Bitcoin and Beyond: a Technical Survey on Decentralized Digital Currencies
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Security Applications of Formal Language Theory
Dartmouth College Dartmouth Digital Commons Computer Science Technical Reports Computer Science 11-25-2011 Security Applications of Formal Language Theory Len Sassaman Dartmouth College Meredith L. Patterson Dartmouth College Sergey Bratus Dartmouth College Michael E. Locasto Dartmouth College Anna Shubina Dartmouth College Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/cs_tr Part of the Computer Sciences Commons Dartmouth Digital Commons Citation Sassaman, Len; Patterson, Meredith L.; Bratus, Sergey; Locasto, Michael E.; and Shubina, Anna, "Security Applications of Formal Language Theory" (2011). Computer Science Technical Report TR2011-709. https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/cs_tr/335 This Technical Report is brought to you for free and open access by the Computer Science at Dartmouth Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Computer Science Technical Reports by an authorized administrator of Dartmouth Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Security Applications of Formal Language Theory Dartmouth Computer Science Technical Report TR2011-709 Len Sassaman, Meredith L. Patterson, Sergey Bratus, Michael E. Locasto, Anna Shubina November 25, 2011 Abstract We present an approach to improving the security of complex, composed systems based on formal language theory, and show how this approach leads to advances in input validation, security modeling, attack surface reduction, and ultimately, software design and programming methodology. We cite examples based on real-world security flaws in common protocols representing different classes of protocol complexity. We also introduce a formalization of an exploit development technique, the parse tree differential attack, made possible by our conception of the role of formal grammars in security. These insights make possible future advances in software auditing techniques applicable to static and dynamic binary analysis, fuzzing, and general reverse-engineering and exploit development. -
Overview of Crypto Currency`S Role in India
www.ijemr.net ISSN (ONLINE): 2250-0758, ISSN (PRINT): 2394-6962 Volume-8, Issue-1 February 2018 International Journal of Engineering and Management Research Page Number: 105-110 Overview of Crypto Currency`s Role in India Dr. R. Chandrasekaran1 and K. Anitha2 1Assistant Professor, Department of Management, Dr. N.G.P Arts and Science College, Coimbatore, INDIA 2Assistant Professor, Department of Commerce (Finance), Dr. N.G.P Arts and Science College, Coimbatore, INDIA 1Corresponding Author: [email protected] ABSTRACT Bitcoin Cryptocurrencies are digital assets that Bitcoin is a globalcrypto currency and digital use cryptography, an encryption technique, for security. payment system noted to be the first decentralized digital Cryptocurrencies are primarily used to buy and sell goods currency, as the system works lacking a central source or and services, though some newer cryptocurrencies also single overseer. It was developed by an unidentified person function to provide a set of rules or obligations for its or a set of people under the name Satoshi Nakamoto and holders—something we will discuss later. They possess no intrinsic value in that they are not redeemable for another released as open-source software in 2009.The arrangement commodity, such as gold. Unlike traditional currency, they is peer-to-peer, and dealings take place between users are not issued by a central authority and are not considered straight, without an midway. These transactions are legal tender. confirmed by network bulges and recorded in a public circulatedjournal called a block chain. Keywords-- Bitcoin, Cryptocurrency, Zebpay Bitcoins are formed as a recompense for a procedure known as mining. -
Smart Contracts: Building Blocks for Digital Markets
1/25/2018 Nick Szabo -- Smart Contracts: Building Blocks for Digital Markets Smart Contracts: Building Blocks for Digital Markets Copyright (c) 1996 by Nick Szabo permission to redistribute without alteration hereby granted Glossary (This is a partial rewrite of the article which appeared in Extropy #16) Introduction The contract, a set of promises agreed to in a "meeting of the minds", is the traditional way to formalize a relationship. While contracts are primarily used in business relationships (the focus of this article), they can also involve personal relationships such as marraiges. Contracts are also important in politics, not only because of "social contract" theories but also because contract enforcement has traditionally been considered a basic function of capitalist governments. Whether enforced by a government, or otherwise, the contract is the basic building block of a free market economy. Over many centuries of cultural evolution has emerged both the concept of contract and principles related to it, encoded into common law. Algorithmic information theory suggests that such evolved structures are often prohibitively costly to recompute. If we started from scratch, using reason and experience, it could take many centuries to redevelop sophisticated ideas like property rights that make the modern free market work [Hayek]. The success of the common law of contracts, combined with the high cost of replacing it, makes it worthwhile to both preserve and to make use of these principles where appropriate. Yet, the digital revolution is radically changing the kinds of relationships we can have. What parts of our hard-won legal tradition will still be valuable in the cyberspace era? What is the best way to apply these common law principles to the design of our on-line relationships? Computers make possible the running of algorithms heretofore prohibitively costly, and networks the quicker transmission of larger and more sophsiticated messages. -
Lab 5: Bittorrent Client Implementation
Lab 5: BitTorrent Client Implementation Due: Nov. 30th at 11:59 PM Milestone: Nov. 19th during Lab Overview In this lab, you and your lab parterner will develop a basic BitTorrent client that can, at minimal, exchange a file between multiple peers, and at best, function as a full feature BitTorrent Client. The programming in this assignment will be in C requiring standard sockets, and thus you will not need to have root access. You should be able to develop your code on any CS lab machine or your personal machine, but all code will be tested on the CS lab. Deliverable Your submission should minimally include the following programs and files: • REDME • Makefile • bencode.c|h • bt lib.c|h • bt setup.c|h • bt client • client trace.[n].log • sample torrent.torrent Your README file should contain a short header containing your name, username, and the assignment title. The README should additionally contain a short description of your code, tasks accomplished, and how to compile, execute, and interpret the output of your programs. Your README should also contain a list of all submitted files and code and the functionality implemented in different code files. This is a large assignment, and this will greatly aid in grading. As always, if there are any short answer questions in this lab write-up, you should provide well marked answers in the README, as well as indicate that you’ve completed any of the extra credit (so that I don’t forget to grade it). Milestones The entire assignment will be submitted and graded, but your group will also hold a milestone meeting to receive feedback on your current implementation. -
A Decentralized Cloud Storage Network Framework
Storj: A Decentralized Cloud Storage Network Framework Storj Labs, Inc. October 30, 2018 v3.0 https://github.com/storj/whitepaper 2 Copyright © 2018 Storj Labs, Inc. and Subsidiaries This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 license (CC BY-SA 3.0). All product names, logos, and brands used or cited in this document are property of their respective own- ers. All company, product, and service names used herein are for identification purposes only. Use of these names, logos, and brands does not imply endorsement. Contents 0.1 Abstract 6 0.2 Contributors 6 1 Introduction ...................................................7 2 Storj design constraints .......................................9 2.1 Security and privacy 9 2.2 Decentralization 9 2.3 Marketplace and economics 10 2.4 Amazon S3 compatibility 12 2.5 Durability, device failure, and churn 12 2.6 Latency 13 2.7 Bandwidth 14 2.8 Object size 15 2.9 Byzantine fault tolerance 15 2.10 Coordination avoidance 16 3 Framework ................................................... 18 3.1 Framework overview 18 3.2 Storage nodes 19 3.3 Peer-to-peer communication and discovery 19 3.4 Redundancy 19 3.5 Metadata 23 3.6 Encryption 24 3.7 Audits and reputation 25 3.8 Data repair 25 3.9 Payments 26 4 4 Concrete implementation .................................... 27 4.1 Definitions 27 4.2 Peer classes 30 4.3 Storage node 31 4.4 Node identity 32 4.5 Peer-to-peer communication 33 4.6 Node discovery 33 4.7 Redundancy 35 4.8 Structured file storage 36 4.9 Metadata 39 4.10 Satellite 41 4.11 Encryption 42 4.12 Authorization 43 4.13 Audits 44 4.14 Data repair 45 4.15 Storage node reputation 47 4.16 Payments 49 4.17 Bandwidth allocation 50 4.18 Satellite reputation 53 4.19 Garbage collection 53 4.20 Uplink 54 4.21 Quality control and branding 55 5 Walkthroughs ............................................... -
Geraszimov-Doktrína – Egy Másik Megvilágításban
KATONAI NEMZETBIZTONSÁGI SZOLGÁLAT XVI. évfolyam 3–4. szám FELDERÍTŐ SZEMLE ALAPÍTVA: 2002 BUDAPEST 2017 A Katonai Nemzetbiztonsági Szolgálat tudományos-szakmai folyóirata Felelős kiadó Kovács József altábornagy, főigazgató Szerkesztőbizottság Elnök: Dr. Béres János vezérőrnagy Tagok: Dezső Sándor vezérőrnagy Dr. Magyar István ny. dandártábornok Dr. Tömösváry Zsigmond ny. dandártábornok Deák Anita alezredes Dr. Fürjes János alezredes Háry Szabolcs ezredes Dr. Magyar Sándor ezredes Dr. Tóth Sándor alezredes Dr. Vida Csaba alezredes Felelős szerkesztő: Deák Anita alezredes Olvasószerkesztő: Gál Csaba ny. ezredes Tördelőszerkesztő: Tóth Krisztina tzls. HU ISSN 1588-242X TARTALOM BIZTONSÁGPOLITIKA HOLECZ JÓZSEF ALEZREDES A GERASZIMOV-DOKTRÍNA – EGY MÁSIK MEGVILÁGÍTÁSBAN ...................................................... 5 BERTALAN DÁVID OGY. ALEZREDES A BIZTONSÁGI SZEKTOR SPECIÁLIS VONÁSAI .......................... 28 MEZŐ ANDRÁS ALEZREDES A DOKTRÍNAFEJLESZTÉS NEMZETKÖZI TAPASZTALATAI ... 45 HEGYI ÁGNES SZÁZADOS TERRORIZMUS A SZÁHEL-ÖVEZETBEN ....................................... 74 DR. GERENCSÉR ÁRPÁD KÖZÉP-ÁZSIAI SZÉLSŐSÉGES MOZGALMAK MEGJELENÉSI FORMÁI ÉS JELENTŐSÉGE .................................. 87 HÍRSZERZÉS – FELDERÍTÉS KOÓS GÁBOR NY. ALEZREDES – PROF. DR. SZTERNÁK GYÖRGY NY. EZREDES A FEGYVERES KÜZDELEM JELLEMZŐI KUTATÁSÁNAK FONTOSSÁGA, A HÍRSZERZÉS ÉS A FELDERÍTÉS JELENTŐSÉGE ..................... 97 DR. VIDA CSABA ALEZREDES AZ ELEMZŐ-ÉRTÉKELŐ MUNKA TERMÉKEI – NEMZETBIZTONSÁGI TÁJÉKOZTATÓK KÉSZÍTÉSE .............. 112 -
Read the Report Brief
A REVOLUTION IN TRUST Distributed Ledger Technology in Relief & Development MAY 2017 “The principal challenge associated with [DLT] is a lack of awareness of the technology, especially in sectors other than banking, and a lack of widespread understanding of how it works.” - Deloitte Executive Summary1 The Upside In 2016, the blockchain was recognized as one of the top 10 In a recent report, Accenture surveyed emerging technologies by the World Economic Forum.2 The cost data from eight of the world’s ten potential of the blockchain and distributed ledger technology largest investment banks, with the goal of putting a dollar figure against potential (hereinafter “DLT”) to deliver benefits is significant. Gartner cost savings that might be achieved with estimates that DLT will result in $176 billion in added business DLT. The report concluded that the value by 2025; that total reaches $3.1 trillion by 2030.3 banks analyzed could reduce infrastructure costs by an average $8 to Investment in the field reflects the widespread belief that the $12 billion a year. The survey mapped technology can deliver value. Numerous trials, and some more than 50 operational cost metrics deployments, can be found across multiple sectors. and found the savings would break down as follows: Over two dozen countries are investing in DLT 70% savings on central financial More than 2,500 patents have been filed in the last 3 reporting 4 30-50% savings on compliance years 50% savings on centralized operations As of Q4, 2016, 28 of the top 30 banks were engaged in 50% savings on business blockchain proofs-of-concept operations. -
A Regulatory and Economic Perplexity: Bitcoin Needs Just a Bit of Regulation
Washington University Journal of Law & Policy Volume 47 Intellectual Property: From Biodiversity to Technical Standards 2015 A Regulatory and Economic Perplexity: Bitcoin Needs Just a Bit of Regulation Daniela Sonderegger Washington University School of Law Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons Recommended Citation Daniela Sonderegger, A Regulatory and Economic Perplexity: Bitcoin Needs Just a Bit of Regulation, 47 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 175 (2015), https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol47/iss1/14 This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Journal of Law & Policy by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact [email protected]. A Regulatory and Economic Perplexity: Bitcoin Needs Just a Bit of Regulation Daniela Sonderegger [T]here is something special about Bitcoin that makes it inherently resistant to government control. It is built on code. It lives in the cloud. It is globalized and detached from the nation state, has no own institutional owner, operates peer to peer, and its transactions are inherently pseudonymous. It cannot be regulated in the same way as the stock market, government currency markets, insurance, or other financial sectors. —Jeffrey Tucker1 INTRODUCTION Set aside all of the legal and regulatory parameters and simply take a moment to imagine a world that functions on a single digitalized currency, regulated not by a central authority, but rather by the individual users who take part in the system. -
Sok: Tools for Game Theoretic Models of Security for Cryptocurrencies
SoK: Tools for Game Theoretic Models of Security for Cryptocurrencies Sarah Azouvi Alexander Hicks Protocol Labs University College London University College London Abstract form of mining rewards, suggesting that they could be prop- erly aligned and avoid traditional failures. Unfortunately, Cryptocurrencies have garnered much attention in recent many attacks related to incentives have nonetheless been years, both from the academic community and industry. One found for many cryptocurrencies [45, 46, 103], due to the interesting aspect of cryptocurrencies is their explicit consid- use of lacking models. While many papers aim to consider eration of incentives at the protocol level, which has motivated both standard security and game theoretic guarantees, the vast a large body of work, yet many open problems still exist and majority end up considering them separately despite their current systems rarely deal with incentive related problems relation in practice. well. This issue arises due to the gap between Cryptography Here, we consider the ways in which models in Cryptog- and Distributed Systems security, which deals with traditional raphy and Distributed Systems (DS) can explicitly consider security problems that ignore the explicit consideration of in- game theoretic properties and incorporated into a system, centives, and Game Theory, which deals best with situations looking at requirements based on existing cryptocurrencies. involving incentives. With this work, we offer a systemati- zation of the work that relates to this problem, considering papers that blend Game Theory with Cryptography or Dis- Methodology tributed systems. This gives an overview of the available tools, and we look at their (potential) use in practice, in the context As we are covering a topic that incorporates many different of existing blockchain based systems that have been proposed fields coming up with an extensive list of papers would have or implemented. -
On Trade-Offs of Applying Block Chains for Electronic Voting Bulletin
On Trade-offs of Applying Block Chains for Electronic Voting Bulletin Boards Sven Heiberg1, Ivo Kubjas1, Janno Siim3;4, and Jan Willemson2;3 1 Smartmatic-Cybernetica Centre of Excellence for Internet Voting Ulikooli¨ 2, 51003 Tartu, Estonia fsven,[email protected] 2 Cybernetica AS, Ulikooli¨ 2, 51003 Tartu, Estonia [email protected] 3 Software Technology and Applications Competence Center Ulikooli¨ 2, 51003 Tartu, Estonia 4 Institute of Computer Science, University of Tartu Ulikooli¨ 18, 50090 Tartu, Estonia [email protected] Abstract. This paper takes a critical look at the recent trend of building electronic voting systems on top of block chain technology. Even though being very appealing from the election integrity perspective, block chains have numerous technical, economical and even political drawbacks that need to be taken into account. Selecting a good trade-off between de- sirable properties and restrictions imposed by different block chain im- plementations is a highly non-trivial task. This paper aims at bringing some clarity into performing this task. We will mostly be concentrating on public permissionless block chains and their applications as bulletin board implementations as these are the favourite choices in majority of the recent block chain based voting protocol proposals. 1 Introduction In virtually all of the modern democratic societies, democracy (translated from Greek roughly as rule of the people) is implemented via some sort of public opinion polling e.g. voting on the elections of representative bodies. Regrettably, the process of public polling is very fragile. Many things can go wrong, and have gone wrong in the history of elections. To address the his- torically experienced problems, many requirements have been put forward and many measures have been developed to meet them. -
Blockchain and The
NOTES ACKNOWLEDGMENTS INDEX Notes Introduction 1. The manifesto dates back to 1988. See Timothy May, “The Crypto Anarchist Manifesto” (1992), https:// www . activism . net / cypherpunk / crypto - anarchy . html. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid. 6. Timothy May, “Crypto Anarchy and Virtual Communities” (1994), http:// groups . csail . mit . edu / mac / classes / 6 . 805 / articles / crypto / cypherpunks / may - virtual - comm . html. 7. Ibid. 8. For example, as we wi ll describe in more detail in Chapter 1, the Bitcoin blockchain is currently stored on over 6,000 computers in eighty- nine jurisdictions. See “Global Bitcoin Node Distribution,” Bitnodes, 21 . co, https:// bitnodes . 21 . co / . Another large blockchain- based network, Ethereum, has over 12,000 nodes, also scattered across the globe. See Ethernodes, https:// www . ethernodes . org / network / 1. 9. See note 8. 10. Some blockchains are not publicly accessible (for more on this, see Chapter 1). These blockchains are referred to as “private blockchains” and are not the focus of this book. 11. See Chapter 1. 12. The Eu ro pean Securities and Market Authority, “Discussion Paper: The Dis- tributed Ledger Technology Applied to Securities Markets,” ESMA / 2016 / 773, June 2, 2016: at 17, https:// www . esma . europa . eu / sites / default / files / library / 2016 - 773 _ dp _ dlt . pdf. 213 214 NOTES TO PAGES 5–13 13. The phenomena of order without law also has been described in other con- texts, most notably by Robert Ellickson in his seminal work Order without Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994). 14. Joel Reidenberg has used the term “lex informatica” to describe rules imple- mented by centralized operators online. -
Proofs of Replication Are Also Relevant in the Private-Verifier Setting of Proofs of Data Replication
PoReps: Proofs of Space on Useful Data Ben Fisch Stanford University, Protocol Labs Abstract A proof-of-replication (PoRep) is an interactive proof system in which a prover defends a publicly verifiable claim that it is dedicating unique resources to storing one or more retrievable replicas of a data file. In this sense a PoRep is both a proof of space (PoS) and a proof of retrievability (PoR). This paper establishes a foundation for PoReps, exploring both their capabilities and their limitations. While PoReps may unconditionally demonstrate possession of data, they fundamentally cannot guarantee that the data is stored redundantly. Furthermore, as PoReps are proofs of space, they must rely either on rational time/space tradeoffs or timing bounds on the online prover's runtime. We introduce a rational security notion for PoReps called -rational replication based on the notion of an -Nash equilibrium, which captures the property that a server does not gain any significant advantage by storing its data in any other (non-redundant) format. We apply our definitions to formally analyze two recently proposed PoRep constructions based on verifiable delay functions and depth robust graphs. Lastly, we reflect on a notable application of PoReps|its unique suitability as a Nakamoto consensus mechanism that replaces proof-of-work with PoReps on real data, simultaneously incentivizing and subsidizing the cost of file storage. 1 Introduction A proof-of-replication (PoRep) builds on the two prior concepts of proofs-of-retrievability (PoR) [30] and proofs-of-space (PoS) [24]. In the former a prover demonstrates that it can retrieve a file and in the latter the prover demonstrates that it is using some minimum amount of space to store information.