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FINAL VOL 2 POST BOMBING.Indb ARCHIVED - Archiving Content ARCHIVÉE - Contenu archivé Archived Content Contenu archivé Information identified as archived is provided for L’information dont il est indiqué qu’elle est archivée reference, research or recordkeeping purposes. It est fournie à des fins de référence, de recherche is not subject to the Government of Canada Web ou de tenue de documents. Elle n’est pas Standards and has not been altered or updated assujettie aux normes Web du gouvernement du since it was archived. Please contact us to request Canada et elle n’a pas été modifiée ou mise à jour a format other than those available. depuis son archivage. Pour obtenir cette information dans un autre format, veuillez communiquer avec nous. This document is archival in nature and is intended Le présent document a une valeur archivistique et for those who wish to consult archival documents fait partie des documents d’archives rendus made available from the collection of Public Safety disponibles par Sécurité publique Canada à ceux Canada. qui souhaitent consulter ces documents issus de sa collection. Some of these documents are available in only one official language. Translation, to be provided Certains de ces documents ne sont disponibles by Public Safety Canada, is available upon que dans une langue officielle. Sécurité publique request. Canada fournira une traduction sur demande. Air India Flight 182 A Canadian Tragedy VOLUME TWO Part 2: Post-Bombing ©Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, represented by the Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 2010 Cat. No: CP32-89/2-2010E ISBN: 978-0-660-19926-9 Available through your local bookseller or through Publishing and Depository Services Public Works and Government Services Canada Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0S5 Telephone: (613) 941-5995 or 1 800 635-7943 Fax: (613) 954-5779 or 1 800 565-7757 [email protected] Internet: www.publications.gc.ca Volume Two Part 2: Post-Bombing VOLUME TWO PART 2: POST-BOMBING INVESTIGATION AND RESPONSE TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER I: HUMAN SOURCES: APPROACH TO SOURCES AND WITNESS PROTECTION 1.0 Introduction 5 1.1 Mr. A 12 1.2 Tara Singh Hayer 29 1.3 Ms. E 85 1.4 Mr. Z 202 1.5 Ms. D 212 1.6 Atwal Warrant Source 227 CHAPTER II: RCMP POST-BOMBING 2.0 Set-up and Structure of the Federal Task Force 233 2.1 Centralization/Decentralization 254 2.2 The RCMP Investigation: Red Tape and Yellow Tape 261 2.3 The Usual Suspects versus “Alternate Theories” 279 2.3.1 November 1984 Plot 279 2.3.2 Mr. Z 290 2.3.3 The Purported Parmar Confession 297 2.3.4 The Khurana Tape 316 CHAPTER III: CSIS POST-BOMBING 3.0 The CSIS Investigation 339 CHAPTER IV: CSIS/RCMP INFORMATION SHARING 4.0 The Evolution of the CSIS/RCMP Memoranda of Understanding 355 4.1 Information Sharing and Cooperation in the Air India Investigation 363 4.2 The Liaison Offi cers Program 421 4.3 The Preservation of CSIS “Evidence” 433 Volume Two Part 2: Post-Bombing 4.3.1 Tape Erasure 433 4.3.2 Destruction of Operational Notes 467 4.4 CSIS Information in the Courtroom 475 4.4.1 The Reyat Trial and the BC Crown Prosecutor Perspective 475 4.4.2 The Air India Trial 517 4.5 Recent Cooperation and Information-Sharing Mechanisms 522 CHAPTER V: THE OVERALL GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE AIR INDIA BOMBING 5.0 Introduction 545 5.1 Early Government Response 545 5.2 Government Attempts to Avoid/Delay Reviews or Inquiries and Government Response to External Review 564 5.3 1995 Anniversary and Renewed Interest in a Public Inquiry 596 5.4 The Prosecution of Malik, Bagri and Reyat 601 5.5 2003 Calls for an Inquiry 606 5.6 The Rae Review 606 5.7 The Present Commission of Inquiry 619 5.8 Conclusion: Learning From Past Mistakes 641 VOLUME TWO PART 2: POST-BOMBING INVESTIGATION AND RESPONSE CHAPTER I: HUMAN SOURCES: APPROACH TO SOURCES AND WITNESS PROTECTION 1.0 Introduction The RCMP: Diffi culty Recruiting Sources in the Sikh Community When Air India Flight 182 exploded off the coast of Ireland on June 23, 1985, much of the key forensic evidence settled hundreds of metres under the sea. At the same time, there was a widespread view that numerous members of the tight-knit Canadian Sikh community held key knowledge about the perpetrators of the crime.1 If the RCMP could get them to talk, it could begin to build a case against the perpetrators. Thus it was crucial for the RCMP to make active eff orts to gain access to the Sikh community and build trust.2 However, the diffi culty recruiting sources and witnesses in the Sikh community is often cited by the RCMP as one of the main challenges faced by the Force in the Air India investigation.3 The RCMP began its investigation at a signifi cant disadvantage. Prior to the bombing, the RCMP did not have access to many sources who could provide information about Sikh extremism and threats to Indian interests.4 After the bombing, members of the Task Force were essentially starting at “ground zero” in terms of their understanding of the Sikh community and culture.5 According to retired RCMP Commissioner Norman Inkster, when the investigation got underway there were “…perhaps one maybe two, but certainly not more” people in the RCMP who actually spoke Punjabi. Offi cers could not communicate with the community in a language that they were comfortable with, and there was “…a signifi cant lack of understanding of the culture.”6 While many in the Sikh community held strong views about the Air India bombing, they were afraid to cooperate with police, believing that they would end up being forced to participate in a court proceeding, endangering themselves and their families in Canada and in India.7 1 Testimony of Bart Blachford, vol. 63, October 17, 2007, pp. 7825-7826; Exhibit P-101 CAF0411, p. 4. 2 Testimony of Bart Blachford, vol. 63, October 17, 2007, p. 7826. 3 See, for example, Testimony of Warren Sweeney, vol. 26, May 9, 2007, p. 2705, confi rming that gaining access to the Sikh community was an issue for the RCMP in its investigation of Sikh extremism. 4 Testimony of Warren Sweeney, vol. 26, May 9, 2007, pp. 2728-2729. 5 Testimony of Robert Solvason, vol. 89, December 5, 2007, p. 11587. 6 Testimony of Norman Inkster, vol. 81, November 22, 2007, p. 10314. 7 Testimony of William Laurie, vol. 61, October 15, 2007, pp. 7396-7397. 6 Volume Two: Part 2: Post-Bombing Early on in the Air India investigation, the RCMP found that it had diffi culty obtaining information from the Sikh community. In August 1985, the RCMP stated, in an affi davit in support of an application for authorization to intercept private communications, that the wiretap was necessary because conventional investigative methods had been unsuccessful to date, and were “…likely to be unsuccessful, due to the nature of the East Indian community and their peoples’ unwillingness to co-operate with this investigation,” noting that “…other eff orts to infi ltrate this community have failed at the outset.”8 Many members of the community were specifi cally concerned about the possibility that the Government of India could become aware that they were providing information to police and that there could be ramifi cations for their relatives in India.9 In a briefi ng to the RCMP, a CSIS investigator who provided information about Sikh extremism and the Sikh culture noted that, in some cases, members of the community could resort to dishonesty when questioned by police because of past experiences with Indian police and fear of reprisals against family members in India.10 In this context, the “full-scale liaison” the RCMP sought to establish with Indian authorities to “…coordinate the timely fl ow of pertinent information” relating to the Air India case11 could negatively impact the RCMP’s ability to gain trust in the community. For instance, following the “Kaloe incident” in 1986, a perception took hold in the Sikh community that the death of Balbir Singh Kaloe at the hands of Indian authorities was a result of information supplied to India by Canadian authorities. This had a signifi cant impact on the Sikh community’s trust of Canadian authorities.12 The CSIS Approach versus the RCMP Approach CSIS investigators were often more successful than the RCMP in obtaining information from individuals in the community during the post-bombing period. They could tell community members clearly from the start that they were not the police. When individuals agreed to speak with CSIS, they often did so on the condition – explicit or implicit – that their information not go to the police.13 CSIS investigators adjusted their approach, depending on the person they went to meet. At times, they would use an approach intended to resemble that of the police, which CSIS investigator William Dean (“Willie”) Laurie described as having “two large male[s]” impress upon the individual that they were from the government and that there was something the individual could do to assist. More often, however, they stressed that they were not the police and explained that they wanted to obtain information so that “…at least somebody in government 8 Exhibit P-101 CAA0310, p. 7. 9 Testimony of Axel Hovbrender, vol. 33, May 24, 2007, p. 3897. 10 Exhibit P-101 CAA0313, pp. 2-3. 11 Exhibit P-101 CAF0057, p. 38. 12 See Section 2.3.3 (Post-bombing), The Purported Parmar Confession, where the “Kaloe incident” is discussed.
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