november 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 12

Combating Terrorism Center at West Point CTC Sentinel Objective . Relevant . Rigorous

Contents The Dilemma of the Yemeni

FEATURE ARTICLE Detainees at Guantanamo Bay 1 The Dilemma of the Yemeni Detainees By Gregory D. Johnsen and Christopher Boucek at Guantanamo Bay By Gregory Johnsen & Christopher Boucek

Reports 5 Al-Qa`ida’s Presence and Influence in Lebanon By Bilal Y. Saab 9 U.S. Cross-Border Raid Highlights Syria’s Role in Islamist Militancy By Anonymous 11 Afghanistan’s Heart of Darkness: Fighting the Taliban in Kunar Province By Brian Glyn Williams 14 Al-Qa`ida’s Changing Outlook on Pakistan By Jarret Brachman 16 Violent Trends in Algeria Since 9/11 By Hanna Rogan 19 Interview with a Former Terrorist: Nasir Abbas’ Deradicalization Work in Indonesia By Nick O’Brien 22 Shi`a Leaders Disagree on Integration Camp Delta at Guantanamo Naval Base. - Photo by Mark Wilson/Getty Images of Sons of Iraq into Army By Reidar Visser ore than one-third of the it has repeatedly sought assurances remaining 255 detainees at from the Yemeni government that it 23 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity the U.S. detention facility will set standardized restrictions before 28 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts in Guantanamo Bay are any individuals are released. Part of MYemenis, representing the single largest this hesitation stems from security national contingent. Since the detention concerns about what would happen to facility opened in early 2002, Yemenis the detainees once they are returned to have consistently comprised a sizeable Yemen. percentage of the population. Other About the CTC Sentinel countries, most notably Saudi Arabia, This article seeks to examine the The Combating Terrorism Center is an have successfully repatriated many of dilemma posed by the detention of independent educational and research their nationals, but Yemen has been Yemeni nationals at Guantanamo Bay. institution based in the Department of Social unable to convince the United States to Following an overview of Yemen’s Sciences at the United States Military Academy, release detainees into its custody. There previous attempts to engage Islamists, West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses is even widespread speculation in both the article will focus on some possible the Center’s global network of scholars and the United States and Yemen that the risks associated with the repatriation of practitioners to understand and confront Yemeni government does not actually the Yemeni detainees. This will include contemporary threats posed by terrorism and want the detainees back and is content identifying individual detainees who other forms of political violence. to let them remain in U.S. custody. have connections to al-Qa`ida members The Yemeni government, however, involved in the recent upsurge in maintains in private its stated, public terrorist violence in Yemen. It will The views expressed in this report are those of goal to return the detainees to Yemen, conclude with a brief look at some the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, charge those it has evidence against possible solutions under consideration. the Department of the Army, or any other agency and release the rest. For the United of the U.S. Government. States, this has been insufficient, and

1 november 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 12

Extremist Disengagement in Yemen1 decided that the Qur’an and the on former prisoners.6 A total of 364 In recent years, the Yemeni government sunna would serve as the basis for the individuals were released through the has engaged in a series of ambitious dialogue, with the hadith providing a dialogue process. Some have escaped programs designed to counter Islamist firm foundation. The dialogue sessions while others have reportedly been killed radicalization in the country. These were explained to participants as being in Iraq. After some initially promising have included traditional poetry comprehensive and that detainees were results, the committee was eventually recitals, the internationally-supported encouraged to persuade the ulama that suspended for a variety of reasons. “Shaykhs Against Terror” initiative, their understandings of Islam were and the use of religious dialogue. While correct, just as the committee would The committee’s primary objectives admirable unconventional approaches, seek to convince the detainees of their were to get participants to recognize some of these efforts—such as religious position. Some sources have questioned the legitimacy of the Yemeni state, not dialogue—have left many in Washington the effectiveness of the process.3 commit violent acts within Yemen, dissatisfied. and ensure that foreigners were not Initial discussions were focused on targeted in the country. With respect In September 2002, the Yemeni whether or not Yemen was an Islamic to these objectives, the committee government established the Committee state, and the legality of President `Ali for Religious Dialogue. Led by Judge `Abdullah Salih’s rule. Sana`a’s foreign “Yemen’s once promising Hamoud al-Hitar, it was created to treaty obligations and relations with interact with security detainees held non-Muslim states were also discussed, rehabilitation program by the government on suspicion of as was the permissibility of killing now appears to be a failure, involvement with Islamist extremists non-Muslims. The committee worked and terrorists. The committee sought to to demonstrate the legitimacy of the while its recent record Yemeni government and attempted to of releasing convicted al- “Unlike in other countries show the appropriate rules for jihad. It was clearly stated that those who Qa`ida members has done that have since adopted renounced violence would be eligible for little to ease U.S. fears.” extremist rehabilitation release through a unique presidential 4 programs, the Yemeni amnesty program. government provided Much of the committee’s efforts focused achieved some relative successes. It on getting participants to recognize the appears, however, that the committee freed detainees with little authority of the state and obtaining was less concerned with affecting actual external social support.” assurances from them that participating ideological change in participants than in violence within the country was it was with obtaining their acquiescence forbidden. The “covenant of protection” on sensitive political matters. Following (when the government issues a legal the 9/11 attacks, Washington exerted dialogue with these men, and through visa) that exists between the state considerable pressure on Sana`a to their religious discussions and debates and foreigners was also stressed. round up Islamist extremists, terrorists demonstrate that terrorism based on In essence, once detainees acceded and activists. Many of these individuals religious grounds was impermissible. to these points, they were released. had broken no laws. Others had gone The initiative was the first post-9/11 Unlike in other countries that have abroad to fight in Afghanistan, and prison rehabilitation program for since adopted extremist rehabilitation some were suspected (tangentially) of extremists, a format that has now been programs, the Yemeni government involvement in the October 2000 attack adapted in a number of Arab and Muslim provided freed detainees with little on the USS Cole. It has been argued that countries. external social support. Many released religious engagement and dialogue was detainees were absorbed into the thus used as a method to process the On September 15, 2002, al-Hitar and military and security services,5 and large numbers of security detainees, three other ulama met for the first time there was some attempt made to assist and, in exchange for their allegiance to with prisoners at the Political Security others through a non-governmental the Yemeni government, release them Organization Center in Sana`a.2 organization. These efforts, however, from prison. The committee met with prisoners were minimal. Passports were collectively, and they exchanged reportedly not confiscated, nor did the The first participants in the program questions and responses directly. At Yemeni government maintain close tabs are believed to have fared better than the first meeting, it was collectively later participants, aligning with those individuals radicalized at home versus 1 Section based on Christopher Boucek, Shazadi Beg, 3 Ibid. those radicalized through the global and John Horgan, “Opening up the Jihadi Debate: Ye- 4 Abd al-Mun’im al-Jabri, “Yemeni Interior Minister jihad. Initial participants recognized men’s Committee for Dialogue,” in Tore Bjorgo and John Discusses Terrorism Issues, Cooperation with US,” 26 authority and were thus more Horgan, Leaving Terrorism Behind (New York: Routledge, September, October 17, 2003. susceptible to dialogue and negotiation. 2008), pp. 181-192. 5 Eric Westervelt, “Growing Repression in Yemen May 2 Boucek et al., “Opening up the Jihadi Debate: Yemen’s Feed al-Qaeda,” National Public Radio, November 10, 6 Personal interview, Yemeni analyst, Sana`a, July Committee for Dialogue,” p. 185. 2005. 2007.

2 november 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 12

Individuals who participated later, of knowledge that hampered U.S. efforts Zakariya, were among the 23 escapees. the so-called younger generation, did in the fearful months after the 9/11 Both turned themselves in to Yemeni not do as well. When the government attacks. The most accurate description authorities in late 2006 and were eventually attempted to use the is probably a combination of both. placed under loose house arrest, which committee to deal with combatants from The Department of Defense seemed to required them to periodically sign-in the conflict in Sa`da in the north, it met be genuinely confused in the first few with authorities. Mansur, however, stiff opposition within Yemen.7 years, compiling lists of detainees that was able to flee the country and made identified them as citizens of the wrong his way to Somalia, where he was killed Yemeni Population at Guantanamo: Gauging country, listing the equivalent of only in a U.S. naval strike by the USS Chafee the Risk a first name and the detainees’ father’s on June 2, 2007.8 If eventually released Yemen’s once promising rehabilitation name, or even in some cases merely in Yemen, it is impossible to predict program now appears to be a failure, while the kunya or nickname of a detainee. how the two brothers would react to its recent record of releasing convicted Gradually, as its information about the the news of their brother’s death at al-Qa`ida members has done little to detainees improved, it seems to have the hands of U.S. forces. Al-Qa`ida in ease U.S. fears. With the exception of a corrected many of the early mistakes. Yemen, for example, has developed a handful of cases, most Yemenis remain By and large, however, these corrections rationale of revenge during the past in Guantanamo. According to a list few years, and it has effectively utilized produced by the Yemeni government, “For instance, four this in its statements and journals as there are 101 Yemenis currently being justification for a number of attacks. held in Guantanamo. Of these, only detainees currently being While al-Qa`ida has morphed and two—Ramzi bin al-Shibh and Walid bin held in Guantanamo had changed during the years in Yemen, it Attash—have been designated “high has clearly demonstrated the existence value” detainees. Two others have brothers among the 23 of a long institutional memory. recently been convicted by military al-Qa`ida suspects who commissions in Guantanamo. The rationale of revenge could also be escaped from a Yemeni a factor with Salman al-Rabi`a, whose The remaining 97 are an eclectic group prison in February 2006.” older brother, Fawaz, was killed by of intentional, unrepentant combatants Yemeni forces in October 2006 after and accidental warriors. Yet, separating masterminding a dual suicide attack a the detainees into two groups, and month earlier. Another brother, Abu determining where different individuals do not seem to have made their way Bakr, is currently in a Yemeni prison fall on a spectrum of past and potential into the public list of detainees. Nor on terrorism charges. One of the other violence, is a nearly impossible task. Part is there a public list in Arabic, which Guantanamo detainees, Ali al-Raymi, of the problem in such determinations hampers predictions and analysis, as is the younger brother of the current stems from the circumstances of their the current list has a number of curious deputy commander of al-Qa`ida in incarceration. How capable, mentally or transliterations of Arabic names, many Yemen, Qasim al-Raymi, who likely had physically, such individuals will be of of which appear not to adhere to any a leading role in the September attack on taking up arms against the United States standard other than the interrogator’s the U.S. Embassy. If eventually released after years in Guantanamo is difficult to transcription. by the Yemeni government, it is probable predict from the outside. The situation that Ali al-Raymi and other like-minded in Yemen has also changed. Some of Broader Connections detainees would join al-Qa`ida in these detainees were born and raised in Some of those for whom full and fairly Yemen, giving the organization an influx Saudi Arabia and will be returning to a accurate information does exist have of new and dedicated members. The last country they know only superficially, been linked to the new generation of time al-Qa`ida received such a shot in if at all. Others will be returning to a al-Qa`ida in Yemen, which has been the arm was in the wake of the February country where close family members responsible for, among other operations, 2006 prison break, which sparked the have been arrested and mistreated as a the recent September 17 attack on the most recent al-Qa`ida campaign in the result of being related to a Guantanamo U.S. Embassy in Sana`a. For instance, country. detainee. four detainees currently being held in Guantanamo had brothers among the 23 Next Steps Another difficulty in determining who al-Qa`ida suspects who escaped from a There appears to be growing consensus the detainees are and what they are Yemeni prison in February 2006. The that Guantanamo will eventually need likely to do if returned to Yemen has prison break was the opening salvo in to be shut down. During the campaign, to do with the list of detainees initially the second phase of the war against President-elect Barack Obama was critical provided by the Department of Defense al-Qa`ida in Yemen, which is still of the facility and pledged to close it. One in 2006 as a result of a lawsuit brought ongoing. notion apparently under consideration by by the Associated Press. It is possible to read the list either as evidence of an Among the Yemenis currently in 8 For more information, see Gregory D. Johnsen, “Track- uncooperative Department of Defense or Guantanamo are two of four brothers, ing Yemen’s 23 Escaped Jihadi Operatives – Part I,” Ter- as illustrative of the confusion and lack Ghalib and Tawfiq al-Bayhani, from one rorism Monitor 5:18 (2007); Gregory D. Johnsen, “Track- of Yemen’s leading jihadist families. ing Yemen’s 23 Escaped Jihadi Operatives – Part II,” 7 Ibid. The other two brothers, Mansur and Terrorism Monitor 5:19 (2007).

3 november 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 12

Obama advisers would be to prosecute some of the strongest weapons in the Although negotiations eventually broke some detainees in the domestic criminal struggle against violent extremism. For down, what al-Raymi reportedly wanted court system, repatriate others to their the remainder of the Yemeni detainees, is telling: the release of al-Qa`ida countries of origin, and possibly send which would likely be a sizeable suspects in Yemeni prisons. The outline the remaining highly classified cases to portion, the United States may find of the story seems to be confirmed by a new special court.9 that its best option is to silently partner al-Raymi’s authorial absence from the with the Yemeni government and fifth issue of Sada al-Malahim,13 which How this will impact the Yemeni support a modified hostage system,12 was written in August and September, nationals remains to be seen. One now which has a long tradition in Yemen but only released on November 9. Had abandoned notion had been to finance the negotiations been successful, it is the construction of a supermax-style “The alternative of just possible that the September 17 attack prison in Yemen to house returnees. It on the U.S. Embassy would have never appears that there is renewed interest in releasing the detainees taken place. It did, of course, and al- reviving Yemen’s Dialogue Committee whom the United States Raymi returned to writing for Sada al- as a reintegration program for former Malahim in its sixth issue. Guantanamo detainees; however, some cannot convict will almost recent information that possibly three certainly result in more The hostage system would also further of the seven U.S. Embassy attackers fracture al-Qa`ida in Yemen by may have been graduates of al-Hitar’s deaths in Yemen at the exacerbating tensions and loyalties program makes this extremely unlikely.10 hands of individuals who within the group. Such a system would To be modeled in part on Saudi Arabia’s force Qasim al-Raymi and numerous relatively successful program to care for were once in American others to ask themselves whether they Guantanamo returnees,11 it is presently custody.” are more loyal to Nasir al-Wahayshi— unclear how such a reintegration the amir of al-Qa`ida in Yemen—or to system would operate in Yemen. While someone such as Ali al-Raymi—who there had been hope that some Yemenis was once in Guantanamo and is now would be sent back before the end of as a tool of governing. Historically, the being held by the Yemeni government. the Bush administration, this appears United States has found this practice The answer is far from clear, but even increasingly unlikely. Facilities have unpalatable, but the current situation forcing individuals in al-Qa`ida to face reportedly been created to accommodate may render such criticisms moot. such a question would likely do more to returnees; however, a successful Yemen has also shied away from any disrupt the group’s Yemeni branch than reintegration program will require a private deals with the United States, have years of counter-attacks. This detailed program, thorough curriculum, particularly after 2002 when such a deal system would require the United States trained and qualified personnel, and was made public by a U.S. leak. Intense to temper many of its criticisms of massive financing. One possible way to and concentrated pressure, however, Yemen’s opaque practice of individual move forward on addressing the plight should ensure Yemen’s cooperation. deals with terrorists, such as Jamal al- of the Yemenis held at Guantanamo The alternative of just releasing the Badawi and Jabir al-Banna. Years of could be for Washington to financially detainees whom the United States Guantanamo, however, have removed underwrite the costs associated with cannot convict will almost certainly the good courses of action from the table applying some of the methodologies result in more deaths in Yemen at the and left the United States with only a being developed in Saudi Arabia hands of individuals who were once in limited set of options. and elsewhere to reintegrate former American custody. detainees. All told, the costs of finding a Gregory D. Johnsen has written for a variety solution to this dilemma are far cheaper There are already signs that such a of publications, including The American than the costs of maintaining the status system could work. According to a Interest, The Christian Science Monitor quo. number of sources in Yemen, during the and the Boston Globe. He is currently a late summer Yemen was negotiating an Ph.D. candidate in Near Eastern Studies at In the end, the best option could be agreement with Qasim al-Raymi that Princeton University. for the United States to prosecute in would have taken him off the warpath. civilian courts those it believes it can Dr. Christopher Boucek is an Associate at convict based on the lawful evidence it 12 Different governments in Yemeni history (for in- the Middle East Program at the Carnegie possesses. Transparency, due process, stance, the imams in addition to the current republican Endowment for International Peace where his and the power of the rule of law are system of government) have utilized a hostage system research focuses on regional security issues. that kept relatives, traditionally males, under the control This article is part of an ongoing research 9 Matt Apuzzo and Lara Jakes Jordan, “Obama Planning of the state to ensure the good behavior of their relatives. project on Saudi counter-radicalization, US Trials for Guantanamo Detainees,” Associated Press, The United States could use this option with the “in-be- rehabilitation and reintegration strategies. November 10, 2008. tween” detainees–those it does not have enough evidence 10 Personal interview, anonymous Yemeni political ana- against to prosecute but are considered too dangerous to lyst, November 2008. release–as a weapon to splinter al-Qa`ida by turning 11 Christopher Boucek, “The Saudi Process of Repatri- the organization against itself. This is not so much out- ating and Reintegrating Guantanamo Returnees,” CTC sourcing detention as it is using one of al-Qa`ida’s main Sentinel 1:1 (2008). strengths, tight-knit relationships, against it. 13 Sada al-Malahim is a jihadist publication in Yemen.

4 november 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 12

Al-Qa`ida’s Presence and in financing and arming these terrorist current events, support the following groups.3 conclusions, each of which will be Influence in Lebanon examined in detail: It is critical for Lebanese from all sides By Bilal Y. Saab of the political spectrum to come to a - Al-Qa`ida’s senior leadership, based in clear understanding of the nature of the the tribal areas of Pakistan-Afghanistan, there is no official consensus in terrorism threat. While terrorism may has no franchise or coordinated group Lebanon on whether al-Qa`ida has not be an existential threat to Lebanon, in Lebanon.5 a presence in the country. Since the it has hit hard in various regions and assassination of former Prime Minister in multiple directions. The past three - The Salafi-jihadi movement has neither Rafiq Hariri in February 2005, all years alone have registered more than a local insurgent presence in Lebanon politics in Lebanon has been polarized. 18 terrorist attacks that have taken the nor a unifying leader of the stature of It is on the threat of terrorism where the lives of innocent civilians, high-profile Abu Ayyub al-Masri, the presumed 1 gap is arguably most pronounced. On officials and politicians, prominent leader of al-Qa`ida in Iraq. the one hand, the anti-Syrian political journalists and commentators, coalition, led by Prime Minister Fuad military personnel, and international - The Salafi-jihadi movement in Siniora and parliament majority leader peacekeepers. Furthermore, the two Lebanon is neither fictional nor a Saad Hariri, believes that al-Qa`ida theories about al-Qa`ida in Lebanon mechanical creation of the Syrian does not have an indigenous presence in as proposed by the anti-Syrian and intelligence services. It also has an Lebanon. What the country faces instead pro-Syrian coalitions are not mutually important Lebanese constituency and is is a fabricated threat by Damascus and exclusive. Their common denominator not exclusively Palestinian. its intelligence services that is intended is the Lebanonization process of the to destabilize Lebanon and restore Salafi-jihadi movement in the country. - The current Salafi-jihadi threat is 2 Syrian hegemony. On the other hand, Five years after the start of the war caused by a network of capable terrorist the pro-Syrian alliance, spearheaded by in Iraq, Islamic radicalization is still cells scattered across the country, Hizb Allah (also spelled Hezbollah) and on the rise in the Middle East. The mostly in northern Lebanon. The most the Free Patriotic Party of Michel Aoun, spillover effects of the war in Iraq, the dangerous terrorist axis is the one that judges that al-Qa`ida exists in Lebanon resurfacing of political and sectarian links, by land and sea, regions in the and poses a real threat to national tensions in Lebanon following the May north—such as Tripoli, al-Koura and security. For them, the rise of al-Qa`ida 2005 withdrawal of Syrian troops, the Akkar—to the Palestinian refugee camp in the country is largely attributed 2006 war between Israel and Hizb of `Ayn al-Hilwa in Sidon. Pockets in to a devilish pact between Lebanese Allah, and the Sunni perception of the Bekaa Valley are also increasingly Sunni politicians and extremist Islamic ascending Shi`a and Iranian power in witnessing Salafi-jihadi activity. factions in the north, the purpose of the region gave new life and meaning to which is to counter-balance the perceived the Salafi-jihadi movement in Lebanon. - Al-Qa`ida’s senior leadership values the ascending power of Shi`a Hizb Allah. target of the international peacekeeping The Lebanese Internal Security Forces During the course of a six year period force in the south6 and has a profound (ISF), an institution that is perceived to starting in 2002, the author conducted interest in attacking Israel, but it be fairly loyal to Siniora—in addition to both practical and theoretical research also understands the limitations and Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the two most on the subject of Salafi-jihadism in difficulties of waging jihad on Lebanese influential regional patrons of the anti- Lebanon.4 The findings, updated by soil. Syrian coalition—are also accused by the pro-Syrian alliance of having a hand 3 Leading the campaign of warning against the rise of The Salafi-Jihadi Movement in Lebanon Salafi-jihadism in Lebanon are the leftist-leaning news- Lebanese government attention on and 1 Many would dispute this assumption and argue that paper al-Safir, the pro-Hizb Allah newspaper al-Akhbar, local media coverage of Sunni Islamic the issue of Hizb Allah’s weapons is the most divisive is- and the pro-Syrian newspaper al-Diyar. militancy has always been episodic and sue among Lebanese politicians. 4 This research was conducted around the country from tangential, focusing exclusively on a 2 Media coverage by outlets sympathetic to or associ- south to north including the regions of Akkar, Majdar limited geographical area—the refugee ated with the anti-Syrian coalition, such as the Lebanese Anjar, Tripoli, Qarun, Arqoub, Sidon, and others, where camp of `Ayn al-Hilwa—and scrutinizing Broadcasting Corporation and Future Television, have the phenomenon of Salafi-jihadism in its concrete and a specific ethnic population—the largely reported that the threat posed by al-Qa`ida is spiritual manifestations was investigated. This article re- Palestinian refugees. `Ayn al-Hilwa more imaginary than real, more Syrian-orchestrated lies on interviews of leaders from the mainstream Sunni is located on the southeastern part of than driven by domestic factors, and as a result less Islamist community in Lebanon, militants who volun- the port of Sidon in southern Lebanon worthy of thorough coverage or investigative journal- tarily associate themselves with the Salafi-jihadi move- and has been historically known to ism. Anti-Syrian newspapers, such as al-Nahar and al- ment, academics who specialize in political Islam, report- Mustaqbal, either totally dismiss the thesis that al-Qa`ida ers who are experienced in covering terrorism, Salafist 5 This is in contrast to, for example, al-Qa`ida in the Is- exists in Lebanon or argue that the threat is exaggerated. preachers, Lebanese politicians, leading intelligence lamic Maghreb or al-Qa`ida in Iraq. Most of their editorials and opinion pieces argue that the officers in the ISF, and senior officers in the Military 6 Bilal Y. Saab and Magnus Ranstorp, “Al Qaeda’s Ter- majority of the political murders that have taken place Intelligence Directorate. For more, see Bilal Y. Saab and rorist Threat to UNIFIL,” Saban Center for Middle East in Lebanon during the past two decades have been com- Magnus Ranstorp, “Securing Lebanon from the Threat of Policy at The Brookings Institution and the Center for mitted by the Syrian intelligence services, not by an al- Salafist Jihadism,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 30:10 Asymmetric Threat Studies at the Swedish National De- Qa`ida-affiliated group. (2007): pp. 825-855. fence College, June 2007.

5 november 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 12 have served as a hotbed for Sunni both based in `Ayn al-Hilwa. These against “infidels.” Some are also divided Islamic militancy. A number of high- two groups, whose relationship often along political lines. Importantly, these profile terrorist attacks with Salafi- fluctuates between cooperation and groups have faced constant recruitment jihadi imprints emanated from the hostility, share a history of terrorism challenges within the Lebanese Sunni camp, including the bombing of the and politically motivated violence community, whose solid majority is Lebanese Customs Directorate and the against the Lebanese state and society. In opposed to Salafi-jihadi ideology. In killing of four Lebanese judges in the addition, the two groups have sent many fact, this acute lack of support to al- Justice Palace in Sidon in 1999,7 and the young men to the Iraqi battlefield.10 Of Qa`ida’s ideology and agenda explains attack against the Russian Embassy in the two groups, Usbat al-Ansar is the why the two most ambitious attempts senior partner and arguably the most by the Salafi-jihadi movement to create “Salafi-jihadi factions in capable Salafi-jihadi group in `Ayn a durable and potent insurgent force in al-Hilwa with an estimated strength the country have failed miserably. Lebanon are not united between 200-300 members, according under a single umbrella to estimates by the Lebanese Military The first attempt happened on Intelligence Directorate (MID). Jund December 31, 1999 in al-Dinniyeh, or organization. They al-Sham, on the other hand, can be which is approximately 30 miles away have dissimilar agendas described as a relatively small group from the northeastern part of Tripoli. of 25-50 freelance jihadists that has A group of Lebanese Sunni Islamic and are relatively small no coherent organizational structure militants, led by Afghanistan returnee and clandestine semi- or important terrorist potential. Jund Bassam Kanj, launched an attack on al-Sham militants have been accused, the Lebanese Army and fought it for autonomous entities with however, of murdering Hizb Allah six days. The army eventually defeated informal organizational senior official Ghaleb Awali in July the insurgents and foiled their alleged 2004 and of attempting to assassinate plot of establishing an Islamic state structures.” Hizb Allah Secretary General Hassan in Tripoli. The second more deadly Nasrallah in April 2006. Other Salafi- attempt was in the summer of 2007 jihadi entities—such as the Qarun group when a group called Fatah al-Islam13 and the Majdal Anjar group—have also attacked a Lebanese Army outpost near Beirut with rocket-propelled grenades been involved in building networks of Tripoli and slaughtered several soldiers in 2000.8 For too long, however, vast local fighters in their villages to join during their sleep,14 an action that swathes of territory throughout the the jihad in Iraq. The village of Majdal triggered an army counter-offensive. country that are fertile for terrorism Anjar, for example, became a focal point The three-month battle between the have evaded the public eye. after five of its residents were killed in army and Fatah al-Islam in the Nahr al- Iraq in 2005 fighting coalition forces.11 Bared Palestinian refugee camp ended Investigating the complex root causes of In September 2004, half a dozen men on September 2, 2007 when most of the Salafi-jihadism in Lebanon is not easy.9 from there were arrested on various surviving few dozen militants punched Since its awakening in the early 1980s, terrorism charges including attempting through army lines in a desperate bid Salafist militancy in Lebanon was largely to blow up the Italian Embassy in to escape. Several were rounded up in defensive and reflected the perceived Beirut.12 Lebanon’s interior minister subsequent sweeps of the hills to the severity of local crisis conditions. at the time, Elias Murr, stated that the east, but an unknown number, including Systematic security crackdowns by group was planning to pack a car with their leader Shakir al-Abssi, have so far the Lebanese authorities, large-scale 300 kilograms of explosives and ram it evaded the dragnet. Even though the foreign (particularly Israeli) aggression into the Italian Embassy in addition to army crushed Fatah al-Islam in Nahr against Lebanon, and violent clashes plotting a sophisticated attack against al-Bared, the organization still exists with rival Islamist groups tended to the Ukrainian Embassy. in an unknown number of cells, mainly awaken and mobilize the Salafi-jihadi in Tripoli, including in the Badawi movement as a whole in defense of an Although sympathetic to one another, camp, but also in `Ayn al-Hilwa. More Islamic order. Still, Salafist militancy Salafi-jihadi factions in Lebanon are recently, Fatah al-Islam seems to have remained grounded in local realities and not united under a single umbrella or established a presence in the Bourj al- only marginally (if ever) connected to organization. They have dissimilar Shemali and Rashidieh camps, where it al-Qa`ida’s global Islamic insurgency. agendas and are relatively small and appears to have amalgamated with Jund clandestine semi-autonomous entities al-Sham. Scattered in the north, these The two Salafi-jihadi groups that are with informal organizational structures. cells (some of which are remnants of closest to al-Qa`ida ideologically are Each is more concerned about its own Fatah al-Islam) that have proven links Usbat al-Ansar and Jund al-Sham, survival than waging an offensive jihad 13 For a detailed account of the story of Fatah al-Islam, 7 Agence France-Presse, June 9, 1999. 10 Usbat al-Ansar frequently issues statements from the see Bilal Y. Saab and Magnus Ranstorp, “Fatah al Islam: 8 For more information on the history of terrorism and camp confirming that its members became “martyrs” in How an Ambitious Jihadist Enterprise Went Awry,” The politically motivated violence in Lebanon, see Saab and Iraq after facing the “crusaders.” Brookings Institution and the Swedish National Defense Ranstorp, “Securing Lebanon from the threat of Salafist 11 Fawaz A. Gerges, Journey of the Jihadist, Inside Muslim College, November 2007. Jihadism.” Jihadism (Orlando: Harcourt Inc., 2006), pp. 273-277. 14 This information is based on the account provided to 9 Ibid. 12 Agence France-Presse, September 27, 2004. the author by the MID.

6 november 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 12 with jihadists in `Ayn al-Hilwa have the public statements of several U.S. particular), Lebanon is not a priority. been responsible for a number of recent officials—including Deputy Secretary terrorist acts including the twin attacks of State John Negroponte—confirming Recently, Ayman al-Zawahiri released on the Lebanese Army buses on August that al-Qa`ida does have a presence in yet another long message22 urging 13, 2008 and September 29, 2008, which northern Lebanon,19 and by the visits Muslims worldwide to join insurgencies, killed 15 soldiers and six civilians.15 of a handful of high level intelligence mainly in Iraq.23 Reserving a few words officers to Lebanon, including CIA for Lebanon, which he called a “Muslim The story of Fatah al-Islam is Director Michael Hayden.20 front-line fort,” he said that the country important because it underscores the will play a “pivotal role in future battles transformation of the Salafi-jihadi The argument that Syria did not create with the Crusaders and the Jews.” movement in Lebanon and sheds light Fatah al-Islam or is not responsible While Lebanon is not a “Muslim front- on its future trajectory. That story, for causing the recent wave of Salafist line fort,” al-Zawahiri was correct in his however, is anything but conclusive. militancy in Lebanon does not exonerate assessment that the country may play Damascus from the terrorism threat an important role in al-Qa`ida’s global “Al-Qa`ida’s senior and leaves a number of important Islamic insurgency. The events of Nahr leadership has yet to questions unanswered. For example, it al-Bared last summer were indicative of is concerning that there is no reliable the relative ease with which al-Qa`ida unequivocally declare information or explanation as to why in Iraq was able to transfer fighters— Fatah al-Islam leader Shakir al-Abssi via Syrian territories and with Syrian Lebanon a theater for was released from Syrian prison in the acquiescence—to Lebanon to cause major operations.” fall of 2002. While Syria may not have terror and havoc. given birth to the Salafi-jihadi movement in Lebanon, it surely has aided it and Al-Qa`ida’s senior leaders recognize the aggravated its threat by allowing the big challenges their organization would The author’s analysis of Fatah al- transfer of al-Qa`ida fighters and face in waging jihad on Lebanese soil. Islam’s statements and behavior prior, terrorist finances and equipment from This is why they may have settled for during, and after the battle, coupled Iraq and Syria into Lebanon. The Syrian using Lebanon as a staging ground to with intelligence assessments by senior regime understands the dangers of the the Palestinian and European theaters officers in the MID and European game it is allegedly playing,21 given the intelligence agencies worried about strong ideological enmities between the safety of their troops in southern secular Damascus and militant Islamist “It is naïve to assume that Lebanon, support the following account: movements and the bloody history they removing the grievances of Fatah al-Islam is not merely a Syrian have shared since the 1970s. Damascus, tool, but an actual jihadist group whose however, has shown it is willing to Salafi-jihadists in Lebanon goals are inimical to Syrian interests accept the risks given the relative will prevent terrorism and whose creation was greatly benefits such policies have earned it facilitated by spillover from Iraq.16 The over the years. from occurring, for the conclusion reached by senior members nature or root causes of of the Swedish, Danish, German and Lebanon as Viewed by al-Qa`ida’s Senior Italian intelligence agencies is that Leadership these grievances are not al-Qa`ida has a real presence in the Al-Qa`ida’s senior leadership has clear.” country and is determined to strike hard yet to unequivocally declare Lebanon against their interests in Lebanon and a theater for major operations. their troops in the south.17 It appears For al-Qa`ida’s senior leadership, that this appraisal is now shared by notwithstanding the many advantages and not so much as a jihadist battlefield. most intelligence agencies in the U.S. the Lebanese battlefield offers to the Still, terrorist operations against government.18 This is evidenced by Islamic insurgency in the Middle the international force in the south Eastern corridor (most importantly the would be praised and welcomed, as al- 15 Al-Safir, October 13, 2008; al-Hayat, October 14, geographical proximity to the Israeli- Zawahiri has repeatedly reminded his 2008. Palestinian theater in general and the followers. The reality is that Lebanon 16 While local actors may have sharp disagreements spiritual significance of Jerusalem in has turned into a place where jihadist over the nature of the threat of terrorism in Lebanon, travelers can quietly meet, train, and 24 all foreign governments and intelligence agencies that ment on the issue of al-Qa`ida in Lebanon during confer- plan operations against Israel. This are concerned about the rise of terrorism speak with one ences and briefings in which he presented. voice on this matter and state that al-Qa`ida has a pres- 19 Andrew Wander, “UNIFIL Says Attack Plot May Not 22 Al-Zawahiri released two messages on December ence in the northern part of the country. Have Been Aimed at Peacekeepers,” Daily Star, October 20, 2006 and February 13, 2007 in which he briefly ad- 17 These conclusions were privately communicated to 22, 2008. dressed Lebanon and Security Council Resolution 1701. the author during several meetings in Stockholm, Ber- 20 It is worth noting that Hayden’s visit was never pub- 23 For an analysis of the letter, see Bilal Y. Saab and Mag- lin, Copenhagen and Beirut in the summer and winter licly confirmed or commented on. nus Ranstorp, “What Zawahiri’s Really Mean for Leba- of 2007. 21 It is also accused of playing this game more explicitly non and the War on Terror,” al-Hayat, May 5, 2008. 18 For the past year, the author received a sense of the in Iraq by providing a range of support to Iraqi insur- 24 This is the most recent terrorism threat assessment thinking of most intelligence agencies in the U.S. govern- gents. reached by several European intelligence agencies on the

7 november 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 12 happens mostly along the axis that links - The MID claimed it produced a Conclusion by land and sea regions in the north to clear map that shows the location and The most reassuring aspect of the history the troublesome Palestinian camp of distribution of these cells, whether in of Salafi-jihadi terrorism in Lebanon is `Ayn al-Hilwa in Sidon. Given how the rural or urban areas in the north. that it is not widespread and has few al-Qa`ida views Lebanon, the country The MID also said it possessed reliable followers. Yet, in a small country such might be spared the fate of Iraq. The intelligence on the means with which as Lebanon, even a small number of cells international community, however, still these cells communicate and secure can cause havoc and terror. It is naïve to needs to work closely with the Lebanese weapons and funding. assume that removing the grievances of government to prevent al-Qa`ida from Salafi-jihadists in Lebanon will prevent setting up operations. - The MID, with the authorization of the terrorism from occurring, for the nature Lebanese cabinet, has sent out letters or root causes of these grievances are Combating Terrorism: The Lebanese MID Role to the Arab League, Arab embassies, not clear. This is not to recommend The MID is pursuing a number of and Arab intelligence agencies asking an exclusive reliance by the Lebanese initiatives to combat terrorism in for old and new information about the government on military approaches to Lebanon,25 some of which are listed terrorist cells in the north. The MID did solve the problem. Balanced economic below.26 not hide the fact that it was seeking the and political development policies in cooperation of elements in the Syrian the deprived north may deny the Salafi- - Inside the MID (unlike other intelligence services and coordinating jihadi movement additional recruits. It government institutions), there is with U.S. covert agencies. should be emphasized, however, that overall agreement that these local cells heavy-handed approaches by the MID are inspired by al-Qa`ida’s ideology - The MID’s offensive plan to eradicate are essential at this relatively nascent and have extremist ambitions, but the threat of terrorism in the north is stage of the post-Iraq Salafi-jihadi have no verifiable connections with al- divided into four fronts: one, the army’s movement because they help contain Qa`ida in Pakistan-Afghanistan. They 10th Brigade constantly monitors and the threat and prevent it from inflating. are self-starters who are trying hard tracks the cells to keep them on the to earn the endorsement of Usama bin run and in a state of disarray; two, Bilal Y. Saab is Research Analyst at the Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri. They lure the cells to closed areas and break Saban Center for Middle East Policy at hope to catch their attention by staging them one by one; three, deny the cells The Brookings Institution in Washington, terrorist attacks across the country any kind of support or sympathy from D.C., where he specializes in Middle East and planning spectacular operations the few disenfranchised members of security and global terrorism. Previously, against high-value targets such as the the northern populace; four, avoid he served as Chief Officer and Editor of United Nations headquarters in Beirut confrontation with all the cells at once the Middle East desk at the Center for the and the international force in southern and avert a repeat of the Nahr al- Study of Terrorism and Political Violence Lebanon. While most of these cells are Bared incident which resulted in heavy (CSPTV) in the United Kingdom. Mr. Saab active, some of them are dormant. Their loss of lives on both sides.27 Instead, is frequently consulted by European and connection to al-Qa`ida’s franchise in apply a gradual approach and expand U.S. intelligence agencies on the topics of Iraq is traceable. the network of informants (be they Hizb Allah and al-Qa`ida in Lebanon. This agents or citizens) to procure the best article is inspired by a speech delivered - The estimated number of members intelligence. at a Lebanon conference in winter 2007 of these terrorist cells, according to organized by the U.S. National Intelligence military intelligence, is 3,700. Their - The MID confirms that its plan, Council. nationalities range from Lebanese, which it coordinates with the ISF, is Palestinian, Saudi Arabian, Algerian, working, as evidenced in the recent Egyptian, Iraqi, and a small minority of breaking of three cells in the north non-Arabs. Experts in explosives occupy that perpetrated or planned terrorist the biggest chunk of these members. attacks against Lebanese Army posts and vehicles. The military intelligence service, however, is badly funded, situation in Lebanon. It was privately shared with the au- lacks sophisticated equipment and is thor during meetings in European capitals. overstretched. It claims it cannot do the 25 Due to the prevalent bickering and divisiveness in the job alone and needs the help of regional Lebanese political sphere, the Lebanese Military Intel- and international intelligence agencies ligence Directorate (MID), the leading public counter- who have an interest in neutralizing the terrorism institution, operates in a challenging environ- terrorism threat in Lebanon. ment. To effectively analyze and combat the terrorism threat, the MID has had to virtually insulate itself from politics. 26 This information is based on several meetings the au- thor had during the past five years with senior members 27 For more on that battle and the lessons learned by of the MID. For more on the counter-terrorism effort in the army, see Bilal Y. Saab and Bruce Riedel, “Lessons Lebanon, see Bilal Y. Saab, “Lebanon on the Counterter- for Lebanon from Nahr al Bared,” The Brookings Institu- rorism Front,” Middle East Times, March 19, 2008. tion, October 4, 2007.

8 november 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 12

U.S. Cross-Border Raid publicly available information about Syrian tribes to give up their nomadic the raid, Syria’s role in border security life in favor of settlement in and around Highlights Syria’s Role in and whether Syria risks “blowback” by the Euphrates River and its (often dry) Islamist Militancy foreign fighters who, after being forced tributaries. Farms in the area produce out of Iraq, may be turning their sights cotton and wheat, and the arid lands By Anonymous on the Syrian government. and dry streambeds from which the tribes hail are particularly good for an october 26 raid by U.S. special The Syria-Iraq Border Region smuggling livestock and contraband. To forces on Syrian territory highlights According to a November 9 New York shore up support for the government, the long-festering issue of foreign Times report, the attack was the latest the Assad regime, which is led by jihadist networks operating between in a dozen of previously undisclosed Alawites, an obscure offshoot of Shi`a Syria’s Deir ez-Zour region and Iraq. U.S. special forces raids on al-Qa`ida Islam, employs a large proportion of the According to various press reports, militants in Syria and Pakistan.6 The region’s Sunnis in the country’s army a group of U.S. military helicopters only previously reported raid in Syria and security services, creating much attacked the al-Sukariyya Farm, which occurred on June 18, 2003, when a U.S. needed jobs in Syria’s poorest region.8 lies approximately five miles west of task force penetrated 25 miles inside the Iraqi frontier in Syria’s Deir ez- Syrian territory in pursuit of a convoy of Leading up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Zour Province. Al-Sukariyya is near the SUV’s suspected of carrying senior Iraqi Syria publicly gathered “volunteer” Iraqi border city of al-Qaim, which the Ba`athists. Unlike the October 26 attack, fighters by the busload to wage “jihad” U.S. military has identified as a major which could be justified as “self-defense” against coalition forces.9 This was later crossing point for foreign fighters and under Article 51 of the United Nations confirmed by U.S. forces who captured supplies from Syria into Iraq. During the Charter, that raid was carried out under or killed hundreds of fighters with raid, U.S. forces reportedly killed eight the rules of “hot pursuit,” which allows passports showing they had transited people,1 including Badran Turki Hishan security officials to cross international Syria into Iraq. As security worsened in al-Mazidih (also known as Abu Ghadiya), boundaries to apprehend criminals. Iraq, and coalition intelligence lapsed, an Iraqi national sanctioned by the U.S. the degree of Syrian support for the Treasury Department in February for While Syria thus far has been more Iraqi insurgency remained unclear. In “facilitating and controlling the flow of forthcoming about its version of the response to repeated accusations by money, weapons, terrorists, and other raid, getting to the bottom of U.S. the United States that it was allowing resources through Syria to al Qaida accusations of al-Qa`ida activity in Deir foreign fighters to travel across its in Iraq (AQI).”2 Another unconfirmed ez-Zour Province is difficult given the borders, the Syrian government report identified the dead as members of regime’s tight grip on security affairs constructed a four foot high “sand the Mashahda tribe, which has members in the region. The regime, together with berm” along the frontier and laid fallen in the Tikrit area of Iraq.3 The Syrian its local informant network, tightly electricity poles to flip smugglers’ fast government statement claimed that the controls independent access by foreign moving vehicles.10 Damascus repeatedly raid killed eight civilians, and denied media and diplomats to the area unless claimed that it was doing all it could to any relationship between al-Qa`ida and they have authorization from the Syrian patrol the 375-mile border, comparing those killed.4 government. State minders are assigned its task with unsuccessful U.S. attempts to “protect” visiting foreigners. All to keep foreign migrants crossing its According to an anonymous U.S. military Syrian territory east of the Euphrates border with Mexico. official speaking to the Associated River is the domain of Syrian Military Press, the raid demonstrated that the Intelligence, headed by President With the advent of Iraq’s Awakening United States was “taking matters Bashar al-Assad’s brother-in-law, Asif Councils, greater details of foreign fighter into our own hands” to shut down the Shawqat. The regime’s concern with flows through Syria have emerged. This network of al-Qa`ida-linked foreign Deir ez-Zour is based on the allegiance of includes the Sinjar Records, documents fighters moving between Syria and Iraq, the area’s residents to tribes that extend that coalition forces in Iraq seized during and using the former country as a safe eastward into Iraq and the Arabian a raid on a suspected al-Qa`ida safe house haven.5 This article will examine the Peninsula. The largest Sunni tribes in in Sinjar, an Iraqi town 10 miles east of Syria with brethren on both sides of the the Syrian frontier. The records, compiled 1 Bill Roggio, “US Strike in Syria ‘Decapitated’ al Qaeda’s border include the al-Baggara (Mosul by the Combating Terrorism Center at Facilitation Network,” The Long War Journal, October and Tikrit), al-Ughaydat (Mosul) and West Point, indicate that hundreds of 7 27, 2008. al-Mashahda (Tikrit). Despite the foreign fighters between September 2006 2 “Treasury Designates Members of Abu Ghadiyah’s region’s oil wealth, which accrues and September 2007 transited through 11 Network - Facilitates Flow of Terrorists, Weapons, and directly to the state’s coffers, Deir ez- Syria. Money from Syria to al Qaida in Iraq,” U.S. Department Zour is historically Syria’s poorest of Treasury, February 28, 2008. province. The state has encouraged 8 Ironically, eastern Syria’s oil production makes the 3 “Syrian Witness Reacts to Raid,” BBC News, October area technically Syria’s richest region. According to Syr- 27, 2008. In this case, family means “extended family” or 6 Eric Schmidt and Mark Mazzetti, “Secret Order Lets ian law, however, all oil proceeds accrue to the state. a subsection of a tribe. U.S. Raid Al Qaeda in Many Countries,” New York Times, 9 Neil MacFarquhar, “For Arabs, New Jihad Is in Iraq,” 4 Albert Aji, “U.S. Special Forces Launch Rare Attack November 9, 2008. New York Times, April 2, 2003. Inside Syria,” Associated Press, October 26, 2008. 7 Personal interview, resident of eastern Syria, August 10 Personal observation, Abu Kamal, August 2004. 5 Ibid. 2006. 11 Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman, Al-Qaida’s Foreign

9 november 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 12

Reduction in Foreign Fighter Flow? a “different story” from the security Damascus Facing Threat of Blowback? During the past few months, U.S. situation on Iraq’s borders with Saudi Although it appears that Syria has officials have said that there has been Arabia and Jordan, which have tightened taken some steps to limit the number a sharp reduction in foreign fighters security considerably.16 of foreign fighters crossing the border in and out of Iraq. Yet it remains into Iraq, the October 26 raid highlights unclear how much of the reduction is Adding to the confusion, in the days the role of Syria in Iraq’s insurgency, a due to the sahwa (awakening) in Iraq following the raid Western journalists point often eclipsed by announcements and how much is due to a recently based in Syria and Lebanon published of indirect peace talks between Syria and announced “change” in Syria’s policy stories attributing the raid to secret Israel and political dialogue in Syria’s on border security. Beginning with security cooperation between Damascus western neighbor, Lebanon. In light of a meeting between U.S. Secretary of and Washington. One report in London’s recent successes in defeating al-Qa`ida State Condoleezza Rice and her Syrian The Sunday Times said that Syrian security in Iraq, Syria’s role as a staging ground counterpart, Walid Mouallem, at the personnel seemed to be complicit in the for the Iraqi insurgency threatens to May 2007 Iraq neighbors conference raid, which was confirmed by anonymous endanger its own interests. As coalition in Sharm al-Shaykh, the United States “sources in Washington.”17 The report efforts continue to push foreign has repeatedly asked Syria to improve claimed that “Abu Ghadiya was feared jihadists out of Iraq, and U.S. Arab its border security. This has primarily by the Syrians as an agent of Islamic allies tighten controls on the return of involved two areas: scrutinizing single fundamentalism who was hostile to the foreign fighters to their home countries, military-aged males entering Syria secular regime in Damascus. It would Syria could become the foreign fighters’ from Arab countries, and closing off be expedient for Syria if America would refuge of last resort. smuggling routes across the Syrian eliminate him.”18 Another report from frontier. the Damascus-based correspondent of If Damascus’ claims that it is doing the Abu Dhabi-based The National also more to crack down on foreign jihadists The degree of Damascus’ compliance alleged Syrian complicity. It quoted a and similar militant groups is true, with Washington’s request remains U.S. intelligence officer, Major Adam this could help explain the motivations unclear. In July, a group of Syrian Boyd of the third armored cavalry behind a number of recent violent academics in good favor with the Syrian regiment responsible for Mosul and incidents in Syria: the September 27 regime visited Washington and claimed a 236-mile stretch of the Iraqi-Syrian suicide bombing near a new military that Syria had shifted its policy and had border in Ninawa Province, as saying security bureau outside Damascus;20 now secured the border “to the best of that Syria had “been relatively good in an October firefight between security our abilities.”12 One delegation member the near recent past, arresting people forces and Sunni militants that claimed claimed Damascus has “its own interest on their side of the border.” Boyd also four lives in the Yarmouk Palestinian to play a stabilizing role” and that Syria explained the “gray area” surrounding camp;21 and the mysterious July riot by had done a “very good job” on policing Syria’s position on foreign jihadists Islamist prisoners at Syria’s Saydnayya the border.13 They claimed that “several traveling in and out of Iraq from Syria: military prison. Syria’s role in Islamist U.S. field commanders” at the border militancy could present Damascus had even shared such kudos with Syrian For every example of cooperation with increased security problems, officials.14 Such claims come in sharp from Syria, there are an equal as radicalized foreign fighters could contrast to U.S. statements before and number of incidents that are turn their skills against their hosts, after last month’s raid. A U.S. military not helpful…We just captured especially in an era of diplomatic talks official told the Associated Press that someone who was trying to escape between Syria, Israel, and the United “the one piece of the puzzle we have into Syria and found out that he’d States. not been showing success on is the been arrested last November on the nexus in Syria.”15 This was supported Syrian side after they caught him Anonymous22 is a researcher and journalist by statements in the days leading up with a bunch of fake passports. who has worked in Syria for the past seven to the raid by U.S. Major General John But he bribed his way out and years. Kelly, who said that Syria’s border was managed to get back in. But, “uncontrolled by their side” and was again, I don’t know I necessarily attribute that to the government Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records (West as to an individual Syrian border 19 Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2008). patrol unit. 12 “Engaging Syria: New Negotiations, Old Challenges,” The Brookings Institution, July 23, 2008. In a subsequent 20 On November 8, Syrian state television aired “con- article, one of the delegation’s members, Sami Moubayed, fessions” of members of Fatah al-Islam, a Sunni Islamic put “recognition of Syria’s cooperation on border security militant group that grew out of Fatah Intifada, a Pales- with Iraq” on a 10-point list of demands that President- 16 Ibid. tinian militant group closely controlled by the Syrian elect Barack Obama must do for Syria to receive him in 17 Marie Colvin and Uzi Mahnaimi, “Questions Raised regime. The report claimed Saudi support for the attack Damascus “like Jimmy Carter, and Bill Clinton.” over Syrian Complicity in U.S. Raid,” The Sunday Times, channeled via Saad Hariri, Rafiq Hariri’s son. The report 13 Ibid. November 2, 2008. remains highly controversial and unconfirmed. 14 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 21 “A Puzzling Raid,” Economist, October 30, 2008. 15 Aji, “U.S. Special Forces Launch Rare Attack Inside 19 Phil Sands, “Syria Stops Insurgents on Iraq Border,” 22 The author’s name has been withheld to protect the Syria.” The National, November 2, 2008. sources involved in the research.

10 november 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 12

Afghanistan’s Heart of against them. This article will examine and Korengal Valleys which reach up the history of warfare in Kunar Province to the remote mountains of Nuristan, Darkness: Fighting the up until the present day, in an effort to one encounters non-Pashtun tribes Taliban in Kunar Province provide a context of understanding for previously known as “Kafirs” (pagan U.S.-led international forces. unbelievers). The Kafirs were conquered By Brian Glyn Williams by the Afghan-Pashtun state in the 1890s A Natural Fortress: The History of Kunar and converted to the nur (light) of Islam; most observers see Afghanistan’s In Afghanistan, Kunar is a rare forested their land was renamed Nuristan. By southern provinces of Helmand and valley carved by the Kunar River, which the mid-20th century, these two remote Kandahar as being the heart of the flows 300 miles southward along the peoples had put aside their differences country’s insurgency. Northeastern Pakistani-Afghan border from Chitral and came to be included in one province Kunar Province, however, has been down to the Kabul River near Jalalabad. known as Kunar.6 Fundamentalism described in mythic proportions as Along the way, the Kunar River is joined came to Kunar in the 1950s via the the “most dangerous terrain for U.S. by numerous tributaries—such as the neighboring Pakistani Pashtun province forces anywhere in the world.”1 U.S. Pech Dara—that add to its flow. Kunar’s of Bajaur. Like new converts elsewhere, soldiers who fight a bold enemy in population is roughly 380,000.3 The the Nuristanis became zealots, and the Kunar Province’s rugged mountains north-south Kunar Valley parallels the Kunari Pashtuns similarly developed a have dubbed it Afghanistan’s “Heart of Pakistani border and has been used as a reputation for being fundamentalists. Darkness.” In 2007, the province saw corridor of communications between the 973 insurgent attacks making it the uplands of Badakshan (Tajik territories The Kunari Pashtuns and the newly second most active Afghan province to the north) and the Pashtun lands of converted Nuristanis were driven closer after Kandahar. The Kunar battlefield the south for centuries. Insurgents have together in 1978 by the clumsy policies is not the flat open plains or scrub long used the Kunar-Nuristan corridor of the new Communist government that covered desert mountains of the south, for attacking Kabul and other parts of assumed power in the Saur Revolution but forested mountains similar to those Afghanistan. Alexander the Great saw of April 1978. Both conservative tribal found in Colorado’s Rockies. What the strategic importance of Kunar and groups resented the new government’s Kunar does share with Helmand and invaded the valley in fourth century interference in their lives and rose Kandahar is a “bleed over” of tribes BC on his way into Bajaur, the tribal up in opposition to Kabul’s efforts to and loyalties between Pashtuns living land to the east. When he invaded, the arrest their elders, de-emphasize Islam, in Afghanistan and those found in the local inhabitants burnt their houses empower women, and redistribute Federally Administered Tribal Areas and fled to wage guerrilla warfare land. In fact, the first sparks of what (FATA) of Pakistan.2 against his troops, a style of warfare would become the mujahidin resistance their descendents would continue right were lit in the mountains of Kunar by The combination of lush tree cover, up until the modern era.4 In the late the summer of 1978 as local lashkars rugged mountains, cross-border 19th century the British found that the (fighting units) began to attack regional sanctuaries, and prickly mountain tribes best way to suppress the local Pashtuns Communist government police and that resent outside rule is a volatile was to divide their lands artificially garrisons. mixture that has made Kunar prime and place the Pashtuns of Bajaur in insurgent territory. Kunar Province has British India (later Pakistan) leaving The Peoples Democratic Party of been a “no-go zone” since its people rose the remainder in Kunar, Afghanistan. Afghanistan’s (PDPA) army eventually up against the Communists in 1978. In The artificial border did not prevent the responded to these attacks by carrying many ways, it remains one today. Kunar Kunari Pashtuns from joining with their out the systematic massacre of Kunari made headlines across the world for Bajauri Pashtun kin in waging guerrilla Pashtuns in the farming village of Kerala the coalition’s two deadliest actions in jihad against the British up until the in April 1979. In this tragic event that has Afghanistan to date, namely the spring late 1930s. come to define the Kunari Pashtuns’ deep 2006 ambush of a U.S. Navy SEAL team distrust of outside government forces, followed by the shooting down of a The vast majority of Kunar’s population some 200 Afghan Army troops and Chinook helicopter sent to rescue them, is Pashtun, with the Pech-based Safi Soviet advisers executed and bulldozed and the summer 2008 swarm attack on tribe the most prominent.5 Yet if one almost 1,700 men into a mass grave.7 a newly built U.S. outpost that almost goes up the Kunar Valley, into the Pech The slain men’s women and children succeeded in overwhelming it. Both fled over the border into Bajaur, and attacks revealed the existence of a bold 3 For a virtual tour of Kunar featuring its landscapes became the first of millions of Afghan enemy that had seemingly found the way and tribes, see the video at www.youtube.com/ war refugees who would soon settle in to use the local terrain and the enemy’s watch?v=B1uJG16M3_k. Also see www.youtube.com/ Pakistan. By the summer of 1979 Kunar unfamiliarity with Kunar’s history, watch?v=DiuPV6wB-3E. had become “virtually independent,” tribal politics, culture and tactics 4 A.B. Bosworth, Conquest and Empire: The Reign of Alex- and the local government forces had ander the Great (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, been forced into their compound in the 1 Tim Hetherington, “The Fight for Korengal,” Vanity 1988), p. 121. Fair, December 3, 2007. 5 The Safis or Safays are broken down into the Masaud, 6 In 2004, Nuristan was administratively separated 2 Kunar shares a border with FATA’s Bajaur Agency, Gurbaz, and Wadir sub-tribes. Smaller tribes include the from Kunar and now forms its own province. which can be crossed through the Nawa and Ghahki Shinwari, Mahmund, Kuchis, Pashai, Hisarak, among 7 Edward Girardet, Afghanistan: The Soviet War (New mountain passes. others. York: St. Martin’s Press, 1985), pp. 107-110.

11 november 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 12 provincial capital of Asadabad.8 This commander), succeeded in expelling he took refuge. On August 30, 1991, garrison later mutinied and joined the Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-i-Islami he was assassinated by an Egyptian, rebels who, for a brief time, seized the and establishing an independent presumably on Hekmatyar’s orders. provincial capital. Wahhabi-style state with Saudi aid.12 Hizb-i-Islami took control over most of Soon thereafter, scores of Arabs the valley. In response to these insurgent activities, made their way to Kunar via Bajaur the PDPA’s Soviet allies helped the to fight the Soviets alongside Jamil ur In 1996, Hizb-i-Islami’s dominance in Afghan Communist government shore up Rahman. Saudi and Egyptian fighters in Kunar was threatened by a new anti- garrisons in key points along the Kunar particular came to consider the province mujahidin force emerging from the south: Valley at Asadabad, Asmar and Barikot. to be their home base. One of these Arab the Taliban. By late 1996, the Taliban While the Soviets initially aimed to hold volunteer mujahidin, Abu Ikhlas al- had defeated Hizb-i-Islami and forced static positions and allow their Afghan Masri, married a local woman and was its leader, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, to flee Communist allies to move out into the to play a key role in reintroducing Arab into exile. The Taliban subsequently countryside to fight, they eventually got fighters to Kunar after 2001. claimed the right to rule. Most local sucked into the fighting. They launched Salafists rejected the Taliban due to several large-scale military operations When the Soviets began to pull out their their insistence on referring to Mullah in Kunar designed to open up the troops in 1988, the Afghan Communist Omar as Amir ul Mui’meen (Commander of valley, such as their first major Afghan government saw its position in Kunar the Faithful), a claim that the Salafist operation in February-March 1980. The as untenable and withdrew troops from puritans did not accept. The main Kunar invasion included approximately the isolated garrisons in spring of that Salafist leader in Kunar, Haji Rohullah, 10,000 Soviet troops backed by 7,500 year. By November 1988, Asadabad had in fact moved to Pakistan to avoid the Afghan Communist troops.9 The Taliban and stayed there in exile until invasion forced as much as two-thirds of “The first sparks of the Taliban regime was destroyed in the local population (estimated to have 2001’s Operation Enduring Freedom. been around 330,000 at the start of the what would become the war) to flee to Bajaur in Pakistan. While mujahidin resistance Kunar Post 9/11: The Crucible of the Afghan the Russian spetsnaz did occasionally Insurgency issue out from their bases to destroy were lit in the mountains When Operation Enduring Freedom mujahidin bases and groups or launch of Kunar by the summer commenced, the locals either waited air assaults to relieve bases, for the on the sidelines or helped their former most part the Soviets and their Afghan of 1978 as local lashkars Taliban and al-Qa`ida opponents escape Communist allies remained “bottled up (fighting units) began to through their territory into Pakistan in their forts” and under a state of “semi- out of a feeling of Islamic solidarity or siege.”10 The Soviets spent most of their attack regional Communist because they were bribed. The locals time fighting off local mujahidin swarm government police and began to turn against the government attacks and being shelled by rebels and its coalition allies in June 2002 when who had an almost ritualistic style of garrisons.” an elder from Ganjgal named Abdul warfare.11 The Soviets responded to Wali, who was wanted by the coalition, these attacks with large clumsy sweeps was taken to their headquarters. He and by using close air support that led subsequently died under mysterious to high civilian casualties. been taken by the rebels, making it one circumstances. When his body was of the first provincial capitals to fall to released13 two days later, the locals By the mid-1980s, Kunar had become the mujahidin. With the removal of the decided to revolt much as they had in one of the “hottest” zones in all of Communists, Jamil ur Rahman set up a 1978. Additionally, the locals began Afghanistan for the Soviets. By this Salafist-Wahhabi “amirate” in Kunar. to complain that policemen sent to the time, all the major mujahidin resistance Jamil ur Rahman crushed all other local province from Kabul were extorting groups had established a presence in fighting groups and fought to fend off money from them. To compound the valley. The independent commander attacks by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s matters, the recently returned Salafist Jamil ur Rahman from Pech, a Salafist Hizb-i-Islami, which aimed to control leader Haji Rohullah was arrested by religious leader belonging to the the entire northeast. In August 1991, the coalition on grounds that he was Safi tribe (and former Hizb-i-Islami Hekmatyar launched a major invasion collaborating with the Taliban.14 As of the Kunar Valley that led to the these events were taking place, the local 8 Anthony Hyman, Afghanistan Under Soviet Domination: deaths of 50 of Jamil ur Rahman’s Arab Salafists began to lose power as their 1964-1981 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982), p. 124. allies and the sacking of his capital at leaders were displaced by professionals 9 Mark Urban, War in Afghanistan (New York: St. Mar- Asadabad. In response, Jamil ur Rahman tin’s Press, 1989), p. 156. fled across the border to Bajaur, where 13 One popular account said his body was thrown on the 10 Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, Af- side of the road. ghanistan the Bear Trap: The Defeat of a Superpower (Hav- 12 Gilles Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 14 Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: erton, PA: Casemate, 1989), p. 132; Michael Scheuer, 1979 to the Present (New York: Columbia University The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan (New York: “Assessing the Six Year Hunt for Osama bin Laden,” Ter- Press, 2005), p. 230. A similar Wahhabi state known as Columbia University Press, 2008), pp. 71-72. Antonio rorism Focus 4:30 (2007). the Dawlat (the state) was also formed in neighboring re- Giustozzi points out that the accusations against Rohul- 11 Ibid. gions of Nuristan at this time by Maulvi Afzar. lah may have been false.

12 november 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 12 sent to rule the province from Kabul. attack them.16 Reinforcements arrived, also extended the writ of the Afghan This bred further resentment against but one of the Chinooks carrying SEALs government to places where there the Hamid Karzai government. was shot down en route by a Taliban has been no government presence for rocket-propelled grenade. Sixteen decades. It has helped cut off insurgent Fears that Kunar would turn on the soldiers were killed in the ensuing crash. “rat lines” over the Ghahki and Nawa coalition seem to have been borne out. Meanwhile, three of the encircled Navy passes from Pakistan into Kunar and Fighting began in late 2002 as the 82nd SEALs on the ground were killed, while on to Nuristan. Writing about one such Airborne arrived in the valley. Kashmir the fourth escaped.17 In the aftermath, base in the Salafist-Wahhabi-dominated Khan, the Hizb-i-Islami commander Regional Command East decided that Korengal Valley,20 Elizabeth Rubin of who had earlier fought against the Kunar and the neighboring province the New York Times explained: Taliban, seemed to be leading the revolt. of Nuristan needed a greater military In an effort to flush out Kashmir Khan’s presence. In response, it launched Unlike in Iraq, where the captains Hizb-i-Islami fighters as well as dozens Operation Whaler in August 2005, and lieutenants could let down of foreign fighters led by Abu Ikhlas al- Operation Pil in October 2005 and their guard in a relatively safe, Masri, who was declared al-Qa`ida’s amir Operation Mountain Lion in April 2006. fortified operating base, swapping in Kunar and Nuristan, the United States Hundreds of Taliban-linked fighters stories and ideas, here [Korengal launched Operation Mountain Resolve were killed in the operations. Since Operating Post] they had no one then, Regional Command East has also to talk to and were almost as “The new counter- been active in building roads (including vulnerable to enemy fire inside the a $7.5 million road linking the Pech wire as out…And unlike every other insurgency strategy has Valley to Asadabad), bridges, schools place I’ve been in Afghanistan— resulted in the construction and other Provisional Reconstruction even the Pech River valley, just an Team projects as part of a “hearts and hour’s drive away—the Korengal of small, platoon-sized minds” strategy. had no Afghan police or district outposts throughout the leaders for the Americans to work The military has been active in with.21 province. These have establishing forward operating bases become magnets for local far from the town centers controlled The enemy in Korengal and nearby Pech by the Soviets in the 1980s. This has consists of a variety of fighters belonging insurgent attacks.” meant inserting a U.S. presence18 deep to Kashmir Khan’s Hizb-i-Islami into a countryside that is hostile to the faction, Abu Ikhlas’ al-Qa`ida, angry coalition and generally supportive of local Afghans who resent the presence the local Pashtun, Pashai, Nuristani of “infidels” or any outsiders in their on November 7, 2003. The operation and Arab insurgents. Moreover, the valleys, Lashkar-i-Tayyaba, Taliban involved a Soviet-style airdrop into new counter-insurgency strategy has fighters led by Dost Muhammad and the Hindu Kush mountains by the U.S. resulted in the construction of small, Qara Ziaur Rahman, Nuristanis led by 10th Mountain Division and resulted in platoon-sized outposts throughout the Mullah Munibullah, Arab fighters from the killing of Hizb-i-Islami commander province. These have become magnets a group calling itself Jami`at al-Da`wa Ghulam Sakhee, a few clashes with the for local insurgent attacks.19 While al-Qur’an wa’l-Sunna, and Pakistani enemy, and the discovery of some minor this forward base policy has increased volunteers. Among these groups are weapon caches.15 U.S. casualties in the region, it has hundreds of fighters who routinely ambush U.S. patrols, plant IEDs, snipe The next U.S. operation was Operation 16 “US Navy Seal’s Afghan Disaster,” BBC News, July at exposed soldiers, shell observation Red Wing, which occurred on June 28, 25, 2005. posts, and on occasion even attempt to 2005. The small operation involved 17 The story of this tragedy, the worse loss of Navy the insertion of four elite Navy SEALs SEALS in its history, was vividly recounted in a Time into Kunar to track and kill Ahmad Magazine article entitled, “How the Shepherd Saved the 20 For remarkable video footage shot by Sebas- Shah Ismail, a mid-level Taliban/al- SEAL,” and a book entitled Lone Survivor: The Eyewitness tian Younger for ABC on life in an outpost in Ku- Qa`ida mercenary commander said to Account of Operation Redwing and the Lost Heroes of SEAL nar’s deadly Korengal Valley, see www.liveleak.com/ be leading a group of 200-300 Afghan Team 10 (London: Little, Brown and Co., 2007). The tar- view?i=d0f_1197424119. and Arab fighters calling themselves get of this failed operation, Ahmad Shah, escaped his 21 The story of the insurgency in Korengal Valley be- the Bara bin Malik. The operation failed pursuers and survived a subsequent B-52 strike on his gins with the Americans getting caught up in a feud with when the Navy SEAL team operating on compound, but was eventually killed two years later. rivals from the nearby Pech Valley. According to Eliza- a 10,000-foot high ridge known as Abas 18 The Marines, 173rd Airborne Brigade, 10th Mountain beth Rubin, the Americans were duped into bombing Ghar (near Korengal Valley) was spotted Division and 503rd Infantry Regiment have all been in- the house of a local lumber magnate named Haji Matin. by local shepherds. The shepherds volved. Several of Haji Matin’s family members were killed in informed Ahmad Shah Ismail, who sent 19 These attacks are often posted online. For a Taliban the attack. To gain revenge, he took his men over to al- roughly 140 fighters to surround and perspective video of the fighting in Kunar, see “Part 2 Qa`ida commander Abu Ikhlas al-Masri and began to of BM Rocket Operation in Kunar,” at www.liveleak. fight against the Americans. As more blood was spilled, 15 Sergeant Greg Heath, “10th Mtn. Div. Shows its Mettle com/view?i=3c9_1174862660&c=1. See also “Mujahideen Matin’s lashkar gathered up the support of locals in the In Operation Mountain Resolve,” Defend America, U.S. Launch Hawk Rockets at American Post in Kunar” at Korengal who made it their mission to destroy the U.S. Department of Defense, November 2003. www.liveleak.com/view?i=a37_1174985631. forward operating post in their valley.

13 november 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 12 storm forward operating bases.22 and its tributaries. While the coalition Al-Qa`ida’s Changing has advantages over its Soviet This last point was vividly demonstrated predecessors in terms of intelligence, Outlook on Pakistan in one of the boldest insurgent attacks training, equipment, and fighting spirit, in Afghanistan to date: the July 13, 2008 it will continue to sustain heavy losses By Jarret Brachman mass assault on a partially established as it fights valley by valley for control overt observation post in the Kunar/ of Kunar. Qari Ziaur Rahman, the on the morning of November 19, 1995, Nuristani border village of Wanat. overall Taliban commander for Kunar, a terrorist cell operating under the The attack was launched by Hizb-i- Bajaur, and Nuristan, summed up the authority and financing of Dr. Ayman al- Islami commander Maulawi Usman and importance of the battle for Kunar as Zawahiri’s Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) involved between 200-400 Arab and follows: organization unleashed two vehicle- Afghan fighters in a pre-dawn ambush based improvised explosive devices on on 45 Americans and 25 Afghan Army From the Soviet days in the Egyptian Embassy in Islamabad. soldiers who were protected only by Afghanistan, Kunar’s importance The attack leveled the embassy’s main concertina barbed wire, earthen barriers has been clear. This is a border wing, killing 17 and wounding another and a wall of Humvees. At one point they province and trouble here can 60. While al-Zawahiri was clearly breached the post and fighting was done break the central government. no fan of the Pakistani government face to face before the insurgents were Whoever has been defeated in during the mid-1990s, it would be a repulsed.23 In the eight hour firefight, the Afghanistan, his defeat began mistake to construe the incident as an Americans came close to being overrun from Kunar. Hence, everybody is attack against Pakistan. It is true that and were only saved when A-10s, F-15s, terrified of this region. The Soviets al-Zawahiri was perturbed with the Apaches, and a Predator drone bombed were defeated in this province and joint Egyptian-Pakistani crackdown and strafed the perimeter of the base. NATO knows that if it is defeated on the “Afghan Arabs,” but he was When the smoke cleared, nine members here it will be defeated all over also a student of international politics. of Chosen Company serving in Wanat Afghanistan.25 Al-Zawahiri believed that Pakistan’s had been killed, 21 wounded, and ongoing cooperation with enemies such four allied Afghan soldiers wounded. Dr. Brian Glyn Williams is currently as Egypt and the United States was Between 15 and 40 of the enemy were Associate Professor of Islamic History less the Pakistani government’s fault also killed in the assault. While the at the University of Massachusetts- and more a structural outcome of the operation was a Taliban military failure, Dartmouth. In addition to his scholarship, Zionist-Crusader “New World Order” it was a strategic success because of the which includes numerous articles on jihadi that had been established. propaganda value of the attack. Three terrorism, ethnic violence, and nationalism days later, the U.S. military decided to in Islamic Eurasia, he has a book entitled Today, al-Qa`ida’s high command evacuate the base altogether. The Crimean Tatars: The Diaspora is likely holed up in the Afghan- Experience and the Forging of a Nation Pakistan tribal territory, overstretched, The Future of Kunar (2001). His field work has ranged from embattled and perplexed, especially From a larger perspective, the United Kosovo to Kashmir to Kazakhstan and when it comes to their Pakistani States has little presence along the varies from living with Northern Alliance policies. By spending the past eight porous Kunar-Bajaur border and its warlords in Afghanistan to interviewing years arguing that President Pervez authority is largely limited to the Kosovar Albanian field commanders. Most Musharraf was the source from which Jalalabad-Asadabad-Asmar highway, recently he served as an expert witness all of Pakistan’s evils emanated, al- the same area the Soviets tried to at Guantanamo Bay in the case of Salim Qa`ida had failed to rhetorically control. The arrival of thousands of Hamdan, Usama bin Ladin’s driver. Dr. prepare themselves or their audiences Pashtun refugees into Kunar fleeing a Williams’ website is located at www. for a post-Musharraf Pakistan. Now, al- Pakistani offensive across the border brianglynwilliams.com. Qa`ida’s propagandists are scrambling in Bajaur in the fall of 2008 might to convince their constituencies that exacerbate problems.24 Thus a pattern the new regime is no different than of revenge killings, spontaneous tribal Musharraf’s. At the same time, al- jihad, and counter-insurgency that goes Qa`ida continues to falter on fulfilling back 30 years to the original lashkar Khalid Shaykh Muhammad’s dream uprising against the Afghan Communist of integrating the domestic Pakistani regime continues in the Kunar Valley jihadist movement with al-Qa`ida. A strong indicator about how poorly the integration is going is the extent to 22 For video of an example of a typical ambush which senior al-Qa`ida leaders have on one of these patrols, see www.liveleak.com/ been willing to pander to the Pakistani view?i=2b1_1193703874. Also see Sebastian Junger, “Re- populace in their public statements turn to the Valley of Death,” Vanity Fair, October 2008. during the past two years. Given the 23 This was the first time a U.S. post had been breached. range of operational and strategic 24 This problem may be mitigated, however, by the Pak- challenges they now face, there is istani Army’s recent success in taking back much of the growing reason to believe that al- neighboring cross-border Taliban sanctuary in Bajaur 25 Syed Saleem Shahzad, “At War with the Taliban: A Qa`ida’s high command is in dire need Agency in late October 2008. Fighter and a Financier,” Asia Times, May 23, 2008.

14 november 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 12 of a face-saving respite. The incoming of the embassy left a clear message Christian targets.7 Furthermore, its U.S. administration will, therefore, need to the Egyptian government,” not the geopolitical importance, particularly to think carefully and creatively about Pakistani government or people.4 its ready access to the Kashmiri how to best capitalize on al-Qa`ida’s front, made it better not to raise the self-inflicted wounds. 1990s Bin Ladin: Positively Pakistan Pakistani government’s ire. “We don’t Pakistan was not at the forefront of burn the ground we pass through,” Zawahiri vs. Egypt the jihadist leadership’s mind in the Suri counseled.8 Before 9/11, Pakistan In 1995, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri’s mid-1990s. In Usama bin Ladin’s well- was simply not on the operational or terrorist infrastructure inside Egypt known August 1996 and February ideological radar for al-Qa`ida. had been decimated. More than 1,000 2008 fatawa, for example, the topic of of his operatives were wrapped up Pakistan comes up just once in passing. Slipping into the Abyss by Egyptian security services, his In an undated interview with Daily Ausaf Bin Ladin had hoped that the 9/11 mentor abandoned him and the EIJ’s editor Hamid Mir, published on March attacks would unite the Islamic world incidental yet highly publicized killing 18, 1997, Bin Ladin briefly mentioned under the banner of al-Qa`ida as a way of a schoolgirl soured much of the Pakistan’s decision to send Pakistani of dislodging the Zionist-Crusader Egyptian population’s attitude toward military forces into Somalia in support “New World Order.” When the U.S.- his operations. The Egyptian security of U.S. and UN peacekeeping operations led coalition began its retaliation in collaboration with Pakistan became Afghanistan, however, he did not see particularly troubling for al-Zawahiri the kind of overwhelming resistance beginning in April 1993, when Egyptian “Al-Qa`ida finds itself in movement for which he had hoped. On President Hosni Mubarak passed a variety of predicaments September 24, 2001, Bin Ladin appealed Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to the Pakistanis, “we incite our Muslim the names of 1,500 Egyptians living in with regard to the brothers in Pakistan to deter with Pakistan, 600 of whom were deemed Pakistani government, all their capabilities the American terrorists.1 Pakistan’s new prime crusaders from invading Pakistan and minister, Benazir Bhutto, followed suit its army and its jihadist Afghanistan.”9 Four days later he said, by expelling a number of Egyptians who population. Al-Qa`ida’s were working in Pakistan-based relief Pakistan is a great hope for the organizations.2 The Egyptian-Pakistani headaches are U.S. Islamic brotherhood. Its people security relationship came to a head opportunities.” are awakened, organized, and rich for al-Zawahiri when the Pakistani in the spirit of faith. They backed justice minister visited Egypt to sign Afghanistan in its war against the an extradition agreement between the Soviet Union and extended every two countries, ensuring that Egyptians there. Given the fact that the United help to the mujahidin and the apprehended in Pakistan could be more States was “run by the Jews,” Bin Ladin Afghan people.10 efficiently mainlined back to Cairo. explained, any Pakistani cooperation with the United States, particularly in Bin Ladin finally realized that the By 1995, Egyptian jihadists had declared supporting military operations where Musharraf-led government would an open war on Egypt around the Muslim soldiers could be killed, had be unwilling to actively or indirectly world, including an assassination plot to be rejected. Pakistan’s decision, support Bin Ladin’s call for mass on President Mubarak during a trip to however, was not a deal-breaker for mobilization against the Americans. Ethiopia, a bombing of a Croatian police Bin Ladin at the time.5 To the contrary, By October 2001, Bin Ladin had station in retaliation for the capture of in a May 1998 interview he suggested enough. “Unfortunately,” he explained, a senior Egyptian jihadist spokesman, that a resurgence of Pakistani “the position taken by the Pakistani and the killing of an Egyptian trade nationalism might help it achieve Government has made it a pillar in attaché in Geneva for his suspected role nuclear capabilities vis-à-vis India.6 this ominous alliance, this Crusader in tracking down Egyptian jihadists in alliance…The brethren in Pakistan Europe. Al-Zawahiri’s decision to bomb Even in the early months of Musharraf’s must take serious action.”11 Bin Ladin’s the Egyptian Embassy in Islamabad rule, jihadists were tolerably irritated call for unspecified “action” inside of fits squarely in line with these other with the Pakistani regime. In August attacks, which were fundamentally a 2000, for instance, Abu Mus`ab al- 7 Abu Mus`ab al-Suri, The Brigades of the Global Islamic reaction “to the Egyptian government’s Suri, a trusted adviser to al-Zawahiri Resistance: The Call - The Way - The Method, recorded in expansion of its campaign against at the time, warned jihadists against August 2000. Egyptian fundamentalists outside the committing terrorism in Pakistan 8 Ibid. 3 country.” For al-Zawahiri, “the rubble because it had no critical Jewish and 9 “Text of Bin Ladin’s Letter to the Pakistani People,” al- Jazira, September 24, 2001. 1 ‘Abd al-Rahim ‘Ali, “Planners Behind Bombing of al-Sharq al-Awsat, December 3, 2001. 10 “Exclusive Interview With Usama Bin Ladin on 11 Egyptian Embassy in Islamabad Flee,” al-Ahali, Novem- 4 Ibid. September Attacks,” Karachi Ummat, September 28, ber 26, 1995. 5 Hamid Mir, “Interview with Usama Bin Ladin,” Daily 2001. 2 Ibid. Ausaf, March 18, 1997. 11 Taysir Alluni, “Full Text of Interview Held with Al- 3 Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Knights Under the Banner of the 6 Abu Shiraz, “May 1998 Interview With Bin Ladin,” Qa’ida Leader Usama Bin Ladin,” al-Jazira, October 21, Prophet Muhammad,” published in serialized format in February 20, 1999. 2001.

15 november 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 12

Pakistan was a clear, final signal to its territory and airspace to the U.S. Violent Trends in Algeria Musharraf’s regime to back away from military, or if the Pakistani government the United States or face all out war. held Musharraf accountable for the Since 9/11 When the prospect of a large-scale U.S.- crimes he committed against Islam led ground invasion into Iraq became during the past seven years.15 By Hanna Rogan real, al-Qa`ida concluded that the United States was finally initiating its Gadahn’s argument, likely developed after a lethal late summer in Algeria, push to divide and conquer the Middle in coordination with al-Zawahiri, can with several high-casualty bombings East. Bold action had to be taken. In be viewed in two ways. First, it might and suicide operations, the month of February 2003, Bin Ladin demanded be seen as an attempt to decouple Ramadan—often a preferred time for that his followers overthrow the their grievances with Musharraf to attacks by militant Islamists—turned Pakistani government to save the nation shore up the relevance of its anti- out to be relatively peaceful. In fact, from impending American domination.12 Pakistan argument with its jihadist the main Islamist insurgent group In April 2003, Bin Ladin pushed harder, constituency. This interpretation would in Algeria, al-Qa`ida in the Islamic pleading for suicide operations against be borne out by the incessant chatter Maghreb (AQIM), has so far been less Musharraf’s regime.13 of al-Qa`ida’s talking heads in recent active in 2008 than in recent years. months trying to reiterate al-Qa`ida’s This article presents the preliminary During the next few years, al-Qa`ida old indictments against Pakistan in findings of a quantitative analysis of codified its grievance list against new, “Musharraf-less” language. The militant Islamist activism in Algeria Musharraf, charging him with blindly second more interesting interpretation from 2001 until October 2008. The study supporting the U.S. military agenda in is that al-Qa`ida is communicating with includes a sample of 1,580 incidents. It Afghanistan at the expense of the lives Pakistan and the United States about identifies a number of trends in militant of mujahidin, intentionally reducing what kind of face-saving measures it Islamist activism in Algeria since hostilities with India—an unrepentant needs to back off from its current anti- 2001. For example, there has been an enemy of Islam—disarming Pakistan’s Pakistan trajectory. Gadahn’s list of increase in high-casualty attacks, but nuclear arsenal, recognizing the Jewish grievances may actually be a diplomatic also an increase in operations with no state of Israel, withdrawing its support communiqué coded in screed. His low- casualties, or failed operations. Non- for the legitimate jihadist resistance level status in the organization fits lethal operations pursuing economic ongoing in Kashmir and sending the well with general diplomatic protocols aims are on the rise, while bomb Pakistani military into the tribal areas to about where such talks are initiated. explosions have become the most hunt down Taliban and al-Qa`ida forces. Al-Qa`ida may, in fact, be trying to common means of attack. There are now negotiate their way out of the corner. fewer operations targeting civilians, Al-Qa`ida’s Pakistani Predicament although this group remains vulnerable. Even though Musharraf is now out of The fact is that al-Qa`ida finds itself in Geographically, the area of operations power, the inertia of al-Qa`ida’s anti- a variety of predicaments with regard has been significantly reduced inside Pakistan policy has made it difficult for to the Pakistani government, its army Algeria, but there is emerging activity in them to back-peddle without admitting and its jihadist population. Al-Qa`ida’s neighboring countries. These findings strategic weakness. In al-Qa`ida headaches are U.S. opportunities. will be examined in detail. propagandist Adam Gadahn’s recent Nevertheless, a wounded animal can video dedicated to explaining al-Qa`ida’s be extremely irrational, unpredictable A Quantitative Study post-Musharraf policy, he dismissed the and dangerous. It may be useful for the The period of 2001 to October 2008 Pakistani government’s public anger United States to find ways to decrease covers the activity of the Salafist with recent U.S. raids into the tribal the domestic pressure on the ruling Group for Preaching and Combat areas as nothing more than a “cynical Pakistani regime while maintaining (GSPC), which was established in 1998 public relations ploy,” similar to those pressure on extremists. The less that by Hassan Hattab. In October 2006, used by Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan or Pakistan appears to be the handmaiden under the leadership of Abdelmalek by the Saudi regime.14 Gadahn explained of the United States, the easier time Droukdal, the GSPC officially joined al- that he would be more apt to believe it will have garnering the domestic Qa`ida, and in January 2007 the group Pakistani rhetoric if “Pakistan had not support that it needs to effectively deal adopted the name al-Qa`ida in the continued to pledge its unwavering with its extremist problems itself. Islamic Maghreb. This study suggests support” to U.S. military campaigns in that certain, although not all, changes Afghanistan, if the Pakistani Army was Dr. Jarret Brachman is a specialist on al-Qa`ida in operational patterns can be traced to not “still engaged in a massive, bloody, strategy and ideology. He holds an appointment and probably explained by this alliance and tyrannical anti-Islam campaign in at North Dakota State University’s Upper Great between a mainly nationally-oriented Bajaur and Swat,” if Pakistan denied Plains Transportation Institute. He also maintains Islamist group and Usama bin Ladin’s a Research Fellow position with the Combating global al-Qa`ida network. 12 “Usama Bin Ladin’s Message to Iraq, Urges Muslims Terrorism Center at West Point. His new book, The study is based on open source To Overthrow Regime,” al-Jazira, February 11, 2003. Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice, accounts of militant activity attributed 13 “Usama Bin Ladin Urges Muslims To Launch ‘Suicide was published in September 2008 by Routledge to armed Islamist groups in Algeria and Attacks’ Against US,” Daily Ausaf, April 9, 2003. Press. elsewhere in the region. The author has 14 Adam Gadahn, “The Believer Isn’t Stung From The used the online archives of French and Same Hole Twice,” al-Sahab, October 4, 2008. 15 Ibid.

16 november 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 12

Arabic language Algerian newspapers, Explaining such numbers requires in- sample is complete, and it should be as well as collections of press reports depth analysis of the armed group in assumed that the first four years also compiled through private initiatives.1 question and the context in which it included operations with no casualties. Although there are 1,580 incidents operates. In brief, possible explanatory It is likely that, at times with high included in the study, it does not claim factors include: the amnesty programs numbers of violent incidents, the press to present a comprehensive overview initiated by Algerian President does not prioritize reporting on “failed of all violent operations in Algeria in Abdelaziz Bouteflika since 1999 that at operations.” the selected period. It should also be least temporarily reduced the strength noted that press reports sometimes of the armed Islamists; the split between Target Selection present an incomplete narrative or remnant groups of the GIA at the The targets of the militant Islamists can even contradictory information about beginning of the 2000s and infighting be classified into two main categories, incidents. For instance, numbers of over control of the Islamist scene; the separating civilians from the combined reported casualties tend to diverge, and ideological conviction of Hassan Hattab, security forces (including the military, in these cases this study has chosen who by 2001 led the largest militant police, gendarme, municipal guard and to register the most modest estimates. Islamist group in Algeria, fervently local militia). Furthermore, many press reports do not opposing the civilian massacres of the adequately identify the perpetrators of GIA; the “new generation” that took attacks, particularly for the first few over the leadership of the GSPC in years in the sample when remnants of 2004 and that sought alignment with the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) were the global jihad; and finally, the recent still active. It should also be noted increased military offensive against that the Algerian Security Services militant Islamist activity in Algeria. have been accused of being behind a number of massacres that took place Number of Casualties in the name of militant Islamism in the With fewer incidents during the last 1990s and early 2000s. Despite certain eight years, there has also been a general elements of uncertainty, and even if decrease in the number of casualties. not comprehensive, the study suggests There is no correlation between the two certain trends in the use of violence by factors, however, and the efficiency Islamist militants in Algeria during the rate regarding the number of killed per period 2001-2008.2 incident has declined. On the other hand, Figure 1. Targets: Civilian and Security Forces. the number of wounded per incident has Number of Incidents increased. Yet, this relationship does At the beginning of the current not tell the whole story. The material millennium, Algeria emerged from a in the database suggests that the 2005- decade of violent civil war that claimed 2008 period, as compared to 2001-2004, the lives of between 100,000 and experienced both an elevated number of 250,000 people. Compared to such high-casualty incidents and an elevated numbers, the levels of violence and number of incidents without casualties. numbers of attacks that have taken place There are several possible explanations. during the last eight years have been First, suicide operations that have been limited and relatively constant. Yet, carried out during the last two years certain variations must be considered have inflicted large numbers of dead significant. This study indicates that and wounded. The same goes for some of the decrease in incidents since the late the bomb explosions, which have been 1990s was a trend that continued until increasingly popular since 2005. At the 2004. With 324 reported incidents same time, a striking number of bomb Figure 2. Targets: Civilian and Security Force Components. in 2001, the curve fell gradually to explosions have been failed operations— 141 in 2004. From 2005, the number in the view of the Islamists—resulting Figure 1 indicates GSPC founder Hassan of reported incidents rose slightly, in only injuries, or no casualties at all. Hattab’s vow not to target civilians reaching 203 incidents last year. The Reportedly, Algeria’s first incident of (as opposed to the GIA’s massacres of figures for 2008, however, do not seem a cell phone remotely-detonated bomb civilians) and to focus on the security consistent with this trend, with 106 explosion took place in 2005.3 While forces coincided with a decrease in incidents so far through September 30. one would assume that such a technique attacks on civilians. Since 2003, the would increase the precision of the number of incidents targeting civilians attack and thereby increase casualties has indeed been lower than the number per incident, it seems that this has of incidents targeting security forces. 1 This information was drawn from the online archives not been the overall result. Secondly, Breaking down the numbers further of Liberté, El-Watan and El-Khabar, in addition to press one cannot take for granted that the in Figure 2, however, it is revealed collections by Algeria-Watch and TROUBLES. that the number of incidents targeting 2 The last date for which figures were collected is Sep- 3 “Ould Abbès échappe à un attentat,” Le Soir d’Algérie civilians has remained higher than tember 30, 2008. Online, November 16, 2005. the number of incidents targeting the

17 november 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 12 military—with the notable exception collective massacres that were common incidents in only 18 wilayat. Overall, of 2007. Moreover, the number of around the turn of the millennium and as shown in Figure 4, the main region incidents targeting municipal guards to the adoption of more sophisticated of activity is the populated north, and local militia (both form armed means of attack. This tendency is comprising cities, mountains and citizens’ units that supplement police possibly linked to the second trend, the plains. The vast south has seen few in rural areas) has overall been higher manifest increase in the use of bomb incidents on the whole. The wilaya of than the number of incidents targeting explosions. From 2005 onward, this Algiers, including the capital Algiers, police and gendarme. This suggests technique was the single most used also has relatively few reported that civilians and armed citizens’ units, in operations by militant Islamists incidents overall. In addition to a which are probably less well-equipped in Algeria. Third, suicide operations reduced area of operation during the than the military and police, remain emerged as a new tactic in Algeria in period under study, one can observe a highly vulnerable groups. 2007. There has been an increase in distinction between the northeast (NE) the use of suicide operations in 2008. and northwest (NW) of the country. In Operational Variety This operational technique has been 2001, there was an approximate 50/50 As shown in Figure 3, the main types of attributed to the GSPC’s merger with ratio of operations in the NE and NW. operations that the militant Islamists al-Qa`ida in late 2006. Likewise, the From 2003 onward, more than 60% have conducted include ambush, fake use of bomb explosions in general has of total incidents happened in the NE. roadblock, clash (often during military been linked to the practices of al-Qa`ida Since 2006, around 80% of militant security operations), raid for economic in Iraq, a front for which the GSPC/ activity has taken place in the NE. purposes, abduction (also often with AQIM has recruited heavily.5 Fourth, economic aim), bomb explosion and and perhaps more interestingly, there suicide operation, and what has been has been an increase in the reporting labeled “killing.” The “killing” category of violent incidents pursuing economic includes assassination, most commonly objectives in 2008. Such operations by firearm or knife, but also other include raids on villages, attacks operations in which people are reported on commercial institutions, fake dead without further details. It is roadblocks with robberies of motorists, important to note that one incident may and abductions (where those abducted include several of the above-mentioned are not reported killed). Such incidents techniques.4 In such cases, both coincide with press reports about the techniques have been registered in the difficult financial and material situation database under one incident, in order of AQIM, and may indeed support the to document the widest operational media’s claim about poor economic capacity of the militant Islamists. conditions for Algeria’s militants.6 In this regard, it is also worth noting that Figure 4. Geographical Dispersion. the GSPC was known to finance itself through illegal businesses, such as Within the northeastern region, one area the smuggling of drugs, cigarettes and stands out with disproportionately high weapons across the Sahara. The joining activity. The area has been nicknamed of the GSPC with al-Qa`ida, however, the “triangle of death” and is composed allegedly created a split between the of the three wilayat of Tizi Ouzou, northern cells, which supported the Boumerdes and Bouira. Interestingly, alliance, and the southern cells which these three wilayat also form Zone 2 of opposed it, and thus possibly caused AQIM, which essentially constitutes a halt in financial support from the the central command of the group. The Sahara region. area has traditionally been a stronghold of insurgents in Algeria, mostly due to Geographical Dispersion its mountains and maquis, which make One of the clearest trends in militant it difficult for the security forces to Islamist activity in Algeria during access. The recent 2008 development, in the last eight years is less geographic which the so-called “triangle of death” dispersion. In 2001, violent operations represents approximately 70% (2008) of Figure 3. Operational Variety. were reported in 36 out of 48 wilayat all militant Islamist activity in Algeria, (provinces). In 2008, there have been suggests that AQIM has been forced into For some types of operations there one of its traditional strongholds and is is little variation over time, yet four 5 Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman, Al-Qaida’s Foreign seriously weakened in other areas. The trends appear to be significant. First, Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records (West number of incidents carried out outside 7 the number of “killings” has decreased Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2008). Also Algeria is very low. The database noticeably. This may be due to the halt in see “Ces bombes humaines qui reviennent d’Irak,” includes none before 2004, and only L’Expréssion, August 21, 2008. 4 For instance, one incident may combine ambush and 6 “Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb…Requests Money 7 Operations abroad that were registered in the database bomb explosion, or fake roadblock and abduction. and Men,” al-Sharq al-Awsat, March 10, 2008. are only ones claimed by the GSPC/AQIM.

18 november 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 12 slightly more than a handful altogether, Interview with a Former Nasir Abbas became the head of Jemaah including the three reported so far this Terrorist: Nasir Abbas’ Islamiya’s Mantiqi III in April 2001.2 year. Although it may be too early to In 2003, Abbas was arrested by the speak of a trend, the reported incidents Deradicalization Work in Indonesian police and prosecuted for may indicate ambitions to extend AQIM’s Indonesia immigration offenses. He agreed to work area of operations to include the Maghreb for the police in their deradicalization region and more specifically Mauritania, By Nick O’Brien program, and in 2004 he identified Abu Mali and Tunisia. Bakar Bashir as the head of JI in an a problem with countries that suffer Indonesian court of law.3 Conclusion terrorism is that they often do not There has been little variation in the understand the enemy and therefore lack Nasir Abbas was born on May 6, 1969 in timing of attacks, and only the months the framework to counter the terrorist Singapore. Early on, he and his parents of April, June and October (2001- threat. Understanding how and why moved to Malaysia, where he earned 2007) stand out by being a subtle two people are radicalized to the extent that citizenship. He described his upbringing percentage points higher than average they want to kill others and sometimes as normal and not very Islamic; his activity. As for October, it should be themselves is fundamental to countering mother did not wear a headscarf nor noted that it coincided partly with terrorism. Once the radicalization issue was his father an activist. He stated that Ramadan from 2003-2007. Yet during is understood, steps can be taken to he did not even pray five times a day as this year’s Ramadan, Algeria did introduce deradicalization and counter- required and was not a good Muslim. not experience heightened militant radicalization strategies and policies. In 1983-84, he began reading about Islamist activity. Overall, 2008 has the Soviet-Afghan war in newspapers experienced slightly less violence by The best way to understand the and magazines. It was at this time militant Islamists than previous years. radicalization process is to question he became aware of the mujahidin. Nevertheless, there is a steady increase those who have been radicalized During the interview, he described the in activities that include new operational themselves to the point of turning to mujahidin as “holy warriors” having techniques, such as suicide operations violence. This article will examine “holy status” and fighting for Islamic and large-scale bomb explosions, which the case of Nasir Abbas, a former rights and defending Islam. He said target indiscriminately and may inflict senior member of the Southeast Asian that at this time his “dream” was to go high casualties. The increase in such terrorist group Jemaah Islamiya (JI) to Afghanistan. operations, well known from Iraq and who now works with the Indonesian Afghanistan, can probably be explained government in their deradicalization Abbas said that he was a poor student as an effect of the GSPC’s alliance with al- program. In February 2008, Abbas and not good at school; therefore, at Qa`ida. Likewise, the emerging pattern of agreed to be interviewed on film about age 16 he asked his father if he could militant activism in the Maghreb region radicalization and deradicalization for drop out. His father initially refused, may be attributed to this global alliance. Charles Sturt University’s postgraduate but Abbas found a school attached to a The geographical area of activity within distance education program. During mosque that ran a course in translating Algeria, however, has been drastically the interview, Abbas was accompanied Arabic and taught students about the reduced over the years, possibly a sign of by a senior Indonesian police officer, Qur’an. Abbas persuaded his father a weakened movement.8 and Abbas had to be careful not to that he should attend the school. He incriminate himself since he has not explained that the school was not radical Hanna Rogan is a Research Fellow and been charged with any terrorism and that he would not learn about Ph.D. candidate with the Terrorism Research offenses. The Indonesian police killing or fighting—just Arabic and the Group at the Norwegian Defence Research officer was himself an expert in their Qur’an. Some Indonesians, however, Establishment (FFI). Her research focuses on deradicalization program, having been started preaching at the school. Abbas Islamist insurgencies in North Africa. Mrs. instrumental in introducing a strategy identified three of the preachers as Rogan holds an M.Phil. in Arabic studies from following the recent Muslim-Christian Abu Bakar Bashir, Abdullah Sungkar the University of Oslo. clashes in Poso. He also agreed to be and Abu Jibril, all of whom would interviewed. What was learned from become prominent members of Jemaah the two interviews is described in detail Islamiya. Abbas stated that they did not below. speak about fighting, but talked about Islam and the obligations of Muslims. Before Afghanistan: Nasir Abbas’ Upbringing Some of the preachers sold the students JI was organizationally split into four books about Afghanistan and jihad. “mantiqis” under a regional consultative Abbas was impressed by the Indonesian 8 The findings presented here are preliminary conclu- council, with each mantiqi covering teachers because they were wise and sions based on a collection of press reports about militant a different region in Southeast Asia.1 could speak Arabic. Islamist activity in Algeria. This study points out some tendencies and trends, but the material in the database 1 Mantiqi I covered Singapore and Malaysia; Mantiqi II is suitable for further analysis. Likewise, the study has was based in Indonesia; Mantiqi III’s area was Sabah, Su- White Paper, January 2003, p. 10. not provided any in-depth examination of the reasons for lawesi and the southern Philippines; Mantiqi IV covered 2 Personal interview, Nasir Abbas, February 25, 2008. certain developments, which also should be undertaken Australia. For more, see “The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests 3 “Ex-JI Member Names Bashir as Leader,” The Age, May in the future. and the Threat of Terrorism,” Singapore Government 25, 2004.

19 november 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 12

In 1987, one of the visiting preachers was granted a month and a half leave, that Hambali carried out the bombing of approached Abbas’ teacher and asked and it was during these times that he the Philippine ambassador’s residence him to speak to Abbas about going to went to the battlefront. During these in Jakarta on August 1, 2000. Abbas Afghanistan. By this time Abbas was a periods, he engaged in various military also said that a cache of “explosives” and valued resource at the school since he activities, including clearing minefields. “armalites” that were seized in General had spent two and a half years there He was experienced in many aspects Santos City, Philippines, were destined and had become an assistant teacher. of warfare, from small-arms to guided for Singapore.8 According to Abbas, Bin His teacher did not pass the message missiles. Abbas said that following his Ladin’s message was counter to what on to Abbas and consequently one day training period he became a trainer at he believed, which was that the killing he was asked by a visiting preacher the academy. of civilians was wrong. Abbas claimed, whether his teacher had spoken to however, that at the time he could not him about Afghanistan. When Abbas After six years in Afghanistan, Abbas protest as he was at a “low level in the questioned his teacher, the two of them returned to Southeast Asia where he organization.” Abbas also stated that he prayed together, had lunch and then his joined Darul Islam (DI) and later Jemaah believed the first Bali bomb was “sinful.” teacher spoke to him “with heavy heart” Islamiya.5 He subsequently established He asserted that when he became head about going to Afghanistan. His teacher a “training camp” in the Philippines. of Mantiqi III in April 2001, he tried to made one proviso before allowing Abbas explained that the aims of DI protect his men against the influence of the young Abbas to leave: he had to Hambali. receive permission from his parents. “JI used a mixture of Abbas stated that he knew his mother Abbas offered some comments about would not allow him to go, so he asked Islamic preaching, JI’s method of radicalizing supporters, his father who agreed to him leaving education, and social and explaining that it was achieved through because he considered the fighting in activities other than military means. JI Afghanistan an “Islamic struggle.” economic outreach to used a mixture of Islamic preaching, radicalize supporters.” education, and social and economic Abbas thought that this was a “dream outreach to radicalize supporters. This come true” and said that he was curious in itself is interesting as it appears that about the mujahidin and jihad. He JI leaders may have been attempting understood that the conflict was about and JI were different, since DI wanted to copy similar successful strategies repelling the Russian invaders and to form an Islamic state in Indonesia, employed by other groups such as helping the Afghans fight for their whereas JI was pursuing a wider agenda, Lebanese Hizb Allah, which is known homeland. He did not see anything witnessed by its mantiqi structure. for its delivery of social and other public wrong about the fighting.4 Abbas alleged that the radicalization services.9 Abbas was asked how people of Muslims started in earnest when the become so radicalized that they would To Afghanistan and Back terrorist operative Hambali became be willing to kill themselves in a suicide In 1987, Abbas went to Afghanistan in a “representative for JI,” a comment attack. He answered that it was because a group of 15 comprising 13 Indonesians supported by the section on Hambali in of “misfaith,” stating that “heaven is and two Malaysians. On arrival, he the 9/11 Commission Report.6 In 1997, a gift; it’s not our goal.” He believed was sent to a military academy. He was Hambali started to send JI personnel to that some Muslims were preaching that frustrated at being told that he had to a camp established by Usama bin Ladin heaven was a goal and that becoming a spend three years at the academy, the in Kandahar. suicide attacker would make one a shahid inference being that he would have (martyr) and go straight to heaven. preferred to get involved in the fighting Abbas stated that it was about this immediately. Yet, Abbas stayed the time that Bin Ladin was urging revenge Turning Abbas into an Asset course. He said that life in the academy against the Americans on “both military After Abbas’ arrest, the Indonesian was disciplined and included saluting and non-military” targets.7 Abbas said police were able to convince him to senior officers and flags and wearing a that the effect of Bin Ladin’s message was work in their deradicalization program. military style uniform. His instructors Abbas was treated with respect when he were from the Afghan military, most of 5 Rohaiza Ahmad Asi asserts that many members of was arrested and spent his first night in whom had been trained at the military Darul Islam were recruited into Jemaah Islamiya. For captivity wondering why God did not academy in India. As well as learning more, see Rohaiza Ahmad Asi, “Darul Islam: A Fer- let him die. In his own words, about Islam and jihad, Abbas was tile Ground for Jemmah Islamiyah’s Recruitment,” in taught about weaponry, navigation, Rohaiza Ahmad Asi, Fighting Terrorism: Preventing the I tried to make myself to be killed, leadership, physical training, self- Radicalisation of Youth in a Secular and Globalised World I mean not to kill myself, but make defense and marching. Each year Abbas (Singapore: Taman Bacaan Pemudi Melayu Singapura, people to kill me because I fight 2007), p. 114. against the police. When I got 4 During this point in the interview, Abbas was asked 6 The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W. W. Norton whether he thought Muslims looked at the situation in & Co., 2004), pp. 150-152. 8 This seizure was mentioned in a speech on February Iraq in the same way. He replied that Muslims had an 7 A useful abbreviated version of this declaration is 7, 2002 by the Philippine president, Gloria Macapagal- obligation to fight in Iraq but that there was a difference published in Bruce Lawrence, Messages to the World: The Arroyo. between fighting troops and killing civilians. His view Statements of Osama Bin Laden (London: Verso, 2005), pp. 9 J.P. Harik, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism was that it was “sinful” to kill civilians. 23-30. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005), p. 80.

20 november 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 12

arrested, I had Kung Fu fighting was certainly a factor that led him to commented that the majority of people with the police, me one against assist their deradicalization program, in Poso—both Christians and Muslims— six policemen because I try to although it must be acknowledged were “fed up with fighting” and that make them to kill me or to shoot that not being charged with a terrorist “dialogue was really important.” at me but they did not shoot at me offense may have also played a role. with one bullet. So I am thinking, The Indonesian police officer who was For the hard approach, the INP all night long I am not saying present during the interview—from established a police unit in 2005 any words I am just saying God this point referred to as “K”—spoke specifically to deal with the Poso forgive me, God forgive me, God about the Indonesian National Police’s situation. After one year, they had forgive me. They are asking me (INP) deradicalization program. K said arrested 64 individuals and seized 135 ‘what is your name?’ I just say God that the INP had realized that they had weapons, more than 11,000 rounds of forgive me, ‘who are you where is been responding to terrorist incidents ammunition, 168 homemade bombs and your origin?’ God forgive me, I in a “fire-brigade” style and that they 414 detonators as well as miscellaneous just only say that. All night long needed to change mindsets to contain bomb making materials. They had also because I don’t want to answer terrorist violence. He believed that there solved 46 cases connected with the the police questions before I am was no single reason for people joining conflict. As a result, between January answering my own questions. My terrorist groups, commenting that some 2007 and the February 2008 interview own question is, the first question joined because they believed jihad to be there were no terrorist attacks in either is, why God not let me die? Why a spiritual obligation. He identified both Poso or Central Sulawesi. God not let them to shoot at me? I Abbas and Imam Samudra, however, as tried, I tried, they are pointing the people who had been initially motivated Although there are a number gun against me, maybe six guns. In by “fun and adventure.” K believed it of weaknesses in Indonesia’s the police training when you are was important to teach police officers deradicalization program—discussed being asked to stop, don’t move, to treat Islamists well and that torture in detail by Dr. Kirsten Schulze11—the OK, so once you move, one step you would only make people more aggressive fact remains that Indonesia is one of the move, they are allowed to kill you, when released. few countries to have initiated a robust or to shoot at you. I am not only program that has had some success. It is move one step but I am rushing I The Indonesian Solution important for Western governments to am going forward but they not kill According to K, one test case of a study Indonesia’s program more closely, me so this is a big question, why solution to Islamist violence occurred in as its expansion could help further God not let me die? I tried, I tried Poso, which was plagued by Christian- reduce the risk of terrorist violence in to make them to kill me, so this is Muslim violence. The Indonesian Southeast Asia. something, something mysterious solution was identified as multifaceted that I do not know but God knows, but basically had two elements: the hard Nick O’Brien is an Associate Professor he knows. and soft approach. The hard approach of Counter-Terrorism at Charles Sturt was to identify, arrest and prosecute University. Before joining Charles Although the above is only the account those responsible for terrorist acts. Sturt University, he represented the UK of one man, there are some interesting The soft approach involved changing Association of Chief Police Officers - indicators as to what causes a person mindsets using a number of different Terrorism and Allied Matters Committee to become radicalized to the extent that strategies. The INP worked with local (ACPO-TAM) and all the UK police forces they will use violence, and also what can people and local governments to identify as the Counter-Terrorism and Extremism assist to deradicalize. In Abbas’ case, he Islamist preachers and to “encourage Liaison Officer (CTELO) at the British went to fight in Afghanistan in response local people to kick those people out of High Commission in Canberra. Prior to to the Soviet-Afghan war. His goal was Poso.” They also identified two Islamic this posting, Mr. O’Brien was in charge to join the mujahidin in defending boarding schools that were run by JI. of International Counter-Terrorism in Muslim lands. Similar to the case of They encouraged the school foundations Special Branch at New Scotland Yard. He London bomber Shehzad Tanweer, who to initially close the schools, and to also had responsibility for the National mentioned Iraq and Afghanistan in his replace the Islamist teachers with others Terrorist Financial Investigations Unit video will as being the reason for his who held moderate views. Modern and (NTFIU) and International Liaison. Mr. attack, Abbas was driven by foreign large Islamic boarding schools were O’Brien has had national responsibility for policy grievances.10 also constructed with $2.5 million all Special Branch training in the United funding from the central government. Kingdom. He is a visiting Fellow at the What is also of note are the Compensation was given to widows Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Co- circumstances of Abbas’ arrest. The fact who had lost their husbands in the operation in Indonesia. that Indonesian police treated him well conflicts, and the local government offered scholarships to the children of 10 “London Bomber Video: ‘Just the Beginning,’” CNN, the widows. Work opportunities were July 7, 2006. This was also the case in the 2006 UK plot also provided in consultation with non- to blow up aircraft. Police found six video wills and three governmental organizations. K believed of these mentioned the West’s presence in Muslim lands. that it was especially important to Also see “‘Suicide Videos’: What They Said,” BBC, April ensure that military-trained civilians 11 Kirsten E. Schulze, “Indonesia’s Approach to Jihadist 4, 2008. were given work opportunities. He Deradicalization,” CTC Sentinel 1:8 (2008).

21 november 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 12

Shi`a Leaders Disagree the government’s control and under Muhammad al-Yaqubi, emphasized the the title of al-Sahwa,” and stressed the vital role of the tribes, and highlighted on Integration of Sons of government’s lack of knowledge about the role of the sahwa in bringing an end Iraq into Army them and their “loyalties.”2 This latter to terrorism. He also envisaged a tribal theme was developed more fully in awakening and “support councils” for By Reidar Visser another television interview in January the state in the “central and southern” 2008: areas of Iraq, code for the Shi`a majority one of the most acute issues in the areas south of Baghdad.5 Later, he post-surge debate in Iraq concerns the Questions remain concerning the criticized the Iraqi government for not integration of the Awakening Councils/ identity of the members of the providing sufficient and regular pay Sons of Iraq into the Iraqi Army. There is sahwa. Are they decent and national for the sahwa.6 The generally positive growing fear that the Iraqi government in orientation? Are they from all approach to the sahwa among the Fadila of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki will the colors present in their areas? leadership has been followed up at approach this issue much in the way it Are they from among the people the local level as well, with meetings has dealt with other important questions of the area, or have they been between the tribal committees of the relating to national reconciliation: recruited from a different area?3 local branches of the Fadila Party and by sticking to its own agenda of the local sahwa leadership, in places continued sectarian dominance instead In fact, to the extent that ISCI has been such as Mada’in near Baghdad.7 Finally, of exploiting the opportunity to reduce interested in the Awakenings, it has Fadila’s approach has differed from sectarian tensions by offering specific emphasized their role in maintaining that of the ISCI in that it has included and real concessions. This article will order at the very local and often the Sahwa in a wider national vision examine al-Maliki’s and other Shi`a peripheral level where state forces are of an integrated security force: “Our groups’ stance on the integration not present. Conversely, in the question proposal to join the sahwa to the Iraqi process of Sunni armed groups, in security forces will lead to stabilizing addition to examining growing political the situation in a bigger way…the person differences between al-Maliki and the “Fadila’s approach has who belongs to the sahwa will work for Islamic Supreme Council in Iraq (ISCI). differed from that of all of Iraq and not for his area only.”8

Maliki Takes Conservative Approach the ISCI in that it has The Fadila Party is often dismissed In taking a conservative approach to included the sahwa in a in the Western press as the faction integrating the Sunni-dominated Sons that broke away from the al-Maliki of Iraq into the army, al-Maliki can wider national vision of an government when it was not awarded rely on support from at least some of integrated security force.” the oil ministry, and whose only the Shi`a parties that participate in his remaining interest is to hold on to the government. ISCI, in particular, has a governorate position in oil-rich Basra. history of skepticism when it comes to This viewpoint, however, overlooks the this issue. While it did pay its respect of integration at the national level, the many positive initiatives by the party to the martyrs of the Anbar Awakening skepticism of the al-Hakims has been in the area of national reconciliation, back in 2007 (and at one point even tried echoed, and the reluctance to see them where it repeatedly has proven itself to establish a rather strained genealogy become part of (or “infiltrate”) the Iraqi more prepared to work across sectarian back to its own proposal of creating security forces has been pronounced. lines than the Shi`a parties that “popular committees” to support the In August 2008, ISCI preacher Jalal currently enjoy Washington’s attention, state back in 2006), the suspicion that al-Din al-Saghir reportedly went as Daawa and ISCI. Thus, with regard to the sahwa (awakening) councils could far as saying that “the state cannot its stance on the sahwa, Fadila has once become a threat to the dominance of the accept the Awakening…their days are more taken a position that resembles al-Maliki government was evident early numbered.”4 the anti-sectarian attitude also seen in on. For example, in an interview with the its intervention in the heated federalism al-Furat television station in December Fadila Party Takes Anti-Sectarian Attitude debate in Iraq.9 2007, the head of ISCI, `Abd al-`Aziz al- It is noteworthy, however, that not all Hakim, mentioned the “mistakes of the Shi`a parties support al-Maliki’s hard Fadila stands out among the Shi`a multinational forces in arming certain line on this issue. The Fadila Party, in Islamist parties since it generally takes tribal councils without the knowledge particular, has been markedly more a more pragmatic and realistic attitude of the government.”1 Similarly, as early positive toward the tribes as a potential as November 2007, Ammar al-Hakim, instrument of national integration. In 5 Muhammad al-Yaqubi, bayan, January 9, 2008. in an interview with al-Alam, the January 2008, their spiritual leader, 6 Fadila Party, press release, February 17, 2008. Arabophone Iranian satellite channel, 7 Activities report of the Rusafa branch of the Fadila portrayed the sahwa as a somewhat 2 Islamic Supreme Council in Iraq, press release, No- Party, March 2008. suspect phenomenon, describing it as vember 30, 2007. 8 Fadila Party, press release, January 15, 2008. “70,000 armed men in Baghdad outside 3 Islamic Supreme Council in Iraq, press release, Janu- 9 Reidar Visser, “Suffering, Oil, and Ideals of Coexis- ary 13, 2008. tence: Non-Sectarian Federal Trends in the Far South of 1 Islamic Supreme Council in Iraq, press release, Decem- 4 Richard Oppel, “Iraq Takes Aim at US-Tied Sunni Iraq,” November 2007, available at www.historiae.org/ ber 27, 2007. Groups’ Leaders,” New York Times, August 22, 2008. south.asp.

22 november 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 12 to Iraq’s Ba`athist past, partially due to southern parts of Iraq.11 Recent Highlights in the fact that many of its members held relatively high positions inside Iraq While the government’s explanation of Terrorist Activity before 2003. This is in contrast to the the exact mission of the new councils exiles in organizations such as ISCI, thus remains somewhat Delphic, it is October 16, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): which in the 1990s in Iran developed a interesting that Nuri al-Maliki finally Taliban gunmen fired on a passenger highly purist attitude to the question of seems to turn to the tribes in the south bus and seized control of another in Ba`ath membership. as a potential source of political support. Kandahar Province. During the incident, This kind of “awakening” south of Taliban fighters killed at least 25 of the Rift Develops Between al-Maliki and ISCI Baghdad is something which for a long civilian passengers and took a number of During the summer of 2008, the struggle time did not make it onto the Iraqi hostages. The Taliban, however, claim over the sahwa acquired an additional agenda, primarily because the United that those killed were Afghan soldiers. dimension beyond the Fadila/ISCI States yielded to pressure from ISCI, – Reuters, October 19; AP, October 19 dichotomy. Until this time, there had whose leaders were eager to avoid the been skepticism inside the al-Maliki emergence of a Shi`a tribal force that October 16, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): An government toward any extension of could challenge its own hegemony in the Afghan policeman threw a grenade and the sahwa concept south of Baghdad, Iraqi security forces. Still, the narrow opened fire at a U.S. military patrol in where it might pose a challenge to the structure of al-Maliki’s new electoral Paktika Province, killing one U.S. soldier. hegemony of the ISCI and the Badr coalition suggests that rather than – Minneapolis Star Tribune, October 16 forces, whether inside or outside the constituting a project of true national Iraqi security forces.10 During the reconciliation, the Iraqi premier’s tribal October 16, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A course of “the surge,” however, al- maneuvers are first and foremost aimed suspected U.S. missile strike killed Maliki gradually extended his control at fishing for votes in the next provincial an alleged foreign militant in South inside the Iraqi security forces quite elections (which his government has, Waziristan Agency of the Federally dramatically, and increasingly came to for a long time, tried to postpone and Administered Tribal Areas. On October see himself as a Shi`a leader speaking obstruct).12 His new rivals in ISCI are 30, a senior European counter-terrorism an Iraqi nationalist and centralist already busy visiting the tribes of the official identified the dead militant language that did not resonate with the Albu Muhammad, the very tribe of the as Khalid Habib, a veteran Egyptian ISCI’s vision of decentralization. As a minister of state that directs al-Maliki’s jihadist working in al-Qa`ida. – AP, result, tension between al-Maliki and scheme.13 If the new scheme by al-Maliki October 16; Los Angeles Times, October 31 the ISCI grew perceptibly during the is a mere attempt at winning voters for first months after the security sweeps the next elections, more fundamental October 16, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A suicide in Basra and Amara in early 2008. issues—such as integrating the Sons of car bomber attacked a police station in Iraq and winning over the anti-Iranian Mingora of Swat District in the North- This eventually turned into a kind Shi`a tribes in the south that approve West Frontier Province. Four security of tribal awakening of al-Maliki’s of neither al-Hakim nor al-Maliki—are officers were killed in the blast. – AP, own through the so-called “support likely to remain unresolved. October 16 councils,” which were gradually rolled out in Iraq in 2008, mostly in Shi`a- Dr. Reidar Visser is a research fellow at October 16, 2008 (PAKISTAN): The BBC dominated areas south of Baghdad but the Norwegian Institute of International reported that Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan also to some extent elsewhere. The Affairs and editor of the Iraq-focused website (TTP) spokesman Maulvi Omar said the exact objective of these new councils www.historiae.org. His publications on Iraq TTP was “willing to negotiate with the remains unclear. ISCI has accused al- include the books Basra, the Failed Gulf government without any conditions” Maliki of creating these Shi`a groups State: Separatism and Nationalism in and “also willing to lay down our arms, for political purposes, while one of its Southern Iraq and, edited with Gareth once the military ceases operations proponents, Muhammad Abbas al- Stansfield, An Iraq of Its Regions: against us.” Pakistan’s Dawn newspaper, Uraybi, the minister of state charged Cornerstones of a Federal Democracy? however, claimed that Omar told one of with organizing them, in November their journalists on October 15 that “a 2008 characterized the new council in threat [U.S.-led forces] is looming large Diwaniyya as on our western borders and, therefore, Taliban can’t disarm themselves a national project declared by unless the occupation forces leave the prime minister building on Afghanistan.” – UPI, October 16; Dawn, the success of the tribal support October 16 councils around Baghdad and in the 11 Aswat al-Iraq, November 10, 2008. west of Iraq…they should support 12 For the relationship to the Daawa-ISCI struggle in the October 16, 2008 (MOROCCO): The national reconciliation, establish upcoming provincial elections, see Reidar Visser, “The trial of accused al-Qa`ida insurgent an atmosphere of dialogue and Map of Electoral Coalitions South of Baghdad Is Taking Abdul Kader Belliraj began in Morocco. solve disputes in the central and Shape,” October 31, 2008, available at www.historiae. According to UPI, “Belliraj was arrested org/coalitions.asp. in February along with 32 other people 10 Michael Gordon, “The Last Battle,” New York Times, 13 Islamic Supreme Council in Iraq, press release, No- and has been accused of planning terror August 3, 2008. vember 13, 2008. attacks in Morocco in an attempt to

23 november 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 12 overthrow the government.” Belliraj policemen, including a district police claimed that 58 foreign terrorists were claims that he was working for the chief, in Faryab Province. – AP, October operating in the Philippines and were Belgian government. – UPI, October 17 20 constantly on the run from government troops. “The 30 JI members and 28 other October 17, 2008 (PAKISTAN): Pakistani October 20, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): foreign terrorists are now on the run fighter jets destroyed a training camp A suicide bomber attacked German due to extensive government pressure,” for Taliban-linked militants in Swat soldiers in Kunduz Province, killing he said. – GMANews.tv, October 21 District of the North-West Frontier two of them in addition to five Afghan Province. During the attack, security children. – AFP, October 20 October 21, 2008 (SAUDI ARABIA): officials claimed 60 pro-Taliban fighters The Saudi media reported that the were killed. – AFP, October 17 October 21, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): government has indicted 991 suspected Taliban fighters told mobile phone al-Qa`ida militants for carrying out October 18, 2008 (IRAQ): A female operators to shut down their networks 30 attacks since 2003. According to suicide bomber exploded—possibly after during the day in Ghazni Province, Reuters, some of the accused include receiving gunfire from an Iraqi police alleging that signals from their towers clerics who had publicly supported officer—at a checkpoint in Dhuluiyya, help government and international al-Qa`ida’s violent campaign in the Salah al-Din Province. There did not troops track their movements. “We country. Al-Arabiya reported that most appear to be any casualties, other than have informed mobile companies of the suspects are Saudi nationals. the death of the bomber. – CNN, October operating in Ghazni to turn off their – Reuters, October 21 18; AFP, October 18 signals during the daytime now as it endangers the lives of our fighters,” a October 21, 2008 (SAUDI ARABIA): October 18, 2008 (PHILIPPINES): Taliban spokesman said. “We want the Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal Suspected Abu Sayyaf Group gunmen companies to cut off their signal for 10 announced that, in September, his attempted to kill a Catholic priest in days from now.” – Reuters, October 21 country hosted talks between Afghan Basilan in the southern Philippines, officials and the Taliban in Mecca. although the priest’s bodyguards October 21, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A long According to press reports, one of the were able to repel the attackers. The gunfight between Taliban-linked Taliban representatives was Abdul assailants were able to inflict a number fighters and paramilitary soldiers broke Salam Zaeef, the former Taliban of injuries. – AFP, October 18 out in the Kabal area of Swat District in ambassador to Pakistan. – Washington the North-West Frontier Province. The Post, October 22 October 19, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): incident resulted in the deaths of at least Afghan and international soldiers killed 15 paramilitary soldiers and five Taliban- October 22, 2008 (IRAQ): The head of the 34 Taliban militants during an operation linked fighters. – Reuters, October 22 al-Qa`ida-linked Islamic State of Iraq, south of Lashkar Gah in Helmand Abu `Umar al-Baghdadi, confirmed the Province. – AP, October 20 October 21, 2008 (PHILIPPINES): A death of Abu Qaswarah, who was killed Philippine court extended a freeze on by U.S. forces on October 5 in Mosul, October 19, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): the assets of Hilarion Santos, the alleged Ninawa Province. Abu Qaswarah Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr leader of the Rajah Solaiman Movement has been identified as the second-in- Mottaki told a news conference that the (RSM). Santos was arrested three years command of al-Qa`ida in Iraq. Al- West should not engage in negotiations ago and is on trial for kidnapping and Baghdadi said that the Moroccan native or talks with the Taliban. Mottaki rebellion. The freeze, which makes it Abu Qaswarah was a “unique, beloved warned, “We advise them to think about illegal to sell off any properties owned and close knight whose departure is the consequences of the talks [with the by Santos, will be in effect until January painful and hard.” – AP, October 22; Reuters, Taliban] which are taking place in the 25, 2009. The RSM spun off from the October 15; TimesOnline, October 16 region and in Europe and avoid being Abu Sayyaf Group, and is primarily bitten in the same spot twice.” – AFP, composed of Filipino Christians who October 22, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): A October 19 converted to Islam. – AFP, October 21 roadside bomb exploded and killed three U.S.-led coalition soldiers in western October 20, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): October 21, 2008 (PHILIPPINES): Afghanistan. The exact location of the Taliban gunmen shot to death a According to a statement made by incident was not reported. – AP, October 23 Christian aid worker as she walked Philippine Colonel Eddie Maningding, to work in western Kabul. The aid Jemaah Islamiya operatives are using October 22, 2008 (PAKISTAN): The worker, Gayle Williams, was a dual Mindanao as a “as training and exposure Pakistani parliament unanimously South African-British national, and she area” for recruits. He also alleged passed a resolution calling for dialogue primarily worked with handicapped these operatives are “supporting some with extremist groups and an end Afghans. A Taliban spokesman charged rogue MILF [Moro Islamic Liberation to military action. According to the that Williams “came to Afghanistan Front] elements for extortion and other resolution, “Dialogue must now be to teach Christianity to the people of criminal activities. Recently, they are the highest priority, as a principal Afghanistan.” – AP, October 20 eluding government counter-terrorist instrument of conflict management operations and co-opting with local and resolution. The military will be October 20, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): radicals for sanctuary and propagation replaced as early as possible by civilian Suspected Taliban militants killed five of their extremist beliefs.” Maningding law enforcement agencies.” The British

24 november 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 12

Guardian newspaper, however, reported bail as he awaits his sentencing. – AP, language book on al-Qa`ida’s continued that “the document is not binding on the October 22 struggles. The al-Qa`ida sources said government even though it was party that Bin Ladin is writing the book in to it. The army remains the ultimate October 23, 2008 (IRAQ): A suicide response to the “negative propaganda arbiter of security policy.” – Guardian, car bomber rammed his vehicle into and insufficient information” about the October 24 the convoy of Iraq’s labor minister in al-Qa`ida network. The sources also downtown Baghdad, killing at least 11 stated Bin Ladin “is writing the book October 23, 2008 (GLOBAL): 21-year- people. The minister, Mahmud Jawad with the assistance of a young man with old German citizen and convert to Islam al-Radi, escaped injury. – AFP, October 23 a Middle Eastern background who will Eric Breininger appeared in a new online later translate the text into English.” video stating, “I am in Afghanistan and, October 23, 2008 (IRAQ): The U.S. – The News, October 24 personally, do not plan to carry out an military handed control of Babil attack on Germany.” On September 25, Province to the Iraqi government. Babil October 24, 2008 (PHILIPPINES): German federal prosecutors issued a is the 12th province out of 18 that has Arturo Lomibao, the head of the public alert seeking the whereabouts of been handed over to Iraqi government Philippines’ counter-terrorism unit, Breininger, who they thought had slipped control. – AP, October 23 warned that Indonesian and Malaysian back into Germany after attending a jihadists, with ties to Jemaah Islamiya, terrorist training camp in Pakistan. The October 23, 2008 (IRAQ): The U.S. continue to infiltrate the Philippines web video was Breininger’s response military announced that Iraqi security despite stricter border controls. to the German alert. He further stated, forces had captured 66 people allegedly “Jihadists associated with [JI operative] “We declare war on any country that connected to al-Qa`ida in Iraq (AQI). Umar Patek continue to arrive fights against Muslims at the side of the The arrests, which occurred during intermittently in Mindanao,” he said. United States. However, the Germans separate operations in northern Iraq – GulfNews.com, October 24 are so blinded by the press that the over a few days, included 45 operatives people apparently demanded even more from AQI and 21 others part of the October 24, 2008 (SOMALIA): Islamist soldiers and intelligence services, which Islamic State of Iraq. – CNN, October 23 insurgents attacked the Hodan police logically increase the risk of attacks on station in Mogadishu. Although the German territory.” – ABC News, October 23 October 23, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): insurgents were eventually pushed Afghan Foreign Minister Rangeen back, at one point it is believed they October 23, 2008 (GERMANY): The Dadfar Spanta said that his government infiltrated the station. The number of head of Germany’s Federal Intelligence would negotiate with the Taliban since casualties was not clear. The attack was Service, Ernst Uhrlau, warned that “peace requires that we talk with the just the latest in escalating violence in al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb armed opposition.” Yet, according southern Somalia as Islamist insurgents (AQIM), which is based in North to Spanta, any negotiations with the continue to attack Transitional Federal Africa, could pose a threat to Western Taliban must be on the premise that Government, Ethiopian and African Europe. According to Ernst, out of al- they will accept the current Afghan Union forces. – Shabelle Media Network, Qa`ida’s various “franchises,” AQIM constitution. – AFP, October 23 October 24 is “developing the most dynamically.” Uhrlau also identified the internet as October 23, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A U.S. October 25, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): a prime “vehicle for preparations” for unmanned aerial drone fired a missile Two senior officials of the international terrorists who hope to attack Europe. at a madrasa near the town of Miran shipping company DHL, along with a – The Canadian Press, October 23 Shah in North Waziristan Agency of the bodyguard, were shot to death in front of Federally Administered Tribal Areas. their Kabul office. Early reports identified October 23, 2008 (AUSTRALIA): An The site was a suspected training area the assailant as a company security guard. Australian jury found 35-year-old for Taliban militants. Approximately – Voice of America, October 25 Muslim convert Joseph Thomas not nine people were killed. – The Times, guilty of receiving funds from al-Qa`ida. October 24 October 26, 2008 (SYRIA): U.S. soldiers Thomas was, however, convicted on a launched an attack on Syrian territory lesser charge of possessing a falsified October 23, 2008 (PAKISTAN): close to the Iraqi border and killed passport; that charge carries a maximum Pakistan’s Frontier Constabulary told approximately eight people. The penalty of 10 years in prison and a fine. journalists that security forces killed purpose of the attack was to shut down Thomas, often referred to as “Jihad Jack,” at least 35 Taliban during ground and a network moving al-Qa`ida-linked was arrested after leaving Afghanistan air assaults in Bajaur Agency of the foreign fighters from Syria into Iraq. where he had spent time in an al-Qa`ida Federally Administered Tribal Areas. According to the New York Times, U.S. training camp and had personally met The offensive began late on October 22 sources confirmed the death of Abu Usama bin Ladin. Thomas explained and continued to the next day. – Daily Ghadiya, an Iraqi suspected of leading that he went to Afghanistan in 2001 Times, October 24 the cell. – AP, October 26; New York Times, with the intention of fighting with the October 30 Taliban, but claimed to have mistakenly October 24, 2008 (GLOBAL): A report in ended up at a training camp for al- Pakistan’s The News claimed that al-Qa`ida October 26, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A Qa`ida. This marked Thomas’ second sources informed the newspaper that suspected U.S. missile strike killed trial on the charges. He was released on Usama bin Ladin is writing an Arabic- at least 16 people, including Taliban

25 november 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 12 commander Haji Omar Khan, in South October 27, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): out a way to embrace those who are Waziristan Agency of the Federally Taliban gunfire forced down a U.S. willing, ultimately, to work with the Administered Tribal Areas. It is Blackhawk helicopter in Wardak central government, lay down their believed that all of those killed were tied Province, although the crew were arms—at least stop pointing them at the to the Taliban and involved in sending extracted safely. Coalition troops government and at us—and work in a fighters into Afghanistan. Khan had ties responding to the attack also came constructive manner for the good of all to Taliban leader Jalaluddin Haqqani. under fire, and they proceeded to kill the Afghan people.” – Reuters, October 29 – AFP, October 27 12 Taliban fighters. The helicopter was recovered and brought to a nearby October 29, 2008 (CANADA): Mohammed October 26, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A NATO military base. – AFP, October 28 Momin Khawaja was found guilty in suicide car bomber attacked a security a Canadian court for his involvement post in Mohmand Agency of the October 28, 2008 (GLOBAL): Top in a foiled terrorist plot in the United Federally Administered Tribal Areas, al-Qa`ida leader Abu Yahya al- Kingdom. Khawaja was found to killing 10 soldiers. – Bloomberg, October 27 Libi appeared in a new video posted have “knowingly participated” and on Islamist web forums. The video “knowingly facilitated” a terrorist October 26, 2008 (SOMALIA): Somalia’s apparently was released several weeks group’s plan to attack civilians in transitional government signed a cease- later than planned, as in the video al- London. He was arrested in March fire agreement with some opposition Libi commemorated `Id al-Fitr, which 2004. According to an Agence France- leaders during a meeting in Djibouti. was celebrated during the first week of Presse report, “The devout Muslim was The agreement read: “Effective 26 October. – ABC News, October 30 born in Canada of Pakistani immigrant October 2008, cease-fire observance parents and once worked as a computer has been announced. It will become October 28, 2008 (UNITED STATES): A expert at Canada’s Foreign Affairs effective 5 November 2008…starting 21 State Department official told reporters Department.” He will be sentenced on November 2008, the Ethiopian troops on the condition of anonymity that the November 18. – AFP, October 29 will relocate from areas of the cities of United States was examining ways to Beledweyn and Mogadishu…The second negotiate with “reconcilable” elements October 29, 2008 (AUSTRALIA): After phase of the troop withdrawal shall be of the Taliban in Afghanistan. “If being found not guilty of receiving completed within 120 days.” Somalia’s people are willing to renounce violence, funds from al-Qa`ida in an Australian Islamist opposition group is not united, give up their arms…it makes sense,” the court on October 23, 35-year-old Muslim however, and the deal was not accepted official said. Negotiations could occur convert Joseph Thomas was sentenced by all of the warring factions. One of if Taliban elements were willing to to nine months in jail for possessing a these hard line leaders, Shaykh Hassan “give up their arms, renounce violence, falsified passport. Since Thomas had Dahir Aweys, questioned the agreement, pledge allegiance to the Afghanistan already spent that amount of time in stating, “The agreement reached in constitution and become part of the custody, he was immediately set free. Djibouti Sunday is an illusion to deceive political process instead of getting in – Herald Sun, October 29 the Somalis. Neither the international the way of the political process.” – AFP, community nor Ethiopia itself October 28 October 29, 2008 (SOMALIA): Five announced the complete withdrawal of suicide car bombs ripped through Ethiopian troops.” – Reuters, October 26 October 28, 2008 (PAKISTAN/ various key targets in the northern AFGHANISTAN): Afghan and Pakistani Somalia autonomous areas of October 27, 2008 (UNITED STATES): tribal and political leaders released a Somaliland and Puntland. In Hargeysa, During the opening day of the military declaration after a two-day meeting Somaliland, the presidential palace, trial for al-Qa`ida suspect Ali Hamza calling for the establishment of contacts Ethiopia’s diplomatic compound and al-Bahlul at Guantanamo Bay, both al- with Taliban factions in order to end the the UN Development Program building Bahlul and his Pentagon-appointed insurgencies affecting both countries. were all targeted. In Bosasso, Puntland, lawyer refused to participate and did Both the Pakistan and Afghanistan two separate offices affiliated with the not answer questions from the judge. governments endorsed the declaration. Interior Ministry were targeted. The Al-Bahlul, a Yemeni, faces a possible – AP, October 28 coordinated attacks killed 19 people. life sentence for his alleged role in There were no immediate claims of conspiracy, supporting terrorism and October 29, 2008 (UNITED STATES): responsibility, although U.S. authorities solicitation to commit murder. – AP, Pentagon press secretary Geoff Morrell suspect al-Qa`ida involvement in October 27 told reporters that Taliban leader conjunction with local insurgents. Mullah Omar should not be involved in – AFP, October 29; Fox News, October 30 October 27, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): any negotiations between the Taliban A suicide bomber wearing a police and Afghanistan. According to Morrell, October 30, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): A uniform blew himself up inside a police “Mullah Omar has the blood of thousands suicide bomber blew himself up inside station in Baghlan Province, killing of Americans on his hands, based upon the Information and Culture Ministry two American soldiers and a child. The the support that he provided Osama bin in Kabul, killing five people. Two other Taliban immediately claimed credit for Laden.” Morrell also addressed recent assailants were possibly involved in the the operation. – New York Times, October 27 attempts made by the Afghanistan and attack, but they escaped. Authorities Pakistan governments to negotiate believe that the intended target was the with the Taliban: “You have to figure minister, Abdul Karim Khoram, but he

26 november 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 12 was not in the building at the time of the November 1, 2008 (YEMEN): A Yemeni November 5, 2008 (PHILIPPINES): blast. The Taliban claimed credit for the security official said that the suicide Authorities apprehended a sub-leader operation. – AFP, October 30 team that attacked the U.S. Embassy of the Abu Sayyaf Group—identified as in Sana`a on September 17 had ties to Sakirin Andalin Sali—in Sulu Province October 30, 2008 (PHILIPPINES): One al-Qa`ida in Iraq. The official said that in the southern Philippines. – GMANews. of two aid workers held hostage by the three of the six had previously fought tv, November 5 Abu Sayyaf Group for 45 days in the in Iraq, and that the team had trained jungles of the Philippines was released in al-Qa`ida camps in southern Yemen. November 6, 2008 (IRAQ): U.S. and unharmed. The gunmen did not release – AP, November 1 Iraqi forces killed a senior al-Qa`ida the second hostage. According to a in Iraq leader in the Tarmiyya area press report, the released hostage said November 1, 2008 (SOMALIA): Shaykh north of Baghdad. The dead operative she “lived in constant fear during her Sharif Shaykh Ahmad, who chairs was identified as Abu Ghazwan. – AP, ordeal, with the rebels at one time the oppositionist Alliance for the Re- November 7 threatening to cut off her fingers if her liberation of Somalia (ARS), returned family refused to pay a ransom of two to Jowhar in Somalia, two years after November 6, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A million pesos.” It was not clear whether the Ethiopian intervention forced suicide bomber detonated his explosives a ransom was paid. – The Age, October 30 him to flee. On October 26, the ARS amid a meeting of anti-Taliban Salarzai signed a cease-fire agreement with tribal leaders in Bajaur Agency of the October 30, 2008 (MALI): After spending the Transitional Federal Government. Federally Administered Tribal Areas, 252 days in captivity, two Austrian Ahmed told supporters in Jowhar that killing at least 17 of them. – Bloomberg, tourists who were kidnapped by al- “we need you to support that agreement, November 6; AFP, November 6 Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) which we believe serves the interest of on February 22 in Tunisia were released the nation.” – AFP, November 1 November 6, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A to the Malian Army. According to a suicide car bomber attacked paramilitary Bloomberg report on their release, “5 November 2, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A forces in Swat District of the North- million euros ($6.4 million) and the suicide car bomber slammed his vehicle West Frontier Province, killing two release of 10 of its [AQIM] members from into a security checkpoint in South people. – AFP, November 6 Tunisian and Algerian prisons” was Waziristan Agency of the Federally demanded in exchange for the hostages. Administered Tribal Areas, killing November 7, 2008 (PAKISTAN): The Austrian Foreign Ministry did not eight soldiers. – Reuters, November 2 Suspected U.S. aerial drones fired immediately say whether a ransom was missiles at targets in North Waziristan paid for the pair’s release. One of the November 3, 2008 (UNITED STATES): Agency of the Federally Administered released hostages, Wolfgang Ebner, A military court at Guantanamo Bay Tribal Areas. Approximately 13 told reporters after his release that “the convicted al-Qa`ida operative Ali militants were killed, five of whom were conditions of detention were harsh, it Hamza al-Bahlul of three terrorism- foreigners. – Reuters, November 7 was not at all easy, but we were treated related charges. On the opening day of normally.” – Bloomberg, October 31; AFP, the trial, al-Bahlul refused to defend November 8, 2008 (UNITED KINGDOM): October 31 himself. He was sentenced to life in Abu Qatada, an Islamist cleric with prison. – Reuters, November 3 suspected ties to al-Qa`ida, was arrested October 31, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A suicide and placed in prison in the United bomber killed nine people in an attack November 3, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): A Kingdom after allegedly planning to targeting the police in Mardan in the French aid worker was kidnapped in violate his bail conditions by fleeing to North-West Frontier Province. – Reuters, broad daylight on a street in Kabul. A Jordan. In June, Qatada was released October 31; The Nation, October 31 local intelligence worker intervened from jail on the condition that he would to stop the kidnapping, but he was be under house arrest for 22 hours a October 31, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A shot dead by the assailants. A Taliban day. – Bloomberg, November 10 suspected U.S. aerial drone fired spokesman denied involvement. – AP, two missiles at targets in Mir Ali, November 3 November 8, 2008 (IRAQ): A suicide North Waziristan Agency of the car bomber attacked a police checkpoint Federally Administered Tribal Areas. November 4, 2008 (THAILAND): Two in Anbar Province, killing eight people. Approximately 15 to 20 people were bombs ripped through Narathiwat – AP, November 8 killed in the attacks. Separately, an Province in southern Thailand, additional suspected U.S. aerial drone wounding 62 people. It appeared that November 9, 2008 (IRAQ): A female fired two missiles at a house in Wana, one of the bombs targeted an outdoor suicide bomber exploded in front of a South Waziristan Agency. Around meeting of village chiefs. – Reuters, hospital in Falluja, Anbar Province, seven people were killed during that November 4 killing three people. – AFP, November 9 attack. Various news reports stated that al-Qa`ida’s propaganda chief—an November 5, 2008 (IRAQ): A suicide car November 9, 2008 (INDONESIA): Egyptian known as Abu Jihad al-Masri— bomber attacked a police patrol on the Three men convicted of the 2002 Bali was killed in the North Waziristan road to Baghdad’s airport, killing six bombings—Amrozi Nurhasyim, Imam attack. – Reuters, October 31; AP, October 31; people. – AP, November 5 Samudra and Ali Ghufron—were executed AFP, November 1 by firing squad. – Bloomberg, November 10

27 november 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 12

November 9, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): A November 12, 2008 (PAKISTAN): U.S. CTC Sentinel Staff suicide car bomber attacked a military aid worker Steve Vance and his driver convoy in Herat Province, killing two were shot to death in the University Editor-in-Chief Spanish soldiers. – AP, November 9 Town area of Peshawar. – AP, November Erich Marquardt 13 Senior Editor, CTC November 10, 2008 (IRAQ): At least two bombs ripped through a shopping November 12, 2008 (SOMALIA): Islamist Editorial Board district in Baghdad’s Adhamiyya rebels seized control of the town of COL Michael J. Meese, Ph.D. neighborhood, killing at least 30 people, Marka, increasing their geographic Department Head most of whom were civilians. – Seattle control to much of southern Somalia. Department of Social Sciences (West Point) Times, November 11 – Bloomberg, November 12

COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. November 10, 2008 (IRAQ): A 13-year- November 13, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): Deputy Department Head old female suicide bomber killed A suicide car bomber targeted a coalition Department of Social Sciences (West Point) five Iraqi guards in Ba`quba, Diyala convoy near a market in Nangarhar Province. – The Australian, November 11 Province, killing one U.S. soldier and MAJ Reid Sawyer 10 civilians. – AFP, November 13 Director, CTC November 10, 2008 (PAKISTAN): Militants hijacked 13 supply trucks November 13, 2008 (PAKISTAN): An Brian Fishman for Western forces in Afghanistan as Iranian diplomat was kidnapped in Director of Research, CTC they traveled through the Khyber Pass Peshawar, and the policeman assigned in northwest Pakistan. Later that day, to protect him was shot to death. Christopher Heffelfinger the Pakistani military claimed they – Reuters, November 13 FBI Fellow, CTC recovered the trucks. – Reuters, November 10; Daily Times, November 11 November 14, 2008 (PAKISTAN): Suspected U.S. aerial drones fired November 11, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A suicide missiles into a village on the border Contact bomber detonated his explosives at a of North and South Waziristan in Combating Terrorism Center crowded sports stadium in Peshawar, the Federally Administered Tribal U.S. Military Academy killing four people. – AFP, November 11 Areas, killing 12 people, including five 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall foreigners. – Reuters, November 14 West Point, NY 10996 November 12, 2008 (IRAQ): Iraqi troops Phone: (202) 425-8578 arrested “a very high level, wanted November 14, 2008 (PHILIPPINES): Email: [email protected] terrorist” responsible for training al- Philippine Marines killed an Abu Sayyaf Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ Qa`ida operatives who specialized in Group militant—who was linked to a beheadings. The terrorist, identified as 2001 kidnapping of three Americans—on * For Press Inquiries: (845) 667-6383 Riyadh Wahab Fleih, was apprehended Jolo Island in the southern Philippines. in Diyala Province. – AP, November 12 The operative was identified as Faidar Hadjadi. – AP, November 16 November 12, 2008 (IRAQ): Gunmen killed two Christian sisters at their November 15, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): support home in Mosul, Ninawa Province. They Coalition troops killed five al-Qa`ida- The Combating Terrorism Center would then planted a bomb in the house before affiliated insurgents and apprehended like to express its gratitude to its financial they left. – Reuters, November 12 eight in Paktia Province. One of the supporters, for without their support and apprehended militants allegedly shared vision of the Center products like November 12, 2008 (IRAQ): An Iraqi facilitated the flow of foreign fighters the CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If soldier killed two U.S. soldiers at an into Afghanistan. – AP, November 16 you are interested in learning more about Iraqi military base in Mosul, Ninawa how to support the Combating Terrorism Province. According to the Associated Center, please visit http://www.ctc.usma. Press, which received information edu/support/ or call Wayne Richardson at from the U.S. military, “the attacker West Point’s Association of Graduates at strolled into the courtyard carrying 845-446-1553. a Kalashnikov rifle and a drum of ammunition, walked to a corner, turned and opened fire.” – AP, November 13

November 12, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): A tanker truck filled with explosives The views expressed in this report are those of detonated outside Kandahar’s provincial the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, council office, killing at least six people. the Department of the Army, or any other agency – New York Times, November 12 of the U.S. Government.

28