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Israel and Syria: the Military Balance and Prospects Of Center for Strategic and International Studies Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy 1800 K Street, N.W. • Suite 400 • Washington, DC 20006 Phone: 1 (202) 775 -3270 • Fax: 1 (202) 457 -8746 Web: www.csis.org/burke Israel and Syria: The Military Balance and Prospects of War Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy [email protected] With the Assistance of Ion ut C. Popescu Working Draft, Revised: August 15, 2007 Please note that this document is a working draft and will be revised regularly. To comment, or to provide suggestions and corrections, please e -mail the author at [email protected] . 2006 © All Rights Reserved to the CSIS. All further dissemination and reproduction must be done with the written permission of the author. Cordesman: Syrian -Israeli Military Balance 8/15/07 Page ii Table of Conte nts I. PROSPECTS FOR WAR ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ ........ 8 THE GOLAN : RECENT MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS AND THE PROSPECTS OF WAR ................................ ...................... 8 Shifts on the Golan ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ ............... 9 A Growing Missile Threat? ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ 10 Israeli Activity on the Golan ................................ ................................ ................................ .............................. 11 ALARMS AND EXCURSIONS ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 11 THE PROSPECTS FOR WAR ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 12 II. MAJOR TRENDS IN FORCE STRENGTH ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 14 ISRAELI FORCE QUALITY VERSUS SYRIAN FORCE QUANTITY ................................ ................................ .................. 14 LOOKING AT A SNAPSHOT OF TOTAL FORCES ................................ ................................ ................................ .......... 14 COMPARATIVE MANPOWER QUANTITY AND QUALITY ................................ ................................ ............................ 23 III. COMPARATIVE LAN D FORC E STRENGTH ................................ ................................ .............................. 27 COMPARATIVE LAND FORCE MANPOWER ................................ ................................ ................................ ............... 27 VARYING MIXES OF ARMOR AND ANTI -TANK WEAPONS ................................ ................................ ........................ 27 VARYING MIXES OF ARTILLERY AND ANTI -AIRCRAFT WEAPONS ................................ ................................ ........... 29 IV. COMPARATIVE AIR STRENGTH: QUALITY OV ER QUANTITY ................................ ......................... 43 COMPARATIVE AIR FORCE STRENGTH ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................... 43 COMPARATIVE LAND -BASED AIR DEFENSE FORCES ................................ ................................ ............................... 44 V. COMPARATIVE NAVAL S TRENGTH: PERIPHERAL MISSIONS ................................ ........................... 53 VI. TOTAL RESOURCES: RECAPITALIZATION, F ORCE MODERNIZATION, AND IMPACT ON EFFECTIVENESS ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ .................... 57 COMPARATIVE TRENDS IN MILITARY EXPENDITURES ................................ ................................ ............................. 57 COMPARATIVE TRENDS IN ARMS IMPORTS ................................ ................................ ................................ .............. 62 Recent Deals: The Importance of US and Iran ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 63 VII. THE MILITARY FO RCES OF ISRAEL ................................ ................................ ................................ ........ 70 ASYMMETRIC WARS OF ATTRITION ................................ ................................ ................................ ......................... 71 THE THREAT FROM PROLIFERATION ................................ ................................ ................................ ........................ 72 SHIFTING FROM A CONVENTIONAL TO ASYMMETRIC “E DGE ”................................ ................................ ................. 76 ADAPTING WHILE RETAINING CONVENTIONAL MILITARY STRENGTHS ................................ ................................ .. 77 TRENDS IN MANPOWER AND TOTAL FORCE STRENGTH : ACTIVE VERSUS RESERVE FORCES ................................ ... 78 The “Kela 2008 Plan” ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 79 Kushet (Rainbow) Plan ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 80 ISRAELI DEFENSE PLANNING AFTER THE 2006 LEBANON WAR ................................ ................................ .............. 81 ISRAELI LAND FORCES ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 86 Land Force Transformation ................................ ................................ ................................ ............................... 86 Command and Control Changes ................................ ................................ ................................ ........................ 87 Main Battle Tanks ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ .............. 88 Ot her Armor ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ ....................... 90 Anti -Tank Weapons ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 91 Uparmoring Lighter Vehicles and Support Forces ................................ ................................ ............................ 91 Artillery Forces ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ .................. 92 Asymmetric Warfare Capabilities ................................ ................................ ................................ ...................... 93 Other Aspects of Land Force Development ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 94 ISRAELI AIR FORCES ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ ................ 99 Modern Air Operations Are Joint Operations ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 99 Air Defense and Air -to -Air Com bat Capability ................................ ................................ ............................... 101 2006 © All Rights Reserved to the CSIS. All further dissemination and reproduction must be done with the written permission of the autho r. Cordesman: Syrian -Israeli Military Balance 8/15/07 Page iii Air Offense and Air -to -Ground Combat Capability ................................ ................................ ......................... 101 IAF Readiness and Training Standards ................................ ................................ ................................ ........... 103 Current Superiority and Future Challenges ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 103 ISRAELI LAND -BASED AIR DEFENSES ................................ ................................ ................................ ................... 108 C4I/BM and Sensor Systems ................................ ................................ ................................ ............................. 109 Short -Range Air Defense Systems (SHORADS) ................................ ................................ ............................... 109 Readiness and Effectiveness ................................ ................................ ................................ ............................. 110 ISRAELI NAVAL FORCES ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ ........ 112 Surface Fleet Developments ................................ ................................ ................................ ............................. 112 Smaller Surface Ships ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 113 Submarine Forces ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ ...........
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