Medieval Worlds Comparative & Interdisciplinary Studies
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medieval worlds comparative & interdisciplinary studies No. 2/2015 medieval worlds comparative & interdisciplinary studies medieval worlds comparative & interdisciplinary studies Volume 2015.2 Empires Elements of Cohesion and Signs of Decay medieval worlds comparative & interdisciplinary studies The journal is funded by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) project OAJ-52. All rights reserved ISSN 2412-3196 Online Edition Media Owner: Institute for Medieval Research Copyright © 2015 by Austrian Academy of Sciences, Vienna Cover design, layout: Anneke Gerloff Austrian Academy of Sciences Press A-1011 Wien, Postfach 471, Postgasse 7/4 Tel. +43-1-515 81/DW 3402-3406, +43-1-512 9050 Fax +43-1-515 81/DW 3400 http://hw.oeaw.ac.at, http://verlag.oeaw.ac.at Editors Walter Pohl, Austrian Academy of Sciences/University of Vienna Andre Gingrich, Austrian Academy of Sciences/University of Vienna Editorial Board Maximilian Diesenberger, Austrian Academy of Sciences Bert Fragner, Austrian Academy of Sciences Christian Gastgeber, Austrian Academy of Sciences Johann Heiß, Austrian Academy of Sciences Claudia Rapp, Austrian Academy of Sciences/University of Vienna Irene van Renswoude, Huygens Institute for the History of the Netherlands/ Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences Pavlína Rychterová, Austrian Academy of Sciences Veronika Wieser, Austrian Academy of Sciences International Advisory Board Glenn Bowman , University of Kent Sabrina Corbellini, University of Groningen Mayke de Jong, Utrecht University Nicola di Cosmo, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton Stefan Esders, Free University of Berlin Patrick Geary, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton John Haldon, Princeton University William C. Jordan, Princeton University Osamu Kano, Nagoya University Birgit Kellner, Heidelberg University Hugh Kennedy, SOAS, University of London Gábor Klaniczay, Central European University Lars Boje Mortensen, University of Southern Denmark Elisabeth Lambourn, De Montfort University Leicester Eduardo Manzano, Centro de Ciencias Humanas y Sociales (CSIC) Helmut Reimitz, Princeton University Marina Rustow, John Hopkins University Dittmar Schorkowitz, Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology Teresa Shawcross, Princeton University Naomi Standen, University of Birmingham John Tolan, University of Nantes Przemysław Urbańczyk, Polish Academy of Sciences Dan Varisco, Qatar University Luo Xin, Peking University Editorial Assistant Celine Wawruschka Homepage www.medievalworlds.net Table of Contents Walter Pohl Editor’s Introduction: Empires – Elements of Cohesion and Signs of Decay 2 Mayke de Jong The Empire that was always Decaying: The Carolingians (800-888) 6 Simon MacLean Cross-Channel Marriage and Royal Succession in the Age of Charles the Simple and Athelstan (c. 916-936) 26 Andrew J. Newman ›Great Men‹, ›Decline‹ and Empire: Safavid Studies and a Way Forward? 45 Jeroen Duindam Dynasties 59 Susan Reynolds Nations, Tribes, Peoples, and States 79 Glenn Bowman Lieux Saints Partagés: An Analytical Review 89 Ongoing Research Project Johannes Preiser-Kapeller Calculating the Middle Ages? The Project »Complexities and Networks in the Medieval Mediterranean and Near East« (COMMED) 100 medieval worlds • No. 2 • 2015 Editor’s Introduction: Empires – Elements of Cohesion and Signs of Decay Walter Pohl The first issue of Medieval Worlds (1/2015) has provided a broad overview of ›Approaches to Comparison‹ and of interdisciplinary projects being pursued in that context. This, the second issue, departs from a more focused thematic frame for comparison, the decay of empires. The comparison of empires has emerged as one of the most productive strands in today’s compar- ative and global history. Mayke de Jong reminds us in her contribution to the present issue that this is a relatively recent research interest. It emerged as a key topic in the 1990s, after the swift fall of the Soviet Empire and at the moment when the US seemed to reach unchal- lenged worldwide hegemony. The focus was both on modern and on ancient empires, especi- ally on Rome and China.1 In medieval studies the topic was less prominent. That was not least because medieval European empires raised major problem of definition: when and to what degree were Byzantium and the Holy Roman Empire ›empires‹? And which of the European steppe ›empires‹, those of the Huns, Avars, Bulgars, Magyars, Chasars or the Golden Horde, could confidently be defined as such? However, the fates of numerous Asian empires provide ample opportunities for wide-ranging comparison. What medieval Europe can add to the debate consists primarily of examples of self-styled ›empires‹ in a state of tension between imperial pretences and limited means, more often than not in a defensive mode – were these empires in decay? However, the notion of decay may to some extent be a modern projection, inspired by the implicit comparison with the much better means that modern empires had at their disposal. If we define ›empires‹ in terms of direct control of their populations and territories, pre-modern empires and states usually pose problems of definition, although they all have their moments of glory. Yet what modern scholars have often interpreted as signs of decay does not necessarily indicate ›failed empires‹. As Jürgen Osterhammel has argued, historical empires typically were rather weak states and left much of the direct rule to regional or ethnic units.2 If we look at the social whole and the way in which empire is embedded in it, we can spot many ways in which ›society in the imperial mode‹ remained robust and creative although an expansive political dynamic had long stopped. Therefore, rather than imposing modernity-based definitions on pre-modern empires, it may be worthwhile to historicize our concepts and to measure the success of imperial ›visions of community‹ also by the standards of their own times.3 Some of the contributions assembled here address this problem head-on, for instance, in the cases of the Carolingian and the Safavid empires. Both Mayke de Jong’s and Andrew New- 1 See, for instance, Morris and Scheidel, Dynamics of Ancient Empires; Scheidel, Rome and China. Comparative Per- spectives; Burbank and Cooper, Empires in World History; Fibiger Bang and Kołodziejczyk, Universal Empire; Gehler and Rollinger, Imperien und Reiche in der Weltgeschichte. 2 Osterhammel, China und die Weltgesellschaft, 69-85. 3 Pohl, Introduction; cf. Pohl et al., Visions of Community. eISSN-Nr. 2412-3196 DOI 10.1553/medievalworlds_no2_2015s2 medieval worlds • No. 2 • 2015 • 2-5 3 Walter Pohl man’s contributions challenge established notions that both empires experienced extended phases of decay, or indeed, little but decay. According to received opinion, the Carolingian empire had been in decline almost since Charlemagne was crowned emperor in Rome in 800 CE, and until the dynasty lost its last power bases and the imperial title was discontinued about a century later. However, as de Jong argues, this raises two fundamental questions: do we define empire by the imperial title, or by the imperial range of expansion and dominion that had started well before 800? And as to the topic of decay, by what standards do we measure the success or failure of empires? Signs of subsiding expansive dynamic and inner conflict may not be sufficient to diagnose pervasive decline. Andrew Newman forcefully pro- poses a very similar argument about Safavid Iran in the seventeenth century. One striking common feature in both cases is the increasing influence of – Christian/Shi’ite – clerics and a conspicuous wealth of religious texts. In modern historiography, that has quite naturally been taken as proof of decline, whereas the extension and impact of intellectual and cultural production in the Frankish ninth and the Iranian seventeenth centuries have hardly been acknowledged. In both worlds, a still momentous imperial framework facilitated the creation of fundamental features of medieval Latin Europe, and of the modern Iranian state. Already in the 1970s, Peter Brown and others made similar points about the later Roman Empire.4 Simon McLean supplements de Jong’s argument with a study of marriage alliances in the post-imperial West in the early tenth century. Even though power politics had now assumed a much more regional flavour, the imperial past continued to provide important resources for those who were skilful enough to handle them. Carolingian memories could supply ele- ments of political cohesion, as long as they were not used to bolster exaggerated pretensions that inevitably rouse adversity. Throughout the Western Middle Ages, imperial modes of re- presentation remained a valuable symbolic asset and a familiar political idiom, which could inspire high hopes but rarely fulfill them. The Holy Roman Empire remained a grandiose construction, but its actual power hardly ever corresponded to modern definitions of empire. Thus, the modern European nations all carry their legacy of imperial ambitions and gestures, but at the same time the relatively stable national landscape of medieval Europe prevented the establishment of a powerful new empire.5 Other contributions in this volume explore a somewhat wider range of phenomena connected to elements of cohesion of states and empires. Jeroen Duindam offers a fascinat- ingly rich panorama of the workings of dynasty in late medieval and early modern Eurasia and Africa, showing, among other things, that dynastic rhythms do not necessarily coincide with the dynamics of empire. Dynastic rule allowed both for a concentration