Iniciati Peace Initiatives and Colombia´S Armed Conflict
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CONFLICTO ARMADO E INICIATIVAS DE PAZ EN COLOMBIA DE PAZ ARMADO E INICIATIVAS CONFLICTO CUADERNOS DEL CONFLICTO CUADERNOS DEL CONFLICTO PEACE INITIATIVES AND CONFLICTO ARMADO E COLOMBIA´S ARMED CONFLICT INICIATIVAS DE PAZ EN COLOMBIA Aldo Civico Aldo Civico Román D. Ortiz Román D. Ortiz Father Darío Antonio Echeverri Padre Darío Antonio Echeverri Rodrigo Pardo Rodrigo Pardo Eduardo González Eduardo González Javier Ciurlizza Javier Ciurlizza María Teresa Ronderos María Teresa Ronderos Juan Carlos Garzón Juan Carlos Garzón Jeremy McDermott Jeremy McDermott Edited by Editado por Cynthia J. Arnson Cynthia J. Arnson December 2009 Maria Victoria Llorente Diciembre 2009 Maria Victoria Llorente PEACE INITIATIVES AND COLOMBIA´S ARMED CONFLICT INITIATIVES PEACE CUADERNOS DEL CONFLICTO PEACE INITIATIVES AND COLOMBIA´S ARMED CONFLICT CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS PREFACE INTRODUCTION I IN SEARCH OF PEACE WITH THE ELN AND THE FARC Aldo Civico, Center for International Conflict Resolution, Columbia University Román D. Ortiz, Independent consultant in security and defense Father Darío Antonio Echeverri González, National Reconciliation Commission Rodrigo Pardo, Cambio Magazine Eduardo González, Office of the High Commissioner for Peace II PARAMILITARY GROUPS: DEMOBILIZATION, REARMAMENT, AND REINVENTION Javier Ciurlizza, American Program, International Center for Transitional Justice, ICTJ Fundación Ideas para la Paz María Teresa Ronderos, Semana.com Woodrow Wilson Juan Carlos Garzón, Organization of American States, OAS International Center for Scholars Jeremy McDermott, BBC Correspondent Edited by, Cynthia J. Arnson Maria Victoria Llorente BIOGRAPHIES ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The Latin American Program Woodrow Wilson Cen- ter and Ideas para la Paz Foundation (FIP) would like to thank the Ford Foundation for their support in devel- oping the conference Peace Initiatives in Colombia’s Armed Conflict, as well as this publication is the result of that meeting which took place on 3 April 2008 in Wash- ington. Similarly, we recognize the contributions of Adam Stubits team member of the Latin American Program, who helped with editing the text in English, Diana Rodri- guez, formerly of the Wilson Center’s Mexico Institute, who provided all their help with the organization of event; Carey Carpenter and Nikki Nichols for their support and assistance in editing; Juan Sebastian Ospina, who was a researcher of the FIP and made initial coordination and editing of texts; Joanna Rojas Roa, a researcher at the FIP, who made the final edition of the publication; Gerson Arias, Coordinator of FIP’s Area of Conflict Dynamics and Peace Negotiations, for his invaluable colaboration updating the data, and information, and David Rendón, who took a relentless work with design and layout. The talks made in 2008 have been revised and up- dated for this publication. —María Victoria Llorente y Cynthia J. Arnson December 2009 4 PREFACE The Landscape of Armed Conflict in Today’s Colombia María Victoria Llorente, Executive Director, Fundación Ideas para la Paz Cynthia J. Arnson, Director, Latin American Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars ver the past several years, the landscape of armed tation with the security forces.3 Although the ELN pres- conflict, war, and peace in Colombia has under- ence in its traditional strongholds has declined, the group Ogone significant transformation. These changes has grown in a small number of other areas, particularly are product of the democratic security policy adopted in zones of drug trafficking. This constitutes a break with by the administration of President Alvaro Uribe (2002-), the past, in that the ELN historically had avoided in- and reflected in two main processes. First is the partial volvement with the drug trade. The tendencies manifest- dismantling of the paramilitary movement as a result of ed with respect to both guerrilla groups raise once again negotiations with the Colombian government; the talks the question of how to put a definitive end to the armed led to the collective demobilization of 31,671 combatants conflict. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that the between 2003 and 2006. As part of the paramilitary de- military weakening of the guerrillas would create incen- mobilization, and after a drawn-out debate in the Colom- tives to enter into a peace process, no such negotiations bian Congress, the government also adopted mechanisms have taken place, nor are they on the horizon. of transitional justice in an effort to respond to victims’ The strategic options for the guerrillas are influenced demands for truth, justice, and reparations. The principal by the volatile regional environment, one marked in par- mechanism was Law 975 of 2005, better known as the ticular by heightened tensions between Colombia and Law of Justice and Peace. Venezuela as well as credible accusations of Venezuelan The second process has to do with the erosion of the support for the FARC.4 Colombia has privileged its rela- guerrillas’ military capacity as a result of continuous tions with the United States in light of the significant U.S. pressure from military and police forces which have been contributions to the democratic security policy, as well as modernized and strengthened. The guerrillas have with- a coincidence of interests in fighting narcotics and ter- drawn primarily toward border areas and have suffered rorism. Meanwhile, tensions between Colombia and its a progressive increase in the number of desertions from neighbors in the Andean region have progressively es- their ranks. Between 2002 and 2009, close to 20,000 calated, reaching their apogee following a March 2008 members of the insurgent forces laid down their weapons cross-border raid by the Colombian armed forces on a and took advantage of the government’s demobilization FARC encampment inside Ecuadorian territory. The and reintegration program.1 guerrillas have taken advantage of this climate of con- Meanwhile, the ongoing challenges to overcoming frontation to extend their strategic rearguard beyond Co- conflict and consolidating peace in Colombia are enor- lombia’s borders into Venezuela and Ecuador. Colombia mous, and the overall strategic situation presents a great has accused neighboring governments of passivity, ac- deal of ambiguity. At the same time that Colombian soci- quiescence, or outright support of a FARC presence in ety has benefited from the dramatic improvement in se- border areas, while Ecuador, in particular, has protested curity conditions, the drug trafficking that for years has the multiple ways that the spillover of Colombia’s inter- financed irregular armed actors has not abated as much nal armed conflict has affected its own security and sov- as had been hoped, especially considering the substantial ereignty. resources committed to the counter-narcotics effort.2 Multiple concerns have also arisen with respect to the Despite the significant setbacks to the guerrillas, both justice and peace process underway with the paramili- the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) tary groups. Criminal gangs (bandas criminales) linked and the National Liberation Army (ELN) have adapted to drug trafficking have grown in tandem with the de- their military and political strategies. The FARC has re- mobilization process. Some of these gangs are new, but grouped to a great extent in the strategic areas of cocaine the majority is comprised of holdouts from paramilitary production and trafficking, and the ELN has adopted a groups who never laid down their weapons or who sim- strategy of “passive resistance,” avoiding direct confron- ply rearmed. In addition, many in and outside Colombia 5 have questioned whether the confessions made by former These developments led to triumphant statements by combatants who applied for benefits under the Law of the Colombian government that the “end of the end” of Justice and Peace have contributed significantly to know- the FARC was at hand.8 Meanwhile, the mass extradi- ing the truth about the conflict. Others have questioned tion of paramilitary leaders generated a fierce debate the meager progress in offering reparations to victims, between human rights activists and the government. Hu- including the return of stolen land and other goods. Rec- man rights groups claimed that the extraditions deliv- onciliation, in turn, continues to be ephemeral. How is ered a near-mortal blow to the justice and peace process, reconciliation defined in the Colombian context? How compromising both victims’ rights and the possibility of can one balance and unify the efforts to reintegrate for- gaining further information about politicians indicted mer combatants and to attend to victims in a way that for their ties to paramilitary organizations (the so-called contributes to reconciliation? These are basic questions “parapolitics” scandal). The government argued that, with as yet no concrete answers. to the contrary, the extraditions relieved the justice and With all of these issues in mind, the Latin American peace process of the negative influence exercised by the Program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for paramilitary leaders, who not only continued to com- Scholars and Bogotá’s Fundación Ideas para la Paz held a mit crimes from jail but had contributed very little to the conference in April 2008, to assess the state of peace initia- process of truth and reparations. Even worse, said the tives with the FARC, ELN, and paramilitary groups. This government, these commanders were trying to control report contains