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Gustav Bergmann: Bibliography M. S. Gram E. D. Klemke THE ONTOLOGICAL TURN: Srudies in the Philosophy of GUSTAV BERGMANN xowA crTy $ uNlvERSrTy oF rowA PRESS Bibliography WORKS BY GUSTAV BERGMANN Abbreaiations MLP: Th9 Metaphysics of LogicalPositiahm. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1954. 'ME: Meaning and Existence. Madison: Universiry of Wisconsin Press, 1959. LR: Logic and Reality, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 196,$. FB: H. Feigl and M. Brodbeck, eds. Readi.ngs in tbe Philosopby of Science. New York: Appleton-Century Crofa, 1953. M: M. H. Marx, ed. Psychological Tbeory: Contemporary Readings.New York: Macmillan, 1951. 1928 "Zur Axiomatik der Elementargeometrie." Wiener Akdilernie der Wissen- schaften 26 (1928): l-3. 1929 "Zur Axiomatik der Elemenargeometrie." Monatshefte fih Matbematik and P by sik 36 (1929) :269-84. "IJeber eine mit der Hypertorsen verwandte Flaechenklasse." Monatshefte filr Mathematik und Physik 36 (t929)15948. 302 Bibliography 1930 " E benen und B ewe gungs gruppen in Rientanns c hen Raeurnen." J ahre s b eric ht der Deutschen Mathematiker Vereinigung 39 (1930), Part II:54-5 (wirh E. Lukacs). "Ebenen und Beuegangsgruppen in Riemannscben Rteumen." Monatshefte fiir Mathematik und Physik 37 (1930):303-24 (with E. Lukacs). 193 1 "Zwei Bemerkungen zur abstrakten und kombinatorischen Topologie." Mo- natsbefte fiir Mathemutik und Physik 38 (1911):245-56. 1932 "Zur algebraisch-axiomatischen Begruendung der Topologie." Mathematische Zeitschrif t 35 ( 1932) : 502-ll. 193t "Zut anrlytischen Theorie literarischer trVertmasstaebe." lmago 2I (1935): 498-504. "On Physicalistic l\{odels of Nonphysical Terms." Philosophy of Science 7 (1940):l5l-58. "On Some Methodological Problems of Psychology." Philosophy of Science 7 (1940):205-19. Reprinted in FB. "The Subject Matter of Psychology," Pbilosophy of Science 7 (1940):415-33. 1941 "The Logic of Probability," Anaerican lournal of Physics 9 (1941):263-72. "Operationism and Theory in Psychology." Psychological Reaieu 48 (1941): 1-14 (with K. W. Spence). Reprinted in M. Reprinted in an essay collection of Spence. 1942 "An Empiricist Schema of the Psychophysical Problem." Pbilosoph;y of Sci- ence 9 (1942):72-9L ' Bibliography ,01 "syntactical Analysis of the Class Calculus." Philosophy of Science 9 (1942): 227-32. 'lRenrarks Concerning the Epistemology of Scientific Empiricism." Pbilosophy of Sci,ence 9 (1942):283-93. "The Indexical and Presentative Function of Signs." Philosopby of Science 9 (1942):372-74. Discussion of a paper by Willis Moore. 1943 "Note on Identity." Philosophy of Science 10 ( 1943): L6346, (Psychoanalysis and Experimental Psychology;' Mind 52 (1943);122-40. Re- printed in M. 'lOutline of an Empiricist'.Philosophy of Physics." Arnerican loumal of Physics ll (L943):248-58 and 33542. Reprinted in FB. 1944 'lThe Logic of P-sfchophysical Measuremenr." Psychological Revi,ew 5l (1944):1-24 (with K. W. Spence). Reprinted in FB and M. Reprinted in an essay collection of Spence. "The Formalism in Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law." Ethics 55 (1944):l1G-30 (with L. Zerby). "An Empiricist's System of the Sciences." Scientific Monthly 59 (1944): r4H8. "Holism, Historism, and Emergence," Philosophy of Science ll (1944):2A9-21. l'Pure Semantics, Sentences, and Propositions." Mind 5l (L944):218-57. "Notes on Identity." Pbilosophy of Science 11 (1944): 123-24, Discussion. "A Positivistic Metaphysics of Consciousness." Mind 45 (1945):193-226. "Frequencies, Probabilities, and Positivisrn." Pbilosophy and Pbenomenological Research 6 (1945) :26-44. "Review of Ebenstein's 'The P.ure Theory of Law."' Ethics 56 (1945):71-72, "Review of Ortega y Gasset's 'The Mission of the University.'" Mississippi Valley Historical Re,tsiew 32 (1945):266a7, 304 Bibliography 1946 ,,Remarks on Realism." Pbilosophy of Science L3 (1946)t261-73. Reprinted in MLP (153-75). ,,Some Comments on Carnap's Logic of Induction." Phi.losophy of Science 13 (1946)t7r-78. "Review of Cohen's 'Faith of a Liberal."' Ioana Lau Reaiew 32 (1946):178-81. 1947 "The Logic of Quanta." Americdn lournal of Physics 15 (L947):397-408, and 497-508. Reprinted in FB. "Russell on Particulars." Philosophicdl Reaieu 56 (1947)t59-72. Reprinted in MLP (187-214). ,,Undefined Descriptive Predicates." Philosophy and Pbenomenological Re- search 8 (1947)t55-82. "Sense Data, Linguistic Conventions, and Existence'" Pbilosophy of Science t4 (t947)i52-63. Reprinted in l\{LP (r7G96). "Philosophical and Psychological Pragmatics." Philosophy of Science 14 ( 1947 ) :27 L-7 3. Discussion. "Review of Kelsen's 'General Theory of Law end State."' Etbics 57 (1947): 213-15. 1948 "Concerning Carnap's Definition of 'Extensional' and 'Intensional."' Mind 57 (1948):494-95. "Conditions for an Extensional Elementaristic Language." Analysi's 8 (1948): 44-47. Reprinted in MLP (232-37). "Contextual Definitions in Nonextensional Languages," Joarnal of Symbolic Logic 11 (1948):140. "Descriptions in Nonextensional Contexts." Philosophy of Science 15 (1948): 351-55. "Review of Koehler's'Gestalt Psychology."'Psychological Bulletin 45 (19a8): 3 51-5t. Bibliography 30t 1949 "The Finite Represenations of S5." Methodos I (1949):217-19. "On Nonperceptual Intuition," Philosophy dt Phenomenological Researcb L0 (1949):261-64. Reprinted in MLP (228-31). "Professor Ayer's Analysis of Knowing." Analysis 9 (1949):98-106. Reprinted in MLP (215-27). "A Syntactical Characterization of S5." lournal of Syrnbolic Logic L4 (19+9)t 173-74. "Two Criteria for an Ideal Language," Pbilosopby of Sci'ence L6 (L949):71- 74. Reprinted in Richard Rorry, ed. The Lingai.stic Turn. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1967. See pp. 132-34. "Review of Russell's 'Human Knowledge."' Pbysics Today 2 (1949):27-28. 19t0 "Logical Positivism." In V. Ferm, ed. A History of Philosophicdl Systems. New York: Philosophical Library, 1950. See pp. 47L-82, Reprinted in MLP. "Semantics." In V. Ferm, ed. A Hbtory of Philosophical Systems, pp. 483-92. Reprinted in MLP (1719). "Comments on Storer's Definition of 'Soluble."' Analysis 12 (195L):44r48, "Review of 'Albert Einstein, Philosopher-Scientist!"' (ed. Schilp), Philosophi- cal Reaieu 60 (1951)2268-74. "Review of Kraft's 'Der Wiener Kreis' and Juhos' 'Die Erkenntnis und ihre Leistung."' P hilosopby b P henomenolo gical Researcb 12 ( 195 1 ) : 11943. "Review of Lasswell and Kaplan's 'Power and Society."' Ethics 62 (1951): 6H5. "Two Types of Linguistic Philosophy." Reuieu of Metaphysi.cs 5 (1952)t417- 38. Reprinted in MLP (106-31). 19t2 "The Problem of Relations in Classical Psychology." Philosophical Quarterly 2 (1952):14G-52. Reprinted in MLP (277-99). 306 BibliograPhy "A Criterion of Necessity." Reztie'ut of Metaphysics 6 (L952)t128-79- Discus- sion. "Multiplicative Closures." P ornt gali ae M athematic s ll (19 52) : 169-72. "Review of Brunswick's 'The Conceptual Framework of Psychology!" Psy- chological Bulletin 49 (1952). 19t' "Theoretical Psychology." Io Annual Reaie'ur of Psychology 4 (1953):435-58. ,,The Identity of Indiscernibles and the Formalist Definition of ldentity." Mind 62 (t9h);75-79. Reprinted in MLP (268-76). "Two Comerstones of Empiricism." Synthese 8 (1953):435-52. Reprinted in MLP (78-105). "Logical Positivism, Language, and the Reconsuuction of Metaphysics." Riu. Criti di Storia della filoifiis (1953):453-81. Reprinted in MLP (30-79). Re- printed in part in Richard Rorty. The Lingui.sti.c Turn. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1968. See pp. 63-71. "Review of Wisdom's 'Other Minds."' Philosophy & Phenomenological Re- searcb L4 (1953): ll2-14. 19t4 "Bodies, Minds, and Acts." frst published in MLP. "Particularity and the New Nominalism." Methodos 6 (1954):131-47. Re- printed in ME (91-10t). "Sense and Nonsense in Operationism." Scientific Monthly 79 (1954):21V14. Reprinted in P. Frank, ed, The Validation of Scientific Theories. Boston: Beacon Press, 1957. For German tranSlation, see 1965. ,,Some Remarks on the Ontology of Occam." Philosophical Reaie:as 63 ( 1954): 560-71. Reprinted in ME (14+-5+). "Review of Goetz' 'Die Entstehung der Ordung.' " Philosophy anil Phtenome- nological Research 15 ( 1954):287-88. The Metapbysics of Logical Positittism. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1954. Second ed. by University of Wisconsin Press, 1967, with Preface. Bibliography 30i 19tt "Professor Quine on Analyticity." Mind 64 (1955):254-58. Reprinted in ME (13e43). "Reducrion." ln Current Trend.s in Psychology and the Behaaioural Sciences. Pittsburgh: Universiqy of Pitp-sluqgh Press, f955. See pp. 59-81. "Intentionaliry." In Sernaktica. Archivio di Filoiofa' Rome: Bocca, 1955. See pp. 177-216. Reprinted in ME (3-38). Reprinted in Thomas M. Olshewsky. Problems ;n thi Pbllosophy of Langaage. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969. See pp. 20G-32. ,,Dispositional Properties and Dispositions." Pbilosophicdl Studies 6 (1955): 77-80. "Review of Frenkel-Brunswik's 'Psychoanalysis and the Unity of Science."' !ournal of Philosophy 52 (1955):692-95. "Review of Nagel's 'sovereign ReaSon.'" Philosopby dv Phenoruenological Research 16 (1955):128-30. 'Wissenschaft, "Review of Stegmueller's 'MetaphysibS, Skepsis."' Philosophical Reaiew 64 (195 5) :665-67. "Dell'ideologia." Ocidente 6 (1955):519-35. Translation of "Ideology" from J\,ILP. 19t6 "The Contribudon of john B. Watson,'r Psychological Reaieus 63 (1956)t?65- 76. Reprinted in Jordan Scher, ed. Theories of the Mind. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Pless, 1962. For Italian translation, see'1958. 'lRussell's Examination of Leibniz Examined." Philosophy of Science 23 (1956):175-203. Reprinted in ME (1t5-88). '(The RepreSentations of S5." Journal
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