The Evolution of Sikh Secessionist Movement in Western Liberal Democracies

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The Evolution of Sikh Secessionist Movement in Western Liberal Democracies International Journal of Business and Social Science Vol. 3 No. 18 [Special Issue – September 2012] The Evolution of Sikh Secessionist Movement in Western Liberal Democracies Dr. Shinder Purewal Professor Department of Political Science Kwantlen Polytechnic University Surrey, Canada, V3W 2M8 This paper focuses on the evolution of Sikh secessionist movement in Western democracies. It explains how and why a segment of émigré Sikh community turned against the Indian state? The paper has divided this separatist movement in three distinct periods: (i) The politics of ‘Sikh Home Rule’ movement from 1960’s to 1978; (ii) Terrorist Movement for Khalistan from 1978 to 1993, and (iii) the politics of ‘grievance’, from 1994 to present. The first period witnessed the rise of a small group of Sikh separatists in Britain and the United Sates, as minor pawns of Cold War politics in the South Asian context. The second period witnessed the emergence of a major terrorist network of Sikh militants armed, trained and, to certain extent, financed by Pakistan, as battle-lines were drawn between two superpowers in Afghan war theatre. The third period has witnessed the decline of militancy and violence associated with Sikh secessionist movement, and the adoption of a new strategy cloaked in the language of justice and human rights. In the post war period, most Western societies had very little population of Sikh immigrants, and, with the exception of the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US), many had very little interest in South Asia. Sikh soldiers serving with the British army were the first to settle in Canada, the UK and the US. In 1897, after participating in the golden jubilee function of Queen Victoria’s coronation, Sikh soldiers first came to the west coast of Canada. As a result, most Sikhs in the early 20 th century were settled on the Pacific West Coast of North America. Many had found a route through Hong Kong and Shanghai ports, where they worked in the security apparatus of the British colonial administration. The educated strata of the Sikhs came to study in the universities of both the UK and the US. While most of the educated Sikhs went back to newly independent India, Sikh soldiers came in large numbers to settle in England after World War II, as the British government opened its immigration doors. In late 1950s and early 1960s a limited number of trained and educated Sikh professionals started westward journey as new opportunities opened in expanding western economies. The larger migration patterns started after the success of ‘green revolution’ technologies in the Punjab. In the early 1970s, a large number of unemployed and semi-employed youth came and settled mostly in Canada, but also in England and the US. They were followed by one of largest waves of Sikhs immigrants in history in the 1980s and 1990s. While most of them came to traditional Sikh destinations like Canada, the UK and the US, many settled in other western countries like Germany, Austria, France, Italy etc. Sikh Home Rule While earlier Sikh émigrés joined anti-British colonial movements in the UK and in North America, the politics of post-independent India witnessed a new trend. Although Sikh Diaspora’s numbers were too small to make any impact on the post-1947 political developments, the seeds of a secessionist movement were sown. A small segment of Sikh émigré community started turning the wheel of patriotic movement in the opposite direction. As a result, in the early 1960s, the Sikh Home Rule movement started under the leadership of a London based Sikh émigré, Sardar Charan Singh Panchi. A discussion paper on de-classified operations of Pakistan’s Inter-Service- Intelligence (ISI) agency states that the agency supported this Panchi led movement against India, but it was later transformed into Khalistan movement under the leadership of Dr. Jagjit Singh Chohan i. It had the imprint of classical Cold War proxy war against India, and its non-aligned foreign policy. Apart from ISI’s involvement in Sikh secessionism, a tacit approval came from the United States and its cold war allies like Britain, where Jagjit Singh Chohan and other Khalistani protagonists had resided. 107 The Special Issue on Arts, Commerce and Social Science © Centre for Promoting Ideas, USA www.ijbssnet.com US-Sikh relations came under radar for the first time when Dr. Chohan, a former Akali minister from Punjab, published a half-page advertisement in the New York Times , on 11 October 1971, making a case for Khalistan. ii After India’s independence and partition, the US had shown no deep understanding of country’s new journey after two centuries of colonial rule. Policy makers in Washington were consumed by new cold war with the Soviets. Unable to comprehend the realities of South Asian geo-politics, the US began searching for allies to ‘contain communism.’ For Indian leadership, the real issue was to deal with economic backwardness, task of nation- building, and strengthening secular and democratic system. India was willing to deal on friendly basis with any small, middle or superpower to develop its economic and political system. Prime Minister Nehru wrote that after independence “we appeared to have no inherited problems and conflicts with any country.” iii Apart from Pakistan, the statement seems to be accurate as India tried to develop friendly relations with not only Western democracies, but also socialist China and USSR. For the US, India was “a land of mystery, exotic and inscrutable.” iv In a hurried manner, the US concluded a security agreement with Pakistan in 1954 to deal with Soviet security threat to Middle East. Robert McMahon comments that in a rather strange fashion, the security partnership with Pakistan was forged by the US based not on American “interests in South Asia, but about strategic calculations v about Middle East.” While the US administration remained largely unhappy with India’s non-aligned and pro-Soviet foreign policy, it was still not ready to abandon India for Pakistan. During 1962 Sino-Indian war, the US showed huge interest in supporting India against Chinese military adventure. In 1971 Bangladesh war, however, the US tilt toward Pakistan did not please India; and India’s decision to conclude a ‘Friendship Treaty’ with Soviet Union did not please the US. Further, as the Sino-American relations witnessed détente, Pakistan’s position as a strategic partner against Soviet threat increased. It was further cemented by Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. For the next ten years, Pakistan became a frontline state to “contain communism.” All Western countries supported Pakistan with economic and political aid, as Afghanistan became a hot spot for cold war. While India did not have cordial relations with many western capitals in the first three decades after independence, there is no evidence to suggest that Sikh secessionist movement received any official backing from London, Ottawa or Washington. There is no doubt that certain elements in the British or the US governments may have been friendly with secessionist leaders, but, unlike the Kashmiri separatists, the Sikhs did not receive direct or indirect official sympathy. Many western governments continued to turn a blind eye to Sikh secessionists, as they were not seen posing any real internal threat. Separatist leadership, however, did not abandon its efforts to lobby western capitals. London based secessionists were particularly active to influence the British government to do “historic justice” by supporting a Sikh state, as the British had ended the Sikh raj. One of the biggest myths propagated by Sikh secessionists is about the British proposal for a separate Sikh state during partition discussions in 1947. The Akali and Sikh leadership of the time is blamed for rejection of this proposal vi , and blamed for trusting Indian leadership of Mahatma Gandhi and Pandit Nehru. In fact, no such proposal was ever made to any Sikh delegation by the British vii . However, there is no doubt that Sikh leaders were vigorously opposed to the creation of Pakistan by bifurcating Punjab, as they feared they would be the biggest losers. History proved them right as millions of Sikhs and Hindus had to leave their properties and prosperous lives to migrate to eastern Punjab, just as millions of Muslims had to leave their homes in India. After bloody partition, Sikh leadership threw its lot with the Congress party, as Akali Dal was formally disbanded. This decision did not please many migrant Sikh leaders from trading classes, including Master Tara Singh, who were struggling to settle in new markets of Punjab and Delhi. A new cause to unite the Sikhs under the command of Akali leadership was provided by States Re-Organization Commission, as it refused to bifurcate the sensitive border state on the basis of linguistic formula. It reasoned that Where border areas are not under the direct control of the Centre, it would be safer to have relatively large and resourceful states….It is neither possible nor desirable to reorganize States on the basis of a single test of either language or culture; a balanced approach, which takes all relevant factors into account, is necessary. viii Akali leadership launched a state-wide agitation to demand the bifurcation of Punjab on the basis of language formula, which had been used to divide southern states of India. 108 International Journal of Business and Social Science Vol. 3 No. 18 [Special Issue – September 2012] This was turned into a new cry for a Sikh dominated state in the northwest of India. Émigré Sikh leaders like Sardar Panchi used this just demand for a Punjabi speaking state to convince Sikh Diaspora to support Sikh rule movement. Meantime, in the intense atmosphere of cold war politics, especially after the Cuba Missile Crisis, the United States could not ignore any anti-India card it could posses as a foreign policy tool.
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