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Priorities for Review of the ECB's Monetary Policy Strategy
IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS Requested by the ECON committee Monetary Dialogue Papers, December 2019 Priorities for Review of the ECB’s Monetary Policy Strategy Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies Directorate-General for Internal Policies Authors: Jérémie COHEN-SETTON, Christopher G. COLLINS, Joseph E. GAGNON PE 642.355 - November 2019 EN Priorities for Review of the ECB’s Monetary Policy Strategy Monetary Dialogue Papers December 2019 Abstract Lower neutral rates of interest have eroded the policy space necessary to fight recessions. Against this backdrop, several central banks are re-assessing how their strategy and tools can be refined to best achieve their goals. The ECB should be no exception. Its strategy review should focus on redefining the inflation objective and on developing contingency plans for using its statutory authority creatively to achieve its mandate. This document was provided by Policy Department A for the European Parliament's Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs. This document was requested by the European Parliament's Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs. AUTHORS Jérémie COHEN-SETTON, Peterson Institute for International Economics. Christopher G. COLLINS, Peterson Institute for International Economics. Joseph E. GAGNON, Peterson Institute for International Economics. ADMINISTRATOR RESPONSIBLE Drazen RAKIC Dario PATERNOSTER EDITORIAL ASSISTANT Janetta CUJKOVA LINGUISTIC VERSIONS Original: EN ABOUT THE EDITOR Policy departments provide in-house and external expertise to support -
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Accord
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE MIN(86)/INF/3 ACCORD GENERAL SUR LES TARIFS DOUANIERS ET LE COMMERCE 17 September 1986 ACUERDO GENERAL SOBRE ARANCELES ADUANEROS Y COMERCIO Limited Distribution CONTRACTING PARTIES PARTIES CONTRACTANTES PARTES CONTRATANTIS Session at Ministerial Session à l'échelon Periodo de sesiones a nivel Level ministériel ministerial 15-19 September 1986 15-19 septembre 1986 15-19 setiembre 1986 LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES LISTE DES REPRESENTANTS LISTA DE REPRESENTANTES Chairman: S.E. Sr. Enrique Iglesias Président; Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores Présidente; de la Republica Oriental del Uruguay ARGENTINA Représentantes Lie. Dante Caputo Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto » Dr. Juan V. Sourrouille Ministro de Economia Dr. Roberto Lavagna Secretario de Industria y Comercio Exterior Ing. Lucio Reca Secretario de Agricultura, Ganaderïa y Pesca Dr. Bernardo Grinspun Secretario de Planificaciôn Dr. Adolfo Canitrot Secretario de Coordinaciôn Econômica 86-1560 MIN(86)/INF/3 Page 2 ARGENTINA (cont) Représentantes (cont) S.E. Sr. Jorge Romero Embajador Subsecretario de Relaciones Internacionales Econômicas Lie. Guillermo Campbell Subsecretario de Intercambio Comercial Dr. Marcelo Kiguel Vicepresidente del Banco Central de la Republica Argentina S.E. Leopoldo Tettamanti Embaj ador Représentante Permanante ante la Oficina de las Naciones Unidas en Ginebra S.E. Carlos H. Perette Embajador Représentante Permanente de la Republica Argentina ante la Republica Oriental del Uruguay S.E. Ricardo Campero Embaj ador Représentante Permanente de la Republica Argentina ante la ALADI Sr. Pablo Quiroga Secretario Ejecutivo del Comité de Politicas de Exportaciones Dr. Jorge Cort Présidente de la Junta Nacional de Granos Sr. Emilio Ramôn Pardo Ministro Plenipotenciario Director de Relaciones Econômicas Multilatérales del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto Sr. -
La France Après Charlie : Quelques Questions Sensibles, Parmi D'autres, À Mettre En Débat
La France après Charlie : quelques questions sensibles, parmi d’autres, à mettre en débat (Jean-Claude SOMMAIRE 23 03 2015) Une onde de choc de forte amplitude Les tueries de ce début d’année, à Charlie Hebdo et à l’Hyper Cacher de la Porte de Vincennes, ont produit une onde de choc de très forte amplitude sur l’opinion publique de notre pays. On a pu en mesurer l’effet, dès le week-end suivant, quand des marches républicaines, d’une ampleur inattendue, se sont déroulé un peu partout en France, à Paris comme en province. La force de ce séisme, sur nos compatriotes, peut s’expliquer par la conjonction d’un ensemble d’évènements exceptionnels : l’exécution à la kalachnikov, sur leur lieu de travail, d’une équipe de journalistes et de dessinateurs en raison de leur impertinence à l’égard de l’islam, la prise en otage et l’assassinat de clients d’un magasin cacher au seul motif qu’ils étaient juifs, l’achèvement, à terre, d’un policier blessé d’origine maghrébine, etc. Cependant, pour beaucoup d’entre nous, l’élément le plus déstabilisant de ces journées tragiques aura été que ces meurtriers fanatiques ne venaient pas d’une contrée lointaine, où la sauvagerie règne de façon habituelle. Les frères Kouachi et Amedy Coulibaly, nés et scolarisés en France, vivaient près de chez nous, ils étaient nos compatriotes et nos voisins. Comme on avait commencé à le pressentir avec Mohamed Merah, ce trio sanguinaire nous a démontré que l’école laïque, les dispositifs sociaux de l’Etat providence, et les valeurs de la République, ne faisaient pas obstacle au développement de la barbarie islamiste dans nos banlieues. -
Swiss Franc: Not a Peg for All Seasons
News Monday, August 13, 2012 Page 1 Anatole Kaletsky Daily Comment [email protected] Swiss Franc: Not A Peg For All Seasons !e Swiss National Bank has constrained the appreciation of the franc, but incurred spill-over e"ects. !e result of liquid funds pouring into safe- haven Switzerland has been rapid credit growth and a surge in property prices. But the question we increasingly hear asked is whether the SNB will stick with the de facto peg since the cost of doing so keeps increasing. While markets almost always win when an authority seeks to protect its The SNB’s reserve currency from devaluation, the opposite usually applies in the case of an accumulation has been huge authority repressing the value of its currency. In practice, however, the Swiss story may turn out di"erently for four key reasons: Firstly, the SNB's reserve accumulation has been enormous. Reserves are at about 71% of GDP (in China that would be $5 trillion and in the US $10.5 trillion!) and the pace of accumulation shows no sign of dwindling. !e increase in July alone was CHF41b. !e problem with this sort of reserve accumulation is not just the potential in#ationary e"ect, which has so far been mild. !e bigger problem is the potential loss incurred by the SNB when the peg eventually breaks or is abandoned. Central banks cannot go bust, but If the peg was to go then they must publish accounts. When the peg policy is $nally ended the paper losses could run into paper losses could run into hundreds of billions. -
PDF the Swiss National Bank's Monetary Policy Concept
The Swiss National Bank’s monetary policy concept – an example of a ‘principles-based’ policy framework Ernst Baltensperger, Philipp M. Hildebrand, Thomas J. Jordan No. 3 2007 No. Swiss National Bank Economic Studies Bank Economic Swiss National Copies of Swiss National Bank Economic Studies may be obtained from: Swiss National Bank, Library, Fraumünsterstrasse 8, P.O. Box, CH-8022 Zurich Fax: +41 44 631 81 14 E-mail: [email protected] This publication is also available on the SNB website (www.snb.ch). Economic Studies represent the views of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Swiss National Bank. ISSN 1661-142X © 2007 Swiss National Bank Swiss National Bank Economic Studies No. 3 2007 The Swiss National Bank’s monetary policy concept – an example of a ‘principles-based’ policy framework Ernst Baltensperger, Philipp M. Hildebrand, Thomas J. Jordan* * We gratefully acknowledge helpful comments from Helen Baumer, Nicole Brändle, Otmar Issing, Caesar Lack, Michel Peytrignet, Enzo Rossi, Jean-Pierre Roth, Marcel R. Savioz, Wolfgang Schill, Lars E.O. Svensson, John Taylor, Charles Wyplosz and an anonymous referee. Contents Abstract (Zusammenfassung, Résumé) 2 Introduction 4 1. What constitutes ‘best-practice’ monetary policy? 6 1.1 The rise of inflation targeting during the 1990s 6 1.2 The current discussion on ‘best-practice’ monetary policy 7 1.3 Some academic proposals 12 2. The SNB’s monetary policy concept 14 2.1 Monetary policy guided by basic principles 14 2.2 Technical assumptions underlying the SNB inflation forecasts 17 2.3 Implementation of monetary policy 18 2.4 Experiences with the new concept 19 3. -
2012 01 10 Lab (Pdf, 80KB)
DER LANDBOTE DIENSTAG, 10. JANUAR 2012 BANKRAT IM VISIER TAGESTHEMA l 3 «Es gibt keine Alternative zu Jordan» BERN. Der Rücktritt von Nationalbankchef Hildebrand hat Peter Hildebrand war acht Jahre im Direkto- Nachfolge zu regeln – und zwar deini- Wer trägt die Verantwortung für das V. Kunz überrascht. Der Professor für Wirtschaftsrecht an der Uni Bern rium der Nationalbank. Welches sind tiv. So zeigte man Stärke, damit man heutige, schwache Reglement? seine herausragendsten Leistungen? auch im Ausland sieht und glaubt: Die Verantwortung liegt beim Bankrat. fürchtet um den Umgang mit Amtsträgern, wünscht professionelle In seine Zeit fallen zwei markante Er- Auch der neue Präsident wird die Dieser muss sich die kritische Frage Bankräte und sieht in Thomas Jordan den idealen Nachfolger. eignisse: die Rettung der UBS und die Wechselkursuntergrenze von 1.20 stellen lassen, ob man bei der National- Festlegung einer Wechselkursunter- Franken pro Euro verteidigen. Danach bank die Corporate Governance ver- INTERVIEW: SIMON HUNGERBÜHLER führt. Hildebrand war nicht irgendein grenze zum Euro. Wichtige Arbeit hat geht es darum, die Glaubwürdigkeit schlafen hat. In der Privatwirtschaft ist Gemeindepräsident, sondern der wich- er auch bei der Verschärfung der Stabi- der Nationalbank die Corporate Go- Nationalbankpräsident Philipp Hilde- tigste Amtsträger in der Schweiz. litätskriterien, Stichwort «Too big to wiederherzustellen. vernance, also das brand hat sein Amt zur Verfügung ge- fail», geleistet. Persönlich inde ich, war Das heisst, dass Einhalten von stellt und seine Beweggründe an einer War ein Rücktritt wirklich notwendig? die Arbeit von Hildebrand sehr gut. Ich dieses ominöse Re- «Das Problem des Unternehmenskon- Medienkonferenz erläutert. Wie haben Heute nicht. Am vergangenen Don- möchte aber anmerken, dass man seine glement zügig über- trollgrundsätzen, Sie seinen Auftritt erlebt? nerstag hatte Hildebrand einen souve- Leistung auch nicht überschätzen soll- arbeitet wird. -
Financing Globalization: Lessons from Economic History
Globalization and Finance Project supported by the Ford Foundation www.bsg.ox.ac.uk FINANCING GLOBALIZATION: LESSONS FROM ECONOMIC HISTORY All Souls College 19 June 2012 CONTENTS List of participants Cyrus Ardalan:Vice Chairman:Barclays Foreward Hugo Banziger:former Chief Risk Officer:Deutsche Bank » Ngaire Woods 2 Jaimini Bhagwati:Indian High Commissioner to the United Kingdom Amar Bhide:Thomas Schmidheiny Professor, Summary of Proceedings The Fletcher School of Diplomacy: Tufts University » Kevin O’Rourke and Philipp Hildebrand 3 Patricia Clavin:Professor of International History & Fellow: Jesus College, Oxford Rui Esteves:University Lecturer in Economics, Brasenose Historical Lessons College:Oxford » Hugo Banziger 5 Marc Flandreau:Professor of International History: The Graduate Institute, Geneva » Rui Esteves 9 Macer Gifford:Visiting Research Fellow, Globalization & Finance » Marc Flandreau 12 Project:Blavatnik School of Government, Oxford » Harold James 15 Charles Goodhart:Professor:London School of Economics » Catherine R Schenk 17 Philipp Hildebrand:Senior Visiting Fellow, Globalization & Finance Project:Blavatnik School of Government, Oxford Contemporary Challenges Roberto Jaguaribe:Ambassador of Brazil to the United Kingdom » Cyrus Ardalan 20 Harold James:Claude and Lore Kelly Professor in European Studies:Princeton University » Charles Goodhart 22 Rob Johnson:Executive Director: » Rob Johnson 23 Institute for New Economic Thinking » Pierre Keller 25 Vijay Joshi:Emeritus Fellow:Merton College, Oxford Pierre Keller:former Senior -
The Independence of the Swiss National Bank
Philipp Hildebrand: The independence of the Swiss National Bank Speech by Mr Philipp Hildebrand, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at Avenir Suisse, Zurich, 21 June 2011. * * * The speaker would like to thank Peter Kuster for his support in preparing this paper. In addition, his thanks go to Rita Kobel Rohr for her helpful comments when drawing up the speech. Is the independence of the Swiss National Bank so extensive that it stands outside the reach of our democratic system based on the separation of state powers, on checks and balances? The topic of central bank independence is a matter of discussion beyond the borders of Switzerland. Around the world, a debate has started on the limits to power, in general, and the independence of central banks, in particular, and in some cases radical demands have been made.1 Because many central banks found themselves obliged to resort to large-scale unconventional measures during the financial crisis, it is not surprising that the debate is raging now. Central banks are indeed very special institutions. They hold the banknote-issuing monopoly and provide the domestic money market with liquidity. Consequently, they can never really be short of money. In Switzerland, the state has conferred the banknote-issuing monopoly on the SNB. This means that it always has the requisite means for meeting its obligations in Swiss francs. However, that does not stop it from making losses. As you know, the SNB had to report a large annual loss in 2010. This was due to exchange rate losses on the foreign currency holdings. -
Yale University Library Digital Repository Contact Information
Yale University Library Digital Repository Collection Name: Henry A. Kissinger papers, part II Series Title: Series III. Post-Government Career Box: 723 Folder: 9 Folder Title: Interview about François Mitterrand, Nouvel Observateur, May 24, 1995 Persistent URL: http://yul-fi-prd1.library.yale.internal/catalog/digcoll:558814 Repository: Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library Contact Information Phone: (203) 432-1735 Email: [email protected] Mail: Manuscripts and Archives Sterling Memorial Library Sterling Memorial Library P.O. Box 208240 New Haven, CT 06520 Your use of Yale University Library Digital Repository indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use http://guides.library.yale.edu/about/policies/copyright Find additional works at: http://yul-fi-prd1.library.yale.internal GLe-3 MAX ARMANET ReDACTEUR EN CHEF Olifervateur 10-12. PLACE DE LA BOURSE TEL (1) 44.88.34.1 2 78081 PARIS CEDEX 02 FAX (1) 44.08.37.82 te ritatetitl 4 MITTI Eiri"_Ih A N D 50 pages de témoignages pour l'Histoire Robert Badinter Tahar Ben Jelloun George Bush Jean Daniel Jacques Delors Françoise Girond MikhaY1 Gorbatchev Jacques Julliani Henry Kissinger Jean Lacouture Emmanuel I,e Roy Ladurie Pierre Mauroy Jean d'Ormesson Shimon Peres Claude Roy Mario Soares Philippe Sollers Alain Muraine Michel Tournier M 2228- 1593- 20,00 F 2000 CFA ZONE N i593 DU 18 AU 24 MAI 1995 120 FB 510 ES. AILE 8 DM CAN $ 4.2s.430 PTAS 8000 LIN RCI SUAI 2000 CFA CFA 2000 MAROC 22 DU TUNIS 1,8 DTU ANTIL L ES NEUN 22,50 I ()SA NY 3 98 09 E 220 vat vals [rD [atm [go Mon jugement sur la Pyramide avait évolué comme mon sentiment à son égard :je n'aimais pas l'idée au départ maisj'ai été séduit par son exécution Par Henry e Nouvel Observateur. -
Preparing for a Higher Inflation Regime*
SUERF Policy Note Issue No 211, December 2020 Preparing for a higher inflation regime* By Elga Bartsch, Jean Boivin, and Philipp Hildebrand** BlackRock Investment Institute JEL codes: E31, E52, E58, E62, F60. Keywords: Inflation, inflation expectations, inflation target, central bank, fiscal and monetary policy, policy framework, deglobalization, nominal anchor. Inflation has persistently undershot central bank targets despite more than a decade of stimulus to revive it. Yet we see three new forces that may lead to a higher inflation regime than many investors are expecting. * This Policy Note is a partly updated version of „Preparing for a higher inflation regime“, BlackRock's macro and market perspectives issued in September 2020. Disclosure ** Authors: Elga Bartsch – Head of Macro Research, BlackRock Investment Institute Jean Boivin – Head, BlackRock Investment Institute Philipp Hildebrand – Vice Chairman, BlackRock Contributor: Nicholas Fawcett – Macro research, BlackRock Investment Institute www.suerf.org/policynotes SUERF Policy Note No 211 1 Preparing for a higher inflation regime Summary • Inflation is still missing in action after more than a decade of monetary policy stimulus and ever- expanding central bank balance sheets. Why, then, would inflation become an important investment theme over the next five years, or indeed, ever again? Because three new forces are at play. Production costs are set to rise globally. Central banks are fundamentally changing their policy framework with the intent of running inflation above their targets. And the joint monetary-fiscal policy revolution – a necessary response to the Covid-19 shock – risks greater political constraints on the ability of central banks to lean against inflation. • First, higher global production costs are likely: the Covid-19 fallout marks a major negative shock to services activity. -
Central Bankers Defend New Capital Rules
Central Bankers Defend New Capital Rules By Brian Blackstone and Michael R. Crittenden Theme: Global Economy Global Research, October 16, 2010 Wall Street Journal 11 October 2010 WASHINGTON—Central bankers participating in weekend meetings of the International Monetary Fund rejected concerns that proposed rules to raise bank capital requirements will weigh on the global recovery, and said they are pressing ahead with efforts to limit the contagion risks from large, complex institutions often dubbed “too big to fail.” Their assurances come amid mounting warnings from private-sector bankers of the economic costs of imposing too many regulations on them. “We need to avoid a process where requirements on banks keep growing to the point where their ability to contribute fully to economic growth is choked off,” saidJosef Ackermann, chief executive of Deutsche Bank AG. “Some argue that the new standards are too severe” by restraining credit in the early stages of economic recovery, Federal Reserve Bank of New York President William Dudley said in a speech on Sunday. Though the reforms, known as Basel III, “do impose some real costs” on the financial system, “I believe the concerns over the costs are exaggerated,” Mr. Dudley said. Under Basel III, internationally active banks will have to hold capital equal to at least 7% of their assets, much higher than current standards. Some rules start to take effect in 2013, but most banks will have until 2019 to comply. Officials also plan new requirements on the amount of liquidity banks must hold, but plan a later phase-in date amid uncertainties over the effect on certain financial markets. -
2019 Fall Florida International University Commencement
Florida International University FIU Digital Commons FIU Commencement Programs Special Collections and University Archives Fall 2019 2019 Fall Florida International University Commencement Florida International University Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/commencement_programs Recommended Citation Florida International University, "2019 Fall Florida International University Commencement" (2019). FIU Commencement Programs. 2. https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/commencement_programs/2 This work is brought to you for free and open access by the Special Collections and University Archives at FIU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in FIU Commencement Programs by an authorized administrator of FIU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Florida International University Ocean Bank Convocation Center CommencementModesto A. Maidique Campus, Miami, Florida Saturday, December 14, 2019 Sunday, December 15, 2019 Monday, December 16, 2019 Tuesday, December 17, 2019 Table of Contents Order of Commencement Ceremonies ........................................................................................................3 An Academic Tradition ..............................................................................................................................18 University Governance and Administration ...............................................................................................19 The Honors College ...................................................................................................................................22