Jung’s Answer to

Greeted with controversy on its publication, Answer to Job has long been neglected by many serious commentators on Jung. This book offers an intellectual and cultural context for C.G. Jung’s 1952 publication. In Jung’s Answer to Job: A Commentary, the author argues that such neglect is due to a failure to understand Jung’s objectives in this text and offers a new way of reading the work. The book places Answer to Job in the context of biblical commentary, and then examines the circumstances surrounding its compositions and immediate reception. A detailed commentary on the work discusses the major methodological presuppositions informing it and explains how key Jungian concepts operate in the text. Jung’s Answer to Job: A Commentary unravels Jung’s narrative by reading it in the chronological order of the biblical events it analyses and the books to which it refers, offering a comprehensive re-reading of Jung’s text. An original argument put across in a scholarly and accessible style provides an essential framework for understanding the work. Whilst taking account of the tenets of , this commentary underlines Answer to Job’s more general significance in terms of cultural history. It will be invaluable to students and scholars of analytical psychology, the history of ideas, intercultural studies, comparative literature, religion and religious studies.

Paul Bishop is Professor of German and Head of the Department of German Language and Literature at the University of Glasgow. He edited Jung in Contexts: A Reader (Routledge, 1999) and has published various articles on Jung’s intellectual affinities with German philosophy and literature. In memoriam Anthony Storr (1920–2001) Jung’s Answer to Job

A Commentary

Paul Bishop First published 2002 by Brunner-Routledge Published 2014 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY, 10017, USA Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

© 2002 Paul Bishop Typeset in Times New Roman by Keystroke, Jacaranda Lodge, Wolverhampton Paperback cover design by Sandra Heath All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Bishop, Paul, 1967– Jung’s answer to Job : a commentary / Paul Bishop. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Jung, C. G. (Carl Gustav), 1875–1961. Answer to Job. 2. Bible. O.T. Job—Criticism, interpretation, etc. 3. Religion—Philosophy. I. Title.

BL51.J853 B57 2002 223'.106—dc21 2002071242 ISBN 13: 978-1-583-91239-3 (hbk) ISBN 13: 978-1-583-91240-9 (pbk) Our language is a faithful reflection of the psychic phenomenon with its dual aspect ‘perceptual’ and ‘imaginary’ . . . The language I use must be ambiguous, must have two meanings, in order to do justice to the dual aspect of our psychic nature. Jung, letter to R.J. Zwi Werblowsky, 17 June 1952

A la différence de Job, je n’ai pas maudit le jour de ma naissance; les autres jours en revanche, je les ai tous couverts d’anathèmes . . . Cioran, De l’inconvénient d’être né (1973) This page intentionally left blank Contents

Acknowledgements ix Abbreviations x

Introduction 1 The and its commentators2 Knowledge or faith? 14 Overview 24

PART ONE Background 29

1 Genesis of the text: Jung on Answer to Job 31 Job in Jung’s childhood 31 Background dreams 34 Aion 38 Jung on Answer to Job in his correspondence 41 Reception of Answer to Job 44

2 Sermons and symbols 51 Gnosticism and the controversy with Buber 52 In the image of 63 Beyond good and 65 Basic concepts underpinning Answer to Job 69 In the name of God 82

PART TWO Commentary 87

3 Answer to Job: An analytical commentary. Part I 89 ‘I am distressed for thee, my brother . . .’ 89 Theoretical presuppositions 92 viii Contents

The Book of Job 94 The Creation 98 Wisdom literature 101 The Prophets 108

4 Answer to Job: An analytical commentary. Part II 115 The Incarnation 115 ‘Ye are ’ 127 Age of Aquarius 129 The coming of the Holy Spirit 132 The 137 The Assumption 154

Conclusion 163 Notes 178 Bibliography 204 Index 215 Acknowledgements

It is a pleasure for me to acknowledge the assistance I have received when writing this book from the following, whom I should like to thank: Roger Stephenson, for his inspiring comments on an early draft of the manuscript; Graham Whitaker, for his unflagging bibliographical assistance, locating sources for classical and patristic allusions; Brian Bishop and the Grex Latine Loquentium, for further classical information; and Bernard Ashbrook, Hedy Harsem, and, above all, Jennifer Leeder, for much helpful comment, useful criticism, and welcome support. I am grateful to the students in my Honours course ‘Modern German Thought: Freud and Jung’, who have made me think long and hard about what Jung’s Answer to Job means. Meta Jamison kindly helped with the final print-out of the manuscript, and Andrea Greengrass created the index. Finally, my thanks go to Kate Hawes at Brunner- Routledge, for her support of this project from proposal through to completion. While writing this book, I have made particular use of the following reference works: William E. Addis and Thomas Arnold, A Catholic Dictionary, 15th edition, revised by T.B. Scannell and P.E. Hallett, London: Virtue, 1954; The HarperCollins Encyclopedia of Catholicism, general editor Richard P. McBrien, New York: HarperCollins, 1995; The Jerusalem Bible, general editor Alexander Jones, London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1966; Bruce M. Metzger and Michael D. Coogan (eds), The Oxford Companion to the Bible, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993; F.L. Cross (ed.), The Oxford Dictionary of the Church, London: Oxford University Press, 1957. Extracts from Memories, Dreams and Reflections by C.G. Jung, edited by Aniela Jaffé, translated by Richard and Clara Winston, copyright © 1961, 1962, 1963 and renewed 1989, 1990, 1991 by Random House, Inc. Used by permission of Pantheon Books, a division of Random House, Inc. Extracts from Jung’s Collected Works copyright © 1959, 1969, 1971, 1977 by PUP. Reprinted by permission of Princeton University Press. Published in the UK by Routledge. Extracts from Jung’s Letters, volume 1 copyright © 1971 by PUP. Reprinted by permission of Princeton University Press. Published in the UK by Routledge. Extracts from Jung’s Letters, volume 2 copyright © 1953, 1955, 1961, 1963, 1968, 1971, 1972, 1974, 1975 by PUP. Reprinted by permission of Princeton University Press. Published in the UK by Routledge. Abbreviations

AV King James translation of the Bible (Authorized Version). CW C.G. Jung, Collected Works, ed. Sir Herbert Read, Michael Fordham, Gerhard Adler and William McGuire, 20 vols, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1953–1983. Freud/Jung The Freud/Jung Letters: The Correspondence between and C.G. Jung, ed. William McGuire, tr. Ralph Manheim and R.F.C. Hull, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979. JB Jerusalem Bible, general editor Alexander Jones, London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1966. L1 C.G. Jung, Letters, 1906–1950, ed. Aniela Jaffé and Gerhard Alder, tr. R.F.C. Hull, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973. L2 C.G. Jung, Letters, 1951–1961, ed. Aniela Jaffé and Gerhard Adler, tr. R.F.C. Hull, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975. MDR C.G. Jung, Memories, Dreams, Reflections, recorded and edited by Aniela Jaffé, tr. Richard and Clara Winston, London: Collins/ Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963. NT New Testament OT Old Testament PU C.G. Jung, Psychology of the Unconscious: A Study of the Transfor- mations and Symbolisms of the Libido: A Contribution to the History of the Evolution of Thought, tr. B.M. Hinkle (Collected Works, Supplementary Volume B), London: Routledge, 1991. SE Sigmund Freud, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. James Strachey and Anna Freud, 24 vols, London: Hogarth Press, 1953–1974.

Note: Translations from German have been amended where necessary. Introduction

One of the most remarkable aspects of the intellectual life of C.G. Jung (1875–1961) is the extraordinary diversity of interests he entertained throughout his long, and productive, career. Beginning with his activity as a psychiatrist in the Burghölzli Clinic in Zurich, which expanded into a university lecturing post and a successful private practice, Jung undertook empirical scientific experiments in word association, before coming under the influence of Freudian psychoanalysis. In the course of his professional association and personal friendship with Freud, he developed an interest in comparative mythology that is reflected in his first major work, Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido (Transformations and Symbols of the Libido, translated as Psychology of the Unconscious) (1911/12). This book also marked his break with Freud. In the early 1920s he completed a substantial work on psychological typology, but his interests were to move in the direction of other things: comparative religion, alchemy, astrology, and – notoriously – flying saucers. Nothing was too esoteric, or obscure, or even ridiculous, for . In the early 1940s, he collaborated with the Hungarian-born classical scholar Karl Kerényi (1897–1973) to produce a collection of papers, entitled Essays on a Science of Mythology (Swiss original, 1941; US translation, 1949), an examination of the myth of the divine child and the Mysteries of Eleusis. Then, in 1952, following a lengthy correspondence between the two,1 he and the Austrian- born Swiss physicist (1900–58) published a volume entitled The Interpretation of Nature and the Psyche (Swiss original, 1952; US translation, 1955), which sought a rapprochement between subatomic physics and analytical psychology. He travelled widely, too, visiting the United States (1909; 1912; 1924–25; 1936; 1937), Great Britain (1919; 1925; 1935; 1938), Algeria and Tunisia (1920), the Pueblo Indians in New Mexico (1925), Kenya, Uganda, and the Nile, including a visit to the Elgonyi on Mount Elgon (1925–26), Egypt and Palestine (1933), and India (1938). Honorary degrees were awarded to him by Clark University (1909), Harvard University (1936), the universities of Calcutta, Benares, and Allahabad (1938), of Oxford (1938), Geneva (1945), and the Swiss Federal Polytechnic (ETH), Zurich (1955); and he was awarded the Literature Prize of the City of Zurich (1932), and appointed Titular Professor of the ETH, Zurich (1935), Honorary Fellow of the Royal Society of Medicine, London (1938), Honorary 2 Introduction

Member of the Swiss Academy of Sciences (1943), to the Chair of Medical Psychology at the University of Basle (1943), and made an Honorary Citizen of Küsnacht (1960). Not surprisingly, then, Jung had to appeal to a wide variety of audiences throughout his career. For example, on 4 July 1919 he addressed the Society for Psychical Research in London, whilst a few days later he was delivering a lecture to the Royal Society of Medicine in London, where he also gave a talk, twenty years later, in 1939. In 1927 he addressed Hermann Graf Keyserling’s so-called School of Wisdom in Darmstadt; in 1929, the Literary Club of Zurich; and in 1934, the Kulturbund in Vienna. He gave a series of lectures to the Institute of Medical Psychology (the Tavistock Lectures) in 1935, to Yale University (the Terry Lectures) in 1938, and many of his most famous papers were first presented as lectures to the Eranos conferences. He gave radio interviews, wrote newspaper articles, and addressed medical colleagues and fellow analysts, as well as a wider public. In 1952 the Rascher Verlag, which had been printing Jung’s works for several decades, published a volume by the now world-famous psychologist entitled Answer to Job. The work proved controversial, and cost Jung his friendship with one of his closest intellectual companions, the Dominican priest and professor of dogmatic theology at Blackfriars in Oxford, Father (1902–60). Yet the work has received relatively little serious attention,2 and the reason for this comparative neglect is not hard to find: the book is very hard to construe – and to make sense of it is even harder. This neglect is a pity because, among Jung’s mature works, Answer to Job stands out as presenting an argument that does not rely heavily on alchemical texts, and as representing an attempt on Jung’s part to make a would-be valid public statement out of the solution to a psychological dilemma, at once personal and of wider significance. Furthermore, in tackling the Book of Job, Jung was situating himself in a distinguished line of eminent commentators on what is, by common consent, one of the most problematic texts of the Judeo-Christian Bible. If Jung is, as I have argued elsewhere,3 best appreciated within the intellectual traditions of German-speaking Europe, then we need to pay attention to his Answer to Job, which represents a significant, provocative, twentieth-century response to an ancient, foundational, fifth-century BCE text.

THE BOOK OF JOB AND ITS COMMENTATORS

Although it was probably written in the fifth century BCE, the Book of Job may in fact have been composed at any point between the seventh and the second centuries BCE. It, together with four other books (Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and two ‘deutero- canonical’ texts, Ecclesiasticus, and Wisdom),4 constitute the set of books known as the ‘Wisdom’ books.5 Equally ‘inspired’ literature, these works are nevertheless more reflective in tone and content than, say, the ‘Law’ books or the Prophets, and this is certainly true of the Book of Job. The editors of the Jerusalem Bible describe Introduction 3 it as ‘the literary masterpiece of the wisdom movement’ (JB, OT, p. 727). A figure from the patriarchal age of Noah and Daniel, Job served as a model of virtue for the prophet Ezekiel (Ezekiel 14:14, 20). From the story of his suffering, his patience in misfortune, and the eventual vindication of his faith, are derived such expressions as a ‘Job’s comforter’ and ‘Job’s post’. In Henry IV: Part II, Falstaff ironically refers to himself as being ‘as poor as Job, my lord, but not so patient’ (Act I, Scene ii). The Book of Job opens with a prose narrative which begins: ‘There was a man in the land of Uz, whose name was Job; and that man was perfect and upright, and one that feared God, and eschewed evil’ (Job 1:1).6 Because of his virtue, Job enjoys prosperity and contentment, yet his fortunes change when and Yahweh (the main Hebrew name for God) agree to the following wager:

Now there was a day when the sons of God came to present themselves before the Lord, and Satan came also among them. And the Lord said unto Satan, Whence comest thou? Then Satan answered the Lord, and said, From going to and fro in the earth, and from walking up and down in it. And the Lord said unto Satan, Hast thou considered my servant Job, that there is none like him in the earth, a perfect and an upright man, one that feareth God, and escheweth evil? Then Satan answered the Lord, and said, Doth Job fear God for nought? Hast thou not made an hedge about him, and about his house, and about all that he hath on every side? thou hast blessed the work of his hands, and his substance is increased in the land. But put forth thine hand now, and touch all that he hath, and he will curse thee to thy face. And the Lord said unto Satan, Behold, all that he hath is in thy power; only upon himself put not forth thine hand. So Satan went forth from the presence of the Lord. (Job 1:6–12, AV)

As a result, Job loses his oxen, his sheep, his camels, his servants, and his sons and daughters. But Job’s response is exemplary in the faith he retains in Yahweh: ‘Naked came I out of my mother’s womb, and naked shall I return thither: the Lord gave, and the Lord hath taken away; blessed be the name of the Lord’ (Job 1:21). Meeting with Yahweh again and discussing Job for a second time, Satan obtains permission to ‘touch his bone and his flesh’, provided he ‘save his life’; so Satan afflicts Job with ulcers and boils, and his wife urges him: ‘Curse God, and die.’ Yet Job persists in his faith in Yahweh: ‘What? shall we receive good at the hand of God, and shall we not receive evil?’ (Job 2:9–10). The rest of the book falls into two sections: a set of speeches constituting an extended discussion between Job and his three friends, the Temanite, the Shuhite, and Zophär the Naamathite, later joined by , son of Barachel the Buzite (chapters 3–37), and a second set of speeches delivered from 4 Introduction

Yahweh ‘out of the whirlwind’ (chapters 38–41). In his second speech, Yahweh acknowledges that he is, in the words of the commentary of the Jerusalem Bible, ‘master of the forces of evil’:

Then answered the Lord unto Job out of the whirlwind, and said, Gird up thy loins now like a man: I will demand of thee, and declare thou unto me. Wilt thou also disannul my judgment? wilt thou condemn me, that thou mayest be righteous? Hast thou an arm like God? or canst thou thunder with a voice like him? Deck thyself now with majesty and excellency; and array thyself with glory and beauty. Cast abroad the rage of thy wrath: and behold every one that is proud, and abase him. Look on every one that is proud, and bring him low; and tread down the wicked in their place. Hide them in the dust together; and bind their faces in secret. Then will I also confess unto thee that thine own right hand can save thee. (Job 40:6–14, AV)

In the conclusion to the book, Job retracts any accusations he made against Yahweh, and submits to the supremacy of God:

I know that thou canst do every thing, and that no thought can be withholden from thee. Who is he that hideth counsel without knowledge? therefore have I uttered that I understood not; things too wonderful for me, which I knew not. Hear, I beseech thee, and I will speak: I will demand of thee, and declare thou unto me. I have heard of thee by the hearing of the ear: but now mine eye seeth thee. Wherefore I abhor myself, and repent in dust and ashes. (Job 42:2–6, AV)

Whilst Eliphaz, Bildad, and Zophär are rebuked by Yahweh and ordered to sacrifice seven bullocks and seven rams, Job’s fortunes are restored twofold, and he is given more sheep, camels, oxen, and asses, seven sons, and three daughters. ‘After this lived Job an hundred and forty years, and saw his sons, and his sons’ sons, even four generations. So Job died, being old and full of days’ (Job 42:16–17). There is, of course, an extensive tradition of commentary on this text, as on other books of the Bible, to which the collection by Nahum Glatzer, The Dimensions of Job (1969), provides a helpful guide.7 (Glatzer excludes, however, Jung’s ‘weird analysis’ of Job (p. 45).) To give some idea of this tradition – of which Jung may well have been aware – one might mention that commentaries on the Book of Job were written by, among others, the Alexandrian theologian Didymus the Blind Introduction 5

(c.313–c.398), the Arian heretic Julian (c.357–c.380), Julian, the Pelagian Bishop of Eclanum (c.386–c.454), St John Chrysostom (c.347–407), and Pope Gregory I, the Great (c.540–604). The figure of Job is mentioned in the Qur’an, and presented as one of triumphant righteousness, although without reference to the circum- stances related in the Hebrew Bible.8 Later commentaries include the sixteenth-century Historia Jobs of Johan Narhamer, the Explication du livre de Job (1732) of Jacques Joseph Duguet (1649–1733), and the translations into German (with commentary) by Wilhelm Carl Umbreit in 1824 and by Ferdinand Hitzig in 1874. Of the long and distinguished tradition of Jewish commentary on this text, Moses Maimonides, the twelfth-century philosopher and biblical and talmudic scholar, might serve as just one example. In chapters 22 and 23 of Part III of The Guide for the Perplexed, originally written in Arabic, Maimonides wrote that ‘the strange and wonderful Book of Job’ was ‘a fiction, conceived for the purpose of explaining the different opinions which people hold on Divine Providence’. At the end of his commentary, Maimonides promised the reader: ‘If you pay to my words the attention which this treatise demands, and examine all that is said in the Book of Job, all will be clear to you, and you will find that I have grasped and taken hold of the whole subject; nothing has been left unnoticed.’9 And indeed, of all the books of the Bible, Job has always been the one in which philosophers in the Western tradition have shown the greatest interest. In eighteenth-century Germany,10 On the Spirit of Hebrew Poetry (1782–1873) by Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803) brought about a revolution in the approach to the Hebrew Bible, emphasizing its textual (i.e., literary) quality. A substantial section of this work quotes at length from the Book of Job, as Eutyphron tries to persuade Alciphron that, by ‘secur[ing] that unity which the understanding demands’ when contemplating the cosmos, Job, and Hebrew culture, was ahead of Lucretius (i.e., the Romans), as well as the Greeks and the Celts.11 For Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), Herder’s pupil and arguably Germany’s most important Enlightenment thinker, the figure of Job was almost prototypical of the aims of the Aufklärung. ‘On the Failure of All Philosophical Attempts at Theodicy’ (1791), an essay attacking the outmoded world-view of Leibniz and Wolff, with all its scholastic presuppositions, presented the biblical figure in contrast to his friends in the following light:

Job speaks as he thinks, and with the courage with which he, as well as every human being in his position, can well afford; his friends, on the contrary, speak as if they were being secretly listened to by the Mighty One, over whose cause they are passing judgment, and as if gaining his favour through their judgment were closer to their heart than the truth. [. . .] If we now consider the theoretical position maintained by each side, that of Job’s friends might convey more of an appearance of greater speculative reason and pious humility; before any court of dogmatic theologians, before a synod, an inquisition, a venerable congregation, or any higher consistory in our times (one alone excepted), Job would have likely suffered a sad fate.12 6 Introduction

Just as Kant emphasized the radical honesty of Job, he drew attention to the ‘inscrutable’ nature of the deity that reveals itself in the Book of Job:

God deigned to lay before Job’s eyes the wisdom of his creation, especially its inscrutability. He allowed him glimpses into the beautiful side of creation, where ends comprehensible to the human being bring the wisdom and the benevolent providence of the author of the world unambiguously to light; but also, by contrast, into the horrible side, by calling out to him the products of his might, among which also harmful and fearsome things, each of which appears indeed to be purposively arranged for its own sake and that of its species, yet, with respect to other things and to human beings themselves, as destructive, counterpurposive, and incompatible with a universal plan established with goodness and wisdom. And yet God thereby demonstrates an order and a maintenance of the whole which proclaim a wise creator, even though his ways, inscrutable to us, must at the same time remain hidden – indeed already in the physical order of things, and how much more in the connection of the latter with the moral order (which is all the more impene- trable to our reason).13

Nor was Kant alone in the German philosophical tradition in taking particular interest in the figure of Job. Arguably his most important successor, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831), as a student ‘had a special delight in the Book of Job on account of its unconventionalized [ungeregelter] natural language’.14 Of course, Hegel was, like Herder, reading the text in the original Hebrew. Of less direct, but equal relevance, is the theology Hegel developed in his later years, as reflected in the section on ‘Revealed Religion’ in his Encyclopedia (1817, revised 1827 and 1830), a summary of his philosophy originally designed to accompany his lectures in Heidelberg. In the concluding paragraph of this section, Hegel wrote:

To grasp in thought, correctly and definitely, what God is as spirit, that requires thorough speculation. To begin with, this contains the following propositions: God is only God insofar as he knows himself; his knowing himself is, furthermore, a self-consciousness in man and man’s knowledge of God that goes on to man’s knowing himself in God.

[Was Gott als Geist ist, dies richtig und bestimmt im Gedanken zu fassen, dazu wird gründliche Spekulation erfordert. Es sind zunächst die Sätze darin enthalten: Gott ist nur Gott, insofern er sich selber weiß; sein Sichwissen ist ferner sein Selbstbewußtsein im Menschen und das Wissen des Menschen von Gott, das fortgeht zum Sichwissen des Menschen in Gott.]15

Hegel’s argument here anticipates the kind of dialectics in terms of which, in Answer to Job, Jung explored the way in which the consciousness of humankind and of God were caught up in a common process; and on 28 March 1953, in a letter Introduction 7 to Jakob Amstutz, he summarized his (Hegelian) argument in the following dramatic statement: ‘Man is the mirror which God holds up to himself, or the sense organ with which he apprehends his being’ (L2, p. 112). In his lectures published as On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History (1841), the Scottish essayist and Germanophile Thomas Carlyle (1795–1881) lavished praise on the Book of Job, calling it ‘one of the grandest things ever written with pen’ and arguing that ‘there is nothing written [. . .] in the Bible or out of it, of equal literary merit’:

One feels, indeed, as if it were not Hebrew; such a noble universality, different from noble patriotism or sectarianism, reigns in it. A noble Book; all men’s Book! It is our first, oldest statement of the never-ending Problem, – man’s destiny, and God’s ways with him here in this earth. And all in such free flowing outlines; grand in its sincerity, in its simplicity; in its epic melody, and repose of reconcilement. There is the seeing eye, the mildly understanding heart. So true everywhere; true eyesight and vision for all things; material things no less than spiritual; the Horse, – ‘hast thou clothed his neck with thunder?’ – he ‘laughs at the shaking of the spear!’ Such living likenesses were never since drawn. Sublime sorrow, sublime reconciliation: oldest choral melody as of the heart of mankind; – so soft, and great; as the summer midnight, as the world with its seas and stars!16

In Repetition (1843), the Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard (1813–55), now widely regarded as the founding father of Existentialism – and one of Hegel’s most vociferous intellectual opponents – discussed Job’s destitution and subsequent compensation. And in one of his four Edifying Discourses (1843) he presented a commentary on the verse ‘The Lord gave, and the Lord hath taken away’ (Job 1:21), writing: ‘Only the thoughtless man could wish that Job should not accom- pany him, that his venerable name should not remind him of what he seeks to forget – that terror and anxiety exist in life.’17 Yet the issues raised by the Book of Job run right through Kierkegaard’s writings, such as Fear and Trembling (1843). Even though the episode that forms the focus of this work is the story of how Abraham was commanded to sacrifice his son Isaac, it touches on the same question of the relation between faith and reason, and the implications for how we choose to act. Corresponding in 1954 with Père William Lachat and in 1957 with the Reverend David Cox, Jung chose yet another biblical example to make a similar point, the story of how the prophet Hosea was commanded to marry a whore, thereby ‘making himself ridiculous’ and ‘overturning the traditional order’:18

[T]he action of the Holy Spirit does not meet us in the atmosphere of a normal, bourgeois (or proletarian!), sheltered, regular life, but only in the insecurity outside the human economy, in the infinite spaces where one is alone with the providentia Dei. We must never forget that Christ was an innovator and revolutionary, executed with criminals. The reformers and great religious 8 Introduction

geniuses were heretics. It is there that you find the footprints of the Holy Spirit, and no one asks for him or receives him without having to pay a high price. The price is so high that no one today would dare to suggest that he possesses or is possessed by the Holy Spirit, or he would be too close to the psychiatric clinic. The danger of making oneself ridiculous is too real, not to mention the risk of offending our real god: respectability. [. . .] And yet how can there be religion without the experience of the divine will? Things are comparatively easy as long as God wants nothing but the fulfilment of his laws, but what if he wants you to break them, as he may do equally well? Poor Hosea could believe in the symbolic nature of his awkward marriage, but what about the equally poor little doctor who has to swear his soul away to save a human life? (CW 18 §1539 and §1637)

(Kierkegaard’s reading of Job formed the basis of a discussion of the biblical text by the French existentialist philosopher Jean Wahl (1888–1974), who, like Jung, placed great emphasis on the rightness of Job’s position vis-à-vis God.19 And another later biblical commentator has seen the Book of Job as a work which, in Kierkegaard’s phrase from the Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846), ‘keeps the wound of the negative open’.20) In a widely read and influential work from the end of the nineteenth century, William Hale White (1831–1913), who wrote under the pseudonym ‘Mark Rutherford’, referred to the Book of Job as part of his classic exposition of the shift from religious dissent to doubt. In Mark Rutherford’s Deliverance (1885), the sequel to The Autobiography of Mark Rutherford, Dissenting Minister (1881), the story of Job was used to illustrate the position that it would be ‘a mockery to think about love for the only God whom I knew, the forces that maintained the universe’:

In Job, God reminds us that man is not the measure of his creation. The world is immense, constructed on no plan or theory which the intellect of man can grasp. It is transcendent everywhere. This is the burden of every verse, and is the secret, if there be one, of the poem. Sufficient or insufficient, there is nothing more [. . .] God is great, we know not his ways. He takes from us all we have, but yet if we possess our souls in patience, we may pass the valley of the , and come out in sunlight again. We may or we may not! [. . .] What more have we to say now than God said from the whirlwind over a thousand five hundred years ago?21

Jung may well have known this passage, for it is quoted in William James’s The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature (1902), first delivered as the Gifford Lectures on Natural Religion at Edinburgh in 1901/02. As James himself wrote to a friend, these lectures were highly popular,22 and Jung alluded to the discussion of Job in the eighteenth lecture in his letter to his friend, the pastor and theologian Adolf Keller (1872–1963), of September 1956 (L2, p. 330). In that chapter, entitled ‘Philosophy’, James had attacked dogmatic theology (otherwise Introduction 9 known as systematic theology, the exposition of Christian doctrine) and, in particular, its arguments for the existence of a holy, omnipotent, omniscient, just, loving, and unalterable God, declaring of such arguments:

It stands with them as ill as with the arguments for [God’s] existence. Not only do post-Kantian idealists reject them root and branch, but it is a plain historic fact that they never have converted any one who has found in the moral complexion of the world, as he experienced it, reasons for doubting that a good God can have framed it. To prove God’s goodness by the scholastic argument that there is no non-being in his essence would sound to such a witness simply silly. No! the book of Job went over this whole matter once for all and definitively. Ratiocination is a relatively superficial and unreal path to the deity: ‘I will lay mine hand upon my mouth; I have heard of Thee by the hearing of the ear, but now mine eye seeth Thee.’ An intellect perplexed and baffled, yet a trustful sense of presence – such is the situation of the man who is sincere with himself and with the facts, but who remains religious still.23

Among James’s conclusions about the religious person’s experience in the final chapter of his work were the propositions that ‘the visible world is part of a more spiritual universe from which it draws its chief significance’, that ‘union or harmonious relation with that higher universe is our true end’, and that ‘spiritual energy flows in and produces effects, psychological or material, within the phenomenal world’.24 Such views reflect the Swedenborgian beliefs of William’s father, Henry James senior, and would have chimed well with the attitude toward religion adopted by Jung, who himself was at least familiar with some of the teachings of Swedenborg.25 Throughout the twentieth century, the figure of Job has remained a compelling one for all kinds of thinkers and intellectuals, in both the German-speaking and English-speaking worlds.26 For example, in 1917 the Austrian Expressionist Oskar Kokoschka (1886–1980) turned a short play into a three-act drama called Hiob, and the biblical story into an allegory of sexuality, producing the play in Dresden and publishing the text with 14 lithographs. In 1919 the novelist H.G. Wells (1866–1946) (whom Jung met on a couple of occasions) published The Undying Fire, subtitled A Contemporary Novel, which re-enacts the biblical legend in the form of conversations among the ruined and now cancer-ridden ex-headmaster of Woldingstanton School, Mr Job Huss (= Job of Uz), with the governors, Dr Elihu Barrack (= Elihu son of Barachel), Sir Eliphaz Burrows (= Eliphaz), Mr William Dad (= Bildad) and Mr Joseph Farr (= Zophär), who wish to turn the school into a modern commercial school (the ‘undying fire’ in Man of the title is the refusal to ‘curse God and die’).27 The Jewish philosopher Lev Shestov (1866–1938) wrote a study called In Job’s Balances (1929), which included essays on Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Spinoza, Pascal, and Plotinus, and in 1930 the German novelist Joseph Roth (1894–1939) published Hiob, Roman eines einfachen Mannes, the story of 10 Introduction

Mendel Singer (the Job of Roth’s title) and his family, Jews who emigrate from Russian Galicia to America. The years following the Second World War showed an increase in the number of adaptations of the Job story, sometimes (but not always) with reference to its Jewish context. In 1945 the American poet Robert Frost (1874–1963) published the first of his two dramatic poems on theological themes, A Masque of Reason, in which God speaks the ironic words to Job:

You realize by now the part you played To stultify the Deuteronomist And change the tenor of religious thought. My thanks are to you for releasing me From moral bondage to the human race and Job is moved to remark:

The chances are when there’s so much pretence Of metaphysical profundity The obscurity’s a fraud to cover nothing. I’ve come to think no so-called hidden value’s Worth going after. Get down into things It will be found there’s no more given there Than on the surface. If there ever was, The crypt was long since rifled by the Greeks.28

In 1946 the critic and philosopher Margarete Susmann (1872–1966), who lived in Zurich, wrote a work entitled Das Buch Hiob und das Schicksal des jüdischen Volkes (1946), which investigated the identity of Job and the people of Israel, represented in Isaiah 53 by the figure of the suffering servant. Written in 1947–48, the drama Der Blinde (The Blind Man) by the Swiss playwright Friedrich Dürrenmatt (1921–90) reset the story of Job at the time of the Thirty Years War, deriving its dramatic tension from the conflict between the blind Duke (= Job) and the Italian nobleman, Negro da Ponte (= Satan). Martin Buber wrote in The Prophetic Faith (1949) that, ‘in order to grasp the great inner dialectic of the poem’, the reader must understand that the book presents ‘four views of God’s relationship to man’s sufferings’: that of the Prologue, that of the friends, that of Job ‘in his complaint and protest’, and that of God Himself. ‘In spite of its thorough rhetoric – the product of a long drawn-out literary process’, Job is, Buber recognized, ‘one of the special events in world literature, in which we witness the first clothing of a human quest in form of speech’.29 The year 1950 saw the publication of Job or the Four Mirrors by Karl Wolfskehl (1869–1948), a series of declamatory poems which foregrounded the relationship of Job to to four other biblical figures: the people of Israel, Samson, the Prophet, and the Messiah.30 Indeed, Wolfskehl himself had earlier identified himself with Job, when he wrote in 1933: Introduction 11

From that day on, when the ship left the harbour of Europe, I have known, lived, spoken, sobbed, and sung of the sign under which my life, the last phase of this earthly existence, has since stood. This sign, which is more than just an image, is the eternal calling of the Jewish fate. And I, flinchingly and almost reluctantly obedient, feel that, as the co-administrator, the co-protector of the German spirit, I am destined to represent the living, indeed, the creative symbol of this fate. From that moment on, everything I am, everything I create, has stood under the eternal name of Job; since then I have been, lived, experienced Job. Everything which, since then, I have written carries this name or, even when it appears to be have arisen independently, is pervaded by it.31

Beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, the emphasis of biblical criticism on the literary quality of the text drew attention to the ironic32 and the poetic33 qualities of Job. (The hit Broadway playwright Neil Simon offered a comic re-imagining of the Job story in God’s Favorite (1974), in which Joe Benjamin promises never to renounce God, come hell or high water... and promptly gets the modern equivalent.34) Then, in 1982, the literary critic Northrop Frye (whose earlier book Anatomy of Criticism (1957) had been influenced by Jungian ideas) published The Great Code, a study of the Bible – albeit not ‘a work of Biblical scholarship’, but rather an expression of Frye’s own ‘personal encounter with the Bible’.35 Like Jung in his Answer to Job, Frye saw the Bible in terms of ‘a unified structure of narrative and imagery’ (p. xiii), and he compared the biblical narrative to a sequence of human life:

If we follow the narrative of the Bible as a sequence of events in human life, it becomes a series of ups and downs in which God’s people periodically fall into bondage and are then rescued by a leader, while the great heathen empires rise and fall in the opposite rhythm. At a certain point this perspec- tive goes into reverse, and what we see is something more like an epic or romantic hero descending to a lower world to rescue what is at the same time a single bride and a large host of men and women. In this perspective the sequence of captivities and redemptions disappears and is replaced by a unique act of descent and return. But the act, if in itself unique, has many symbolic settings. (pp. 192–93)

Frye claimed that the Book of Job, ‘though it is classed with wisdom literature and includes a eulogy of wisdom, cannot be understood by the canons of wisdom alone’, but ‘needs the prophetic perspective to understand it’ (pp. 129, 198). In the Book of Job, Frye detects what he calls ‘the narrative unit in the Bible’, a U-shaped curve – ‘the U-shaped progression of original prosperity, descent to humiliation, and return’: ‘Job, like Adam, falls into a world of suffering and exile, “repents” (i.e., goes through a metanoia or metamorphosis of consciousness), and is restored to his original state, with interest’ (pp. 128, 198, 193). As such, the Book of Job is ‘the epitome of the narrative of the Bible’ as a whole (p. 193), and although it is ‘usually classified among the tragedies’, it is, Frye contended, ‘technically a 12 Introduction comedy of virtue of its “happy ending”, with Job restored to prosperity’ – albeit with, Frye suggested, the hint of a possible twist at the end:

The sequence of resolutions at the end follows the usual Biblical pattern. First is the restoration of the human community: we are told that God turned the captivity of Job when he prayed for his friends (42:10), even though what the friends have said ‘in God’s behalf’, to use Elihu’s phrase, is not acceptable. The reintegration of the human community is followed by the transfiguration of nature, in its humanized pastoral form. One of Job’s beautiful new daughters [‘Keren-happuch’, AV; ‘Mascara’, JB; Job 42:14] has a name meaning a box of eye shadow. Perhaps if we were to see Job in his restored state we should see, not beautiful daughters or sixteen thousand sheep, but only a man who has seen something that we have not seen, and knows something that we do not know. (p. 197)

As well as in literature and philosophy, the story of Job has been a major theme for painters and musicians. Perhaps the most famous examples in the visual arts are the two major cycles of illustrations by William Blake (1757–1827), a series of watercolours produced largely in 1805 to 1806, and a second set of engravings produced in 1823 to 1826, which show Blake at his most striking. (Even though Jung described himself as ‘no particular friend of Blake’, and regarded Blake’s work as ‘an artistic production rather than an authentic representation of unconscious processes’, the engravings have found at least one commentator from the school of Jung.36) In Jung’s lifetime, two British composers wrote pieces based on the story about Job: in 1892, Hubert H. Parry (1848–1918) composed an oratorio for voices and orchestra, entitled Job, and in 1935 Ralph Vaughan Williams (1872–1958) wrote Job: A Masque for Dancing. The British composer Peter Maxwell Davies has also composed a piece for four soloists, chorus and orchestra called Job (1997), based on Stephen Mitchell’s translation (1979) of the biblical work. At the beginning of the 1980s, the literary theorist Hans-Robert Jauss (born 1921), drawing on the earlier discussions of the Book of Job by Hans Blumenberg (1920–96) and Ernst Bloch (1885–1977), drew a line of continuity between the biblical text, Goethe’s Faust, Nietzsche’s parable of the madman in The Gay Science, and Heidegger’s discussion of that text in a 1943 lecture.37 At around the same time, the American psychiatrist Israel J. Gerber used the Book of Job as a focus for his investigation into the religious aspects of suffering in Job on Trial: A Book for Our Time (1982). In Dame Muriel Spark’s novel The Only Problem (1984), the only problem – that of suffering – forms the backdrop to the story of Harvey, a fomer theological student whose tranquil life, spent writing a monograph on the Book of Job and admiring Georges de la Tour’s painting Job visité par sa femme, is disturbed by the arrest of his former wife on terrorist charges. In 1985, René Girard offered a reading of the text in terms of the theory of ‘mimetic desire’, Introduction 13 according to which ‘the unanimous violence of the group is transfigured into a sacred epiphany’.38 Once freed from the Prologue, he argued, the dialogues of the Book of Job ‘present something particularly conclusive and convincing about the principles that govern the transformation of collective violence into the sacred’, demonstrating ‘the all against one of the scapegoat mechanism’ (pp. 31, 24). Contrasting Oedipus, ‘a successful scapegoat, because he is never recognized as such’, with Job, ‘a failed scapegoat’, Girard claimed that Job ‘derails the mythology that is meant to envelop him, by maintaining his own point of view in the face of the formidable unanimity surrounding him’ and that, ‘[b]y remaining faithful to the truth revealed by the victim, Job is the true hero of knowledge rather than Oedipus, who is perceived as such in the philosophical tradition’ (p. 35). Among the theologians proper, in The Betrayal of God: Ideological Conflict in Job (1990), the biblical scholar David Penchansky uses Western Marxist, French Structuralist, Russian Formalist, and deconstructive techniques of interpretation to offer a ‘dissonantal reading’ of Job,39 and to investigate those ‘rough, violent, unpre- dictable’ qualities of the God described in the Hebrew Bible, particularly the Book of Job, which suggest that ‘the portrait of the deity’ in this book was ‘ironical and deliberately deconstructive’.40 In the early 1990s, as if to show its perennial importance, as well as the variety of readings that it can sustain, the New York Times columnist William Safire interpreted the Book of Job as an example of political expression in which Job emerged as ‘the first dissident’, showing how the biblical text offers ‘the blueprint for modern dissidence’, and arguing that ‘in the exercise of any kind of power, the best way to create a constituency of the devout is to stimulate the creativity of the defiant’.41 And in 1995, the columnist and former Jesuit Jack Miles offered a reading not just of the Book of Job but of the entire Hebrew Bible that is remarkably close to Jung’s analysis (without, however, apparently drawing on Jung). In God: A Biography, Miles showed how one could read the Bible as ‘God’s story’, treating God as a ‘literary character’, ‘the protagonist of a classic of world literature’. For Miles, ‘when we read the Bible as a work of literature in which God is the protagonist, it becomes the story of how he gradually became both more unitary and more ethical’ – the story, no less, of ‘God’s self-discovery’.42 Attempting, as Jung did, ‘a consciously postcritical or postmodern reintegration of mythic, fictional, and historical elements in the Bible so as to allow the character of God to stand forth more clearly from the work of which he is the protagonist’, Miles argues that ‘Job becomes the starting point in the life of God, reading that life as a movement from self-ignorance to self-knowledge’. Miles rejects traditional interpretations of Job’s final reply in chapter 42 in terms of repentance, seeing it instead as ‘irony responding to sarcasm’ – the sarcasm, that is, of the Lord’s speeches from the whirlwind. In those speeches, Miles writes, ‘the Lord’s inscrutable ways have been made all too scrutable’, and the encounter with Job has changed both God and humankind:

[Job] harangues God, countercharacterizing him relentlessly as not the kind of God who would do what we the readers know he has just done. Without 14 Introduction

realizing that he does so, Job changes the subject, making God’s righteousness rather than his own the question on the reader’s mind. And ultimately on God’s own mind as well, for in the end, Job wins: The Lord bows, in a way, to Job’s characterization of God, abandons his wager with the devil, and after a vain attempt to shout Job down, atones for his wrongdoing by doubling Job’s initial fortune. Job may, therefore, have saved the Lord from himself, yet God can never seem to Job after this episode quite what he seemed before it. [. . .] After Job, God knows his own ambiguity as he has never known it before.43

(We can see here how close the style of presentation is to Jung’s.) In his follow-up work to this biography of a (quasi-Jungian) God who initially ‘does not know who he is’, comes to combine in his own character ‘several ancient personalities’, and achieves ‘self-understanding’ only through ‘crisis’ and ‘trauma’, Miles has inter- preted the figure of Christ in the New Testament in terms of the resolution of ‘a crisis in the life of God’.44 Finally, the Slovenian cultural critic Slavoj Zizˇ ˇek has had recourse to the story of Job in his analysis of religion in a ‘postmodern’ age:

Christianity gives a specific twist to the story of Job, the man-believer abandoned by God – it is Christ (God) himself who has to occupy the place of Job. Man’s identity with God is asserted only in/through God’s radical self- abandonment, when his distance towards God overlaps with the inner distance of God towards himself. [. . .] This divine self-abandonment, this impene- trability of God to Himself, thus signals God’s fundamental imperfection. And it is only within this horizon that the properly Christian Love can emerge, a Love beyond Mercy. Love is always love for the Other insofar as he is lacking – we love the Other BECAUSE of his limitation, helplessness, ordinariness even. In contrast to the pagan celebration of the Divine (or human) Perfection, the ultimate secret of the Christian love is, perhaps, the loving attachment to the Other’s imperfection.45

Given the enthusiasm among all kinds of commentators for interpreting Job, right up to those of our present day, Jung’s decision to write a psychological analysis of it seems almost inevitable.

KNOWLEDGE OR FAITH?

In addition to the tradition of theological and philosophical commentary on the Book of Job, there is a broader socio-theological context in terms of which the composition of Answer to Job should be seen: the continuing decline in religious belief in general, and in Christianity in particular, which has been a feature of intellectual life in Europe since the Enlightenment. After all, Kant had written in the preface to the second edition (1787) of his Critique of Pure Reason that he had found it necessary Introduction 15

‘to deny knowledge [Wissen] in order to make room for faith [Glauben]’,46 and in a letter to Fichte of 1799, Jacobi had gone as far as castigating philosophical idealism as leading to ‘nihilism’.47 So although nihilism is frequently regarded as part of the ‘modernist’ or ‘postmodernist’ condition, its roots go back at least as far as the post- Kantian philosophy of Fichte.48 The decline of organized religion and the growth of nihilism were, in turn, both welcomed by Nietzsche, who was to speak, in his notes for The Will to Power, of nihilism as ‘the uncanniest of all guests’, standing right before our door.49 In so doing, Nietzsche was taking up again a theme that had preoccupied him from The Birth of Tragedy (1872) onwards. In that work, Nietzsche described myth as ‘the necessary prerequisite of every religion’, and lamented its paralysis and consequent subjugation in Wihelmine Germany at the hands of optimism, ‘the germ of destruction in our society’.50 The suppression of myth, Nietzsche argued, represented nothing less than the death of religion:

For this is the way in which religions are wont to die out: under the stern, intelligent eyes of an orthodox dogmatism, the mythical premises of a religion are systematized as a sum total of historical events; one begins apprehensively to defend the credibility of the myths, while at the same time one opposes any continuation of their natural vitality and growth; the feeling for myth perishes, and its place is taken by the claim of religion to historical foundations.51

If, in The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche was hoping for a renewal of myth, not in the form of a revival of Christianity, of course, but in the form of the Dionysian music of Richard Wagner, he would later turn away from Wagner and create Zarathustra, his own symbol of the qualities required for willing the anti-Christian, anti- optimistic figure of the Superman. For his part, Wagner saw his music drama as meeting a specific historical need. In Religion and Art (1880), written at the time when he was composing Parsifal, he claimed that art could act as a substitute for religion:

One might say that where Religion becomes artificial, it is reserved for Art to save the spirit of religion by recognising the figurative value of the mythic symbols which the former would have us believe in their literal sense, and revealing their deep and hidden truth through an ideal presentation.52

And it was not artists and philosophers alone who understood that the status of the mythical element in religion, especially Christianity, had become extremely problematic. For example, there was the theologian David Friedrich Strauss (1808–74), whom Nietzsche savagely attacked in the first of his Untimely Meditations in 1873 for undermining the revival of the kind of ‘tragic culture’ that The Birth of Tragedy had envisaged. Writing in the historico-critical tradition of the nineteenth century that went back to Schleiermacher’s Life of (1832), in The Life of Jesus Critically Examined (1846) Strauss stripped the figure of Jesus of its supernatural trappings, and in The Old Faith and the New (1872) the idea of 16 Introduction a personal God was rejected. Denied its ‘mythical’ status, ‘the ideal Christ’ which remained for Strauss was not even an historical figure, but ‘mankind’s moral exemplar’. In France, the historian, scholar, and critic Ernst Renan (1823–92) published, in 1863, his Life of Jesus (the first volume of his larger project, The Origins of Christianity (1863–83)). In his biography of Jesus, the Hegelian- influenced Renan drew on recent German scholarship (including Strauss) for its exegesis of the Bible, offering a rationalized and, above all, psychological interpretation of the figure of Christ. In fact, the late nineteenth century saw such a proliferation of biographies of the founder of Christianity that Albert Schweitzer (1875–1965), the Swiss biblical scholar turned missionary, saw the need to provide an overview of them in Die Geschichte der Leben-Jesu-Forschung (1906; trans. The Quest for the Historical Jesus, 1910), as well as contributing his own views to the theological debate in Das Messianitäts- und Leidensgeheimnis (1901). That Jung was aware of this nineteenth-century debate is made clear in his letter of 3 November 1952 to Upton Sinclair (1878–1968) (himself the author of a book about Christ),53 to whom he wrote:

Being the son of a parson, and having grown up in an atmosphere steeped in theology, I learnt about a number of attempts such as those of Strauss, Renan, Moore, etc., and in later years I was an ardent reader of A. Schweitzer’s work. I have repeatedly, i.e., at different phases of my life, tried to realize what kind of personality – explaining the whole effect of its existence – could be reconstructed from the scanty historical evidence offered by the New Testament. Having had a good deal of psychological experience, I should have been sufficiently equipped for such a task, but in the end I came to the conclusion that, owing on the one hand to the paucity of historical data, and on the other to the abundance of mythological admixtures, I was unable to reconstruct a personal character free from rather fatal contradictions. (L2, pp. 87–88)54

This ‘reconstruction’ of the figure of Christ could refer, at least in part, to Jung’s discussion of ‘Christ as Archetype’ in his essay ‘A Psychological Approach to the Dogma of the ’ (1942/48) (CW 12 §§226–33), but also to his psychological analysis of Christ in Answer to Job. (Whilst Jung’s attitude to Renan seems to have been largely positive, his attitude towards Schweitzer was far more ambivalent: in 1952, he wrote that Schweitzer was ‘urgently needed in Europe but prefers to be a touching saviour of savages and to hang his theology on the wall’, adding that ‘we have a justification for missionizing only when we have straightened ourselves out here, otherwise we are merely spreading our own disease’; and in 1953, he wrote: ‘I rate this man and his scientific achievements very highly and admire his gifts and versatility’; but: ‘I can see no particular merit in his recognition that Christ and his apostles erred in their expectation of the parousia and that this disappoint- ment had repercussions on the development of ecclesiastical dogma’; and: ‘Faced with the truly appalling afflictio animae [= affliction of the soul] of the European Introduction 17 man, Schweitzer abdicated from the task incumbent on the theologian, the cura animarum [ = cure of souls], and studied medicine in order to treat the sick bodies of natives’.55) Whereas Albrecht Ritschl (1822–89), Adolf von Harnack (1851–1930), and other liberal thinkers were equally concerned to present Christianity in a form acceptable to contemporary society (but were criticized for their approach by, among others, the early Jung),56 it was, amongst subsequent German theologians, Rudolf Bultmann (1884–1976) who argued most consistently for what he called the ‘de-mythologization’ (Entmythologisierung) of Christianity.57 In Kerygma and Myth (1952), Bultmann defined ‘myth’ as follows:

Mythology is the use of imagery to express the otherworldly in terms of this world and the divine in terms of human life, the other side in terms of this side. For instance, divine transcendence is expressed as spatial distance. It is a mode of expression which makes it easy to understand the cultus as an action in which material means are used to convey immaterial power.58

If, as is often said, Hegel in his Life of Jesus (1795) presented a figure of Christ who spoke the language of Kant’s moral philosophy, then Bultmann presented a version of Christianity that took as its framework the existentialist philosophy of Martin Heidegger (a close friend and colleague). To Jung, however, Bultmann’s entire approach was anathema and, in a letter of 17 March 1951, he described Bultmann’s attempt at demythologization as ‘a consequence of Protestant rationalism’which would lead to ‘the progressive impoverishment of symbolism’. (The psychologist and philosopher Karl Jaspers (1883–1969) likewise argued, contra Bultmann, that the significance of symbols lay precisely in the way they eluded rational understanding.59) ‘What is left over’, Jung believed, ‘does not suffice to express the prodigal (and dangerous) world of the unconscious, to join it to consciousness or, as the case may be, to hold it in check’ (L2, p. 7). With reference to a case he had once seen,60 Jung concluded his attack on Bultmann as follows: ‘“Demythologization”! What hybris! Reminiscent of the disinfection of heaven with sublimate of mercury by a crazy doctor who then declared God could [not] be found. Yet God is the mythologem kat ‘exochen [= par excellence]’ (L2, p. 9).61 His Answer to Job is, in some respects, an answer to Bultmann too. Jung’s response to Bultmann points to a completely different understanding of myth. Indeed, for Jung, religion is ‘precisely that function which links us back to the eternal myth’, and so to strip the myth away from religion is to destroy religion entirely (CW 11 §647). Jung’s view of the importance of myth was derived from Nietzsche and, in particular, The Birth of Tragedy: ‘Without myth every culture loses the healthy natural power of its creativity: only a horizon defined by myths completes and unifies a whole cultural movement.’62 Consequently, Jung argues that it is a mistake to equate ‘myth’ with mere ‘fiction’ since, for him, ‘myth is not fiction: it consists of facts that are continually repeated and can be observed over and over again’ (CW 11 §648). Hence the ‘mythical character’ of a life is ‘just 18 Introduction what expresses its universal human validity’, and Jung goes on to speculate that ‘it is perfectly possible, psychologically, for the unconscious or an archetype to take complete possession of someone and to determine his or her fate down to the smallest detail’. For Jung, Christ was ‘just such a personality’. In the case of these individuals, the archetype is also represented by ‘objective, non-psychic parallel phenomena’, suggesting that ‘the archetype fulfils itself not only psychically in the individual, but objectively outside the individual’ (§648). (Such a coincidence of objective and subjective archetypal phenomena was what Jung, in a controversial paper published in 1952, called ‘’.) The post-Nietzschean, theological background to Jung’s psychology can be most clearly seen in his early writings. In Transformations and Symbols of the Libido (1911/12), Jung had, in effect, reversed Kant’s formula, proposing instead to abolish faith and replace it with knowledge – knowledge, that is, of the psychological symbol:

The religious myth meets us here as one of the greatest and most significant human institutions which, despite misleading symbols, nevertheless gives man assurance and strength, so that he may not be overwhelmed by the monsters of the universe. The symbol, considered from the standpoint of actual truth, is misleading, indeed, but it is psychologically true, because it was and is the bridge to all the greatest achievements of humanity. [. . .] This would be the course of moral autonomy, of perfect freedom, when man could without compulsion wish that which he must do, and this from knowledge, without delusion through belief in the religious symbols. [. . .] I think belief [der Glaube] should be replaced by understanding [das Verstehen]; then we would keep the beauty of the symbol, but still remain free from the depressing results of submission to belief. This would be the psychoanalytic cure for belief and disbelief.63

The redemption, in psychological terms, of both faith and non-belief thus lay, for Jung, in a post-Nietzschean transformation of faith into a ‘secular religion’, although the extent to which the practice and institutions of analytical psychology can be understood in terms of a ‘religion’, or even a ‘cult’, remains controversial. Rejecting the accusation that he was out to establish a ‘Jungian Church’ as ‘sheer defamation’, in 1956 Jung told the British psychologist and theologian H.L. Philp, he knew ‘a considerable number of people that have converted to the Catholic Church after they were analysed by myself’. In this same letter, Jung claimed: ‘I am definitely inside Christianity and, as far as I am capable of judging about myself, on the direct line of historical development.’ Characteristically, however, Jung set up a parallel between himself and the Pope, whilst at the same time aligning himself with the Reformation, Protestantism, and even ‘heresy’!

If the Pope adds a new and thoroughly unhistorical dogma to Catholicism, I add a symbolic interpretation of all Christian symbols. At least I am trying Introduction 19

to. If the Reformation is a heresy, I am certainly a heretic too. [. . .] Looked at from a strictly Catholic point of view I make very heretical statements indeed; but there are plenty of reformers that have done the same thing, including the present Pope, declaring the dogma [of the Assumption] without the slightest apostolic authority and without the consent even of his own Church, which has emphatically resisted any such declaration during at least the 600 years of its early history. [. . .] Thus far I am a Protestant in my soul and body, even if most of the Protestant theologians are just as childishly prejudiced as the Catholic priests. (L2, pp. 334–35)

If we examine Jung’s remarks in his correspondence, or at least in that portion of it which has been published, we find there is a remarkable continuity between his concern with the psychological significance of religion in the first decade or so of the century and his attitude, as a psychologist, towards religion in the 1950s, that is, during the time of the composition of Answer to Job. For example, in his letter of 17 March 1951 to a correspondent known as Dr H., Jung wrote that he was fighting ‘for the reactivation of symbolic thinking, because of its therapeutic value, and against the presumptuous undervaluation of myth, which only a very few people have the least understanding of anyway’ (L2, p. 8). Writing to a Protestant minister in Basle, Dorothee Hoch, on 28 May 1952, Jung pointed out: ‘My docu- mentation is concerned with the historical development of ideas in Western culture’; and on 3 November 1952 he told the American novelist Upton Sinclair that the problem of Christ ‘can only be approached through [the history of man] and comparative psychology of symbols’ (L2, pp. 66 and 91). When asked in 1955 by the editor of the journal of the Pastoral Psychology Book Club in New York, Simon Doniger, how Answer to Job came to be written, Jung replied by describing the aim of his work as being ‘to point out [the] historical evolution [of the problem of Job] since the time of Job down through the centuries to the most recent symbolic phenomena like the Assumption Mariae, etc.’ (L2, p. 282). And in a letter of 7 May 1960 to an unnamed correspondent, Jung wrote that the Preface and Introduction to Answer to Job showed that he was approaching the biblical text, not in terms of personal belief, but in terms of ‘the history of symbols’ (L2, p. 556). True to what he regarded as his Kantian roots, in his letter to G.A. van den Bergh von Eysinga of 13 February 1954, Jung had recourse, when speaking about God, to the notion of ‘symbolic anthropomorphism’ as presented in Kant’s Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (1783):

We hold ourselves to [the boundary of experience] if we limit our judgment merely to the relation that the world may have to a being whose concept itself lies outside all cognition that we can attain within the world. For we then do not attribute to the supreme being any of the properties in themselves by which we think the objects of experience, and we thereby avoid dogmatic anthropo- morphism; but we attribute those properties, nonetheless, to the relation of this 20 Introduction

being to the world, and we allow ourselves a symbolic anthropomorphism, which in fact concerns only language and not the object itself.64

By aligning himself with Kant’s concern for, as Jung put it, ‘“language” (and mimic representation in general) but not the object itself ’, Jung believed himself to be right to distinguish between God and the God-image, ‘an autonomous archetypal pattern’ (L2, p. 154) – a point that proved to be of central importance in his debate with Martin Buber (see Chapter 2), as well as in his Answer to Job. It is difficult to judge what religious convictions Jung actually held, let alone the sincerity with which he may have held them. In response to a questionnaire sent to him in 1955 by Palmer A. Hilty, a professor of English at the State College of Washington, Jung had no hesitation in describing himself as a Protestant in the Swiss Reformed tradition (L2, p. 274), and he spoke, on this occasion and on several others,65 of having, not belief in God, but knowledge: ‘I don’t need to believe, I know.’ Although he interpreted this remark to Valentine Brooke as meaning that he knew ‘of the existence of God-images’, Jung was nevertheless buried, following a funeral service at the local Protestant church, in the family grave in the cemetery at Küsnacht. According to his biographer Vincent Brome, ‘what one witness described as a “hushed assembly” came to the Protestant church in Küsnacht where the pastor celebrated his passing as a prophet who had stemmed the flood of rationalism “and given man the courage to have a soul again”’.66 He lectured with enthusiasm on religious themes, including the Terry Lectures at Yale University on ‘Psychology and Religion’ (1938), and his lectures at the Eranos conferences tackled such themes as ‘A Psychological Approach to the Dogma of the Trinity’ (1942) and ‘Transformation Symbolism in the Mass’.67 On 30 April 1960, Jung told the psychotherapist Josef Rudin (b. 1907) that his client base came from ex-believers, non-believers, or believers in religions other than Christianity: ‘I have in the main to do with people who have either lost their Christianity or never had any, or with adherents of other religions who nevertheless belong to the human family’ (L2, p. 553). He went on to make the following point: ‘It is impossible for me to subscribe to the view of a theological friend who said: “Buddhists are no concern of ours”. In the doctor’s consulting-room they are very much our concern and deserve to be addressed in a language common to all men’ (pp. 553–54). Given this remark, it is not surprising that Jung also wrote commen- taries on the Tibetan Book of the Dead (1935) and the Tibetan Book of the Great Liberation (1939), and provided forewords to Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki’s Introduction to Zen Buddhism (1939) and Richard Wilhelm’s translation of the (1950).68 There is evidence that the 1950s saw an intensification of Jung’s interest in the question of religion, of which his writing of the Answer to Job is arguably the most important example. For instance, in 1950 Jung published the fourth version of Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido, now retitled Symbole der Wandlung (Symbols of Transformation).69 In this substantially revised version, Jung greatly expanded the material discussed between his observation that ‘sentimentality is repressed brutality’ (1911/12)/‘sentimentality is sister to brutality’ (1950) (PU Introduction 21

§690/CW 5 §668) and his statement that, in mythology, the annual sacrifice of the maiden to the dragon represented an ideal (symbolic) sacrifice (PU §692/CW 5 §671). This material includes a digression on the etymology of the word religion, derived (according to the OED) by Cicero from religere (= to read over again), but connected by later authors to religare (= to bind). To his observation that ‘(the part of) the libido which erects religious structures regresses/is fixed in the last analysis to/in the mother, and thus represents the real bond through which we are (permanently) connected with our origins’ (PU §691/CW 5 §669), Jung appended the following remark: ‘When the Church Fathers derive the word religio from religare (to reconnect, link back), they could at least have appealed to this psychological fact in support of their view’ (CW 5 §669). And, in a footnote, he added that ‘the original derivation from religere (to go through again, think over, recollect) is the more probable’ (n. 71). Nine years later, in a letter to a pastor in Kronbühl, Canton St Gallen, etymological considerations were once again at the base of Jung’s distinction between ‘religion’ (now derived, he said, from relegere or religere (to ponder, to take account of, to observe, e.g., in prayer))70 and ‘creed’. By ‘religion’ (Religion), Jung told Pastor Tanner, he meant ‘a kind of attitude which takes careful and conscientious account of certain numinous feelings, ideas, and events[,] and reflects upon them’, whereas, for him, ‘belief’ or ‘creed’ (Konfession) meant ‘an organized community which collectively professes a specific belief or a specific ethos and mode of behaviour’ (L2, pp. 483–84). In practice, then, ‘faith without religion’ could be translated, he claimed, as ‘“(non-denominational) religion without creed”, manifestly an unorganized, non-collective, entirely individual exercise of the “religious function”’, a trend which Jung regarded as ‘characteristic of present- day humanity, especially the young’. Going on to diagnose this social condition, Jung argued that ‘people have grown rather tired of believing [daß die Leute etwas glaubensmüde sind] and are worn out by the effort of having to cling on to ideas which seem incomprehensible to them and are therefore quite literally unbelievable’. In these circumstances, he claimed, theologians such as Bultmann had responded by ‘purifying’ the tenets of belief and relieving them of ‘their principal encumbrances, which for the rationalist are their particularly obnoxious “mythological” elements’ (L2, p. 484). Yet even the approach of Bultmann and his followers, he insisted, betrayed the persistence of the need for mythology. Cunningly, Jung even found a link between materialism and the dogma of the Assumption:

But if the believer without religion now thinks that he has got rid of mythology he is deceiving himself: he cannot get by without ‘myth’. Religio is by its very nature always an erga, a ‘towards’, no matter whether the following accusative be ‘God’, ‘Redeemer’, a philosophical idea or an ethical principle; it is always a ‘mythic’ or transcendental statement. This is naturally also the case when the ultimate principle is called ‘matter’. Only the totally naïve think this is the opposite of ‘myth’. Materia is in the end simply a chthonic mother goddess, 22 Introduction

and the late Pope [Pius XII] seems to have had an inkling of this. (Cf. the second Encyclical to the dogma of the Assumption!) (L2, pp. 484–85)

Like Nietzsche, Jung saw myth as an essential constituent of religion, without which even the very possibility of religious experience may be no more. Further on in his letter to Pastor Tanner, he explained:

With this radical ‘demythologization’ religious communication comes to a dead end too. Myth is pre-eminently a social phenomenon: it is told by the many and heard by the many. It gives the ultimately unimaginable religious experience an image, a form in which to express itself, and thus makes community life possible, whereas a merely subjective religious experience lacking the traditional mythic imagery remains inarticulate and asocial, and, if it does anything at all, it fosters a spiritually anchoritic life. (L2, p. 486)

The flip-side of this particular coin was, however, Jung’s belief that myth, whilst it might have decayed, nevertheless remained a potential force for psychological good:

Myths are descriptions of psychic processes and developments, therefore. Since these, so long and so far as they are still in the unconscious state, prove to be inaccessible to any arbitrary alteration, they exert a compelling influence on consciousness as pre-existent conditioning factors. This influence is neither abolished nor corrected by any environmental conditions. From ancient times, therefore, it has been deemed a daemonium. No amount of reason can conjure this empirical fact out of existence. (L2, p. 487)

Towards the end of what even Jung himself described as an ‘unusually prolix’ letter to Pastor Tanner, however, he speculated on the possibility that, despite the forces ranged against it, myth might not prove to be ineradicable, and suggested that it would be thanks to psychology, not to the theology of Bultmann, that Christianity – or ‘the Christian myth’, as he put it – would be revived:

These new insights enable us to gain a new understanding of mythology and of its importance as an expression of intrapsychic processes. And from this in turn we gain a new understanding of the Christian myth, and more particularly of its apparently obnoxious statements that are contrary to all reason. If the Christian myth is not to become obsolete – which would be a sell-out with quite unpredictable consequences – the need for a more psychologically oriented interpretation that would salvage its meaning and guarantee its contin- uance forces itself upon us. The danger of its final destruction is considerable Introduction 23

when even the theologians start to demolish the classic world of mythological ideas without putting a new medium of expression in its place. (L2, p. 488)

Thus, contrary to the claims of such recent critics as Richard Noll, who has ventured the opinion that, ‘as an individual, [Jung] ranks with the Roman emperor Julian the Apostate (fourth century CE) as one who significantly undermined orthodox Christianity and restored the polytheism of the Hellenistic world in Western civilization’, and moreover that, in important respects, ‘Jung has succeeded where Julian failed’,71 Jung sought to defend and protect Christianity. Yet Jung’s analytical psychological version of ‘the Christian myth’ was undeniably unconventional, insisting as it did on the pagan roots of Christianity. In a programmatic letter sent to Freud as early as 11 February 1910, Jung had written of ‘a far finer and more comprehensive task for Ψα [i.e., psychoanalysis] than alliance with an ethical fraternity’:

I think we must give it time to infiltrate into people from many centres, to revivify among intellectuals a feeling for symbol and myth, ever so gently to transform Christ back into the soothsaying god of the vine, which he was, and in this way absorb those ecstatic instinctual forces of Christianity for the one purpose of making the cult and the sacred myth what they once were – a drunken feast of joy where man regained the ethos and holiness of an animal. [. . .] A genuine and proper ethical development cannot abandon Christianity but must grow up within it, must bring to fruition its hymn of love, the agony and ecstasy over the dying and resurgent god [i.e., Dionysos-Zagreus], the mystic power of the wine, the awesome anthropophagy of the Last Supper – only this ethical development can serve the vital forces of religion. (Freud/Jung, p. 294)

‘A feeling for symbol and myth’ – throughout his Answer to Job, it is this feeling, not conventional theological dogmatics, that governs Jung’s investigation of the biblical text. For it is here that Jung succeeds in marrying the tenets and assumptions of analytical psychology with the history of commentary on this biblical book, along with the history of religion in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Finally, two further quotations serve to sum up Jung’s view of the relation- ship between, on the one hand, analytical psychology and, on the other, religion in general and Christianity in particular. Writing to Hélène Kiener, an analyt- ical psychologist in Strasbourg, on 15 June 1955, Jung claimed that ‘analytical psychology teaches that attitude which meets a transcendent reality halfway’, but only after reminding his correspondent: ‘Analytical psychology only helps us to find the way to the religious experience that makes us whole. It is not this experience itself, nor does it bring it about’ (L2, p. 265). About five years later, on 2 July 1960, Jung assured Oscar Nisse, a pastor in Brussels: ‘It was precisely through my analytic work that I arrived at an understanding not only of the 24 Introduction

Christian religion but, I may say, of all religions.’ And he told Nisse that ‘present- day Christianity is not the final truth’ (L2, p. 575). By contrast, Answer to Job is an attempt on Jung’s part to tell the final truth, as he saw it in terms of analytical psychology.

OVERVIEW

In presenting a deity that changes and interacts with humankind, Jung’s view of God acquires a distinctly Goethean flavour. In a short poem from the collection ‘God, Mind and World’, Goethe asked: Was wär ein Gott, der nur von außen stieße, / Im Kreis das All am Finger laufen ließe! (What kind of a God would it be who only intervenes from the outside, allowing the cosmos to circle around his finger!).72 This poem, one of his ‘world-philosophical’ texts, belongs to his late period (being written circa 1812/13), and displays a confidence in the existence of a micro–macrocosmic relationship between the individual and the world: Im Innern ist ein Universum auch (Inside there is a universe as well). But, if we are to believe the account of his early years in the autobiographical work, Dichtung und Wahrheit (1811–33), Goethe as a young man developed a cosmology that involved a quaternity, a Godhead that changes by acquiring and divesting itself of its own nature (verselbsten, entselbsten), and which is saturated in Gnostic, hermetic, and kabbalistic motifs.73 Like Jung, Goethe here imagines God in terms of a dynamic process:

I was fully minded to posit a deity that reproduces itself, by itself, from eternity. Since, however, reproduction cannot possibly be imagined without diversity, the only immediate result could be the appearance of a second entity, which we acknowledge under the name of the Son. These two had to continue the act of reproduction and they reappeared to themselves in the third entity, which was just as consistently alive and eternal as the others. That closed the circle of divinity, however, and even they themselves could not have produced another entity altogether equal to themselves. Since the urge to reproduce nevertheless constantly went on, they created a fourth entity, but it contained an inner contradiction, for while it was absolute, like them, at the same time it was to be kept within them and delimited by them. This, now, was Lucifer, to whom from now on the whole creative power was transferred, and from whom all other essence was to proceed. (pp. 261–62)

Thus within Goethe’s scheme, as in Jung’s, a divine quaternity is configured, consisting bizarrely of Father, Son, Holy Spirit, and – Satan/Lucifer. The function of Lucifer, although essentially negative, is nevertheless creative. True to the beliefs of Gnosticism,74 Goethe conceived of the universe – the realm of space and time – as created, not by God, but by the Devil: Introduction 25

From this concentration of the whole universe (for it had proceeded from Lucifer and had to follow him) there now arose everything that we perceive in the form of matter. We imagine it as being heavy, firm, and opaque, but since it derives by descent, if not with total immediacy, from the divine essence, it is just as absolutely powerful and eternal as its father and grandparents. Since all the mischief, if we may call it that, was purely the result of Lucifer’s unilateral actions, this universe of course lacked its better half. For while it possessed everything that is gained through concentration, it lacked everything that can be accomplished by expansion, and so the entire universe could have destroyed itself by perpetual concentration, have annihilated itself along with its father Lucifer, and have forfeited its claim to equal eternity with the deity. (p. 262)

Given this situation, God becomes involved with the universe, the realm of Lucifer, and this response constitutes the creation of the world and, in particular, the creation of humanity. Within the world as thus created, humanity shares in the nature of the deity as well as of the nature of Lucifer:

The Elohim watched this situation for a while, and they had the choice either to wait for aeons until the field was clear again and space left for a new universe, or to intervene in the existing condition and repair the defect according to their infinite nature. They decided on the latter, and through their will alone they made up in a moment’s time for the whole defect that marred the success of Lucifer’s enterprise. They gave the infinite essence the capacity of expanding, of moving toward the deity. The real pulse of life was restored again, and Lucifer himself could not escape its influence. This is the epoch when the thing we know as light emerged, and when the process began that we customarily designate with the word ‘creation’. Although this by degrees became more multifarious, thanks to the ever-active life energy of the Elohim, what was still missing was a being qualified to restore the original connection with the deity; and so man was brought forth. He was supposed to be like, indeed equal to the deity in everything, but because of that naturally found himself in the same situation as Lucifer, that is, simultaneously absolute and limited. And since this contradiction would be manifested by him in all the categories of existence, and his condition would be complicated by his perfect consciousness and resolute will, it was foreseeable that he would necessarily become at once the most perfect and the most imperfect, the happiest and the unhappiest of creatures. Before long, he was also playing Lucifer’s role entirely. Ingratitude really implies a separation from one’s benefactor, and so rebellion loomed for the second time; nevertheless, the whole creation is nothing and was nothing but a rebelling against and returning to the original source. (pp. 262–63) 26 Introduction

It could well be that Jung’s vision of God incorporates, consciously or uncon- sciously, some of the motifs from the cosmology presented by the 63-year-old Goethe. Certainly, in terms of style, Jung’s text follows Goethe’s in respect of its informal, even conversational tone – and sometimes (although by no means always) its irony. For whereas the playful, parodistic irony of Goethe’s attribution of his personal myth to his younger self (referred to in the third person) also distances himself from it, Jung’s writing is sometimes characterized by a ferocious earnest- ness, tempered only by an irony of the most savage kind. From another perspective, Jung’s ‘answer to Job’ could be read, too, as an ‘answer to Freud’. For years, the two men had competed on the field of anthro- pological interpretation. Following the publication of Transformations and Symbols of Libido, Freud wrote Totem and Taboo (1913).75 Whereas Jung had gone back, as he had told Freud in 1909, to Friedrich Creuzer, Richard Payne Knight, and Herodotus (Freud/Jung, pp. 255 and 258), and uncovered in the fantasies of Miss Miller a neo-Romantic ur-myth, Freud moved into the area of contemporary ethnography, drawing on recent accounts of primitives still living in the South Seas and Australia, mixed with a heady dose of Frazer’s Golden Bough. As controversial as Totem and Taboo might have been, it attracted an accolade from, for example, Thomas Mann.76 Significantly, in this work Freud opens the possibility of under- standing the Oedipus complex in terms of a collective (archetypal?) memory, inherited from the era of the primal horde. So when, in 1938, Freud published Moses and Monotheism, Jung may have seen himself licensed to return to the theme of the psychology of religion. In fact, Freud had been working on Moses and Monotheism since 1934, basing his book on the startling thesis, originally put forward by Ernst Sallin, that Moses had been an Egyptian.77 At the same time, Jung began to interest himself in the history of religion, although his focus was on Catholic, and certainly not Jewish, dogma. Whatever identifications or targets lay behind its composition, Answer to Job is a miniature exercise in cultural history, albeit on a vast time-scale. Compressed to the point of incomprehensibility, Jung’s argument can, if re-presented within a chronological framework, start to become coherent and meaningful. Whether it is right is, of course, another matter; but as a story, his narrative is compelling. In Jung’s own words, Job is ‘a hard nut to crack [daß für Unvorbereitete der Hiob eine harte Nuß ist]’,78 and the same is true of Jung’s commentary on the biblical text. To situate Jung’s work in its conscious and unconscious context, then, Part One of this book examines the personal and intellectual background to Jung’s composition of Answer to Job, and offers an overview of the most important secondary literature on this biblical text. Chapter 1 discusses the importance of the figure of Job to Jung in his childhood, particularly with reference to his reading of Goethe’s Faust. After outlining the main ideas of Aion (1951), a text by Jung that preceded Answer to Job and sets out many of the assumptions of the later work, I review Jung’s statements in his correspondence regarding the composition of Answer to Job, and provide a brief overview of the reception of this work. In Chapter 2, I look in more detail at the debate between Jung and Martin Buber on Introduction 27 the question of whether analytical psychology represented a revival of Gnosticism (a charge hotly disputed by Jung) and, by relating Answer to Job to Jung’s other writings, set out some of the basic concepts of analytical psychology that underpin the argument of this work. Then, in Part Two, I provide an analytical commentary on Jung’s Answer to Job. Chapter 3 examines the ‘Prefatory Note’ and ‘Lectori Benevolo’, and the theoretical presuppositions presented in those sections, before turning to Jung’s commentary on the Book of Job. Arguing that Jung’s Answer to Job becomes more intelligible if it is approached in the chronological order of the biblical events and texts it discusses, I look at his commentary on the Creation, on that part of the Hebrew Bible known as ‘Wisdom Literature’, and on the Prophets, particularly the and the apocryphal . Chapter 4 continues this analytical commentary, discussing Jung’s view of the Incarnation, Christ’s death, the advent of the Holy Spirit, the apocalyptic visions of the Book of Revelation, and finally developments in Catholic dogma in the twentieth century. A concluding chapter seeks to open up further possibilities of interpreting Jung’s Answer to Job as an important contribution to the history of ideas. This page intentionally left blank Bibliography

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