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Air India Flight 182 A Canadian Tragedy VOLUME TWO Part 1: Pre-Bombing ©Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, represented by the Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 2010 Cat. No: CP32-89/2-2010E ISBN: 978-0-660-19926-9 Available through your local bookseller or through Publishing and Depository Services Public Works and Government Services Canada Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0S5 Telephone: (613) 941-5995 or 1 800 635-7943 Fax: (613) 954-5779 or 1 800 565-7757 [email protected] Internet: www.publications.gc.ca VOLUME TWO PART 1: PRE-BOMBING TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER I: WHAT WAS KNOWN ABOUT THE THREAT? Critical Incidents 1.0 Introduction 7 Threat Assessment 1.1 November 1984 Plot 8 1.2 June 1st Telex 21 1.3 Parmar Warrant 27 1.4 Duncan Blast 38 1.5 Mr. X 60 1.6 Khurana Information 66 1.7 Testimony of James Bartleman 75 1.8 Rogue Agents (Deschenes) 91 Threat Response 1.9 Mr. Simpson’s Visit to the Air India Aircraft 96 1.10 Serge Carignan and Arko the Explosives Detection Dog 106 1.11 The Cost of Delay – Testimony of Daniel Lalonde 112 1.12 A “Crescendo” of Threats 121 CHAPTER II: THREAT ASSESSMENT AND RESPONSE 2.0 The Intelligence Cycle and Intelligence Community 131 2.1 The Civilianization of Security Services 141 2.2 Failure to Appreciate the Nature and Seriousness of the Threat 147 2.3 Inadequate Preparation for Nature of Threat 153 2.3.1 Recognition of the Threat of Sabotage and Weaknesses in the Ability to Respond 155 2.3.2 Failure to Push Through Responsive Regulations 170 2.3.3 Over-Reliance on Technology 187 2.4 Security Culture at Canada’s Airports 213 Volume Two: Part 1: Pre-Bombing CHAPTER III: WHAT WENT WRONG? Assessing the Threat CSIS Pre-Bombing 3.0 The CSIS Act 239 3.1 Internal CSIS Structure 246 3.2 The CSIS Investigations into Sikh Extremism 258 3.3 CSIS’s Threat Assessment Failures 288 3.3.1 The Infancy of CSIS 290 3.3.2 The Changing Threat Paradigm 301 3.3.3 Failure to Allocate Resources 308 3.3.4 CSIS Failures in Assessing the Threat 325 3.3.5 Failures in Internal Information Sharing 336 3.3.6 Lack of Meaningful Threat Assessments 344 RCMP Pre-Bombing 3.4 Defi ciencies in RCMP Threat Assessment Structure and Process 353 3.5 Information-Sharing Failures 390 3.5.1 CSIS/RCMP Relations and Information-Sharing Policies 390 3.5.2 CSIS Failures in Sharing with RCMP 402 3.5.3 RCMP Failures in Sharing with CSIS 404 3.5.4 RCMP Failures in Sharing with Local Forces 410 3.6 Lack of Government-Wide Coordination in the Threat Assessment Process 427 CHAPTER IV: RESPONDING TO THE THREAT Defi ciencies in the Translation of Threats into an Operational Response 4.0 Threat-Response Regime in 1985 441 4.1 General Obligations and Relationship to the Threat Level 442 4.2 Structural Issues in Protective Policing and Airport Security 447 4.2.1 RCMP-Transport Canada Relationship 447 4.2.2 RCMP Protective Policing 452 4.2.3 Transport Canada Structural Issues 463 4.3 The Role of the “Specifi c Threat” in the 1985 Threat-Response Regime 468 4.4 Failures in Sharing of Information 491 4.5 Failures in Coordination between Transport Canada and the RCMP 508 4.6 RCMP Implementation Defi ciencies in the Threat-Response Regime 517 4.7 Transport Canada Policy Gaps and Implementation Defi ciencies 531 Volume Two: Part 1: Pre-Bombing CHAPTER V: THE DAY OF THE BOMBING 5.0 CP Air Checked In Unaccompanied Luggage 547 5.1 Unaccompanied Bag “Infi ltrated” Air India’s System 554 5.2 No Dogmaster on Duty at Pearson and Mirabel International Airports 556 5.3 Lack of Surveillance of Air India Aircraft 566 5.4 Air India Personnel – Confusion about Duties 568 5.5 Breakdown of the X-ray Machine and Use of the PD4 578 5.6 Handling of the Three Suspect Bags Incident at Mirabel 580 5.7 The Bombing of Air India Flight 182 582 5.8 The Bombing at Narita 584 5.9 Conclusion 585 Volume Two: Part 1: Pre-Bombing VOLUME TWO PART 1: PRE-BOMBING CHAPTER I: WHAT WAS KNOWN ABOUT THE THREAT? 1.0 Introduction The fi rst issue in the Commission’s mandate1 is to decide whether there were “... defi ciencies in the assessment by Canadian government offi cials of the potential threat posed by Sikh terrorism before or after 1985.”2 The fi rst question is: were there intelligence failures prior to June 22, 1985? In answering this question it is important to look at all the stages of threat assessment, commencing with the development of intelligence. There are four phases in the intelligence cycle: tasking, collection, analysis and distribution. A signifi cant failure in any of these will lead to what is called an intelligence failure.3 To help answer the question of what took place during the pre-bombing period (events prior to June 22, 1985), the Commission has focused on a series of “critical incidents” – real, but singularly dramatic, episodes that serve to illustrate gaps that occurred in the recognition of responsibility, the development of an intelligence plan, the assignment of resources and the recognition, handling, assessment and dissemination of information. A word of caution is required. Hindsight always makes it easier to notice gaps, identify errors and point out failures. The reader is urged to digest the details of the following events. Each description may contain clues about the ways in which systems, structures and individual actions could have triggered a better or diff erent response to pieces of information that arose in various contexts. In the critical incidents that follow, a series of seemingly unrelated clues appear that may fi t together to solve a puzzle. At the time these events took place, there was no awareness that such a puzzle existed. Thus, the Commission has a retrospective advantage. The puzzle pieces take the form of possible leads, tips and warnings: some coming from human informants, some coming from intercepted conversations, 1 Adapted from Remarks by Mark Freiman, Lead Commission Counsel, Transcript vol. 20, April 30, 2007, pp. 1867-1870. 2 Terms of Reference, P.C. 2006-293, para. b(i). 3 Testimony of Wesley Wark, vol. 16, March 5, 2007, pp. 1442-1443. 8 Volume Two Part 1: Pre-Bombing others coming from the intelligence community in other countries, still others coming from direct observation by domestic security and intelligence personnel. The pieces provide evidence of what the Canadian security and intelligence community were looking for, what they thought they knew, what they believed they did not know and how they planned to fi ll in information gaps. These critical incidents are presented as a series of episodes, each illustrating a single bit of information, a potential clue or a proposed response to a known information gap. They identify potential issues with respect to the intelligence cycle and the fl ow of information during the period leading up to the bombing. Serving as markers for specifi c issues and possible diffi culties in the intelligence cycle, these critical incidents also underpin the Commission’s more detailed inquiry into the larger question of intelligence fl ow in its historical, institutional and practical contexts. These fragments combine to form a mosaic; a larger picture that gives the reader a better appreciation of what happened. At the same time, they identify specifi c details that underlie the Commission’s conclusions and recommendations. References to these critical incidents appear often in the chapters that follow, and will help the reader understand the overall context in which decisions and actions were taken. 1.1 November 1984 Plot The November 1984 Plot Revealed by Two Independent Sources By October 1984, the RCMP had learned from two independent sources about a plot to bomb two Air India fl ights. Here, they are identifi ed as Person 1 and Person 2.4 In 1984, these two individuals, who had known each other since 1977, moved in shadowy circles in the Vancouver area. They both had extensive connections to a web of criminal activity within, and extending beyond, the BC region. Person 1 told the Inquiry of his dubious past, with a criminal record dating back to 1956 and approximately 16 convictions including theft, break and enter, armed robbery, and false pretences. For the past 15 years, however, he has had no criminal charges or convictions.5 On June 23, 1985, when Constable Rick Crook6 of the Vancouver Police Department (VPD) learned of the fate of Air India Flight 182 and of the explosion 4 The individuals and locations associated with this “critical incident” have been provided with aliases in agreement with the Government of Canada. Though Commission counsel do not accept the Government of Canada’s position that the individuals associated with this story are “informants,” the individuals involved are at some risk and summaries of the relevant documents were created and assembled in an agreed chronology for the purpose of entering the content into the public record before the Commission. 5 Testimony of Person 1, vol. 20, April 30, 2007, pp. 1932-1974. 6 Crook is currently a temporary civilian employee with the RCMP and the Integrated Proceeds of Crime Section in Vancouver: Testimony of Rick Crook, vol. 20, April 30, 2007, p. 1879. Chapter I: What Was Known About the Threat? 9 that had taken place in Narita, his thoughts immediately returned to his October 1984 interview of Person 2,7 and the information Person 2 had provided about a terrorist plot to bomb Air India planes.