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British Intelligence and Turkish Arabia: Strategy, Diplomacy, and Empire, 1898-1918 by Geoffrey Hamm A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of History University of Toronto © Copyright by Geoffrey Hamm, 2012 ii Abstract British Intelligence and Turkish Arabia: Strategy, Diplomacy, and Empire, 1898-1918 Geoffrey Hamm Doctor of Philosophy Department of History University of Toronto, 2012 This dissertation addresses early British intelligence activities and Anglo-Ottoman relations by viewing the activities of army officers and private individuals as a collective pursuit to safeguard British imperial interests. It offers a new understanding of the relationships between intelligence, grand strategy, and diplomacy before the Great War. It also examines the role that pre-1914 intelligence played in that conflict. The Boer War had shown that the geographic expanse of the British Empire was a source of strategic danger as well as a foundation of global power. The revelation of weakness propelled Britain to begin collecting intelligence on possible sources of conflict in preparation for the next war. A 1906 border incident between Egypt and Turkey marked turning points in Anglo- Ottoman relations and British intelligence efforts. Intelligence began to focus on railways that threatened Britain’s commercial position, on the disposition of Arab tribes who might revolt against Turkish authority, on the state of the Turkish army, and on the extent of European activity in Turkey. In 1914, British policy in the Middle East was unco-ordinated. Needing an effective means of combatting the Turco-German Jihad proclaimed in 1915, London created the Arab Bureau as an advisory organ based in Cairo. It became the central repository for much of the intelligence gathered before 1914. Officials in Cairo and London created iii new maps, compiled route reports, and assembled intelligence handbooks for distribution. Once the Arab Revolt began in 1916, intelligence helped marshal Britain’s resources effectively in pursuit of victory. Placing pre-1914 intelligence in the context of British imperial concerns extends our understanding of Anglo-Ottoman relations by considering strategic and diplomatic issues within a single frame. It demonstrates the influence of the Boer War in initiating intelligence-gathering missions in the Ottoman Empire, showing that even those undertaken before the establishment of a professional intelligence service in 1909, although lacking organization, were surprisingly modern, and ultimately successful. Analysis of under-utilized sources, such as the handbooks created by the Arab Bureau and the Royal Geographical Society, demonstrates the value of pre-war intelligence in detailed ways. It deepens understanding of the role British intelligence played in the defeat of the Ottoman Empire and shows how one nation’s intelligence, military, and diplomatic bodies operated separately and collectively in an era that presented them with unprecedented challenges and opportunities. iv Acknowledgements The completion of this thesis would not have been possible with the encouragement and support I have been fortunate to receive from so many people. A few short lines of thanks seems paltry recognition. Nevertheless, I hope that those named below will understand that the depth of my gratitude extends far beyond the words on the page. For many years – more than I care to count – it has been a privilege to have Jim Retallack as supervisor, editor, mentor, and friend. His tireless efforts on my behalf, to say nothing of his energetic red pen, have made me both a better historian and a better writer. I am grateful for his unfailing generosity and his constant good humour; it is not an exaggeration to say that this thesis would not have been possible without him. I am grateful to Denis Smyth for having been not only a thoughtful critic of my work, but also as a pedagogical mentor. I have endeavoured to apply the principles of historical practice that he emphasizes to undergraduates to my own writing. Eric Jennings graciously signed on to this project at a very late stage. His faith in my abilities and interest in my project were a source of encouragement as the finish line approached. His incisive comments and critiques sharpened the final product in ways I could not have predicted, and provoked me to think about this project in very different, but very interesting, ways. I would like to thank John Ferris, of the University of Calgary, and Margaret MacMillan, of the University of Toronto, for agreeing to serve as external examiners. It is a pleasure to work with two historians whose own research I have long admired. Financial support for research was made possible in part by the Sir Val Duncan Travel Grant at the University of Toronto, the Ontario Graduate Scholarship, the Rotenberg Memorial Award in British History, the Alan Marchment Travel Grant, and the University of Toronto School of Graduate Studies Travel Grant. Special thanks are due to my “research assistants” at the National Archives in London, Jane Black and Trudi Camilleri, for their willingness to ride the District Line to Kew – no mean feat – to retrieve documents for me. I owe an enormous debt of gratitude to Paul and Rich Derksen, Andrew Hillier, Brent Knowles, and Joseph Rochon, who were always generous with their friendship, hospitality, and camaraderie; whether at a ballgame or over steaks or drinks, time with them was always time well spent. Many friends and colleagues, both in Toronto and elsewhere, enriched the Ph.D. experience immeasurably. I am indebted to Anthony Adamthwaite, Adrian Ally, Sarah Amato, Andrew Barros, Auri and Olga Berg, Jeff Bowersox, Nori Bradley, Lorne Breitenlohner, Heather Burns, Tim Corson, Burl Crone, John Christopoulos, Elissa Deenick, Amy Delmonte, Jenn DeSilva, Jackie Feke, Andrea Gill, Jeremy Hamm, Val v Hebert, Ming Hillier, Michelle Hoffman, Siamak Khajehpour, Sean Kheraj, Brandon King, Adele Kirby, Bev Lewis, Nathalie Ling, Brett Lintott, Steve Maddox, Alex Melnyk, Deb Neill, Kristina Oldenburg, Michal Ruhr, Sara Russell, David and Julie Sankey, Nathan Smith, David Stiles, Jacob Sweezey, Mike Thicke, Lisa Todd, Yen Tran, Joanna Weis, Emma Wensing, and Sue Wilson for so much friendship and support, in so many ways. Lastly, heartfelt thanks are due to my family. My parents, Bev and Ernie Hamm, never wavered in their belief in my abilities, even when I had my own doubts. My greatest debt is to my wife, Elizabeth Hamm, who has been at once my toughest editor and critic, and most enthusiastic supporter. Her love, patience, laughter, and friendship have encouraged me through writer’s block and study guilt, through drafts, redrafts, and further redrafts, and through so much else besides. This thesis is dedicated to her. vi Table of Contents Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 1 Chapter One: The Boer War and the Ottoman Empire, 1898-1905 .......................... 30 I. Intelligence and South Africa .............................................................................................. 32 II. New Focus, Old Problem .................................................................................................... 36 III. Kuwait ................................................................................................................................ 46 IV. Consuls, Officers, Spies ..................................................................................................... 51 V. The “Military Report on Arabia” ...................................................................................... 67 Chapter Two: The Eastern Question, 1898-1905 ........................................................ 75 I. The Question of Turkish Authority .................................................................................... 78 II. The Russian Threat ............................................................................................................ 87 III. The German Threat .......................................................................................................... 92 IV. The Baghdad Railway ....................................................................................................... 96 V. Captain Smyth’s Report ................................................................................................... 104 Chapter Three: A Changing Sense of Purpose, 1906-1909 ....................................... 123 I. The Taba Affair .................................................................................................................. 124 II. Military Reconnaissance .................................................................................................. 134 III. The Young Turks and Changing Anglo-Turkish Relations ........................................ 141 IV. Germans, Railways, Arabs ............................................................................................. 146 V. New Co-operation ............................................................................................................. 150 VI. Commerce, Mapping and the Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf ...................................... 155 Chapter Four: Transition and Strategic Planning, 1909-1914 ................................. 162 I. The Course of Anglo-Turkish Relations .........................................................................