scholar warrior Myanmar’s Arakan Conflict: Should India Initiate a Modified Replication of its Mizo-Model? TEJUSVI SHUKLA With a population comprising sizeable numbers of ethnic minorities, Myanmar has had a history of ethnic conflict. With over a year long delay, peace talks with various Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) resumed on January 8, 2020; with the 8th Joint Implementation Coordination Meeting (JICM) conducted at Naypyitaw.1 The JICM was attended by the ten EAOs that are signatories of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), along with various military and political representatives. Expectedly though, the Arakan Army (AA), one of the most prominent EAOs in Myanmar, continued to remain absent from the negotiation table. India too, like its eastern neighbour, has experienced (and continues to experience) a number insurgencies since its independence. Among these, the resolution of the Mizoram insurgency is considered to be one of the best conflict resolution models in the near-continent’s history. Interestingly, while the Mizoram insurgency has some stark differences from other Indian insurgencies, it holds a compelling resemblance to the Arakan conflict. Through this paper, the author aims to analyse these similarities between the two insurgencies to suggest a modified replication of the Mizoram model as a conflict resolution model for the Arakan conflict. The author also tries to justify the need for India to assume a larger role in resolving this conflict owing to its national stakes, apart from its capabilities as a peace-broker. scholar warrior ä SPRING 2020 ä 139 scholar warrior The Mizoram Insurgency The Mizoram insurgency took off following the famine (called Mautam) in the 1960s when the Indian state failed to cater to the survival needs of the Mizo population. An insurgent group under Landenga, a former Havildar in the British Indian Army, emerged against this state negligence and inaction. He trained and organised an armed insurgent group under the name of the Mizo National Front (MNF). The factors leading to a sustained upward curve of the insurgency, till the peace accord was finally signed in 1986, can be analysed through the local support the MNF enjoyed, the external support it received, and its demand for federalism. Local Support Mautam had wreaked havoc in the lives of the people, and the government’s inaction over their suffering had aggravated public sentiment. Suppression instead of any engagement with the population kept boosting the locals’ sympathy for the MNF. This skyrocketed with geometric progression following the air strikes in Aizwal in 1966. The Aizwal air strikes comprise the first and only instance in independent India’s history where air power was employed against local insurgents.2 This hit the public sentiment terribly and translated into the MNF’s foundational strength. External Support While local support formed the MNF’s foundational base, the logistical support and training that was required for the insurgency’s offensive visibility was provided through external support. The MNF received external support in two ways: through other northeast insurgent groups as well as, allegedly, through China and Pakistan.3 Notably, these external allies were connected to each other due to their mutual interests (northeast insurgent groups) and vested interests (China and Pakistan), respectively, instead of issue-based unity. Demand for Federalism In combination with the prior two factors, the demand for statehood within the Indian state instead of secession or systemic alteration was the most distinct feature of the Mizo insurgency, differentiating it from other contemporary movements. This demand had two drivers: aspirations for recognition of the Mizos as a distinct cultural entity followed by local governance in accordance with Mizo customs. 140 ä SPRING 2020 ä scholar warrior scholar warrior The Mizoram Peace Accord, signed in 1986, arrived at a mutual consensus on each of the three core drivers of the insurgency, thus, resolving the conflict. The MNF acknowledged the Indian Constitution and was recognised as a legitimate political party. Its armed cadres came overground and embraced constitutional politics. It gave up all communication with, and support, to (and from) all anti-state external forces. The then Union Territory of Mizoram was granted statehood which gave way to state elections, and Laldenga emerged as the first Chief Minister of Mizoram. Further, the accord notified no application of any law concerning Mizo customs passed in the Parliament of India without the approval of the state’s Legislative Assembly.4 Arakan Insurgency: Resemblance to the Mizo Conflict Interestingly, the insurgency under the Arakan Army (AA) shows a compelling resemblance to the Mizo insurgency. It operates in the Rakhine and Chin states of western Myanmar. Established by Major General Htun Myat Naing in 2009, this organisation currently claims to hold a cadre strength of over 7,000. With growing violent clashes between the AA and Tatmadaw, the Myanmar government has designated it as a terrorist organisation. The challenges that the AA poses, like the MNF, too can be aptly explained through the massive local support they enjoy, the external support they receive and their pressing demand for federalism. Fig 1: The Source of the AA’s Strength and the Reason behind its Growing Aggressive Response can be Traced to the Local and External Support it Enjoys. This is only Aggravated by the Mass Disillusionment that Arises due to the Slow Democratisation Process of the Country External Support (Northern Alliance and tacit Chinese support) Local Support Myanmar’s (mass grievances Nascent and military democracy oppression) Arakan Army’s source of strength scholar warrior ä SPRING 2020 ä 141 scholar warrior Local Support The local support that the AA enjoys in the region today can neither be denied, nor ignored. Most of this support has emerged from the state’s negligence of the masses’ needs. The Rakhine state is one of the worst performing states in terms of most socio-economic indicators—access to drinking water, sanitation, electrification, or unemployment. Although a naturally resource- rich state, only 37.8 per cent of all households have access to improved sources of drinking water, as opposed to a national average of 69.5 per cent. Almost half of all households in Rakhine have no toilet facilities (as in 2017). Plus, against a national average of 32.4 per cent electrified households, only 12.8 per cent households in Rakhine have access to electricity. What aggravates this public sentiment is the high unemployment rate (10.4 per cent against 3 per cent national average) in an otherwise fairly literate state (84.7 per cent against 89.5 per cent national average).5 These public grievances emerging from the inefficiency of the state machinery, much like in the case of Mizoram, have translated into the local support that the AA currently enjoys. A major role in aggravating this sentiment has been played by Tatmadaw’s excessive military response to contain this swarming support. A recent allegation regarding the use of combat drones against the AA by the Tatmadaw has only catalysed the ongoing crisis. Moreover, a major reason behind the failure of attempts for negotiation with the AA has been the alleged military action of the Tatmadaw, at times, despite a ceasefire being in place. Worse, instead of being deterred, the AA has been asserting its authority in the region with increased aggression, thus, intensifying the conflict. External Support External support to the AA has been extended in two forms—by other EAOs in Myanmar and in the form of tacit Chinese support. This yet again finds resonance with the Mizo insurgency that enjoyed support from other northeast Indian insurgent groups mostly based on mutual interests, coupled with training and arms allegedly from the Chinese. The AA is a part of the Northern Alliance which is a group of four of Myanmar’s prominent EAOs—none of them signatories to the NCA. Coordination between them due to mutual or similar interests has indeed positively impacted the strength of the AA. The Kachin Independence Army (KIA, another Northern Alliance member) played a vital role in the organisation and training of the AA 142 ä SPRING 2020 ä scholar warrior scholar warrior in its initial days. In fact, joint recruitment and training of recruits by the KIA and AA has currently resulted in a collective cadre strength of over 10,000.6 The Chinese involvement, due to vested interests, has only enhanced this strength. China and Myanmar share a love-hate relationship with frequent instances of clashes and convergence of interests. Although there is economic engagement worth billions of dollars between the two countries and Naypyidaw looks up to China for support in various international fora while facing a backlash on humanitarian grounds, a sense of distrust between the two cannot be ruled out. Some experts also believe that Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts are used by the Chinese as leverage against their economic and strategic interests in the country. Drawing a link between the rise of ethnic conflicts in northern Myanmar following the downsizing of Beijing’s projects there around 2011, the then Information Minister of Myanmar hinted at a Chinese role in the conflict escalation along the border.7 Further, in a public statement by the Myanmar Army in November 2019, displeasure was expressed over the seizure of a cache of Chinese arms from an insurgent group in northern Myanmar. In the context of the AA, which concerns India the most, it is claimed that it shares a “patron-client relationship” with the Chinese since it is a part of the Brotherhood Alliance that allegedly has significant Chinese influence. Demand for Federalism Apart from local and external support, the conflict claims to derive its legitimacy from the nascence of Myanmar’s democracy. It cannot be denied that while a civilian government succeeded the 50-year military rule in 2010, the democratisation process in Myanmar is far from complete.