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Myanmar’s Arakan Conflict: Should Initiate a Modified Replication of its Mizo-Model?

Tejusvi Shukla

With a population comprising sizeable numbers of ethnic minorities, has had a history of ethnic conflict. With over a year long delay, peace talks with various Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) resumed on January 8, 2020; with the 8th Joint Implementation Coordination Meeting (JICM) conducted at Naypyitaw.1 The JICM was attended by the ten EAOs that are signatories of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), along with various military and political representatives. Expectedly though, the Arakan Army (AA), one of the most prominent EAOs in Myanmar, continued to remain absent from the negotiation table. India too, like its eastern neighbour, has experienced (and continues to experience) a number insurgencies since its independence. Among these, the resolution of the insurgency is considered to be one of the best conflict resolution models in the near-continent’s history. Interestingly, while the Mizoram insurgency has some stark differences from other Indian insurgencies, it holds a compelling resemblance to the Arakan conflict. Through this paper, the author aims to analyse these similarities between the two insurgencies to suggest a modified replication of the Mizoram model as a conflict resolution model for the Arakan conflict. The author also tries to justify the need for India to assume a larger role in resolving this conflict owing to its national stakes, apart from its capabilities as a peace-broker.

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The Mizoram Insurgency The Mizoram insurgency took off following the famine (called Mautam) in the 1960s when the Indian state failed to cater to the survival needs of the Mizo population. An insurgent group under Landenga, a former Havildar in the British , emerged against this state negligence and inaction. He trained and organised an armed insurgent group under the name of the (MNF). The factors leading to a sustained upward curve of the insurgency, till the peace accord was finally signed in 1986, can be analysed through the local support the MNF enjoyed, the external support it received, and its demand for federalism.

Local Support Mautam had wreaked havoc in the lives of the people, and the government’s inaction over their suffering had aggravated public sentiment. Suppression instead of any engagement with the population kept boosting the locals’ sympathy for the MNF. This skyrocketed with geometric progression following the air strikes in Aizwal in 1966. The Aizwal air strikes comprise the first and only instance in independent India’s history where air power was employed against local insurgents.2 This hit the public sentiment terribly and translated into the MNF’s foundational strength.

External Support While local support formed the MNF’s foundational base, the logistical support and training that was required for the insurgency’s offensive visibility was provided through external support. The MNF received external support in two ways: through other northeast insurgent groups as well as, allegedly, through China and Pakistan.3 Notably, these external allies were connected to each other due to their mutual interests (northeast insurgent groups) and vested interests (China and Pakistan), respectively, instead of issue-based unity.

Demand for Federalism In combination with the prior two factors, the demand for statehood within the Indian state instead of secession or systemic alteration was the most distinct feature of the Mizo insurgency, differentiating it from other contemporary movements. This demand had two drivers: aspirations for recognition of the Mizos as a distinct cultural entity followed by local governance in accordance with Mizo customs.

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The Mizoram Peace Accord, signed in 1986, arrived at a mutual consensus on each of the three core drivers of the insurgency, thus, resolving the conflict. The MNF acknowledged the Indian Constitution and was recognised as a legitimate political party. Its armed cadres came overground and embraced constitutional politics. It gave up all communication with, and support, to (and from) all anti-state external forces. The then Union Territory of Mizoram was granted statehood which gave way to state elections, and Laldenga emerged as the first Chief Minister of Mizoram. Further, the accord notified no application of any law concerning Mizo customs passed in the Parliament of India without the approval of the state’s Legislative Assembly.4

Arakan Insurgency: Resemblance to the Mizo Conflict Interestingly, the insurgency under the Arakan Army (AA) shows a compelling resemblance to the Mizo insurgency. It operates in the Rakhine and Chin states of western Myanmar. Established by Major General Htun Myat Naing in 2009, this organisation currently claims to hold a cadre strength of over 7,000. With growing violent clashes between the AA and Tatmadaw, the Myanmar government has designated it as a terrorist organisation. The challenges that the AA poses, like the MNF, too can be aptly explained through the massive local support they enjoy, the external support they receive and their pressing demand for federalism.

Fig 1: The Source of the AA’s Strength and the Reason behind its Growing Aggressive Response can be Traced to the Local and External Support it Enjoys. This is only Aggravated by the Mass Disillusionment that Arises due to the Slow Democratisation Process of the Country

External Support (Northern Alliance and tacit Chinese support)

Local Support Myanmar’s (mass grievances Nascent and military democracy oppression)

Arakan Army’s source of strength

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Local Support The local support that the AA enjoys in the region today can neither be denied, nor ignored. Most of this support has emerged from the state’s negligence of the masses’ needs. The Rakhine state is one of the worst performing states in terms of most socio-economic indicators—access to drinking water, sanitation, electrification, or unemployment. Although a naturally resource- rich state, only 37.8 per cent of all households have access to improved sources of drinking water, as opposed to a national average of 69.5 per cent. Almost half of all households in Rakhine have no toilet facilities (as in 2017). Plus, against a national average of 32.4 per cent electrified households, only 12.8 per cent households in Rakhine have access to electricity. What aggravates this public sentiment is the high unemployment rate (10.4 per cent against 3 per cent national average) in an otherwise fairly literate state (84.7 per cent against 89.5 per cent national average).5 These public grievances emerging from the inefficiency of the state machinery, much like in the case of Mizoram, have translated into the local support that the AA currently enjoys. A major role in aggravating this sentiment has been played by Tatmadaw’s excessive military response to contain this swarming support. A recent allegation regarding the use of combat drones against the AA by the Tatmadaw has only catalysed the ongoing crisis. Moreover, a major reason behind the failure of attempts for negotiation with the AA has been the alleged military action of the Tatmadaw, at times, despite a ceasefire being in place. Worse, instead of being deterred, the AA has been asserting its authority in the region with increased aggression, thus, intensifying the conflict.

External Support External support to the AA has been extended in two forms—by other EAOs in Myanmar and in the form of tacit Chinese support. This yet again finds resonance with the Mizo insurgency that enjoyed support from other northeast Indian insurgent groups mostly based on mutual interests, coupled with training and arms allegedly from the Chinese. The AA is a part of the Northern Alliance which is a group of four of Myanmar’s prominent EAOs—none of them signatories to the NCA. Coordination between them due to mutual or similar interests has indeed positively impacted the strength of the AA. The Kachin Independence Army (KIA, another Northern Alliance member) played a vital role in the organisation and training of the AA

142 ä SPRING 2020 ä scholar warrior scholar warrior in its initial days. In fact, joint recruitment and training of recruits by the KIA and AA has currently resulted in a collective cadre strength of over 10,000.6 The Chinese involvement, due to vested interests, has only enhanced this strength. China and Myanmar share a love-hate relationship with frequent instances of clashes and convergence of interests. Although there is economic engagement worth billions of dollars between the two countries and Naypyidaw looks up to China for support in various international fora while facing a backlash on humanitarian grounds, a sense of distrust between the two cannot be ruled out. Some experts also believe that Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts are used by the Chinese as leverage against their economic and strategic interests in the country. Drawing a link between the rise of ethnic conflicts in northern Myanmar following the downsizing of Beijing’s projects there around 2011, the then Information Minister of Myanmar hinted at a Chinese role in the conflict escalation along the border.7 Further, in a public statement by the Myanmar Army in November 2019, displeasure was expressed over the seizure of a cache of Chinese arms from an insurgent group in northern Myanmar. In the context of the AA, which concerns India the most, it is claimed that it shares a “patron-client relationship” with the Chinese since it is a part of the Brotherhood Alliance that allegedly has significant Chinese influence.

Demand for Federalism Apart from local and external support, the conflict claims to derive its legitimacy from the nascence of Myanmar’s democracy. It cannot be denied that while a civilian government succeeded the 50-year military rule in 2010, the democratisation process in Myanmar is far from complete. A point worth consideration here is that the AA, which is fighting for the recognition of its claims in Rakhine, has been demanding a confederate status, instead of secession— something similar to the ultimate demand of statehood under the Indian Union by the MNF. It must be recalled in this context that the AA recently announced the levying of taxes on infrastructural projects in Rakhine. While some read this as a means of fund generation, most experts perceive it as an attempt at an aggressive assertion for recognition of its authority in the state. It is here that the role of the Tatmadaw becomes important. Almost a quarter of the seats in the Parliament of Myanmar are still reserved for the military, which curtails the powers of the civilian government. This was prominently reflected in the government’s compromised stand on the amendment of Article 261 of the Constitution,8 which indeed could have pushed

scholar warrior ä spring 2020 ä 143 scholar warrior for some federalism that the EAOs demand. This situation, in turn, raises sympathies for the EAOs among ethnic minorities whose political aspirations remain unmet (because of Article 261) and who have historically faced (and continue to face) military oppression.

India’s Stakes Amidst this, India’s stakes in Myanmar, at present, cannot be ignored. A visible overlap of India’s strategic, economic and security (external and internal) interests in the country raise its significance for India. Four points deserve consideration in this regard. One, Myanmar is a convergent country for two of India’s flagship policies: Act East and Neighbourhood First. It shares a 1,643-km- long border with India and forms a gateway for India to Southeast Asia. Two, the ambitious Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project (KMMTTP), which is on its last leg after numerous delays, passes majorly through western Myanmar. It provides an alternative route connecting West Bengal to the northeast Indian states through Mizoram. Plus, the Trilateral Highway which is set to connect India with Thailand (acting as a major economic and strategic asset) passes through an entire stretch of Myanmar.

Fig 2: Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project Connecting Kolkata’s Haldia Port to Mizoram through Sittwe Port along the Kaladan River

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Fig 3: The Trilateral Highway Crossing through an Entire Stretch of Myanmar Connecting India with Thailand

Three, Myanmar’s assistance and cooperation have been instrumental in containing India’s northeast insurgency. Coordinated operations with the Myanmar Army have helped eliminate the insurgents camps and curtailed their use of Myanmar’s territory as a safe haven. Four, growing Myanmar dependence on the Chinese in terms of economic investment (close to US$ 20 billion) and support against an international backlash on humanitarian grounds, is not a positive signal for . Additionally, China has been officially mediating in the peace talks in Myanmar since 2017. But, it must be noted that these mediations by China, itself not a democracy, have borne no significant result so far. Apart from long-term considerations, what comes as an immediate concern for India is the constant threat that lingers over Indian strategic and economic assets within the country, especially in Rakhine. Of late, the Kaladan project has borne the brunt of the violent clashes between AA and Tatmadaw. Recently, as previously mentioned, the EAO had announced “taxing” of infrastructural projects in the Rakhine state. This was preceded by the abduction of five Indian workers engaged in the Kaladan project in November 2019, in turn, preceded by another incident in March the same year that involved the setting on fire of a civilian vessel carrying logistics for

scholar warrior ä spring 2020 ä 145 scholar warrior the project. Although neither the Tatmadaw, nor AA directly aims at attacking Indian projects, the threat of being caught between the violent faceoffs continues to hit and hurt Indian interests.

A Modified Mizo-Model Could Pacify Rakhine Striking similarities between the Mizo insurgency and that occurring in Rakhine and Chin under the Arakan Army cannot be ignored—nor can the high costs of the Indian stakes attached to the region’s stability. Currently, the status quo appears gloomy. Myanmar’s peace talks with the AA are not reaching a convergent point and Chinese mediation is having no significant results. It is here that India’s role could serve the larger goal of conflict resolution through a modified replication of its Mizo model. Although this would involve a number of nuances, it can broadly be put down as three compromising fronts.

Federalism With the AA clearly outnumbered by the Tatmadaw, in terms of numbers and strength, a direct faceoff is less likely. But, with curtailed local political aspirations and continued state inefficiency, coupled with military oppression, local sympathies would continue to strengthen the AA in Rakhine. A major stake of the Tatmadaw in the conflict, constitutionally (25 per cent reserved seats in Parliament) and otherwise (continuing offensive against the AA on ground), makes any negotiation without the military’s involvement meaningless. The last such meeting with most EAOs held in December 2019 in China ended in a stalemate due to the absence of the military leadership at the negotiation table. It is here that a limited decentralisation, at the initial stage, of state power through federalism, needs to be encouraged. Through building a consensus among the Tatmadaw, the Myanmar government and AA, the recognition of the Arakan ethnic minority on lines similar to the granting of statehood for the Mizos could be initiated. A modified provision empowering the Regional Parliaments to decide on laws and policies pertaining to ethnic customs and practices, while retaining other powers with the Myanmar government could further restore local confidence in the government.

Armed Cadres With recognition of ethnic identity and political aspirations met to some extent, the armed cadres of the AA could either be rehabilitated by gradually providing adequate employment opportunities, or absorbed, after the required process,

146 ä SPRING 2020 ä scholar warrior scholar warrior as a unit under the Myanmar Army. The AA can be then pushed to give up all communications with any external anti-state support, like the MNF, and be recognised as a legitimate political party.

Bottom-up Approach While the democratisation process is mostly looked at as a top-down journey, a bottom-up approach could help accelerate this process. A remarkable role was played by the church priests in bringing the Mizo insurgency to its final resolution. Socially acceptable institutions and individuals from the ethnic Buddhist Arakan population must be engaged with on a regular basis. This might help bridge the communication gap that has existed for a long time now between the authorities and the masses. These socially acceptable institutions and individuals could help convey the proposals and counter-proposals that could ultimately fructify as a formal peace accord, thus, pacifying a conflict-ridden Rakhine state.

Conclusion Ultimately, an accelerated democratisation process lies at the root of this conflict’s resolution. While the civilian government is willing to initiate this resolution, it is for the military leadership to act in accordance with the larger good of Myanmar. India, being a mature democracy, could help Myanmar through this journey with its experiences and capabilities. In doing so, it will help stabilise a bordering country and, consequentially, strengthen its own regional presence and economic engagement in the Indian Ocean Region. Its role in resolving the Arakan conflict through a modified Mizo model, with its obvious nuances, would help both Myanmar and India, individually as well as collectively.

Tejusvi Shukla is a Research Assistant at CLAWS, New Delhi. The views expressed are personal.

Notes 1. National Reconciliation and Peace Centre, “Govt, EAOs Reach Eight Agreements at 8th JICM in Nay Pyi Taw”, January 9, 2020. http://www.nrpc.gov.mm/en/index.php/node/348. Accessed on January 15, 2020. 2. “Air Attacks in Mizoram, 1966 – Our Dirty, Little Secret”, The Economic Times, February 19, 2013. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/opinion/et-commentary/air-attacks-in- mizoram-1966-our-dirty-little-secret/articleshow/18565883.cms. Accessed on 20 January, 2020. 3. “China, Pakistan Supported Mizo Insurgency, Says in his Autobiography”, India Today, December 9, 2018. https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/china-pakistan-

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supported-mizo-insurgency-says-zoramthanga-in-his-autobiography-1405666-2018-12-09. Accessed on January 16, 2020. 4. United Nations Peace Maker, Memorandum of Settlement (Mizoram Accord). https:// peacemaker.un.org/india-mizoram-accord86. Accessed on January 15, 2020. 5. United Nations Population Fund, “A Changing Population: Rakhine State Figurs at a Glance”, May 2015, https://myanmar.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/3K_Rakhine_Figures_ ENG.pdf. Accessed on January 14, 2020. 6. The Strategy Page, “Myanmar: Stalemates”, January 15, 2020. https://www.strategypage. com/qnd/myanmar/articles/20200115.aspx. Accessed on January 15, 2020. 7. “Myanmar’s Generals Make a Show of Displeasure at China’s Arming of Rebels”, The Irrawaddy, November 26, 2019. https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/commentary/ myanmars-generals-make-show-displeasure-chinas-arming-rebels.html. Accessed on December 23, 2019. 8. Article 261 of the Constitution of Myanmar gives the power to nominate and dismiss heads of the Regional Parliaments, known as the Chief Ministers. The Regional Parliaments have no say in this procedure. This provision has continuously worked in worsened the ethnic conflicts across the country.

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