CORRUPTION AND THE RUSSIAN TRANSITION

BELARUS: THE OPPOSITION AND THE PRESIDENCY

UKRAINIAN CASE TO UKRAINIAN CAUSE

WAS GEORGIA READY FOR INDEPENDENCE?

RUSSIAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AFTER 1921 tti'C Pm lrupamreview

Volume 12, Number 1 Fall 1999

Peter Rutland and Natasha Kogan CORRUPTION AND THE RUSSIAN TRANSITION 1

Uladzimir Padhol and David R. Marples BELARUS: THE OPPOSITION AND THE PRESIDENCY 2 2

Mykola Ryabchuk UKRAINIAN CASE TO UKRAINIAN CAUSE 2 9

Paul B. Henze WAS GEORGIA READY FOR INDEPENDENCE? 26

Frederick Corney Review of Andre Liebich, From the Other Shore. Russian Social Democracy after 1921 31

Cover: Vladimir Favorsky's illustration for Alexander Pushkin's 'The Miserly Knight"

The Harriman Institute Bradley F. Abrams, Edward A. Allworth, Karen Barkey, Edward Beliaev, Robert L. Belknap, Thomas P. Bernstein, Richard Bulliet, Kathleen R. Burrill, Vitaly Chernetsky, Istvdn Detlk, Padma Desai, Richard E. Ericson, Richard Foltz, Anna Frajlich-Zajac, Boris Gasparov, David Goldfarb, Raroila Gorup, Richard E Gustafson, Leopold H. Haimson, Robert Jervis, Peter Juviler, Manouchehr Kasheff, Christina H. Kiaer, Mara Kashper, Peter Kussi, Valentina Lebedev, Marina Ledkovsky, Robert Legvold, Rado L. Lencek, Robert A. Maguire, Stephen Paul Marks, Rajan Menon, John S. Micgiel, Frank J. Miller, Catharine Theimer Nepomnyashchy, Marc Nichanian, Vratislav Pechota, Cathy Popkin, Irina Reyfman, Joseph Rothschild, Carol Rounds, Ivan Sanders, Peter J. Sinnott, Jack Snyder, Steven L. Solnick, Michael Stanislawski, David Stark, Lars Tragardh, Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier, Marie von Hagen (Director), Stanislaw Wellisz, Richard Wortman, Warren Zimmermann, Kimberly M. Zisk.

THE HARRIMAN REVIEW, successor to The Harriman Instisuie Forum, is published quarterly by the Harriman Institute, Columbia University. Copyright © 1999 by the Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New' York. AH rights reserved. Reproduction of any kind without written permission is strictly forbidden. Annual subscription rates: U.S. and Canada: $35.00 (1 year), $60.00 (2 years); elsewhere: $45.00 (1 year), $85.00 (2 years). Back issues: $10.00. Check or money order should be made payable to Columbia University. U.S. funds only. Send all orders, changes of address, and subscription inquiries to: The Harriman Review, 1218 International Affairs Building, Columbia University, 420 West 118'" Street, New York, New York 10027. FAX: (212) 666-3481. The Harriman Review is indexed by PAIS (Public Affairs Information Service). CORRUPTION AND THE RUSSIAN TRANSITION

Peter Rutland and Natasha Kogan

Introduction in the transition economies (as in most of the develop- ing world) the issue of corruption had become impossi- ble to ignore. Corrupt practices were not merely para- his paper surveys the state of the debate over the causes, character and con-sequences of corrup- sitical on an otherwise healthy body politic and market economy: to a worrying degree, corruption had become tion in Russia. The main argument is that while a central, structural feature of the logic of political and Tthere is broad agreement over these questions, there are economic behavior. few credible suggestions to explain how Russia will escape from its current impasse. By 1997 authorities from the World Bank to Jeffrey Corruption has not traditionally been a subject that Sachs were for the first time acknowledging that a has attracted the attention of political scientists. The successful transition to capitalism required that more attention be directed towards promoting the rule of study of corruption has largely been the province of investigative reporters: from the very beginning, in the law.4 The initial operating assumption back in 1989-92 U.S., it was “muckraking” journalists who exposed the was that liberalization would create the incentives for phenomenon. In the literature on the politics of transi- profit-seeking behavior. This would lead to the emer- tion in socialist countries, it was journalists who first gence of new social actors (entrepreneurs, workers and drew attention to the prominent role of corruption.1 consumers) who would have a vested interest in the And among academic disciplines, it is anthropology, new market economy. These groups would realize that with its analysis of reciprocal gift-giving and patronage it is in their interest to help create the social institutions networks, that is most comfortable with the analysis of necessary to the smooth functioning of a market corruption.2 economy—clearly defined property rights, enforceable Political scientists and economists traditionally contracts, fair and transparent government regulation. tended to treat corruption as a marginal phenomenon, The introduction of democracy would give them the a regrettable example of deviant behavior that did not chance to translate their demand for market institutions seriously affect one’s analysis of the political/economic into public policy. The main political threat to market system.3 However, it has become increasingly clear that transition was seen as lying in the desire of bureaucrats and some groups of workers to try to turn the clock back to central planning. Even as late as 1996 Boris 1 For journalists writing on Russian corruption, see Stephen Yeltsin ran an election campaign by painting commu- Handleman, Comrade Criminal: Russia’s New Mafiya (New nism, and not corruption, as the main threat to social Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995); David Kotz and Fred progress in Russia—and he received the unanimous Weir, Revolution From Above (London: Routledge, 1997). support of Western governments and international 2 The leading investigator of the scandal surrounding the USAID- agencies. funded work in Moscow of the Harvard Institute for International Development is anthropologist Janine R. Wedel. See her Janine Wedel, “Cliques and Clans and Aid to Russia,” Transitions, July 1997. 1997); Robin Theobald, Corruption, Development and 3 For samples of serious work on the issue, see Arnold Underdevelopment (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990). Heidenheimer et al (eds.), Political Corruption: A Handbook 4 Jeffrey D. Sachs and Katarina Pistor (eds.), The Rule of Law and (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1989); John Girling, Economic Reform in Russia (Boulder, Col: Westview Press, Corruption, Capitalism and Democracy (New York: Routledge, 1997); World Bank 1997 World Development Report.

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Alas, something went wrong in Russia and most of private is not clear-cut, and must be explained and the other Soviet successor states. Liberalization led to analyzed, not assumed. short-run' profiteering rather than long-run profit Hence we will proceed by describing the behavior seeking. Few social actors emerged with a commitment we wish to investigate as “rule evasion” rather than to institution-building. As of August 1998, the official corruption. “Rule evasion” is a less pejorative term position of the IMF, World Bank and U.S. government than corruption, and is open to the interpretation that is that the market reform pursued (fitfully) by Russia such behavior can be individually rational and even since 1991 was and still is the only feasible alternative socially functional. It is also a broader term than for Russia. They now concede, however, that market corruption, encompassing all behavior involving liberalization should have been accompanied by more deviation from laws and formal procedures. determined efforts at institution-building to promote the Second, using the term “corruption” implies that the rule of law. behavior is confined to a small deviant section of Political scientists were perhaps even slower to society: parasites on an otherwise healthy social adapt to the souring of the Russian transition than were organism. Rule-evasion may be more pervasive than is economists. Corruption still tends to be seen as some- implied by the term corruption. Indeed, it may be thing that should be studied by legal scholars, a blot on endemic to the core functions of the political organism the body politic that belongs in the category of “crime and not merely a feature of its “parasitic” and dysfunc- and social problems.” Despite a growing recognition tional elements. that corruption has deeply penetrated Russian political The difference between corruption and rule evasion and economic elites, few political scientists have tried is more than mere semantics. Officials and business- to systematically analyze the phenomena of organized men may be behaving rationally and often responsibly crime, “clan politics” and their implications for the by engaging in rule evasion in an situation far removed Russian political system. from a mature market economy, characterized by legal The purpose of this paper is therefore twofold. nihilism; inadequate liberalization; intense First, to alert political scientists to the dimensions of politicization of economic decision-making; deficient the corruption issue in Russia and the challenge it institutional infrastructure; prevalence of barter trade; poses to our conventional understanding of the demo- widespread arrears in meeting contractual and tax cratic transition. Second, the goal is to question the obligations, and so forth. assumptions behind the way that economists are conceptualizing the problem of corruption and to argue that political science has a specific role to play. How Bad Is Corruption? Some commentators are prepared to argue that corruption is not necessarily a barrier to social prog- ress. They note that corruption to a degree is present in What Is Corruption? all societies, and that it can serve some useful social It is clear that the contemporary Russian economy, functions. from the corner store up to the federal budget, is far In economic terms, the spread of corruption can removed from the “perfect competition” theory to be undermine traditional, inefficient patterns of economic found in economics textbooks. This deviation from organization (communist bureaucracies, in the Russian orthodox models of how an economy operates is often case), clearing the field for new capitalist forms. Some explained by reference to the spread of “corruption,” would argue that it can encourage the spread of profit- conventionally defined as the abuse of public office for seeking, market-oriented behavior.5 Bribery of state private gain. officials, for example, may enable entrepreneurs to get This definition has several problematic aspects. around archaic rules and regulations hostile to the First, it has a strong moral connotation: the behavior development of markets and hence economic prosper- described as “corruption” is prejudged as necessarily “bad.” Second, it presupposes that one can readily distinguish between two spheres: a public sector on one hand and private interests on the other. Once this is assumed, the battle against corruption is half-won: the 5 For example, “the ability to evade rules helps prevent increased authorities simply have to strengthen the barrier be- government regulation and, in some cases, leads to a tween public and private. In Russia, however, and in rationalization of laws.” Jim Leitzel, “Lessons of the Russian economic transition,” Problems of Post-Communism (January- many other societies, the separation between public and February 1997), pp. 49-55, p. 55.

2 THE HARRIMAN REVIEW ity.6 7Organized crime may provide entrepreneurs with corruption is inimical to economic growth.9 Corruption personal security and contract enforcement which the may accompany growth driven by public sector spend- public judicial system is too weak to provide. Hence ing, but much of this may be pork-barrel driven “roads in countries such as Indonesia or China over the past to nowhere” that do not contribute to social welfare.10 decade we have seen very high levels of corruption Correlating the absolute level of GDP and perceived coinciding with rapid rates of economic growth. The corruption also suggests that, generally speaking, the living standard of the general population in those richer the country, the lower the level of corruption. countries was also rising, although at a slower pace With the Asian meltdown over the past year, the than that of the economic elite. Indonesian model of economic growth plus rising In political terms, corruption may be a messy but social inequality does not look so attractive. necessary lubricant, forging political alliances between In the Russian case, the argument that corruption otherwise antagonistic groups. The creation of patron- may be the price you have to pay for economic growth age networks can bring a sense of order and hierarchy is something of a moot point, since the economy shrank out of incipient social anarchy. The pyramid of favors for seven straight years. After stabilizing in 1997 (GDP and obligations may reach down deep into society, grew by an anemic 0.8% that year), the economic giving even ordinary people a sense of belonging and contraction resumed in 1998. Russian corruption has a stake in the future. This is the argument made in not been parasitical on a healthy, growing economy. seeking to explain the persistence for more than a Rather, it has flourished amid the decaying remains of century of organized crime in Sicily, for example.8 the corpse of the Soviet economy. Thus there may be a tradeoff between the social stabil- The Hierarchy ity which corruption can provide and the greater economic efficiency which would flow from more open of Rule-evading Behavior market competition. In looking at the role of corruption, it is important The U.S. itself went through a “robber baron” to recognize that there is a hierarchy of rule-evading phase at the end of the nineteenth century. A concentra- behavior of varying types. Talk of corruption in Russia tion of economic power in the hands of a few monopo- is often conflated with the role of organized crime: that lists seemed to be necessary to create national indus- is, criminal gangs relying upon violence or the threat of tries of railways, steel and oil. Meanwhile, in the cities violence.11 Organized crime is best viewed as a subset the millions of new immigrants were absorbed into the of rule evasion: the two phenomena are related, but democratic process through Tammany-hall style distinct. Rule evasion in Russia is a widespread and machine politics. However, this concentration of entrenched phenomenon that cannot be reduced to the economic and political power in the U.S. soon pro- antics of Mafia gangs. duced its own antithesis. The democratic process threw Let us begin at the level of the individual. Casual up the progressive movement, which waged a success- observation reveals that most Russians have no com- ful war on corruption and broke up the trusts. The punction about evading taxes or other government analogy implies that corruption is just a phase, perhaps regulations (such as those forbidding citizens from even a necessary phase through which the national having bank accounts abroad). On the contrary, even organism will pass on its way to political and economic professionals who should be at the forefront of the maturity. struggle to introduce legal norms—journalists and However, a correlation of levels of perceived lawyers—often freely explain to foreign visitors the corruption in various nations with their economic growth performance suggests that in most countries

9 Paulo Mauro, “Corruption and growth,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, no. 110 (1995). 10 Vito Tanzi and Hamid Davoodi, “Corruption, public investment and growth,” IMF Working Paper 97/139 (1997). Japan will 6 Nathaniel Leff, “Economic development through bureaucratic spend $278 billion on public works this year: more than the corruption." American Behavioral Scientist, vol. 8, no. 3 Pentagon’s annual budget. Sandra Sugawara, “Japanese (November 1964). construction trade built on cronyism,” Washington Post, 31 January 1998. 7 Federico Varese, “Is Sicily the future of Russia?” Archives 11 On organized crime see the special issue of Demokratizatsiya, Europeenes de Sociologie, vol. 35, no 2. vol. 2, no. 3 (Summer 1994); Tanya Frisby, “The rise of organized 8 Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia: the Business of Private crime in Russia,” Europe/Asia Studies, vol. 50, no. 1 (January Protection (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993). 1998).

3 THE HARRIMAN REVIEW various ways in which their employer avoids paying to criminal gangs, to criminal-like security services, or taxes on their salaries. (A favorite technique is paying to the police) in order to stay in business. This practice, them with insurance payments or bank loans as a way which anecdotal evidence suggests is pervasive, has of avoiding personal income tax.). As a result of such been a severe constraint on the development of small strategies, income from employment (wages and businesses in Russia. The payments range from 10 to salaries) has shrunk to about 45% of total reported 50 percent of overall turnover, and this helps explain income. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that when why everything from beer to toothpaste tends to be confronted with a rule, Russians’ first reaction is to more expensive in Russia than, say, Poland (which also look for a way around it. has its own problems with organized crime). This pattern has a parallel in moral reasoning. The Moving further up the economic hierarchy, at the Soviet-era adage “he who does not steal from the state, level of the enterprise it is clear that many transactions steals from his own family” still has some resonance. depend for their success on the firm’s position in local Moral behavior in Russia is judged primarily in terms elite networks. This is true whether it is a question of of honest treatment of family and friends, rather than renting premises, shipping goods on the railway, or conformity with more abstract rules such as public avoiding paying wages and taxes. Despite protestations laws. The view that morality resides in the private and that Russia has introduced a market economy since not the public sphere crystallized in the Soviet era, 1991, barter trade still accounts for about 40% of when involvement in public life (Communist Party industrial turnover (and has increased since 1992). membership, etc.) was seen by most people as requiring Barter involves both the physical exchange of commod- conformity to an amoral and false public rhetoric. ities, and the use of various types of non-monetary Soviet man inhabited a “gray zone” where behavior financial instruments (bills of exchange, tax waivers, was regulated by custom, but not by law.1213 This polar- etc.). Such barter transactions are very difficult for the tax authorities to monitor: that indeed is one of the ization of private morality and public deceit is obvi- mairireasons for their popularity. Other reasons include ously inimical to the development of any sort of public order, but especially one based on notions of civil the simple absence of cash—barter ballooned in 1992 society and a voluntary compact between rulers and as the government tried to tighten monetary policy. It ruled. The introduction of competitive elections since may also reflect a desire to avoid price controls, which 1991 has not apparently been sufficient to promote a still apply to the gas, electric and railway utilities new sense of respect for public institutions. (where one finds the heaviest reliance on barter). Moving up from individual behavior to the level of The barter trade is embedded in local networks of small businesses, one finds private entrepreneurs factory directors and political bosses. Thus, for exam- trapped between rapacious state tax and regulatory ple, an enterprise will agree to provide construction officials, on one side, and equally rapacious criminal materials and workers to repair roads for the local government, in return the latter will agree to write off gangs, on the other. A great deal of commerce takes place in the “shadow economy,” not reported to official the project as provision of “tax in kind.” The officials agencies in a bid to avoid Russia’s tough and often presumably have their own way of keeping track of the arbitrary tax laws. Enterprises often pay bribes to ebb and flow of favors. This way of doing business is officials in order to stay in business. A World Bank already familiar to them from the days of the centrally survey of 50 small businessmen found the proportion planned economy, when informal bargaining for scarce admitting to paying bribes to various categories of inputs took place in parallel to the formal adherence to plan targets. It has persisted since 1991, and has proved official ranged from 21% (tax inspectors) to 40-50% fairly impervious to faltering efforts to introduce (for export/import licenses), to 100% (for phone Western-style accountancy procedures. installation).14 At the same time most owners of stores It is hard to separate “illegitimate” and “legitimate” and service outlets have to pay protection money (either practices in the Russian economy—either before or after 1991. Some of the barter deals may represent honest efforts by selfless managers to, say, provide 12 Aleksandr Kirpichnikov, Vzyatka i korruptsiya v Rossii resources to keep hospitals and kindergartens in opera- [Bribery and Corruption in Russia] (St. Petersburg: Alpha, 1997) tion. But many of the deals, such as those channeled 13 Victor Sergeyev, The Wild East. Crime and Lawlessness in through intermediary firms privately owned by the Post-Communist Russia (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1998), chapter managers, are used to generate hidden profits that are 3. siphoned off into private, typically offshore, bank 14 Daniel Kaufman, “Why is Ukraine's economy not growing?” accounts. Transition (World Bank), voi. 8, no. 2, (April 1997), pp. 5-8.

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There are no reliable estimates of the size of the elections have been held on time in a more or less free shadow economy not captured in official GDP statis- and fair manner, and Yeltsin has avoided direct viola- tics. The State Statistics Committee itself officially tion of the constitutional rights of the legislative and boosts GDP figures by 23% to allow for unreported judicial branches. The problem in national politics is activity. Most observers consider this an underestimate. not so much overt violation of rules, but the fact that (In June 1998 the top leadership of Goskomstat was there are too many gray areas that are not covered by arrested for, among other things, taking bribes in return any existing legislation. For example, the role of the for underreporting enterprise output.) According to the presidential administration (the effective power-center former Interior Minister Anatolii Kulikov, the shadow of Russia) is not legally defined, nor are there any rules economy accounts for an estimated 45% of all eco- pertaining to campaign financing. nomic activity in Russia (equivalent to over $100 One issue demanding research and reflection is the billion a year).15 way that these various levels of rule-evasion coexist The shadow economy not only decisively influences and interact. Clearly, at the very least there is a high the daily operations of most enterprises, it has also degree of congruence and compatibility between rule- shaped the allocation of property rights. The privatiza- evasion at the level of the individual citizen, the enter- tion process has seen 70% of Russia’s state-owned prise, and political leaders. But how tightly the levels industry transformed into privately owned joint-stock interact is not known. It is generally assumed that the companies over the past decade. In each of its three linkage between economic clans and political leaders is stages, privatization was characterized by rule-evasion very close, that the former provide funding for the latter rather than rule-obedience. and expect favors in return. But just how direct are the The first stage of “spontaneous privatization” in ties between these elites and the networks of organized 1988-91 saw individual firms spring up on the basis of crime remains an open question. assets leased from the state sector, or the granting of special permission to create a private company on the Historical Origins basis of a state corporation. The reformers promised The current situation of endemic rule-evasion in that the second stage of voucher privatization, launched Russia is the product of rapid market transition intro- in 1992, would create a new share-owning middle duced into an economy and society shaped by seven class. In fact, it delivered assets into the hands of decades of authoritarian rule and central planning. In insiders, either Soviet-era industrialists or new-era pointing to the pre-1991 roots of post-1991 corruption, bankers. The third phase of cash auctions since 1995 one should not lapse into determinism, and assume that has seen a series of rigged deals, virtually none of Russia is doomed by its history to a distorted and which would pass scrutiny as open, competitive trans- corrupted market transition for the foreseeable future. actions. Still, one can argue that rule-evading behavior in Finally, moving from the economic to the political Russia has deep cultural roots. In Tsarist times political scene one also sees a high degree of rule-aversion. authority, and the state in general, were seen as sepa- President Boris Yeltsin dismissed the parliament in rate from society and were viewed with suspicion by 1993, in an action of dubious constitutionality, and then both the common people and intelligentsia. Neither pushed through a new constitution that granted him ruler nor ruled felt particularly constrained by rules: broad leeway to rule as he sees fit with few legislative political debate was couched more in terms of power, constraints. Regional legislatures have passed thou- order, obligation and justice than legality per se. sands of laws and decrees that violate the Russian In the Stalinist era the gulf between state and federal constitution. Constitutionally-guaranteed rights, society widened still further. There was an explosion of such as the option to refuse military service, or to live rule-making by state bureaucracies, but these rules where one chooses without police permission, are were enforced through violence in an arbitrary and routinely violated by local organs despite court pro- unpredictable manner. Both ordinary people and tests. Yeltsin generally tolerated these rule-infractions officials developed ways of “beating the system” by regional leaders, who in turn offered him political through creating informal networks of trust. The state support. generally turned a blind eye to such practices, recogniz- The situation in political life is not completely bleak ing that they were functional to social stability and to from the point of view of rule-adherence. National the smooth operation of the economy. Anti-corruption

15 Cited in Obshchaya Gazeta, no. 30, August 1998.

J THE HARRIMAN REVIEW campaigns made only a small dent into the entrenched ments by economic sector (the military-industrial patronage networks of the Brezhnev era.16 17 complex, energetiki, agrarians). This historical acceptance of rule-evasion seems to Some organizations of the communist era, such as have carried over to the new democratic Russia that the Komsomol or academic institutes, proved to be emerged after 1991. Apart from continuity at the level good training grounds (in terms of skills, values and of social norms, there was also continuity at the level of contacts) for the new capitalist elite. While individu- social organizations. Organized crime networks, which als used these organizations as a springboard to launch were forged in the labor camps of the Soviet Union, themselves into the market economy, the institutions found that opportunities for their services (protection themselves did not, by and large, survive the post- rackets, money laundering, smuggling, prostitution) Soviet transition (at least not with the same status they increased during the economic liberalization which enjoyed prior to 1991). began in the perestroika period. These criminal gangs Although one can see a degree of continuity in proved to be one of the social institutions most able to social values from the communist era, and a degree of adapt and flourish in the shift from plan to market. continuity in the composition of elite groups, there Exactly how widespread is organized crime in the have been radical changes in the formal institutions new Russia is a matter of some controversy. The through which political and economic life is managed Russian public perceives it to play an important role, in Russia since 1991. These rapid changes have in- and in Western popular imagery (i.e., Hollywood) the volved the swift collapse of many old institutions and Mafia has replaced the Communist Party/KGB as the a much slower and more hesitant building of new spirit behind the Evil Empire. But it is not clear just to institutions. Given the collapse of formal institutions, what extent criminal gangs have extended their influ- the persistence of informal values and networks looms ence through the various layers of the shadow econ- even larger in shaping the development of post-1991 omy. The level of banditism seems to be lower in Russian society. Russia than in, say, Chechnya or Colombia: the crimi- nals have not managed to establish physical control Corruption and Political Life over large chunks of territory. The crime of kidnapping While rule-evasion was becoming a norm of life in for ransom is not widespread, and seems mainly the new market economy, it was also invading the confined to mutual feuds between gangs of Caucasian nascent political sphere of democratic Russia. This origin. Another factor muddying the waters is the fact trend is visible both in the way the political elite that local police organs (Ministry of Interior, Tax conducts its business, and in the relations between the Police, Federal Security Service) often seem to have a elite and the masses. degree of competition and collaboration with the Polls suggested that by 1997 the Russian public had criminal groups. For example, 80% of the security come to believe that the Mafia had replaced the services guarding property in Moscow are provided nomenklatura as the shadowy power ruling their under contract by personnel from the official security country. An August 1997 poll asked respondents “Who organs. do you believe runs Russia?” A remarkable 52% The Communist Party elite has also shown a degree selected as their first choice “the Mafia, organized of adaptability by surviving the market transition with crime,” followed by “the state apparatus” (21%), the a degree of political and economic power still in its president (14%), regional authorities (11%) and the hands. However, it would be a mistake to treat this vast government (10%).19 Other polls confirm that the level bureaucratic host as a monolith. The nomenklatura of public trust in national and local political leaders and system was a set of bureaucratic procedures for the political institutions in general is extremely low. recruitment and promotion of cadres, it was not a secret A natural consequence of the public’s suspicion society or a tightly-knit group of people with common that “all politicians are crooks” has been their willing- interests and values. The nomenklatura as a sociologi- ness to elect to public office candidates of dubious cal group (about 2 million strong) had deep internal moral probity. Criminals themselves are keen to get divisions—ideologists versus economic managers, for example—and was separated into distinct compart-

18 Steven Solnick, Stealing the State: Control and Collapse in 16 William Clark, Crime and Punishment in Soviet Officialdom Soviet Institutions (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998). (New York: ME Sharpe, 1993). 19 Poll of Institute for Sociology of Parliamentarism, cited in 17 Sergeyev, chapter 6. Moskovskii Komsomolets, 5 September 1997.

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elected, since this may bring either immunity from reinforcing political behavior. Corruption infiltrates prosecution or political connections which can dissuade and undermines the very processes that have the prosecutors.20 A striking example of this was the potential to keep it in check—the legal system, the March 1998 election of Andrei Klimentev, a nightclub security organs, the electoral process. This makes it owner and thrice-convicted criminal, as mayor of very difficult to identify and encourage anti-entropic Nizhnii Novgorod, the fourth-largest city in Russia. processes which can stem the tide of corruption. The election commission struck down the results of the election, citing vague procedural irregularities. One The Prospects month later Klimentev himself was sentenced to six for a Reduction in Corruption years in jail on fraud charges.21 In October 1997 a local Much of the writing on corruption in transition criminal boss, Gennadii Konyakhin, was elected mayor economies adopts a hortatory character. Liberal critics of Leninsk-Kuznetskii in a Siberian coalmining region. of the situation in Russia argue that corruption is bad Local residents actually demonstrated on his behalf for democracy and bad for long-run economic growth. after he was removed from office on Moscow’s orders. They therefore insist that Russia must adopt rule of law President Yeltsin won re-election as president in if it is to move forward - without explaining how July 1996 despite the fact that between the first and precisely Russia can get from the present anarchy to a second rounds of the election two campaign aides were law-based system. discovered carrying a Xerox box with $500,000 cash One can sketch out five possible paths (not mutu- out of the Kremlin. The legal case against the aides was ally exclusive) through which Russia could move in the dropped at the end of the year, when the law expired direction of more rule-adherence and less rule-evasion. which had made it illegal to handle large amounts of All of the solutions have one thing in common; they foreign currency without Central Bank registration. require time. Rule-observation, and rule-evasion, hinge (Also, it transpired that no one had come forward to on collective expectations. Expectations about whether report the money as missing.) other persons will obey or ignore rules are primarily Within the space of a few years Russia made the based on observations of past behavior. Russian society transition from a political system based on a single is facing a prisoner’s dilemma of rule-evasion, in which ruling party to a pluralistic, electoral democracy. Russia everyone was defecting from rule-obedience through has not yet experienced a turnover of power in the key 70 years of a socialist economy and 7 years of an political position of the presidency, but the June 1996 ostensibly market economy. Russians can see that it presidential election was generally regarded as free and would be in their interest to live in a society with rules fair by the international community. However, by 1995- which everyone obeys, but in a society where one 96 it became commonplace to see decision-making in expects others to evade the rules, there is no incentive the Russian government and presidential administration for a single individual to start obeying them. as heavily influenced by a set of financial “clans” or (1) Introduce liberal institutions. This approach, central oligarchs. These magnates used their capital to gain to the policy adopted by the U.S. government towards control over media outlets, and made their cash and Russia, posits the step-by-step construction of a rule- publicity machinery available to chosen candidates in of-law based society through the introduction of tried- elections. In the new system money has replaced and-true Western institutions: freedom of the press, an ideology as the currency of power, the glue holding independent judiciary, tight anti-corruption legislation; together the political elite. a professional and well-paid civil service. The driving The reliance of elites on clan politics, on the one force in this approach is the emulation of Western hand, and public acceptance of rule-evasion as perva- experience. Just as companies strive to adopt the “best sive, on the other, creates a vicious circle of self- practice” of the world’s most advanced corporations, so Russian politicians should realize that liberal democ- racy is the best system of political organization. Aid and trade opportunities have often been tied (at least 20 For comparison, in India it is estimated that more than 10% of rhetorically) to the adoption of Western institutions. the candidates in the 1996 parliamentary elections had criminal Over the past five years the World Bank has started to records. See John Bums, “In India, Criminals Take to the Campaign Trail, ” New York Times, 26 February 1998. make the adoption of anti-corruption measures an 21 Former Nizhnii Novgorod governor Boris Nemtsov was also important part of its lending policy in the developing implicated in the Klementev loan fraud. See Jamestown world. Foundation Monitor, 13 August 1998; Institute forEastWest Studies Russian Regional Report, no 22 (1998).

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There is no question that these liberal institutions (2) Democratization. A more refined version of the can help battle corruption. A free press clearly plays a liberal solution relies upon democratization as the pivotal role in mounting a challenge to corruption. By decisive factor in promoting rule of law and hence a and large, it is only through the media that we learn diminution of corruption. The prevalence of corrupt about corrupt behavior, and press exposure can force practices benefits a small privileged elite at the expense politicians and legal authorities to take action. But the of the majority. Giving real political power to that free press is not a panacea, of course. Media exposure exploited majority through the introduction of competi- is no guarantee that action will be taken to stop the tive elections should increase the prospects for an malfeasance. Authoritarian leaders have a broad array effective anti-corruption drive. of means to intimidate or shut down independent The problem is that in practice one sees few exam- editors and journalists, from tax inspections to assassi- ples of leaders coming to power on an anti-corruption nations. Russian experience shows that the media may ticket, and even fewer cases where that leadership themselves become part of the politics of corruption, successfully tackles corruption. Unscrupulous leaders being used as a vehicle for throwing dirt on political may rise to power using the rhetoric of “clean hands,” opponents. In the summer of 1997 a war of compromis- but on winning office they merely replace the former ing materials or kompromat flooded the Russian media, corrupt officials with their own cronies. Boris Yeltsin’s as rival clan leaders battled over the spoils of privatiza- own efforts to battle corruption have seen few heads tion. (The low point was the release of a grainy video roll, and have amounted to little more than populist of the justice minister cavorting in a mob-connected gestures, such as the abortive 1997 campaign to have bathhouse.) Finally, one should note that repeated state officials renounce their foreign limousines in public airing of corruption in the media may merely favor of Russian Volgas. In April 1997 a presidential serve to encourage public cynicism and the conviction decree instructed all senior government officials to file that everybody is breaking the rules. a declaration of family income and assets. This pro- Likewise, while an independent judiciary is often duced some laughable results. (For 1998, the executive seen as a sine qua non for effective anti-corruption secretary of the CIS Boris Berezovsky, a businessman campaign, experience suggests that the judiciary can who is described by Forbes magazine as a billionaire, only succeed if the broader political context is favor- reported net assets of $38,000.) able. A judiciary that is “too” independent of the Unfortunately, experience around the globe sug- political system may lack the authority to go after the gests that democratization is not an antidote to corrup- top dogs of the corrupt establishment (as may be tnie in tion, but may in fact be highly compatible with the India). If the judiciary is so independent as to become persistence of rule-evasion. Part of the problem is that a political power in its own right, that too can generate many societies adopt a charade of electoral competition concern that justice is not being served by anti-corrup- while preserving power in the hands of a narrow elite. tion campaigns—witness the controversy around the Indonesia and the Philippines are examples of such a motives of the investigating magistrates in the “quasi-democracy” or “pseudo-democracy.” Introduc- Tangentopoli scandal in Italy. 2 ing a quasi-democracy is quite easily accomplished. These caveats aside, most would agree that it would Developing a real democracy with a competitive party be better for Russia to have liberal institutions than not system, in which ordinary people can exercise real to have them. The key problem is how to get these power over their leaders, is far more difficult. And institutions into place. Social institutions cannot easily even well-established democracies can fall prey to be exported. Proffering advice and lending money to corruption: witness the campaign finance scandals that promote their adoption does not seem to have worked have dogged nearly every developed democracy. The in the Russian case. What is lacking in the orthodox huge sums of money which are required to run profes- liberal account is some explanation of the politics of sional party bureaucracies and mount media election anti-corruption: what incentives are there for local campaigns can often only be obtained through quasi- elites to embrace these measures at anything beyond a legal means, either tapping into the public purse, or rhetorical level? soliciting donations from powerful interest groups.

(3) The robber baron argument. One cynical approach is to concede that corrupt elites cannot be displaced from power by pressure from outside (the international 22 Stanton Burnett and Luca Mantovani, The Italian Guillotine community) or from below (a mobilized public). They (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1998).

8 THE HARRIMAN REVIEW

will only abandon rule-evasion when they conclude that ing economy and a stagnant if not impoverished it is in their own interest to do so. society. Adherents of this position argue that liberalism and A third element of difference, connected to the democracy fail to address the reality of political power second, is that the Russian elite is exercising an exit in the transition societies. The ruling elite is strong option. They are taking their money, and their families, enough to prevent liberal-democratic institutions from and moving them abroad—to Cyprus, the South of working to promote good government. Hence the only France, and elsewhere. Electronic banking and jet hope for a diminution of corruption is that the leading travel make the exit option more attractive for elites of beneficiaries of the rule-evading society—the corrupt the late twentieth century than was the case in previous elite—will eventually realize that it is in their interest eras. to create a framework of law and order. As Thomas Hobbes observed, even the richest person in society is (4) The strongman scenario. It is widely assumed that vulnerable to a blade in the back from an irate peasant. the natural response to anarchy is order imposed from Hence the Russian elite will tire of having to spend a above, by a new “strongman” leader. Rather than large portion of its wealth protecting their families from waiting for the incumbent corrupt elite to change its kidnappers. Having accumulated wealth through trade ways, perhaps only the arrival in power of a new and financial intermediation, they will see that long- counter-elite will bring about a change in the status term prosperity requires long-term investment in quo. This new leadership will probably come to power productive assets: something that will not happen in through violence (by coup, revolution or foreign Russia unless the rule of law is strengthened. conquest); will originate from a social group bearing A parallel line of argument is to suggest that some values distinct from those of the corrupt elite. The sort of Darwinian struggle has been taking place typical source for such strongmen is of course the between the financial magnates (and for that matter military, but new sources appear from time to time between Mafia gangs). After a few years of strife a (such as the Afghan Taliban). power hierarchy will emerge, perhaps regionally The record of “strongmen” rulers in battling corrup- segregated, and these bosses will be able to strike deals tion is rather poor. As Lord Acton noted in the last with each other in a fairly civilized and predictable century, “absolute power corrupts absolutely.” Outsid- fashion. Slowly but surely these bosses will gravitate ers may quickly succumb to corruption once they towards the state apparatus, since what is the state but become insiders. Recall that Alaksandr Lukashenka, a large, sophisticated, monopolistic protection racket? the dictatorial president of Belarus, rose to power in the One can also use the diminishing marginal utility of Belarusian parliament through his energetic anti- money argument. Having achieved a certain level of corruption investigations. Similarly, Vladimir Meciar, wealth, corrupt leaders will lose interest in making who presides over one of the most corrupt regimes in more money, and will explore charitable and patriotic Europe, is one of the few politicians in the region to outlets as a way to achieve more lofty and lasting have won twice in fair elections. After experiencing rewards. decades of dictatorial rule, only about a third of the Unfortunately, it is something of a leap of faith to Russian public evince any enthusiasm for a strongman believe that the Mafia leopard will change its spots. regime (as reflected in opinion polls and voting pat- Just because some societies managed to pass through a terns). phase of corrupt elite rule is no guarantee that others will follow the same path. Argument by analogy is (5) Economic competition. The market economist inherently deceptive. Why should present-day Russia will put her faith in increased competition as the best resemble nineteenth-century America, and not, say, long-term antidote to corruption. The core strategy is to contemporary Nigeria? After all, there are some impor- shrink the size of the public sector through deregulation tant structural differences between modern Russia and and privatization, thereby diminishing the opportunities robber baron America. First, the latter country had for rent-seeking behavior by bureaucrats and politi- experienced 200 years of civil society, limited democ- cians. State contracts should be allocated through racy and rule of law, none of which is true for Russia. Second, the robber barons flourished in an epoch of rapid economic expansion, improving efficiency, rising living standards and a booming population. In contrast, the Russian robber barons are profiting from a collaps-

9 BELARUS: THE OPPOSITION AND THE PRESIDENCY

Uladzimir Padhol and David R. Marples

Introduction Hanchar.1 The process of registering candidates and In June 1994, Belarus held its first presidential gathering a minimum of 100,000 signatures was election as mandated by the post-Soviet Constitution identical to that of 1994 and followed the 1994 that had been adopted earlier that same year. In the Constitution. The leaders of the opposition had one first round of the election no candidate received more common goal, namely to mount an assault on President than 50% of the vote, but in the runoff in July, Lukashenka, noting that he had already been in power Alyaksander Lukashenka, a former state farm chairman for five years and focusing on the sharp deterioration of from the Shklou district, Mahileu province, emerged as living standards in that period. In turn, the opposition the clear winner over former prime minister also had to make the case that it was capable of Vyachaslau Kebich. The presidency of Lukashenka bringing about an improvement of the economic has been eventful and controversial. Most notably in situation. the summer of 1996, when Belarus experienced a Among the leading players in this process, however, constitutional crisis and the president decided to the goals varied. Hanchar was anxious to improve his organize a referendum on enhancing presidential standing among the electorate by creating an image of powers while reducing those of the parliament and a man of great organizational ability who at the same Constitutional Court. The referendum was duly held in time was selfless in his motives. Hanchar also wished November 1996. Although the electorate strongly to make political inroads into two power sectors, in supported all of Lukashenka’s propositions, observers order to establish a "party of the new power" that from both the West and the opposition believed the would support his political ambitions. These two results to have been falsified. By the end of the year, sectors were the Belarusian Popular Front (BPF), long the results of the referendum were made legally binding recognized as the principal opposition party of Belarus, through amendments to the 1994 Constitution and at and part of the Lukashenka nomenklatura, which fears the same time the president declared his intention to the implications of a change in the power structure and start his term of office over, from the date of the was perceived as willing to make compromises. referendum. Neither the West nor the Belarusian Zyanon Paznyak, the leader of the BPF, has been living opposition has recognized the validity of this process in exile since 1996, officially as a refugee in the United and thus the question arose of what would happen in States but in fact he resides mainly in Poland. Paznyak, the country when the original five-year term of office though assured of loyal support from his followers, was for the president expired, on 20 July 1999. thus distanced from events in his homeland. Nonetheless, he decided to allow himself to be a The Pre-Election Campaign presidential candidate (as he was also in 1994) to improve his standing in his native country and to attract In January the 13th Session of the Supreme Soviet, more funding for his party. officially dissolved by the president in late 1996, but Other potential candidates appeared briefly. which has continued to hold sessions and is still Henadz Karpenka, one of the leaders of the Congress chaired by Semyon Sharetsky, formed a Central of Democratic Forces held in Minsk in late January and Electoral Commission. On 16 January, Decree No. 7 of the Central Electoral Commission announced its intention to hold a presidential election on 16 May, to be organized by the Commission under Viktar 'See, for example, Belorusskaya delovaya gazeta, 15 February 1999, p. 1.

11 THE HARRIMAN REVIEW a prominent member of the United Civic Party, held the The government laid the blame for the dramatic decline view that the opposition elections would push the in the Belarusian standard of living first on Russian president into holding his own elections later in 1999; criminal elements, followed by local ministers and at that time, he intended to allow himself to be factory managers, the ramifications of the 1986 nominated as a rival. Moreover, Karpenka believed Chernobyl disaster, and the opposition for "slandering" that Hanchar would use the May election to conduct the regime in the West, with the result that Belarusian various political tricks that would shed an unfavorable products could no longer find markets abroad. light on the process in the eyes of the electorate. Boris During the election campaign, Lukashenka had Berezovsky, then secretary of the CIS and once an several positive resources. He possessed the material important power broker in Russia, also played a part in assets of the state, control over the media, the ability to the Belarusian campaign by supporting the candidacy obtain information from opposition centers, and not of Chyhir. This move can be perceived as a reaction by least his own remarkable oratory and ability to discern Berezovsky to Lukashenka’s outspoken opposition to the mood of the public. How popular is the president? the CIS while it remained under Berezovsky's Clearly, he is more popular and trusted by the older leadership. Other possible candidates included S. generation. This is evident from polls conducted by the Domash, Syarhey Haydukevich, N. Statkevich, and S. Independent Institute for Socio-Economic and Political Kalyakin. Studies over the five years of the Lukashenka Domash proposed that several political leaders presidency (ending in March 1999), which show a should meet and decide on a candidate to run in the pattern that is virtually unchanged, but for a slight fall elections, ostensibly with the hope that he personally in support for the president in 1999. Thus to the would be that candidate. He gave the Minsk leaders an question: If the presidential elections were held ultimatum that if they failed to form a united front, then tomorrow, whom would you choose as the candidate? the union of democratic forces would commence not in (only one politician could be named), 75% of those Minsk, but in his home base of Hrodna. Gennadiy over the age of 55 selected Lukashenka, 36.4% in the Grushevoy (Henadz Hrushavy), the Chairman of the age group 16-19, and only 24.3% between the ages of Belarusian Charitable Fund "For the Children of 25-29. In the over 55 category two years ago, however, Chernobyl," the largest locally administered NGO in the corresponding figure was 81.8%.2 3 Belarus, elected not to run because of fears for his A survey conducted by the organization Novak, led physical safety, but he considered a role as an organizer by Andrey Vardamatsky, polled 1,094 Belarusians of a petition to gather signatures in support of a between 26 April and 3 May 1999 on the question: referendum on the question: Do you support the How do you appraise well known politicians?- integration of Belarus into the European Union? All allowing for both positive and negative responses. In the potential candidates began the campaign with the positive category, Lukashenka received 47.5%, certain goals vis-a-vis the electorate: to preserve the followed by Jacques Chirac with 25.1%, Slobodan voters' faith in them; to undermine the support of the Milosevic with 17.9%, and Boris Yeltsin and Bill electors for their rivals; and to attract apolitical voters. Clinton came at the bottom of the list with 12.3% and 11.4% respectively. The negative voting saw the same The Position of President Lukashenka two world leaders well ahead of the field with 52.2% During the election campaign and especially at the and 52.1%, Milosevic with 35.1%, and Lukashenka initial stages, Lukashenka competed with the with 30%? The survey demonstrates two factors: first, opposition candidates for the support of the electorate. Lukashenka remains the most popular politician within He sought to present an image of a president who fights Belarus, but second, that support may be lukewarm and against corruption and is the servant of the people. His his negative ratings are quite high. Moreover, the opponents, meanwhile, were depicted as people who obvious lack of faith in Yeltsin may reflect badly on would side with the Western powers, who were corrupt Lukashenka’s initiatives to form a union with Russia. and self-serving, and for whom power and money took Lukashenka’s ratings in Minsk have consistently been precedence over the interests of the people. His speeches portrayed the opposition leaders as children. Lukashenka’s main weakness was the sharp decline in 2Belarus Today, 4 May 1999. the economy that had taken place since the fall of 1998. 3Naviny, 18 May 1999, p. 3.

12 THE HARRIMAN REVIEW up to ten percentage points lower than those in Belarus Chyhir is a poor public speaker; indeed, his as a whole. Lukashenka, then, had significant positive speeches attract ridicule rather than attention. In the forces at his disposal during the campaign. election campaign he tried to present himself as a man On the negative side, he faced the process of the of organizational ability who could reverse the trends continual decline in living standards. In a survey in the economy. He advocated minimum wages of published in the newspaper Naviny (25 May 1999), in $100 a month (in May 1999 they were on average an article entitled "How We Live," it was noted that about $34) and pensions of $50 a month. He had the 63% of the electorate consider that the economy of support initially of the powerful former Minister of Belarus is "weak" or "very weak." In the early years of Internal Affairs Yuri Zakharenka and vowed to bring his presidency Lukashenka could successfully divert criminal charges against Lukashenka for corruption. attention for economic problems to the government of His campaign thus focused on his creativity and his predecessors, Stanislau Shushkevich (1991 to initiative, and at the same time his ability to be a strong January 1994) and Vyachaslau Kebich (January-June leader. Paznyak also declared his intention to form 1994). After five years in power, however, and with people's tribunals to investigate issues such as enhanced authority since November 1996 in what is corruption, political repression, and Chernobyl-related virtually a presidential state, it is becoming increasingly problems. Paznyak and the BPF have also advocated difficult to avoid responsibility for Belarus's decline in closer contacts with Europe, as opposed to Russia, and living standards. By May 1999, according to a survey ultimately the integration of Belarus into the European published in an opposition newspaper, the negative Union. vote exceeded the positive (2.5 million to 1.5 million Paznyak, however, was limited by several factors. out of 7 million voters).4 His directions to his subordinates came by facsimile from Poland, since he never crossed the border into The Opposition Campaign Belarus. Eventually these constant faxes elicited The opposition campaign was well funded. laughter and irritation. In short, it proved impossible Hanchar, as the chairman of the CEC, received about for Paznyak to obtain an accurate picture of what was $250,000 in funds, with potential for as much as $5 happening in the campaign. His rating among the million (though as will be observed, funding began to majority of voters remained negative, thanks in part to dry up as a result of internal disputes). It received the regime's depiction of him and his family as sympathy from Russian media sources, which "fascists" (despite the fact that he was born only in publicized the opposition campaign within Belarus. 1944 and that his father perished at the hands of The election campaign was helped by a strong Fascists during the war). His flight to the United States organizational team, the tacit support of the West, in 1996 was equated with cowardice by some voters, positive backing from some Russian leaders, and by the particularly when contrasted with those imprisoned widespread structure of the BPF in all regions of recently in Belarus-eventually including Chyhir Belarus. Ultimately, only two candidates took part in himself. the campaign: Mikhail Chyhir, a former prime minister under Lukashenka; and Zyanon Paznyak, chairman of The Decline of Lukashenka the BPF. A third group under Karpenka, supported by The opposition election placed reliance on the hope the Charter-97 group under the leadership of that as a result of the campaign, the electoral rating of Alyaksander Sannikau, intended to mount a campaign Lukashenka would begin to fall significantly. Focus later in the year against Lukashenka. This plan was was also placed on the "lawlessness" of the regime. ended abruptly with Karpenka’s untimely death on 6 Lukashenka, in turn, emphasized his role as “protector” April.5 * of Belarusians against threats from the West. This role could be said to have begun with the evictions of Western ambassadors from their residences at the 4 Oleg Manaev, writing in the newspaper Narodnaya Drazdy complex outside Minsk in June 1998. He has Volya, 21 May 1999. The figures, however, seem suspect and the frequently changed his cabinet, illustrating his role as likelihood is that they pertained only to a certain phase of the election a leader who is prepared to develop new initiatives. In campaign. sAn oributary of Karpenka appeared in Belorusskaya addition, however, his initial approach to the election delovaya gazeta, 7 April 1999, p. 1. was to denounce the opposition for trying to seize

13 THE HARRIMAN REVIEW power, using as his instrument the State Prosecutor. apartment building and has not been seen since.7 Each This accusation undermined the credibility of the government action designed to thwart the elections and president among the public. In the eyes of the voters, punish the candidates and organizers undermined its the president appeared weak and even frightened, prestige. For a brief period it appeared that not only whereas the opposition seemed to have taken the would the elections be conducted successfully, but that initiative. After mass protests of workers in November the fact of their being held at all constituted a serious 1998 in Salihorsk and Minsk, Lukashenka offered to threat to the Lukashenka presidency. Lukashenka's give up his portfolio as president if the workers and over-reaction and brute-force tactics appeared crude collective farmers felt the need to punish him. This and unnecessary and demonstrated, above all, his event was an earlier manifestation of the president's trepidation at the turn of events. The first stage of the fear of losing power. election campaign was thus a sweeping success for the In turn, the policy of repressing opponents had the opposition. reverse effect to what was intended. Hanchar was summoned to the office of the KGB and warned not to The Rise of Lukashenka continue the election campaign. Members of his At this stage, Lukashenka's supporters in committee were detained and then Hanchar himself was government came to his aid. Both Prime Minister arrested in early March and jailed for ten days, and then Syarhey Linh and head of the presidential force-fed after declaring a hunger strike. These events administration Mikhail Myasnikovich played prominent were highlighted on Russian Television, which is roles. Gradually during the campaign Lukashenka accessible to the vast majority of Belarusian residents, reestablished his position as a powerful and all- in addition to opposition newspapers. Hanchar became pervasive leader, while Linh receded into the something of a hero to Belarusians, particularly during background. Moreover, Linh was held responsible for the hunger strike. He was seen as a man who was not the government’s poor economic performance. even running as a candidate but was prepared to Lukashenka was directly assisted in this transition by sacrifice himself for the goal of free elections. the two opposition candidates themselves, Chyhir and Lukashenka's credibility, on the other hand, continued Paznyak, as the election campaign took on a bitter hue. to dissipate. The Russian media at this stage of the Even prior to his arrest, Chyhir mounted an attack on campaign began to highlight the activities of Chyhir Paznyak, while shortly afterward the latter tried to have and Hanchar, causing Paznyak to accuse Chyhir of Chyhir's wife Yulia and her colleague Tatsyana Vanina being Moscow's protege. The government also expelled from the Soym (leadership body) of the BPF. threatened to close six opposition newspapers that A direct confrontation occurred between the BPF continued to advertise the date of the elections. leader and Yulia Chyhir that served to discredit both The arrests and detentions, first of Hanchar for presidential candidates and discouraged potential holding an unsanctioned meeting, and then Chyhir on sponsors from investing further funds in the two 31 March, on a trumped-up charge of transferring $1 opposition campaigns. Indeed, the critique of Paznyak million to a company in Canada while chairman of the in the democratic newspaper Svobodtiye novosti (23-30 board of the Belahrodprombank, created martyrs of April 1999) exceeded in its venom anything directed these two opposition leaders. On 8 April Chyhir was formerly against President Lukashenka. charged with grand larceny and jailed for three months, A second event played an important role in the thereby ensuring that he would be absent from the change of fortunes for the president, namely NATO's remainder of the presidential campaign.6 On 15 April the authorities prevented a press conference to have been held by Hanchar by turning off electricity and blocking off the entrance to the building. On 7 May, 7 Disappearances of Lukashenka’s opponents are Zakharenka disappeared in the vicinity of his own becoming increasingly common in Belarus. The most notorious case is that of former chairperson of the National Bank, Tamara Vinnikava, who had been under house arrest for over two years and “disappeared” on the night of 7-8 April. Her Russian lawyer, Garri Pogonyaylo, believes taht she may have been moved to a secret location to keep her concealed from pubic view. Others speculate that she may no longer be alive. Belorusskaya gazeta, 17 April 6 RFE/RL Newsline Daily Digest, 9 April 1999. 1999, pp. 2,5.

14 THE HARRIMAN REVIEW bombing attack on Yugoslavia. Lukashenka used of appearing in public with Gorbachev, and made the "NATO aggression" as a means to undermine the unsolicited comment-to the delight of the BPF-that campaigns of Paznyak and Chyhir. The mass media "we are all children of Gorbachev." Opinions of began to portray the president in several ways: as a man Gorbachev among the electorate are uniformly low. He fearless of NATO attacks, who was willing to fly to is associated less with the ending of a totalitarian Yugoslavia to meet with Milosevic in mid-April, regime than as the man who destroyed the Soviet despite there being no guarantees of his safety; as an Union, in which Belarus had thrived, and as the man integrator working toward the union of Russia, Belarus, responsible for several bloody conflicts that ensued. and even Yugoslavia; and as a peacemaker, adopting The liberal opposition could thus present Lukashenka the principles of protection of his citizens from as a second Gorbachev, more devoted to chatter than aggression. Lukashenka’s flight to Yugoslavia had two any authentic reform. However, attention was diverted other consequences. First, it raised the possibility of from this "electoral slip" of Lukashenka by a profound the “accidental" removal of the president from the rift that occurred between Paznyak and Hanchar over political scene by his flying through a war zone. the way in which the election was to be conducted. Second, it presented to the world television pictures of For Hanchar, the organization of the elections was Lukashenka and Milosevic as close friends. This a formidable task. There were no official polling development heightened the anti-western image of stations available and it appeared impossible to hold Lukashenka but it also served to perpetuate the view of valid elections-i.e., in which at least 50% of the Lukashenka as a ruthless politician who was willing to electorate participated-unless some other means were eliminate his enemies (such as Zakharenka and Tamara devised. His solution was to have members of the Vinnikava) and was on cordial terms with tyrants Central Electoral Commission carry the ballot boxes (Milosevic). from one apartment building to another so that votes At this same time the death of Karpenka led to could be collected. This process necessitated the further ramifications for Chyhir’s campaign. In several beginning of voting on 6 May rather than the official regional newspapers, articles appeared that accused polling day of 16 May. Paznyak, who had already former members of Karpenka's executive committee of accused the Chyhir camp of falsifying signatures for its deserting to Chyhir, a fact that Karpenka had candidate's original registration, reacted with fury to considered a personal misfortune. Obituaries of this change of procedure. He called on the electorate Karpenka in the newspaper Naviny and other BPF to boycott the "pre-election" voting and accused publications dwelled on this event. One such article, Hanchar of arbitrarily overriding the law in ways entitled "Traitors in the camp of similar to those used by the president in the November Chyhir," was even broadcast on radio and 1996' referendum.9 Further, on 11 May, Paznyak television. As Chyhir’s ratings began to fall, articles ordered those BPF members on the Central Electoral appeared in the mass circulation daily Sovetskaya Commission to resign their posts and on 13 May, he Belorussiya creating an image of Lukashenka as a declared that he would withdraw his own candidacy leader of genius. While Sovetskaya Belorussiya has from the election. long been a sycophantic newspaper in the president’s In taking this stance, Paznyak split his own camp. camp, the timing of the new eulogies was significant. Some of his deputies (S. Papkau, A. Krivorot) began Ultimately, therefore, the death of Karpenka, which telephoning regions and insisting that BPF members might have united the opposition, only divided it leave the commissions, communicating both with the further, while permitting the president to solidify his headquarters of the BPF and with Hanchar. Another own backing. group felt that Paznyak had sabotaged the efforts of the A slight setback for Lukashenka occurred with the opposition to hold the elections and began to assess the visit to Minsk of former Soviet president Mikhail actions of their leader as treacherous. Deputy chairman Gorbachev on 14-15 April to participate in an Yuri Khadyka considered that Paznyak’s action had international round-table on the theme "Russia and destroyed the image of the BPF as a democratic party Belarus in the New Europe."8 Lukashenka made a point and claimed that Paznyak was using the campaign for

o Belorusskaya gazeta, 17 April 1999, p. 4. 9See, for example, Belarus Today, 11 May 1999.

15 THE HARRIMAN REVIEW

self-promotion rather than to promote the goals of his sympathizers had ignored Paznyak's demand that they party and democracy.10 BPF leaders meanwhile held boycott the elections. The newspaper Pagonya (20 several press conferences that accused Hanchar of May 1999) declared that Paznyak had received almost falsifying the election returns while members of the 500,000 votes in the Hrodna region alone. Other rank-and-file could only perceive such actions as sources indicated a victory for Chyhir. Under these furthering the interests of the Lukashenka government. circumstances Lukashenka announced on television Within the leadership of the BPF some members began that the elections would not lead to a change of to consider the removal of Paznyak as leader. The 13th government. Though the president's ratings had fallen Session of the Supreme Soviet, led by Sharetsky, slightly as a result of the campaign, those of Paznyak rejected Paznyak's claims and declared that the voting and Hanchar had suffered a catastrophic decline. procedure was legitimate. The main issue hitherto-the Chyhir's ratings were more stable since a portion of the power and authority of Lukashenka-had been electorate was resolutely opposed to his continuing forgotten. detainment in jail. Where do these events leave Sharetsky and After the Elections Hanchar? For Sharetsky's own presidential ambitions By the morning of 15 May the CEC reported that it was useful that during the opposition presidential 3.6 million Belarusians had cast their votes, elections no candidate was elected. Hanchar, on the representing 48.7% of the electorate.11 Four days later, other hand, may hope that even negative publicity is a spokesperson for the Central Election Commission, good publicity in terms of keeping his name in the Alyaksander Koktysh, announced that by the end of the limelight. In the next stage of the presidential campaign, over 4 million people had taken part in elections, which Sharetsky has declared his intention to voting, or 53.1 % of eligible voters. In announcing such hold, Hanchar plans to advance his nomination as a figures, the CEC claimed that the elections had been a candidate for the presidency. His place as chairman of success. Neither Koktysh nor Hanchar provided a the CEC will be taken by Tarazevich, while in the breakdown of votes for individual candidates, however. background the real authority may be Boris Gyunter, a Moreover, the alleged size of the turnout seemed very CEC secretary. Two years ago Sharetsky and Hanchar unlikely to most observers. In Minsk it was difficult to conducted an ideological war against one another, but find people who had actually voted, and on 16 May, recently the two have been in close contact and have many potential voters had no idea where to vote. Ballot held discussions on various issues. Hanchar has used stations included the shell of an old bus in a Minsk the departure of numerous BPF members from the suburb, for example. The announcements of 15 and 19 regional electoral commissions to ensure that these May, therefore, more than any other events of the posts are filled with his own supporters. Hanchar, in tumultuous campaign, destroyed the faith of the short, is hardly fulfilling the role of a democratic or opposition in Hanchar, as the chief organizer of the unselfish statesman. The question in the minds of the elections. Those in opposition were completely BPF, the OSCE, and other observers of the situation in disillusioned by what appeared to them to be the Belarus is: How will Sharetsky respond to the falsification of the election results. Paznyak again machinations of Hanchar? Are they in the same camp? overreacted by blaming Chyhir who was declared to be Will they continue to work together?12 relaxing under comfortable conditions in prison! Between the two camps a new battle commenced over the votes for the individual candidates. A BPF version of the results appeared on the Internet, and 12 Since this article went to press, both politicians have maintained that Paznyak had received 2.5 million votes been removed, temporarily or otherwise, from the Minsk political to Chyhir’s 1.5 million. Paradoxically, if correct, this scene. On 20 July, fearing imminent arrest, Sharetsky fled to Vilnius, would signify that most BPF members and Lithuania, where he remained as of the end of September. See RFE/RL Newsline, Part 11, 26 July 1999. On 16-17 September, Hanchar “disappeared” not far from his apartment and has not been in Minsk since. The authorities have claimed that he has left Belarus; other sources, including the OSCE and the US Department 10 Yuriy Khodyko, “BNF ne ozero dlya Nartsissa,” of State, suspecting foul play, have demanded an explanation from Naviny, 18 May 1999, p. 3. the authorities. See The Jamestown Foundation Monitor Daily 11 Belorusskaya gazeta, 17 May 1999, p. 6. Report, 23 September 1999.

16 THE HARRIMAN REVIEW

Sharetsky received a message from L. Barshcheuski considering the position, particularly as Paznyak had and A. Krivorot, deputy chairman and secretary of the openly demanded his removal from the deputy BPF respectively, on 30 May outlining the alleged chairmanship. Another deputy chairman, Lyavon falsification of the election results by Hanchar. At Barshcheuski, was to maintain his position of loyalty to stake was the potential support of both the BPF and Paznyak as long as the party did not submit itself to the OSCE for Sharetsky and the 13lh Session of the re-registration procedures demanded by the Supreme Soviet. On 16 May, at an OSCE meeting government. If it was reregistered then Barshcheuski attended by Hanchar, Tarazevich, Gyunter and with would support the replacement of Paznyak. As far as Adrian Severin of the OSCE, Hanchar accused other the beleaguered chair is concerned, there are two OSCE representatives of providing an unobjective conflicting analyses. The first notes that Paznyak has appraisal of the election campaign in Belarus. For his a negative image among voters, most of whom perceive part, Severin anticipated that there were two possible him as a fascist or an aggressive nationalist. The rating scenarios for Belarus after 20 July. In the first, of Paznyak has collapsed and has no potential to rise, Sharetsky would assume the presidency after 20 July, and thus Paznyak has no chance of succeeding against supported by the EU and the United States, who would a popular figure such as Lukashenka, particularly when put pressure on Lukashenka to agree to new elections the incumbent president has all the machinery of the for president later in the year. Lukashenka and the government at his disposal. opposition could then hold discussions (such The alternative deduction, however, is that despite discussions failed to get off the ground in 1997) and his negative qualities, Paznyak has positive potential as create a united commission for the election of president a candidate. He is well known and his name is that would also incorporate the CEC. Elections would practically synonymous with the BPF. If Paznyak were then occur under the control of international observers. replaced, his successor would be unknown, and lacking In Severin's second variant, Sharetsky would adequate access to the mass media he would find it assume the presidency but Lukashenka would refuse impossible to unravel the hard core of support for the overtures of the West and refuse to hold elections. Lukashenka. Further, Paznyak is idolized by a section Then the OSCE would offer its own version of a of the BPF, thus any attempt to replace him would presidential election in which only the opposition cause a deep rift within the party. In the minds of forces would participate. The OSCE also stressed the supporters therefore, the removal of Paznyak would importance of continued pressure of the IMF and likely mean the extinction of the BPF as a political EBRD on Russia through the assignment of credits. force. At the very least, however, Paznyak's actions Severin maintained that the departure of Primakov as during the campaign made him appear foolish to many Russian premier was linked to pressure on Yeltsin on voters. the part of the United States. In turn, Russia would put pressure on Lukashenka to hold new elections this year The Future for the presidency. However, the views of Western Lukashenka can take heart from the failure of the statesmen clearly may vary and there has been opposition election campaign, despite making some supposition that some leaders of the US government elementary blunders at the outset by adopting heavy- are not averse to seeing a continuation of the handed tactics. The electoral ratings for all his rivals Lukashenka presidency, providing that it offers stability for the presidency have either plummeted (as in the in the republic rather than a situation closer to civil war case of Paznyak and Hanchar) or remain very low between the various parties. (Domash, Grushevoy, Sharetsky, Chyhir, Kalyakin, Haydukevich). The pro-Western platforms of leaders The Belarusian Popular Front of the democratic opposition were deeply undercut by An intensive debate within the BPF occurred after the NATO attack on Yugoslavia and even with the the election among those leaders who favor the ending of this conflict may take several months to replacement of Paznyak. The likely time for such an recover from these events. The president currently has event was the summer Congress of the party a unique opportunity to combine new presidential (commencing 31 July). At the time of writing the elections with a referendum question that could be potential candidates for BPF Chair were Viktor phrased to cover the spectrum of Europe and the world: Ivashkevich and Vintsuk Vechorka. Khadyka was also Do you support the union of Belarus and Russia with

17 THE HARRIMAN REVIEW the integration of Belarus into European and world under international scrutiny.13 In so doing he may even society? This question would solidify the electoral be able to retain his revised Constitution and the program of Lukashenka and undercut the platform of revamped parliament and upper house. He will have opposition leaders who choose to oppose him. satisfied the demands of the OSCE and can reopen a The danger for Lukashenka comes from several dialogue with the West as an alternative to the abortive quarters. Retired servicemen, for example, including discussions with Russia to bring reality to the Russia- those from Russia, voted solidly for Paznyak in the Belarus Union. election (reportedly around 52% in Lida, the main The presidential elections held in May 1999 have military base). The trade unions are increasingly active thus provided a new opportunity for Lukashenka both and anti-government, though they in turn are to consolidate his power and take his place as a leader experiencing a leadership struggle and competing for in the new Europe. For the democratic opposition, long foreign funds. Catholics, the majority of whom live in struggling to make its voice heard in the West, it is the Hrodna region, are alienated from the Lukashenka difficult to imagine what greater disaster could have government and a president self-described as an befallen it. "Orthodox atheist." Lastly, the country is in a deep economic recession with no prospects for improvement Uladzimir Padhol is Chairman of the Department of in the near future. The president, as in the past, will Political Psychology at the Belarusian People’s need to make a distinction between a presidency which University in Minsk. has as its main motivational factor the needs and interests of the people and a government composed, David Marples is Professor of History at the University mainly, of incompetent bureaucrats. Significant of Alberta, Canada, and the author of Belarus: A changes in the Cabinet can thus be anticipated, and Denationalized Nation (1999). Prime Minister Linh's position must be considered very insecure. Ultimately Lukashenka must circumvent the fundamental question on the lips of voters: Who is to blame for the collapse of living standards? Lukashenka, then, faces significant problems, but they pale beside those of an opposition whose tactics during the election have caused bewilderment among a population slowly becoming accustomed to the loss of Karpenka, one of the greatest forces for unity in the opposition. Sharetsky's direct association with the activities of Hanchar has done little to promote faith internationally in the Supreme Soviet of the 13th session. Paznyak's tactics, hectoring, and high- handedness from his rostrum abroad have cost him support and already elicited significant divisions within the BPF. Chyhir has little charisma and would be unlikely to succeed in a direct competition with Lukashenka. He has benefited from his imprisonment, which has brought protests both within and outside Belarus, but he would not pose a serious challenge without support from the BPF or Trade Unions, neither of which is likely to be forthcoming. Under these circumstances, Lukashenka has little to lose from calling new presidential elections that can be held

13In mid-July 1999, Lukashenka reportedly agreed to hold presidential elections in the year 2000 in cooperation with the OSCXE. Reuters, 17 July 1999.

18 UKRAINIAN CASE TO UKRAINIAN CAUSE

Mykola Ryabchuk

Catherine Wanner, Burden of Dreams. History and Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine. The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998. xxvii pp. + 255 pp.

ust a few years of Ukrainian independence have 75); "Fewer and fewer Russian newspapers, magazines, prompted in the West more books and articles on books, and television programs are making their way the country than in all the preceding decades of into Ukraine, exacerbating an already sizeable JUkrainian (non)existence. Like many newcomers to the information vacuum" (p. 196). Some harmless but subject, Catherine Wanner arrived at Ukrainian topics noticeable factual mistakes that should have been from her rather substantial Russian studies—an avoided in such a scrupulous and otherwise well- ambivalent background for all who approach an elaborated study might also distress some pedantic (ex)colonial periphery from an (ex)metropolitan center. readers (e.g., Volodymyr Ivasiuk, the composer, died in One can speculate whether or not another approach is Lviv, not Chernivtsi, as the author claims; Vitaly possible and preferable, but the pitfalls of Korotych, the journalist, hails from Kyiv and not Russocentrism are obvious when trying to explore Kharkiv; Volodymyr Vynnychenko, a writer, was not Ukraine from the historically biased and often largely a historian; the huge Lenin monument in Kyiv was distorted Russia-based perspective. erected in 1977 and not 1946, etc.). In most cases, Wanner avoids the temptation to As a cultural anthropologist, Wanner carried out follow the easy road of prevailing Russophile extensive anthropological field research in Ukraine in stereotypes and anti-Ukrainian biases. This is not an 1990-96, which included both courageous trips easy task, and sometimes she makes dubious throughout the country and interviews with various references. With no additional explanations for such people on different occasions. Her book, as a result, complicated, controversial and extremely sensitive contains exciting pieces of “creative reporting” matters, she would have us take for granted the supplemented, however, with perceptive academic "Ukrainian nationalist collaboration with the Nazis," as analyses of numerous primary and secondary sources. masterminded by Stepan Bandera (p. 130); a "military In her introduction to Burden of Dreams, Wanner alliance with Nazi Germany," forged by the defines her work as a "multi-sided ethnography of Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (p. 163); processes, specifically the processes and dynamics oversimplistically defines OUN as "an armed force that involved in converting a nationalist ideology into an originally collaborated with the Nazis during World institutionalized national culture and a meaningful War II" (p. 223); unjustifiably labels Kyiv Mohyla national identity in the aftermath of the socialist Academy as "highly nationalistic" (p. 110); discovers experiment [...]. As such, this ethnography becomes an a "hypernationalist" private school in Lviv (p. 115); anthropological study of the state, of how the state, and uncritically states that "Petliura is also associated through a negotiated settlement among competing with the vicious pogroms committed by the UNR interests and visions, attempts to establish the troops" (p. 223). categories, periods, and events that give meaning to Occasionally she makes unsubstantiated statements individual and collective experience, and of how such about Ukrainian culture and media, apparently attempts by the state are challenged and even overruled purchased at secondhand Russian colonial stores: by individuals through everyday practices" (p. xvii). "With little cultural capital at their disposal, political The book consists of two unequal parts, divided and cultural leaders [of Ukraine] turned to history" (p. into three and four chapters respectively, the first,

19 THE HARRIMAN REVIEW smaller portion of her book, entitled "The Legacy of articulating a national culture and a sense of national Soviet Culture," provides an excellent account of "how identity to reflect new political realities [in Ukraine] a sense of nationality was constituted by the Soviet particularly complex" (p. xviii). system" and how various loyalties and allegiances were In the author's view, there are two major obstacles incorporated into a larger, supranational Soviet identity to nationalizing efforts in Ukraine: first, the 11 million (chapter 1, "Nationality in Soviet and Post-Soviet members of the Russian minority, more than 20% of Ukraine" ); how a secessionist project succeeded in the Ukrainian population; and second, the largely heavily Russified Ukraine and the role of historical Russified Ukrainian majority (at least one-third of revisionism in generating support for this cause ethnic Ukrainians are apparently Russophone). (chapter 2, "The Rise of Nationalist Opposition"); and Therefore, Wanner claims, any attempt to nationalize finally, how "Soviet-era patterns of discourse and "the people of Ukraine" (narod Ukrainy) into the practices [...] remain salient and give life to the values "Ukrainian people" (ukrains'kyj narod) triggers not and practices embodied in Soviet culture even though only interethnic tensions but also intraethnic discord: the Soviet Union has collapsed" (chapter 3, "On Being the Russified Ukrainians have little, if any, wish to be Soviet"). renationalized. They feel they were rather freely The second part of the book, entitled "Sites of assimilated into Russian culture than brutally Nationalizing," deals extensively with the "sites at victimized by Russian and Soviet cultural policies (p. which national culture is articulated, contested, xix). negotiated, and perhaps, institutionalized" (p. xix). The author seems to be of two minds—caught Subsequently, in four chapters, four such sites are between the nationalistic depiction of the "historic examined (namely, schools, festivals, the state relationship between Ukrainians and the Russian and calendar, and urban space) which "serve as arenas Soviet states in terms of cultural subjugation, economic where a post-Soviet national culture can be articulated exploitation, forced assimilation, and genocide"; and and, of course, contested as part of an overall project to the "creolic" concept of peaceful and voluntary fortify or challenge the new state” (p. 75). Such a assimilation into the dominant culture through choice is well justified by the critical importance of "intermarriage, mobility, and the media" (p. xix). The these sites in state efforts to "convert the meaning of numerous facts and historical references in the book historical events into personal events and turn a confirm the former, nationalistic view, but the latter national identity into a personal identity" (p. 206). creolic view remains unquestioned and unexplained. Naturally, there are other sites of equal or even greater Occasionally Wanner comes very close to the importance that could and probably should be problem, but never close enough to reveal it. For explored—the national media, for example, or sporting example, at many points she writes about "confusion events (in September 1998, over 90% of the and apathy toward national re-identification in post- respondents to a poll in the Crimea supported the Soviet Ukraine" (p. 50), and about "cultural and Ukrainian soccer team in her victorious match against historic amnesia collectively experienced by the Russians). Nonetheless, the general paradigm for Ukrainians" (p. 123); she quotes common people who the research has been firmly established, and the results claim that "earlier [in the USSR] we never had any seem to be very plausible. problems with nationalities" (p. 69) and that their The major assumption of Wanner's research is that nationality had "no meaning" for them and never did any state has a vested interest in nationalizing (p. 15). She also describes the "process of stripping processes, because "their success or failure directly down the individuality and dignity of every citizen to affect perceptions of state legitimacy" (xvii). And for create homo sovieticus" and "peeling back the histories Ukraine, a "new state steeped in economic crisis and cultures of many nationalities in the Soviet Union legitimating itself against a culturally oppressive to create the Soviet people" (p. 49). multinational empire [...], the institutionalization of a This "stripping" and "peeling" was not merely national culture is a project of paramount importance" metaphorical. Powerful propaganda was effectively (p. xxi). Yet, Wanner argues, "the legacy of supplemented with secret police terror, concentration statelessness, combined with the mosaic of influences camps, and mass killings. Referring to the manmade it produced and comparatively close cultural and famine of 1932-33, which resulted in the deaths by geographical proximity to Russia, makes the process of starvation of at least 5 million Ukrainians, Catherine

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Wanner states that "for a peasant-based people, this received under Soviet rule. The message is clear: we meant that the nation and its 'soul' had been destroyed" don't care what a person's nationality is—as long as it (p. 43). Wanner, however, does not take the next step is Soviet (or Russian), like ours; nationality has no to draw a proper conclusion from all these general meaning for us—as long it is truly meaningless under observations, namely, Ukrainians, in general, were not the Soviet/Russian superidentity. On one hand, this just "freely" assimilated into the "mainstream" culture, makes a good excuse for the "raped" to accept violence but rather, were brutally dispossessed from their as progressive development; on the other hand, it is an linguistic and cultural identity. Therefore, in actuality, equally good excuse for the "rapists" to persecute the Ukrainian people had been "raped" throughout the "nationalists" who devote too much thought to their centuries in a most violent and humiliating way. Now, non-Soviet nationalities, their "virgin" non-Russian the rape victims typically defend their traumatized cultures, and their languages. consciousness, widely exposing their "cultural Catherine Wanner is essentially aware of the amnesia," their "confusion and apathy," and claiming ambiguity of Soviet "internationalism" and "anti- that they had not been "raped" but, rather, got married nationalism" as peculiar forms of Russian nationalistic quite voluntarily. ideology. "Even though the Soviet Union was never Actually, they avoid any talk on the topic as organized as a Russian state per se," she notes, potentially dangerous and, again, traumatizing. Wanner "Russians were the dominant nationality. They has perfectly captured this phenomenon: "We don't controlled the key Party and state positions in the care what a person's nationality is," says one of her government. Russian was the lingua franca of the state, interviewees. "The whole idea is strange to us" (p. 19). the media, education, and printing, and this created The explanation she offers is good but hardly formidable pressure to assimilate to the Russian sufficient: "Many people feel Soviet out of recognition language" (p. 13). of having collectively endured the ill-fated Bolshevik Wanner is also aware of how the term "bourgeois experiment. Soviet culture was, of course, supported nationalism" was misused by the Soviets, who applied by an entire ideological system, a way of life perceived it in the witch hunt against all who resisted the as unique, and the institution of citizenship... The “progressive” pace of Sovietization/Russification. enduring practices created by the Soviet system [...] "This was particularly so in Ukraine," Dr. Wanner sustain the social relations they spawned and influence writes, "where various decrees celebrated the pace and nature of social change in post-Soviet 'internationalist' values as the police apparatus rooted society" (p. 50). out 'bourgeois nationalism' and 'hostile foreign One must realize that no "ideological system" per influences', Soviet labels for national and religious se, no "way of life," no "institution of citizenship" sentiments and activities" (p. 24). And since "Ukrainian could ever create such a dreadful phenomenon as the nationalism was" not just an ideological label, but a Soviet identity—not without total and permanent criminal accusation, it was effectively used to eliminate coercion. Soviet identity was not just a social any "nationalistic" sentiment or attachment, and to experiment, but was also a genetic one that discredit nearly all Ukrainian leaders and activists lobotomized the weak and obedient species, while throughout history. euthanizing the strong and resistant breeds. The people Yet this ideological brainwashing would never who therefore claim to "never [have] had any problems have resulted in such a profound Sovietization of with nationalities" (p. 69) or that their own nationality Ukrainian society were it not for the purges, terroristic had "no meaning" for them (p. 15) are only speaking a witch-hunts and other genocidal forms of Soviet half-truth. They are probably right when they say that "psychotherapy." The Ukrainian (and Belorussian and they themselves have no problem with even, to some extent, the Russian) case is clear when nationalities—after all, they had chosen (or inherited) compared with those of the Baltics, Poles, or the the right nationality, language, and identity—the Soviet western Ukrainians who had not been exposed as long identity. But ask a Ukrainian about their fellow citizens or hard to the Soviet and Russian imperial who do grapple with their own national identities, and "engineering" system. "The ability to externalize they will certainly say that these people are socialism and to conceive of Soviet rule as a foreign "nationalists"—people who care about their imposition is a critical culture difference between the nationalities, and who fully deserved the treatment they western provinces and other regions of Ukraine,"

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Wanner writes (p. 122). In eastern Ukraine, we might To understand this phenomenon, the psychological continue, since the “Sovietism” had been internalized, consequences of historical victimization should be peculiar psychological ties between the victims and the considered, and some methods from psychoanalysis victimizes emerged—a kind of conspiracy or, more could be applied to deconstruct both the consciousness accurately, pervasive solidarity between the "raped" and subconsciousness of Sovietized Ukrainians. and the "rapists" which to this day stands as a major Wanner comes close to the problem when writing about obstacle to further de-Sovietization and the "harrowing and haunting images of the past," and “Ukrainization.” about the "erased or significantly altered" memories (p. Perhaps the notion of the deep psychological 45), but again, she does not attempt to answer why trauma experienced by Ukrainians could have given the Ukraine has no "independent social criteria for author a better key to understanding the problems she evaluating and eventually accepting or rejecting rival vigorously discusses in her well-documented book. At interpretations of the past." Or, in other words, why one point she insightfully writes: "The pervasiveness Ukrainians are not listening to each other, to scholars, and persistence of a Russian-based Sovietized culture to politicians, or to anyone who could destroy their impinges upon a redesign of Ukrainian society by psychologically settled "ignorance" and rekindle the hampering reform in numerous ways..." A little effort traumatizing feeling of being "raped"—or, equally is needed to interpret the “persistence” through the uncomfortably, of being a "rapist." “pervasiveness.” The author, however, largely seems to This may well explain why "Chernobyl symbolized ignore the anthropological methodology elaborated by the exploitative nature of the system and the contemporary post-colonial studies (no classic book of victimization of Ukraine under Soviet rule" (p. 32) the sort is actually referred to in the bibliography, nor much more persuasively than the Great Famine or any is the term "colonial" listed in the index, despite the other historical event for Ukrainian national leaders, fact that it is employed in the text at least twelve times). who used it to mobilize people toward independence. This makes the author's approach rather positivistic: the The Chernobyl atomic disaster was made by "them" Sovietization/Russification of Ukraine is treated as an (Moscow) to "us" (all the inhabitants of Ukraine). The essentially social and cultural phenomenon—a sort of Famine was less clear: it affected only some of "us" "inertia," inherited, socially constructed, and imposed (rural Ukrainians), while others (urban Ukrainians and on the society's way of life, thought, and behavior. Russians) enjoyed relative comfort and prosperity, Implicitly this suggests that, in the newly independent largely because of the enslavement and cruel Ukraine, these old patterns could be gradually replaced exploitation of the Ukrainophone kolkhoz serfs. The with new ones, and this is what "Ukrainization/ de- question of active and, especially, passive collaboration Sovietization" could mean. But these changes are not of many (if not the majority) of "us" with "them" makes progressing well, if progressing at all, to the growing modem Ukrainian history more divisive than unifying. irritation of Ukrainian patriots and Western observers. Therefore, modern Ukrainian history played a minor The Ukrainian state, of course, cannot forge and role in public mobilization for the secessionist cause impose a new identity with the same means used by (except for Western Ukraine). Ancient history proved the Soviet state. The new Ukraine seems to rely first to be much more appealing: Kyivan Rus', considered a and foremost on the "natural" development of common history for both Ukrainians and Russians, and democracy, where the return to the norm is the ultimate the Cossacks, whose conflicts with Russians were goal. Yet the notion of the "norm" in a heavily ignored while their fights against Poles and Tatars were Sovietized country is largely distorted and mystified; overemphasized. Yet, of paramount appeal was the there is no public consensus on things "normal," nor a vision of the economic prosperity of an independent dialogue between the adherents of opposing views on Ukraine—a vision that looked forward rather than to "normality." In reality, Ukraine still lives today in a the past. "cold civil war"—cold only because the Ukrainian As soon as this vision faded, and the new social people are too tired, indifferent, and alienated. They order proved to be, in many aspects, "far crueler and still live in mythical worlds of "cultural and historic more unpredictable than the old" (p. 202), the amnesia," as Wanner has aptly noted; they seldom Ukrainian state faced a "burden of dreams" which respond to intrusion from the outer world with might well become unbearable. Despite some militancy, but rather with "confusion and apathy." achievements and positive changes, carefully noted by

22 THE HARRIMAN REVIEW

Wanner in the examined realms, a "fragile [Ukrainian] terms, such as 'diaspora Russians in the east versus state mired in economic chaos [...] with russification, nationalistic Ukrainians in the west' with language as sovietization, and sharp regionalization as legacies to the sole criterion delineating group membership." overcome and little in the way of broad cultural Instead, she argues that "the fracturing of Ukraine goes unifiers, such as a common language or religion," beyond an east-west dichotomy and creates national seems to be rather unsuccessful, so far, in forging a and linguistic divides that are far more blurred than the "collective identity to unify [its] highly indifferent, national allegiances that are assumed to follow diverse, and disenfranchised population" (p. 75). linguistic lines" (p. xxvi). There are many concrete What surfaces instead, is the profound eclecticism examples in her book which confirm such a of Ukrainian life and an essential ambivalence of multidimensional fracturing of Ukrainian society; people's views and behaviors. Wanner discovers these however, some conceptual generalization cannot be symptoms at every site she considers. For example, "In avoided. 1992 [in order to de-Sovietize schools] a government It is clear that there is a large group of "committed" decree was issued, stating that each school had to Ukrainians, primarily located in the west, whose ethnic remove all Soviet propaganda, portraits of Lenin, identity coincides with their cultural and linguistic slogans, etc." Yet, Wanner reports, "the enforcement of identity, as well as with their political loyalty to an such decrees has become random and ineffective" (p. independent Ukraine. There is also a large group of 218). And the situation at the universities is no better: "committed" Soviets, for the most part located in the "Departments of atheism became departments of southeast, whose ethnic identity is irrelevant ("has no religion; departments of political economy transformed meaning," as one sincerely said), but whose cultural themselves into departments of management and and linguistic identity is predominantly Russian-Soviet, marketing; departments of the history of the USSR now and whose political loyalty largely rests with some sort focus on the history of Ukraine; former departments of of old-new Empire. For better or worse, each group still philosophy now call themselves departments of remains a minority in Ukraine, while the (relative) culturology; and so on. Needless to say, few professors majority consists of russified Ukrainians whose and administrators, nearly all of whom have retained loyalties and identities are, in truth, blurred. The their jobs, are able to 'restructure' themselves, their tendency of their social behavior is much clearer: disciplines, their courses, and their work routines from politically, they tend to be Ukrainian, while culturally one year to the next" (p. 87). they are Russian, or rather, Soviet. The same ambiguity is also discovered in the In December 1991 these Russified Ukrainians analysis of the official Ukrainian calendar, where new supported the committed Ukrainians in their struggle national and reestablished religious holidays mix for political independence, but at the same time they grotesquely with the old Soviet ones. And the urban supported the Soviet presidential candidate as a symbolic landscape—monuments and street guarantee that relatively minimal cultural changes signs—considered in the last chapter provides the would occur, and that the Soviet way of life would scholar with further arguments to conclude that a largely be preserved. This paradox does not go "newly institutionalized Ukrainocentric perspective on unnoticed in Catherine Wanner's book: "Political historical interpretation of the Soviet period must borders,” she writes, “were quickly redrawn following engage the representations of official Soviet narrative the failed coup, but cultural barriers are not so easily [...]. The signs emerging from this encounter [are] read dislodged. In spite of widespread support for an alongside the old signs of Soviet ideology, new signs of independent Ukrainian state, many living in Ukraine capitalist consumerism, and above all, signs of are less supportive of the cultural changes that have confusion" (pp. 198-99). followed new state formation" (pp. 46-48). The confusing, eclectic nature of Ukrainian life, Of course, this ethno-linguistic group is far from Wanner convincingly argues, results from the being monolithic and uniform in its cultural and ambivalent nature of Ukrainian society, which is deeply political orientations. One cannot deny, however, that divided along regional, cultural, ethnic, linguistic, this group is a major source of ambivalence in religious, generational, and many other lines. From the Ukrainian society, as well as the ambiguity of its very beginning of her book, Wanner refuses to political, economic and cultural (under)development. conceptualize nationalism in Ukraine "in overly stark On one hand, they seem to play a positive role by

23 THE HARRIMAN REVIEW preventing the committed Ukrainians and the character of the ruling elites who themselves are a part committed Soviets from direct clashes, thereby granting of the Sovietized/Russified population, perhaps even Ukraine some sort of stability. On the other hand, this more Russified than on average due to career ambivalent and largely disoriented ("confused" is requirements. In any case, these elites are far from Wanner's term) majority serves as a powerful social committed to any ideology except that of their own base for the ruling post-communist nomenklatura personal enrichment. They would never pursue any which effectively hinders any radical changes and ideologically determined, reformist policy (including keeps the country deeply stagnated. "Ukrainization") that would threaten their non- Regrettably, Catherine Wanner does not sufficiently ideological, overriding interests in power and property. explain the essence of the ruling regime, whose very Thus, these elites not only reflect the ambivalent political existence is largely determined by the feelings and attitudes of the majority of the people, but ambivalent character of Ukrainian society. In also do their best to preserve this ambivalence as a particular, it is determined by the confused, partly source of their societal dominance. As a result, Ukraine Russian and partly Ukrainian, identity of the majority seems to have no coherent and comprehensive of the people. From some of Wanner's remarks, policy—be it in culture, in the economy, in state- however, one could conclude that "nationalist leaders" building, in international relations, or in anything else. (p. 48) came to power in 1991, that the nationalist The ruling elites pursue no set strategy but the strategic ideology elaborated by Rukh ("the umbrella opposition goal of day-to-day survival in order to grab the movement advocating a nationalist platform" [p. 22]) maximum benefit from "privatized" power and state became a quasi-official ideology in the newly property. Such a policy lacks any articulated principles independent Ukraine, and that since that time Ukrainian and transparent decisions, since it is largely based on elites have done their best "to promote a national "under the table" arrangements and "share-holding" culture based on an alternative [nationalistic] historical concessions to different regions, clans, or political interpretation that repositions the historic relationship groups (including, on occasion, Ukrainian nationalists with Russia and sets the parameters of a new as well as "Soviets"). Of course, any nation-state by independent, European-oriented, Ukrainian nation- definition "nationalizes," regardless of which foreign state" (p. 171). The most overt expression of this view or native "dynasty" rules it—and Ukraine is no is offered in the author's statement that "even Leonid exception. "Nationalizing," however, does not Makarovych Kravchuk, a former leading anti- necessarily mean "nativizing"; in neighboring Belarus, nationalist, head of ideology, and chairman of the for example, "nationalizing" means further Supreme Soviet in Ukraine, began to swiftly Russification and sovietization, accompanied with the 'restructure' himself into a proponent of nationalism in inevitable repression of the Belorussian language and 1990 in time to campaign to be the first president of culture. In Ukraine, the situation is more complicated; independent Ukraine by adopting 90 percent of the neither Russification-Sovietization tendencies have Rukh program" (p. 46). thus far succeeded, as they have in Belarus, nor have This position, however, leaves room to explain why Ukrainianization-Westemization tendencies gained the the state has failed actually to achieve any of its upper hand, as they have in the Baltics. presumably "nationalizing" goals. The author seems Such widespread ambiguity in the Ukrainian state, simply to believe that a "nationalistic" Ukrainian neither communist nor capitalist, neither pro-western leadership sincerely seeks to "Ukrainize" the country, nor pro-Russian, neither quite Soviet nor quite but wavers "for fear of alienating the large Russified Ukrainian, is occasionally perceived as a kind of constituencies" (p. 120). Again, Catherine Wanner postmodern and/or post-colonial pluralism, which in an seems to yield to a positivistic view of the inclusive way integrates exclusive historical and "nationalizing" state versus the resistant, heavily cultural narratives and promotes a much-needed sovietized/russified population. Such a view is certainly reconciliation within the society. Unfortunately, better than the folk-tale notion of a "good" Ukrainian however, it is eclecticism rather than pluralism which pro-reform tsar at the top and "bad" anti-Ukrainian, reigns supreme over Ukraine. It results from the fact anti-reform servants below—the notion promoted by that no rival force, so far, has proved to be strong some pro-government advocates. However, the view enough to overcome its worst enemy and to push the largely ignores the ambivalent (again, "wavering") country, like the Baltics, forward or, like Belarus, back.

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Since both the committed Ukrainians and the committed Soviets are only a minority, they are easily manipulated by the ruling non-ideological nomenklatura that still controls the majority of "confused" Ukrainian Russophones. The latter group, however, due to its unstable and ambiguously ambivalent identity, is often a major target of both committed Ukrainians and committed Soviets, who lay equal claim to the group as their own. Apparently the "cold civil war" cannot persist forever. Ukrainian "Soviets" can no longer withstand a shock without a therapy, an existence without any economic rewards from the independent state. And committed Ukrainians can no longer be satisfied with their marginal role in a would-be Ukrainian state. Catherine Wanner proves to be quite aware of this contradiction: "For a population that has been russified and sovietized, the prospects of now being ukrainized can seem daunting. For those who have long awaited the institutionalization of a Ukrainian national culture under its own state, the feelings are one of elation, relief, and disappointment" (p. 198). Hence, the "hybrid forms of economic, political, social, and cultural life" she foresees emerging from Ukraine are far from being the worst outcome of the current situation. Yet the author's suggestion to "be prepared to witness and analyze the unexpected" (p. 207) should encourage us instead to better analyze what we witness, and to fnake the unexpected rather expectable. In this light, Catherine Wanner's book, despite some analytical shortcomings and minor errors, gives an insightful view of contemporary Ukraine, and contributes significantly to further studies of a peculiar yet very important region.

Mykola Ryabchuk is Deputy Editor ofKrytyka Monthly (Kyiv).

25 WAS GEORGIA READY FOR INDEPENDENCE?

Paul B. Henze

istory cannot be relived, but it is worth have been much slower and both politically and studying for what we can learn from it that can economically more difficult if it had fought to maintain be applied to the present and the future. This a precarious independence. Georgia received more Hessay explores several lines of thought in respect to investment during Russian imperial times than many Georgia's independence, both its frustrated attempt in more distant parts of the empire, including regions of 1918, and its recent successful transition to Russia itself. By the end of the 19th century Georgia independence as a result of the collapse of the Soviet had reached a stage of economic develop- Union. Nothing said here is intended as a definitive ment—spurred by the discovery of oil in neighboring judgment. The purpose of the essay is to stimulate Azerbaijan—that did not differ greatly from that of discussion, debate, and reflection. other southern European countries. The population increased rapidly and the natural vigor of the Georgian Georgia as Part of the Russian Empire people expressed itself in a rapid increase of literacy Georgia's absorption into the Russian Empire was a and flowering of literature and art. Georgia's ancient several-stage process. Russian interest in Georgia cultural traditions made it relatively invulnerable to the began at the end of the 16th century when the tsars most negative features of Russification. There was, of became increasingly concerned with expansion into the course, an oppressive side to Russia's domination of Middle East.1 The Georgian principalities, under Georgia. The Georgian Church lost its independence, pressure from the Ottoman and Persian empires, fell Georgians were required to play a supporting role in into disarray in the 18th century. The united Kingdoms Russian military conquests in the North Caucasus and of Kartli and Kakheti accepted Russian protection in in campaigns against the Ottoman Empire—reinforcing 1783. Less than two decades later protection turned a historic legacy of hostility toward Islam. By the end into absorption.2 During the first quarter of the 19th of the nineteenth century, many Georgians concerned century all Georgian lands became part of the Russian with progress and reform attracted the suspicion of Empire. It was a classic colonial process. Like the tsarist authorities and suffered oppression, prison, and other major states of Europe, Russia invested a great exile. deal of military, political, and economic energy in Nevertheless, as Georgia's population steadily grew, expansion of its colonial empire. the quality of life improved. Infrastructure was greatly The major difference between Russia and other expanded—railroads were built, highways extended, colonial powers was that Russia expanded into electricity introduced. Contacts with Europe increased contiguous territories rather than overseas. This was steadily and were not all mediated through Russia. Georgia's misfortune, but there was also a positive side. During the last four decades of the Russian Empire, As part of a large, modernizing state, Georgia was able Georgia began to attract significant investment from to participate in a process of development that might abroad. As a result of the last Russo-Turkish war in 1876-78, the ancient Georgian region of Ajaria was reunited with Georgia and Batumi soon grew from a sleepy village into a major port linking Georgia to the W.E.D. Allen, Russian Embassies to the Georgian wider world. Kings, 1589-1605 (Cambridge University Press for the Hakluyt Society, 1970), 2 vols. 2 W.E.D. Allen, A History of the Georgian People London: Routledge, 1902).

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Prerequisites for Independence their place in the Russian Empire, taken advantage of Unlike some of the other imperial powers, however, opportunities it offered for cultural and economic Russia did comparatively little to prepare its colonies development, and tended to see Russia as a guarantor for self-administration, let alone independent existence. against designs on the Caucasus which Ottoman Nevertheless, as Russian society became more open Turkey might still harbor. Russia's collapse shocked after the reforms of the mid- and late 19th century, Georgians into realization that their geopolitical Georgia shared in these developments and political situation had drastically changed.5 While the sizable groups began to form. Thus, to the question—Was Georgian aristocracy had become partly Russianized, Georgia ready for independence when the Russian nationalism had grown among the lower classes in Empire collapsed in 1917?—an unequivocal answer Georgia, but the bourgeoisie was still underdeveloped. can be given: yes. Georgia compared favorably with Armenians to a great extent constituted the urban the countries of eastern Europe that became bourgeoisie of Georgia. independent from the 1820s onward—Greece, Serbia, History, Russian divide-and-rule politics, as well as Romania, and Bulgaria, all as a result of European and political and economic evolution during the 19th Russian pressure on the Ottoman Empire; and it also century, laid the basis for potential ethnic problems in compared favorably with those that gained Georgia. None of these was more serious than those independence with the collapse of the Russian and with which newly independent East European countries Austro-Hungarian empires as a result of World War had to contend after World War I: Jews, Ukrainians I—Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Lithuanians in Poland; Germans in Poland, and Yugoslavia.3 Czechoslovakia, and Romania; Hungarians in all the Like all these countries, and to a greater degree than countries surrounding truncated Hungary; Turks and some, Georgia had developed politically to the point other Muslims in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. And if one where it had a lively political life and was capable of compares Georgia in 1918 with the overwhelming self-government. Economically it had reached a level majority of the countries that became independent in of development which could sustain independence and the great wave of decolonization that occurred in the provide the foundation on which increased prosperity two decades after World War II, there can be no doubt and social development could be based. that by these standards Georgia was fully qualified for Psychologically the fast-moving course of events from independence in 1918. March 1917 to the spring of 1918 brought Georgia to a stage where the major portion of its population was Experience in the Soviet Empire enthusiastic about independence and ready to accept But it was not to be. It was Russia that was not the responsibilities of existence as a full-fledged prepared for the independence of any of its colonial member of the international community. possessions. World War I caused three empires to The situation was not clear-cut, of course. Many collapse: the Russian, the Ottoman, and the Austro- factors came into play. I will mention only a few of Hungarian. The evil genius of Lenin brought the them. Russia did not administer Georgia as a national Russian Empire back to life as the Soviet Union, thus entity. Georgians had not thought much about doing great damage to Russia and delaying its evolution independence during the 19th century. The dominant into the modern world by 70 years. Meanwhile Mensheviks until a very late stage of their evolution Austrians and Turks abandoned all thought of saw themselves as part of an all-Russian (and even recreating their empires and concentrated on worldwide) socialist movement for political developing modern nation-states. liberalization and reform.4 Most Georgians had found Destruction of Georgian independence by Russia was accomplished by a combination of conspiracy and military force. Independent Georgia was fortunate in 3 The same comparison can be made in favor of having coherent leadership under Noe Jordania and his Georgia in respect to Middle Eastern countries which became independent from the 1920s to the 1940s: Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq. 4 Ronald G. Suny, The Making of the Georgian Nation (Bloomington: Indiana University Press/Stanford: Hoover 5Firuz Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia, Institution Press, 1988). 1917-1921 (Oxford: George Arnold,1950).

27 THE HARRIMAN REVIEW colleagues, but the task of steering the country through relationship to the basic interests of Georgia. the conflicting forces that surrounded it at the end of Georgians who were judged enemies of the Soviet World War I was beyond their skill and ingenuity. For system were repeatedly purged, exiled, and killed. a brief period Germany appeared to provide a solution Georgians thus gained no experience in true self- and the period of German occupation of Georgia stands administration or in open political life. They became out as a time of hope. But Germany was in the process skilled in manipulation of the Soviet political system of being defeated. The efforts Germany made at Brest- for temporary advantage, and parallel exploitation of Litovsk to protect Georgia's independence came to the economic system. They learned how to survive. nothing. A century of Russian rule left the countries of the South Caucasus incapable of cooperating On the Threshold of Independence effectively to mutual advantage. Bolshevik Russia The qualified gains Georgia made during the Soviet undermined each in succession. Revolution in Turkey period became less and less valuable as the Soviet worked to Georgia's disadvantage, though the new Union neared collapse. In 1990 Georgians found Turkish republic later evolved as a positive factor for themselves enthusiastic about independence but lacked Georgia. By the beginning of 1921 the tide of history a civil society and leaders with skill in politics and had turned hopelessly against Georgia. Nevertheless knowledge of how to lead and govern. The country the country put up strong resistance to Russian military had a deteriorated infrastructure and industry that was conquest and seizure of power by the communist party barely functional. Every aspect of economic and was never approved by a majority of the Georgian financial life had to be revised, rethought, and people. reformed. Was Georgia prepared for independence in What did Georgia gain and what did she lose from 1990-91 ? Psychologically, yes, but in almost all other 70 years as a Soviet Socialist Republic? There was respects it was less well prepared than in 1918. further development of infrastructure and industry, but Georgians proved, however, to have great reserves it was a dubious gain—all such development was of endurance, intelligence, and resourcefulness. They according to Russian and Soviet priorities imposed were able to live through a period of crisis as serious as from Moscow. Thus Georgia found itself in 1991 with any part of the former Soviet Union had to face. They a distorted economic structure and unprofitable withstood efforts by incompetent adventurers as well as industries without a market. Agriculture, too, suffered Russian neo-communists and militarist-nationalists to from collectivization and priorities set for Moscow's divide the country and plunge it into civil war. Coping advantage. Georgia lost the ability to feed itself. with crisis, Georgia produced leaders ready to take Agroindustry operated under priorities that did not great risks to set the country on a positive course of correspond to Georgia's needs. Georgia suffered from development. Strong Georgian sentiments and being a frontier region of the Soviet Union, where traditions had not been destroyed by the Soviet enormous investment was made in military installations experience. They had not been destroyed in Edward that absorbed local resources for support and Shevardnadze even by service as the Soviet Union's contributed nothing to the Georgian economy. Foreign Minister. Georgians took advantage of Soviet stress on education If Georgia was not well prepared for independence and training, however, to gain the highest level of in 1990-91, it had another enormous advantage over literacy in the Soviet Union and produce a population 1918: its international situation was far more favorable. well equipped with basic knowledge and skills. They There was no Turkish threat to fear as in 1918. Turkey also took advantage of opportunities for cultural was fully supportive of Georgian independence and development and historic preservation. Their church quickly became one of Georgia's closest and strongest resisted Soviet suppression of religion long enough to friends. Europe and America were not crippled by a emerge strong and effective as collapse of the Soviet long war or equivocal about Georgia, as they were in system neared. 1918. Georgia received both sympathy and support Georgians lost most of their contacts with the outer from all major Western countries, including reunified world during the Soviet period. They lost the Germany. In 1918 the international system was so opportunity to participate in international affairs except weakly developed that Georgia could not rely on the as Soviet proxies. Georgian men had to fight in Soviet kind of assistance it received, and continues to receive, wars and serve in Soviet armed forces that had no from the United Nations, the World Bank, the

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International Monetary Fund, the European Union, and Neo-Imperialism in Russia other important functional organizations which Georgia No region arouses more resentment among has joined. unreformed Russians than the Caucasus, and no region of the Russian Federation today is more problematic than the North Caucasus. It is Georgia's misfortune to Prospects for Maintaining be located directly to the south and to be infected by Independence some of the same instability, which Russians abet. So Georgia's prospects for maintaining its Russia has yet to develop a comprehensive policy independence are enormously better at the end of the toward the North Caucasus. Nor does Russia have an 20th century than they were 80 years earlier. The honest policy toward the independent nations of the country has already stabilized itself politically to the South Caucasus. For lack of anything better, it slips point where it is judged as the most successful of post- into the old divide-and-rule approach.7 Soviet states. It is also judged the most democratic. In Officially, relations between Yeltsin's government recent years it has had the highest rate of economic in Moscow and Georgia are being conducted according growth of any ex-Soviet country. It has made excellent to recognized international procedures. But there are progress reforming its agriculture and a good beginning many disquieting aspects to the situation that raise on its industry. Its relations with both other ex-Soviet serious questions: is Yeltsin's government honest about states and its neighbors to the south and west are strong its official position vis-a-vis Georgia? Is it fully in and largely devoid of tensions. Are there threats to control of all the elements formally responsible to it: Georgian independence? Unfortunately, Russia remains the military, the FSB (successor to the KGB), the a threat. Foreign Ministry, other ministries? There are several Though many of Russia's younger leaders show disquieting problems: strong evidence of commitment to turning Russia into a full-fledged, responsible member of the community • Despite repeated promises, Russia has of nations—i.e., a non-aggressive nation-state—and brought no significant pressure on the though there is little evidence of virulent nationalism breakaway Abkhaz leaders to enter into surviving among the Russian people as a whole, .there serious talks with Georgia. Russia continues are groups in Russia that are unreconciled to the loss of to supply Abkhazia with essential goods and the Empire. In other ex-imperial countries survivors of services without which it could not exist in its this kind have dwindled to an insignificant minority present condition. who are no more harmful than people who believe that the world is flat. But in Russia such people are still • Russian military installations in Georgia plentiful and vocal. They seem unable to understand continue to operate extraterritorially, without that Russian power has evaporated. The disastrous Georgian supervision, and at times contrary to Soviet misadventure in Afghanistan followed by utter Georgian national interests. failure in Chechnya has left the Russian military forces crippled. They are unlikely to recover for at least a • Russia has failed to investigate repeated decade.6 Nevertheless we still hear loud voices from incidents of terrorism against Georgian Russia advocating restoration of Russian control over officials, including President Shevardnadze her former colonies and reestablishment of the himself when evidence implicates Russians in Russian/Soviet Empire. these actions. Georgian citizens sought for suspicion of involvement in such incidents enjoy asylum and freedom of movement in Russia.

7 Anatole Ueven, Chechnya, the Tombstone of the Paul B. Henze, "Conflict in the Caucasus", Studies in Russian Army (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); William Conflict and Terrorism, no. 19 (1996):389-402; "Conflict in the E. Odom, The Collapse of the Soviet Military (New Haven: Yale Caucasus", Eurasian Studies (Ankara), (Spring 1994):69-84. University Press, 1998).

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The most regrettable thing about Russian behavior eorgia was capable of existing as an toward Georgia is that it is difficult to see how independent nation and responsible member of harassment of Georgia and attempts to destabilize the the international community in 1918 when it country benefit Russia.8 Russia would gain much more Gfirst declared independence. Its reabsorption into the from following the example of other ex-imperial Russian/Soviet Empire delayed its political powers toward their colonies: constructive engagement. development and did comparatively little for its Russia would gain from cooperative economic economic development, but the country has been relationships with Georgia. It would gain from psychologically ready for independence throughout the professional and intellectual contacts and exchanges as twentieth century. well. Interrelationships between Georgia and Russia Georgia has one of the oldest continuing are deep and extensive. Russia has more to lose than civilizations in the world. It was one of the first Georgia does from a posture of negativism and nations to adopt Christianity. It has shown a hostility. remarkable capacity to endure confusion and hardship and survive to flourish. It deserves a place in the civilized community of nations. The Soviet experience Could Russia Reconquer Georgia? left Georgia with physical and human problems that There is very little likelihood that Russia could continue to require energy and time to overcome. The reconquer Georgia. Russia is too weak. Its capabilities international climate at the end of the 20th century is are limited to harassment, interference and "spoiling." vastly more favorable to Georgia's situation than it was Georgia must remain alert to protect itself. It must in 1918-21. Georgia can look forward to the 21st continue to seek the support of the international century as a time of greater development of its national community in bringing pressure on Russia to adopt a life than ever before in its long history. more constructive policy toward the Caucasus—not simply in the interest of Caucasians, but in the interest of Russians themselves. As Zbigniew Brzezinski has This essay was delivered at the Noe Jordanie repeatedly stressed, a Russia that devotes its energies to Conference, co-sponsored by the Harriman Institute re-acquisition of an empire, will condemn itself to and convened on the occasion of the eightieth permanent second- or third-rate status among the anniversary of the Georgian Declaration of nations of the world. A Russia that concentrates its Independence of 1918, and held in Tbilisi, 26-28 May energies on evolving into an open, democratic society 1998. committed to improving the well-being of its people, has the resources to repeat the experience of former totalitarian countries such as Italy, Germany, and Japan.9

g The same is true of Russian behavior toward Azerbaijan, where the same pattern of harassment, threats, and suspicion of at least indirect involvement in destabilization efforts and assassination attemptsagainst leaders is evident. Russian policy toward Armenia, on the other hand, has encouraged some of the most unproductive aspects of Armenian behavior and done little to ease Armenian tensions with its neighbors. The most flagrant example of Russia's use of Armenia for short-range, negative political purposes, is the continuing supply of large amounts of weaponry to the country. All this is reminiscent of the Russian approach to the Caucasus since the beginning of the nineteenth century. 9 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Failure, The Birth patient," Washington Times, 22 December 1995; The Grand and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century (NY: Chessboard, American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives Scribner's, 1989); "Brzezinski on the Breakup of the USSR", (NY:Basic Books, 2997; "On to Russia," Washington Post, 3 May World Monitor, November 1990; "Russia: Neither our partner nor 1998.

30 Andre Liebich, From the Other Shore. Russian Social Democracy after 1921 (CambridgeHarvard University Press, 1997)

Reviewed by Frederick Comey

cottage industry of scholarly publications has along clear "factional lines of continuity" (59) from the ensured that the Mensheviks have not ended prewar to the postrevolutionary period, preferring up in Trotsky's “dustbin of history.” Indeed, instead to blur the lines between the Bolshevik and Athe Mensheviks and Menshevism have acquired a Menshevik factions. He notes that the stance adopted particularly coherent profile in Soviet, post-Soviet and during the First World War was a more reliable Western historiography. Scholars often pay lip service indicator of "subsequent individual and factional self- to the recent genesis of the revolutionary parties and definition" (60). As such, he suggests that problems the accompanying weakness of party identities, to the exist with traditional approaches that deal mercurial nature of popular support for these parties, unproblematically with the Mensheviks and and to the alienating effects of the long periods of exile Menshevism as coherent and identifiable categories of most of their leaders. Still, most studies nonetheless (and, by implication, he raises questions about the treat the immediate pre- and post-revolutionary period categories of Bolshevik and Bolshevism as well). in Russia as a battleground of competing and largely This intentional indeterminacy informs and benefits coherent political parties. In the case of the this work. It helps explain his unusually moderate Mensheviks and Menshevism, this interest was fuelled picture of Menshevik persecution under Soviet power, by a political argument most energetically driven first the Mensheviks, he argues, enjoying a "curiously by the Cold War and then by glasnost-inspired privileged position" (88) presumably deriving from the reevaluations of the Soviet past: a belief in paths not often close relationships leading Mensheviks had taken in 1917, in viable, coherent alternatives shared with leading Bolsheviks. His close readings of prematurely and brutally crushed by the soon-to-be the often bitter and fractious quarrels within the Stalinist regime. The Mensheviks have become in Menshevik family abroad leave the impression that Western historiography (and increasingly among post- these Mensheviks did not represent any realistic Soviet historians) the alternative par excellence, the “alternative” to the Bolshevik path at any time “conscience” of the revolution. Forced into the (notwithstanding Liebich’s concluding remarks hoping emigration, they are center-stage as the Greek chorus to for a revival of alternativnost' as a "fruitful heuristic the unfolding tragedy of Soviet Russia. device" (329) for historians of Soviet Russia). Finally, In this prodigiously researched and ambitious book, their own conviction that their very legitimacy Liebich offers a rather different approach. His focus is depended on the vitality of their ties inside Soviet the intimate and often fractious Menshevik “family” of Russia, combined with a deep identification with intellectuals, most notably the Menshevik certain aspects of the Soviet project, ensured that their Internationals who gathered around Iulii Martov in the readings of events inside Soviet Russia were not emigration. Fleeing persecution, this group would always apposite. Stalin's revolution bewildered them move from Russia, to Berlin, Paris and finally New and Stalin the man "remained a mystery to them" (251), York City in a tragic odyssey that would span four even generating in these old revolutionaries a certain decades but never bring them home again. The title "nostalgia for the old Bolshevik Party, for the party of notwithstanding, however, a full third of this book is Lenin, and perhaps even for the party of Trotsky" devoted to the pre-emigration period. Liebich offers a (251). As Liebich implies, their commentaries on wonderfully indeterminate picture of Menshevik events inside Soviet Russia revealed more about them identity at the very top of the party, a picture surely than about the object of their study. His analysis of the even more applicable to the rank-and-file which saw often difficult relationship between the shifting events "no sense to the ideological wrangling [among the inside Soviet Russia and the fundamental philosophical leaders of the RSDRP]" (54). He resists the traditional and ideological views of these emigres is fascinating. historiographical practice of sketching his Mensheviks

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After two decades in the emigration, they would again RSDRP after 1921-22" (129), and that the journal find themselves split, this time formally and would ultimately become "the only manifestation of the irrevocably, over Soviet Russia and the viability of the party's existence" (100). In such an approach, certain socialist project. Led in its final years by idiosyncratic issues which are dealt with only tangentially or and often difficult survivors, the Menshevik family anecdotally by Liebich would acquire enormous became preoccupied with how it would be remembered influence: the polemics both inside and outside of by posterity. Soviet Russia over the term “Menshevism” (more could While Liebich undercuts the traditional reasons for be done with the Menshevik trial of 1931, for example, studying these Mensheviks, his work nonetheless in this vein); the creation and institutionalization of the contains very good reasons why they should not be Menshevik archive; the embrace of these Mensheviks ignored (beyond the fact that his story is fascinating initially by European Social Democracy and later by and engaging in its own right). First, despite his stated the American academy, which can be seen as a reluctance in a footnote (p. 346) to evaluate the formative factor in this process of (re)creating Russian Menshevik influence on Soviet historiography, he does Social Democracy as a principled stand against so on several occasions. He documents Menshevik Bolshevik maximalism. That this term can serve efforts in focusing international attention on the gulag; apparently without irony as the subtitle for this study of he traces quite specifically to individual Mensheviks a small group of emigre intellectuals says much about the application of the term "totalitarian" to Soviet their success (with the support of other actors) in Russia; he notes the development of the “discipline” of profiling themselves as a coherent and articulate kremlinology, Boris Nicolaevsky's "trademark," which, political entity larger than the sum of its parts. It is as he notes, would "become the tool of an entire testament to the power and influence of this group, and profession" (302). Liebich thus unwittingly makes the broadens our notions of what political power is and case for a much more systematic analysis of the how it might be exercised. Mensheviks' role in shaping the very terms and This complex and ambitious work is essential categories long used to conceive of Soviet society. reading for anyone interested in these intellectuals both Second, the role of European Social Democracy and before and after the revolution. That it is also highly especially of the Labor and Socialist International in suggestive of other ways of thinking of the Mensheviks helping to shape these categories also deserves more and Menshevism is testament to the reach and systematic scrutiny, particularly as it was, in Liebich's significance of the arguments contained therein. own view, the "principal multilateral forum for the promotion of Menshevik views" (166) from the Frederick Corney is Assistant Professor of History at Hamburg Congress in 1923 to the fall of France in the University of Florida. He is completing his book 1940. manuscript entitled, "Writing October: Memory and Third, and perhaps most importantly, while the Making of the Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1927.” Liebich's work is very much an analysis of the Menshevik view of Soviet Russia, it is also occasionally suggestive of the self-identification project in which these emigres were engaged. "There is a tendency," he writes at one point, "toward introversion in every exile group, if only for reasons of collective self-preservation and identity" (103). Indeed, the very categories of Menshevik and Menshevism might be viewed rather as an extended process of self-definition that was intimately linked with a similar process of Bolshevik self-definition in Russia after 1917. In some ways, the Mensheviks might be seen as the “imagined community” par excellence. The author, for example, argues that the readership of the Menshevik journal Sotsialisticheskii vestnik "may be seen as the real constituency of the

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