EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN SOVEREIGNTY STRATEGIC RELATIONS ecfr.eu FROM PLAYTHING TO PLAYER: HOW EUROPE CAN STAND UP FOR ITSELF IN THE NEXT FIVE YEARS

Mark Leonard and Carl Bildt

The last five years have not been kind to the European Union’s foreign policy. The EU has been less relevant, less SUMMARY active, and less united than was hoped in the heady days after the Lisbon Treaty came into force in 2010. The next • The EU’s foreign policy is inadequate to the task five years might be harder still: the world is well on its way of keeping Europe safe in today’s world. towards a new order based on geopolitical competition and • Over the last five years, trust between Brussels the weaponisation of global economic, cultural, and even and member states dwindled, and policy came climate linkages. As the international situation descends to reflect the lowest common denominator of into a miasma of geopolitical competition, Europeans are in popular opinion. danger of becoming hapless playthings in a tussle for pre- • The coming five years herald acute pressure on eminence between China, Russia, and the United States. Europe, as Russia, China, and the US undermine multilateral institutions and treat trade, finance There is nothing inevitable about this scenario. Europeans data, and security guarantees as instruments of have the power to take their destiny into their own hands. power rather than global public goods. Collectively, the EU’s member states have: the biggest • The new high representative should move single market in the world; higher defence spending than to rewire European foreign policymaking to any power but the US; the world’s largest diplomatic exercise strategic sovereignty. corps; and the highest levels of development spending. • The high representative needs more support But unless Europeans can leverage their collective on this strategy – from deputies, special potential – through the EU or other mechanisms – these representatives, and foreign ministers tasked impressive facts will mean little. Securing this leverage with specific roles. will require a clear-eyed understanding of European • The new leadership team in Brussels needs weaknesses and an honest appraisal of why they persist. to reoperationalise European defence, build Europe’s self-sufficiency through a strong The time is ripe for such an accounting – and the need is European pillar in NATO, and consider urgent. The new EU leadership team will take over in late innovations such as a European Security Council. 2019. Unless they understand the challenge that confronts • Europe will only build greater unity by tackling them and acquire the tools they need to change Europe’s controversial issues head on in the European approach to foreign policy, it will likely not matter who the Council and the Foreign Affairs Council. The high team after them are. Accordingly, this paper offers a frank representative needs to play a much more active assessment of the last five years of EU foreign policymaking, role in these debates. and it sets out practical and positive ways for Europe to fulfil its potential on the world stage over the next five years. July 2019 July 2 ECFR/294 July 2019 www.ecfr.eu FROM PLAYTHING TO PLAYER: HOW EUROPE CAN STAND UP FOR ITSELF IN THE NEXT FIVE YEARS eutne o ocd dcso-aig n oeg policy foreign on decision-making concede to to general reluctance a to hostage and members, its remains among consensus of machinery lack a policy foreign EU’s the Overall, Brussels. of failure a principally even or is only this not clear, be To policy. foreign global of agent an than rather spectator helpless a appeared often has EU Europe – the around and world the of deterioration the by offset than more been have Brussels in capacity in gains the But and affairs US. the along brought while, a for least at that, Iran with foreign for union security policy was essential in negotiating a nuclear deal the influential of high EU most the representative of EU’s help the with the E3, the of And neighbours. one with important channel an up new opened and migration around crisis political the of out heat the of some took 2016 in Turkey with deal the of negotiation The Ukraine. in crisis the of the of establishment the Normandy process, have contributed to the de-escalation and Crimea, of annexation the after Russia on regimes sanctions and several introduce maintain to ability EU’s The policy. European to challenges pressing most the of several with dealing in Brussels, the larger member states have had fromsome successleadership policy foreign strong of absence the In commissioner. competition the by taken decisions bold and Regulation Protection Data General the of introduction the with realm, digital the in rule-maker a be to potential the Organisation. Meanwhile, the EU has proved that it still has of generation new trade deals. It a has tried to with advance reform of countries the World third Trade to out reaching in role European proactive more a playing also while the tariffs of threat trade, the On from EU the insulating at skilful been policy. has realm Commission the foreign outside traditional leadership some of shown has EU The Coordinated the Annual Review on Cooperation, Defence, and the European Defence Structured Fund. Permanent as such initiatives through policy, defence made on forward also moves has EU The perspective. membership the and development, management, crisis strategy: a policy into tools foreign various its all of integrate to EU the for need the on concentrated it and and – order, order security global European the rules-based the multilateralism, – for EUstands policy the what foreign effectively articulated EU It strategy. and about discussion necessary a created 2016 in Strategy Global EU the of adoption the Meanwhile, continuity. more decision-making EU given has presidency rotating the of end the And world. the around countries in has brought many of Europe’s assets together on the ground Commission and foreign policy. The The creation years. European the between of gap the five narrowed has Treaty EU Lisbon last delegations the the in in machinery improvements policy many foreign been EU’s have there fair, be To Not allbad The lastfiveyears u te U o fcs ra pwr opttr ta are that competitors power great faces now EU the But concerns. states’ member remain primarily US the with ‘geopolitical’ traditionally considerations such as foreign and more defence Brussels policy or relations the Meanwhile, of machinery. province the are policy competition and trade economic as such issues govern policy economic foreign So, can geopolitical disputes. from rules separate them global keep and of that considerations structure holds very EU The disadvantage. the the particular puts a competition at geopolitical EU of form modern The of the US all mean that the old model looks unlikely to self-absorption growing the endure. and Russia, by affairs domestic authoritarian China, the increasing penetration of European of rise The order. world multilateral a of dream EU’s the on The resurgence in great power competition has put pressure Things fallapart further. picture the worsening risks Brexit of prospect been incapable of effective action on these files. The looming therefore, has, It US. the course, of and, China on Venezuela, consensus European Balkans, the Russia, East, Middle the a as has essential as issues machinery forging EU’s of the incapable that proven is result The Brussels. to eahd rm ebr tts I ter, h high the theory, In states. member become from have detached institutions policy the that foreign way the Brussels-based in been has failure biggest the Perhaps decisions. EU blocking Brussels andmemberstates loseoneanother or become down have and watering states at exploit member adept routinely EU US the between and splits in China, Russia, progress itself. the the EU splitting blocking increasingly paralysing is it and – just neighbourhood Europe’s system not multilateral is global competition power Great developments. on influence no to next had have France, as some clout even when acting outside the EU framework, such been have higher. Here, too, not individual member could states that used flows to have refugee political staunching collective in its interest where Libya, and Syria on divided utterly been has it shockingly, More role. a of more much had have could it where – Balkans the in underperformed has it and a countries, European as eastern faded many has in it presence Ukraine, stabilise to failed fire. has of EU ring The a into degenerated has world. neighbourhood its hardball in a build to sought EU the that in friends of ring the Meanwhile, softball play to wants EU The by different game rules in its areas different of strength, such as trade a and development. playing is it like looks even it times, in at – respond competition to geopolitical of struggling areas only traditional not is EU useeconomic versa. the vice contrast, and In ends they military or this, political further For to tools influence. and compete power to which for in theatres as domains these all using representative and the European External Action Service two are partly civilian while two others are naval. One of (EEAS) have the unique capacity to act as a bridge between the things that has damaged the EU’s credibility has been the European Commission and the Council. But the EEAS its unwillingness to use assets such as the Battlegroups. has instead become a creature of the European Commission. On diplomacy, the EEAS remains absent from the biggest Partly as a result of this – and partly because they prefer conflicts – in Ukraine, Syria, Libya, and Yemen –and it – member states have focused heavily on their own reluctant to empower member states. And, with the possible foreign policy and have not sufficiently invested in the exception of its migration deals with Turkey and a few other EU’s machinery. East-west and north-south divisions have countries, the EU has not deployed development assistance also reduced foreign policy cohesion and made the high as an instrument behind a clear common strategy. In the representative’s job much more difficult. For all these absence of this integrated approach, EU foreign policy has reasons, the EU foreign policy apparatus has lost the trust of sometimes looked like a ‘sanctions machine’ – but even that member states, many of which routinely take on foreign policy has been more driven by US pressure and member states commitments without reference to institutions in Brussels. such as the United Kingdom than by any collective will.

The EU has avoided having real discussions at a political One of the indicators of this ‘ever looser union’ is the level – whether at the European Council, the Foreign Affairs limited participation of EU foreign ministers in formal Council (FAC), or the Gymnich. This has fed through to the meetings such as those at the FAC, where they often turn Political and Security Committee (PSC), which is underused up for only part of the discussion or send junior officials to as a format. The high representative and the council president deputise for them. Worse still, when ministers do show up, have failed to forge an effective partnership to bring the high the lack of unity among them is often a barrier to action: representative’s agenda to heads of state and government. member states such as Hungary routinely block attempts to agree on unified EU foreign policy positions. But, rather Part of the problem is that the current high representative than allowing these countries to become isolated, the first sees her job as reflecting member state consensus rather instinct of the EEAS is to water down common statements, than forging it. In doing this, she has mostly delivered wasting valuable time and reducing the credibility of the what member states want. But, at a time of serious EU. In the past, ministers would go to great lengths to internal disputes and great-power efforts to split the avoid isolation; now, it has become a badge of honour for EU, this lack of initiative is nearly fatal to the effort those keen to play to the gallery in their national capitals. to create a unified and ambitious EU foreign policy. The European Commission’s decision to trigger Article The EU Global Strategy reflects this approach. It has helped 7 against Poland, and the EU’s use of qualified majority the EU adjust to new power relationships; but, rather voting to decide to impose migration quotas, helped lead than promoting a real consensus among member states to a huge lack of trust. This creates a perverse situation – in the way that the 2003 strategy did – the EU Global in which central and eastern European countries that are Strategy has been used as a tool to lower EU ambitions not violating the rule of law, such as the Baltic states and by shifting from transformation to resilience. It does not Slovakia, feel pressure to side with Poland and Hungary. really live up to its name: for instance, it is not global, as it concentrates on the EU’s regional role and has almost The next five years nothing to say about Asia, Africa, or even the US. And nor is it really a strategy, as it ambles along for 53 pages Storms ahead – the 2003 strategy was 13 pages long – while offering little guidance on the allocation of the EU’s financial, Many in Brussels would reject the charge that EU foreign diplomatic, or military resources. Most seriously, the Brexit policy has weakened and even regressed in some areas. referendum and the rise of Donald Trump as president of They would maintain that this remains a work in progress the US rendered the strategy out of date before it was even and that the last five years have seen slow but steady published. In its next iteration, the EU’s new strategy will improvements in the machinery available to member states. need to expand to encompass new challenges such as cyber security, artificial intelligence, climate change, and, of Alas, the world will not wait. Many of the course, China. And yet it will also need to be much shorter. trends that have put pressure on the EU could become more acute in the next five years. In some ways, the track record of EU foreign policy over the last five years has reduced the scope of EU tools. Rather The US under Trump is actively pursuing the idea of than living up to the Lisbon Treaty’s dream of integrating deploying economic warfare against the EU to get its way defence, diplomacy, and development aid into a more in trade disputes. It is actively dividing the EU, by asking coherent foreign policy, the EU has aimed its biggest guns at central and eastern European governments whether they ever-smaller targets. On defence policy, the EU has focused really want to hold their security relationship with the US on industrial policy, and the Common Security and Defence hostage to Washington’s bilateral problems with Berlin and Policy (CSDP) has become largely demilitarised. Only six Brussels. And the months ahead will see EU unity come of the 16 current CSDP missions are military and, of these, under great pressure in the Middle East, and in relations 3 4 ECFR/294 July 2019 www.ecfr.eu FROM PLAYTHING TO PLAYER: HOW EUROPE CAN STAND UP FOR ITSELF IN THE NEXT FIVE YEARS problems, and that it will deploy its influence and policy. influence foreign its on consensus deploy forge will to power it structural that and policy on foreign problems, efforts various their geopolitical its with states focus EU’s member will helping states the it takes member that it seriously, of predicament that trust demonstrates it the if earn increasingly could Brussels in team new The own. its on respond to enough powerful is state fromEU individual no challenge that and the the powers, great to that response agree geopolitical states a member needs EU most time, same the well. At it do to machinery Brussels current the themdo of trust all want not nearly states and effort, EU this on all take to not Brussels fundamentally, precarious because, – increasingly task the easy no is with This what in. itself finds EU the deal about situation geopolitical to more and necessary the processes improving is incrementally internal of creaky terms EU’s in need less will Brussels think in team to new the that implies this All ambitions. stated its behind lag still actions EU’s the and states member among divisions big remain there year, this for action that came out of the European Parliament election mandate clear the Despite agreement. the from demonstrated retreat US the have after accord climate Europeans Paris the upholding in where leadership climate on area strategy clear an a change, have even not does EU The nothing. with left be then could EU the and – renewal their blocks state member a because lifted be will sanctions the relationships developed by various member states. One day, EU and Russia. This void has been filled by a series of bilateral formats for dialogue and no strategic discussion between the no are there case, any in And, Russians. the with engage to Among strategy. political member states, there is little trust in any the high representative from divorced utterly are does not have a common policy beyond sanctions, and these have a dual-track policy of sanctions and engagement, but it defined its interests in relation to Russia. The EU is meant to invasion of Ukraine in 2014. However, Europe to has never agreeing really Russian the after regime sanctions a tough maintaining and by expectations exceeded EU the Russia, On capitals. European and Washington between tension ease to problem mutual their use better, even or, front united a toform a way find to and challenge China the addressing in interest common a US the with shares it that realise to failed has EU and the efforts, Africa best its in Despite East. Middle even the or Asia east in challenge China’s geopolitical to responding at good less been has it but China, on policy foreign economic in front common a creating of job good fairly a done recently has EU The GDP. global of half for account collectively them of three the century; next the in economy global the of shape the determine will EU the and China, US, difficulties. the between relationship trilateral transatlantic The of source biggest the be China will But too. Turkey and Russia as such countries with bu frin oiy roiis o te U Ti sol be should This EU. the discussion for priorities real policy a foreign have about to needs Council European The • competencies. EU of concept usual the own beyond its go that for responsibility more security. Leaders in take Brussels will need to consider measures and better toorganise itself for Europe ways new finding in lead the take must EU The here. valuable be would delegation, EU local the by orchestrated mission, of heads EU by reporting joint member for basis and the states’ discussions and decision-making. For instance, more facts form key should the that out considerations laying analysis, relevant present also can It ignore. to prefer might they issues big address collectively to Brussels states member ‘force’ it. and agenda the want set can to them induce to lot a do can it But want to. not Brussels can do they far if cooperate how to to states member persuade are limits There in. have can confidence states member that competence a and attitude, new an forge machinery, a to establish to is primarily it Instead, not policies. foreign is team leadership EU the next for task key the that implies world the of picture This Rewiring Brussels What istobedone? okn a te ees t tae oiy a i ti area. this in has policy trade its levers the at looking while policies, management crisis and prevention conflict climate-sensitive on focus could EU the example, For areas. policy other into feeds climate how examine to needs also up It stage. this world the on backing diplomacy climate and active more with of 2050 goal maintain by the neutral to fulfilling carbon needs by becoming EU role leadership the green years, global few its next the Over • preparing an agenda for the European Council to implement president of the European issues). Commission multilateral should be charged on with organisation European (exploring elements diplomatic hybrid political- and domain); cyber the in those including threats, and conventional to resistance and responsibility security and defence elements (promoting greater European regulation); technology and screening, investment systems, payments dollar, the of role the sanctions, secondary with (coping elements This financial world’. and economic multipolar include: a should in sovereignty ‘EU on agenda an board. on agree to be the should this of elements of key the of One chair • EU of sort a as presence establish global and policy a foreign EU in role take proactive also more should a Council ministers. European foreign the of of president level The the at agenda their supports who representative high a with closely very working policy, foreign EU in interest real a takes who Council European of the astrongpresident of foreignministers.TheEUneeds and state of that heads to linked better be to needs of level that so – government level the at made is policy foreign more and More PSC. the and ministers foreign by prepared h nw ih ersnaie n the and representative high new The . • Unable to cover the whole agenda alone, the high such a council would inevitably require, and thus move representative will require support from a group of strong into a position to shape the agenda and alert member deputies who are members of the European Commission states to developments they might otherwise neglect. but who also have a mandate from the Council covering key regional issues: the Sahel, the Balkans, and the There are different models for organising this. At one Eastern Partnership. There could also be a commissioner extreme is the model of the United Nations Security for defence and one for cyber and hybrid threats. Another Council, with permanent and rotating members. At the option is to make more frequent and effective use of EU other extreme is the idea of simply inviting the UK to join special representatives. These figures used to provide a the European Council for a discussion once a year, with the sustained, high-level focus on topics, and to report back to process being prepared by occasionally adding the UK to member states. Such special representatives – including the FAC and the PSC. A model in between these options is EU foreign ministers – could thus report back to member that of the African Union Peace and Security Council, whose states and submit written reports to the PSC. This could members are elected for two- or three-year terms from occur on both specific conflicts and cross-cutting issues within regional groups (so, eastern Europeans would have such as disarmament. A third approach is to task EU two seats, western Europeans would have three seats, and foreign ministers with specific roles. There is a precedent so on). One of the advantages of establishing a European for this: Catherine Ashton mandated Radoslaw Sikorski Security Council is that it could also create a political and Frank-Walter Steinmeier to represent the EU in superstructure for the European Intervention Initiative, Georgia, and Sikorski and Carl Bildt to do so in Moldova. a French-led defence cooperation initiative involving ten member states that sit outside the EU institutions and • A review of the role, added value, and impact of the aims to develop a shared strategic and military culture. EEAS should take place at the beginning of the new high representative’s term. Such a review took place a year after • Organising the European pillar in NATO – NATO the service was created, which resulted in some reforms. and the US remain central to European defence, but it But no one has looked at these issues systematically does not follow that the main burden of bolstering the since then. The EU has been successful at establishing alliance’s military presence in central and eastern Europe, effective delegations in key countries and at bringing as agreed at the 2014 NATO summit in Wales, must fall on foreign policy expertise into the EEAS and the European the Americans. Nor does it follow that forward-basing of Commission. But it has been less successful at assembling allied forces is only of value if those forces are American. that expertise into strong efforts in strategic analysis and communicating such analysis to key institutions beyond the European allies should, therefore, reflect on the possibility EEAS or to member states. The high representative should that US support through the European Deterrence Initiative seek to promote both strategic analysis and planning, could go into reverse. Indeed, the EU’s new leadership team, as well as a more systematic process for dissemination. along with key member states, would do well to anticipate such a development and organise a proactive response. Reorganising European defence This would not involve immediately offering to take over current US efforts but rather proposing to emulate them. NATO will remain the central body for the territorial The US leads one of the four multinational battlegroups that defence of Europe from Russia and other threats. But, constitute NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence (roughly for all other areas of their security, Europeans need to 1,500-strong multinational units based in Estonia, Latvia, find ways to organise themselves better and take more Lithuania, and Poland, led by the UK, Canada, Germany, responsibility. This is both so that they can be a better and the US respectively). It also plays the lead role in the partner for the US and so that they can act alone, if necessary. Tailored Forward Presence in the Black Sea region. Overall, If the UK leaves the EU, each side should conclude a the US has a presence, familiarity, and credibility in the security treaty to allow the EU to share information and region that its western European allies lack. Europeans work with the British on counter-terrorism and crime. should contemplate more forward bases of their own, They will also need to establish new mechanisms for even on a permanent basis. Poland’s “Fort Trump” idea exchanging views and information, and for cooperating is objectionable because it heads the wrong way in asking on sanctions and operations. Creating such mechanisms more of the US and because it circumvents NATO. But it also gives Europeans the chance to develop structures at least has virtue in its implicit recognition that the Wales that might be useful more generally. These could include: summit erred in stopping short – out of deference to Russian sensitivities – of permanently stationing forces on the • A European Security Council – This idea was territory of former Warsaw Pact allies. If EU member states originally floated by Angela Merkel and then picked up were to develop even a small facility in Poland, this would be by Emmanuel Macron. The goals behind it are threefold: a powerful demonstration of European defence solidarity. conduct a strategic discussion; engage with the UK; and allow the willing and able to make progress. The EEAS The EU should also take over the lead of the NATO would furnish the secretariat of the council, marshal the mission in Kosovo, to show the US that it is serious infrastructure of deputies and preparatory groups that and that it can make a real impact. Steps like this will 5 6 ECFR/294 July 2019 www.ecfr.eu FROM PLAYTHING TO PLAYER: HOW EUROPE CAN STAND UP FOR ITSELF IN THE NEXT FIVE YEARS pin ppr witn y h EA o ‘oe groups’ ‘core or EEAS the positions. by clear written with papers prepared, competing options well be should reconciling discussions These the and issues, compromise finding to view a with controversial agendas meeting their on matters avoiding contentious place should FAC the than and Council European Rather steps: • certain take can to EU specifically, the More direction, exercise. that of in lots move only gets will it muscle if policy develop foreign The experience action. best practical can common the EU of the through acting say: trust to by mutual is is That establish act. solidarity to this seen being achieving and to key general most the the level, On interests. core countries’ facto many de for of form a defence of line first the is EU build the that showing by solidarity to is challenge long-term The EU the so. do them make to follow powerless proved EU the and decision to refused simply states member some as counter-productive, was qualified quotas refugee on using voting majority of example EU, The the themselves. weakening weaken they by that, majority states member qualified all to persuade placed introduce better be that would EU to the a Philosophically, is voting. as needed barrier well is suggestion as practical practical unanimity The This a faces challenge. policy. it philosophical but foreign merit, some on has voting qualified introducing majority by this around get to tempting is It human arbitration. international of Sea China issues South the the and rights on China challenging resolutions diluted or Hungary, blocked have example, powers. for Slovenia, and third Greece, with favour courting of way a as decision-making EU blocking to taken has states member of minority a recently, More isolated. being avoid to lengths member great to go past, would and rarely the only powers these in used states But, interests. vital their defend countries allow to to unanimity by works policy foreign EU Finding unityandengagingmemberstates alert. on to put being of days 30 within deploy NATO to ready ships 30 and squadrons, requires fighter air 30 battalions, which land 30 have plan, 30-30-30-30 under The troops Hudayda. NATO’s the of towards count city also Yemeni could the Battlegroups or Libya in asproviding back-up such tasks, for suitable UN be the to offered be should and Exercises efforts management crisis civilian should EU with coupled be Battlegroups policy. The Battlegroups. foreign the for organised EU operational to an reintroduce element to do attempt To should together. mud they the this, in time spending by is culture strategic common a develop can Europeans that ways the capability. intended • future NATO’s of supplying part for discrete responsibility a collective takes within ambition and of NATO level EU an formulating Brussels in if succeeds Washington to convincing particularly prove Reoperationalising European defence Oe of One – o h Nrad poes n usa n Ukraine. and Russia on process Normandy the to for could, adjustments France such make and this on way the and show example, Germany EU. the within formats member states – would help other enhance the legitimacy of these for mediator and mechanism reassurance active an as acting representative high the with – back reporting of process This Iran. with negotiations E3+3 the in happened eventually as institutions, EU by of this representatives achieve including can groups Core states. member other to back report always would they that is EU the of behalf on • One of the principles of the core groups that would operate it. abusing from them discourage to process the in invested least one at group join that matters can to states them, member they might EU have all enough If states. member larger of preserve the be not should groups Core represented. are issue the in interest particular a have that states smaller member key that ensure to important be also will it cases, most In positions denominator. common common lowest the and above rise that options develop core to these attempt issues divisive and appoint through work to should states member representative of groups steps. high next The the • out lay and together the exercise conclusions discussion, the main the of the of draw end should representative the high At states. member of ay o a eee E t mng polm sc a a as – problems that currently seem completely insurmountable. such problems US disruptive a manage and China, assertive an to Russia, revisionist EU renewed a for which to easy on relatively be will it there, foundation From unity. EU a solid of sense a build offer to they seek and that, above do outlined steps against The interests depredations. core outside their defend and policy foreign in Only in this way will it be able to adequately represent them confidence. their regain and states member to provides it about leadership the up talk firm to even needs it strategies, can such creating institutions EU’s the before that, is here point The Sahel. the and East Middle the to from the Balkans neighbourhood, its in fire of ring the dousing to its approaches new on with agree to need also deal will It US. the to even and China, strategies Russia, from forge challenges to geopolitical principal need will thestory. EU of The thebeginning only clearly are efforts These Looking forward blockages. or measures, watered-down delay, accepting than rather situation this 26 into get of they group when (or Brexit) after 27 of group a as statements releasing of habit the into getting by this do could They state. member single a by blocked or down watered being statements and actions their of risk the from themselves free should states member EU progress, make to fail they that event the In • About the authors Acknowledgements

Mark Leonard is co-founder and director of the European This paper reflects the views of its authors who are solely Council on Foreign Relations. He writes a syndicated responsible for them – but it has been immeasurably column on global affairs for Project Syndicate and his essays improved with the input of various people. Above all we have appeared in numerous other publications. Leonard is would like to thank Miroslav Lajcak for hosting a retreat the author of Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century and on the future of European Union foreign policy in the high What Does China Think?, and the editor of Connectivity Tatra mountains; this included the two authors along with Wars. He presents ECFR’s weekly World in 30 Minutes Camille Grand, Anne-Karin Eneström, Stefan Lehne, and podcast and is a former chair of the World Economic Klaudia Bederkova who also kindly offered comments Forum’s Global Agenda Council on Geo-economics. on the text. We have had extraordinarily perceptive and original written contributions and comments from our Carl Bildt is a former prime minister and foreign amazing colleagues at the European Council on Foreign minister of Sweden. He has served in international Relations, including Julien-Barnes Dacey, Susi Dennison, functions with the EU and UN, primarily related to Jonathan Hackenbroich, Manuel Lafont Rapnouil, Nicu the conflicts in the Balkans. He was co-chair ofthe Popescu, Jeremy Shapiro, Vessela Tcherneva, José Ignacio Dayton peace talks on Bosnia and became the first high Torreblanca, and Nick Witney. We are grateful to Miroslav representative to the country. Later, he was the special Lajcak, Josep Borrell, Janis Mazeiks, and Peter Javorcik envoy of UN secretary general Kofi Annan to the region. for giving excellent feedback on the ideas at a dinner in Luxembourg in June 2019. At ECFR’s Annual Council Meeting, Isabel Mota hosted a wonderful discussion on a draft of the paper at which Helle Thorning-Schmidt led a discussion with many wise contributions from ECFR Council members. We also benefited from input from ECFR board members Franziska Brantner, Ian Clarkson, Marta Dassu, Lykke Friis, Sylvie Kauffmann, Ivan Krastev, Andrzej Olechowski, Norbert Roettgen, Javier Solana, and Helle Thorning-Schmidt. Jeremy Shapiro brought much greater structure and rigour to the arguments in an early draft while Adam Harrison was as thoughtful and meticulous an editor as we could have hoped for.

7 8 ECFR/294 July 2019 www.ecfr.eu FROM PLAYTHING TO PLAYER: HOW EUROPE CAN STAND UP FOR ITSELF IN THE NEXT FIVE YEARS www.ecfr.eu institutions. or individuals to grants make not does but organisations and tanks think other with partnership in works ECFR policy. EU foreign avalues-based for advocate and ideas our publish to us allow donors These entities. corporate Foundations and other generous foundations, individuals and Society Open by the funded charity aregistered is ECFR •  • •  its activities: define that elements ECFR three developed has astrategy with distinctive foreign policy. andvalues-based developmentEuropean ofcoherent,the effective conduct research andpromote across informeddebate Europe on European think-tank. isto Launched 2007,its objective inOctober pan- first the European is The Council on Foreign (ECFR) Relations ABOUT ECFR for research, debate, advocacy andcommunications. Madrid, Paris, Rome, andWarsaw. Sofia are platforms Ouroffices among European London, think-tanks, inBerlin, offices has Council ischaired by Carl Bildt, Lykke Röttgen. Friis, andNorbert own their countries. within The activities ECFR’s with andhelp ideas advice with members provide andfeedback onpolicy ECFR staff body.year afull as Through geographical task forces, andthematic andcandidatemember states countries –which meets once a decision makers, thinkers peoplefrom andbusiness EU’s the hundred Councildistinguished Members–politicians, ofover two A physical presence ECFR, mainEUmemberstates. inthe uniquely A pan-European Council. ECFR brought has togethera capitals; andreaches outto strategicmediaoutlets. inEU gatherings ofECFR” and“friends meetings, publicdebates, private produces hosts research; original reports; policy publishes apan-European developmentwith projects focus.and policy ECFR frompractitioners allover Europe outinnovative to carry research researchersbrought ofdistinguished together ateam and Developing contagiousDeveloping peopletalking. get that ECFR ideas has Berlin, London,Madrid,Paris,Rome,Sofia, Warsaw on ForeignRelations(ECFR), Published bytheEuropeanCouncil ISBN: 978-1-911544-94-4 © ECFRJuly2019 European CouncilonForeignRelations. use requiresthepriorwrittenpermissionof personal andnon-commercialuse.Anyother content fromthispublicationexceptforyourown reproduce, republishorcirculateinanywaythe Council onForeignRelations.Youmaynotcopy, Copyright ofthispublicationisheldbytheEuropean Relations, representsonlytheviewsofitsauthors. publications CouncilonForeign oftheEuropean positions. Thispaper, likeall collective take not The EuropeanCouncilonForeignRelationsdoes