bear on the foreign policy and national security challenges facing the United States. It seeks to educate the public, teach teachers, train students, and offer ideas to advance U.S. national interests based on a nonpartisan, geopolitical perspective that illuminates contemporary international affairs through the lens of history, geography, and culture. EDUCATING THE AMERICAN PUBLIC: FPRI was founded on the premise than an informed and educated citizenry is paramount for the U.S. to conduct a coherent foreign policy. Today, we live in a world of unprecedented complexity and ever-changing threats, and as we make decisions regarding the nation’s foreign policy, the stakes could not be higher. FPRI offers insights to help the public understand this volatile world by publishing research, hosting conferences, and holding dozens of public events and lectures each year.
    [Show full text]
  • Flags and Banners
    Flags and Banners A Wikipedia Compilation by Michael A. Linton Contents 1 Flag 1 1.1 History ................................................. 2 1.2 National flags ............................................. 4 1.2.1 Civil flags ........................................... 8 1.2.2 War flags ........................................... 8 1.2.3 International flags ....................................... 8 1.3 At sea ................................................. 8 1.4 Shapes and designs .......................................... 9 1.4.1 Vertical flags ......................................... 12 1.5 Religious flags ............................................. 13 1.6 Linguistic flags ............................................. 13 1.7 In sports ................................................ 16 1.8 Diplomatic flags ............................................ 18 1.9 In politics ............................................... 18 1.10 Vehicle flags .............................................. 18 1.11 Swimming flags ............................................ 19 1.12 Railway flags .............................................. 20 1.13 Flagpoles ............................................... 21 1.13.1 Record heights ........................................ 21 1.13.2 Design ............................................. 21 1.14 Hoisting the flag ............................................ 21 1.15 Flags and communication ....................................... 21 1.16 Flapping ................................................ 23 1.17 See also ...............................................
    [Show full text]
  • Russian Government Continues to Support Cattle Sector
    THIS REPORT CONTAINS ASSESSMENTS OF COMMODITY AND TRADE ISSUES MADE BY USDA STAFF AND NOT NECESSARILY STATEMENTS OF OFFICIAL U.S. GOVERNMENT POLICY Voluntary - Public Date: 6/17/2013 GAIN Report Number: RS1335 Russian Federation Post: Moscow Russian Government Continues to Support Cattle Sector Report Categories: Livestock and Products Policy and Program Announcements Agricultural Situation Approved By: Holly Higgins Prepared By: FAS/Moscow Staff Report Highlights: Russia’s live animal imports have soared in recent years, as the Federal Government has supported the rebuilding of the beef and cattle sector in Russia. This sector had been in continual decline since the break-up of the Soviet Union, but imports of breeding stock have resulted in a number of modern ranches. The Russian Federal and oblast governments offer a series of support programs meant to stimulate livestock development in the Russian Federation over the next seven years which are funded at hundreds of billions of Russian rubles (almost $10 billion). These programs are expected to lead to a recovery of the cattle industry. Monies have been allocated for both new construction and modernization of old livestock farms, purchase of domestic and imported of high quality breeding dairy and beef cattle, semen and embryos; all of which should have a direct and favorable impact on livestock genetic exports to Russia through 2020. General Information: Trade Russia’s live animal imports have soared in recent years, as the Federal Government has supported the rebuilding of the beef and cattle sector in Russia. This sector has been in decline since the break-up of the Soviet Union, but imports of breeding stock have resulted in a number of modern ranches which are expected to lead to a recovery of the cattle industry.
    [Show full text]
  • REPORT on Best Practices in Initiative Budgeting Development in the Russian Federation Regions and Municipalities
    REPORT on Best practices in initiative budgeting development in the Russian Federation regions and municipalities Moscow 2018 SUMMARY This publication is a review of national experience and best practices in the development of initiative budgeting in Russia up to 2018. It analyzes various practices to involve citizens in budgeting through their participation in proposing and selecting the initiatives to be financed from the budgetary funds, and the subsequent monitoring of the project implementation. The data was collected from an official survey conducted by the Russian Ministry of Finance. The original report was prepared in Russian and published on the official site of the Ministry.1 It is planned to be published annually. This publication may be of interest to a wide range of readers, academic researchers, government officials, specialists in IB development and other practices of citizen participation, civic activists, and all those who are interested in democratic processes taking place in local communities in Russia. The report has been jointly prepared by the Department of Budget Methodology and Public Sector Financial Reporting and the Center for Initiative Budgeting at the Scientific Financial Research Institute of the Russian Ministry of Finance. Authors: Shapovalova N., Belenchuk A., Vagin V., Galkina N., Antsyferova I., Gavrilova N. 1 Electronic publication www.minfin.ru/common/upload/library/2018/08/main/IB_2018.pdf 2 CONTENTS INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]