Crossing Borders Fiona B. Adamson International Migration and National Security

Crossing Borders Crossing Borders Fiona B. Adamson International Migration and National Security

International migration has moved to the top of the international security agenda. Increasingly, policymakers in the United States, Europe, and around the world are making links between migration policy and national security. Much of this discussion has focused on migration ºows as a conduit for international terrorism. The ability of nineteen hijackers from overseas to enter, live, and train in the United States in preparation for carrying out attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pen- tagon could not but raise concerns regarding the relationship between the cross-border mobility of people and international terrorism. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the management of migration has become a top national security priority for the United States, with concerns about migration helping to drive the largest reorganization of the U.S. government since the passage of the National Security Act of 1947.1 Even before the September 11 attacks, however, interest in the relationship between globalization, migration, and security had emerged both in the policy world and in some areas of the security studies ªeld.2 Migration was high on the European security agenda throughout the 1990s.3 The bombings in Madrid

Fiona B. Adamson is Director of the Program in International Public Policy and Assistant Professor of International Relations at University College London.

A version of this article was presented at the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies workshop “Globalization and National Security,” on June 11–12, 2004, at Harvard University. The author thanks the organizer of the workshop, Jonathan Kirshner, and the workshop participants for their helpful suggestions. In addition, she is grateful to Nora Bensahel, Alexander Cooley, Peter Liberman, Pieter van Houten, and two anonymous reviewers for comments on earlier versions of this article.

1. Since March 1, 2003, immigration and border control have fallen within the purview of the De- partment of Homeland Security; in January 2004 the Department of Homeland Security rolled out the new US-VISIT program, which began to introduce biometric technology at all U.S. immigration and border control points. 2. See, for example, Roxanne Lynn Doty, “Immigration and the Politics of Security,” Security Studies, Vol. 8, Nos. 2/3 (Winter 1998/99–Spring 1999), pp. 71–93; Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, eds., Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997); Myron Weiner, “Security, Stability, and International Migration,” International Secu- rity, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Winter 1992/93), pp. 91–126; Myron Weiner, ed., International Migration and Security (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1993); and Myron Weiner, ed., The Global Migration Crisis: Chal- lenges to States and to Human Rights (New York: HarperCollins, 1995). 3. Fiona B. Adamson, “Globalization, International Migration, and Changing Security Interests in Western Europe,” paper presented at the Ninety-ªfth Annual Meeting of the American Political

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on March 11, 2004, and in London on July 7, 2005, only reinforced already- existing fears regarding the links between migration and terrorism in Europe. Earlier incidents, such as the 1995 bombings of the Paris metro system by Algeria’s Armed Islamic Group and attacks in various Western European states in the 1990s by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, had already raised concerns regarding the relationship between migration and security. Some scholars have noted that the end of the Cold War and bipolarity has helped to transform both the nature and the function of national boundaries in ways that increasingly securitize migration and lead to a greater policing of national borders.4 In addition, concerns about the security impacts of massive refugee ºows and the roles that mobilized diasporas play in fueling violent conºicts around the globe were being discussed long before September 11.5 Moreover, migration and migrants have a long history of being viewed as closely linked to national security concerns. States have traditionally forged their national immigration policies in response to their security and economic interests.6 In the United States and other countries, migrants have all too often been viewed as national security threats during times of war or crisis because

Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia, September 2–5, 1999; Sarah Collinson, Europe and Interna- tional Migration (London: Pinter, 1994); Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitiza- tion of Migration,” Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 38, No. 5 (December 2000), pp. 751–777; Jef Huysmans, “Contested Community: Migration and the Question of the Political in the EU,” in Morten Kelstrup and Michael C. Williams, eds., International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration: Power, Security, and Community (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 149–170; Peter J. Katzenstein, “Regional Orders: Security in Europe and Asia,” paper presented at the Thirty- ninth Annual International Studies Association Convention, Minneapolis, Minnesota, March 17– 21, 1998; and Ole Waever, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup, and Pierre LeMaitre, eds., Identity, Migra- tion, and the New Security Agenda in Europe (New York: St. Martin’s, 1993). 4. Peter Andreas, Border Games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000); Peter Andreas and Timothy Snyder, eds., The Wall around the West: State Borders and Immigration Controls in North America and Europe (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littleªeld, 2000); Didier Bigo, Polices en réseaux: L’Expérience Européene (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 1996); Didier Bigo, “Security, Borders, and the State,” in Paul Ganster, Alan Sweedler, James Scott, and Wolf Dieter-Eberwein, eds., Borders and Border Regions in Europe and North America (San Diego, Calif.: San Diego State University Press, 1997), pp. 81–104; and Malcolm Anderson and Monica den Boer, eds., Policing across National Boundaries (London: Pinter, 1994). 5. Aristide R. Zolberg, Astri Suhrke, and Sergio Aguayo, Escape from Violence: Conºict and the Refu- gee Crisis in the Developing World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); Gil Loescher, Beyond Charity: International Cooperation and the Global Refugee Crisis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Weiner, International Migration and Security; Barry R. Posen, “Military Responses to Refugee Disasters,” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Summer 1996), pp. 72–111; Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999); and Paul Collier, “Economic Causes of Civil Conºict and Their Implications for Policy,” Working Paper (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, June 15, 2000). 6. Christopher Rudolph, “Security and the Political Economy of Migration,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 4 (November 2003), pp. 603–620.

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of the possibility that they may possess dual political loyalties or represent a “ªfth column” in a conºict.7 Scholars in mainstream security studies have often dismissed such concerns as insigniªcant or as issues limited to matters of domestic politics and policy. Yet international security scholars and policymakers are ªnding it increasingly difªcult to ignore the relationship between migration and security in a highly interconnected world deªned by globalization processes. Globalization is changing the overall environment in which states operate, including how they formulate their security policies. The management of international migration ºows is one area in which policymakers are having to weigh the costs and beneªts of particular policies with an eye to their overall implications for international security, in addition to their implications for other policy areas, such as social welfare and economic growth. To assess the implications of any particular set of migration policies for national security, however, it is ªrst necessary to understand the ways in which migration ºows can potentially help or hinder states’ security interests. This article provides a framework for thinking about the relationship between international migration and national security by surveying how cross- border migration ºows affect state interests in three core areas of national security concern: state sovereignty, or the overall capacity and autonomy of state actors; the balance of power among states; and the nature of violent conºict in the international system.8 A focus on traditional national security interests does not imply that such interests should always trump other factors relating to migration, or that a state-centric framework is the only lens through which to view the relationship between migration and security. Migration and migration policies are also closely intertwined with issues relating to individual and human security. While human security and national security para- digms need not necessarily be diametrically opposed, each does suggest a particular analytical lens through which one can assess the security impacts of international migration ºows.9 For the purposes of this discussion, the focus is restricted to the impact of migration ºows on the security interests of state actors. The rest of this article is organized into four main sections. In the ªrst

7. A prime example of this would be the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II. 8. For discussion of these categories in relation to the broader phenomenon of globalization, see Jonathan Kirshner, ed., Globalization and National Security (New York: Routledge, 2006). 9. For an analysis of the human security paradigm, see Roland Paris, “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?” International Security, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Fall 2001), pp. 87–102.

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section, I discuss the relationship between globalization and international migration, providing a brief overview of the volume, types, and causes of contemporary migration ºows. I examine the various categories of phenomena that the terms “international migration” and “mobility of people across national borders” refer to. To reach general conclusions regarding the impact of migration and human mobility on national security, it is necessary to ªrst acknowledge that people cross borders for a variety of reasons and that states generally devise immigration policies to encourage some forms of border crossing and not others. The general impact of migration on national security therefore depends on the efªcacy of a particular state’s policy to shape migration ºows according to its overall national interests. The second, third, and fourth sections of the article discuss the ways in which immigration may inºuence one of three dimensions of national security: state capacity and autonomy, the balance of power, and the nature of violent conºict. In the section on state capacity and autonomy, I examine the effect of migration on border control and national identity—that is, the ability of states to maintain control over their territory and national purpose. With regard to migration and the balance of power, I look at the inºuence of migration on states’ ability to exercise and project economic, military, and diplomatic power. Finally, in the section on the nature of violent conºict, I discuss the relationship between migration and three forms of security threats to states: internal conºicts, organized crime, and international terrorism. I conclude with a summary of my overall ªndings derived from the analysis in each section, a discussion of their implications, and suggestions for further research.

Globalization, International Migration, and Cross-Border Mobility

Migration is not a new phenomenon. It is, however, more than ever before, a global phenomenon that is closely related to a number of other globalization processes in both its causes and its effects.10 The globalization of trade, ªnance, and production, and the general trend toward greater global economic

10. The literature on globalization is vast and growing. For useful overviews, see Malcolm Waters, Globalization (London: Routledge, 1995); David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jon- athan Perraton, Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, and Culture (Cambridge: Polity, 1999); James H. Mittelman, The Globalization Syndrome: Transformation and Resistance (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000); and Michael Zuern, “From Interdependence to Globalization,” in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons, eds., Handbook of International Relations (London: Sage, 2002).

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integration—all contribute to the emergence of new and more mobile pools of labor, while creating stronger ties and networks among advanced industrial and developing economies that provide new avenues and opportunities for migration.11 These economic processes are reinforced by cheaper and more accessible forms of transportation and communication technologies, as well as an emerging global infrastructure of services, that link national economies and undergird the formation of international migration networks.12 “Like other ºows, whether ªnancial or commercial, ºows of ideas or information,” notes a 2003 report by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), “the rising tide of people crossing frontiers is among the most reliable indicators of the intensity of globalization.”13 In the words of David Held and his coauthors, “There is now almost no state or part of the world that is not im- porting or exporting labor.”14 States that were once countries of emigration have become migration-receiving states, and states that once declared that they were “not countries of immigration” have amended long-standing migration and citizenship policies to adjust to the realities of contemporary migration ºows.15 An examination of some basic migration statistics offers an indication of the signiªcance of migration as one component of the larger process of globalization. According to the IOM, approximately 180 million people live outside their country of birth, up from 80 million three decades ago. The number of people who migrate across national borders in any given year is between 5 and 10 million. One out of every 35 persons in the world is a migrant, or almost 3 percent of the global population. If all migrants formed a single state, it would be the world’s ªfth most populous country. Migration to both Europe and the

11. Saskia Sassen, The Mobility of Labor and Capital: A Study in International Investment and Labor Flow (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 12. See, for example, Mary M. Kritz, Lin Lean Lim, and Hania Zlotnik, International Migration Sys- tems: A Global Approach (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); Mittelman, The Globalization Syn- drome; and Thomas Faist, The Volume and Dynamics of Migration and Transnational Social Spaces (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). There is, of course, a vast body of literature on the causes of migration, which is not addressed here. For an overview of theoretical approaches and regional applications, see Douglas S. Massey, Joaquin Arango, Graeme Hugo, Ali Kouaouci, Adela Pellegrino, and J. Edward Taylor, Worlds in Motion: Understanding International Migration at the End of the Millennium (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998). 13. International Organization for Migration (IOM), World Migration, 2003: Managing Migration: Challenges and Responses for People on the Move (Geneva: IOM, 2003), p. 4. 14. Held et al., Global Transformations, p. 297. See also Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller, The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World, 3d ed. (London: Macmillan, 2003). 15. Examples of the former include Greece, Ireland, and Italy; and the latter, Germany.

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United States has continued to increase over the past two decades. In the year 2000, 40 percent of all international migrants lived in Western industrialized countries, including approximately 19 million in the European Union.16 Many countries have signiªcant portions of their populations abroad and rely on them heavily as a source of foreign exchange. Migration plays a particularly important role, for example, in the economic life of states in the Middle East. Ten percent of Moroccans live outside of Morocco, and 8 percent of Tuni- sians live outside Tunisia. In some of the Gulf states, up to 70 percent of the labor force is composed of migrant labor.17 Among the factors contributing to these overall increases are declining transportation costs; the growing ease of travel; continuing levels of economic inequality among states; the fall of the iron curtain and the opening up of borders in the former Soviet bloc; the loosening of emigration restrictions in other states, such as China; refugee-generating conºict and violence, such as in the Balkans and sub-Saharan Africa; state policies of forced migration; and the growth in human smuggling networks.18 At the same time, as compared with other indicators of levels of globalization, levels of global migration are still relatively low. While 1 in 35 people is a migrant, 34 of 35 people in the world are not migrants. Similarly, contemporary levels of migration are not unprece- dented in their volume; the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, for example, were also characterized by high levels of international migration.19 Determining which categories of migrants to let in and which to keep out is a key challenge facing states today. The United Nations deªnes a “migrant” as someone entering a country for twelve months or longer; yet individual states have varying deªnitions of what constitutes a migrant. Some states measure migration ºows based on the number of border crossings; others measure migration by country of birth.20 In addition, there are broader categories of temporary border crossers (e.g., tourists, commuters, and business

16. IOM, World Migration, 2003, pp. 5–6, 17, 44. 17. In 2003, 70 percent of the labor force was composed of foreigners in Qatar; 67 percent in the United Arab Emirates; and 65 percent in Kuwait. See ibid., pp. 224, 231, 34. 18. Ibid., p. 197; Castles and Miller, The Age of Migration; and Rey Koslowski, Migrants and Citizens: Demographic Change in the European State System (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000). 19. During this period, approximately 60 million people emigrated from Europe; 10 million people emigrated from Russia; and 12 million Chinese and 6 million Japanese emigrated to other states in Asia. Aaron Segal, An Atlas of International Migration (London: Hans Zell, 1993), p. 16, as cited in Paul Q. Hirst and Grahame Thompson, Globalization in Question, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Pol- ity, 1999), p. 23. See also Robert Gilpin, Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Eco- nomic Order (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 365–366. 20. IOM, World Migration, 2003, p. 8.

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travelers) who cannot be counted as “migrants” per se, but nevertheless are signiªcant for understanding the political dynamics surrounding migration, security, and border control.21 In practice, the lines between various categories of border crossers and migrants are difªcult to deªne. Nevertheless, it is useful to think conceptually about who crosses borders and why as a prelude to thinking about how this inºuences national security.

voluntary versus forced migration Much of the general literature and political debate on migration has dealt im- plicitly with voluntary migration—that is, migration by individuals who have left their homes of their own accord to pursue economic opportunities, for per- sonal enrichment, or to be reunited with their families (family reuniªcation is a standard immigrant category in most industrialized states). A second category, forced migration, includes refugees and displaced persons. Involuntary migration can stem from a variety of causes, including human slavery, ethnic cleansing, and deportation. Many of the major migrations throughout history have occurred as a result of forced migration or expulsion. The formation of the Jewish diaspora after the destruction of the Temple of Jerusalem in 586 b.c.; the mass migration ºows that occurred during the transatlantic slave trade, in which approximately 15 million Africans were transferred to the Americas prior to 1850; the population exchanges between Greece and Turkey at the end of World War I; the forced migration of Jews during the Russian pogroms and later during the Holocaust; the expulsion of Germans from the Sudetenland following World War II; the expulsion of indigenous Arab populations with the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948; the ethnic cleansing that characterized the Balkan wars in the 1990s; and the coerced trafªcking of women in many parts of the world (especially Eastern Europe and East Asia) that has been referred to by many as a contemporary form of slavery—all are examples of largely involuntary waves of migration.22

21. This article does not deal with intrastate migration ºows. Particularly signiªcant for many countries’ ability to maintain their internal security are the 25 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) around the globe. Global IDP Project, Internal Displacement: A Global Overview of Trends and Developments in 2003 (Geneva: Norwegian Refugee Council, 2004). 22. Robin Cohen, Global Diasporas: An Introduction (London: UCL Press, 1997); Michael R. Marrus, The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947–1949 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Castles and Miller, The Age of Migration; and Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo, Escape from Violence.

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The population ºows of refugees and exiles produced by forced migration have, as often as not, been the product of state action rather than of nonstate or market forces. Serbian leader Slobodan Miloševib, for example, employed refugee ºows during the 1999 Kosovo crisis as a weapon of war in what was an asymmetric conºict with NATO.23 More generally, many instances of forced migration have been intimately bound up with the emergence of new states in the international system—a fact observed by Aristide Zolberg, who has characterized state making as a “refugee-generating process.”24

economic versus political migration The impetus for an individual to migrate can be economic, political, or in many cases, a combination of both. Economic migrants leave their countries in search of employment or other economic opportunities. Refugees and asylum seekers leave to avoid the trauma of war or political persecution. In practice, disentangling the political and economic factors that contribute to migration ºows is often difªcult.25 Economic migrants can feel compelled to move because of the harsh conditions they face in their country of origin; asylum seekers or refugees may be able to exercise a degree of choice in their country of destination, which can be inºuenced by such factors as economic opportunities, family ties, and existing migration networks.26 Economic migration can include unskilled and skilled labor, temporary workers, guest workers, forced migrants such as trafªcked persons in the sex industry, and slave labor. Much of the literature on international migration written primarily from an economic perspective has concentrated on one form of migration—voluntary labor migration. Indeed, analyzing the global economy without taking into account global migration patterns and their relationship to the globalization of production would be exceedingly difªcult.27 The

23. Kelly M. Greenhill, “The Use of Refugees as Political and Military Weapons in the Kosovo Conºict,” in Raju G.C. Thomas, ed., Yugoslavia Unraveled: Sovereignty, Self-Determination, Interven- tion (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2003), pp. 205–242. 24. Aristide Zolberg, “The Formation of New States as a Refugee-Generating Process,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, Vol. 467, No. 1 (May 1983), pp. 24–38. 25. Ibid., pp. 30–33; and Eric Neumayer, “Bogus Refugees: The Determinants of Asylum Migra- tion to Western Europe,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 49, No. 3 (September 2005), pp. 389– 410. 26. Kritz, Lim, and Zlotnik, International Migration Systems; and Faist, The Volume and Dynamics of Migration and Transnational Social Spaces. 27. See, for example, George J. Borjas, Heaven’s Door: Immigration Policy and the American Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999); Mittelman, The Global Syndrome; Leah Haus, “Openings in the Wall: Transnational Migrants, Labor Unions, and U.S. Immigration Policy,” Inter- national Organization, Vol. 49, No. 2 (Spring 1995), pp. 285–333; Lin Lean Lim, “International Labor

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postwar economic boom in Europe, for instance, would have been impossible without massive amounts of labor migration—much of it organized via bilat- eral agreements between particular states, such as Germany and Turkey. The economies of some countries, such as those of the Gulf states, would collapse without foreign labor. In the global economy, however, the relative immobility of labor distinguishes it from other factors of production. Despite the sheer numbers and im- portance of labor migration, the ºow of labor across national borders is generally less liberalized than other factors of production and is subject to more state intervention. In a global economy, the mobility of labor has not kept pace with the mobility of capital. As Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson note, “A world market for labor just does not exist in the same way that it does for goods and services. Most labor markets continue to be nationally regulated and only marginally accessible to outsiders, whether legal or illegal migrants or professional recruitment. Moving goods and services is inªnitely easier than moving labor.”28 In general, states still exercise a great degree of control over whom they ad- mit as migrants; it is partly due to the tight restrictions on labor migration that have emerged since the 1960s’ economic boom in Europe that one sees a blur- ring of the lines between political and economic migration, on the one hand, and the corruption of the asylum process, on the other. Progress in liberalizing the global market for labor has been mostly at the high end of the skills con- tinuum, with provisions for increased mobility in the service sector or for highly skilled professionals built into broader economic agreements such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization and the North American Free Trade Agreement, although the ºow of labor across borders is still much more restricted than the ºow of goods and services in these agreements.29 International law distinguishes between political and economic migration by assigning categories to individuals who are seeking to cross borders to escape political persecution or violent conºict, as opposed to those who cross borders in search of economic opportunities. International law deªnes “refugees” as those who have a well-founded fear of persecution because of race, re-

Movements: A Perspective on Economic Exchanges and Flows,” in Kritz, Lim, and Zlotnik, Inter- national Migration Systems, pp. 133–149; and Sassen, The Mobility of Labor. 28. Hirst and Thompson, Globalization in Question, p. 29. 29. Ibid., p. 29.

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ligion, nationality, or membership in a particular social or political group. In 2001 there were approximately 12.0 million refugees in the world, as compared with 8.8 million in 1980; 47.9 percent of all refugees in 2001 were concentrated in Asia, 27.3 percent in Africa, and 18.5 percent in Europe.30 Similarly, recent decades have witnessed an increase in asylum seekers. In 2001, 923,000 people ªled asylum requests, up from 180,000 in 1980. Alto- gether, approximately 6 million asylum applications were ªled in advanced industrialized countries during the 1990s. Of these, only a small percentage were by individuals eventually deemed to be legitimate asylum seekers. Asylum applications cost advanced industrial states approximately $10 billion per year; this is ten times the annual budget of the Ofªce of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.31 The number of false asylum seekers, combined with high levels of illegal migration, contributes to the perception that states are losing sovereign control over their borders.

legal versus illegal migration Many immigrants enter states through formal, legal channels; others enter through illegal channels, including those who are smuggled or trafªcked, or who enter with either forged papers or none at all. So-called irregular migrants make up 30–50 percent of all migration to Western industrialized countries. The IOM surmises that approximately 4 million people are smuggled across borders every year. In the United States alone, there may be as many as 12 million illegal migrants, with approximately 4,000 illegal border crossings every day. Half of all illegal migrants have some interaction with smuggling or trafªcking networks—a global industry that generates approximately $10 billion per year.32

permanent versus temporary migration “Permanent migration” refers to the crossing of national borders leading to permanent resettlement, what many traditionally think of as “immigration.” “Temporary migration,” on the other hand, includes so-called guest workers, seasonal laborers, and students. In addition, millions of people cross borders for purposes of travel, contributing to the $6.5 trillion global travel industry.33

30. IOM, World Migration, 2003, pp. 98, 17, 29. 31. Ibid., pp. 102, 97. 32. Numbers of illegal migrants are not counted in ofªcial statistics and are thus difªcult to estab- lish. Ibid., pp. 58–61. 33. World Travel and Tourism Council, “Progress and Priorities, 2006/7,” http://www.wttc.org/ publications/pdf/PandP2006-07.pdf.

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The status of some border crossers—for example, artists on tour, international civil servants working outside their country of origin, and military forces abroad—is less clear.

categorization of migrants Categories of border crossers are not always clear cut. Tourists enter a country and then proceed to stay and look for work; political asylum seekers may leave one country for political reasons but then decide to relocate to another due to the existence of economic opportunities or family ties; members of organized criminal networks and international terrorist organizations are un- likely to mention such afªliations when they apply for visas, and may well have a legitimate pretext to enter a country as, for example, students or busi- nesspeople. Like other dimensions of globalization—whether ªnancial ºows or information technology or marketization processes—the intervening variable for understanding the relationship between migration and security is state policy, and much of migration policy is about designing systems that allow some categories of immigrants in, while attempting to keep other categories out—clearly a signiªcant challenge.

Impacts of Migration on State Capacity and Autonomy

Some experts portray international migration ºows as overwhelming states’ capacity to maintain sovereignty across a number of areas,34 thus jeopardizing the very basis of their security. Ever larger ºows of people across borders; increasingly multicultural populations; and the emergence of informal, migration-based, transnational networks that circulate capital, goods, and ideas—all challenge notions of the territorial state as a bounded entity with a clearly demarcated territory and population. This in turn calls into question traditional models of national security, which assume a unitary national identity from which a set of national interests can be derived. Yet this does not necessarily mean, as some more sensational accounts claim, that large migration ºows are causing states to lose control.35 As Gary Freeman has argued, “Any- one who thinks differently should try landing at Sydney airport without an entry visa or go to France and apply for a job without a work permit.”36

34. See, for example, Saskia Sassen, Globalization and Its Discontents: Essays on the New Mobility of People and Money (New York: New Press, 1998). 35. Saskia Sassen, Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization (New York: Columbia Uni- versity Press, 1996); and Weiner, The Global Migration Crisis. 36. Gary Freeman, “The Decline of Sovereignty? Politics and Immigration Restriction in Liberal

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It is still states that have the primary responsibility both for regulating borders and for conferring citizenship rights and claims to membership in a political community.37 States have always faced challenges to their sovereignty, and the impact of migration ºows across borders is analogous to other instances in history in which states have had to respond to pressures arising from increased transnationalism.38 All states are not equally able to manage the challenges posed by migration, however, and those with high levels of institu- tional capacity are in a much better position to adapt to this new environment than are weak or failing states. Two areas in which migration inºuences state capacity and autonomy are border control and national identity. The ability of states to maintain control over their borders and to formulate a coherent national identity are arguably necessary preconditions for the maintenance of state security in other areas.

regulating borders: migration and interdependence sovereignty The ability to control who has the right to cross the borders of a state is a key dimension of what Stephen Krasner refers to as a state’s “interdependence sovereignty.”39 States have interests in controlling their territorial borders for a variety of reasons, such as maintaining control over their populations, limiting access to labor markets and public goods, and maintaining internal security. A failure to control territorial borders can precipitate serious security challenges. In weak and failing states, a lack of border control signiªcantly jeopardizes their capacity across a number of areas. Large-scale refugee ºows, for example, can overwhelm a state’s capacity to provide public services and can lead to conºicts over resources.

States,” in Christian Joppke, ed., Challenge to the Nation-State: Immigration in Western Europe and the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 93. 37. Some scholars, however, have pointed to how nonstate actors, such as airlines, are assuming some aspects of border control activities. See, for example, Gallya Lahav, “The Rise of Non-state Actors in Migration Regulation in the United States and Europe,” in Nancy Foner, Rubén G. Rumbaut, and Steven J. Gold, eds., Immigration Research for a New Century: Multidisciplinary Per- spectives (New York: Russell Sage, 2000); Gallya Lahav and Virginie Guiraudon, “Comparative Perspectives on Border Control: Away from the Border and Outside the State,” in Andreas and Snyder, The Wall around the West, pp. 55–77; and Sassen, Losing Control? 38. Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999). 39. International migration arguably poses a challenge to two broad dimensions of sovereignty: interdependence sovereignty, or the ability of states to control transborder movements, and domestic sovereignty, or the level of effective control a state exercises within its borders. The other two dimensions of sovereignty enumerated by Krasner, which are less affected by migration ºows, are international legal sovereignty and Westphalian sovereignty. Ibid.

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The end of communism in Eastern Europe was symbolized by the loss of control over state borders and offers a dramatic example of the relationship between border control and state strength. The fall of the iron curtain began when thousands of East Germans escaped to the West through Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland in 1989, until the border between East and West Germany was ªnally declared open by East Germany on Novem- ber 9, 1989.40 Similarly, one of the characteristics of weak or failing states is the inability to control their territorial borders. The world’s poorest states host most of its refugees, and the uncontrolled ºow of refugees or other migrants across borders produces additional stresses on already weak state institutions, heightens competition over scarce resources, and exacerbates ethnic and sec- tarian tensions.41 Moreover, porous borders in weak states can allow politically organized nonstate actors access to territory and population groups that can be used for political mobilization, which in turn can lead to the emergence of “refugee- warrior communities.”42 Examples include the mobilization activities of the Palestine Liberation Organization in refugee camps in Lebanon in the 1970s, the role played by refugee camps in Pakistan as sites of mobilization for Taliban-related groups in the 1980s, and the emergence of the Rwandan Patriotic Front in Ugandan refugee camps in the 1990s.43 Refugee ºows can act as conduits that regionalize and internationalize internal conºicts; the Great Lakes region of Africa provides just one example of the disastrous consequences that such dynamics can have on weak states.44 For advanced industrial states with very high levels of internal capacity and control, the concern with maintaining secure borders is also signiªcant. As John Torpey has pointed out, the monopolization of the legitimate means of

40. See Timothy Garton Ash, “The German Revolution,” New York Times Review of Books, Decem- ber 21, 1989, pp. 14–17. 41. Alan Dowty and Gil Loescher, “Refugee Flows as Grounds for International Action,” Interna- tional Security, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Summer 1996), pp. 43–71; and Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo, Escape from Violence. 42. See Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo, Escape from Violence, pp. 275–278. 43. Sarah K. Lischer, “Collateral Damage: Humanitarian Assistance as a Cause of Conºict,” Inter- national Security, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Summer 2003), pp. 79–109; Dowty and Loescher, “Refugee Flows as Grounds for International Action,” p. 49; and Barnett R. Rubin, “Political Exiles in Search of a State,” in Yossi Shain, ed., Governments-in-Exile in Contemporary World Politics (New York: Routledge, 1991), pp. 70–91. 44. See Stephen John Stedman, “Conºict and Conciliation in Sub-Saharan Africa,” in Michael E. Brown, ed., The International Dimensions of Internal Conºict (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 235–265.

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movement of people across borders through the creation of the passport and accompanying bureaucracies has been a key feature in the development of modern nation-states.45 Although states are authorized to monopolize the legitimate means of movement, they do not necessarily control all movement— just as they do not always have a monopoly over the means of violence.46 As the earlier statistics on illegal migration demonstrate, even if states have formal control over migration processes, a number of nonstate actors—in particular, organized criminal networks and smugglers—are in competition with the state in this area. The emergence of organized criminal networks around illegal migration can also pose a signiªcant challenge to state authority and control. As the IOM report mentioned above notes, “Given the vast amounts of money involved, such operations erode normal governance and present real challenges and threats to national sovereignty.”47 Globalization produces a situation that re- sembles a cat-and-mouse game between migration pressures and state control over borders. If migration pressures on states increase without the state adapt- ing, then the capacity of states is indeed under threat. The record shows, however, that many states are adjusting to these pressures. As Peter Andreas argues, “Globalization may be about tearing down economic borders, as glob- alists emphasize, but it has also created more border policing work for the state. At the same time as globalization is about mobility and territorial access, states are attempting to selectively reinforce border controls.”48 Throughout the 1990s, the United States and Europe expanded the policing of their borders, increased the use of technology to monitor and regulate these borders, and generally militarized and securitized border crossings.49 Since 1993, for example, the budget of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Ser- vice (since 2003, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service) has tripled, and the number of agents in Border Control has doubled.50 The human consequences of this strengthening, however, have been very high. The number of

45. John Torpey, “Coming and Going: On the State Monopolization of the Legitimate ‘Means of Movement,’” Sociological Theory, Vol. 16, No. 3 (November 1998), pp. 239–259; and John Torpey, The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship, and the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 46. John Torpey, “States and the Regulation of Migration in the Twentieth-Century North Atlantic World,” in Andreas and Snyder, The Wall around the West, pp. 31–54. 47. IOM, World Migration, 2003, p. 60. 48. Peter Andreas, “Redrawing the Line: Borders and Security in the Twenty-ªrst Century,” Inter- national Security, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Fall 2003), p. 84. 49. Andreas, Border Games. 50. Wayne A. Cornelius, “Death at the Border: Efªcacy and Unintended Consequences of U.S. Im-

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deaths at the U.S.-Mexican border has steadily increased, with approximately 1,700 occurring during the second half of the 1990s—a 400 percent jump from 1996 to 2000. Since the creation of the Department of Homeland Security following the September 11 attacks, the control of U.S. borders has become even more securitized.51 Smuggling fees from Mexico into Arizona in 2001 were 50 percent lower than what they were before the attacks, because of the higher likelihood that migrants would be interdicted.52 As a border crosser who was caught trying to enter the United States illegally after September 11 suc- cinctly put it, “Because of this bearded guy, what’s his name, bin Laden, it is harder now. There are more reinforcements now because America is afraid of terrorism.”53 States are learning to employ technology in ways that reinforce their capacity. One sees this particularly in the area of migration and border control. The use of biometric technology to monitor entrants into the United States under the US-VISIT program, which commenced in January 2004, is one such example. On both the U.S. border and the external borders of the European Union, surveillance technology has been increasingly employed to deter illegal border crossings.54 The EU has established a European-wide corps of border guards and a European entry visa linked to a computerized database.55 With the Schengen agreement of 1985, which was subsequently incorporated into the EU with the 1999 Amsterdam treaty, a single external border in the EU has in effect been created. This has been accompanied by measures to improve police and judicial cooperation, including the exchange of information through the Schengen Information System database. Thus, even though illicit migration ºows provide states with clear challenges, it would appear that overall state capacity has been threatened by migration ºows to a much lesser degree than many of the more sensationalist accounts in the globalization literature had predicted. Of course, for states with very weak or low capacity, monitoring borders will continue to be a challenge. Even here, however, a common interest in the regulation of migration

migration Control Policy,” Population and Development Review, Vol. 27, No. 4 (December 2001), p. 661. 51. Ibid.; and Timothy Egan, “Risky Dream and a Rising Toll in Desert at the Mexican Border,” New York Times, May 23, 2004. 52. IOM, World Migration, 2003, p. 60. 53. Quoted on National Public Radio, Strangers at the Gates, January 30, 2002, as cited in ibid., p. 66. 54. Andreas, Border Games. 55. IOM, World Migration, 2003, p. 65.

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has prompted stronger states to earmark economic, technical, and development assistance to weaker states for border control. In Europe during the 1990s, for example, approximately 50 percent of funds spent on technical assistance for the EU Phare programs to Eastern Europe were targeted at illegal immigration and border control in candidate states.56 Migration does, however, challenge states’ autonomy, as they come to real- ize that effective border control requires increased levels of interstate cooperation in areas such as information sharing. Europe, of course, is the most prominent example of this trend, as it has basically managed to harmonize much of its border control policy, allowing for free movement within the Schengen area. Other examples include international coordination on U.S. “no- ºy” or “automatic selectee” lists used to screen passengers on international ºights entering the United States. Thus, although international migration does not yet pose an insurmountable challenge to states’ abilities to regulate their borders, it does create incentives for states to selectively relinquish dimensions of their autonomy so as to increase their capacity to control their borders.57 International cooperation on migration and border control can be seen as es- sential to maintaining a state’s capacity to regulate population ºows, and is therefore a vital component of a state’s national security policy.58

reshaping national identity: multicultural states and diasporas State migration policies generally have two main objectives: regulating who enters (e.g., controlling borders), and deciding who is entitled to membership in a polity (e.g., conferring citizenship or political membership in a community). States may be able to rely on technology to control borders, but how do they respond to challenges to their national identity? Traditional conceptions of national security are based on national interests, which, as social construct- ivists and others have argued, are derived from a state’s national identity.59 Even rationalist and realist perspectives on security, which emphasize material interests over identity, acknowledge that models of the state as a unitary rational actor assume an underlying coherence in its collective identity. In modern

56. António Vitirono, EU commissioner in charge of justice and home affairs, lecture, Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Harvard University, March 22, 2001. 57. Bimal Ghosh, ed., Managing Migration: Time for a New International Regime (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 58. James F. Holliªeld, “The Emerging Migration State,” International Migration Review, Vol. 38, No. 3 (September 2004), pp. 885–912. 59. See Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996).

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times, a coherent identity has been provided by the ideology of nationalism, which confers legitimacy on and brings cohesion to nation-states.60 International migration processes call into question the cultural basis of a state’s identity and provide incentives for states to take up more liberal and expansive national identities. The challenge that migration ºows pose to unitary conceptions of national identity has deep historical roots and continues to pro- voke political debate. Many states have historically incorporated national, ethnic, or racial criteria into their migration policies; examples include racial restrictions on immigrants to the United States during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the favoring of ethnic Germans (or Aussiedler)by Germany in its post–World War II immigration policy, the “White Australia” policies that deªned Australian migration policies for much of the twentieth century, and the automatic right to immigrate to Israel that is granted to Jews in the 1950 Law of Return.61 The spread of international norms of racial equality and universal human rights, the rise of civil rights movements and multiculturalism, and economic imperatives resulting from the changing global structure of production have increasingly delegitimized the use of ethnic and racial criteria in the formulation of immigration policy.62 Debates surrounding the relationship between migration and national identity, however, are still politically contentious: when established patterns of national identity formation are called into question, even highly institutionalized and liberal democratic states may experi-

60. See, for example, the discussion of nationalism and states as units in Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), pp. 175–176; and James Fearon and Alexander Wendt, “Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View,” in Carlsnaes, Risse, and Simmons, Handbook of International Relations, pp. 52–72. Representative literature on nationalism, more generally, includes Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reºections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983); Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism: New Perspec- tives on the Past (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983); and Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Or- igins of Nations (New York: Blackwell, 1989). 61. On discrimination against Asians in U.S. immigration policy, see Sucheng Chan, “European and Asian Immigration into the United States in Comparative Perspective, 1820s to 1920s,” in Virginia Yans-McLaughlin, ed., Immigration Reconsidered: History, Sociology, and Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 37–75; and Aristide Zolberg, “Global Movements, Global Walls: Responses to Migration: 1885–1925,” in Wang Gongwu, ed., Global History and Migrations (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1997), pp. 279–302. On the privileging of ethnic Germans, see Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992). 62. On international human rights norms and deracialization, more generally, see Neta C. Crawford, Argument and Change in World Politics: Ethics, Decolonization, and Humanitarian Interven- tion (Cambridge: Cambridge University( Press, 2002). On international human rights norms and citizenship, see Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal, Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Member- ship in Europe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).

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ence some levels of internal instability and incoherence at the societal level— what Ole Waever has referred to as “societal insecurity.”63 The problem is most acute for states that derive their identity and legitimacy from an ethnic version of nationalism, rather than a civic nationalism.64 Meanwhile, some cultural conservatives argue that even states whose identities are primarily liberal, civic, and constitutional can be threatened by migration, as they claim that liberal constitutionalism itself has its origins in a particular culture. Samuel Hun- tington, for example, has made the argument that recent waves of immigration to the United States threaten to undermine its core identity, which he asserts is based on an “Anglo-Protestant” heritage.65 Despite Huntington’s claims, language is arguably the most salient symbol of national cohesion in the United States; whereas it is religious identity, some have argued, that plays this role in many European countries. If this is the case, it would help to explain why, even after September 11, neither Muslim immigrants nor Islam more generally is viewed as posing a cultural threat to American identity in the same ways that have been manifested in some European states, such as France, which has outlawed the wearing of headscarves in public schools.66 The relationship between migration ºows and national identity provides an example of the many ways in which market forces are challenging traditional state functions. States are increasingly using market criteria to make migration policy, with economic skills largely trumping cultural and identity criteria in evaluating potential migration requests. At the same time, a global “market” for the political loyalties of individual migrants and their descendents is emerging. Old models of incorporation or assimilation into a nation are giving way to new discourses of multiculturalism, transnationalism, and diasporic

63. Ole Waever, “Societal Security: The Concept,” in Waever et al., Identity, Migration, and the New Security Agenda, pp. 17–40. 64. Some authors have tried to group states according to these criteria, with states such as France, Great Britain, and the United States being classiªed as states deriving their identity from civic nationalism, and states such as Germany deriving their identity from ethnic nationalism. In reality, most states exhibit a mix of ethnic and civic nationalism. For discussions, see Liah Greenfeld, Na- tionalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992); and Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. 65. Samuel P. Huntington, Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004). 66. For an interesting discussion, see Aristide Zolberg and Long Litt Woon, “Why Islam Is Like Spanish: Cultural Incorporation in Europe and the United States,” Politics and Society, Vol. 27, No. 1 (March 1999), pp. 5–38. Additional factors, such as differences in the origins and composition of Muslim populations in the United States and Europe, may also help to account for this variation.

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identities—all of which challenge the notion of a unitary and territorially deªned national entity. Factors such as the ease of travel, new communication technologies, and the emergence of a global media infrastructure allow migrants to maintain ties with their homelands or even take part in wholly new transnational identity communities. Migrants and their descendents can easily maintain dense social networks that stretch across national borders, are rich in social capital, and can 67 be used( for a variety of purposes—including political mobilization. Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal has observed that migrant communities in Europe engage in political activities at the supranational level, in addition to the national level.68 And Linda Basch, Nina Glick Schiller, and Cristina Szanton Blanc demonstrate in their work that migrants increasingly “live lives...stretched across national borders.”69 The literature on diasporas points to how the emergence of transnational or- ganizational structures, such as diaspora organizations, creates identities and political loyalties that challenge conventional notions of citizenship. Gabriel Sheffer, for example, notes, “The establishment of diaspora organizations and participation in those organizations can create the potential for dual authority, and consequently also for dual or divided loyalties or ambiguous loyalty vis-à- vis host countries. Development of such fragmented loyalties often results in conºicts between diasporas and their host societies and governments.”70 Members of diaspora groups are sometimes actively involved in the politics of their “home state.” Prime examples are the political activities of Jews in the diaspora directed toward politics in Israel or of Armenians vis-à-vis Armenia.71 Migrants and their descendents thus form contested constituencies that can be mobilized by a variety of actors. Some scholars have argued that the transnationalization of political participation and the existence of diaspora networks can impair a state’s ability to formulate a coherent foreign policy based on a uniªed national interest. Huntington and Tony Smith, for example, argue that U.S. foreign policy

67. Faist, The Volume and Dynamics of Migration and Transnational Social Spaces, pp. 96–123. 68. Soysal, Limits of Citizenship. 69. Linda Basch, Nina Glick Schiller, and Cristina Szanton Blanc, Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and De-territorialized Nation-States (Langhorne, Pa.: Gordon and Breach, 1994), p. 4. 70. Gabriel Sheffer, Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 81. 71. Yossi Shain and Aharon Barth, “Diasporas and International Relations Theory,” International Organization, Vol. 57, No. 3 (Summer 2003), pp. 449–479.

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formulation in some areas can be inºuenced by skilled ethnic lobbying groups whose loyalties are to a real or imagined homeland.72 Interestingly, Huntington makes the comparison between transnational ethnic groups and economic actors, such as multinational corporations. Both, in some sense, illus- trate how increased levels of marketization and pluralization can challenge a state’s ability to act coherently as a unitary rational actor in the area of foreign policy formulation. Global migration ºows may challenge some classical notions of national identity. Yet the overall effect this has on the core national security interests of states is debatable, and may in fact be more positive than negative. Most modern industrial states are increasingly identifying themselves according to civic forms of nationalism and are deªning themselves using liberal criteria. A prime example is Germany, a state that has traditionally displayed an ethnic form of nationalism, yet since 2000 has begun to consider jus soli criteria, in addition to jus sanguinis criteria, in deciding who can become a German citizen.73 Such changes to national identity are ultimately security enhancing rather than detracting, as they help states to adjust to the demands of globalization and decrease the dangers posed by virulent and exclusionary forms of nationalism. The spread of liberal and civic forms of nationalism across states ultimately enhances overall levels of international stability.74 The adoption of liberal forms of national identity is indicative of the resil- ience of the state and its ability to adapt to changing circumstances. European states are becoming increasingly multicultural in response to changes associated with migration. While banning the wearing of headscarves in public schools, France is also working to institutionalize and incorporate Islam as an ofªcial religion, on a par with the institutionalized representation given to Christian and Jewish communities—a process also taking place in other European states.75 Although cultural conservatives may bemoan the loss of ho-

72. Samuel P. Huntington, “The Erosion of American National Interest,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 5 (January/February 1997), pp. 28–49; and Tony Smith, Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of American Foreign Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001). See also Eric M. Uslaner, “A Tower of Babel on Foreign Policy?” in Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis, eds., Interest Group Politics (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1991), pp. 299–318. 73. This challenges some of the claims in Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. 74. Stephen Van Evera, “Hypotheses on Nationalism and War,” International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), pp. 5–39; and Jack L. Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Na- tionalist Conºict (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000). 75. Jonathan Laurence, “From the Elysée Salon to the Table of the Republic: State-Islam Relations and the Integration of Muslims in France,” French Politics, Culture, and Society, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Spring 2005), pp. 36–63.

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mogeneous national identities, most observers view the global trend toward a convergence in states deªning themselves according to nonracial and liberal identities as a positive and security-enhancing development. Likewise, the presence of ethnic and diaspora lobbies in, for example, the United States and Great Britain can be viewed as a healthy indicator of the robustness of democ- racy in these states, highlighting the ability of interest groups to operate in plu- ral societies, rather than being seen as a threat to a unitary national interest.76

International Migration and the Balance of Power

The size of a state’s population, in addition to its natural resources, territory, economy, and military strength, are the most basic measures of its power.77 The distribution of power in the international state system may now be unipo- lar, but as the IOM report notes, “Migration circuits span the globe like a spi- der’s web, with complex ramiªcations and countless intersections. The current world map of migration is therefore multipolar.”78 Migration policy can be a tool for states to exercise their national interests. A country’s population is arguably its most important resource; to be an effective instrument of power, however, it must be mobilized. Purely on the level of basic demographics, migration can make a difference to a state’s power. Many advanced industrialized countries have aging populations and need younger workers if their social security systems are to function and if they are going to compete on the world market. Japan is a key example, with the government institutionalizing various measures to encourage labor migration in the mid- 1990s.79 Migration and human mobility inºuence three core areas of state power: economic, military, and diplomatic. Here, again, the intervening variable between migration and national security is policy: if states have the capacity to design and implement effective policies that “harness the power of migration,” international migration ºows can enhance, rather than detract from or compromise, state power.

76. See, for example, Charles McC. Mathias Jr., “Ethnic Groups and Foreign Policy,” Foreign Af- fairs, Vol. 59, No. 4 (Spring 1981), pp. 975–998; Yossi Shain, “Multicultural Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy, No. 100 (Autumn 1995), pp. 69–97; and Robert W. Tucker, Charles B. Keely, and Linda Wrig- ley, eds., Immigration and U.S. Foreign Policy (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1990). 77. On counting poles and measuring power, see Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), pp. 129–131. 78. IOM, World Migration, 2003, p. 4. 79. In 2001, for example, more than 140,000 economic immigrants entered Japan—a ªgure that was nearly 10 percent higher than in 2000. Ibid., p. 200.

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economic power: human capital in a globalizing world economy Some scholars argue that, in an increasingly global economy, states will in- evitably see labor migration as a means of maximizing economic gains.80 Immigration ºows are highly correlated with economic growth. The postwar economic boom in Germany and other Western European countries would not have been possible without the inºux of migrant labor from Mediterranean countries in the 1960s. In the 1990s, migration ºows and an increase in the foreign-born labor force were largely responsible for spurring growth in the U.S. economy.81 Highly industrialized countries are designing their immigration systems to harness the talent of skilled workers, attempting to outdo one another in luring talent in what the IOM has referred to as a “human capital accretion ‘sweepstakes.’”82 This trend is especially noticeable in the area of information technology and the knowledge economy, which has become an in- tegral component of state power.83 The United States, for example, has encouraged highly skilled labor migration with the H-1B visa, which brings people in to work temporarily in the information technology and communication sectors, a route that often becomes a fast-track for permanent migration.84 In 2000 Germany initiated a new “Green Card” program, modeled on the U.S. program, as a way of attracting highly skilled labor, especially computer specialists.85 Students are another group of sought-after “migrants.” The United States continues to be a world leader in issuing student visas, although other states are increasingly attempting to capture a greater share of this “market.” Univer- sities in Great Britain, for example, are turning to overseas students as a source of revenue to stem the ªnancial crisis that has hit its education sector; in 2005, for example, Britain was host to approximately 50,000 students from China.86 In the wake of the September 11 attacks, U.S. leadership in attracting international talent has been called into question, as the United States has reduced the number of visas issued to foreign students and increased the time it takes for

80. Rudolph, “Security and the Political Economy of Migration.” 81. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, “U.S. Immigration and Economic Growth: Putting Policy on Hold,” Southwest Economy, No. 6 (November/December 2003), http://www.dallasfed.org/ research/swe/2003/swe0306a.html. 82. IOM, World Migration, 2003, p. 149. 83. Rudolph, “Security and the Political Economy of Migration”; and Mittelman, The Globalization Syndrome. 84. IOM, World Migration, 2003, p. 149. 85. For details, see German Embassy, Washington, D.C., http://www.germany-info.org/ relaunch/welcome/work/work.html. 86. Nick Mackie, “Chinese Students Drawn to Britain,” BBC News, September 7, 2005, http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/education/4219026.stm.

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students to acquire visas: an overall drop in foreign graduate student applications to top U.S. universities has caused some to question the ability of the United States to maintain its leading edge in science and technology if such restrictions continue.87 In the global competition for highly skilled workers, however, there are winners and losers. In particular, many parts of Africa continue to experience a brain drain of skilled labor. In 1987, 30 percent of Africa’s skilled workforce lived in Europe, and in the 1990s more than 5 percent of all Africans were estimated to be living outside their country of origin.88 According to estimates, 70,000 professionals and university graduates leave countries in Africa every year with the aim of working in Europe or North America; more than 20,000 Nigerian doctors practice in North America; and in 2003 the South African economy had lost approximately $7.8 billion in human capital due to emigration since 1997.89 The exit of highly skilled labor from developing economies contributes to the growing gap between the wealthiest and poorest members of the international state system. Yet the effects of emigration processes from the developing world to the developed world are multiple, and developing countries also beneªt greatly from out-migration. Perhaps the most signiªcant result of migration from developing countries is the capital ºows that are generated through labor remittances. If states are able to capture the developmental beneªts of remittances, this can contribute substantially to economic growth in ways that have advan- tages over other types of capital ºows. Unlike other categories of external capital ºows, which are measured as changes in the assets and liabilities of residents vis-à-vis nonresidents in a state, many labor remittance ºows are technically transfers of capital from one set of nationals (living abroad) to another set of nationals. Additionally, remittances tend to be more stable than other forms of private capital ºows across borders.90 The size of remittances has been growing steadily since the 1970s. Whereas in 1970 global remittances were estimated at slightly more than $3 billion, by 1988 the ªgure had increased to $30.4 billion.91 In the mid-1990s global remittances were estimated at $66 billion, an amount greater than the sum of all

87. “Science, Visas, and America: On the Turning Away,” Economist, May 6, 2004, p. 76. 88. Mittelman, The Globalization Syndrome, p. 45. 89. IOM, World Migration, 2003, pp. 6, 216–217. 90. John McHale and Devesh Kapur, “Migration’s New Payoff,” Foreign Policy, No. 139 (Novem- ber/December 2003), pp. 48–57. 91. Segal, An Atlas of International Migration, p. 150, as cited in Hirst and Thompson, Globalization in Question, p. 30.

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state-sponsored foreign development aid programs.92 Estimates for remittances in 2002 ran as high as $100 billion annually in transnational ºows across national borders.93 Labor remittances from migrants make up more than half of all total ªnancial inºows in a number of countries. In Morocco, they total approximately $3.3 billion a year, accounting for 83 percent of the trade balance deªcit.94 In both Egypt and Tunisia, they account for 51 percent of capital inºows.95 Labor remittances can be put to use for a variety of purposes and, if effectively utilized, can help to stimulate economic development.96 In the year 2000, labor remittances contributed more than 10 percent to the national economies of several developing countries, including El Salvador, Eritrea, Jamaica, Jordan, Nicaragua, and Yemen. As such, more states are trying to harness the power of labor remittances. Morocco, for example, is prioritizing migration management through the establishment of foundations that encourage the temporary return migration of skilled professionals; it is also seeking to foster a core of elite émigrés who can further the country’s development and promote Moroccan culture abroad.97

military power: immigrant skills, expertise, and recruits Immigrants can also contribute to a state’s military strength by, for example, providing technical and intelligence expertise (e.g., foreign language skills and analysis). An extreme example is the role that émigré scientists played in developing the U.S. nuclear program in the 1930s. Albert Einstein, Edward Teller, and others who ºed National Socialism in Europe put their scientiªc expertise to work in developing the ªrst atomic bomb. This is but one of many examples of the ability of states to harness the skills and expertise of immigrants for military ends.

92. United Nations Population Fund, The State of World Population, 1993 (New York: UNPF, 1993), as cited in Mittelman, The Globalization Syndrome, p. 45. 93. Peter Gammeltoft, “Remittances and Other Financial Flows to Developing Countries,” Working Paper (Copenhagen: Center for Development Research, 2002), as cited in IOM, World Migration, 2003, p. 310. 94. IOM, World Migration, 2003, p. 224. 95. International Organization for Migration, “Facts and Figures on International Migration,” Migration Policy Issues, No. 2 (March 2003), p. 2. 96. See, for example, Nicholas Van Hear, “Sustaining Societies under Strain: Remittances as a Form of Transnational Exchange in Sri Lanka and Ghana,” in Nadje al-Ali and Khalid Koser, eds., New Approaches to Migration? Transnational Communities and the Transformation of Home (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 202–223. 97. IOM, World Migration, 2003, pp. 17, 225.

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The state can also draw on immigrant populations when ªghting a war. The use of noncitizens mirrors, in some respects, the recent increased use of private contractors in U.S. military operations.98 In 2004 it was estimated that 40,000 noncitizens were enrolled in the U.S. military, or 4 percent of all enlistees. In fact, joining the military is one way to expedite the naturalization process for noncitizens. U.S. military recruiters regularly seek new recruits in immigrant communities. In some areas of California, up to half of all enlistees do not have U.S. citizenship, and ªve of the ªrst ten Californians who perished in the war in Iraq were noncitizens.99 The U.S. military also attempted to mobilize recent immigrants or their descendents when it sought to create a separate division of approximately 3,000 Iraqi expatriates and exiles known as the Free Iraq Forces.100

diplomatic power: migrants as ambassadors Migration can enhance a state’s ability to engage in diplomacy. In some respects, this is the ºip side of the earlier discussion regarding a state’s ability to maintain a coherent national identity. Small states in the international system can involve their diasporas in diplomacy by drawing on emigrants and their descendents within a target country, and by sponsoring lobbying and public relations activities. In the United States, for example, NATO enlargement was helped along by the domestic lobbying activities of Americans of Eastern European descent. Armenia has a diaspora desk in its ministry of foreign affairs.101 The Republic of Cyprus draws on its diaspora in the United Kingdom and elsewhere to represent its interests abroad in the Cyprus conºict. Promi- nent members of the Cypriot diaspora have acquired VIP status because, “much like honorary or career consuls, they enjoy a certain number of limited facilities, privileges and immunities.”102

98. On private contractors, see Deborah D. Avant, The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privat- izing Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); and P.W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003). 99. Ron Hayduk and Michelle Wucker, “Immigrant Voting Rights Receive More Attention,” Mi- gration Information Source, November 1, 2004, http://www.migrationinformation.or/USfocus/ display.cfm?ID=265; and Duncan Campbell, “Dying to Belong,” Guardian, April 22, 2003, http:// www.guardian.co.uk/elsewhere/journalist/story/0,7792,941202,00.html. 100. This endeavor, albeit, was viewed as unsuccessful by many critics. For ªgures, see Jim Garamone, “U.S. Army Trains Free Iraqi Forces in Hungary,” February 24, 2003, http://www .defenselink.mil/news/Feb2003/n02242003_200302243.html. 101. Shain and Barth, “Diasporas and International Relations Theory.” 102. Fiona B. Adamson and Madeleine Demetriou, “Reshaping the Boundaries of ‘State’ and ‘Na- tional Identity’: Incorporating Diasporas into IR Theorizing,” European Journal of International Rela- tions (forthcoming).

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Powerful states in the international system can project their inºuence abroad by manipulating immigration policy, by drawing on immigrant populations, and even by mobilizing diasporas living within them for foreign policy ends. During the Cold War, for example, the United States crafted a refugee policy that encouraged emigration and defection from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and, in the process, sought to “inºict a psychological blow on communism.”103 As in the economic and military realms, highly skilled immigrants can enhance national strength in the diplomatic sphere; in the case of the United States, one need only think of such prominent examples as Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Madeleine Albright. In the post–Cold War world, transnational diaspora populations have been an important source of national inºuence abroad. Yossi Shain, for example, has argued, contrary to Huntington, that rather than hurting the United States’ national interests, migrants and diasporas can promote them by acting as unofªcial ambassadors who propagate American values in their home countries.104 At the level of ofªcial policy, states can mobilize ªrst- and second- generation immigrants to assist in achieving particular foreign policy projects; recent examples include drawing on Iraqi exiles in the process of postconºict reconstruction and nation building in Iraq, mobilizing highly skilled Afghan émigrés for nation building in Afghanistan, and relying on Palestinian Americans as negotiators in various rounds of Middle East peace talks.

Cross-Border Mobility and the Changing Nature of Violent Conºict

The nature of violent conºict in the international system is arguably the area in which migration, in particular, and globalization, more generally, has been most signiªcant in reshaping the security environment facing state actors. Mainstream approaches to security, particularly realist and neorealist approaches, have traditionally assumed that states seek to protect themselves primarily against security threats from other states. What emerges in the con- text of globalization, however, is the proliferation of a number of security threats to states that emanate from nonstate actors.105

103. Aristide Zolberg, “From Invitation to Interdiction: U.S. Foreign Policy and Immigration since 1945,” in Michael S. Teitelbaum and Myron Weiner, eds., Threatened Peoples, Threatened Borders: World Migration and U.S. Policy (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995), pp. 123–124. 104. Yossi Shain, Marketing the American Creed Abroad: Diasporas in the United States and Their Home- lands (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 105. Fiona B. Adamson, “Globalization, Transnational Political Mobilization, and Networks of Violence,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 1 (April 2005), pp. 35–53.

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Migration ºows can interact with other factors in three ways to exacerbate conditions that foment violent conºict in the international system: by providing resources that help to fuel internal conºicts; by providing opportunities for networks of organized crime; and by providing conduits for international terrorism. The degree to which each of these factors affects a state depends on the level of its capacity. Organized crime, for example, presents itself as a law enforcement problem to highly institutionalized states; but for weakly institutionalized states, organized crime can lead to much more serious consequences, corrupting, challenging, or even hijacking state institutions.106 Like many other aspects of the relationship between migration and national security, these factors are not all necessarily new, but rather have been under- studied by specialists in international relations and security studies. For example, in the period of nineteenth-century globalization, which saw similar waves of migration, there was also a plethora of political activity by nonstate actors who utilized migration channels and immigrant communities to mobilize transnationally and, at times, employed political violence that challenged state security interests. Examples include nineteenth-century anarchist and so- cialist networks, as well as various nationalist movements, such as the Fenians, who were particularly active in mobilizing within Irish immigrant communities in the United States.107 International relations, as an academic discipline, has been heavily shaped by the experiences of World War I and World War II— and is, to some extent, an intellectual response to these devastating events. Scholars of international security, however, may have to step back and examine pre–World War I dynamics in the international system to understand some of the post–Cold War and post–September 11 challenges facing states today.

internal conflict: mobilized diasporas and refugees International migration processes, combined with the availability of new technologies and media markets, allow for migrants and their descendents to re- main connected to their home country and co-ethnics through diaspora networks. These transnational diaspora networks, in turn, can be used as a political resource, including in violent conºicts. Studies have shown that diaspora funding played a key role in providing resources for violent conºicts during the 1990s. According to a World Bank study, countries experiencing vi-

106. For the case of Russia, see Vadim Volkov, Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2002). 107. See, for example, David C. Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11,” in Charles W. Kegley, ed., The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2003), pp. 36–59.

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olent conºict that had signiªcant diaspora populations abroad were six times likelier to experience a recurrence of conºict than states without such populations. The author of this report, Paul Collier, argued that “diasporas appear to make life for those left behind much more dangerous in post-conºict situations.”108 A number of qualitative studies of diasporas in internal conºicts have echoed this observation.109 The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, for example, noted that it was Kosovar Albanians in the diaspora who created the Kosovo Liberation Army, raised money in the diaspora to support the conºict, and even utilized the diaspora to recruit ªghters.110 Other examples include the conºict between the Kurdistan Workers’ Party and the Turkish state throughout the 1990s, as well as that between the Tamil Tigers and the Sri Lankan state. Islamists drew upon migrant workers in Gulf states in the 1980s and 1990s to fund Islamic fundamentalist networks that were eventually able to take over the state in Sudan.111 In the Gulf, more generally, states have shifted to recruiting labor from Asian, as opposed to Arab states, in reaction to the politicization of Arab immigrant communities through mobilization activities by nonstate actors.112 In many of these cases, diaspora mobilization ap- pears to feed into “transnationalized cycles of political violence.”113 A similar dynamic exists with regard to refugee populations and violent conºict. Just as political entrepreneurs can mobilize resources and political support for a conºict within diasporas in Western industrial states, refugee populations can also provide a base for political mobilization activities in conºicts.114 Not all refugee populations are likely to become the targets of political mobilization activities, but when they are targeted, dilemmas are created on multiple levels.115 Humanitarian assistance operations that target refugee

108. Collier, “Economic Causes of Civil Conºict and Their Implications for Policy,” p. 6. 109. Kaldor, New and Old Wars; Benedict Anderson, The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, South- east Asia, and the World (London: Verso, 1998), pp. 58–74; and Daniel Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, and David Brannan, Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2001). 110. Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report: Conºict, International Response, Lessons Learned (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 45. 111. Khalid Medani, “Funding Fundamentalism: The Political Economy of an Islamist State,” in Joel Beinin and Joe Stork, eds., Political Islam: Essays from Middle East Report (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), pp. 166–177. 112. IOM, World Migration, 2003, p. 206. 113. Fiona B. Adamson, “Displacement, Diaspora Mobilization, and Transnational Cycles of Polit- ical Violence,” in John Tirman, ed., Maze of Fear: Migration and Security after 9/11 (New York: New Press, 2004), pp. 45–58. 114. Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo, Escape from Violence. 115. Lischer notes that “state-in-exile” refugees are more likely to be violence prone than “situa- tional” or “persecuted” refugee populations. Lischer, “Collateral Damage.”

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populations, for example, can fuel violent conºicts by providing material assistance, support, and legitimacy to militants who are embedded in or linked to refugee camps and populations. This is what occurred in refugee camps in the Democratic Republic of Congo (at that time, Zaire) following the 1994 Rwandan genocide and in camps in Pakistan following the 1979 Soviet inva- sion of Afghanistan.116

organized crime: human smuggling and gray economy networks Perhaps the most obvious link between migration and organized crime is the global industry in human smuggling and trafªcking that has emerged to meet the demands of individuals seeking to cross national borders. This is an instance in which market-based mechanisms take over when the demand for opportunities to immigrate outstrips the supply provided by ofªcial channels in state migration policies. Smugglers command high prices for their services, ranging from $500 for passage from Morocco to Spain to as much as $50,000 from some countries in Asia to the United States.117 Like other nonstate actors, smuggling networks have been able to take advantage of new technologies to achieve their goals. Albanian smuggling groups operating in the Czech Republic during the 1990s, for example, were equipped with night-vision equipment, cell phones with network cards, and other high-technology gear that were used to help smuggle some 40,000 “clients” across the Czech- German border.118 The nexus between organized criminal groups, armed rebel organizations, and terrorist networks is often difªcult to disentangle. Andreas has pointed out the extent to which transnational criminal networks provided the material basis for the Bosnian conºict.119 Similar arguments can be made for conºicts in Kosovo and Turkey. The Kurdistan Workers’ Party, for example, was heavily involved in human smuggling as a way of both raising money for the conºict in Turkey during the 1990s and smuggling in supporters to engage in political activities in Europe.120 Global organized criminal networks are often deªned by a particular ethnic- ity and are able to operate transnationally by forging networks of solidarity

116. Ibid., pp. 92–95. 117. IOM World Migration, 2003, p. 60. 118. Rey Koslowski, “The Mobility Money Can Buy: Human Smuggling and Border Control in the European Union,” in Andreas and Snyder, The Wall around the West, pp. 203–218. 119. Peter Andreas, “The Clandestine Political Economy of War and Peace in Bosnia,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 48, No. 1 (March 2004), pp. 29–51. 120. Koslowski, “The Mobility Money Can Buy.”

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that take advantage of migration-based networks and migration circuits. Again, organized criminal networks are not new. Chinese criminal networks, or “Triads,” for example, smuggled Chinese into California during the Gold Rush in the 1840s.121 What is new, however, is the globalization of ethnically based criminal networks and their ability to forge alliances with one another— organizing themselves internationally, just as any legitimate business might do in a global economy. Peter Lupsha details how contemporary “Chinese illegals in Naples produced counterfeit French perfume in bottles made in Spain, with faux Chanel perfume made in Mexico, and covered in gold wrappings and la- bels printed in Belgium.”122 Just as globalization provides opportunities for legal operations to transnationalize production structures, so too does it provide opportunities for criminal operations that rely on networks of individuals that stretch across national borders. The emergence of transnational criminal networks that use migration strate- gically to pursue their interests can inºuence the national security interests of states in a number of ways. At the most basic level, it can have an impact on the security of the victims of its illegal activities—whether they are individuals who die in transit or under other circumstances, or who are touched by the violence that accompanies such criminal activities. Organized crime, however, is also destabilizing at the global level, leading to what James Mittelman and Robert Johnston term “the corruption of global civil society”—the same civil- society channels and networks that help to produce an international public sphere also provide opportunities for increased levels of transnationally organized illicit activities.123 Finally, in states that are already weak or failing, the inºux of resources tied to international criminal networks can help to support maªa-like organizations that actually challenge the ability of states to maintain sovereignty over particular areas or that otherwise corrupt their authority. When criminal networks take over law enforcement functions and monopolize violence at the local level, as well as engage in distributive and service-providing activities normally associated with the state, a local dependence on international networks of organized crime can develop, creating serious internal security problems, as can be seen, for example, in states such as Colombia.124

121. Mittelman, The Globalization Syndrome, p. 208. 122. Peter Lupsha, “Transnational Organized Crime versus the Nation-State,” Transnational Orga- nized Crime, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 1996), p. 27. 123. James H. Mittelman and Robert Johnston, “Global Organized Crime,” in Mittelman, The Glob- alization Syndrome, pp. 203–222. 124. Louise Shelley, “Transnational Organized Crime: The New Authoritarianism,” in H. Richard

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terrorism: migration and transnational political violence Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, questions relating to migration and security are increasingly viewed through the lens of international terrorism. This is true not just in the United States but also in Europe and other states. Foreign minister Josep Piqué of Spain, for example, argued that “the ªght against illegal immigration is also the reinforcement of the ªght against terrorism.”125 A recent report published by the Nixon Center declares, “Immigration and terrorism are linked—not because all immigrants are terrorists but because all, or nearly all, terrorists in the West have been immigrants.” The same report goes on to cite Rohan Gunaratna’s claim that “all major terrorist attacks conducted in the last decade in North America and Western Europe, with the exception of Oklahoma City, have utilized migrants.”126 Such claims are sensationalist and highly problematic, not the least because they do not take into account attacks by domestic groups in Europe such as the separatist group Basque Fatherland and Liberty, also known as ETA. Migra- tion policies and migration networks, however, do provide avenues for terrorist organizations and other nonstate actors to pursue their interests, just as they provide opportunities for states and other actors. Robert Leiken argues that states tend to view immigration from an economic perspective, whereas terrorist organizations view immigration from a strategic perspective—using all aspects of the immigration system to gain access to target states. He indentiªes two strategies for getting such access: the ªrst is the use of so-called hit squads that enter a state with the explicit aim of committing a terrorist act—this was the case in the attacks of September 11. The second strategy is relying on sleeper cells, that is, groups already inside the target state that are activated at a particular point to carry out attacks. While internal U.S. surveillance has focused on uncovering the latter since September 11, all evidence suggests that the United States is more at risk from external inªltrators than from any form of domestic mobilization around radical Islam—a concern that is much more pronounced in European states such as France, Germany, and Great Britain.127

Friman and Peter Andreas, eds., The Illicit Global Economy and State Power (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littleªeld, 1999), pp. 25–52. 125. Quoted in “EU: Terrorism, Harmonization,” Migration News, Vol. 8, No. 11 (November 2001), http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id?2488_0_4_0. 126. Robert S. Leiken, Bearers of Global Jihad? Immigration and National Security after 9/11 (Washing- ton, D.C.: Nixon Center, 2004), p. 6. Gunaratna’s quotation is attributed to his presentation at the Nixon Center on December 1, 2003. 127. Leiken, Bearers of Global Jihad? p. 6.

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U.S. immigration policy and border control have become a front line in protecting the United States from further terrorist attacks. The reorganization and incorporation of the Immigration and Naturalization Service into the Department of Homeland Security, the screening of potential border crossers, the use of immigration lists for intelligence purposes, and increased cooperation with other states on such issues as the forgery of passports and other doc- uments have all become tools in the war against terrorism. Striking a balance between border control and intelligence gathering, on the one hand, and facili- tating the beneªts of maintaining relatively open borders, on the other, is a del- icate task. One danger in making the link between migration and security with regard to international terrorism is that states may overreact. Already, measures taken since September 11 appear to be deterring foreign students from studying in the United States, which may hurt its ability to lead in science and technology over the long run. Even more serious is the negative impact that surveillance activities have had on alienating Muslim and other populations within the United States.128 The detention of Muslims and non-Muslim Arabs, the monitoring of Islamic charities, and the shutting down of money-transfer services that are thought to feed into the hawala system have all caused widespread re- sentment. In addition to raising serious questions with respect to civil liberties and racial proªling, such actions contribute to other counterproductive out- comes, such as weakening incipient diasporic civil-society networks that could support bottom-up processes of political liberalization in the Middle East and damaging United States efforts at public diplomacy abroad.129

Conclusion

The management of international migration ºows is a key challenge facing states in a globalized international security environment. Like other dimensions of globalization, many of the mechanisms by which migration ºows af-

128. For critical overviews of the impact of internal security measures on Arab and Muslim populations in the United States, see Louise Cainkar, “Targeting Muslims, at Ashcroft’s Discretion,” Middle East Report, March 14, 2003, http://www.merip.org/mero/mero031403.html; and Louise Cainkar, “Impact of the September 11 Attacks on Arab and Muslim Communities in the United States,” in Tirman, Maze of Fear, pp. 215–239. 129. Amaney Jamal and Steven Heydemann, “Social Capital: Rise or Decline in the Immediate Post–9/11 Environment,” background paper for the Social Science Research Council project Reframing the Challenge of Migration and Security, http://www.ssrc.org/programs/gsc/ publications/gsc_activities/migration/Heydemannjamal.pdf.

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fect national security are not necessarily new, but rather operate cumulatively and in combination with other factors, and as such have been largely ignored by much of the literature in mainstream security studies. In part, this is because dimensions of globalization such as international migration inºuence state security interests in much more complex, contradictory, and diffuse ways than do traditional security threats, such as the threat of one state actor using military force against another. To address these more nuanced dimensions of the international security environment, security specialists must move away from grand theories that focus on unitary state actors and begin to employ more conventional forms of policy analysis and evaluation. A ªrst step in devising migration policies that are appropriate to the contemporary international security environment is to assess the range of effects that cross-border ºows of people can have on the overall security interests of states. Based on the discussion in this article, the overall impact of international migration and human mobility on core national security concerns can be brieºy summarized as follows. With regard to state capacity and autonomy, there are two broad ªndings. First, migration ºows inºuence both the capacity and the autonomy of state actors: the extent to which they do so, however, varies widely across states. Migration ºows can have serious security impacts on the capacity of states that are already weak or failing. Yet states with high capacity have generally shown themselves adept at adjusting to the realities of increased human mobility. Second, some globalization processes may be bring- ing about a more profound change in the relationship between state autonomy and state capacity. As two distinct components of state sovereignty, autonomy and capacity are often viewed as going hand-in-hand. One impact of globalization on the state, however, could be the increasing divergence between state capacity and state autonomy as measures of state effectiveness: to manage cross-border challenges, state capacity is enhanced, rather than threatened, by increased cooperation with other states in areas such as the formulation and enforcement of migration policy. With regard to the impacts of migration on the balance of power among states, the results are mixed. On the one hand, current migration regimes, which favor highly skilled workers, tend to exacerbate already existing inequalities by widening the gap between the “winners” and “losers” of globalization and by contributing to problems such as a brain drain from developing economies to advanced industrial economies. In addition, global inequalities are reinforced through the greater barriers and other obstacles placed on the mobility of labor across national boundaries as compared with the mobility of

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capital. For strong states with the capacity to effectively mobilize the talents of migrant populations, migration generally enhances the ability of these populations to project power in a number of areas. Economically disadvantaged states, however, can also beneªt from the effective mobilization of their overseas populations. Although populations in institutionally weak and economically less developed states suffer disproportionately from current migration regimes, there is also the potential for migration processes to promote development and technology transfer between states, which could, over the me- dium to long term, help to temper levels of global inequality, as well as lead to greater levels of interdependence among states. Finally, with regard to migration and the nature of violent conºict, my analysis supports the general conclusion that international migration ºows do indeed provide opportunities for new forms of transnational action that are utilized by violent nonstate actors perpetrating civil wars in weak states; by organized criminal networks that beneªt from the disjunction between the low supply of migration opportunities to advanced industrial countries and the high demand for such opportunities; and by international political movements that employ strategies of violence and terror to achieve their goals. Interna- tional migration ºows provide conduits for the diffusion of network-based forms of political violence and instability, a challenge that harms weak states to a greater degree than strong states and that requires increased levels of interstate cooperation to meet. A signiªcant danger for states, however— especially advanced industrial states—would be to overreact to these threats in ways that would unnecessarily curtail the many beneªts of international migration, including beneªts that enhance overall levels of state security and international stability. In each of these areas—state capacity and autonomy, the balance of power, and the nature of violent conºict—migration ºows change the environment in which states formulate policy, including security policy. Ultimately, however, it is how states respond to global migration ºows through policy formation and implementation that will determine the extent to which national security is enhanced or diminished by international migration. International migration ºows, like other globalized dimensions of the international security environment, “do not present iron laws, but rather they change the cost-beneªt calcu- lus of various policy choices.”130 The challenge facing states is to adopt an

130. Kirshner, Globalization and National Security.

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expansive, long-term view of migration, taking into account the many beneªts of international migration and devising comprehensive migration policies that enhance overall levels of international security. States that are best able to “harness the power of migration” through well-designed policies in cooperation with other states will also be the best equipped to face the new global security environment.

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