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The Internet Is a Semicommons
GRIMMELMANN_10_04_29_APPROVED_PAGINATED 4/29/2010 11:26 PM THE INTERNET IS A SEMICOMMONS James Grimmelmann* I. INTRODUCTION As my contribution to this Symposium on David Post’s In Search of Jefferson’s Moose1 and Jonathan Zittrain’s The Future of the Internet,2 I’d like to take up a question with which both books are obsessed: what makes the Internet work? Post’s answer is that the Internet is uniquely Jeffersonian; it embodies a civic ideal of bottom-up democracy3 and an intellectual ideal of generous curiosity.4 Zittrain’s answer is that the Internet is uniquely generative; it enables its users to experiment with new uses and then share their innovations with each other.5 Both books tell a story about how the combination of individual freedom and a cooperative ethos have driven the Internet’s astonishing growth. In that spirit, I’d like to suggest a third reason that the Internet works: it gets the property boundaries right. Specifically, I see the Internet as a particularly striking example of what property theorist Henry Smith has named a semicommons.6 It mixes private property in individual computers and network links with a commons in the communications that flow * Associate Professor, New York Law School. My thanks for their comments to Jack Balkin, Shyam Balganesh, Aislinn Black, Anne Chen, Matt Haughey, Amy Kapczynski, David Krinsky, Jonathon Penney, Chris Riley, Henry Smith, Jessamyn West, and Steven Wu. I presented earlier versions of this essay at the Commons Theory Workshop for Young Scholars (Max Planck Institute for the Study of Collective Goods), the 2007 IP Scholars conference, the 2007 Telecommunications Policy Research Conference, and the December 2009 Symposium at Fordham Law School on David Post’s and Jonathan Zittrain’s books. -
Crypto Anarchy, Cyberstates, and Pirate Utopias Edited by Peter Ludlow
Ludlow cover 7/7/01 2:08 PM Page 1 Crypto Anarchy, Cyberstates, and Pirate Utopias Crypto Anarchy, Crypto Anarchy, Cyberstates, and Pirate Utopias edited by Peter Ludlow In Crypto Anarchy, Cyberstates, and Pirate Utopias, Peter Ludlow extends the approach he used so successfully in High Noon on the Electronic Frontier, offering a collection of writings that reflect the eclectic nature of the online world, as well as its tremendous energy and creativity. This time the subject is the emergence of governance structures within online communities and the visions of political sovereignty shaping some of those communities. Ludlow views virtual communities as laboratories for conducting experiments in the Peter Ludlow construction of new societies and governance structures. While many online experiments will fail, Ludlow argues that given the synergy of the online world, new and superior governance structures may emerge. Indeed, utopian visions are not out of place, provided that we understand the new utopias to edited by be fleeting localized “islands in the Net” and not permanent institutions. The book is organized in five sections. The first section considers the sovereignty of the Internet. The second section asks how widespread access to resources such as Pretty Good Privacy and anonymous remailers allows the possibility of “Crypto Anarchy”—essentially carving out space for activities that lie outside the purview of nation-states and other traditional powers. The Crypto Anarchy, Cyberstates, third section shows how the growth of e-commerce is raising questions of legal jurisdiction and taxation for which the geographic boundaries of nation- states are obsolete. The fourth section looks at specific experimental governance and Pirate Utopias structures evolved by online communities. -
No Regulation, Government Regulation, Or Self-Regulation
Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy Volume 6 Article 1 Issue 3 Spring 1997 No Regulation, Government Regulation, or Self- Regulation: Social Enforcement or Social Contracting for Governance in Cyberspace Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cjlpp Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Gibbons, Llewellyn Joseph (1997) "No Regulation, Government Regulation, or Self-Regulation: Social Enforcement or Social Contracting for Governance in Cyberspace," Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy: Vol. 6: Iss. 3, Article 1. Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cjlpp/vol6/iss3/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. NO REGULATION, GOVERNMENT REGULATION, OR SELF-REGULATION: SOCIAL ENFORCEMENT OR SOCIAL CONTRACTING FOR GOVERNANCE IN CYBERSPACE Llewellyn Joseph Gibbonst I DIDN'T READ AL.LOF THE APPARENTLY I AGREED TO AE.6 rMur SHRiNK-WRAP LICENSE E. 10 SPEND THE REST OF HE OPENE DANGEROUS AGREEMENT ON M,\YNEW II MY LIFE AS A "TOWEL I SOFTWARE FOP, LAWYERS SOFTWARE. UNTL AFTER BOY IN BILL GATES' STERDAY. TO IRON PANMt I OPENED 1T. NEW MANSION. I NOLO HE'S THEY'DALC'AS KLAUNRrCALL7OUR) "IWSAE ONE ) -- LAWdYER. ) N~ HAN) INk BOY. POCKET. Reprinted with permission. I. INTRODUCTION "Cyberians"' are present at the creation of the jurisdiction of cyber- space and at the closing of the electronic frontier.2 The concept of the f Assistant Professor, University of Orlando School of Law. -
The Internet Is a Semicommons
Fordham Law Review Volume 78 Issue 6 Article 5 2010 The Internet is a Semicommons James Grimmelmann Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation James Grimmelmann, The Internet is a Semicommons, 78 Fordham L. Rev. 2799 (2010). Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol78/iss6/5 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Internet is a Semicommons Cover Page Footnote Associate Professor, New York Law School. My thanks for their comments to Jack Balkin, Shyam Balganesh, Aislinn Black, Anne Chen, Matt Haughey, Amy Kapczynski, David Krinsky, Jonathon Penney, Chris Riley, Henry Smith, Jessamyn West, and Steven Wu. I presented earlier versions of this essay at the Commons Theory Workshop for Young Scholars (Max Planck Institute for the Study of Collective Goods), the 2007 IP Scholars conference, the 2007 Telecommunications Policy Research Conference, and the December 2009 Symposium at Fordham Law School on David Post’s and Jonathan Zittrain’s books. This essay may be freely reused under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 United States license, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/us/. This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol78/iss6/5 THE INTERNET IS A SEMICOMMONS James Grimmelmann* I. -
The Law and Economics of Internet Norms1
Internet Norms DRAFT The Law and Economics of Internet Norms1 Mark A. Lemley2 Private ordering is in vogue in legal scholarship. Nowhere is this clearer than on the Internet. Legal scholars who study the Internet talk freely about new forms of governance tailored to the specific needs of the Net. Only rarely are these "governance" models ones that involve a significant role for government as classically envisioned. Some scholars see international law, with its emphasis on political and moral suasion rather than legal authority, as the appropriate way to govern what is, after all, an international phenomenon.3 Many others, though, look to contracts as the preferred model for 1 Copyright 1999 Mark A. Lemley. 2 Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law; of counsel, Fish & Richardson P.C., Austin, Texas. Visiting Professor, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California at Berkeley (Fall 1998). I would like to thank Keith Aoki, Julie Cohen, Dick Craswell, Susan Freiwald, Rose Hagan, Larry Lessig, David McGowan, Peggy Radin, Arti Rai, Jason Schultz and Eugene Volokh for comments on an earlier draft, the participants in the Chicago-Kent symposium on the Internet and Legal Theory and law and economics workshops at the Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California at Berkeley, the Stanford Law School, and the USC Law Center for helping me to hone these ideas, and Ryan Garcia for research assistance. 33 See, e.g., Matthew R. Burnstein, Note, Conflicts on the Net: Choice of Law in Transnational Cyberspace, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 75 (1996); Sean Selin, Governing Cyberspace: The Need for an International Solution, 32 GONZ. -
Hawaiian Telcom Terms of Service & Acceptable Use Policy
Hawaiian Telcom Terms of Service & Acceptable Use Policy Hawaiian Telcom Terms Of Service And Acceptable Use Policy WELCOME TO HAWAIIAN TELCOM THESE TERMS AND CONDITIONS CONTAIN IMPORTANT REQUIREMENTS REGARDING YOUR USE OF HAWAIIAN TELCOM'S DIALUP AND HIGH SPEED INTERNET ACCESS SERVICE AND YOUR RELATIONSHIP WITH HAWAIIAN TELCOM AND ITS THIRD PARTY SUPPLIERS. READ THEM CAREFULLY AS THEY CONTAIN IMPORTANT INFORMATION REGARDING YOUR RIGHTS AS WELL AS THOSE OF HAWAIIAN TELCOM. IF YOU DO NOT AGREE TO THESE TERMS AND CONDITIONS, YOU MAY NOT USE THE SERVICE AND YOU MUST TERMINATE YOUR SERVICE IMMEDIATELY. 1. These Terms of Service (the "Agreement") are entered into by and between the subscriber ("you", "your", or "Subscriber") and Hawaiian Telcom Services Company, Inc. or its affiliate providers as defined in Appendix A of this Agreement ("Hawaiian Telcom", "us" or "we"). The Agreement includes any Service Quotation(s) ("Quotation") provided to you. The Agreement sets forth the terms and conditions under which you agree to use the Service, and under which Hawaiian Telcom agrees to provide the Service to you. Acceptance of this Agreement. You are deemed to have accepted this Agreement upon the earlier of: (a) your submission of an online order; (b) your accepting the Terms of Service electronically during registration or in the course of installing the Software (see Paragraph 4) or the Equipment (see Paragraph 2); (c) your use of the Service (see Paragraph 2); or (d) your retention of the Software or Equipment we provide beyond 30 days following delivery. This Agreement is made up of the terms below, including all Acceptable Use, Privacy, Civil Subpoena, Newsgroups, Website Use, Email, Alias, Anti- Spam, Security and other policies as listed in the Appendices to this Agreement and the other policies and materials specifically referred to in these Terms of Service. -
Download Chapter
TThhee DDeeffiinniittiivvee GGuuiiddeett m mTToo Email Management and Security Kevin Beaver Chapter 3 Chapter 3: Understanding and Preventing Spam...........................................................................44 What’s the Big Deal about Spam?.................................................................................................45 Scary Spam Statistics.........................................................................................................46 Example Estimated Cost of Spam......................................................................................46 Additional Spam Costs ......................................................................................................47 Unintended Side Effects ....................................................................................................47 Security Implications of Spam...........................................................................................48 What’s in it for Spammers? ...........................................................................................................48 Spam Laws.....................................................................................................................................49 State Anti-Spam Laws .......................................................................................................50 Tricks Spammers Use ....................................................................................................................51 Identifying Spam................................................................................................................52 -
INM 2014 Course Notes
Internet and New Media Course Notes Version of 03 Nov 2014 Ao.Univ.-Prof. Dr. Keith Andrews IICM Graz University of Technology Inffeldgasse 16c A-8010 Graz [email protected] Copyright 2014 Keith Andrews. Contents Contents iii List of Figures vii List of Tables ix List of Listings xi Preface xiii Credits xv 1 Introducing the Internet1 1.1 Internet Statistics . .3 1.2 Internet FAQs (Frequently Asked Questions) . 14 1.3 Warriors of the Net . 20 2 Newsgroups 25 2.1 Usenet News . 26 2.2 Character Encodings and Plain Text . 31 2.3 Configuring Your News Reader . 40 2.4 Netiquette . 47 3 Electronic Mail 57 3.1 Starting with Email . 57 3.2 Different Kinds of Email Access . 59 3.3 Configuring Your Email Reader . 61 3.4 Using Email . 62 3.5 Securing Your Email . 69 4 Searching and Researching 73 4.1 Searching The Web . 74 4.2 Academic Research . 77 4.3 Browser Search Hacks . 79 4.4 Desktop Search . 80 i 5 Plagiarism and Copyright 81 5.1 Academic Integrity . 83 5.2 Copyright Law . 84 5.3 Quoting Text . 86 5.4 A Worked Example . 88 5.5 Quoting Images . 90 5.6 Plagiarism Policy and Consequences . 90 5.7 Breaches of Copyright . 90 6 Getting Connected 93 6.1 Hooking Up . 94 6.2 Types of Internet Connection . 96 6.3 How the Internet Works . 104 7 Staying Safe 113 7.1 The Bad Guys . 114 7.2 Privacy . 115 7.3 Prevention is Better than Cure . 116 8 File Transfer 129 9 The Web 133 9.1 The World Wide Web . -
The Law and Economics of Internet Norms
Chicago-Kent Law Review Volume 73 Issue 4 Symposium on the Internet and Legal Article 12 Theory October 1998 The Law and Economics of Internet Norms Mark A. Lemley Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Mark A. Lemley, The Law and Economics of Internet Norms, 73 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1257 (1998). Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol73/iss4/12 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact [email protected], [email protected]. THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF INTERNET NORMS MARK A. LEMLEY* INTRO D U CTION ..................................................................................... 1257 I. ARGUMENTS FOR NORMS IN INTERNET LAW ........................ 1261 II. PROBLEMS WITH ENFORCING INTERNET NORMS ................. 1266 A. Norms Change Over Time .................................................. 1267 B. Internet Norms Won't Be Understood or Followed ......... 1270 C. Norms Do Not Adequately Account for Externalities..... 1277 D. Network Effects and StandardizationMake Exclusionary Norms Undesirable...................................... 1281 E. Who Will Enforce the Norms, and How? ......................... 1284 1. N et Vigilantes ............................................................... -
Regulating Spams on the Internet 15Th BILETA Conference: “ELECTRONIC DATASETS and ACCESS to LEGAL INFORMATION”
Regulating Spams on the Internet Page 1 of 10 15th BILETA Conference: “ELECTRONIC DATASETS AND ACCESS TO LEGAL INFORMATION”. Friday 14th April 2000. University of Warwick, Coventry, England. Regulating Spams on the Internet Wye-Keen Khong Cyberlaw Centre, Faculty of Management Multimedia University Cyberjaya, Malaysia ABSTRACT This paper briefly surveys the movement to regulate spams or unsolicited commercial emails on the Internet. It discusses the history of spam, definition of spam, and identifies parties fighting spam. Also, it examines legislative efforts to regulate spam and the various schemes and mechanisms employed. KEYWORDS Spam; Unsolicited Commercial Email; Unsolicited Bulk Email. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SPAM Spam is a US trade mark for a canned meat product from Hormel Foods. In Internet lingo, `spam' refers to the mass mailing of unsolicited advertisement through electronic means. The Net Abuse FAQ ( Southwick & Falk, 1998) provides a fairly detailed description of the origin of this word. The word `spam' is commonly ascribed to a skit performed on the British television show Month Python's Flying Circus, in which the word `spam' is repeated to the point of absurdity in a restaurant menu ( CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc. and Sanford Wallace, 1997). Its usage on the Internet is rumoured to have originated from the MUD/MUSH community where one of the users assigned a keyboard macro to the line "SPAM SPAM SPAM SPAM SPAM SPAM SPAM SPAM SPAM SPAM SPAM SPAM SPAM SPAM" and proceeded to send it to the MUD once every couple of second ( Southwick & Falk, 1998). This incident apparently ingrained in the memory of the MUD users and the act was known as `spamming'. -
Das-Lexikon-Der-Internetpioniere.Pdf
Das Lexikon der Internetpioniere © Helmut Neumann Heitmannskamp 24 24220 Flintbek [email protected] 1 Vorwort Das Internet: Das gesamte Wissen der Menschheit auf dem Schreibtisch, ein riesiger Misthaufen oder ein gigantisches Kaufhaus? Die Ansichten sind verschieden. Doch eigentlich ist das Netz, von dem am Ende des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts alle reden, gar nicht das Internet. Es ist nur ein Teil davon ,das World Wide Web. Dort findet sich die Homepage von Lieschen Müller neben der von Bill Gates oder des Präsidenten der Vereinigten Staaten. Der Tante Emma Laden um die Ecke tritt in den Wettbewerb mit weltweit agierenden Unternehmen. Doch wer sind die Menschen, die all dies möglich gemacht haben? Wer erstellte das gigantische Netzwerk und wer hatte die Idee, es kommerziell zu nutzen? Das sind die Fragen, denen dieses Lexikon auf den Grund zu gehen versucht, was allerdings bei einem sich so rasant entwickelnden Medium - man spricht inzwischen davon, daß ein Jahr in der realen Welt sieben Internetjahren entspricht - seine Tücken hat; denn die Geschichte des Netzes ist kaum dokumentiert. Zwar sind die Schöpfer des ßßß ARPANET , das gemeinhin als Keimzelle des Internet betrachtet wird, bekannt, doch all jene, die an Forschungsinstituten, Universitäten und anderswo eigene Netzwerke errichteten oder Mailboxsysteme aufbauten, bleiben weithin im Dunkeln. Sie und ihre Zeitgenossen wußten ja nicht, daß sie an einem Jahrhundertwerk mitarbeiteten, auch sind viele ihrer Projekte inzwischen fast spurlos verschwunden. Von einigen dieser Pioniere sind zwar die Namen bekannt, wie zum Beispiel die der Amerikaner Marshall Rose und Lauren Weinstein, beziehungsweise aus Deutschland Dr. Peter vom ßßß DFN und Günter Leue, der mit seinem "Geo-Net" seiner Zeit voraus war. -
Cyberspace Self-Governance: a Skeptical View from Liberal Democratic Theory
Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical View from Liberal Democratic Theory Neil Weinstock Netanelt TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction ...............................................................................................398 I. Liberal Democracy ............................................................................. 407 II. The Cyberian Claim of Liberal Perfection ......................................... 410 A. Cyberpopulism ............................................................................ 412 1. The Cyberpopulist Claim ...................................................... 412 2. Critique of the Cyberpopulist Claim .................................... 415 a. The Populist Mischaracterization ................................... 415 b. Popular Will ................................................................... 416 i. Plebiscites Inadequately Reflect Popular W ill .......................................................................... 417 ii. Representative Government May Better Reflect Popular Will ................................................ 419 c. Tyranny of the Majority ................................................ 421 i. Unanimous Consent ................................................ 422 ii. Ease of Exit .............................................................. 425 d. Summary (and Caveat) ................................................... 427 B. Cybersyndicalism ........................................................................ 427 1. The Cybersyndicalist Claim ...............................................