s

BACKGROUND The Libyan Revolution: GUIDE 2012 Origins of a New Nation

Crisis Director: Erica Moulton Chair: Rachel Phares and Mina Khan Vice-Chair: Yeareen Yun FCMUN V The Libyan Revolution: Origins of a New Nation

MARCH, 2011: LIBYAN REVOLUTION JOINT-CRISIS COMMITTEE

Dear Delegates,

It is with great pleasure that I welcome you to the Libyan Revolution Joint Crisis Committee at the Five College Model United Nations Conference 2012. My name is Erica Moulton and I am thrilled to be the director of this committee. Creating a joint crisis committee that rests on precipice of the global community’s recent memory has been both challenging and exciting. It is hard to believe that only a year ago the explosive conflict in was on the front page of every newspaper and was driving the 24-hour news cycle. Still more shocking, it has been less than 6 months since Muammar el-Qaddafi was killed. Yet, to the average US citizen, the Libyan revolution seems like a distant memory. However, the Transitional Council and the Libyan people are still embroiled in the aftermath of the conflict. In this committee, I hope to turn the clock back just over a year ago to explore that transformative time.

But before I continue, let me first briefly introduce myself. At Mount Holyoke, I am a sophomore majoring in English and Film. Those majors might seem incongruous to Model United Nations, but in fact, I have been participating in MUN since my sophomore year of high school. I love the collaborative, and often theatrical nature of MUN, particularly crisis, and I hope to see a lot of both collaboration and theatricality in the Libyan committees. I hail from the deep south in a town called Ocean Springs, Mississippi, although I attended high school in Tucson, AZ. I am the vice-president of Mount Holyoke Model United Nations and I am the editor of Arts & Entertainment for the MH News. In my spare time, I love to read, roller-skate and write and make movies. Page 1 of 13

FCMUN V The Libyan Revolution: Origins of a New Nation

Returning to the conference, it is my hope that delegates on both committees will push their portfolio powers to limit in order to create a contentious and fast-paced committee environment. Rather than approach this topic as a single-crisis committee, with the crisis room acting as NATO, I found it important to establish both committees, so that communication between committees is as or more important than communication with crisis staff. Delegates’ individuals powers, which will be enumerated in brief in the study papers, with more detailed instructions to follow on the weekend, will be disparate and equally important to the committee. Each delegate will be vital to their committee, so universal participation and engagement will be necessary to ensure a smooth flow of committee.

The committee begins on March 5, 2011, the day the National Transitional Council of Libya was officially established and it will span several months. The crisis staff is now hard at work preparing a wide range of challenging and hopefully fun crises! I am beyond excited to see the outcome of all our hard work.

I look forward to meeting you in March!

Cheers, Erica Moulton [email protected]

Page 2 of 13

FCMUN V The Libyan Revolution: Origins of a New Nation Overview of the Committee The Libyan Revolution Joint-Crisis committee will consist of two sub-committees that will be working to develop necessary solutions to issues already posed when the committee starts, along with any other crises that present themselves during the course of the committee. The two subcommittees will be: 1. The Transitional Council of Libya and 2. NATO and the Allied Forces. The two groups will work separately, responding to conflicts and forming directives as their respective bodies see fit.

The committees begin after the formation of the Transitional Council and each has their own unique dilemmas and questions that need to be addressed immediately along with any new situations that present themselves. The Transitional Council must first develop a tactical military strategy to employ against Gaddafi’s troops, organize the different factions of the rebellion and create ties with international bodies. NATO’s immediate line of action is less clear, although their initial line of action will be to determine what role, if any NATO has to play in global conflict outside their normally prescribed role in global conflict. goal the body and the individual states must pursue is information. This is a goal that can be achieved through numerous avenues, the first being the recognition of and communication with the Transitional Council, but also through the dispatching of intelligence agents and the manipulation of media sources.

The ultimate goal of the Transitional Council is clear: overthrow Qaddafi’s forces, take control of the capital and ensure the safety of the Libyan people. NATO and the Allied Forces have a more fractured goal, as each country has its own motives in providing/withholding support from Libya. Most importantly, though, the National Transitional Council and NATO/Allied Forces will need to communicate with each other as committees to ensure any sort of peaceful resolution to the conflict.

For the Libyan Transitional government, it will be paramount for the council to agree upon what methods, military or otherwise, they are willing to employ to see their goals fulfilled. For the NATO actors, each individual nation will be afforded a certain arsenal of potential financial aid, military contribution or diplomatic support to exercise at their own discretion, while the body as a whole may also contribute military support to the Transitional Council.

A final note to delegates: although this background guide provides cursory information as to the origins of the conflict and the general directions in which each committee will head, I highly encourage delegates to research beyond this document. Due to the recent nature of these events, there is a bounty of information, including and especially, official websites for both committees. In addition, there has been a great deal written about this conflict by both excellent journalists at , Wall Street Journal and The Economist and by political strategists of many countries. I encourage delegates to make use of a wide range of sources in their preparation for committee.

Page 3 of 13

FCMUN V The Libyan Revolution: Origins of a New Nation

Historical Background A HISTORY OF LIBYAN UNREST

The oil-rich, Islamic nation of Libya, situated in the heart of the African Arab-world, occupies a unique space in the collective global psyche due to its controversial history and its mercurial dictator, Colonel Muammar al-Gaddafi. Taking power by means of bloodless coup in 1969, Gaddafi established himself as an increasingly erratic leader. His ideological system of governance teetered between Arab nationalism and Islamic socialism, enumerated in his controversial treatise called “The Green Book”. In lieu of a parliamentary system, Gaddafi chose to rule by means of Revolutionary committees, which were primarily aimed at crushing any and all political dissent. The highest state authority became the General People’s Congress (GPC) in 1977 and all other political parties were banned. Over the years, Libya continued to operate under the guise of a state “ruled-by-the-people”, although there was never any doubt at the international level that Gaddafi was the absolute authority. During his over forty years in power, Gaddafi took advantage of the wealth of natural resources in Libya, including oil, to amass an enormous personal fortune, which he shared with his family and close colleagues, while areas in eastern Libya struggled with basic problems, like inadequate sewage systems.

The government prohibited all unofficial political activities. By law, many forms of speech or expression were interpreted as illegal resulting in widespread detention by police authorities. The government operated an extensive system of informants resulting in self-censorship throughout society. Gaddafi owned and controlled the print and broadcast media and did not permit the publication of any opinions contrary to his policies, seeking out and silencing all those who defied him, both domestically and abroad.

ORIGINS OF THE CONFLICT

It is out of this harsh political and social climate that the first stirrings of political unrest grew in early 2011. The culmination of resentment and anger felt towards Gaddafi’s oppressive forty-one year reign in Libya bubbled over amidst the general unrest in the Arab world. On February 17, 2011, Libya erupted in response to calls for a “Day of Revolt”. The protests quickly became violent as Gaddafi’s forces turned on protesters in , a coastal city about 400 miles east of the Libyan capital of Tripoli. The BBC reported around 2,000 people taking part in demonstrations for the release of several high profile human rights advocates, namely . In retaliation, the police used water cannons, tear gas and rubber bullets to drive them back.

Page 4 of 13

FCMUN V The Libyan Revolution: Origins of a New Nation Despite Colonel Gaddafi’s extensive security network, the protests spread, spurred on by social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter. Initially, the protests seemed merely a knee-jerk reaction to the widespread unrest surging through the Middle-East in early February. However, it quickly became clear that these protestors were bent on unseating Gaddafi and the protest grew into an organized rebellion. The rebel factions, including groups like National Front for the Salvation of Libya began to consolidate their forces. On Sunday, February 20th, Benghazi became the first Libyan city to fall into the control of rebel groups. The following Thursday, February 24th, the rebel forces repelled a concerted assault by Gaddafi’s forces, “removing any doubt that Libya’s patchwork of protests had evolved into an increasingly well-armed revolutionary movement.”

In response to the Libyan conflict, the United Nations Security Council voted on February 27th to impose sanctions on Gaddafi, which included a backing of an arms embargo and an asset freeze, while they also called for a war crimes investigation. Colonel Gaddafi’s continued attempt to manufacture pro-government demonstrations in the Libyan capital of Tripoli was futile as the eyes of the world were all on Benghazi and the rebels who fought to unseat their demonic despot and create a new Libya.

On March 5th, the rebel forces officially establish The Libyan Interim National Council, composed of “thirty one members representing the various cities of Libya from east to west and from north to the south.” The Council “calls on all the countries of the world to recognize it and deal with it on the basis of international legitimacy.”

This Joint-Crisis committee takes place in the months following the establishment of the Libyan Interim National Council. The starting date is March 5, 2011.

Recent Events: Timeline of Events from February 17 - March 5

17 February: Day of Revolt -Libyans called for a Day of Revolt. 19 February -Anti-Gaddafi protests reported in Benghazi and -UK Foreign Secretary William Hague said he was "deeply concerned" by the "unacceptable -violence" used against protesters. 20 February -Protesters in Benghazi numbered in the tens of thousands, possibly in the hundreds of thousands -The Tuareg tribe in the south said to have answered a call by the larger Warfalla tribe to take part in the protests. The Tuareg towns of Ghat and Ubary were also locations for violence, with members of the tribe reportedly attacking government buildings and police stations. -The European Union called on the Libyan government to refrain from using force and to answer the protesters' grievances. 21 February -In Benghazi, protesters took control of the streets, looted weapons from the main security headquarters and seized the local radio station, starting their own broadcasts under the name Voice of Free Libya.

Page 5 of 13

FCMUN V The Libyan Revolution: Origins of a New Nation -Demonstrators clashed with security forces, and heavy gunfire was heard throughout the city. At least sixty-one people were killed. -UK Foreign Secretary Hague also said that he had received information that Gaddafi had left Libya and was travelling to Venezuela. 22 February -Gaddafi makes a brief appearance on Libyan state television in which he said he had been speaking to the youth in Tripoli's Green Square. -A Libyan naval vessel was reportedly sighted off the coast of Malta. According to , five Italian fighter jets overflew the ship, and the Italian Navy began conducting surveillance. -Former UK Foreign Secretary David Owen said that a "military intervention" via a no-fly zone was immediately necessary. -In a speech, Gaddafi blames foreign powers and hallucinogens being forced on the protesters for the unrest. He rejects stepping down, saying he has no official position from which he could step down, and stated that he would "die as martyr". -, who held the position of top general and interior minister, resigns and calls for the army and police to fight Gaddafi and his regime. 23 February - Benghazi and Misrata reported to be under protester control. 24 February -Protesters assumed complete control of Tobruk and other eastern provinces. Commanders pledged to defend the "liberated territory" -Cities and towns close to Tripoli reported to be falling to protesters, while in Tripoli itself, pro-Gaddafi militia patrolled the streets to prevent demonstrations. In the east, civilian protesters and military units that had defected and reorganized armed themselves to prepare for an upcoming "". -Pro-Gaddafi militia and foreign mercenaries also attacked an airport outside Misrata, which was defended by protesters armed with rifles, in what would become the Battle of Misrata. During the fighting, the militia bombarded the protesters with rocket- propelled grenades and mortars, while the protesters managed to seize an anti-aircraft gun and turn it against the militia. -The EU called for Libya to be suspended from the UN Human Rights Council, and for the UN Security Council to approve a probe to investigate "gross and systematic violations of human rights by the Libyan authorities" 26 February -In Benghazi, a spokesman for the revolution told Agence -Presse that they were drawing up plans for a transitional government to take power -By the end of the day, an interim government had been formed by former justice minister Mustafa Mohamed Abud Al Jeleil. UN Security Council on 26 February unanimously votes to impose sanctions against the Libyan authorities, imposing an arms embargo and freezing the assets of its leaders, while referring the ongoing violent repression of civilian demonstrators to the ICC. 27 February -A National Transitional Council is formed in Benghazi. It is created not as a provisional government but rather seeking to act as the "political face of the uprising". -Hafiz Ghoda, spokesman for the National Transitional Council, said the council was not an interim government, was not contacting foreign governments and did not want them to intervene. 28 February -It is reported that opposition forces shot down a government warplane during the Battle of Misrata. -US Navy began positioning several ships near the coast of Libya -Calls for a military enforced no-fly-zone on Libya became increasingly prominent. -During the day, regime forces attacked Zawiya and Misrata, but were repelled by anti-government forces with a small number of casualties on both sides.

1 March -Al Jazeera reports that Misrata is once again under attack, this time from a combined armor and air assault. According to a witness quoted by Al Jazeera, Gaddafi's forces are using heavy weapons against protesters and rebels in the city, while the anti- Gaddafi forces are fighting back with small arms. -Rebel leaders debate whether to ask for Western airstrikes and hint that they prefer airstrikes to any landed military assistance 2 March

Page 6 of 13

FCMUN V The Libyan Revolution: Origins of a New Nation -The Gaddafi regime attempted to retake the city of Marsa Brega, but the attack was largely repelled by the rebels in what came to be known as the Battle of Brega -The opposition's interim-government council formally requests the UN to impose a no-fly zone and to conduct precision air strikes against Ghaddafi's forces. 4 March - Opposition forces capture the port town of Ra’s Lanuf and attempt to retake the oil refineries in Zawiya - Qaddafi’s regime forces in Tripoli prepare for an expected mass protest by the people after Friday prayers. By the afternoon, demonstrators gather in the thousands, but it does not amount to a siege of the city. 5 March -After previously backing down from the idea, France re-engaged in support for a no- fly zone and was working with the US and UK to get the resolution passed. The National Council is established by the opposition and declares itself Libya's sole representative.

Transitional Council Background

Following their official formation on March 5, the National Transitional Council set up their official website, which issued the following statement:

“The Council will seek to maintain peace and security in the liberated cities with all its strength. It will also plan and work towards liberating the remaining cities still kidnapped by the tyrant Mu’ammar Gaddafi and his gang. Here, we call on all the people of Libya to participate in achieving these lofty goals through the commitment to the noble Libyan ethics and by prioritising [sic] our country before the self in the same way our ancestors did to liberate it from the Italian colonizers.” - Council website

From the beginning of the conflict, the opposition forces facing Qaddafi’s regime found themselves in a perilous position, fending for themselves and their fellow citizens with whatever weapons they could recover. As the revolution spread, many members of the Libyan armed forces defected to fight alongside the rebel forces. At present, the revolutionaries appear to have access to potentially large stores of weapons, including small arms and heavy artillery, automatic weapons smuggled from the Egyptian border and rocket- propelled grenades taken from army bases, like the Kabila in Benghazi. So far, at least in the east, many of the weapons appear to be held in storage to defend against a future attempt by Colonel Qaddafi’s forces to retake the territory.

Like their counterparts in and , the rebels in Libya have shown tech-savvy guile in circumventing government efforts to block their communication. To sidestep the government’s blocking of the Internet and curbing of cellphone access, for example, some of the more active antigovernment protesters distribute flash drives and CDs with videos of the fighting to friends in other towns and to journalists. These methods have been adopted and expanded by the Transitional Council, who hope to exploit technology as a military tactic and an aid to protecting civilians. As a result, they appointed a member of the council to Youth outreach.

In the past few days, opposition figures in rebel-held cities like Benghazi have been appearing on cable news channels promising that opponents of Colonel Qaddafi are heading toward Tripoli to bolster the resistance there. Following several battles in the cities of Misrata and Benghazi, the rebels held their ground and the Council’s next step is to organize movement of their forces towards the capital. They must face the consequences of organizing forces that may or may not be trained in military combat and may be ill- equipped. The rebels now need to weigh the potential for foreign military or other intervention, be it in the form of air strikes or an imposed no-fly zone. The Council’s ultimate goal is to capture Tripoli and set about dismantling Qaddafi’s infrastructure so they may rebuild Libya.

Page 7 of 13

FCMUN V The Libyan Revolution: Origins of a New Nation Within the Council, each member has equal participation in decisions made regarding the movement of troops and the enlistment of foreign aid. The executive of the board facilitates the discussions of these issues and any voting on these matters.

NATO/Allied Forces Background

What is NATO’s role in this conflict? This is the first critical issue the NATO body must grapple with. From the onset of conflict in Libya, appeals were made from rebels for foreign aid. The Libyan revolutionaries requested medical supplies and humanitarian support as Qaddafi’s forces turned violent against the protesters. Many NATO/Allied Forces condemned the use of such force against demonstrators, hoping to persuade Qaddafi to take a less extreme road. However, when the protests quickly evolved into a full revolution, foreign countries began to react strongly to the unfolding events. The international response, particularly from NATO members was one of support for the Libyan rebels. It was unclear, though, what these pledges of “support” meant from most countries. Striking a balance between support and overbearing proved difficult for many foreign supporters. French President Nicolas Sarkozy said early on that military intervention was not a good idea. “What kind of credibility would such intervention bring to the people there?” Mr. Sarkozy asked. “People would then claim that riots have been plotted by foreigners.”

Although the NATO response supported Qaddafi’s unseating, they were wary of any transitional governments that were cobbled together during the conflict and sending military aid to unorganized forces. Countries like the US and France imposed unilateral sanctions against Libya, including the freezing of billions in government assets. Many countries called on Colonel Qaddafi to resign and the UN moved to isolate Libya diplomatically. At this point, NATO officials have stated that they are ready to help evacuate , but further intervention and support from NATO and the Allied Forces remains a question, a question that begs a quick and decisive answer as the conflict in Libya spreads.

Allied forces are currently discussing a no-flight zone over Libya to prevent Colonel Qaddafi from using military aircraft against demonstrators. But such a move would require NATO forces to submit such a request to the UN Security Council, who could issue a resolution. If such a resolution is issued, NATO would have to submit to its limitations, which might include a limiting of ground forces or limits on air strikes. Although air strikes may seem the most beneficial coarse of action, there must be considerations made for Libyan civilians and Libyan infrastructure: Power plants, water purification facilities, telecommunication sites and other critical infrastructure must be left unscathed by any potential air war. Furthermore, Arab governments, such as , or other voting members of the Security Council, might find NATO military intervention in Libya objectionable on sovereignty grounds.

Now, the eyes of the world are on NATO as commentators speculate on the current meeting of NATO forces. “Even if people aren’t explicitly talking about no-fly zones, the fact that NATO met today suggests there is more on people’s minds than diplomacy,” said Tom Malinowski, the director of the Washington office of Human Rights Watch. “I sense military contingencies are on the table.” Page 8 of 13

FCMUN V The Libyan Revolution: Origins of a New Nation One complication that could speed up consideration of any military action would be evidence that Colonel Qaddafi was prepared to use his remaining stockpile of mustard gas to target a rebel stronghold city, like Benghazi.

Each representative on NATO brings with them the convictions and concerns of their respective countries and also, it must be said, a level of suspicion as to the long-term intentions of the Transitional Council. However, right now, what remains important is a prompt disarming of Gaddafi’s forces in order to stop the massacring of the Libyan people. Considering every angle of the Libyan conflict is vital for each NATO member/ally, who now must make crucial decisions as an individual country and as a unified NATO body. They must weigh the stability of the new Transitional Council with how far they are willing to intervene and what support they are willing to pledge.

Delegate Roles:

Libyan Rebels : The National Transitional Council of Libya (established February 27, 2011 in Benghazi) Mahmoud Jibril - Chairman of the Executive Board (CHAIR IN COMMITTEE) Mustafa Mohammed Adul Jalil - Chairman of the Council: Mr Abdul Jalil was born in the city of Bayda, east Libya, in 1952. He graduated from the department of Shari’a and Law in the Language and Islamic Studies faculty of The University of Libya in 1975. Mr. Abdul Jalil was appointed Assistant to the Secretary of the Public Prosecutor in the city of Al-Bayda, and was appointed a judge in 1978. In 2002, he was appointed President of the Court of Appeals and then President of the Court in Al Bayda, before being made Minister of Justice in Libyan Rebel Fighters 2007. Responsible for the general organization of the council, Mr. Abdul Jalil must oversee the military stratagems in Libya and the status of foreign relations and military intervention while keeping his eyes fixed towards the future of Libya.

Abdul Hafiz Ghoga - Vice-President of the Council, Spokesman, and City of Benghazi: Mr. Ghoga is former Head of the Benghazi Lawyers Syndicate. Mr. Ghoga is Vice Chairman of the NTC and its official spokesman. he also represents the city of Benghazi.

Ali Tarhouni - Deputy Chairman of the Council, Finance, and Oil: Mr. Tarhouni is responsible for advising Chairman Adul Jalil in the matters of foreign intervention and he must keep a close eye on the level of foreign interest in Libyan Rebel Fighters Libyan Oil.

Omar El-Hariri - Military Affairs: Chief officer of the Rebellion and chief military strategist, El-Hariri is charged with overseeing military strategy of rebel forces as they struggle to maintain the stronghold of Benghazi and make a labored attempt to claim Tripoli. Jalal al-Digheily - Defense: Mr. al-Digheily is responsible chiefly for advising Chairman Adul Jalil in what forms of military intervention the Council should request from NATO. In addition, Mr. al-Digheily serves as the chief envoy to NATO and will represent them in any international communication conferences.

Page 9 of 13

FCMUN V The Libyan Revolution: Origins of a New Nation Fathi Mohammed Baja - Political Affairs and City of Benghazi: Mr. Baja is primarily concerned with safe-guarding the legitimacy of the Transitional Council, in addition to protecting the rebel capital of Benghazi. Salwa Fawzi El-Deghali - Legal Affairs and Women: Ms. El-Deghali’s position charges her with the responsibility of investigating the crimes of mercenaries employed by Gaddafi. Moreover, she will be collecting and presenting evidence of his war crimes to the ICC. Ahmed Al-Abbar - Economics: Mr. Al-Abbar’s job in committee will entail advising the Chairman in the economic short-term and long-term repercussions of rebel military action and the limited financial situation of the rebel forces. Mahmoud Shammam – Media: Mr. Shammam’s vital position will be to communicate with the international press, providing weekly statements on behalf of the Transitional Council, as well as advising the Chairman in these matters and how to deal with the presence of foreign journalists in Libya. Mohammed Al-Allagi – Justice and Human Rights: Charged with assisting Ms. El-Deghali with gathering evidence against Gaddafi, Al-Allagi also has the mission of ensuring the safety of Libyan civilians in areas of conflict. Moreoever, Al-Allagi will oversee all captured Gaddafi personnel receive fair trials during and after the revolution. Hania Al-Gumati – Social Welfare: Al-Gumati’s primary interest is the welfare of Libyan civilians and will be a significant advisor to the Chairman and Omar El-Hariri as they makes military decisions that will have repercussions on civilian life. Fatih Turbel - Youth: Mr. Turbel has a BA in law from the Gar Yunis University in Benghazi and represented the families of the 1996 Abu Salim massacre. Mr. Turbel is a human rights activist and was arrested on 15th February 2011 during the first street protests in Libya. As a member of the NTC, he is responsible for representing Youth. Fawzy Abdel Ali - Mr. Abdel Ali will work with El-Hariri as a military strategist in Misurata Suleiman Al-Fortia - Mr. Al-Fortia will work with El-Hariri as a military strategist in Ibrahim Bin Ghashir - Mr. Ghashir will work with El-Hariri as a military strategist in Jalo Zubeir Ahmed El-Sharif - Political Prisoners:One of Libya’s longest serving political prisoners, Mr. El- Sharif was arrested in 1973 for conspiracy and sentenced to 31 years in prison. He graduated from the Military Academy of Iraq in 1958 and as a member of the NTC is currently responsible for representing political prisoners. Abdel Razeq Mukhtar - Mr. Mukhtar will work with El-Hariri as a military strategist in Abdel Razaq Abdel Salem Al Aradi - Mr. Al Aradi will work with El-Hariri as a military strategist in Tripoli

Mustafa Mohammed Adul Jalil

NATO/Allied Forces

Secretary General of NATO - Anders Fogh Rasmussen (Denmark; Chair in committee) BLOCKS: European Powers: United Kingdom - UK Foreign Secretary William Hague: The UK’s military arsenal includes Typhoon and Tornado aircraft; refueling and surveillance aircraft; Trafalgar-class submarine firing Tomahawk cruise missiles; frigates HMS Westminster and HMS Cumberland

Page 10 of 13

FCMUN V The Libyan Revolution: Origins of a New Nation France - French Minister of Foreign Affairs Alain Juppé: France’s available military contributions include Rafale and Mirage aircraft; refueling and surveillance aircraft; aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle and escort ships

Italy - Franco Frattini: has at its disposal Tornado aircraft; additionally, it can provide use of its military bases

Albania - Edmond Haxhinasto: Albania cannot commit military aid or personnel, but can make humanitarian contributions, up to $5 million in medical supplies and foot stuffs

Belgium - Steven Vanackere: Belgium has F-16 aircraft

Bulgaria - Ivaylo Kalfin: Bulgaria cannot commit military aid or personnel, but can make humanitarian contributions, up to $7 million in medical supplies and foot stuffs

Canada - John Baird: Canada is in possession of F-18 aircraft along with the frigate HMCS Charlottetown

Denmark - Villy Søvndal: Denmark has F-16 aircraft

Greece - Stavros Lambrinidis: Greece cannot provide air carriers or missiles, but they can contribute up to 700 M-240 Machine Guns and 50 M-2 Machine Guns

Netherlands - Uri Rosenthal : Netherlands cannot provide air carriers or missiles, but they can contribute up to 1,000 M-240 Machine Guns and they are willing to offer Air Force personnel to undertake NATO airstrikes

Norway - Jonas Gahr Støre: Norway cannot provide air carriers or missiles, but they can contribute up to 5,000 M-240 Machine Guns

Spain - Trinidad Jiménez: Spain has F-18 aircraft; refueling and surveillance aircraft; frigate and submarine; military bases

United States of America - US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton: The US has at its disposal B-2 stealth bombers; EA-18G Growler and AV-8B Harrier aircraft; destroyers USS Barry and USS Stout firing Tomahawk cruise missiles; amphibious assault ship USS Kearsage; command and control vessel USS Mount Whitney; submarines.

Anti-military intervention:

Germany - Guido Westerwelle Germany is unwilling to commit German aircraft, weapons or military personnel to any form of NATO intervention in Libya

Turkey - Ahmet Davutoglu : Turkey opposes NATO Libya intervention on the grounds that NATO should only intervene when one of its members is directly attacked.

Questions to Consider - NATO 1.What is the role of NATO in the Libyan Revolution?

Page 11 of 13

FCMUN V The Libyan Revolution: Origins of a New Nation 2. What sort of humanitarian aid is NATO willing to offer? Food stuffs, medical supplies, ect? How can these supplies be safely transferred to Rebel forces and Libyan civilians? 3. If a military intervention in Libya is agreed upon, which countries will lead the mission? 4. What are NATO intentions for intervening in Libya? What sort of future assurances will need to be agreed upon by the Transitional Council in order to secure the support of NATO? 5. What legacy will NATO intervention leave in Libya?

Questions to Consider - Transitional Council -Military strategy will need to be established: what sort of weapons/resources do Colonel Gaddafi’s forces have access to? Where are their strongholds? What strategies can the Council adopt that could unseat Gaddafi’s power in Tripoli?

-How can the Council unite the different elements into a cohesive military force? How should this army be organized?

-What should be the legal policy for the capture and imprisonment of those supporters of Gaddafi, military or civilian, who remain in Libya? What is the official policy towards the capture of Gaddafi? (i.e. Should there be orders to execute him on sight, imprison him, ect.)

-What sort of immediate appeals, if any, should be made to international bodies, like the ICC and the UN Security Council to help mediate the ongoing conflict?

-What sort of military intervention should the Council request from NATO: naval support, airstrikes, ground forces, special-ops, ect.?

-What will NATO intervention mean in Libya?

-Should the Council begin to establish goals beyond the capture of Tripoli and Gaddafi? What will the Libyan government look like beyond the revolution?

Sources

1. http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/libya/index.html?scp=2&sq=libyan%20revolution &st=cse 2. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/17/world/middleeast/17libya.html

3. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/17/world/middleeast/17libya.html?_r=1&ref=libya

4. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13754897

5. http://www.ntclibya.org/english/founding-statement-of-the-interim-transitional-national-council/

Page 12 of 13

FCMUN V The Libyan Revolution: Origins of a New Nation 6. http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/q/muammar_el_qaddafi/index.html?scp=1- spot&sq=muammar%20el%20qaddafi&st=cse

7. http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61694.htm

8. http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/topic,463af2212,4bbc91a02,4d3e8020f,0.html

9. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/gaddafi-could-turn-to-libyas-mustard-gas-stockpile-some-officials- fear/2011/03/16/ABT9iEt_story.html

10. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12589434

11. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/30/opinion/30iht-edheisbourg30.html

Page 13 of 13