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Overcoming Societal Addictions: What Can We Learn from Individual Therapies?

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Overcoming Societal Addictions: What Can We Learn from Individual Therapies? Ecological Economics 131 (2017) 543–550 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Ecological Economics journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolecon Overcoming societal addictions: What can we learn from individual therapies? Robert Costanza a,⁎,1, Paul W.B. Atkins b,MitziBoltona, Steve Cork a, Nicola J. Grigg c, Tim Kasser d, Ida Kubiszewski a a Crawford School of Public Policy, the Australian National University, Canberra, Australia b Australian Catholic University, Sydney c CSIRO Land and Water, Canberra, Australia d Knox College, Galesburg, IL, USA article info abstract Article history: Societies, like individuals, can get trapped in patterns of behavior called social traps or “societal addictions” that Received 11 November 2015 provide short-term rewards but are detrimental and unsustainable in the long run. Examples include our societal Received in revised form 31 July 2016 addiction to inequitable over-consumption fueled by fossil energy and a “growth at all costs” economic model. Accepted 6 September 2016 This paper explores the potential to learn from successful therapies at the individual level. In particular, Motiva- Available online 4 October 2016 tional Interviewing (MI) is one of the most effective therapies. It is based on engaging addicts in a positive discus- sion of their goals, motives, and futures. We suggest that one analogy to MI at the societal level is a modified version of scenario planning (SP) that has been extended to engage the entire community (CSP) in thinking about goals and alternative futures via public opinion surveys and forums. Both MI and CSP are about exploring alternative futures in positive, non-confrontational ways and building commitment or consensus about preferred futures. We conclude that effective therapies for societal addictions may be possible, but, as we learn from MI, they will require a rebalancing of effort awayfromonlypointingoutthedireconsequences of current behavior (without denying those consequences) and toward building a shared vision of a positive future and the means to get there. © 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. 1. Introduction progress toward overcoming the addiction. Yet, such a confrontational approach is typical of the strategies used by scientists and activists The need for human society to rapidly deal with climate change, who try to effect change at the societal level regarding climate change, limit population and material consumption growth, transition to a re- overconsumption, overpopulation, inequality, and many other issues. newable energy path, distribute wealth more equitably, and deal with From a psychological perspective, then, the lack of progress in amelio- a host of other interrelated problems is widely accepted in the scientific rating these issues is to be expected as long as these topics continue to community and, increasingly, in the policy community (Costanza et al., be approached in a mainly confrontational, judgmental way. Like with 2014). However, movement in this direction has been slow. To many, individual addictions, taking a less confrontational approach does not this lack of movement is hard to understand. Given the increasingly ob- deny the reality of the dire consequences. It merely recognizes that vious warning signs, why has society still not taken appropriate action knowledge and communication of those dire consequences is often and changed its behavior accordingly? not enough to motivate change, and can even have the effect of In this paper, we draw the analogy between defensive denial at the prolonging the destructive behavior. Perhaps more progress would be society level and defensive denial from drug or alcohol addicts when made with a different way of framing and discussing the issues that is warned about the long-run implications of their behavior. It is well more analogous with the practices that help people overcome individu- known in addiction therapy that it is rarely effective to directly confront al addictions. addicts concerning the damage they are causing to themselves and We first define addiction at the individual level and then explore others. Rather than motivating addicts to change, such interventions how entire societies might also be thought of as addicted to specific often result in a reactive denial on the part of the addict and lack of modes of behavior. We then consider some of the characteristics of ther- apeutic approaches that have been successful for treating addictions at the individual level. We concentrate on one particular approach (moti- ⁎ Corresponding author. E-mail address: [email protected] (R. Costanza). vational interviewing or MI) since this approach seems especially suc- 1 After the first author, the remainder are listed in alphabetical order. cessful at the individual level and amenable to scaling up to the http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2016.09.023 0921-8009/© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. 544 R. Costanza et al. / Ecological Economics 131 (2017) 543–550 societal level. However, we acknowledge that a range of approaches short-term goals must be made incumbent on and consistent with glob- may be brought to bear on this problem. Finally, we propose an ap- al and long-term goals and incentives. proach to societal therapy for problems facing contemporary society It is worth pointing out that most of this research has been about and conclude with suggestions for how this approach might be how individuals respond to entrapping incentives, rules and norms. In facilitated. essence, to remove the trap, one has to change the rules and incentives that set the trap in the first place. In this paper we are concerned with 2. What Is Addiction? how societies can go about changing these entrapping rules and incen- tives, rather than changing individual behaviors in spite of the Addiction is typically understood as encompassing several features entrapping rules and incentives. (American Psychiatric Association, 2013; Sussman and Sussman, It is also true that it is not easy to predict individual behavior in re- 2011). For example, the most recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statis- sponse to different societal incentive structures from simple “rational” tical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V)specifies that people suffering models of human behavior prevalent in conventional economic think- from substance-use disorders often experience a lack of control (mani- ing. The experimental facts indicate the need to develop more realistic fest in cravings and in failed attempts to quit or regulate intake of the models of human behavior under uncertainty, acknowledging the com- substance), negative consequences (such as problems in work and rela- plexity of real-world decisions and our species' limited information tionships), and a failure to quit using the substance despite negative processing capabilities (Heiner, 1983; Kahneman, 2011). The limita- consequences (like physical and psychological problems). Addiction to tions of the current economic approach have been recognised by some drugs (and apparently to gambling as well) occurs because short-term economists, and there is growing academic and government interest rewards provided by the ingestion of the substance have become so in behavioral and experimental economics approaches that seek to un- powerful and enticing that an addict's life becomes increasingly orient- derstand how people actually behave, rather than how an idealized “ra- ed around the substance, such that other, healthier behaviors diminish tional” individual should behave (Ariely, 2009; Low, 2012; Lunn, 2014; in frequency and substance use behavior persists even in the face of Courtney et al., 2014). (sometimes dire) negative consequences. What has not been adequately addressed in the social trap or behav- ioral economics literatures is the question of the methods that can be 3. How Can a Society Be Thought of as ‘Addicted’? most effective for escaping these traps. “Traps” are obviously best avoided, and strategies that help avoid traps and prevent addictions Unfortunately, many 21st century social institutions and incentive are preferred. But little has been done to design effective escapes or structures parallel those found in addicted individuals, in that short- “therapies” once the societal trap has been entered. Fortunately, much term rewards are sometimes so powerful that other, more adaptive ac- has been done to help individuals escape their own traps or addictions. tions are diminished and damaging activities continue despite evidence We now turn to a discussion of one of the most effective of these thera- of longer-term negative consequences. Individuals (or firms or commu- pies before discussing how to apply these results at the societal level. nities or countries) pursuing their own narrow self-interests in the ab- sence of mechanisms that account for community and global interests frequently run afoul of these more adaptive long-term goals and can 4. Therapies that Work to Treat Addiction at the Individual Level often drive themselves, and the communities of which they are a part, to less desirable ends. One of the most successful treatments for addictions is motivational The inconsistencies of these short-term rewarding goals for individ- interviewing (MI; Miller and Rollnick, 2012). Unlike many other forms uals and incentives with long-term adaptation for the community have of therapy, MI is rated by Division 12 (The Society for Clinical Psycholo- been described many times before. Perhaps the most often cited is gy) of the American Psychological
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