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No. 3 IN A SERIES OF OCCASIONAL PAPERS

The Roots of the Dominican Crisis THEODORE DRAPER

MAY 24, 1965 Reprinted from theNEWLEADER

by the LEAGUE FOR INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 112 E. 19 Street New York, N. Y. 10003 Words vs. Deeds

The Roots of the Dominican Crisis By Theodore Draper

Dominican When President Juan Bosch was would have expected, if words were deeds, was U.S. overthrown in September 1963, President Ken- support of the militarists who overthrew him in 1963 nedy publicly deplored the military coup, broke off and were fighting him two years later. diplomatic relations with the new self-appointed To understand how and why a mockery was made Dominican government, halted all economic and mili- of everything the United States supposedly stood for, tary aid, and withdrew U.S. personnel from Santo it is necessary to go back at least as far as Bosch's

Domingo. Though diplomatic relations were re-estab- term of office and its immediate antecedents. The lished three months later, Bosch did not complain of present crisis is, in essence, merely a continuation of the U.S. government's lack of sympathy. He recalled, the process which led to Bosch's overthrow. If the on the contrary, that U.S. Ambassador John Bartlow military coup of 1963 was a crude political swindle, Martin had offered to call for the U.S. carrier Boxer as U.S. official policy statements have implicitly agreed; to deter the military conspirators. But Bosch did not the military cabal to prevent Juan Bosch's return to wish to owe his political survival to a show of U.S. power in 1965 was exactly the same thing. force in Dominican waters, and refused the offer. f Nothing has changed, not even the names. On May 2 of the present crisis, President Johnson / In December 1962, Bosch's Partido Revolucionario declared that the pro-Bosch uprising had begun as "a IDominicano (prd) won an overwhelming electoral vic- popular democratic revolution committed to democracy ftory. But it was an unexpected victory, at least for and social justice." He also said: "We hope to see a his conservative opposition, the Union Civica National government freely chosen by the will of all the people." \ (ucn), which could not reconcile itself to defeat. Bosch On May 3, the chief U.S. spokesman at the United took office on February 27 the following year, and he Nations, Adlai Stevenson, assured the world organiza- learned of a plot to overthrow him on March 9, ten tion that the U.S. government had "never" considered days later. Another coup was scheduled for April, a Bosch's political party to be "extremist" and called very serious one barely failed to come off in July, attention to U.S. "cooperation" with Bosch's regime a third miscarried in August, and the successful one in 1963. was perpetrated in September.

From all this it would seem that the general line In the atmosphere of , these con- of U.S. policy in the present crisis should have been spiracies were known to Bosch almost as soon as they quite clear—firm support of the man who headed the were hatched. When Bosch heard of the last one, he only government freely chosen by the will of the called the military leaders to his office and decided Dominican people in this century. The last thing one to force a showdown by demanding the dismissal of

May 24, 1965 —

one of the ringleaders. The officer he named was Bosch was also faced. with anotner delicate prob- Colonel Elias Wessin y Wessin of the San Isidro Air lem, By the time he returned to the Dominican Base outside the capital. In reply, the military made Republic in October 1961, after 24 years of exile, Bosch a prisoner in his own office for four days and he had to reckon with the presence of other revolu- then put him on a boat to the island of Guadeloupe, tionary groups of a far more extremist nature than from which he quickly made his way to . his own. Popu- Less than two years later, Wessin y Wessin, now a The oldest of them was the Partido Socialista Brigadier General, emerged as the leading military fig- lar (psp), the old-line which had ure in the attack on the pro-Bosch forces. been organized in the early '40s. The Castroite influence Why was Bosch so vulnerable to the camarilla of was reflected in the formation of the Movimiento 14 de generals and colonels at San Isidro? The question Junio (14th of June Movement) in 1959, when the takes us close to the grandeur and fragility of Bosch's old dictator was still alive. This group was made up regime. largely of middle-class students and young profes- In the last years of the Trujillo dictatorship, the sionals for whom Castro's 26th of July Movement was legendary tyrant no longer wholly trusted the regular the model. It was followed by the Movimiento Popular police and Army to protect him. He tried to reinsure Dominicano (mpd), which called itself "marxista- himself by adding tanks and infantry troops to the lenimsta-fidelista," before Castro and the Castroites San Isidro Air Base under the command of his son, were ready to avow their "-Leninism," and Ramfis. San Isidro thus became the military citadel soon took on a Maoist coloration. of Trujilloism, and the commander of the tank corps, The psp had, like most Communist parties, a Colonel Wessin y Wessin, was one of the citadel's key checkered political past. For a time, in the mid-'40s, chieftains. it had even entered into an alliance with Trujillo, and in When Bosch took office in February 1963, he in- he rather than the Communists broke that alliance This herited the old Trujillo armed forces intact. They con- 1947 when it no longer served his purposes. tinued to remain intact under Bosch because he knew short-lived collaboration later plagued the psp as a that a much-needed purge of the top leadership would somewhat different partnership with Batista in 1938-44 immediately trigger a military coup and plunge the haunted the similarly-named Cuban Communists. After seek- country into civil war. He was determined to rule Trujillo's death, the psp continued the policy of groups peacefully or not at all, and therefore deliberately ing power by working with or inside whatever took the calculated risk of leaving the Armed Forces seemed to have most power at the moment. As long alone. Thus Bosch survived in office seven months; as the conservative ucn was the most promising politi- otherwise, he might not have survived seven days or cal force, the psp gave it the benefit of its favors. Since even seven hours. its services were not rejected by the ucn, post-Trujillo Would a Communist or a Castroite have made such Dominican politics was marked by some strange bed- a decision? The very basis of Castro's power in 1959 fellows. had rested on the total destruction of the former Cuban All three psp, 14th of June and mpd—considered them Army and its replacement by the new "Rebel Army." themselves to be Communist groups. Each of Bosch did not have a "Rebel Army" at his disposal warred shrilly and incessantly against the others. The because he had taken power peacefully and demo- ucn was glad to accept the support of both the psp cratically. He might have used his Presidential power and the 14th of June because the former furnished it to organize a "popular militia" or some form of per- with organizational cadres which it needed badly, and sonal military force. He refused to play this game the latter gave it an opening to the radical youth. civilian because he made it clear at the outset that he would Since the ucn leaders later provided the main rather relinquish power than be forced by his enemies cover for the military coup, they were truly in col- into adopting their own methods of rule. lusion with the Communists before they accused Bosch Was this an evidence of his "weakness"? I do not of having committed the same crime, which is why happen to think so. Only a man of rare strength of this part of the story is so curious. character could have made such a compact with his Writing in The New Leader ("The Dominican conscience and remained true to it to the bitter end. Upheaval," May 10), Sam Halper, former head of Bureau, noted that the 14th of But it is" not the kind of strength that cynics of the Time's Caribbean Left or Right can understand. Above all, if it proves June's leader, Manuel Tavarez Justo, accompanied ucn

anything about him, it proves that Communist strategy representatives to Washington to plan the post-Trujillo and tactics are totally alien to him. The almost ex- government with the State Department. The pieces of

cruciating irony is the fact that, if he were more the puzzle fit together neatly. of a Communist, he might have held on to power Meanwhile, Bosch and his party had to adapt them- more tenaciously. selves to these peculiar political alignments. They were

The New Leader not, however, confronting this problem for the first It should be kept in mind that we are not dealing time. In exile, the Communist psp had long concen- with a man who began his political career in 1962. trated its fire on Bosch's prd, and scarcely an issue Bosch had been active in politics, Cuban and Domini- of the Communist organ, then published in Guatemala. can, for over a quarter of a century. For most of those had failed to carry some sort of scurrility about Bosch years, the Communists had abused and reviled him, or his chief associates. In , where Bosch had as they had abused and reviled Bosch's friends, Luis spent almost 20 years of his exile. Bosch had been Munoz Marin of Puerto Rico and Romulo Betancourt associated politically with former President Prio Socar- of . Anyone who wishes seriously to look ras, the bete noire of the Cuban Communists, who had into the question of Bosch and cannot taken control of the Cuban labor movement away from ignore or neglect decades of political formation and them in 1947 and had even tried to shut down the conviction. official Communist organ. Hoy, in 1950. Not that The first attack on Bosch as a Communist came Bosch necessarily approved of everything Prio did from a Jesuit priest, Lautico Garcia, just before the in power or that Prio later approved of everything election of December 20, 1962. All the Communist that Bosch did in power. But after Bosch's overthrow groups had decided to boycott the election and were in 1963, Prio said: "I know him well because he was assailing Bosch's party furiously for taking part in the at my side for 20 years. He's no Communist, and time "electoral farce." Thus Bosch found himself in a cross- will confirm it." fire of contradictory calumnies. Padre Garcia's cam- The political line adopted by Bosch after his return paign boomeranged. Bosch confronted him in a famous in 1961 was simple: complete independence and no television debate and made a shambles of the Jesuit's entangling alliances. Since the psp and the 14th of equivocations. When the votes were counted in the June were then working with the ucn against the prd, election, which was supervised by the Organization the first two Communist groups did not constitute a of American States (and, therefore, one of the few problem. But the third one, the mpd, had tried to work undeniably honest elections ever held in Latin Amer- inside Bosch's party. Before Bosch and the older prd ica), Bosch's party came out ahead with over 60 leaders had been able to get back in the country, the per cent of the total vote. In a country with a total mpd had succeeded in entrenching itself in the prd's population of only about three million, the prd gained youth section. As soon as the exile leadership was about 650,000 votes, and the UCN, its nearest rival, able to size up the situation, it disbanded the entire less than half as many. The prd elected 22 Senators prd youth section and thereby discouraged all further and 52 Deputies, the ucn only 4 Senators and 13 attempts at Communist infiltration of the party. Deputies, and the other parties shared a handful of No one in Santo Domingo in his right mind would both. have thought of linking Bosch with Communism or Communists in the last months of 1961 or the first the opposition was right, an overwhelming ma- IF months of 1962. In fact, while other Dominican poli- jority of the Dominican electorate had knowingly ticians opened their parties to one or the other Com- voted for a Communist. This was the reductio ad munist groups, Bosch seemed to have a positively absurdum of the malodorous anti-Bosch campaign. quixotic, doctrinaire unwillingness to have anything to The real Communists and Castroites, of course, do with them. As long as Bosch and the prd were knew better. It is enlightening to see what the Cuban not taken seriously as contenders for government power, press was saying about Bosch at this time. Here is the Communist issue simply did not arise. how the official organ of the Cuban Armed Forces, But in 1962, the political alignments were reshuffled. Verde Olivo of December 30, 1962, commented on As the conservative ucn began to groom itself to be- a threat made by Bosch to withdraw from the elections

come the party in power, and as it sought to insure if the Communist charges persisted: itself of U.S. support, it decided to sever its embarrass- "The gesture of Bosch, whose adherence to the

ing ties with its Communist supporters. In January, it policy of the United States, as well as his anti-Com- broke with the 14th of June Movement. In October, munist position, are most notorious, was interpreted the UCN Executive Committee in Santo Domingo was in two ways: either as a last-minute act to enable his rid of its Communists, and the resignations revealed chief rival, [the ucn candidate], whom that they had numbered no less than 18 out of 24. the U.S. Embassy and the reactionary clergy support, About two dozen well-known Communists were ex- to gain the victory in the electoral farce, or as a re- pelled from the country. By the end of the year, the flection of the pressure exerted by the masses of people UCN leaders decided to ride to power on an anti-Com- so that he should not participate in the electoral trick- munist program. And it suddenly occurred to them ery. A number of democratic [sic] organizations, as is that Bosch's party was catching up and they might known, have denounced the electoral farce and have not win. appealed to the people not to take part in the elections."

May 24, 1965 When Bosch made a trip to Washington after the Hams did not appear to be agents of the U.S. govern- election, another Cuban magazine, Bohemia, of Janu- ment but rather two Dominicans as anxious as the ary 4, 1963, wrote: "Juan Bosch is propping himself best of Dominicans to accomplish the impossible for up in the United States, personally affirming his sub- us." 1 mission to the White House, where he has solicited Bosch handled the Communist problem on the same the blessings of Kennedy." Bohemia of January 11, principles that he applied to the military problem. 1963, scoffed at the "electoral farce, which was so Since the former has become uppermost in the present completely within the inter-American system that crisis, I am going to pursue it, for lack of space and whichever of the candidates were elected counted in time, to the exclusion of other important aspects of advance on good terms with Washington. Viriato Fiallo his regime. and Juan Bosch wear the livery of lackeys with exactly In effect, Bosch refused to govern by the use of the same aptitude and ease." Verde Olivo of February any other force than moral force, which was about all 17, 1963, published a photograph of Bosch under he had anyway. During the 3 1 years of Trujillo's reign which appeared the following words: "Juan Bosch is of terror, anyone whom the tyrant had wished to destroy the candidate chosen by Yankee imperialism to check had been indiscriminately labeled a Communist, and the growing liberation movement of the Dominican Bosch himself had been one of the chief victims. Now people which surged forward after the assassination he was determined to inaugurate an era of peace, of the dictator Trujillo." Bohemia of March 29, 1963, tolerance, social reform and constitutional democracy. ran another photograph of Bosch, this time embracing He ruled out, as beyond both his principles and his Vice President Johnson, who was President Kennedy's power, any course of action which risked incipient chief representative at Bosch's inauguration. The ac- or outright civil war, whether by moving against the companying caption read: "he is one of us: This is Armed Forces, carrying out a mass purge of Trujillistas, what Yankee Vice President Lyndon Johnson appears or conducting a repressive campaign against the Com- to be saying as he was embraced by the new puppet munists. In the crisis of July 1963, he actually told of Uncle Sam, the slippery Juan Bosch of Santo the seditious Army officers that he could not govern Domingo." the country if they persisted in demanding repressive (One wonders whether this Bosch-Johnson photo- measures because "I did not return here to shed graph will not be used one day to prove that Lyndon blood." Johnson was the puppet of Uncle Juan. Stranger things As we have seen, Bosch was accused of being a have happened.) Communist, or little better than one, before he as- Denounced by reactionaries as an "agent of " sumed power, and so the origin of the charge has little of and by the Communists-Castroites as an "agent or nothing to do with anything he did in power. It is Yankee imperialism," Bosch took office on February also untrue that once in power Bosch refused to make almost insuper- 27, 1963. The task before him seemed his views on Communism clear, though it must have plotting able. He knew that the. Armed Forces were been distasteful for a man whom the Communists had been decided. against him as soon as the election had vilified most of his life to plead innocence of Com- who He has said that he was aware of only one priest munism. Only a few days after he had assumed office, The was opposed to the conspiracies against him. one of the disappointed politicians, Horacio Julio Ornes, business interests had almost universally backed the President of the Partido Vanguardia Revolucionaria, conservative ucn. The middle-class youth and students which had been particularly badly beaten in the elec- Castroism. The were for the most part infected with tions, came out with a charge that Bosch was planning under press remained exactly the same as it had been a program of "Communist indoctrination" in the was virtually un- Trujillo. The civilian bureaucracy Armed Forces. If Bosch had any such ideas, the Armed predecessors, among changed. Bosch's immediate now Forces would have been the last on his list of suitable the country, had the most rabid anti-Communists in places to try them out; the story, duly published in various govern- put Communists in key positions in the Dominican press, was merely a sample of the elsewhere. lent agencies, the trade unions and utterly unscrupulous slander that Bosch was up against landslide had put On the other hand, a popular from the outset. Nevertheless, at an Army ceremo his- 'Bosch in power. For the first time in Dominican Bosch soon found an occasion to say that he con- tory, the "masses" had become an active political forced sidered the choice before Latin America to be "one Bosch. The U.S. Am- and they were massively behind \ thing only and very clear: democracy or Communism. bassador, John Bartlow Martin, and the head of the and k nd Communism means death, war, destruction, for Progress program in the Dominican Re- Alliance ^ en la Republica l.~~Juan Bosch, Crisis de la Democracia de America 1964), public, Newell F. Williams, were among Bosch's most Dominicana (Mexico: Centro de Estudios y Documentacion, , Experiment: Democracy p. 155. This book, to be entitled The Unfinished his recent book on the 1963 publication in English next ardent supporters. In in the , is scheduled for fall by Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 'crisis, Bosch has written: "In truth, Martin and Wi"

The New Leader 5 Communists. He turned the loss of all our blessings." {La Nation, Santo making martyrs of the local of repression and Domingo, March 13, 1963). his face sternly against all methods Communists behaved within None of this helped, of course. The campaign of, coercion as long as the permitted the newly exiled Communists / defamation went on; if he was not called a Communist the law. He permitting return. believed passionately that the worst way I or a "Communist agent." he was accused of to He problem in the Dominican V or encouraging "Communist infiltration" of the govern- to handle the Communist suppression. \nent. The ucn leader. Dr. Viriato A. Fiallo, raised Republic was through a policy of that the choice was a storm by declaring publicly that Communists were For one thing, he did not think having Communists in the occupying "key posts" in the government. Bosch dared between having and not choice was between him to name them; Fiallo refused to accept the chal- Dominican Republic. The real underground, making politi- lenge. An enterprising reporter who frequently writes having them in the open or guerrilla warfare. The ex- in these pages and was then with the San Juan Star cal propaganda or waging him. Tn our coun- of Puerto Rico, Norman Gall, soon examined a list perience of Venezuela disquieted 1963, "any attempt to of Dominicans who went to Cuba for the 26th of tries," he said on March 24, by direct persecution July celebration in 1963. In the Star of August 1, he suppress the native Communists into guerrillas and ter- did name names, and most of them turned out to have only succeeds in turning them Venezuela." It was, then, held leading positions in Fiallo's ucn until the previous rorists, as has occurred in to be guerrillas and October. Not a single one had ever belonged to Bosch's up to the Communists to choose into guerrillas and party. terrorists, not for him to turn them it. any case, he could Bosch took some practical steps to cut down Com- terrorists if he could help In Communists by making him- / munist influence. Whereas a Communist-led trade only have suppressed the Forces, the same Armed union movement had been formed in 1961, when the self a prisoner of the Armed those Communists had enjoyed the patronage of Fiallo's Forces with which Trujillo had suppressed all Communists. The anti- ucn, a "free" trade union center, affiliated with the whom he had pleased to call campaign, as it unfolded, was a not-too- \ Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers Communist to make Bosch betray his \(which includes the afl-cio), was set up. Bosch broke subtle stratagem not only political suicide. the hold of the Communists on the electrical workers, principles but to commit Communists were just the government employes and other unions. And in Moreover, the Dominican as they were fighting order to get around Communist entrenchment in the then fighting each other as hard term of office, economic planning board, Bosch turned over most of everyone else. In 1963, during Bosch's world had reached the the state planning activities to a private organization, the split in the Communist hostilities, and it was reflected Centro Interamericano de Estudios Sociales (cides), point of open, escalating Dominican Com- supported mainly by U.S. foundations and headed by in the internecine struggles of the middle of that year, Tavarez a Rumanian-born personal adviser, Sacha Volman. munist groups. In the both "moderates" and Scholarships for Dominicans to study in Soviet Russia Justo carried out a purge of and other Communist countries, through the United old-line Communists in his 14th of June Movement. Nations, were prohibited. An indiscriminate campaign of anti-Commumst re- But Bosch refused to be pushed into unnecessary pression would only have solved the Communists' in- and provocative reprisals. The pre-Bosch government, ternal problems, driven them into each other's arms, for example, had rented a school building to a well- and given the repressive agencies of the state the known Communist leader, Dato Pagan, for an "edu- delicate responsibility of deciding who was and who cational" center. When Bosch came in, a campaign was not a Communist. was whipped up to make him evict Pagan and close But these practical considerations were not the main down the center. Bosch opposed hastily breaking the ones in Bosch's mind. He was primarily concerned with existing contract and recommended taking back the the problem of the middle-class youth who, as he put school at the start of the school season on the reason- it in his latest book, "initiate and direct Latin Ameri- able ground that the Ministry of Education needed can revolutions." In the Dominican Republic as else- success all its buildings for its own use. Yet, as the story was where, their heads had been turned by the could told in the United States after Bosch's overthrow, of Castroism. Bosch himself did not feel that he that did he had refused to close down "an out-and-out school . influence them personally; he mentions he for Communists held in the classrooms of a Santo not make a single visit to the University during his Domingo public school" (Rowland Evans and Robert term of office. One reason for his estrangement, he Novak, New York Herald Tribune, October 7, 1963). sensed, was social; he was born into a poor family in a small town and was largely self-educated. Though n one respect, however, Bosch's enemies and he had won recognition as one of Latin America's power. I critics were right. He held out unyieldingly against foremost men of letters, he could never, even in

1965 6 May 24, cross over to the other side of the tracks. Paradoxically, consciously, but there can be no doubt that by doing the radical youth and the conservative adults came so he rendered an incalculable service to the cause from the same social class, often from the same of world Communism, since after his declaration it families, and Bosch, the exile, came home to become became virtually and even totally impossible to make —for both of them—Bosch, the outsider. a democratic revolution in this part of the world, and Yet Bosch had lived long enough in Cuba to under- without a democratic revolution in Latin America stand something of the new revolutionary wave. He there is no way out. The Latin American revolution, had not left Cuba until April 1958, eight months before which is inevitable even if it takes 15, 20 or 25 years, Batista's downfall, and he had watched at close range should not be Communist, but the fear of the demo- as a constitutional government had been overthrown cratic revolution will make it sooner or later fall by a military coup and a military coup had drawn an into the pattern of a Communist revolution." entire generation into revolutionary terrorism and In another passage, Bosch adds prophetically: guerrilla warfare in the name of restoring constitutional "Anyone who does not demonstrate in a satisfac- government. Like two sides of the same coin, Batista tory manner that he respects and will continue to and Castro had been related to each other, repression respect the established order in Latin America, that feeding on revolution and vice versa. In the Dominican he will not touch a single hair on the head of the Republic, these same forces were itching to break vested interests, and that, on the contrary, he will loose, to gain strength by devouring each other. Instead dedicate himself to defend them with body and soul, of Batista, there was no longer the far more evil and night and day, is transmuted into and suspected of monstrous figure of Trujillo; there was only all that being a secret Communist. A chorus of voices all over Trujillo had created and left behind. Instead of Castro, the Continent accuses him of being an agent of Moscow there were inexperienced and untried youths yearning to and of . The pressure raised everywhere prove that the "violent way" was the right and only in response to this accusation is of such a defamatory road to revolution. nature that few can suffer it calmly. But there is an Bosch and his movement interposed themselves be- answer to this accusation: When the youth of Latin tween these two forces. Just as Bosch abhorred the America becomes indignant at the injustice com- living symbols of Trujilloism, so he rejected what mitted against honest democratic leaders, they react Castroism had become, and yet he had to live with by shifting toward Communism. If the accusation both in order not to be destroyed by both. In his comes from the most hated circles in the Hemisphere, against book, he tells how he was living in Venezuela and the youth respond to it by taking a position

his family was still living in Cuba at the beginning the accusers at precisely the opposite extreme. And of 1959, when Castro came to power. His family so, day after day, the most audacious young people in wanted him to return to Cuba, but after watching the Latin America, led by those from the upper and middle course of the Castro regime from afar for only three strata of the middle class, have been swelling the months, he decided in March of that year to bring Communist ranks in all our countries." his family to Venezuela rather than hold a reunion the Dominican Republic, the hardened, experi- in Cuba. In What disturbed Bosch was not that he felt Castro enced, old-time Communists were relatively few. had immediately set out to make a Communist revolu- The greater danger came from the more amorphous, tion; he rather disapproved for the reason that Castro smoldering underground of existing and potential Cas- failed to take those measures which Bosch considered troite sympathizers. In 1962, the State Department's indispensable for a democratic revolution. And when intelligence report, World Strength of the Communist Castro publicly declared that he was a "Marxist- Party Organizations, wrote off the total Communist Leninist" in December 1961, and had been moving strength in the Dominican Republic as "negligible." in that direction in the very years that he had claimed The 1964 edition of the same report, issued after to be a constitutional democrat, Bosch realized that Bosch's overthrow, noted that only the Castroite 14th Castro had become a "Typhoid Mary" of the demo- of June Movement "is reputed to have a mass fol- cratic revolution in Latin America. Bosch's reflections lowing." This report stated: "Pro-Communist influence in on this score are so revealing of his own problem has been found among some university and secondary the Dominican Republic that they are worth quoting: students, in a small segment of organized labor and, "With this declaration [of December 2, 1961] Fidel to a limited degree, among young professionals." This Castro, who had been the leader of a fervently popular rather sober assessment hardly suggests that the Com- democratic revolution, engraved in red one single word, munists in 1962-63 had found a way to gain the mass 'Communist,' on every attempt to make a demo- strength needed to make a bid for power.

cratic revolution for a long time to come. It is In its formative and early stages, Castroism does hazardous to say whether he did so consciously or un- not say that constitutional, democratic reform is unde-

rlie New Leader sirable; it says that such reform is impossible. That to give the Communists some sophisticated political is why all variety of Dominican Communists, including competition in Latin America. More recently, Volman the Castroites, considered the election of December has been secretary of the Institute of International to be 1962 a "farce" and refused to take part in it. Labor Research in . Its chairman is That a free, honest election was possible, that a dark- and its board of directors includes horse candidate like Bosch could come from behind to some of the most knowledgeable anti-Communists in win it overwhelmingly, and that he could even gain the United States. Yet, incredibly, Volman was the the support of the United States—these indisputable piece de resistance of the whole case that Bosch had facts constituted a defeat for Castroism in its deepest been responsible for Communist "infiltration" in high political essence and broadest popular appeal. The places. Countless news stories and editorials in the

idea that a Communist takeover of the Dominican U.S. press repeated this word as if it were a super- Republic was threatened by the "infiltration" of a few stitious incantation that was self-explanatory and self- individual Communists in mythical "key positions" in enforcing. Bosch's government derives from an obsessively con- I know that some of Bosch's friends and admirers spiratorial understanding of traditional Communism did not consider him, as one of them put it at the and an utterly grotesque misunderstanding of Castro- time, "the world's greatest public administrator." Bosch ism. If the Cuban experience proved anything, it proved was no more the ideal bureaucratic executive than is that without a Batista there would have been no Castro. Charles de Gaulle; he was, above all, an inspirational And where there is no Batista, the Castroites have to force and a national conscience. But even a good invent one or live for the day when a reasonable bureaucrat needs a good bureaucracy, and Bosch had facsimile gives them the right to say "I told you so" inherited one of the weakest and worst in Latin by making his appearance. America, which is saying a good deal. In any case,

The real Castroites always understood that Bosch if "efficiency" or "competence" or other personal had put up a constitutional wall between them and characteristics are made the test of a democratic leader's a successful struggle for power. The 14th of June right to remain in power, and his own opposition is leader, Tavarez Justo, continued to attack Bosch after given the privilege of deciding his fate according to the election because Bosch would not attack the such criteria, few if any democratic regimes could sur- United States, just as the reactionaries continued to vive very long. Bosch was elected for four years, not attack him because Bosch would not illegally repress for a lifetime, and the democratic process gives the the Communists. The Cuban organ, Bohemia, of May electorate the right to decide on the relative "compe- 10, 1963, wrote: "Of course, Bosch's regime is least tence" of candidates for office. Bosch was given only suspected of sympathy for the ." At seven months to clean up the political stable left to the same time, Bosch refused to permit the Dominican him; and he had to live with the threat of a coup Republic to become a center of anti-Castro exile ac- before he was able to get started and there could be tivity or to make anti-Castroism a divisive issue at any test of his competence. If the same rules had applied home. As a result, the anti-Castro exile leaders from in the United States, John F. Kennedy would have Left to Right, with few exceptions, covered themselves been through in April 1961, but Kennedy went on to with ignominy by applauding and justifying the mili- learn and grow. tary coup which overthrew him. One would imagine that journalists and editorialists That military coup of September 1963 was a disaster; in the United States would consider it almost de- the propaganda that accompanied it was a disgrace. grading to have to be told such things. Yet it is And it was no less a disaster and disgrace for the necessary. The U.S. press was full of precisely such U.S. than for the Dominican Republic. apologetics for the coup, with or without the Com- The anti-Bosch propaganda played variations on two munist theme. 2 And the same leering references to themes. The main one was the charge of "Communist Bosch's alleged "incompetence" began to reappear in infiltration" of his government. The minor one accused the past month to "explain" why the United States did him of such crimes as "stubbornness," "vanity," and not want him back in power. "incompetence," especially the latter. The "infiltration" to farce. charge proved be a grim Only the Communist issue, however, could pro- Only one name was ever offered to back it up. It vide any serious political cover for the coup. For happened to be that of Sacha Volman, the director if Bosch were really turning over the Dominican Re- of cides, who was quickly hustled out of the country. public to the Communists, he could be held responsible It also happened that Volman had been, for years, a for betraying the democratic order, and his enemies well-known anti-Communist whom Bosch had met in 2. A typical example: "Bosch is accused of many things, including 1957 in at the Institute of Political Educa- stubbornness, vanity, failure to halt Communist infiltration of his gov- tion, a training school set up with U.S. encouragement ernment. But the most damning indictment against him appears to be plain incompetence" (New York World Telegram, September 26, 1963).

8 May 24, 1965 —

could appear to be saving the country, if not for allegedly came from an informer's account of a "secret democracy, at least from Communism. meeting of Communist leaders." The military leaders A peculiar role was played by some U.S. journalists used this ostensible report to demand that Bosch in the months before the 1963 coup. Of one of them, should give them orders to repress the Communists and Bosch has written: "There was a U.S. journalist, no "crack their heads." When Bosch reportedly told Im- less than a Pulitzer Prize winner, who dedicated all bert that he refused to make the Dominican Republic his energies to calling the government headed by me into another Venezuela "because terrorist activities and Communist. For seven months, he devoted his life to anarchy would follow," the military decided to get rid the task of destroying a democracy. He went so far of Bosch and the Constitution. as to say that odes, an institution established ex- The Santo Domingo paper, Prensa Libre, of October pressly to mold the democratic conscience in the 1, 1963, ran the interview under the headline: "Imbert Dominican Republic, had trained no fewer than 17,000 Declares: Overthrow Prevents Second Cuba." April Communist guerrillas." 1965, then, was not the first time that the bloody This writer, Hal Hendrix, was able to give the shirt of a "second Cuba" was waved to cover up an Scripps-Howard Newspapers a scoop on the coming anti-Bosch policy. It had been successfully tried out military coup 24 hours before it happened. The last in the dress rehearsal of 1963. words of this communique may seem familiar to read- Imbert's revelations were, of course, anti-climactic. ers of recent Dominican reports and editorials : "What- No reader of Dubois' story could have discovered a ever develops in the next few months, the U.S. has "Red plot" by Bosch. If there was any Red plot, it made it plain that it will not let the Communists gain was against Bosch. If Bosch were such a benefactor control in Santo Domingo. High ranking officials have and protector of the Communists, it made no sense stated emphatically there will not be another Cuba for them to want to overthrow him. The interview in the Caribbean" (New York World Telegram, Sep- did not even mention "Communist infiltration" of tember 24, 1963). Bosch's government as an alibi of the military's ac- That night, Bosch received a telephone call from tion. But the cream of the jest was still to come Rafael Molina Morillo, then executive editor of El after Bosch was overthrown, the "" that Caribe, one of the most virulent of the anti-Bosch succeeded him in power outlawed the smaller psp and newspapers in Santo Domingo, published by a brother mpd but not the much larger Castroite 14th of June of Horacio Ornes, the politician. As Molina Morillo Movement. later told the story, he informed the President that El A few weeks later, General Imbert's intelligence Caribe had received the text of Hendrix's sensational report of September 19 was put to the test. Late in article and intended to publish it the next morning. November, Tavarez Justo and a small band from the

Bosch replied, in effect, that it did not merit any com- 14th of June took to the hills to wage guerrilla war- ment from him. Yet, according to Molina Morillo, the fare against the new order. They were so badly armed article which he read to Bosch on the phone was one of and trained that they were no match for the govern- the key events of the day that alerted Bosch to the im- ment forces. Tavarez Justo was soon slain and his minent coup (Ahora, Santo Domingo, November 1-15, men gave up the struggle. Such was the gravity of the 1963). Communist plot which was supposed to have made Another U.S. journalist, Jules Dubois, of the Chi- the Dominican Republic into "a bridgehead for sub- cago Tribune, provided the Dominicans with the first versive operations against Venezuela and Haiti." "inside story" on the coup. On September 27, 1963, According to Sam Halper, in the article previously the Chicago Tribune published an interview with cited, the Dominican military decided to oust Bosch Brigadier General Antonio Imbert Barreras, whom "as soon as they got a wink from the U.S. Pentagon." Dubois described as "one of the leaders of yesterday's Halper seems to have reason to believe that "the coup." The banner headline on page one screamed: Pentagon undercut the State Department" and Am- "bosch's red plot bared!" A three-column head over bassador Martin, who was trying to help Bosch. The the story added: "Dominican Revolt Head Tells latter, however, does not go so far. In his book, Bosch Commie Plan for 'Second Cuba.' " Dubois quoted Im- states: "I never had proof that the U.S. military in bert: "Sure, we violated the Constitution by ousting Santo Domingo conspired to overthrow my democratic

Bosch, but I believe that it was absolutely necessary government, although I frequently heard rumors to this to place the constitution in recess in a desk drawer." effect; but I am sure that if a captain in the mission

It was necessary, according to Imbert, because as would have said that the government should be over- head of internal security he had given Bosch on Sep- thrown, it would have been done in an hour because tember 19 a three-page document which claimed that such a captain has more authority over the Dominican the Dominican Communists were planned to stage military high command than the people, the Constitu- an uprising the following January. The information tion and the President."

The New Leader —

Whether or not the "wink" came from the Pentagon, of his own country; he maintained a "discreet attitude." the U.S. military mission's responsibility for restraining The moral, said Castro, was that even such a man the Dominican military was decisive for the success could not survive the "Trujillista gorillas" who would of U.S. official policy, since the military mission was not leave him alone even if he left them alone. The much closer to the Dominican military than the diplo- lesson for the Dominican people was that there was matic mission was. It is most disturbing that a re- only one road, Castro's road, not Bosch's road sponsible journalist, in close touch with Dominican "liquidate the gorillas, combat the gorillas, defeat the affairs, should find it necessary to allude publicly to gorillas and execute the principal gorillas." In short, the Pentagon's complicity in the 1963 coup. One Castro tried to make political capital of the Dominican thing is certain: With all the dependence of the coup by emphasizing the difference between his violent,

Dominican Armed Forces on the U.S. military es- revolutionary road and Bosch '.s peaceful, democratic tablishment, the latter was singularly incapable of road. Bosch's defeat was as much a victory for the exercising a restraining influence. Fidel Castros and Che Guevaras as for the Wessin y In his May 2 speech, President Johnson inexplicably Wessins and Antonio Imberts. referred to Bosch's overthrow in 1963 as a "revolu- tion." It was, of course, nothing of the sort; it was do not wish to suggest that Bosch's way of han- a plain, old-fashioned, conventional military coup. The I dling the Communist problem in the Dominican slip, if it was a slip, might tell us much, if we knew Republic was beyond questioning or criticism. I can who put that word in the speech. well imagine that equally well-intentioned persons might On May 8, 1965, a new five-man junta was ap- differ in some respects with him. Should he speak out pointed to take the place of General Wessin y Wessin's against Castro, whom he personally detested? When three-man junta. And who was head of the new junta? and how should Dato Pagan's "school" be moved out None other than Brigadier General Antonio Imbert of a public building? What are the constitutional or And who, if we may trust press reports from Santo practical limits of freedom of speech and assembly? Domingo, chose General Imbert? None other than Bosch acted against the local Communists in some the U.S. Embassy. 3 areas and not in others. Someone else in his place Meanwhile, in the "first Cuba," few tears were might have done some things differently. wasted on what had happened in the country that had But if Bosch's policies may be questioned, they just been saved from becoming a "second Cuba." The must first be clearly understood and fairly presented. Cuban Communist organ, Hoy, of September 27, 1963, For most of his 31 years in power, Rafael Leonidas devoted an editorial to the "lesson" of the Dominican Trujillo had persecuted and tortured his opponents, coup. "It simply revealed," stated the editorial, "the most of them simple democrats, in the name of "anti- degree of decomposition and the crisis through which Communism." Bosch himself had lived with the great so-called 'representative democracy' is passing." Then lie for decades. When I was in the Dominican Re- it taxed Bosch for having failed to nationalize any public in 1950, in the heyday of Trujillo's power, even U.S. business enterprises, establish diplomatic relations a member of the U.S. Embassy had been visibly afraid J with Castro's Cuba, make a commercial pact with to talk to me outside the Embassy itself. Trujillo had ' Soviet Russia or purge the Armed Forces. Bosch was so debased and debauched the very word, "Commu- gravely advised that his main error had consisted in nism," that he had made anti-Trujilloism and Com- "not understanding that the middle way does not munism virtually synonymous. Less than two years exist." And, therefore, "his overthrow was inevitable." after Trujillo's death, the political air was still so The next day, Fidel Castro touched on the same polluted that anti-Communism did not necessarily subject. He also insisted that the coup had been "pre- mean devotion to democracy; it could easily be turned determined" because no democracy could be based on into protective coloration for a Trujillista comeback. Trujillo's Army. Bosch had been "handcuffed" by that The younger generation, which was Bosch's prime Army even though he had tried to pursue a more :oncern, had only begun to know what democracy in "discreet policy." Castro conceded that Bosch was a practice was or could be. The older politicians, who chief affliction, not in little different and merited a little more respect. "Why? were Bosch's had been nurtured Perhaps because he defended us? No. He had his a democratic environment in which the limits of a great weaknesses; he came to power with the good democratic opposition were clearly recognized. For will of the imperialists." But Bosch was given some Bosch, every day that a legal, constitutional government credit for not being a Betancourt in his policy towards survived was itself a victory over both the Trujillistas Cuba; Bosch merely dedicated himself to the problems and the Communists. More than anything else, he needed time, and he was willing to buy it, but not 3. "The psychological warfare resources of the United States Information to Agency and of the military assist the national council, headed by Brig. at the cost of his principles. He did not wish cut Gen. Antonio Imbert Barrcras. who was picked by the American Em- radical youth, to give them up bassy" (Tad Szulc, New York Times, May 11, 1965). himself off from the

10 May 24, 1965 for lost, to take the initiative in drawing a line of blood terizing the pro-Bosch uprising last month as "a popular between himself and them. He preferred to show them democratic revolution committed to democracy and that the rule of law and freedom applied to everyone, social justice." If Bosch had not been committed to and he could not start by taking it away from anyone. democracy and social justice in 1963, how could the Bosch has been dismissed as a "dreamer" and an movement behind him be committed to them in 1965?

"idealist." Those who do so might give some thought That is why Adlai Stevenson was able to boast of to the fact that Castro's predecessors, the practical U.S. "cooperation" with Bosch's government in 1963. politician, Carlos Prio, and the tough ex-sergeant, Why boast about it if that government was practically , did not, in the long run, come out being turned over to the Communists? too well. A little more idealism might have held off Yet a strange thing happened between Saturday, Communism in Cuba more effectively than anything April 24, and Wednesday, April 28. Instead of sup- else. porting the forces "committed to democracy and social case, In any there is no one way to handle the justice," the U.S. decided to support the forces that Communist in problem a democracy. There are hardly had overthrown them in 1963 and were determined free countries two in the world that manage it the to prevent them from returning to power in 1965. same way. When Bosch was overthrown in 1963, I It appears, curiously enough, that the present crisis wrote: "It would wreak untold havoc in the demo- remarkably resembles the previous one in 1963, at cratic world, especially that part of it like the most least in its origins. A number of correspondents have Dominican Republic, if treatment of the local Com- intimated that the present struggle did not begin merely munists or policy toward the anti-Castro exiles were as a pro-Bosch revolt. It began, in part at least, as made the determining factors in deciding whether one another military coup, this time against the post-Bosch or another democratic government had a right to exist" junta headed by , a former auto- ("Bosch and Communism," NL, October 14, 1963). mobile dealer. Yet this is precisely what was presumed in the case At least five different reports seem to agree on this. of Bosch's government, and it is one reason why the In the New York Times of April 27, Tad Szulc men- Dominican precedent has caused such consternation tioned an "unconfirmed report" that "an agreement in the most democratic countries of Latin America. among most of the military commanders, including In a distorted fashion, the Imbert-Dubois interview General Wessin y Wessin, to form a military junta had an essential element of truth in it, if not about at once" forced Reid to resign as head of the ruling the alleged Communist plot then about the military junta. But, Szulc added, a group of young pro-Bosch plotters. The interview made clear that the issue on Army officers refused to go along with the plan to which Bosch stood or fell was not his own sympathies replace Reid with a military junta and insisted on for Communism or Communist infiltration of his gov- restoring Bosch's constitutional rule. ernment. Imbert's story rightly implied that the crucial Basically the same story was told in a upi dispatch question had been freedom of speech, press, and as- from Santo Domingo dated April 28. (I have seen sembly. refused to deprive the or Bosch Communists it only in Spanish in the El Diario-La Prensa, New anyone else of those freedoms as long as they did not York, of April 29). In the Hearst papers of May 4, commit illegal or violent acts. He declined to declare a former press officer of the U.S. Embassy in Havana, preventive war on the local Communists and "crack Paul D. Bethel, reported from Santo Domingo that their heads" because he believed that the cure was Reid Cabral's decision to fire two Army colonels for worse than the disease. graft and disloyalty had set off the entire chain of There may be differences of opinion with Bosch or events on Saturday. Another Santo Domingo story in with his methods and tactics. But this was not enough. the US. News & World Report of May 17 attributed Juan Bosch had to be scurrilously tainted with Com- Reid Cabral's downfall to "enemies within the Armed munism itself. He had to be presented as the perpetrator Forces" who were out to get him because he wanted of a "Red plot," a Communist stalking-horse, a front to eliminate "a contracts racket operated by top mili- for "Communist infiltration." tary men." This the infamy. was And on May 2, President Johnson seemed to con- firm the essentials of Tad Szulc's unconfirmed report Communism averted; IN 1963, Dominican was not when he declared: "Elements of the military forces of Dominican democracy was suffocated. This is not that country overthrew their government. However, position. merely my personal view. It is the official U.S. the rebels themselves were divided. Some wanted to That is why, as I noted at the outset, President Ken- restore former President Juan Bosch. Others opposed nedy spoke out against the coup and temporarily broke his restoration." ruling off diplomatic relations with the new group- If this account, in essence, proves trustworthy, it charac- That is why President Johnson was justified in will almost seem to be an echo of the story told by

The New Leader 11 Bosch. About a week before the 1963 coup, he had poned as bad news began to come in that day. made a short trip to Mexico with, among others, Gen- The bad news was the virtual disintegration of eral Pablo Atila Luna, head of the Dominican Air Wessin y Wessin's fighting forces. Why they disin- Force. On the plane, Atila Luna had presented Bosch tegrated from Tuesday to Wednesday is a question to with a proposition to buy $6 million worth of British which we will return. The fact that they did, however, war planes. The minimum rake-off or kickback on appears to be indisputable. In his May 2 speech, Presi-

military purchases was 10 per cent, though it some- dent Johnson told that he had received an urgent times went as high as 15 per cent. In this instance, cable from Ambassador Bennett at 5:14 p.m. on Atila Luna apparently expected to get as much as April 28 advising that the Dominican military and $1.2 million or 20 per cent. Bosch told him that a police had completely lost control of the situation country as poor as the Dominican Republic, where and could no longer guarantee the safety of Americans people died of hunger, could not afford to spend so there— as if they had been able to "guarantee" their much on military planes. One wonders whether Bosch's safety previously. Under Secretary of State Thomas C. regime would have lasted longer if he had agreed to Mann, whom all agree bears the brunt of the re- the purchase. In Bosch's view, "corruption" was more sponsibility for working out U.S. policy in the crisis, responsible for the 1963 coup than any other cause. informed Max Frankel of the New York Times (May From this point, however, the two coups tend to 9) that Wessin y Wessin's military forces had suffered diverge. In 1963, there was no evidence of any effort a "virtual collapse" and that "almost complete chaos" by pro-Bosch forces in the Army to fight for him. In had suddenly occurred by the afternoon of April 28. 1965, it appears clear that the pro-Bosch forces came In Puerto Rico, Juan Bosch seems to have known close to winning a quick, easy and almost bloodless that Wessin y Wessin was getting much the worst of

victory in the first two days. The tide was turned against it as early as Tuesday, April 27. Bosch was in daily them mainly by Air Force planes strafing Santo telephonic contact with his supporters and had ap- Domingo on Sunday and Monday, April 25 and 26. parently sized up the military situation correctly. He Wessin y Wessin sent his tanks from the San Isidro later told Homer Bigart of the New York Times (May Air Base toward the capital. By Tuesday, April 27, 8) that he had spoken to the Dominican Republic's some pro-Bosch leaders evidently faltered and con- Papal Nuncio, Msgr. Emanuele Clarizio, who happened sidered their cause lost. They took refuge, the story to be in San Juan on April 27, and had told him: "Our goes, in foreign embassies and asked U.S. Ambassador forces were winning whereas the forces of General W. Tapley Bennett Jr. to arrange a cease-fire. Wessin y Wessin are almost defeated." Nevertheless, Bosch said, he had told the Papal Nuncio that he did The next 24 hours were crucial. As long as the not want more death and destruction and, therefore, forces "committed to democracy and social justice" approved of negotiations to call off the fighting. seemed to be winning—and, according to one of our Then Bosch gave this version of what had taken best Latin American observers, Tad Szulc, their victory place on that fateful April 28: "On Wednesday, the was still expected as late as the morning of Tuesday, Papal Nuncio made contact with Wessin. But Wessin April 27—no word of encouragement or sign of sym- refused to deal with the Nuncio that day because he pathy came from Washington. But on the morning had received from the Americans the offer of Marines' of Wednesday, April 28, Washington officials became support." more loquacious. John W. Finney reported from Wash- On the television program Face the Nation, Bosch ington to the New York Times on April 29: "Early summed up the situation as the U.S. Marines arrived yesterday Administration officials were expressing relief in Santo Domingo on Wednesday evening: "When they over the apparent collapse of the insurrection led by landed, Wessin y Wessin's forces were defeated. young Army officers supporting a return to former Twenty-four hours more and the Dominicans would President Bosch." We will be able to understand more have solved their own problems."

about U.S. policy at this critical juncture when we Moreover, there is some reason to believe that there know who these Administration officials were. In any was more in Ambassador Bennett's cable of April 28 event, their relief was premature. than President Johnson chose to reveal four days On that same day, Wednesday, April 28, the later. "United States assistance in restoring law and seemingly victorious military commanders named a order," John W. Finney reported from Washington to three-man junta to govern the country. According to the New York Times, "was requested yesterday [April Dom Bonafede and Douglas Kiker of the New York 28] by the provisional government of Brigadier General Herald Tribune'?, Washington Bureau, State Depart- Wessin y Wessin and the police chief in Santo Domingo. ment officials discussed the possible recognition of this This has not been made public." If this is confirmed, junta, controlled by General Wessin y Wessin, the San it would mean that Wessin y Wessin recognized that Isidro Air Base's strong man. But recognition was post- he was going down to defeat on April 28 and asked

12 May 24, 1965 —

the United States to bail him out. their authority that they had needed only 24 hours. There are two interrelated questions about the reason turn of events. One is the cause of for this sudden Was it really necessary to make revolutionary Wessin y Wessin's "virtual collapse." Why did his supermen of "a small group of well-known Com- heels of apparent defeat follow so quickly on the munists" in order to explain Wessin y Wessin's defeat his apparent victory? and justify the landing of U.S. Marines? President The official U.S. answer was given by Ironically, the key is probably in President John- the Johnson on May 2. After having conceded that son's phrase, "a popular democratic revolution". The pro-Bosch struggle had started as "a popular demo- restoration of Juan Bosch was undoubtedly an over- "taken cratic revolution," he claimed that it had been whelmingly popular cause. Another outstanding U.S. over and really seized and placed into the hands of Latin American correspondent, Barnard L. Collier, ob- a band of Communist conspirators." Curiously, Under served in the New York Herald Tribune of May 2 that Secretary of State Mann did not go so far in his Wessin's junta was "highly unpopular," "despised by to statements Max Frankel. Mann merely said that many Dominicans who call them corrupt." He re- U.S. intelligence had "from the very beginning" re- ported: "The demoralized, dwindling group of per- ported that "the revolutionary movement itself was haps 2,000 loyalist troops under strongman Brigadier probably led by elements in the Dominican Revolu- General Elias Wessin y Wessin have virtually given tionary (pro-Bosch) party" but that it was clear "very up." A upi report from Santo Domingo on May 2 early" that "elements of the three Communist parties" said that Wessin's forces had lost 21 of their tanks. An had organized, armed and moved into the streets "very Associated Press dispatch of May 10 took note of sizable para-military forces." Mann attributed the "unverified reports that two-thirds of the military de- necessity for landing the Marines to the "virtual col- fected after the civil war started." lapse" of the "regular forces." At no time did he go On the basis of available information, we cannot, so far as to assert that the Communists had succeeded of course, be sure what caused Wessin y Wessin's in seizing control of the "popular democratic revolu- troops to make such a poor showing. What appears tion." It might be that Wessin Wessin's assumed y to be quite clear is that his forces, not Bosch's, "vir- disintegration could have given the Communists a tually collapsed," as Under Secretary Mann put it. free hand, but Mann was careful to stop short of The pro-Bosch popular movement seems to have been crediting them with an accomplished fact. hard hit on April 27, and some of its leaders suffered Nevertheless, it was President Johnson's version a temporary loss of morale, but the movement as a which Administration sources increasingly pressed in whole quickly caught its second wind the following the next few days. Thus arises the second question: day. Once Wessin y Wessin's men quit, they quit for What was the truth about a Communist "takeover" good. They started with such an enormous advantage of the pro-Bosch revolution around Wednesday, April in arms that it is hard to believe that they could have 28? It is difficult to separate these two questions, and been routed so easily unless two conditions obtained: to some extent they must be examined together. first, that they fought halfheartedly and gave up easily, The official U.S. version suggests something like and second, that they were overwhelmingly outnum- this: On Tuesday, the virtuous pro-Bosch revolution bered—which would be an indication that this was seemed to crack up. At this point, "a small group of a "popular revolution." well-known Communists," as Adlai Stevenson was in- There is, we should not forget, a precedent for this structed to put it on May 3, "quickly attempted to seize kind of collapse. When the tide turned against Batista control of the revolution and of the armed bands in in 1958, the bulk of his troops also refused to fight for the streets." Within 24 hours or less, these Communist- him. Under stress, in the face of a popular movement, led "armed bands" had so reorganized and revitalized troops who have to fire on their own people cannot the dying revolutionary movement that Wessin y be expected to be loyal to generals whom they have Wessin's planes, tanks, naval vessels and infantrymen seen use their positions mainly to enrich themselves. were thrown on the defensive and faced virtual defeat, Batista still had an overwhelming advantage in troops, and their commanders were forced to betake them- tanks and planes when he decided to give up and get selves to the U.S. Embassy to ask for help. out with the loot.

If this is going to remain the official story, then the Now we have come to the point that will un-

United States is going to provide Castroism with one doubtedly provide controversy for years to come more myth of how Communist-led street fighters were the alleged Communist "takeover" of the pro-Bosch able to defeat a "regular army." In Cuba, Castro's movement. And before we go further, it should be guerrilla fighters had needed two years to defeat remembered that we are dealing with the decision of Batista's Army. In the Dominican Republic. Castro's April 28. What evidence was there for President disciples may be able to cite President Johnson as Johnson's assertion that "a popular democratic revolu-

The New Leader 13 tion" was "taken over and really seized and placed were a menace." And, to be sure, after May 5, not into the hands of a band of Communist conspirators"? a single one of the 58 names was mentioned again in On April 29, John W. Finney sent a report from the press reports from Santo Domingo. The Commu- Washington to the New York Times which stated: nists who had "taken over," who should have been "The situation this evening was said to be just as most active and prominent, mysteriously faded away. given confused as it was yesterday when President Johnson The U.S. intelligence services, which had just ordered the Marines into Santo Domingo. Mr. Johnson the press the most secret, lurid details about the now had reports that at least two and perhaps seven or open Communist ringleaders, seemed to lose interest eight of the leaders active among the rebels were in them or at least made it necessary for the press to Communists." lose interest in them. the On the same day, Secretary of Defense Robert S. By chance, moreover, U.S. intelligence in McNamara discussed the Dominican situation with the Dominican Republic was not exactly at its best just Senate Armed Services Committee, and he was re- prior to the outbreak of April 24. Ambassador Bennett ported to have persuaded some of its members that says that he knew trouble was brewing there. Newsweek "an element" of the pro-Bosch forces was "Communist- of May 17 was permitted to divulge a sentence from led." But he did not suggest that the Communists had a personal note to Under Secretary Mann: "We are gained control (New York Times April 30). almost on the ropes in the Dominican Republic." A Yet, on April 29, the word went out from Washing- message from the Ambassador early in April of this ton that the landing of the Marines had not been year contained these oracular words: "Little foxes ordered for humanitarian motives only. It had also some of them red are chewing at the grapes." But been designed to prevent a "Communist takeover." Bennett was not at his post in Santo Domingo on It was only on April 30, according to Max Frankel April 24, when the trouble broke out. He had left "routine consultation" the day in the New York Times of May 6, that the number of for Washington on "prominent Communist and Castroist leaders" active before, and he was not able to get back to the Embassy the 13 in the struggle was increased from "at least two and until April 27. To make matters worse, 11 of Mission were perhaps seven or eight" to as many as 55 or, according officers of the Military and Assistance the to another version, 58. The revised estimate was pro- off in Panama, and the resident head of Agency vided to the President by the cia, Douglas Kiker was for International Development was in Washington, all first days of able to report in the New York Herald Tribune of of them at routine conferences, in the so spectacularly May 2. Ironically, Kiker was also told that "U.S. in- the crisis. For an Embassy that was the telligence experts now trace the beginning of the Com- out of touch with the immediate realities in only munist growth in the Dominican Republic" to the Dominican Republic on April 23, its outpouring revelations, all of period after the overthrow of Bosch in 1963. It would a week later of the most intimate be hard to think of a more devastating commentary them compromising Bosch or his men with Communism, 4 on the legend that Bosch was overthrown to prevent was remarkable. a Communist takeover then and that the military coup instance was was the best cure for Communism. It was not until Whether U.S. intelligence in this that May 5 that official Washington sources released a list good or bad, however, it seems clear of 55 "Communist and Castroist" names, duly published intelligence did not fashion policy. As so often happens, in the New York Times the following day. policy fashioned intelligence—or at least the kind of We are now in the shadowy realm of "intelligence." intelligence made public. President Johnson The wonder is that the cia could only scrape together For, as we have seen, on April 29 55 names from the combined psp, mpd and 14th of apparently had reports of only two and perhaps seven June Movement. Evidently the list itself failed to im- or eight Communists active on the pro-Bosch side, press the correspondents in Santo Domingo. Barnard L. and the ostensibly frightening figure of 55 or 58 Collier wrote on May 7: "Correspondents were told was put before him on April 30. By then, U.S. policy that there were over 50 hard-core Communists direct- had been decided for days, and the "small group of ing the rebellion, and a list naming them was passed well-known Communists" had had little to do with it. out by the Embassy. Up to now, no hard proof that That is why "Administration officials" were so the names are any more than names has been pro- relieved early on April 28 that Bosch's forces had vided by any official sources here, although reporters apparently collapsed. That is why the first contingent who know the Dominican situation personally have of Marines was ordered to patrol the streets of Santo found that several of the listed are Reds and active 'Samples: "U.S. intelligence flatly reported that ousted President Bosch here." Newsweek of May 17 blandly passed on this had been in contact with several Communist leaders from the Dominican Republic shortly before the rebellion" (Time, May 14, 1965). "U.S.

156 . . is information: "The embassy failed to convince the officials here [Santo Domingo] . say of Bosch that he probably 58' not a Communist, but that he has been playing the Communist game foreign correspondents in Santo Domingo that 'the for too long" (.National Observer, Washington, March 17, 1965).

14 May 24, 1965 Domingo in company with the military remnants of reports, official and otherwise, at their face value. General Wessin y Wessin's junta—the first visible And I have tried to show that, even on this basis, sign to the populace that, despite all protestations to words and deeds have been only distantly related. the contrary, the United States Government was in The contradictions, confusions and camouflages fact supporting the junta. That is why Tad Szulc manufactured in Washington and in Santo Domingo was able to write on April 29 : "There was no question for the past month have been so unconvincing that that the United States was fully supporting the three-man they forced me to come to the conclusion that, as military junta even though it could not control the John MacCartney put it, most of them were merely city." By May 1, Szulc called the junta "a fictional "cover stories." As I have indicated, the available government" with which "there is no question that evidence led me to suspect that the decision of Washington is lined up." Other correspondents sent Wednesday, April 28, was essentially made against the same reports. Juan Bosch rather than against the Communists, or

De facto support of the military junta on April 28 that it could be interpreted as directed against the could only have meant a decision to prevent Juan latter only if Bosch could be equated with Communism, Bosch from returning to office. At least one U.S. as in the mummery of 1963. official said as much: "We can't afford to let Wessin But it may be worse. lose. We're not going to allow Bosch to come back In the New York Times of May 15, Tad Szulc and let the country drift into chaos so that the conscientiously tried to reconstruct the first few days

Communists and pro-Castro elements can take over." of the present crisis. According to him, the crucial This candid statement appeared in Life magazine anti-Bosch decision was made in the State Department (May 7, 1965). But at least this official did not say on April 25, the second day of the outbreak, not that the Communists and pro-Castro elements had April 28. On the 25th, it seemed that the pro-Bosch already taken over. The line was now the old one of revolt had triumphed and that Bosch was about to 1963—Bosch led to Communism, and to prevent return to Santo Domingo from Puerto Rico. On that Communism, it was necessary to prevent Bosch from day, Szulc goes on, "the State Department was said returning to power. to have decided that such an event would pose a This devious policy could only be put across threat of Communism in the Dominican Republic deviously. Tn Santo Domingo, some U.S. correspondents 'within six months.' " U.S. sources in Santo Domingo have been appalled at the lengths to which U.S. officials told Szulc that the man primarily responsible for this have gone to mislead them. At least two, John judgment was Under Secretary of State Mann._It was MacCartney of the Chicago Daily News and Barnard for this reason that the United States "made no move L. Collier of the New York Herald Tribune have to express interest in the pro-Bosch movement or devoted entire dispatches to their disenchantment with sympathy for it" (at a stage to which, as I must again the official briefings. Collier, on May 8, cited a number point out, President Johnson later paid lip service of concrete cases which give some notion of the kind as "a popular democratic revolution committed to of propaganda that has been emanating from an democracy and social justice"). When other Embassy Embassy that was publicly protesting it was not "taking officials, in Ambassador Bennett's absence, recom- sides." A group of correspondents were told at the mended that official U.S.. representatives should make Embassy that 12 "anti-rebel" Dominicans had been contact with Bosch in Puerto Rico, the State Department lined up against a wall and personally machine-gunned is said to have "vetoed the idea." to death by the anti-junta leader, Colonel Francisco I do not know how much truth there is in Tad Caamaiio Deiio to the accompaniment of the Szulc's account. I do know that Szulc is a thoughtful, Castroite cry, "Pareddn!" (To the wall!) "Not a single serious, hard-working correspondent. His informants reporter," wrote Collier, "has found concrete evidence may be the same "top United States officials" who of the episode, and there are now reports that one of told Barnard Collier that they were not happy with the key men said to have been killed in that incident the precipitancy of U.S. policy and that they were is alive, although wounded." Embassy sources also "being ham-strung in trying to present a picture of assured correspondents that Caamano's forces had what is going on in Santo Domingo militarily and committed "stomach-turning atrocities." Collier simply diplomatically because of the possible effect of that states: "Reporters have found no confirmation." It information contradicting views coming out of Wash- is even to be feared that a campaign may be whipped ington" (New York Herald Tribune, May 8, 1965). up against some of our best Latin American In my judgment, Szulc's time-table accords with the correspondents on the ground that they have not facts, as we know them, but it does not change anythmg followed the U.S. party line or, as it will probably be fundamentally whether the basic decision against translated, shown too much sympathy for the "rebels." Bosch's restoration was made on April 25 or April 28 Thus far, I have taken the various statements and or somewhere in between.

The New Leader 15 have chosen to focus my attention on the decision with a minimum of bloodshed, Wessin y Wessin's junta I to support Wessin y Wessin's junta and then would not have been formed, and the Communists Imbert's junta against the popular movement to restore would not have had time, even if we credit the official Juan Bosch to the Dominican Presidency because I story, to take advantage of the temporary setback to believe that it was the decisive moment of the present the pro-Bosch cause on the fourth day. Tuesday,

April 27. if, after Hitler crisis. Everything else—the build-up of a Communist It was as Adolf had committed "takeover," the doubletalk and deviousness, the suicide in 1945, the Allies had decided to back Air cease-fire that proved to be merely another cover for Force Marshall Hermann Goering as the man to save regrouping the military junta's remaining forces for Germany from Communism. The analogy is not too Wessin Wessin big an all-out attack—flowed from it. Above all, the inappropriate. Whether y was as incalculable consequences of this adventure for years a crook as the other generals is beside the point. To to come and in countries near and far will flow from it. the vast majority of Dominicans, he was the product

In those first days, it was not unreasonable for the and protagonist of the old system of torture, despotism policy-makers in Washington to be concerned about and corruption. In effect, the decision against Bosch the opportunities which the outbreak would give the was a decision against democracy and decency as Communists for extending their influence and doing the bulwarks against Communism. The worst that their mischief. But, if this was the overriding could have happened under Bosch would have been consideration* the crucial moral and political question a return to the conditions that had prevailed in 1963. military still was: with Bosch or with Wessin y Wessin, with The logic of the present decision is that the the man who had represented the first constitutional, conspirators had been right in 1963 and, therefore, democracy in over three decades or the man who had it has again become necessary to defame him. been chiefly responsible for overthrowing him, a man who had suffered from Trujillo's tyranny or a living I venture to make a prediction: In the end we will military symbol of Trujilloism? need Juan Bosch far more than he ever needed us. If the United States had acted quickly and firmly When we betray the Juan Bosches of the world we enough, Bosch would have returned to Santo Domingo must, in the final reckoning, betray ourselves.

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