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Rhétorique Et Cognition / Rhetoric and Cognition, 2014 112 Ce volume met l’accent sur le lien entre démarches cognitives et art du discours qui a toujours été un des enjeux de la rhétorique. Les contributions réunies dans le présent ouvrage n’ajoutent pas une nouvelle couche à l’examen critique des sophismes : en effet elles n’ont pas pour but de dénoncer, mais de décrire le fonctionnement et les effets cognitifs hic et nunc de schèmes argumentatifs susceptibles d’apparaître comme fallacieux. Quels sont les mécanismes qui expliquent la «performance» des arguments réputés fal- lacieux? Comment fonctionnent les stratégies rhétoriques à l’intersection entre cognition, sciences du langage et société? This volume gathers contributions from two disciplines which have much Rhétorique et cognition to gain from one another – rhetoric and cognitive science – as they both have much to say in the broad realm of argumentation studies. This collec- tion neither condemns the fallacious effects of specific argument schemes Rhetoric and Cognition nor adds yet another layer to fallacy criticism, but studies how argumenta- tion and fallacies work, hic et nunc. What are the linguistic and cognitive mechanisms behind the «performance » of fallacious arguments? How do rhetorical strategies work at the interface of cognition, language science and et cognition Rhétorique Rhetoric and Cognition Perspectives théoriques et stratégies persuasives society? Theoretical Perspectives and Persuasive Strategies Thierry Herman is a senior lecturer at the Universities of Neuchâtel and Lausanne. Trained in textual linguistics and discourse analysis, his research con- cerns the use of rhetorical techniques in political, media and academic discourse. Founding member of the Collectif Romand de Recherches en Argumentation (CoRReA), he is interested in the linguistic form of argumentative schemes and Thierry Herman et Steve Oswald (éds) their persuasive effects. Steve Oswald is a postdoctoral fellow at the Universities of Fribourg and Neuchâtel. His dissertation (2010, University of Neuchâtel) investigated unco- operative and manipulative communication. His current research explores the interface between linguistic pragmatics, argumentation, discourse analysis and cognitive science. He is also a founding member of the CoRReA and he studies Thierry Herman Oswald et Steve (éds) the relationship between fallacious argumentation and its cognitive counterpart for the elaboration of a cognitive account of rhetoric. ISBN 978-3-0343-1547-0 Peter LangPeter Peter Lang www.peterlang.com 112 Ce volume met l’accent sur le lien entre démarches cognitives et art du discours qui a toujours été un des enjeux de la rhétorique. Les contributions réunies dans le présent ouvrage n’ajoutent pas une nouvelle couche à l’examen critique des sophismes : en effet elles n’ont pas pour but de dénoncer, mais de décrire le fonctionnement et les effets cognitifs hic et nunc de schèmes argumentatifs susceptibles d’apparaître comme fallacieux. Quels sont les mécanismes qui expliquent la «performance» des arguments réputés fal- lacieux? Comment fonctionnent les stratégies rhétoriques à l’intersection entre cognition, sciences du langage et société? This volume gathers contributions from two disciplines which have much Rhétorique et cognition to gain from one another – rhetoric and cognitive science – as they both have much to say in the broad realm of argumentation studies. This collec- tion neither condemns the fallacious effects of specific argument schemes Rhetoric and Cognition nor adds yet another layer to fallacy criticism, but studies how argumenta- tion and fallacies work, hic et nunc. What are the linguistic and cognitive mechanisms behind the «performance » of fallacious arguments? How do rhetorical strategies work at the interface of cognition, language science and et cognition Rhétorique Rhetoric and Cognition Perspectives théoriques et stratégies persuasives society? Theoretical Perspectives and Persuasive Strategies Thierry Herman is a senior lecturer at the Universities of Neuchâtel and Lausanne. Trained in textual linguistics and discourse analysis, his research con- cerns the use of rhetorical techniques in political, media and academic discourse. Founding member of the Collectif Romand de Recherches en Argumentation (CoRReA), he is interested in the linguistic form of argumentative schemes and Thierry Herman et Steve Oswald (éds) their persuasive effects. Steve Oswald is a postdoctoral fellow at the Universities of Fribourg and Neuchâtel. His dissertation (2010, University of Neuchâtel) investigated unco- operative and manipulative communication. His current research explores the interface between linguistic pragmatics, argumentation, discourse analysis and cognitive science. He is also a founding member of the CoRReA and he studies Thierry Herman Oswald et Steve (éds) the relationship between fallacious argumentation and its cognitive counterpart for the elaboration of a cognitive account of rhetoric. Peter LangPeter Peter Lang Rhétorique et cognition Rhetoric and Cognition Sciences pour la communication Vol. 112 Comité scientifique D. Apothéloz, Université de Nancy 2 J.-P. Bronckart, Université de Genève P. Chilton, Université de Lancaster W. De Mulder, Université d’Anvers J.-P. Desclés, Université Paris-Sorbonne F.H. van Eemeren, Université d’Amsterdam V. Escandell-Vidal, UNED, Madrid F. Gadet, Université de Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense J.-M. Marandin, CNRS et Université Paris-Diderot F. Martineau, Université d’Ottawa M. Milton Campos, Université de Montréal J. Rouault, Université Stendhal (Grenoble 3) Les ouvrages publiés dans cette collection ont été sélectionnés par les soins du comité éditorial, après révision par les pairs. Collection publiée sous la direction de Marie-José Béguelin, Alain Berrendonner, Didier Maillat et Louis de Saussure Thierry Herman et Steve Oswald (éds) Rhétorique et cognition Rhetoric and Cognition Perspectives théoriques et stratégies persuasives Theoretical Perspectives and Persuasive Strategies PETER LANG Bern • Berlin • Bruxelles • Frankfurt am Main • New York • Oxford • Wien Information bibliographique publiée par «Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek» «Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek» répertorie cette publication dans la «Deutsche National- bibliografie»; les données bibliographiques détaillées sont disponibles sur Internet sous ‹http://dnb.d-nb.de›. Publié avec le soutien du Fonds national suisse de la recherche scientifique dans le cadre du projet pilote OAPEN-CH Ouvrage publié avec le soutien de la Faculté des lettres et sciences humaines de l’Université de Neuchâtel Graphic: Atelier 4b, Sandra Meyer ISBN 978-3-0343-1547-0 pb. ISBN 978-3-0352-0271-7 PDF ISSN 0933-6079 pb. ISSN 2235-7505 PDF DOI 10.3726/b10582 ISBN 978-3-0351-9541-5 EPUB ISBN 978-3-0351-9540-8 MOBI This book is an open access book and available on www.oapen.org and www.peterlang.com. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial- NoDerivs 4.0 which means that the text may be used for non-commercial purposes, provided credit is given to the autor. For details go to http://creativecommons.org/ licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ © Peter Lang SA, Editions scientifiques internationales, Berne 2014 Wabernstrasse 40, CH-3007 Berne, Suisse [email protected], www.peterlang.com Remerciements Nous tenons à remercier ici Pauline Dubosson pour son aide précieuse dans le travail de mise en forme de ce volume. Thierry Herman tient en particulier à remercier Steve Oswald de lui avoir proposé ce projet et de l’avoir coordonné de manière impeccable dans une atmosphère de travail très agréable. Table des matières / Contents Remerciements ....................................................................................................... V Table des matières / Contents ......................................................................... VII Introduction ............................................................................................................ 1 Thierry HERMAN & Steve OSWALD La vigilance épistémique ..................................................................................... 21 Dan SPERBER, Fabrice CLÉMENT, Christophe HEINTZ, Olivier MASCARO, Hugo MERCIER, Gloria ORIGGI & Deirdre WILSON Manipulation et cognition: un modèle pragmatique ....................................... 69 Didier MAILLAT Biased argumentation and critical thinking ...................................................... 89 Vasco CORREIA Vers une naturalisation de la rhétorique? Problèmes épistémologiques ... 111 Emmanuelle DANBLON A case for emotion awareness .......................................................................... 129 Evgenia PAPAROUNI L’argument d’autorité: de sa structure à ses effets ........................................ 153 Thierry HERMAN Argumentation from expert opinion in science journalism: The case of Eureka’s Fight Club ...................................................................... 185 Sara GRECO MORASSO & Carlo MORASSO Two-sided rhetorical strategies in top management’s letters to shareholders and stakeholders from corporate reports ........................... 215 Ioana Agatha FILIMON Presupposing redefinitions ............................................................................... 249 Fabrizio MACAGNO Présuppositions discursives, assertion d’arrière-plan et persuasion ........... 279 Louis de SAUSSURE Pragmatics, cognitive heuristics and the straw man fallacy ......................... 313 Steve OSWALD & Marcin LEWIĽSKI Résumés / Abstracts .........................................................................................
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