SUBMISSION TO THE COMMISSION ON THE
DEFENCE FORCES 16 FEB 2021
Unit 12, 4075 Kingswood Rd, Citywest Business Campus, Dublin 24 (D24WE54). Tel: 01-413 3324 Email: [email protected] RACO Submission to the Commission on the Defence Forces Table of Contents Page INTRODUCTION 2
Context – A Defence Forces in decline 3 Positive Aspects of Military Life 3 Relationship between Staffing, Structure and Military Capability 5
STAFFING 6 Turnover 7 Retention vs Recruitment 9 Government HLIP ‘Strengthening our Defence Forces’ 11
STRUCTURES 13 Command and Governance of the Defence Forces 13 Army / Land Component Structure 14 Naval Service / Maritime Component Structure 15 Air Corps / Air Component Structure 16 Inadequate Defence Forces Establishment 17 Portlaoise Prison 18 HR Structures 18 Career Management 20 Pay and Conditions Determination Model – Pay Review Body 22 Single Pension Scheme and Supplementary Pension 23 EU Working Time Directive 24
CAPABILITY 26 Army / Land Component Capability 26 Naval Service / Maritime Component Capability 27 Air Corps / Air Component Capability 28 Defence Funding 29 Intelligence 30 Overseas 30 Training 31 Training Establishment 32 Facilities / Infrastructure 33 Reserve Defence Forces 34
SUMMARY OF RACO PROPOSALS 36 LIST OF ANNEXES A – L 37
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16 February 2021 COMMISSION ON THE DEFENCE FORCES – RACO SUBMISSION INTRODUCTION RACO welcomes the establishment of this latest independent commission to make an extensive review of defence requirements in the medium to long term. As the statutory body representing leaders and decision makers, a key stakeholder in the review process, and a key enabler to delivering its outcomes, RACO is in a unique position to bring you the observations of members who operate from the tactical to the strategic level and live the Defence Forces experience every day.
The Defence Forces have been in a state of slow decline for almost a decade and has reached the point where this decline is becoming irreversible. Numerous reviews and Commissions have touched on the root cause of this decline, without actually addressing it; the failure to adequately resource Defence in order to retain highly qualified and experienced personnel to maintain capability. This Commission on the Defence Forces is a once-in-a-generation, and perhaps final opportunity to address the issues that have brought us to this point. Our submission is based not only on the work that RACO has undertaken over the last decade; it is the culmination of a wide consultation of currently serving and recently retired Defence Forces officers1. Over the past 3 decades the Defence Forces have undergone numerous separate commissions or reviews, most of which have resulted in a reduction in personnel numbers. These include:
• Commission on DF Remuneration and Conditions of Service 1990 (The Gleeson Commission) • Efficiency Audit Group (EAG 1) 1991 • Efficiency Audit Group (EAG 2) 1992 • Efficiency Audit Group (EAG 3) 1994 • Defence Forces Review Implementation Plan (DFRIP) 1996 • Air Corps and Naval Service Reviews 1999 • White Paper on Defence 2000 • Army Reorganisation 2011-2012 • Value for Money Review of the Reserve Defence Forces 2012 • White Paper on Defence 2015 • Climate Survey 2016 and Focus Group report 2017 • Public Service Pay Commission (1-3) 2017/2018/2019.
1 Research conducted by RACO on over 100 former members who have recently voluntarily departed the organisation since 2017 contained in Annex B. DF HR Branch has not been able to conduct this research of late.
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RACO members recall the flawed and inadequate Report of the Public Service Pay Commission2. The research3 underpinning this report concluded the following:
“The conclusions from this study suggest that the Defence Forces is at a critical juncture. The findings presented intimate that without immediate and substantial intervention, particularly in respect of pay, allowances and pension entitlements, the organisation may, within a short time, face major difficulties in maintaining its personnel and in carrying out its mandate.”
The Pay Commission then went on to make NO recommendations on either Pay or Pension Entitlements, and the organisation has continued its cycle of Dysfunctional Turnover and decline.
Members note with a sense of dismay approaching resignation, the failure to progress key commitments in the White Paper on Defence 2015 and the Government High Level Implementation Plan4, and they could be forgiven for approaching this latest process with a degree of scepticism; indeed, some have. Nevertheless, RACO pledges to spare no effort in contributing on behalf of our members to this process and hopes to remain fully engaged for the duration.
There should be no doubt that in spite of the many positive aspects of a military career, we are dealing with an organisation in crisis, and the Commission has an extremely important, extraordinarily complex, though not insurmountable task on its hands.
Positive aspects of Military Life
It is important to outline the unique nature of military service and the very positive aspects of a life in uniform for our members. There are few careers today that can offer the sense of identity, camaraderie, and individual and collective pride that a life in the Defence Forces can. Research conducted for the Public Service Pay Commission and Workplace Climate Survey5, and on RACO’s behalf by Amárach Research6, all showed that personnel feel positively about the peer support they receive and the value of their service to the community. The Public Service Pay Commission reported that “A career in the PDF is not comparable with that of any civilian occupation. It is well established that there are special disadvantages associated with military life. They include unsocial hours of duty, prolonged periods of separation from family, exposure to danger, and restrictions associated with military discipline. It is clear from the research undertaken in the preparation of this Report that those who join the PDF do so
2 https://paycommission.gov.ie/wp-content/uploads/Dept-of-Defence-PSPC-report-2019-WEB-1.pdf 3 https://researchmatters.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Recruitment-and-retention-study-Defence-Forces- Summary.pdf 4 https://assets.gov.ie/30647/dcd2f11e73114ef3ab1d1df8f0e3b627.pdf 5 https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/884c8c-workplace-climate-in-the-defence-forces/ 6 https://paycommission.gov.ie/wp-content/uploads/05.03.2019-RACO-Amarach-Report-20336.pdf
3 for a variety of reasons, but most are motivated by a desire to serve their country, which they do with pride and dedication.”
The Climate Survey Focus Group Report explained how focus group participants were asked what they enjoyed about working in the Defence Forces and how the answers varied significantly depending on rank, contract and tenure. “While many participants expressed a strong commitment to what the organisation stood for and a pride in the uniform, this was predominantly a theme in the more senior focus groups. For example, those with longer tenure and higher rank cited camaraderie as an important positive aspect of working in the Defence Forces – but many of them followed this with the observation that this was no longer the case for newer recruits. Worryingly though, those occupying the lowest ranks did not feel there were many positives associated with working in the Defence Forces and struggled to answer this question.”
Likewise, the Defence Forces Public Perception Survey in December 2020 showed that 74% of those surveyed valued the DF’s role in ensuring Ireland's National security and 79% valued the work the Defence Forces do in supporting their communities. For most Defence Forces personnel, the opportunity to serve abroad, whether on UN peacekeeping or maritime humanitarian missions, is the pinnacle of service and the greatest opportunity to develop and employ skills and practice command and leadership. A significant pillar of Ireland’s
Figure 1: Extract from Defence Forces Public Perception Survey Dec 2020 successful campaign to obtain a seat on the UN Security Council, was the tradition of peacekeeping which our Defence Forces has maintained unbroken for over 60 years. The men and women of Óglaigh na hÉireann are immensely proud of the service they provide to the maintenance of international peace and security and, as the data in figure 1. above demonstrates, so too are the people of Ireland.
Unfortunately, this willingness to serve and esprit de corps are being undermined by the inadequate conditions that currently exist around the nature of military service in Ireland. Our members feel undervalued and overstretched and are leaving the Defence Forces for more stable opportunities in the public service, or better paid positions in the private sector at an unsustainable rate. We will outline in the sections below the factors that have brought us to this point and try to identify some feasible solutions that can be implemented with the political will to really strengthen this proud and wonderful organisation.
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Mindful of the terms of reference of the Commission and the guidelines contained within the invitation to speak here today, we will address three broad themes: Capability, Structures, and Staffing. Generation, maintenance and delivery of defence capability is the overarching goal of any military force. Indeed, the NATO Capability Construct, ‘DOTMLPFI’7, includes Organisation (Structures) and Personnel (Staffing) under its umbrella. However, this submission separates out Staffing and Structures as per the riding instructions.
RACO’s mandate is “to champion the wellbeing of our members” and our key message across all three themes is that the resourcing, remuneration, motivation and retention of our personnel is the key to saving our Defence Forces and ensuring its viability into the future. It is our firm belief that without adequately trained, motivated and incentivised staff, there is no Capability, and it doesn’t matter what Structures you have in place. This is why our submission starts with Staffing.
We will show that current rates of turnover are so high, that we cannot hope to reach our minimum established strength until beyond 2050 without significant retention interventions to significantly reduce the Turnover Rate and that, consequently, we cannot hope to recruit our way out of the current crisis.
Retention of experienced
personnel across our
ranks, corps and services is our best and only option
to arrest the decline and meet new and ambitious challenges in the future.
We will then examine the
structural overhaul
required to facilitate the retention of personnel, Figure 2: Importance of personnel to the delivery of any capability. and the generation of the Example: Protected Mobility capability that the State requires and deserves from a healthy and resourced military arm, which our members will be called on to deliver.
7 DOTMLPFI stands for Doctrine, Organisation, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, Interoperability.
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1. STAFFING
Defence Forces strength is declining each year and the level of recruitment required to offset the debilitating churn and get the DF eventually back up to strength (at least 700 per annum) is not achievable. We cannot recruit our way out of this HR crisis. The dysfunctional cycle of turnover, identified by UL researchers as far back as 2016 necessitates unsustainably high levels of recruitment, which places additional training demands on the organisation. At 31 December 2020, DF strength was 8,573, including 473 personnel in induction training, with only 8,100 therefore considered operational or deployable. Raw and inexperienced recruits cannot replace the years of experience that we are losing. We are constantly reminded that our personnel are our best resource, but that resource is dwindling away before our eyes.
The greatest challenge to the Defence Forces today is simply staffing its appointments, particularly at the junior officer and NCO level. It has been demonstrated beyond a shadow of doubt that we cannot hope to recruit our way out of this retention crisis. RACO identified this fact four years ago, and it appears that Defence sector management is starting to realise this. The White Paper states that ‘the most fundamental requirement and a critical factor for success is well trained, motivated, experienced and capable personnel with a wide range of skills and experience in order to successfully deliver government requirements’.
However, the increased rates of voluntary departures and rapid Length of Service - 29% of Currently induction over the past number of Serving DF Officers have less than 5 years' service years mean that 24% of all operational personnel in the Army, Air Corps and Naval Service have five years’ service or 29% less. For Officers, it is even more stark. 29% of all Commissioned 71% officers have less than 5 years’ service. This has severe implications for governance and More than 5 years Fewer than 5 years supervision and increases organisational risk.
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Turnover
The Defence Forces have been suffering since 2016 from a Dysfunctional Cycle of Turnover. This has led to an ever decreasing pool of suitably qualified and experienced personnel, and in an organisation whose stock in trade is the profession of arms and the management and execution of lethal force, this is a grave risk. Since 01 January 2016 the organisation has inducted 3,116 personnel while losing 3,679 (41% of the average strength for those 5 years) and currently 24% of DF strength is made up of personnel with less than five years’ experience.
This has had a severe impact on the level of experience we have in the organisation, as it can take up to five years (more, in some cases) to train specialists for the many outputs that the Defence Forces provide. This rate of churn has also led to a panicked recruitment effort, delivered by our members, but no amount of water has been able to fill the leaky bucket that the DF has become. New blood is welcome in any organisation, but not at this rate.
It also places an unbearable training demand on the rest of the organisation, in addition to our ongoing operations and other tasks. Over the last few years the DF operational strength figure has consistently fallen; at the end of 2020, our strength stood at 8,573 personnel, which includes 473 personnel in full time Induction Training, and therefore not operational.
In its 2020 publication ‘Defence Forces: Remuneration, Recruitment and Retention’8, the Parliamentary Budget Office described retention in the Defence Forces as ‘a function of recruitment, turnover and career progression’. The Defence Forces are recruiting at an unsustainably high rate and have been for some years, and recent cadet classes have been huge by historical norms yet the turnover current rate for the organisation is 7.5% and was up to 10% overall (and 17% in the Naval Service) just prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. The duration, complexity, resource intensity and management overhead of induction training means that the organisation is not in a position to increase the current levels.
8 https://data.oireachtas.ie/ie/oireachtas/parliamentaryBudgetOffice/2020/2020-05-22_defence-forces- remuneration-recruitment-and-retention_en.pdf
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The upshot is that, at the current turnover rate of 7.5%, if the DF were to induct 700 personnel9 each and every year, strength will continue to slowly decline, and the Defence Forces will not meet its assigned minimum strength until after the year 2050. With a more realistic and sustainable induction rate of 600 per annum, the DF turnover rate must reduce to 5% if 9,500 is to be reached by 2026.
Figure 3: Future strength at current Turnover Rate (TR)
9 There were 607 inductions in 2019 (net strength loss 275), and 538 in 2020 (net strength loss 98).
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Retention vs Recruitment
The Gleeson Commission, established in 1989 to: ‘carry out a major review of the remuneration and conditions of service of the Defence Forces having regard to their separate and distinct role and organisation’, found that “One factor which must be taken into account is the need to arrive at rates of pay which are sufficient to enable the DF to recruit and retain personnel of the proper quality”. A cost/ benefit analysis of retention over recruitment bears this out also.
Value for Money: Cost per Student of Officer Professional Military Education DF Course Cost/student Comment Army Cadet Training €100,000 17 months in DFTC Air Corps Cadet Training €500,000 12 Year undertaking – incl. Wings Cse NS Executive Officer €200,000 Mix of classroom & on-the-job trg NS Mech Engr Officer €450,000 Mix of classroom & on-the-job trg NS Electrical Engr Officer €270,000 Mix of classroom & on-the-job trg Infantry Young Offr Cse €15,000 8 week course in DFTC Overseas Prep Cses/Exercises €20,000 Including Military 1st Responder Cse Land C&S Course €35,000 Requirement for Captain Promotion Joint C&S Course €100,000 Requirement for Comdt Promotion Third Level Degree €100,000 2 year undertaking per academic year Engineer Young Officer Cse €250,000 2 year Level 9 Degree Ordnance Young Officer Cse €230,000 2 year Level 9 Degree CIS Young Officer Cse €100,000 2 year Level 9 Degree Aeronautical Engineer €135,000 6 years training, Level 8 Degree Air Traffic Controller €145,000 3-4 years, Class/Sim/On-Job-Training
This table shows the average cost per student for a number of courses providing professional military education for officers. A senior Army Captain will have completed, as a minimum, their cadet training, a Young Officers Course, a 3rd level degree, two overseas prep courses, and a Land Command and Staff Course. The cost to train this highly skilled and experienced officer is estimated at €255,000. This does not include any additional qualifications they may have obtained in weapon systems, vehicles, etc. The cost to train a specialist officer in Engineering, Ordnance or Communications will be significantly more.
9
The following chart shows the gaps in technical officer strength. We aspire to be tech enabled but cannot train and retain sufficient technicians to maintain our current equipment. Technician training and incentivised retention packages10 are required for specialists.
Technical Officer % Strength in Station
Marine Engineer Officers 50 50
Medical Officers 50 50
Engineer Officer 67 33
CIS Officers 56 44
OrdnanceOfficers 72 28
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Technical Officer % Strength in Station Technical Officer % Vacancies in Station
Figure 4: Technician Officer Strength in Station
The Public Service Pay Commission identified that the PDF comprises highly trained, skilled and well- motivated individuals who inevitably will be sought after and attracted to civilian employment, especially in a buoyant labour market. However, the loss of key personnel places additional pressure on, and limits the capacity of the PDF in undertaking the crucial role that it performs in service to the State. Based on the factors above, RACO maintains that the key to any future capability is retention. Recruitment is too slow and time intensive to make ground on the rate of departure and even if this were not the case, the Defence Forces would continue to lose the valuable skills and experience that are vital to the organisation. It is worth repeating that 24% of all operational personnel in the Army, Air Corps and Naval Service have five years’ service or less. For Officers, it is even more stark. 29% of all Commissioned officers have less than 5 years’ service. This has severe implications for governance and supervision and increases organisational risk.
10 See Annex D: Case for Service Commitment Scheme for Specialist Service Officers submitted to PMO in November 2019.
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Government’s High Level Implementation Plan ‘Strengthening our Defence Forces’
The solution to this staffing crisis was to be the High Level Implementation Plan.
The aim of this plan was to ‘fully implement the Third Report of the Public Service Pay Commission and put the building blocks in place for further initiatives so that PDF members feel valued, respected and appreciated’, and outlined its ‘ULTIMATE GOAL: The Permanent Defence Force is an employer of choice whose members continue to serve Ireland with pride and dedication.’
The plan has been allowed to fail, through a lack of institutional and political will to resource it, and an absence of meaningful oversight. The Defence Organisation, comprising the Department of Defence and senior military management have not been able to realise this ‘Ultimate Goal’, and that is why you are here. RACO had to sell to our members a false promise of significant improvements that never materialised. Having 8 of 15 projects still behind schedule 19 months into any project management process would be unacceptable at any time, but the fact that this is occurring in a Government-sponsored plan supposedly sponsored and monitored by the Taoiseach’s Department, in the face of the well documented DF recruitment and retention crisis is unconscionable. The inadequate response to this burning platform flies in the face of repeated government commitments to a Defence Force of minimum 9,500 personnel and does not bode well for future expansion to meet unmet defence and security needs that this Commission will surely identify. RACO firmly believes, however, that while the implementation of the plan has been unsuccessful, many of the initiatives identified can still bear fruit if given the time, resources and energy they require. Now we will identify a number of incomplete projects from the plan that can have real impact on the valuing and retention of existing personnel and the recruitment of new blood to an employer of choice.
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Project V1 – Review of Pay Structures
RACO is advised that ‘Preliminary work has been undertaken within the Department of Defence as part of the overall project. This project is led by DPER, as outlined in the HLIP “Strengthening our Defence Forces” and is linked to the timeframe for the public sector pay arrangements.” Unfortunately, NO work or discussions took place during the a/m pay negotiations on a review of pay structures. RACO is still waiting to discuss the status of this crucial review, and all requests for updates have been ignored.
Project R3 - Incentivised long service arrangements - NCO and Officer rank.
RACO has been advised that “A report identifying options was completed. These options are to be considered in the context of public sector pay negotiations, as set out in the HLIP.” This did not occur during the recent hugely disappointing pay negotiations, which occurred solely between DPER officials and the Public Services committee of ICTU. RACO made a comprehensive submission to the Official Side’s PMO to assist on this project but has received no feedback. Attached as Annex I.
Project R4 - Barriers to extended participation in the PDF.
Phase 1 of this project was a Review of Mandatory Retirement ages (MRAs) for Officers. According to the Official Side, “a further draft of the report in respect of Phase 1 was submitted to the Project Sponsors for their consideration in late July 2020 (over 6 months ago)”. RACO has been informed that this project will be completed once clarification from the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform on a number of issues is finalised. The Official Side has declined to share any of the reports with RACO.
Project R8 – Non-Pay Retention Measures in the PDF.
This is a key project for the DF, in a climate where the unique nature of military service has not been compensated for by central government, due to the shackles of ‘one size fits all’ public sector pay policy. The final report was signed off by Project Sponsors on 30 Sep 2020 and approved by the Minister on 19 Oct 2020. The objective of this project was “to review, research, propose and implement priority non-pay retentions measures in the PDF in order to contribute to improved retention levels.” RACO has asked for the report but has not been provided with a copy. A hugely significant issue for all DF personnel is the lack of housing supports. RACO has completed a report for the consideration of the Commission on the provision of subsidised housing by the State to DF families, which would offset the burden of frequent mobility and low remuneration. This report, if accepted, would be a phenomenal boost to retention, and RACO believes that it is precisely this type of measure that is urgently needed. The report is at Annex E to this submission and we feel it merits careful consideration.
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2. STRUCTURES
Our military structures need significant adjustment. The Army, Naval Service and Air Corps all require a significant increase in establishment to build resilience and allow for overseas and training commitments, while maintaining its contingent capability for planned and unplanned domestic taskings11. With the introduction of significant retention initiatives, changes to pay and pensions for junior members, and possibly the permanent integration of some suitable reservists the DF could achieve this figure within a reasonable number of years.
Command and Governance of the Defence Forces
Command and governance of the Irish military must be brought in line with international best practice. Although the Irish Defence Forces is legally under the command of the government on behalf of the Oireachtas, the DF is actually broken into formations that are commanded by senior Defence Forces officers, who are under the direct command of the Minister. In Ireland’s case due to the Carltona principle12 this means that the Defence Forces can at times be under the de facto legal command of civil servants in the DoD. Command and control structures remain largely unchanged since the foundation of the State and are now hardly fit for purpose. Ireland has no Chief of Defence with the authority, autonomy, or responsibility required to act as chief executive of the force.
The General Staff function as part of a wider DFHQ network and do not have any command relationship with the operational formations or services of the Defence Forces. Instead, each commander of these formations is delegated a level command directly by the Minister on behalf of the Government. The ultimate holder of risk for all domestic and overseas operations and activities, however, remains with the Minister. As the officials of the Department of Defence often represent the Minister in the day-to- day administration of the Defence Forces, they understandably view most decisions through the lens of risk to the Minister, rather than operational necessity or informed risk management. The influence civilian staff have on military decision making can often match or even outweigh that of the General Staff, a team of professional officers with well over a century of military experience and expertise between them.
Project 26 of the White Paper tasks the Secretary General and Chief of Staff to ‘jointly undertake a review of the current high level command and control structures in the Defence Forces, having regard to international best practice on military command and control and drawing upon external expertise.’. This project remains incomplete, but the scope and competency to undertake and complete this task is
11 See Annex L: DF Outputs 2020. 12 The Carltona principle expresses the idea that the acts of government departmental officials are synonymous with the actions of the minister in charge of that department.
13 available to the Commission. A modern, efficient and workable approach to the establishment of command functions over the Army and a future Joint Force would provide for enhanced coordination and delivery of capabilities, as well as capability development, which is currently lacking in the organisation.
Army / Land Component Structure
A Commander of the Army is required at two-star level. The largest service requires strategic direction and leadership. This should include an Army HQ staff and could also have responsibility for overseas operations. From a strategic point of view, the current Brigade structure of the Army is inadequate. Donegal is simply too far from its HQ in Dublin. The same applies to the distance between Galway and its nominal HQ in Cork. The sub optimal situation where troops are “Geographically the DF wasn’t compelled to travel on a regular basis from Donegal and going to work for me into the Dundalk to Dublin to carry out regimental duties must cease. future as we are settling in Ennis and my future appointments would The land border with Northern Ireland, which has the have been largely in Kildare and Dublin. If the DF gave officers potential to be problematic post-BREXIT, is inadequately geographical certainty I'd be back 'manned' with insufficient built infrastructure. The closure of in uniform in the morning. This is the same for loads of Officers who many smaller barracks has also severed historical links live more than 90 mins drive from between communities and the Army, and limits options for the Curragh/Newbridge/Dublin personnel when deciding where to live. This is clearly one of triangle. If they brought back in the 3 brigades and gave some sort the major factors which has resulted in the current of option for long term recruitment and retention difficulties. We cannot ignore the appointments within a reasonable drive from home a lot of lads fact that the Army geographical disposition is not conducive would come back/would have to a long-term career for personnel who are living long, un- stayed I believe”. Army Captain commutable distances from established Formation or Force who retired with 14 years’ service headquarters, and we have never been able to put in place the adequate supports to facilitate mobility for service personnel.
A simple solution to boost recruitment and the retention of skilled personnel is to situate either the Army / Land Component HQ or a Brigade or Task Force HQ in the centre of the country, for example Athlone.
The development of an intelligence Corps to enhance and retain this essential capability is required, as is a credible Cyber Defence and security capability.
The Land Component will require a significant increase in its establishment, in order to ease the burden of overseas service, increase contingent capability and capacity, and meet the requirements of the EU Working Time Directive.
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Naval Service / Maritime Component Structure
The Naval Service has 9 ships, but barely an establishment for 6. It is therefore set up to fail. A lack of resilience in human resources has plagued Naval Service operations in recent times, with patrols being cancelled due to the lack of suitably qualified and experienced personnel and two of our State’s national fleet being tied up for the long term. This has a huge effect on the ability to conduct Maritime Defence and Security Operations (MDSO) effectively and safely and cannot be allowed to continue. An urgent and significant increase in seagoing establishment is therefore required, with effective retention supports.
A significant increase to the NS training establishment is required to allow for NS to continue to develop a tech enabled force. This training establishment would need to be in excess of the operational fleet requirement.
The C2 structure should be reviewed to allow for naval personnel to serve at DFHQ and directorate level for career and personal development. Equally, CS4 should be amended to provide for appointments for NS personnel to serve overseas. The current overly lean NS establishment effectively precludes the release of personnel to serve in these appointments.
An increased establishment will ensure a resilient maritime component that is compliant with all aspects of the EU WTD and the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997. This establishment will also need to cater for wider societal changes such as maternity leave, parental leave, career breaks, flexible working arrangements. Finally, working from home must be prioritised for personnel posted to operational units when they are off sailing orders, and extended to the rest of the organisation also in keeping with the public sector goal of at least 20% of people working from home.
An Inshore squadron / capability should be explored, based on the East coast with a self-contained logistics base and commercial maintenance partner.
The Naval Service also requires an Offshore squadron, based on the South / West coast. This would consist of a mix of ship types with ability to operate in the North Atlantic sea conditions with capability for long range surface and sub-surface surveillance, fitted with kinetic and self defence capability. Capabilities should comprise limited tactical sea lift, disaster relief capability, Mine Counter Measure capability, Replenishment at Sea (RAS/Fuel) capability and vessels must be built to standards which allow interoperability with partners of choice to contribute to multinational mandated operations.
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Air Corps / Air Component Structure
The current Air Corps establishment of 886 is insufficient to meet current commitments and to react to emergency situations like COVID-19. Air Corps strength currently stands at only 658 operational personnel. Together with an additional 98 personnel in various stages of training, this means that currently, the Air Corps is only at 74.2% of its operational strength.
The recent shortage of Pilot officers has impacted on the Air Corps organic capacity to train pilots resulting in trainees being sent abroad (USAF) to undergo initial pilot training in 2021 and to the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) on multi-engine aircraft in 2020. In order to address these pilot shortages RACO lobbied extensively for a renewed Service Commitment Scheme, which was eventually introduced in Q4 2019. A previous scheme operated from 2002 to 2010 and made a significant difference to the rate of retirement of pilots to the civilian sector. It is crucial that that this scheme is extended beyond 2022 to ensure continued retention of experienced pilots. The Recommissioning of former pilots scheme has yielded over a dozen former officers to date, all with significant operational and management experience, stabilising aircraft commander shortages, oversight roles and senior staff appointments. However, at this stage it is unclear as to how many will remain in service once the aviation industry recovers post-COVID-19.
Air Traffic Services (ATS): There is currently an establishment of 21 personnel in 505 Sqn (ATS), comprised of 6 Officers and 15 Enlisted personnel, with a strength of only 3 officers and 9 enlisted personnel. There is a significant level of training required to qualify ATS personnel. ATS personnel continue to be attracted into the civilian job market and it has not been possible for the Air Corps to maintain a 24/7 ATC service in Baldonnel. A DoD/AC/DFHQ Working Group was established to look at the long-term sustainability of ATS in the Air Corps, which reported in 2020. This Working Group made a series of recommendations, including an increase in establishment from 21 to 32, the introduction of a Service Commitment Scheme13 as well as an ability to run discreet promotion competitions, none of which have been implemented.
Regulatory Structure: The regulatory framework providing safety oversights for the Air Corps requires attention, due to the lack of an independent regulatory function separate from the operational force. This regulatory lacuna could have direct implications for oversight and safety, and requires adequate resourcing, as much of the risk continues to be borne by the existing Air Corps officer body. The creation of an independent Military Aviation Regulator is seen as an essential requirement to improve aviation safety and effectiveness, ad should be implemented without delay.
13 RACO made a submission on ATC SCS to the HLIP; it is unknown whether that submission was considered. See Annex C.
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Inadequate Defence Forces Establishment Case Study Captain/Lt (NS): Critical to the majority of the significant HR issues in the The Capt/Lt (NS) fills the key staff DF at this time is a lack of redundancy or contingency officer appointments in operational units at home and overseas and provide built into the DF establishment. The Employment Control a significant management and Framework (ECF) was imposed at a time of severe mentoring role to NCOs and junior financial crisis and is no longer fit for purpose. It has officers throughout the organisation. created a zero-sum game where inertia reigns, with DF Establishment 452 military authorities reluctant to increase one aspect of their Strength shortfall 108 establishment for fear of reducing another in return. In Overseas 35 short, the re-organisation cut what was seen as the ‘fat’ of PDT 20 the organisation at the time, seeking a ‘lean’ organisational LCSC 31 structure. This, in essence, means that all the appointments Unit shortfall 194 that remained after the re-organisation were key/critical appointments as non-critical ‘fat’ appointments were 42% of Establishment unavailable for on-island operational tasks. removed.
However, this re-organisation did not provide redundancy for long term non-establishment positions such as Overseas appointments, career courses and placements such as DFHQ Project Officers.
Amongst these examples, of particular importance are career courses and overseas appointments as these are prioritised over appointments with establishment vacancies. In an organisation which has been structured on a ‘lean’ basis, every appointment has been deemed essential. Thus, the removal of any personnel to fill a non-establishment vacancy removes an essential employee.
As the work associated with the any vacant appointment is deemed essential, it must be completed. However, as there are only essentially employed personnel remaining, another individual, already staffing an essential position, must complete two (or more) workloads. All of these workloads have been deemed critical by the organisation, but the organisation is not capable of dedicating an individual to each critical workload’s completion. This creates a HR contradiction, as how can a position be deemed important enough to be seen as critical, but not important enough to have a dedicated employee? The end result is that critical work cannot be satisfactorily or safely completed and this is resulting in ever increasing risks being taken, in particular in terms of health and safety, employment/civil law, and administrative procedures. Consequential delays in staffing have direct impact on welfare and morale of personnel, exacerbating the dysfunctional cycle of turnover. Trainees (Recruits, Cadets and
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Apprentices) should NOT be part of the DF established strength as this provides a misleading perspective on the strength and health of the organisation.
The Personnel Management System does not account for personnel serving % Officer Establishment Available in overseas, training for overseas out of Station 100 the unit, on courses, on sick leave, on 90 leaves of absence, or in third level 80 education. When one looks at the 70 figures of any rank in any unit, they 60 will see that the unit is understaffed. 50 But in reality, the unit will be 40 dangerously understaffed because of 30 the amount of people that are ‘on 20 paper’ in the unit but are not actually 10 present. CS4 needs to have a margin of 0 flexibility for personnel management. Army Air Corps Naval Service DF Total
Figure 5: Officer % Strength in Station by Service
Portlaoise Prison
The maintenance of a permanent military guard is essential to the maximum security status of Portlaoise Prison. This has been the case for decades and looks set to continue into the future. Although it may not be appropriate to discuss the size and nature of that contingent in this open forum, it is sufficient to say that the numerical establishment is well below that required. The vast majority of security detail assigned to this permanent post comes from external DF units.
Although certain security operations are contingent (such as Aid to Civil Power on the visit of a foreign dignitary) and DF units should be expected to interrupt their normal battle rhythm, halt non-essential activities, and restrict leave for those purposes, the military security detail in our State’s only maximum- security prison, operates 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, and units are required to deal with it on a contingent basis because no establishment for security troops exists.
HR Structures
The Establishment of the Defence Forces needs to be significantly increased to account for the realities of service. All personnel planning in the Defence Forces above Unit level is done with fictional figures in mind. The operational strength in units bears no resemblance to establishment or ‘strength on paper’.
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Figure 6: Average Captain strength in Army Line Operational Units is 51.4%. Only 1 unit out of 13 (7.7%) is at full Captain strength.
Figure 7: NS Overall Strength 81.8% NS Operational Strength 66.3%
Air Corps Overall Strength 85.3% AC Operational Strength 74.3%
Army Est / Str / Op Strength / Overseas Figure 8: 8000 7520 6923 6662 6021 Army Overall 6000 Strength 92% 4000 Army Operational 92% 88.5% 80% Strength 88.5% 2000 Army Operational 0 Strength less Establishment Strength Operational Strength Incl. Overseas Overseas 80% Army
Conclusion: Services, Corps and Units are operating with no Slack/Resilience and are unable to withstand unforeseen shocks without completely impacting on or replacing another tasking.
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Career Management – Commissioned Officers
The Defence Forces Career Management structures require review and improvement. The appraisal system is in need of overhaul and seen as inconsistent by members, who believe that how well an individual can do in their career is linked with being ‘in the right place at the right time’. An individual should be able to have an influence on what corps they apply to join, and a career development plan should exist for them.
While it can be argued that there is “In terms of career planning, I was privileged to commissioned officer career management recently undergo a long course in the UK and was from the perspective that it is laid out what one envious of the career planning which British must do in regulation in order to be promoted, Army officers have access to. Postings are for 2 the ability and opportunity for officers to years' duration as standard, which greatly achieve these targets is not considered equal. facilitates individual career planning and also The staffing of appointments at all levels is staff management at a Unit level. Each rank in perceived by many as opaque and mysterious each Corps has a desk officer (Capt/Maj) and a and it is difficult to plan a career based on dedicated civilian MOD civil servant to plan their unknowns. Some form of formal career careers for them. This ‘mega-COMO’ takes in an progression cycle would be beneficial in individual officer's personal preferences, as well allowing officers not only to manage their as his/her annual appraisals and career course careers but to also allow them to plan their reports and allocates 2-year postings lives. accordingly. There is an establishment for career courses, so they don't have the farcical situation A dedicated system of career management with where individuals on a career course are the necessary supports and clear and 'holding' a vacancy but not actually doing the job transparent pathways would be a significant required. Also, wherever an officer is posted, they boost to officer morale. It must be invested in can be assured of securing service and fully resourced however, as a piecemeal, accommodation if they are married/have a under-resourced approach only alienates and partner. Local support groups, formal and demoralises officers. informal, ensure that partners are looked after in The DF must continue to prioritise and fund a move. It isn't perfect, but it is far, far better than Continual Professional Development or what is on offer to DF personnel”. Professional Military Education (CPD /PME) Army Tech Captain as part of its HRM policy. This requires a strategic approach to the effective management of its people such that they help their organisation gain a competitive advantage over other employers. These schemes are designed to maximise employee performance in service of an employer's strategic
20 objectives, but such schemes require funding and resourcing through the appointment of designated personnel responsible for PME throughout an officer’s career, developing them over the course of a career.
Career progression is inextricably linked to PME / CPD within an officer’s chosen field of expertise. Officers should be facilitated in developing themselves both as individuals through academic achievement and accreditation with professional bodies but also as professionals by progressing through a range of appointments at unit and HQ level, nationally and internationally.
For Enlisted personnel, “Post 1994” Service Contracts should be abolished, as they are perceived to be responsible for the steady atrophy in numbers, and place obligations on individuals and Units to waste energy and resources trying to meet criteria for sustained service. As a result, the DF has been unable to consolidate. They were brought in with good reason, to lower the age profile and improve the fitness of the Force, but they have outlived their usefulness, are now a hindrance to retention, and should be reviewed. They should be replaced with a system that cuts bureaucracy and allows personnel to pursue a lifelong career in the DF that does NOT always hinge on promotion. Not everyone can, or indeed should, be an NCO.
Under current circumstances the DF can NOT be recommended as a viable career option to school leavers. A suggestion would be a longer term contract offer to new entrants NOT linked to career advancement to make a line role more attractive. This would be subject to periodic review/approval by Unit Comds with a focus on discipline and effectiveness. The Commission should examine the reasons as to why there are currently unstainable gaps at the ranks of Cpl and Sgt (618). The NCO is the glue that holds DF Units together, and the intense levels of NCO movement around the country has diminished unit esprit de corps and morale.
Consideration could be afforded to the reintroduction of an OR 3 rank (Lance Corporal) to encourage Privates to progress in their careers, and also to further enable more members of units to be in charge of training and operational activities. Ireland is unusual that we do not have a rank between Private and Corporal. This means that if someone wants to decide to stay in the DF and try to make a career or to leave as a Private, they face a six month long NCOs course away from family in order to become a fully qualified Corporal (qualified to be in charge of a section of soldiers). Most countries have a much shorter course that a Private can do after only a few years of exemplary service in order to get promoted to Lance Corporal. Progression to the rank of Corporal is then done via a further shorter course. Such a system in Ireland would encourage career engagement and enable units to conduct more training and duties even with our current shortage of Corporals. A Staff Sergeant rank could also be considered for progression between Sergeant and Senior NCO.
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Pay and Conditions Determination Model – Pay Review Body
RACO notes the commitment to the establishment of a permanent independent pay review body by the Commission, or, as it now states in the TORs, ‘on completion of its work.’
The pay determination model that applies to the Defence Forces is primarily focused on a model of trade unionism and collective bargaining, with centralised pay awards and agreements negotiated between government and the major unions of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU). Much like the Single Pension Scheme, this model is a ‘catch-all’ model that fails to catch all of the public service, and the worst off in this model is the Defence Forces.
Our members forego the right to trade union membership and its associated right to strike. They willingly submit themselves to abide by Military Law. They are required to achieve strict annual medical and fitness standards, are liable to be posted away from family for extended periods of time and bear an unlimited liability in their service to the State, ultimately willingly volunteering to place themselves in harm’s way. Unfortunately, this loyalty and commitment to serve had attracted much praise but little else from successive governments.
The Defence Forces should be removed from this model so that pay can be determined fairly and directly by government based on retention data routinely presented to it by an independent Pay Review Body. The only way to come off the foot of the public sector pay table and become ‘an employer of choice’ as envisaged by the HLIP is to break relativities with other public sector bodies.
Defence Forces pay, allowances and conditions will never be to the level that they need to be for us to ever reach and maintain any establishment figure set for ourselves if we remain part of the civilianised collective bargaining model that applies to the rest of the public service. The government is understandably reluctant to adjust pay for public servants based on retention data because of their commitment to this model, and fear of contagion. Removing the Defence Forces from this model would allow government to make whatever decisions it wants on DF pay based on cold hard facts and data. There simply must be a premium associated with the civil liberties that our members willingly forgo, and the DF could adopt this model in lieu of trade union rights, which would nullify any of the government’s concerns that if the DF gets it, others will want it. The message would be clear; the DF is getting this because it doesn’t have what everyone else has – the freedom to unionise, the right to protest, and the right to take industrial action.
One point must be made in the strongest possible terms. RACO fails to understand how such a body can recognise the unique nature of military service, while still remaining within national wage structures. Defence Forces personnel have been treated abysmally in successive pay negotiations, excluded from process and presented with agreements as fait accompli. This is despite assurances of
22 parity of esteem from the highest levels of Government. If any such mechanism for pay determination fails to deal with the unique retention issues that the DF experiences in isolation, then the pay review body cannot and will not work, and the decline of the Defence Forces will continue unabated. RACO will seek clarification and consultation from the Commission as to how this model is proposed to achieve its aims and looks forward to working closely with the Commission to devise a suitable and workable approach to pay determination for the Defence Forces. The imposition of an unsuitable and ineffective model cannot be accepted and must be avoided at all costs by the Commission if it is to effectively fulfil its mandate. The PRB sounds good in theory, but the devil will be in the detail.
Since the Commission's recommendations will be "consistent with national public sector wage policy", the Commission could examine the provision for overtime pay, which is common in other parts of the public service? This would be a game-changer, in terms of remuneration particularly for the lowest paid. This ties in with the Working Time Directive also: in certain other militaries, any hours worked beyond 48 hours per week attract overtime pay, subject to certain upper and cumulative limits for health and safety reasons. This is a model which should be explored by the Commission.
Single Pension Scheme and Supplementary Pensions
The introduction of the Single Pension Scheme Act 2012 results in the designed entitlement to the State Pension Contributory (SPC), or equivalent value by supplementary pension, denied to new entrants since 2013. DPER’s position is that the Act does not provide for a “supplementary pension”. DPER did not consider how integration would actually apply to those forced to retire in advance of the payment age for the State Pension Contributory.
This denial of “total” final benefits (occupational & SPC/Supplementary Pension) to those in the Defence Forces who are forced to retire in advance of qualifying for the SPC (currently 66 and planned to increase to 68 in 2028) is fundamentally flawed and in contradiction of the design intent of the “integrated model of social insurance”. Those in the DF are being treated less favourably than their Public Service counterparts where their final benefit is not realised until 10 years after they are forced to retire. Final benefits do not facilitate a “living sum” and the potential for DF personnel in this category, who will have provided decades of loyalty and service to the State, to be rehired by the market at 58 to 60 years of age will be limited.
RACO commissioned an actuarial review of Defence Forces Pensions as an element of our submission to the Public Service Pay Commission in 2017. Trident Actuarial Consultants concluded that “the absence of a supplementary pension means that in the future fast accrual employees may be forced to retire at an age much younger than the entitlement to a State Pension and left for many years with a pension only a small fraction of their pre-retirement pay. Our projections indicate that the initial
23 pension will be 20% of pay from age 58 as opposed to an initial rate of pension of 42% of pay for an equivalent public servant at the age of 68, if the supplementary pension is not payable. Conditions of employment which force employees to retire well in advance of entitlement to a State Pension which provides an initial pension of c.20% of preretirement pay and eventual pension of c.36% of preretirement pay is not fit for purpose and is not sustainable”.
This has been borne out by further research conducted by Amárach Research for RACO which shows that 79% of Post 2013 DF Officers are planning to leave the organisation well in advance of their mandatory retirement age, due to inadequate superannuation provisions. This is the ticking retention time-bomb that will undo any other good work done by the Commission or any other entity. If this is not resolved, then all of the effort put in to inducting and training the recent historically large cadet classes will have been for nothing. It is the very antithesis of ‘Value for Money’. See Annexes G and H.
EU Working Time Directive
The current structures of the Defence Forces, combined with the unsustainable levels of turnover, result in too few officers fulfilling too many roles over too great a distance to maintain a sustainable work- life balance. More capacity, meaning the retention of experienced personnel, and an increase to the establishment at home and overseas, is required to meaningfully address the requirements of the Working Time Directive14. Essentially the WTD sets out limits on the number of continuous hours employees can work over certain periods. In the absence of agreed derogations or exemptions employers must ensure their employees’ working hours do not exceed;
• 8 hours per 24-hour period • 48 hours in any week. • Minimum daily rest period of 11 consecutive in every 24 hours • Rest/break during working hours. • Minimum weekly rest period of 24 uninterrupted hours for each 7-day period, in addition to the 11 hours daily rest i.e., 35 hour 'weekend'.
The long-established DF 24-hour working patterns do not provide 11 or 35 consecutive hours of rest per day or week, respectively. Due to the definitive number and frequency of these duties, certain personnel regularly exceed 48-hours in a week without any subsequent compensatory time off.
14 The objective of the EU’s Directive 2003/88/EC is to "enhance the safety and welfare of workers and to provide for greater compatibility between work and family life". Accordingly, it is firmly rooted in health & safety rather than employment legislation and legal jurisprudence in the area has determined that it cannot be easily forgone by employers.
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It is clear that in the current environment, the Defence Forces cannot meet the requirements of the WTD and maintain its operational outputs. What is equally clear is ‘The limit on hours worked and that a failure to provide adequate rest and compensatory paid the transition to mandatory type time off to military personnel is significantly impacting their leave is going to be very difficult home-life and the ability of some to maintain a career in the in units that are understrength Defence Forces. and remain significantly tasked. One of the main outputs of an The Workplace Climate Study15 commissioned by the Defence operational unit is Portlaoise Forces in 2016 said the following on work-life balance: prison, we are on our third twist ‘Overall, the focus groups highlighted issues across all ranks in 13 months, I have a strength around work life balance and the quality of life outside of work in station of about 130, strength for members of the Defence Forces. Across ranks the issue of about 150 and should have 250. lack of notice for travel and duties has been highlighted. This In essence with that tasking has an impact on family life. For those who have children, they ongoing I cannot undertake any are forced to miss out on important events due to short notice other significant task, calls for duty’, and that ‘the increasing erosion of down time operational or training, as 75 pers are committed. If you and family time across all ranks but particularly Officers (and calculated the number of hours ( increasingly NCOs) is causing Defence Forces members to 72+) per 11 rotations in a 2.5 question the Defence Forces as a viable career’. month period , you will run out If a positive approach to the WTD is employed, viewed as a of time very quickly’. Army human resource tool rather than limitation, then it can be Unit Commander outlining implemented to the benefit of both the individual and the the impact of WTD on Portlaoise Prison Duty. organisation. But some drastic and urgent changes to the structure of the organisation are required. As demonstrated above however, the current strength of the Defence Forces is well below the minimum established. What is not reflected though, and what the implementation of the WTD will reveal, is how inadequate that establishment already is. Current CS4 is a manifestation of the ECF imposed in 2011. It attempts to divide 9,500 vacancies as equitably as possible geographically and between the various formations and services. It is not linked in any meaningful way to the operational outputs or training requirements of the Defence Forces.
15 https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/884c8c-workplace-climate-in-the-defence-forces/
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3. CAPABILITY
Enhanced capability ensures the protection, health, safety, and wellbeing of our personnel, inspires pride in the service, and improves retention. Critical enablers possessed by normal military forces such as strategic airlift are not only logistical and strategic assets, but they also enhance the wellbeing of personnel by ensuring that they can be deployed and recovered from overseas missions in a safe and timely manner.
The White Paper on Defence 2015 defined Military Capability as ‘the ability to attain operational success for a given scenario, achieving desired effects under specified standards and conditions through combinations of ways and means’16. Capability without capacity is aspiration. Capability is a function of skills and experience, and capacity is the availability of sufficient capability to achieve desired outcomes. With reference to the outline of today’s discussion, the capacity to deliver any capability is dependent on having adequate structures in place to allow a critical mass of qualified staff to deliver it. We are failing to retain capacity due to significant push-factors from within the organisation, and our overall capability is at risk as a result. In the graphical example on Page 4, the best armour platform in the world is redundant unless we can retain enough trained specialists to maintain it and enough experienced crews to operate it. Examples for the NS and AC are seen on Pages 26 and 28. In other words, the key to capability is the retention of skilled and experienced personnel.
Army / Land Component Capability
The Army (Land Component) is required to maintain a contingent capability in order to be able to discharge its primary role “To provide for the military defence of the State from armed aggression”17. To maintain such a contingent capability, the Army is organised into two all-arms conventional Brigades. However, these Brigades are territorial in nature and neither is deployable with the full range of C4I18, combat, combat support and combat service supports necessary to manoeuvre for effect against a full spectrum enemy of even limited capability and capacity. There are very significant capacity deficiencies within the Brigades, and we are lacking in key areas of advanced capabilities such as Cyber, Electronic Warfare, CBRN, Intelligence, INFO OPS and PSYOPS. The aforementioned absence of a unifying Land Commander or Land HQ Staff has caused difficulties in delivering outputs and resourcing capabilities. The Defence Forces has an Army that partakes in some peace support operations. However, the Army currently fits the description of a peace support operations force that sometimes tries to be an Army. Significant investment in transport, armour, fire support, ISTAR capabilities, and cyber capabilities are required to fulfil our mission statement. Cyber warfare is the
16 https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/1b0dc6-white-paper-on-defence/ 17 White Paper 2015, Ch 5. 18 Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence systems.
26 most likely threat to State security at the moment. A dedicated element of the Defence Force should exist to deal with this threat. A separate paper outlining RACO’s views on enhancing DF Cyber capability is at Annex F.
Naval Service / Maritime Component Capability
Capability development and planning must ensure that the Naval Service is equipped, prepared and able to respond or counter identified threats. Critically, the Naval Service must have an appropriate fleet, that is modern, sustainable, interoperable and capable of undertaking military and non-military tasks to meet Irelands needs and the associated support elements to be able to conduct a range of tasks at home and overseas.
The following maritime capability developments should be considered:
A modern, fully-resourced National maritime maintenance facility
(Mechanical Engineering & Naval Figure 9: Importance of personnel to the delivery of any capability. Example: Maritime Drug Interdiction Dockyard) operated in partnership with a commercial partner (New Zealand model) or a reformed dockyard facility with more capability in the planning scheduling, HR, electronics, weapon, design and management fields is required.
The Drydock facility should be re-established. There is only one graving drydock in the state which can fit OPV90 and OPV80 patrol vessels, and this is in private ownership. Each naval ship drydocks on average twice every five years, and once per year after it reaches 25 years in service.
Improved and enhanced berthage facilities for maintenance and access purposes. Look to build further berthage (Haulbowline or elsewhere) or purchase available berthage within the port of Cork.
The provision of suitable, subsidised, affordable accommodation for NS personnel. Old “married quarters” could be renovated and used in addition to accommodation for individuals living-in and personnel from ships off sailing orders. A key retention initiative. All the above would require increased DF civil engineers to oversee projects and maintain and modernise them going forward.
The Main Technical Stores (MTS) storage area is inadequate for the current fleet requirements and is only capable of procuring and administering parts on a just in time basis for delivery to units and not long term planned storage. Brexit could affect lead times for ordering, so storage and maintenance of stock levels could become crucial.
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Air Corps / Air Component Capability
The Air Corps is the only arm of State with the ability to operate over both land and maritime jurisdiction. Increased activity of foreign military aircraft in the Atlantic Ocean off the West coast in recent years has prompted much discussion about the current ‘secret’ agreement between the Irish Government and the UK. In terms of strike the current capability to deliver lethality is pre-nascent with basic weapon systems only available on the sub-sonic PC-9M aircraft.
The State also lacks any ability to identify who is transiting Irish airspace due to the lack of any primary radar capability. Coupled with these deficiencies, the State’s capacity for air mobility remains in its infancy, as demonstrated during the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic where commercial aviation also was not in a position to provide the continued air bridge to and from our island. These fundamental shortcomings serve to highlight the lack of any air defence plan for Ireland, leaving the air domain open to exploitation by any hostile actor or element. Any intentions to develop enhanced capacity in the Air Corps will pivot on the ability of this organisation to generate sufficiently trained and experienced personnel across all ranks, particularly in the officer body.
Driving Sustainable Operational Output: It is important to look at the wider benefits that can be delivered to the State by the allocation of State aviation responsibilities to the Air Corps, such as the SAR contract. This is an example of the
Defence Forces providing services on behalf the State, which also have direct benefits for the organisation in terms of redirected funding, development of capability and also providing a retention incentive to personnel. There are proven successes in areas such as support to the HSE and Gardaí, which Figure 10: Importance of personnel to the delivery of any capability. serve to demonstrate that in providing Example: Emergency Aeromedical Service (EAS) essential specialist aviation services to and on behalf of the State, there are mutual and contingent benefits arising from the Air Corps and its personnel. These two areas a linked; strengthening the Air Corps will involve growing the Air Corps’ capability, but this will require strengthening the organisations personnel in terms of numbers and experience. However, increased investment in strengthening personnel numbers and experience will provide the platform to drive sustainable operational output. By formulating a whole of State policy assigning specialist aviation roles to the Air Corps, there are mutual benefits to be achieved for the State, the Defence Forces, the Air Corps, and importantly, the personnel who deliver these services.
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Defence Funding
The Commission must address the fact that government spending on Defence, at 0.27% of GDP, is dangerously inadequate. Most other EU countries spend at least 4 times more than Ireland on Defence (the EU average is 1.2%), and the Commission must examine this discrepancy. What defence services do we not provide the citizens of this State that other EU armed forces provide, and does this capability gap pose any strategic risks to Ireland and our EU partners? Examples include our lack of cyber defence capability, and the impact that this could have on the decision of multinational corporations to locate here or elsewhere, not to mention the lack of primary radar to monitor our own airspace.
The reality of what funding the DF actually requires is not impressed upon the government at any level. The Chief of Staff (or Chief of Defence as the appointment should become) should be made the Accounting Officer for a significant operational share of the Defence budget, with emphasis on operations, capital expenditure and infrastructure, and a dedicated military staff should be established for audit and oversight. It is contended that there is not enough military expertise or experience in the Department of Defence to have an appreciation of the funding required to maintain capability and ensure the capacity to deliver all of our assigned roles. Furthermore, we cannot continue to rely on pay savings to fund capability development. This cannibalisation of budget had led to a situation where the defence sector does not compete for its fair share of resources, relying instead on the gaps that exist in our organisational strength.
Figure 11: Total general government expenditure on defence, 2018 (% of GDP)
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Intelligence
Military Intelligence is tasked with producing forward-looking intelligence on a number of areas, including counter espionage, counter terrorism, Defence Forces overseas operating environments, and other international developments. For a relatively small unit, this remit is very wide ranging. Moreover, some domestic responsibilities overlap with AGS tasks. Not only is this an unnecessary duplication of work, but it also raises the possibility of circular reporting, and competition between two State organisations. A review of national intelligence architecture is urgently needed to better divide responsibilities for intelligence production between AGS and the DF.
Overseas
As of January 2021, 588 DF personnel are serving overseas of which only 74 are accounted for on an overseas establishment. In other words, there are currently over 500 personnel, from Private Army Deployable Strength 2020 = 6555 Individual Tours Overseas 2020 = 1600 Soldiers to Captains missing from the 24% of Army Deployable Strength deployed domestic establishment. That is roughly 8% of overseas in 2020. the Land Component’s strength. Drilling down by rank, 14% of Captains and 9% of Sergeants in the Army are currently deployed overseas without an establishment. In addition, the next contingent for UNIFIL has just begun its three-month period of pre-deployment training. That means around 340 personnel will remain on the strength of their home Unit but will be entirely unavailable to contribute to its operational outputs. Overseas service is a significant contribution to Ireland’s foreign policy and a manifestation of our approach to multilateralism. It is of immense importance to Ireland as a nation and, to the Defence Forces as a whole and should be reflected in our organisational establishment.
At any given time, 10-13% of the Army is either deployed, or preparing to deploy overseas. On an annualised basis, 20% of the Army will deploy overseas on UN mandated operations/missions, unmatched by other European forces. The force generation process is a very significant and continual drain on the personnel, training and logistical support functions of the organisation.
Trend of Overseas deployment over the last decade:
Year Total Army Annual numbers Percentage Overseas Deployable Strength overseas 2014 7,943 1,228 15.46% 2015 7,989 1,225 15.33% 2016 7,825 1,333 17.04% 2017 6,360 1,639 25.77% 2018 6,862 1,696 27.72% 2019 6,749 1,750 25.93% 2020 6,555 1,600 24.41%
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Training
Training is the lifeblood of all military organisations. It provides personnel with a challenging environment, develops new skills, and enhances those already acquired. As outlined above, any capability the Defence Forces hope to deliver is built on a bedrock of skilled and motivated personnel. The standard of DF induction and career course training is excellent for all ranks and is accredited with various third level institutions. Skills courses are also generally very good, however routine unit training is difficult to non-existent. Exercises are similarly difficult to arrange due to operational commitments. The lack of conventional joint or Battalion level exercises is indicative of this difficulty, with Overseas Mission Readiness Exercises now the only regular large scale conventional exercises being run.
Because training institutions are not generally adequately resourced to conduct assigned training, there is a need for continued movement of personnel in and out of these locations as temporary instructors.
Long-term detachment to training institutions which requires extensive travel and discommoding from their place of employment as well as often entailing increased and irregular hours of employment has a negative effect on personnel, particularly when this extra sacrifice goes unrewarded. The under- resourcing of these establishments created the practice of filling Training Resource Requirements (TRRs) in support of DFTC outputs. This involves the long-term attachment of instructors to DFTC training schools and colleges primarily because CS4 staff establishments are insufficient to enable the training and education demand. This has a crippling effect on units, and the solution must be to increase instructor establishments in line with recommended student - instructor ratios.
The resourcing of training and PME also involves the movement of thousands of troops annually from external Formations and Services to the DFTC in order to enable the conduct of exercises and training activities, primarily because there of a lack of operational units deployed in the DFTC. This once again stretches already stressed, undermanned units and makes it impossible to conduct collective training, not to mention the unnecessary environmental impact, the increased risk associated with frequent long journeys and the strain it paces on accommodation and infrastructure. Therefore, in order to offset this problem, the establishment of a bespoke Battalion sized training unit in the DFTC is an absolute must. This unit should have a permanent Officer and NCO structure, but be fed by newly qualified Privates who would spend at least one year post qualification before dispersing to their new Units. The Unit should also attract an exercise or training allowance and could assume responsibility for the delivery and maintenance of key training skill sets, such as range management, Live Fire Tactical Training or Navigation. This would have a profoundly beneficial impact on regular operational units and allow them some breathing space to consolidate and refresh.
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The current model of DF recruitment, where platoons are decentralised and allocated on an ad hoc basis to operational units is inappropriate and is unable to sustain the induction demand, which is only going to increase if we are to expand as we must and is an inefficient use of DF resources. A centralised Induction Training Depot that is fully staffed and resourced to enable an annual output of induction training. The DF should establish either a single Centralised Induction Training Depot in the DFTC or build two Depots in Gormanstown and Kilworth. The practice of line operational units being tasked with recruit training should cease.
Unlike the Air Corps and Naval Service, the Army has no dedicated technician training school following the disestablishment of the Army Apprentice School in 1998. The Trainee Technician Scheme (TTS) has failed to deliver sufficient technician training capability in response to deteriorating technician strengths. The limited availability of course places with external education institutes and limited Corps Training School instructional staffs and workshop facilities has badly affected TTS output. The DF should re-establish an Army Technician Training School in the DFTC.
Time needs to be made for training. Operational and duty commitments mitigate against this and should be reviewed and reduced where appropriate. Overseas and Portlaoise Prison are filling the training space the Army needs, with the net result being that our practiced conventional skills are neglected.
Training Establishment
The current structure of the organisation does not adequately differentiate between those engaged in essential professional military education (PME), and those available for operations. The Joint Command and Staff Course and Land Command and Staff Course are essential Officer leadership development courses undertaken by Commandants/Lt Commanders and Captains, respectively. The first of these is a nine-month residential programme, the second is six months residential, each with an average intake of 25 students. Neither course has an establishment in DFR CS4 despite the fact that they must run annually and, given the size of recent cadet classes, will need to run multi-annually in the near future. Officers on these courses are usually posted to the ‘general list’ and the result is that almost 50 officers can be missing from units at a given time. The current strength of Captains in the Army is 240, of which 36 are currently overseas. The 28 Army captains who recently commenced their LCSC Total Army Captain Strength = 240 represent 14% of the on-island strength of that Army Captains on LCSC = 28 12% of on-island Army Captains are in group. CS4 should be expanded to include a fulltime training and are not accounted for meaningful establishment for officers in in the current establishment. fulltime PME. Likewise, a training establishment of 500 personnel all ranks is required to account for numbers in full time induction training and therefore non-operational.
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Specialised Instructor Allowance
It is vital that training is of a high standard, and that it is incentivised and rewarded. Specialised Instructor Allowance (SIA) was introduced following the recommendation of the Independent Monitoring Group (IMG) on the Doyle Report. “The Challenge of a Workplace” (2002) Report concluded that “attention needs to be given to the quality of education and training of those who instruct and train others, particularly recruits”. In the subsequent report “Response to the Challenge of a Workplace” (2004) it was recommended that specialised instructor training be provided, and a new post of Specialised Instructor be created with a suitable Instructor allowance. Specialised Instructor Allowance was paid to those instructors who had successfully completed the Specialised Instructor’s Course and were tasked with instructing inductee leaders.
In 2013, payments of Specialised Instructor Allowance to officers ceased. Since the removal of SIA from officers the nature or intensity of the responsibilities, risks or demands placed on officer instructors has not diminished. Moreover, as a result of the retention crisis, which has resulted in an increased level of recruitment, the delivery of induction training has become more onerous. The officer instructors are responsible for the planning and organisation of all activities, they must be present to supervise and ensure the activity is executed correctly to meet learning outcomes and safety standards. They conduct Outside Normal Working Hours lectures and exercises. They assess and document students’ performance and recommend whether they should pass or fail. They plan and conduct exercises of varying degrees of risk, signing off on risk assessments. Yet, they do not receive any remuneration for the addition workload and responsibility. The training and education of cadets, recruits, Ptes, NCOs, and officers is an integral part of the personal and professional development of personnel in the Defence Forces and therefore the personnel in institutions tasked with facilitating this education and development should be awarded appropriately. A detailed case is at Annex J.
Facilities / Infrastructure
Facility management is not generally covered in unit establishments, the tasks are embedded but anywhere between 30-60 personnel are required to run a barracks. We have already touched on the provision of accommodation for personnel, and that is covered in Annex E . The organisation did not invest in the training and PME of military personnel so that they could spend their time cleaning ablutions or working as porters, waiting or bar staff in the Mess. This is not part of any realistic job preview and is a waste of expensive and high quality training and education. Consideration should either be given to the establishment of small facilities sections to run barracks staffed by those who are no longer operationally deployable, or the civilianisation of all facility management with one military officer as head of each facilities section.
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Our Defence Forces Infrastructure is in dire need of an overhaul. The DF Centre of Excellence for Training, the DFTC, is in a dilapidated state due to lack of investment. The nineteenth century structures are in urgent need of repair, and demolition in many cases. This is also the case in the lecture facilities and accommodation. Unfortunately, similar conditions are witnessed in other garrison locations throughout the country. If the Defence Organisation is serious about Dignity in the Workplace, and the health, safety, and welfare of its people, then it has a lot of work to do to get its infrastructure up to standard. Much of it comes down to an apparent policy of managed decline. The failure by the Department of Defence to replace civilian tradespeople (plumbers, carpenters, electricians, etc.) as they retire has severely curtailed the maintenance and upkeep of our facilities. For example, the DFTC had an establishment of over 300 such skilled civilian tradespeople; it now has less than 50. There is significant work to be done here, and our people deserve to feel good about the conditions in which they live and work. In too many locations, this is simply not the case.
Reserve Defence Force
The Reserve Defence Force has followed the decline of the PDF since the 2012 reorganisation and in many ways it has suffered more. RACO contends that one of the main causes of this decline is the absence of a dedicated Permanent Defence Forces (PDF) Cadre to assist with the administration, mentoring and training of the reserve elements integrated with the PDF. Prior to the reorganisation, 298 PDF personnel were dedicated cadre to the RDF. Today it is less than 50, only two of which are officers. Many of these appointments remain unfilled. Without the presence of a professional and dedicated permanent staff to facilitate the training, supervision, mentoring and governance of the RDF, it will fall far short of what is required. Already stretched line operational PDF units simply do not have the resources or the time to dedicate sufficient staff to the conduct of high quality RDF training. This is unfair on both the PDF unit, and in particular on the RDF personnel who cannot hope to achieve the required standards if they are not given the adequate training and education.
The Reserve Defence Force needs to be significantly rejuvenated to the extent that it is can effectively augment the PDF. The RDF should undergo proper military training, with enabling legislation in place to protect their employment so that they can conduct this training effectively. Personnel leaving the PDF at Comdt rank or below should be encouraged to remain members of the Reserve with the ability to volunteer for overseas and key appointments that can’t be filled from within the PDF. For example, there are significant numbers of ex PDF Officers who hold significant skill sets who would relish the opportunity to be able to come back to the DF on an ad hoc basis as reservists for unfillable overseas posts and appointments at home. This could ease the burden on certain specialist cohorts of serving PDF officers who are routinely mandatory selected for overseas service, leaving their crucial domestic appointments unfilled. This has been identified as a significant push factor for our members. An
34 adequate overseas establishment which has been advocated for elsewhere in the submission would also achieve this effect.
They could be allowed transition to their local RDF unit at the rank they previously held in the PDF. This would be of benefit to all, as the years of experience and the professional experience of the retiring officer would not be lost to the organisation completely and would continue to be available on a part- time basis. A number of former RACO members who retired in recent years indicated that they would have been well disposed to this option had it be available at the time.
Technical Capability: First line Naval Service Reserve technical capability is under-utilised. Retired engineers with years of experience could be attracted to assist with both operational seagoing and shore based roles. Many of these work in industry and would bring commercial experience to planning and scheduling roles. Second line reserve technical capability is non-existent. There is a huge opportunity here to harness the potential of part-time reservists in technical roles such as marine engineering ship repair, support, planning and R&D, but these people need to be enticed to engage through some form of tax incentive or allowance. They are willing if the supports are put in place to enable them.
A well-resourced and properly directed RDF could also potentially offer a reinforcement capacity to the DF in response to national emergencies, such as cyber-attacks on critical national infrastructure, medical emergencies or humanitarian disasters. The bottom line is that a properly constituted reserve with appropriate legislation and PDF governance structures can become a key force multiplier for the Defence Forces.
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SUMMARY OF RACO PROPOSALS FOR CONSIDERATION
Establishment • Land Component Commander and HQ Staff • NS and AC Joint Force HQ staffs. • Junior Officers Overseas establishment (50). Similar provision for NCOs. • Training Establishment for personnel in full time induction training (500) • Personnel on Career or Professional Development Courses (50 officers) • Staff in Induction / Professional Training Depots at Brigade and Formation level, and exercise support Battalion in DFTC. • Intelligence SOF and Cyber establishment increases • Portlaoise Prison Establishment • Reserve Directorate and sufficient PDF Cadre • Increase in establishment to cater for Protective Leave (maternity, Paternity, Parental, Carers, etc.) and Leave of Absence for Domestic reasons Remuneration and Superannuation • Immediate establishment of an Independent Pay Review Body, to make the DF an ‘Employer of Choice’. This entity must recognise and compensate for the unique nature of military service. • Immediate implementation of the Working Time Directive, including payment of Overtime where WTD limits are breached. • Provision of suitable subsidised affordable accommodation to facilitate and support domestic postings. Provision of adequate Married quarters and Single Accommodation in garrisons. • Payment of Supplementary Pension for Post 2013 officers • Payment of Specialised Instructor Allowance to Officers Legislation • Defence Act is amended to reflect the appointment having Operational Command and Control over the DF (COS becomes a CHOD) • The provision of operational budget for which the CHOD is the Accounting (and accountable) Officer) • Employment Protection Legislation for RDF • Enabling Legislation for Intelligence proposals Financial Investment required • Increase in Defence spending as a percentage of GDP significantly • Land Transport • Strategic Airlift • Armour/Fire Support Systems/ISTAR/CBRN • Cyber Defence and Security • Primary Radar & Air Intercept
Develop and enhance Capabilities in • Cyber • Intelligence • Search and Rescue • Electronic Warfare • Information Operations and PsyOps
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List of Annexes Page
Annex A: Submission on Commission ToRs and Board Composition 12 October 2020 38
Annex B: RACO Exit Research on Recently Retired Members 48
Annex C: Case for Service Commitment Scheme for ATC Officers (HLIP)* 59
Annex D: Case for Service Commitment Scheme for Specialist Staff Officers (HLIP)* 68
Annex E: Report on provision of subsidised housing by the State to DF families 79
Annex F: Food for Thought Paper on Development of Cyber Capability 85
Annex G: Application of Single Pension Scheme to Officers subject to early MRA* 87
Annex H: Amárach Research Report on Turnover Intent of Post 2013 Officers* 90
Annex I: RACO Case for Long Service Incentives for Captains and Comdts (HLIP)* 99
Annex J: RACO Case for the Reinstatement of Specialised Instructor Allowance (HLIP)* 109
Annex K: Food for Thought Paper on Military Intelligence 113
Annex L: Defence Forces Operational Outputs 2020 114
*Submitted during 2019 and 2020 by RACO to aid the work of the Program Management Office working on the High Level Implementation Plan ‘Strengthening our Defence Forces’. No feedback, engagement or consultation received from the PMO on any of the submitted projects, despite numerous requests.
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Annex A: RACO SUBMISSION ON TERMS OF REFERENCE AND COMPOSITION 12 OCTOBER 2020
COMMISSION ON THE DEFENCE FORCES
Executive Summary The Defence Forces currently operate in a state of near crisis and with great uncertainty about their ability to carry out their assigned roles going forward. The proposed Commission on the Defence Forces is a once-in-a-generation opportunity to address the issues that have brought us to this point. RACO welcomes the Commission but strongly recommends that it be expanded in scope to review the Defence Organisation as a whole. The Commission must be guided by a strategic review of current and future threats and risks to the State. It must define the roles of Defence in addressing these threats and grasp this opportunity to design an organisation that sets that standard of an agile, robust, capable force at home and overseas, fully resourced to deliver all necessary roles.
The exercise will be meaningless unless a genuine will exists to put in place the resources that this force would require. Adequate budgets must be put in the right hands at the right times to facilitate administration and operations. Important and urgent work is underway with the HLIP and will soon commence with the Defence Forces Pay Review Body.
The Commission must not be allowed to postpone, cancel, or otherwise undermine these processes, but must be its own undertaking with a medium- to long-term view. It must be open and transparent and have access to the knowledge and expertise required to deliver necessary change and must have an independent chair and a multi-disciplinary Board. RACO looks forward to the release of the TORs and continued engagement with the process.
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Summary of Recommendations: • Conduct the process as a holistic review of Defence and the Defence Organisation. • Identify the current and future risks and threats, nationally and internationally, that Ireland faces and define the roles of Defence in countering them. • Identify the organisational structure and resources needed to undertake these roles effectively, being mindful always of the operational, technical, and cultural benefits of a conventional military approach. • Embrace the WTD as an opportunity to facilitate better working practices and improve the morale and job satisfaction of personnel. • Propose a budget that meets the requirements of the newly defined organisation and allows it to fulfil its assigned roles. • Devolve a portion of that budget to the Chief of Staff so that senior military leadership can make operational decisions in a timely and efficient manner. • Understand that an under-resourced force will be an ineffective force that will no longer attract or retain the best people. • Recognise the potential that exists in our first- and second-line reserves and recommend the necessary legislative, administrative and structural frameworks to employ those capabilities. • Support the ongoing work of the High-Level Implementation Plan and the establishment of the Defence Forces Pay Review Body. • Establish a Board that has the correct blend of knowledge, expertise, and experience to complete its work in an impartial, open and constructive manner. • Set firm and achievable timelines for the delivery of recommendations and propose realistic timelines for their implementation. • Commit adequate resources and oversight to ensure full implementation of recommendations.
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1. Introduction RACO welcomes the establishment, in the Programme for Government 2020, of an independent commission to make an extensive review of defence requirements in the medium to long term. As the statutory body representing DF leaders and decision makers, a key stakeholder in the review process, and a key enabler to delivering its outcomes, RACO submits its observations on the terms of reference and composition of the review group. The proposed Commission on Defence represents a once-in-a-generation opportunity for Ireland to make significant, positive changes in the way we, as a nation, approach Defence that will better prepare us to face our uncertain future. This review is due to examine, among other things, our ‘arrangements for the effective defence of the country at land, air and sea’, and our ‘Structures for governance, joint command, and control structures’.19 While the last holistic review of Defence was conducted in the early 1990’s, numerous reviews of the Defence Forces themselves have been conducted in the intervening decades. If there is a serious intent to address the strategic factors listed in the PfG, then a strategic mindset and approach is required. An attempt to examine the factors only from the perspective of the Defence Forces, will fall well short of that requirement.
Recommendation:
• Conduct the process as a holistic review of Defence and the Defence Organisation.
2. Scope Norway’s Defence Plan 2020 states in its introduction that ‘Norway is currently better suited to address emerging threats and challenges, due to decisions made in the previous Long Term Plan’.20 It also asserts that increasing threats, challenges and vulnerabilities must be met by active policies, priorities and measures. Investment in defence and security should be a key priority for the Irish Government. The White Paper Update 2019 makes a commitment to undertake defence reviews on a fixed cycle and that the next iteration would be a ‘Comprehensive Strategic Defence
19 Programme for Government - Our Shared Future. pp. 115. 20 The Defence of Norway, Capability and Readiness, Long Term Defence Plan 2020. pp. 2
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Review’.21 Similar in scope to the Commission on the Future of Policing in Ireland, this Commission should be expanded to cover Defence as a concept in the Irish context, and to analyse the current structures and capabilities of the Defence Organisation as a whole. As part of this process, a detailed examination of the roles and responsibilities of various elements of the Defence Organisation and the interaction between them is essential. The Commission must be given the latitude to examine the current, and prospective future, roles of the Defence Forces. The White Paper on Defence 2015, White Paper Update 2019 and National Risk Assessment 2019 provide Ireland’s strategic context and goals in national security and defence, and international peace and security. The proposed National Security Strategy (NSS) will play a key role in this process in the future also. Public consultation on the NSS concluded in December 2019 and the current work of that process must be reflected in the future work of the Commission to align these processes and define our defence goals. The ways in which the Defence Organisation can contribute to these goals, and the means available to it to achieve them now and in the future, must be subject of honest, independent review. The national approach to air search and rescue (SAR) is a good example.
State outsourcing of SAR function The State currently contracts a civilian company to provide most of its SAR services and paid €367m to this company from the Transport Vote in 2018/19.1 As an essential capability, however, the Air Corps must train and organise to provide this live-saving service at a moment’s notice. Effectively, the State is relying on the Defence Forces to maintain the capability but diverting the funding for same to a civilian company. Serious consideration should be given to making the Air Corps the primary agency for this task and providing it the funding, structures, and resources to do it. The benefits from a training, capability and retention perspective are self-evident.
The current global pandemic, the uncertainty around Europe’s relationships with Britain and Russia, the evolving complexity of the peacekeeping environment, and the prevalence of severe weather events should all factor in the assessment of our roles and capabilities on land, at sea, in the air and in cyberspace.
21 White Paper on Defence Update 2019. pp. 1, 9, 49.
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Recommendation:
• Identify the current and future risks and threats, nationally and internationally, that Ireland faces and define the roles of Defence in countering them.
3. Resourcing and Organisation The proposed Commission is an ideal opportunity to address the implementation of the Working Time Directive (WTD) to the everyday running of the Defence Forces. RACO accepts that the unique nature of military service means that, in certain circumstances, the WTD cannot be applied to military operations and that suitable compensatory time off or remuneration must be provided instead. The Association is of the firm belief, however, that with a positive and open-minded approach by all parties, the WTD can be applied in the majority of cases to improve the work-life balance of personnel without having an impact on operational outputs. For this to be successful, a reimagining of the way in which our Defence Forces personnel and assets are structured and deployed is necessary. The primary role of the Defence Forces is to defend the state against armed aggression. While this role is characterised as contingent, it must be underwritten by the continuous maintenance of a credible deterrence and intent to protect our valuable military neutrality. To that end, a modern and capable conventional force must be at the heart of the Defence Forces. The Irish peacekeeper abroad, working in an ever more complex peace and security environment, is renowned for their ability to wield the soft power that comes with the Irish flag they proudly wear. But this ability to de-escalate and mediate is dependent on the robust military capabilities available in the same package, capabilities acquired and fostered in the culture of military discipline, training and identity that exists at home. Recent events have shown the significant gaps that exist in that conventional capability, notably our inability to monitor our sovereign airspace, and the lack of a strategic lift capability to deploy and recover our personnel abroad. The current strength of the Permanent Defence Force is well short of its establishment, but even if the minimum required figure of 9,500 personnel were achieved in the near term, we would still find ourselves under-resourced in terms of human capital.22 The figure of 9,500 allocates almost every soldier, sailor, and air crew to a specific appointment here at home. It does not, with the exception of small number of senior officers, account for over 500
22 On 01 September 2020 the DF strength was 8,374 or 88%.
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personnel deployed overseas, or the 500 undergoing intensive pre-deployment training to replace them, or the 500 who have recently returned and are taking time to reconnect with their loved ones. 9,500 does not account for the roughly forty Captains and Commandants, essential middle management of the organisation, undergoing fulltime professional military education in the Military College. Even if we achieved 9,500 personnel tomorrow, we would instantly remove hundreds of personnel from that figure for essential training and deployments. Consideration must be given to a realistic establishment that captures overseas units and fulltime training.
Recommendation:
• Identify the organisational structure and resources needed to undertake these roles effectively, being mindful always of the operational, technical, and cultural benefits of a conventional military approach. • Embrace the WTD as an opportunity to facilitate better working practices and improve the morale and job satisfaction of personnel.
4. Budget The current method by which the Defence budget is set and consumed must be examined. No new or existing goal can be achieved without the financial resources to make it so. Ireland and New Zealand are often compared as island nations with similar sized populations and defence forces, but this comparison is misleading. In August of 2020, Ireland was the 36th of 119 troop contributors to UN peace support operations globally, with 483 personnel deployed. New Zealand was 100th with seven personnel deployed23. Ireland maintains this operational output with a defence budget at less than 0.3% of GDP compared to New Zealand with a budget at 1.5% of GDP24. Ireland’s budget-to-outputs ratio in international peace support operations is completely inverted to that of most reasonably comparable nations. Notwithstanding the size of the Defence budget, the way it is used should be reviewed. The Chief of Staff, senior military advisor to the Minister of Defence, has no access to an operational budget. His ability to make operational decisions is hindered by the requirement to defer to a civilian counterpart with whom the authority to release necessary funding resides. This situation not only delays and complicates the
23 https://peacekeeping.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors 24 https://Data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPNG.GD.ZS
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operational decision-making process but undermines the authority of the Chief of Staff as the senior military figure of the Defence Organisation. Moreover, the Chief of Staff, unlike the Garda Commissioner, must make operational decisions without the knowledge of whether or not adequate compensation will be paid to those being deployed. The devolution of an operational budget from the Department of Defence to the Defence Forces would place operational resources in the hands of the operational practitioners while allowing the experts in policy and administration more time and space to deliver in those areas.
Recommendation:
• Propose a budget that meets the requirements of the newly defined organisation and allows it to fulfil its assigned roles. • Devolve a portion of that budget to the Chief of Staff so that senior military leadership can make operational decisions in a timely and efficient manner, considering the IR implications of these decisions. • Understand that an under-resourced force will be an ineffective force that will no longer attract or retain the best people.
5. Reserve Recent experience of severe weather events and the response to COVID-19 have shown the current and future potential of our Reserve Defence Forces. The Commission must be tasked to explore this potential further and to identify the legislative and operational frameworks necessary to release the true value of our part time volunteers. In particular, a review of the current First and Second Line Reserves is required. Retired Association members, professional military officers with years of experience, have reported the difficulty in joining the Reserves post-retirement. The positive impact these officers could have on the training and organisation of our Reserves cannot be overstated and they should be facilitated in every way possible to continue adding value after they leave the Permanent Defence Force. A dedicated cadre of PDF staff to drive the command, training and administration of the Reserve Forces was once a standard feature in most installations. As the need to better integrate the standards and capabilities of the Reserve and Permanent elements is clear, reinstatement of the Cadre would be a strong first step. This would also re-establish the local links between permanent and reserve personnel, which have historically proven so
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successful as an aid to recruitment, particularly in rural areas, but even more importantly, as a form of informal vetting for prospective inductees, thereby enhancing security. The use of technical expertise currently residing in the Reserve, particularly in Medical, Engineering, IT and Cyber, for operations at home and overseas should be paid particular attention. These skills are difficult and expensive to acquire and the maintenance of a surge capacity may be beyond the resources of the Permanent Defence Force. With the correct legislation, regulation, training and incentives in place, reservists from these industries could prove hugely valuable in the future.
Recommendation:
• Recognise the potential that exists in our first- and second-line reserves and recommend the necessary legislative, administrative and structural frameworks to employ those capabilities. • Rediscover the value of the Reserve as an aid to recruitment, and an amplifier of security.
6. Government HLIP ‘Strengthening our Defence Forces’ We are currently in Phase One of the High-Level Implementation Plan (HLIP) to deliver the outcomes identified by the Third Report of the Public Service Pay Commission. This plan contains a comprehensive list of projects aimed at attracting, valuing and retaining members of the Permanent Defence Force and establishing it as an employer of choice to attract new talent. RACO supports this process and notes that while the majority of projects remain incomplete, the work of the PSPC and its conclusions remain valid. The HLIP is aimed at addressing concerns of an immediate nature and every effort should be made to support the Programme Management Office in delivering the remining projects. The proposed Commission should not be a pretext to suspend or dismiss the HLIP. This holds true for Phase Two of the Plan also, the establishment of a Defence Forces Pay Review Body. This pay review body will be tasked to address well-established issues in the remuneration of Defence Forces personnel in the context of the unique nature of military service, issues which are hugely influential to the current Retention Crisis. The proposed Commission should not be an impediment or delay to the establishment and operation of the Pay Review Body.
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Recommendation:
• Support the ongoing work of the High-Level Implementation Plan and the establishment of the Defence Forces Pay Review Body.
7. Composition To be effective and achieve buy-in from the many stakeholders to the process, not least the citizens of Ireland, the Commission must be open, transparent, and inclusive. At the outset, the Commission must have an independent chair with extensive knowledge and experience of national and international affairs. This chair must be supported by academics and professionals from the disciplines of cyber security, international security and defence, human resources, and industrial relations. The unique nature of military service cannot be meaningfully conveyed through documentation and statistics alone, and the Commission must have military representation to add the necessary context. Retired senior Defence Forces officers from the Army, Air Corps and Naval Service should be included. A retired senior officer from a foreign defence organisation, one who has knowledge and experience of UN peace support operations and preferably has worked with Irish troops in the past, will add balance and objectivity to the process also. The Terms of Reference must make clear timelines for the establishment of the Board, its deliberations, and its recommendations. The Board should propose achievable timelines for the implementation of its recommendations. Adequate resources must be committed, and credible oversight established to ensure the full implementation of recommendations.
Recommendation:
• Establish a Board that has the correct blend of knowledge, expertise, and experience to complete its work in an impartial, open, and constructive manner. • Set firm and achievable timelines for the delivery of recommendations and propose realistic timelines for their implementation. • Commit adequate resources and oversight to ensure full implementation of recommendations.
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8. Conclusion Reports on the Challenge of a Workplace, reports by Independent Monitoring Groups, reports by Price Waterhouse, and high-level plans from the Public Service Pay Commission have all looked at the Defence Forces through a narrow lens and have produced narrow results. We need to ask ourselves ‘What’s the Why?’ in terms of the Defence Organisation. What does the State want us to do, and what resources are required to execute the mission? What are the optimum governance structures for the security and defence of Ireland? RACO warmly welcomes the establishment of a Commission but hopes the opportunity to conduct a strategic review of Defence as a concept, and of the Defence Organisation as the means to achieve it, will not be lost. Current initiatives to address the ongoing Retention Crisis should not be impinged by the Commission and should be allowed to conclude their important work. RACO looks forward to the publication of the Terms of Reference and to engaging further with all stakeholders to this worthwhile and necessary undertaking.
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Annex B: RACO Exit Research on Recently Retired Members ‘The best thing I ever chose to do was to join the DF. The second-best thing I chose to do was to leave.’25 ‘Regardless of method, the effectiveness of an Exit Interview program should be measured by the positive change it generates.’26
Introduction
The Representative Association of Commissioned Officers (RACO) is a membership organisation with over 1,200 members, or 96% of the Defence Forces Officer Body R ’ scope includes the pay and conditions of officer of the Permanent Defence Force serving in the Army, Air Corps, and Naval Service. The ultimate goal of the association is to champion the wellbeing of its members.
In the last number of years, the Defence Forces has seen a constant decline in numbers underpinned by an unprecedented rate of turnover and the organisation is now in a state of crisis. The Climate Survey27, undertaken on behalf of the Defence Forces, and Amárach Research28, undertaken on behalf of RACO, revealed worrying aspects of current conditions across all ranks and future intentions with regard to service for officers. These surveys, however, did not capture the data around officers who had taken the decision to leave, and in September 2020 RACO began a process to establish the motivations of those personnel to exit.
The objective of the survey was to identify the factors that contributed to officers deciding to retire voluntarily before their mandatory retirement age. To get a good sample and identify trends over time, while keeping the focus on contemporary issues, officers who voluntarily retired in the years 2016 to 2019 were selected.
Research Methodology
It was decided that the best method to gain sufficient reach among retired Officers was to share a link to an online survey with as many as possible. The questionnaire was developed by RACO staff and approved by the RACO National Executive. The invitation to participate was extended to 150 recently retired officers and the survey was completed by a sample size of 103 of those personnel.
The survey included some demographic questions, such as type of service, rank, and longevity in the Defence Forces to identify the quality of the sample size. The demographics are presented in Section One of this report. A number of structured questions were used to gain statistical inputs for quantitative analysis and the results are presented in Section Two. The statistical process was followed up by a series of open questions to gain an insight to the thoughts and opinions of the sample officers and identify relevant themes. These themes are presented in Section Three of the report. A copy of the questionnaire is attached to the end of the report.
25 ff 14 ’ 26 Harvard Business Review https://hbr.org/2016/04/making-exit-interviews-count 27 https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/884c8c-workplace-climate-in-the-defence-forces/ 28 https://paycommission.gov.ie/wp-content/uploads/05.03.2019-RACO-Amarach-Report-20336.pdf
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Key Insights:
1. Although the majority of respondents believed their current employment was a lot better than the DF in terms of pay, only 40% identified Pay as a very important or critical factor in their decision to leave. However, 61% of those surveyed described Working Conditions as critical or very important in their decision. 62% rated Work/Life Balance in the same category. 2. 30% of those surveyed said they would not recommend a career in the Defence Forces based on their experience of the organisation and, more importantly, the direction they felt the organisation was going. 34% said they would recommend the career, but only with changes to the organisation. 36% would recommend a career in the DF. 3. There was a general feeling by respondents that their own careers were not being facilitated by the organisation and at a certain point the only function of HR is to put names against roles regardless of suitability. Many respondents expressed a feeling of being undervalued by the organisation. 4. Officers who did not live close to one of the HQ centres in Dublin, Kildare or Cork felt either q ‘ ’ f HQ , or that their career would suffer if they did not. 5. Opinions expressed by respondents with regard to senior leadership and the direction and management of the organisation were generally negative. In some cases, no specific reason or example was included, and the respondent seemed to be expressing a general sense of dissatisfaction rather than referring to specific personal experience. In a small number of cases, the respondent was making observations based on a portion of their career spent in Defence Force Headquarters where they experienced senior leadership and DoD interaction first-hand. 6. The general feeling for a lot of respondents was that the relationship between the Defence Forces and Department of Defence was dysfunctional and that the DoD were a limiting factor to improvement to the organisation. Like point 5 above, some of these were based on personal experience, others were an expression of opinion. 7. Many of the respondents felt that the necessary hardships and restrictions endured as part of military service were not reflected in the levels of remuneration they received. Several registered surprise at the levels of pay they were able to receive in the private sector. 8. Some respondents believed that ‘ ’ counterproductive to promotion, and that promotion was achieved through less impactful work. 9. Despite the overall negative trend in responses, many of the respondents expressed fondness for the camaraderie in the DF and felt that the organisation had provided them with skills and experience that were valuable to them in their new roles. A number of respondents described their decision to retire as saddening and that it was taken out of necessity rather than desire.
Further Research:
The survey results, as presented below, will identify a number of key themes that present perceived problems within the organisation, but relatively few potential solutions are offered. A follow-up survey with the same sample group is being prepared and will be offered soon. The goal of this research will be to share the themes identified by this process and to ask respondents to draw on their experiences in the DF and their new roles to offer workable solutions to the issues identified.
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Section One: Demographics
The most junior rank surveyed was OF1, which is 2/Lt or Lt in the Army and Air Corps, and Ensign or Sub-Lt in the Naval Service. The most senior rank was Lt Colonel in the Army and Air Corps, and Commander in the Naval Service. 85% of those surveyed were of Captain or Commandant rank or Naval Service equivalent.
74% of those surveyed were line officers, 23% were technical officers and 3% were medical officers.
73% of those surveyed were Army, and the Air Corps and Naval Service were at 13.5% each.
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53% of respondents had three or more trips overseas.
The result of the demographic assessment is that the sample represents a good cross-section of experience, skills, and services of those who have retired early in the four-year period.
Section Two: Quantitative Analysis
Question 7 was a structured question designed to ascertain the degree to which certain commonly cited factors impacted the decision of these officers to exit the Defence Forces early.
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The analysis of these results shows that the three factors that had the greatest impact, were namely Working Conditions, Work/Life Balance and Other. 61% of those surveyed described Working Conditions as critical or very important in their decision, while 62% rated Work/Life Balance in the same category. These results are further borne out in qualitative assessment.
Question 10 was a structured question to see how respondents who had taken up civilian employment compared that job to their military employment.
The research showed that the majority of respondents believed their current employment was a lot better than the DF in terms of pay, non-pay benefits and work/life balance. A significant number identified their current job security as worse that the DF.
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Question 13 was a structured question to ascertain whether respondents would recommend the Defence Forces as a career to a relative or friend.
30% of those surveyed said they would not recommend a career in the Defence Forces based on their experience of the organisation and, more importantly, the direction they felt the organisation was going. 34% said they would recommend the career, but only with changes to the organisation. 36% would recommend the DF as a career. The general results of the statistical analysis show that although subsequent non-DF pay and benefits are superior in most cases, they were not the factors that had the greatest impact on the decisions to leave. The overall conditions of work in the Defence Forces and the impact of the job on work/life balance were most pressing in that regard.
Section Three: Qualitative Analysis
A number of open-ended questions were posed to gain more specific and personal experiences to add context to the statistical data outlined above. Questions 7, 10 and 13 above were each followed by an open question of the type Please expand on your choices above. Question 12 was an open question which asked What if anything could have encouraged you to stay in the DF? Question 14 asked Are there any other comments you'd like to make? Thematic analysis of the responses to these questions identified four common themes and they will be discussed here in turn. Each response is coded to identify the rank-category, service and years of experience of the respondent. The codes are as follows:
Senior Officer SO EG. Senior Officer in Junior Officer JO the Naval Service with Army A 18 ’ : Air Corps AC (SO,NS,18) Naval Service NS
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Theme 1: Geography and Human Resource Planning
Some of the comments made by respondents that reflect on geography and human resource planning include:
“I loved the majority of my career and am saddened by the decline in the DF and the treatment of Officers.” (SO,A,25)
“The constant requirement to be ‘on the road’ in order to be promoted was an important factor.” (SO,A,20)
“I felt there was no plan for me and that I was just another number. The lack of HR planning really drove me out in the end.” (JO,A,15)
“I loved being in the army and being honest prefer it to my current job. But I’m still happy I made the decision to leave for my family life looking into the future, that’s where my priorities are.” (JO,NS,15)
“To a greater degree though, the retention of experience and knowledge that is currently being lost is at least as important. If I could only do one at a time, I'd pick solving retention as opposed to flooding the place with inexperienced pilots with supervisors who are distracted by non-core jobs.” (SO,AC,20)
“Dysfunctional rotation causing severe experience gaps which in my opinion as a unit commander at sea was reducing our operational capacity and capability.” (SO,NS,26)
“Although I had an extremely positive overall experience in the DF there were one or two push factors.” (JO,A,8)
“Lack of career management and planning is unforgivable, returning from overseas without any indication of next appointment or even location is totally unacceptable in this era.” (JO,A,15)
“At the time of retirement, I was covering 3.5 jobs and as a result I was failing slowly on all fronts with no sign of relief.” (SO,A,16)
“My decision to retire was 90% fuelled by closure of 4 W Bde which would have severely limited my options of spending some time in a more senior rank working in the west and therefore within commuting distance from home in the west. A further career of approx. 20 years working in Kildare/Dublin, while living in Galway did not appeal whatsoever.” (SO,A,22)
The feelings and opinions expressed by the majority of respondents with regard to HR planning were, in general, negative. A number of respondents said that they genuinely enjoyed parts of their job in the DF and would have liked to stay longer. However, there was a general feeling that their own careers were not being facilitated by the organisation and at a certain point the only function of HR is to put names against roles regardless of the suitability of the individual or the impact of the job. Many respondents expressed a feeling of being undervalued by the organisation. Geography was another factor contributing to this feeling. Officers who did not live close to one of the HQ centres in Dublin, Kildare or Cork felt that they would either be required to spend months and ‘ ’ f HQ appointments, or their career would suffer if they did not.
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Theme 2: Organisation and Leadership
Some of the comments made by respondents that reflect on organisation and leadership include:
“The DF has a highly educated workforce across all ranks, but it needs to be utilised in multiple ways not least organisational design of structures, systems and processes. However, there is a clear need for senior leaders to design some new processes and practices, open their minds to potential opportunities rather than a risk aversion to change, use the collective talent and knowledge of the organisation).”(SO,A,22)
“The organisation went through a number of change processes without knowing what it wanted to be in the end. I felt the poor treatment of its people led to the brain drain and as a consequence we lost the soul of the organisation.” (SO,A,22)
“In the end I made the decision to leave because I felt it would be impossible to continue with a career in the DF while staying true to these core values because of the nature of the organisational culture that drives officer career promotion and lack of support, resources and guidance that the wider DF feels.” (JO,A,15)
“I have an abundance of positive memories from my time in service and I am not at all bitter. I was trained and educated well, I received excellent qualifications and experience and I sincerely miss the camaraderie of military service.” (SO,A,13)
“Dealing with bureaucrats in DoD who haven’t the first clue about my field, yet interfere constantly. Seeing the emasculation of the DF under these people really hurt.” (SO,AC,19)
“It was extremely frustrating being in an important appointment that I was competent and capable for, but my role was reduced to one of reactive 'fire-fighting' to ensure continuity of operations with very little time left to pro-actively address the other important issues such as an overhaul of training and recruitment.” (SO,NS,20)
“The DF is a fantastic organisation because of the people who populate it.” (JO,A,8)
“We seem to have accepted our current state with minimal fuss which indicates the quality and calibre of senior officers currently serving. No other organisation would put up with it so why we?? (SO,A,22)
Shortly after promotion to Captain I was posted to Military Finance Branch - which I looked for. This was a huge eye opener. Sitting in HLPPG meetings…seeing proposals with a huge body of excellent work behind them slowed down and eventually killed... Pre-meetings where all the decisions were made (or not made as the case tended to be) which rendered the actual meetings a farce. (JO,A,14)
“The DF gave me opportunities and experiences that have shaped me as a person, leader, and employee. It’s robust training and exposure to operations provides willing personnel with core and attractive skills to civilian organizations.” (JO,NS,15)
“A perceived continual willingness by senior leadership to consistently say yes to all tasks which inherently affected quality of product and ability to complete the mission thus affecting the quality of life for the troops carrying out said tasks and exposing them to unnecessary risk.” (SO,A,28)
“The leadership from the top was sorely lacking in many departments. I was tired of hearing sound bites and not witnessing any substantive actions taken by the General Staff within the organisation.” (SO,A,22)
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All of the respondents had held some form of DF leadership role in the past and several credited this experience for their relative success in their new jobs. Some showed a degree of sympathy for senior DF leadership about a perceived power imbalance on the DoD side that made it difficult for senior officers to improve the situation. But the feelings and opinions expressed by respondents with regard to senior leadership and the direction and management of the organisation were predominantly negative. In some cases, no specific reason or example was included, and the respondent seemed to be expressing a general sense of dissatisfaction. In other cases, the respondents could not align what they were hearing from senior leadership with the reality of their experience in units and saw this as either a lack of understanding by senior leadership or a misrepresentation of the situation. In a small number of cases, the respondent was making observations based on a portion of their career spent in Defence Force Headquarters where they experienced senior leadership and DoD interaction first- hand. The general feeling for a lot of respondents was that the relationship between the Defence Forces and Department of Defence was dysfunctional and that the DoD was a limiting factor to improvement in the organisation. That factor did not, however, excuse military management from the duty of care and responsibility they had for matters internal to the DF.
Theme 3: Conditions and Pay
Some of the comments made by respondents that reflect on conditions and pay include:
“The DF took over my life, I was always stressed, doing 5 different jobs at any one time and not paid for my time, effort or expertise.” (JO,A,15)
“I now work in civil service, which is another public service and the conditions of work, promotion opportunities and variation are better than the DF.” (JO,A,13)
“My career in the Navy was everything and more that I could have wished for, the life experiences, career opportunities, exposure to elements of military and civilian units were great times.” (JO,NS,15)
“Money. I had the choice between spending money and time on a house far away and a commute with associated motor costs or renting in Dublin. Both actually cost about the same. If a Comdt’s pay was stretched by this, what hope do other ranks have? A Dublin allowance similar to the AGS, an increase in net pay by other means - this is a problem that CAN be solved by throwing money at it.” (SO,AC,20)
“It wasn’t the job. Realistically what’s asked of you 9-5 is grand. it’s the work life balance when it comes to location and overseas service going forward. I have a wife with a career and a family, so the deciding factors were what was going to be asked of me (to travel overseas every 3 years, and move around the country regularly with no security of location). (SO,A,12)
“I had a fantastic 15 years with great people, my time just naturally came to an end the more I explored alternate employment.” (JO,A,15)
“When compared to equivalents in the civil service and the wider public body, those of the same education and experience are compensated much better. A direct comparison by age, tenure in the organisation and grade with the civil service would show a lot [Officer grades]. (JO,A,16)
“The Defence Forces needs to fix morale as much as pay but I have been shocked by the huge salaries in the private sector for individuals with officer experience and qualifications. (SO,A,28)
“For all that giving out, I loved what I did there! It just became impossible to make everything work at the same time.” (SO,AC,20)
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“Lack of location security and flexibility on a week to week basis is not matched anywhere else without substantial remuneration. (JO,A,8)
“Retiring at 58 and going on to 50% of a Lt Col's salary would not be a good situation for me. At that age starting a new career would be a challenge. (JO,A,14)
“Financial – I needed to extend my working life beyond 58 years. So, I started a new career with pension in addition. (SO,NS,26)
“Members of the Defence Forces tend to underestimate themselves and what they can achieve. With their experience and qualifications, they can target high paying high level jobs, but modesty sees them target jobs lower than their personal worth. Their lack of self-worth may be why they are in the lowest paid sector in the public service.” (SO,A,28)
“I left for a job in the civil service in a related field but with a work - life balance that would shame anything provided by the NS. (JO,NS,10)
“I would have stayed in the DF if I could have worked in my role somewhere close to my home. Anywhere up to 1.5hours commute would have been acceptable.” (SO,A,21)
“The tempo of overseas operations was impacting on my family life with a wife and three small children. In addition, the fact that I could be working away from home on promotion offered no respite.” (SO,A,26)
“The steady erosion of available personnel both for sea and shore-based appointments meant that in order to cover all appointments and responsibilities the Navy dominated my time, both free and otherwise and home life suffered as a result. In the end something had to give.” (JO,NS,10)
The statistical analysis above identified work/life balance and general conditions of service as being more important in the decision to leave than pay was. This is reinforced by the qualitative study, and many cited the difficulty of maintaining a young family and a career in the Defence Forces. Some respondents indicated that had they been enjoying their job right up to the point of retirement. But the more detailed comments also show that pay and pensions were factored in as part of this decision. In general terms, the data above shows that many of the respondents felt that the necessary hardships endured as part of military service were not reflected in the levels of remuneration they received. Several registered surprise at the levels of pay they were able to receive in the private sector.
Theme 4: Roles and Impact
Some of the comments made by respondents that reflect on geography and human resource planning include:
“I enjoyed my time in the DF and would consider my post on leaving to be a dream job but my ability to deliver in that role and the ability of the unit to function was seriously impacted by the reduced numbers available and demands being placed on the unit.” (JO,A,14)
“The Defence Forces did not provide or could not ever provide me with a challenging role and career path.” (JO,A,12)
“I wanted work but had no troops to work with. There is zero satisfaction in turning up for work for the purposes of being marked present in barracks.” (SO,A,17)
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“The Defence Forces is a compelling organisation with exceptional talent and unique challenges/opportunities. The calibre of its personnel is its strongest asset. I think the organisation through its leadership should and could value and trust its assets and skill sets to deliver and perform and in turn to develop and create a powerful, positive, and sustainable culture.” (SO,A,16)
These represent just the headline jobs that I was doing, each day would inevitably bring some extra duty as well. Each on its own was interesting and satisfying but being asked to spread yourself in a way that precluded doing any one job to your own satisfaction was extremely frustrating and exhausting. (SO,AC,20)
“My Father, Uncle, and grandfather all served in the DF. I left with a very heavy heart.” (JO,AC,15)
When you take a step back from it all and consider the effort to get into the PDF and then all of the development that goes into each individual, the DF never allows an individual to reach their full potential. When compared to equivalents in the civil service and the wider public body, those of the same education and experience are compensated much better. (JO,A,16)
“While I have been frank and honest in my responses, I would like to highlight that I am very proud of having served in the DF.” (JO,A,15)
It is the non-pay benefits that I am most enjoying. Seeing my input having a real influence on the direction of the company is the counter to something that I negatively alluded to w.r.t. the lack of influence a Brig Gen was able to have. (JO,A,14)
Having seen Performance Appraisal system in operation in private sector, AF451 / AF 667 is not fit for purpose. (SO,NS,26)
“Also, the fact that service in the units is considered a poor career choice made service there feel massively undervalued. Units are starved of talent and meaning by a culture of box ticking.” (SO,A,20)
“My time at sea on P21 and P23 were some of my best years in the NS.” (JO,NS,16)
“The career development, support and recognition of educational qualification when appointing Officers does not exist except within a dated points system.” (SO,A,20)
The feelings and opinions expressed by respondents with regard to roles and impact identify two distinct but interrelated issues. The first is the struggle some respondents experienced in identifying a meaningful role for themselves where they could see the impact of their work. The second was a f ‘ - ’ f appointments rather that ability and outputs. When these two are combined, it can be observed that ‘ ’ promotion, and that promotion was gained through less impactful work.
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Annex C: Case for Service Commitment Scheme for ATC Officers (HLIP)*
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Annex D: Case for Service Commitment Scheme for Specialist Staff Officers (HLIP)
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Annex E: Report on provision of subsidised housing by the State to DF families
Introduction
The final report of Project R8 of the HLIP, Non-Pay Retention Measures in the PDF, was signed off by Project Sponsors on 30 Sep 2020 and approved by the Minister on 19 Oct 2020. The objective of this project was to review, research, propose and implement priority non-pay retentions measures in the PDF in order to contribute to improved retention levels. RACO has asked for the report but has not been provided with a copy.
The problems of frequent movement in role and station experienced by officers throughout the Defence Forces, and in particular those west of the Shannon, are exacerbated by the lack of any accommodation plan to support these personnel or their families. RACO reached out to members seeking initiatives, under R8, that could ease this burden. Based on those submissions RACO submit a proposal for the provision of subsidised accommodation for DF personnel who are otherwise renting at full market value or availing of limited and frequently sub-standard Single Living In (SLI) accommodation in barracks.
Proposed Measure
The action proposed is the leasing and management of private accommodation by DoD to be sub-let to DF personnel at a subsidised rate. In order to reduce the cost associated with this measure, it is recommended that DoD negotiate leases covering extending periods. Lease payments could be made on an annual rather than a monthly basis which would further reduce the cost associated with the lease. It is recommended that this action be trialled by way of a pilot scheme prior to rolling out across the DF. The key benefits of the scheme include
• Reduced cost of living for PDF personnel; • The creation of an additional barrier for personnel considering leaving the PDF (as they would have to find new accommodation); • The provision of a retention measure specifically targeting personnel leaving in the first five-years of service; • The improvement of operational efficacy in the Defence Forces through increased retention.
Provision of accommodation in other militaries
The concept of this retention measure is based on one conducted by the Australian Government. The data below outlines similar measures in other militaries. In some cases, when rented accommodation is not provided by Defence Departments, a form of rent allowance is.
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Australian Defence Force
Defence Housing Australia (DHA) was established by the Defence Housing Australia Act 1987 with a focus on improving the standard of defence housing29. Prior to its establishment, much of the accommodation allocated for defence personnel “was of poor quality”.30 When compared to the defence housing service offered in New Zealand, Canada and the United Kingdom, DHA rates “well in terms of its efficiency of its processes and the effectiveness of its service delivery”31.
It should be noted that DHA not only lease accommodation for Defence member and their families, they also provide the following services32:
• Assistance in finding housing; • Management and maintenance of housing; • Administration of the allowance for Defence members occupying rental accommodation33; • Construction and acquisition of properties to meet Defence housing demands; • Redevelopment of properties to meet Defence standards34.
The benefits to property owner outlined on the Defence Housing Australia website35 are:
• Long-term lease (three or six years) • Reliable rent (paid monthly in advance) • DHA property care (a single service fee paid by the property owner that includes repair and maintenance, emergency repair, lease-end make-good36)
As of 2015 / 2016, DHA were leasing 13,169 properties from private investors, accounting for 70% of their total housing stock. In November 2015, the then Australian Chief of Defence, Air Chief Marshal Mark Binskin, publicly asserted his support for the DHA stating, “DHA provides an essential service to [defence] personnel and their families, which in turn supports Australia’s military capability”37.
29 Defence Housing – Key issues and impacts, Parliament of Australia, 2017, p. 1. 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid. 32 https://www.dha.gov.au/about-us/our-organisation accessed 24/02/2020. 33 If DHA are unable to offer Defence personnel suitable service residence, they are then eligible for a rent allowance to lease property from the private rental market. 34 This report is not advocating the establishment of a business enterprise in order to provide these services, it is only mentioned here to illustrate the provisions other Governments have put in place in order provide for Defence personnel and their families. 35 https://www.dha.gov.au/investing/lease-your-property-to-dha accessed on 24/02/2020. 36 Restoration is subject to the duration of the lease term and the obligation of a body corporate. 37 Defence Housing – Key issues and impacts, Parliament of Australia, 2017, p. 4.
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UK Armed Forces
The UK MOD are currently introducing a new approach to accommodation that gives Defence personnel greater choice and flexibility, including the option to live in rented properties, or buy a home with funding from the MOD. The Future Accommodation Model (FAM) is considered a “key part of the MOD’s commitment to ensuring a career in the Armed Forces offers a better work-life balance”38.
The current housing system in the UK already provides Defence personnel with rental accommodation, although it appears to be on an ad hoc basis. For single service personnel posted to a location that has no or insufficient SLA, an application for Substitute Single Service Accommodation (SSSA) is submitted and a suitable property is sourced from the local housing market either on a shared or sole occupancy basis depending on eligibility criteria39. Similarly, when Service Family Accommodation (SFA) is not available, a private rental will be sourced, in line with the locations and standards of the SFA.
New Zealand Defence Force
Prior to 1998, the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) either directly provided housing to its personnel or compensated them for accommodation costs through private rental or mortgage subsidies40. However, this came to be regarded as ineffective because the NZDF’s housing stock was generally poor, with most properties having been constructed in the 1950s and since fallen below acceptable standards due to insufficient maintenance and renovation41.
In response to these circumstances the NZDF transitioned to a Universal Accommodation Component (UAC) payment, incorporated into personnel salaries, to subsidies housing costs in the private rental market. The rationale behind the new policy was twofold. Firstly, it was argued that ‘service personnel and their families should live among the community they serve’ and, secondly, that the new policy would also ‘reduce the ownership costs associated with Defence housing’ and enable the Government to ‘reinvest any sale proceeds into front line capabilities’42.
Spanish Military
In the Spanish military, reserve officers and professional soldiers sailors and aircrew who have served over five years may earn a monthly house renting compensation. Although the impact of this measure
38 https://www.army.mod.uk/people/live-well/housing/ accessed 25/02/2020. 39 Ibid. 40 Pacific Road Group, Value for money review of New Zealand Defence Force, 2010, p. 187. 41 Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, 2006/07 financial review of the Ministry of Defence and the New Zealand Defence Force, House of Representatives, Wellington, February 2008, p. 3. 42 New Zealand Defence Force, Defence white paper 2010, Wellington, November 2010, p. 70.
81 is considered a positive (e.g. on retention) it could be “stronger if the time required to get it were reduced to three years of service”43.
An Garda Siochana
It should be noted that other public sector organisations in the State receive a rent allowance to assist them in renting accommodation. Each garda up to and including the rank of Chief Superintendent receive a €4,655 annual rent allowance payment44. If a similar measure was provided to the Defence Forces, it would be expected to cost the exchequer in excess of €40 million annually45.
Feasibility
The DoD already currently rents a number of buildings / offices, for example in Brussels and RDF locations in Ireland such as Sligo. There is a property management section with the DoD and the expertise to administrate the scheme resides therein. Withdrawal of rent from an individual’s wage is currently an established practice as this is the case for those availing of standard accommodation in barracks.
Cost Estimate
The cost associated with implementation very much depends on the scale of implementation and the location of units leased. However, in order to provide indicative figures, the tables below provide an outline of costs associated if 100 units were leased. Table 1 below contains the annual rates per unit and the annual savings for individuals. For the purposes of this analysis, 20% of the leasing costs are subsidised by the Department.
43 NATO - RTO Technical Report on Recruiting & Retention of Military Personnel (2007) p. 2E-13). 44 This payment is pensionable. Source Dáil Eireann debate https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/question/2019-02-19/264/, accessed on 24/02/2020. 45 f 8 600 f L €4 655
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Table 1-Annual rates per Unit and savings
Unit Type Annual Annual DoD Annual Cost per Annual Savings Market Rate (90% of Individual (80% per Individual49 Value46 market value)47 of DoD rate)48 (after BIK is applied)50 Three bedroom €18,271 €16,444 €4,385 €1,705 (€1,650) house (shared) Three bedroom €18,271 €16,444 €13,155 €5,116 (€4,951) house (with dependents) Four bedroom house €20,004 €18,004 €3,601 €1,399 (€1,354) (shared) Four bedroom house €20,004 €18,004 €14,403 €5,597 (€5,417) (with dependents)
Table 2 below details the estimated cost per unit to the DoD including estimated maintenance costs.
Table 2-Cost to DoD annually per unit
House Type Annual DoD Annual Paid by Cost to DoD Rate Maintenance Household Annually per Costs51 Unit52 Three bedroom €16,444 €2,056 €13,155 €5,345 house (shared / with dependents) Four bedroom €18,004 €2,251 €14,403 €5,852 house (shared / with dependents)
The number of personnel that would benefit from this measure would depend on the proportion of housing units leased as shared accommodation versus those leased as family accommodation to personnel with dependents. In the above figures 180 personnel would stand to benefit from this measure.
46 This market rate is based on the average monthly figures from the Daft 2019 Q4 review for areas in the vicinity of DF barracks / bases (see appendix 1). 47 This is conservatively estimated based on DoD negotiating a 10% reduction based on entering a 10-year lease, making payments on an annual basis and maintaining the property. 48 For shared units, this cost is divided by the number of bedrooms. 49 This is the annual market value minus the annual cost per individual. For shared accommodation the annual market value is divided by the number of bedrooms first. 50 The revenue website st “ f f f -in-kind. The f f ” f the benefit is 5% of its value when it was first provided as a benefit. 51 Maintenance costs are difficult to determine, however, for this analysis annual maintenance costs are estimated as 1.5 times the monthly cost. 52 This is calculated by adding the annual DoD rate plus the maintenance costs
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As a comparison, the introduction of a rent allowance, similar to the amount the AGS receive, would cost €837,900 for 180 personnel.
Conclusion
This submission has specifically shown that other militaries are providing similar type measures in order to retain their personnel, acknowledging that the provision of such a service supports their military capability. At the very least, it is recommended that a pilot scheme be introduced in order to acquire additional evidence to determine if this measure is feasible or viable.
Average Monthly Rental Prices in vicinity of DF Locations Location Nearest Barracks 3 bed house (€) 4 bed house (€) Dublin 6 Cathal Brugha Barracks 2,448 2,680 Dublin 6W Cathal Brugha Barracks 2,169 2,375 Dublin 7 McKee Barracks 2,178 2,384 Dublin 8 Cathal Brugha Barracks 2,272 2,488 Dublin 10 McKee Barracks 1,881 2,059 Dublin 11 McKee Barracks 1,909 2,089 Dublin 12 Cathal Brugha Barracks 2,028 2,220 Dublin 14 Cathal Brugha Barracks 2,168 2,374 Dublin 15 McKee Barracks 1,833 2,007 Dublin 20 McKee Barracks 1,886 2,065 Dublin 22 Casement Aerodrome 1,801 1,972 Dublin 24 Casement Aerodrome 1,834 2,008 Cork City Collins Barrack 1,370 1,500 Galway City Dun Ui Mhaoliosa 1,263 1,383 Limerick City Sarsfield Barracks 1,167 1,278 Kildare DFTC / DFHQ 1,303 1,426 Louth Aiken Barracks 1,190 1,303 Westmeath Custume Barracks 958 1,049 Laois DFTC / DFHQ 950 1,040 Kilkenny Stephens Barracks 925 1,013 Cork Co Naval Base / Collins Barracks 937 1,026 Roscommon Custume Barracks 679 743 Sligo Finner Camp 755 827 Donegal Finner Camp 638 698 Monthly Average € € 1,523 1,667 Annual Average € € 18,271 20,004
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Annex F: Food for Thought Paper on Development of DF Cyber Capability
Sovereignty is at the best of times a complex subject, and the Brexit process has made it even more difficult to discuss rationally. However, it does exist, it is important, and it is relevant to cyberspace.
The EU has recognised the importance of a safe and secure environment in cyberspace to European societies, economies and governments, and has engaged significantly with the issue in the last five (5) years. The EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework (2018 update)53 defined cyber as a fifth operational domain (the others are land, air, sea and space), and the EU Cyber Security Strategy for the Digital Decade outlines how “the EU will shield its people, businesses and institutions from cyber threats, and how it will advance cooperation and lead in securing a global and open Internet”. 54
This ambitious strategy includes the following proposals:
• The building of a network of Security Operations Centres across the EU • The establishment of a Joint Cyber Unit • The establishment of a Member States’ EU cyber intelligence working group • A proposal on a cyber deterrence posture • The strengthening of cooperation with international partners, including NATO • A review of the Cyber Defence Policy Framework. 55
According to the latest Global Cyber Security Index, Ireland ranks 17th out of the 27 EU member states when a wide range of indicators are examined56. Despite this relatively low ranking, the National Cyber Strategy 2019-2024 estimates that 30% of all EU data is stored in Ireland.57
The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) is the “primary security authority in the State”.58 It’s budget for 2021 is €5.1 million.59
The 2015 White Paper on Defence states “the primary focus of the Department of Defence and the Defence Forces will remain the protection of Defence networks”. Support in emergencies will be provided to the Department of Communications, Energy and Natural Resources.60 The 2019 White
53 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14413-2018-INIT/en/pdf 54 https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=72164 55 https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=72164 56 https://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-d/opb/str/D-STR-GCI.01-2018-PDF-E.pdf 57 https://www.ncsc.gov.ie/pdfs/National_Cyber_Security_Strategy.pdf 58 https://www.ncsc.gov.ie/pdfs/National_Cyber_Security_Strategy.pdf 59 https://www.gov.ie/en/press-release/748e9-budget-2021-funding-for-the-departments-of-the- environment-climate-and-communications-and-transport-reflects-government-ambition-for-a-green-jobs-led- recovery/ 60 https://assets.gov.ie/21963/f1e7723dd1764a4281692f3f7cb96966.pdf
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Paper Update notes that threats in the cyber domain “have been assessed as increasing since 2015.” It also highlights the need for “building cyber capacity for the present and the future”.61
Considering these factors, it is important that there is clarity on what this capacity is being built for -
• Defence of Defence Networks only: This is within the scope of 2015 White Paper and will take time and resources, particularly considering new technologies like the software defined radio62. • Defence of Defence Networks with limited support to NSCS for defined tasks: This is within the scope of the 2015 White Paper and the National Cyber Security Strategy and will take time and resources. • An expanded role for defence of the cyber domain, following best international practice: This is not currently within the scope of the White Paper.
The DF cannot go to the market and buy expertise to improve capability quickly. For a noticeable change in capability, it may take five (5) years to train a critical mass of experts and implement changes in our Personnel, our Processes and our Technology. In the meantime, improvements may be possible with further resources and the use of some expertise in our RDF colleagues.
Technology is continuing to advance, and its importance to our society and economy will only increase. It is recommended that a clearly defined cyber defence objective is adopted by the DF, and enough resources are put in place that allows the DF to have a robust capacity to operate on this domain. This cannot be achieved without substantial changes to CS4, and sufficient resources to ensure our Personnel, Processes and Technology are adequate.
Sovereignty in cyberspace is real, and almost all EU states have given meaningful roles to their militaries in the cyber domain. If the DF will not have a meaningful role in the cyber defence of the state, who is going to exercise Irish, and EU, sovereignty on our behalf?
61 https://assets.gov.ie/43904/ff0ac8067fd44a7f9f1c3922d3297c8b.pdf 62 https://irl.eu- supply.com/ctm/Supplier/PublicPurchase/169682/0/0?returnUrl=&b=ETENDERS_SIMPLE#:~:text=The%20Defe nce%20Forces%20of%20Ireland,for%20the%20Irish%20Defence%20Forces.&text=Characteristically%20the%2 0SDR%20must%20provide,both%20voice%20and%20data%20communications.
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Annex G: Application of Single Pension Scheme to Officers subject to early Mandatory Retirement Ages – requirement for supplementary pension to safeguard retention of Post 2013 Officers
1. Background
1.1 Public Servants who are forced to retire on age grounds at earlier ages than their public “f ” G í f F Officers). As the label suggests, these sectors pay higher contributions and accrue their pension final benefits at the designed mandatory age of their retirement. 1.2 Mandatory retirement ages of commissioned officers from DF service are from 56 to 60 depending on rank. Mandatory retirement for the fast accrual sector is at ages which are well in advance of the payment of the State Pension Contributory (SPC).
2. Defence Forces Superannuation
2.1 1995 f F R R “ ” F “ f f ” “f ” f f “ ration means that their entitlement to the range of Social Insurance benefits (including the State Pension Contributory) is taken into account when calculating the f ” f 2.2 For PRSI Clas “ ” f f of two elements; • the Occupational element; and • the State Pension Contributory (SPC) or equivalent value through Supplementary Pension.
2.3 Integration with the Social Insurance Benefits saw the requirement of the Defence Sector (where personnel are forced to retire in advance of the payment of SPC) to provide an q f “ ” f qualifying criteria up to and until they qualify for the payment of SPC. CCR421 was the agreement in the Defence Sector that accepted the principles associated with integration and the requirement to provide the total benefit by means of the SPC and Occupational Element of their pension. 2.4 The introduction of the Single Pension Scheme Act 2012 results in the designed entitlement to the SPC, or equivalent value by supplementary pension, denied to New Entrants since 2013. R’ f “ ” DPER did not consider how integration would actually apply to those forced to retire in advance of the payment age for SPC. 2.5 f “ ” f f & / Defence Forces who are forced to retire in advance of qualifying for the SPC (66, going to 68 2028 f f f f “ f ” F f Service counterparts where their final benefit is not realised until 10 years after they are f F f f “ ” f F personnel in this category, who will have provided decades of loyalty and service to the State, to be rehired by the market at 58 to 60 years of age will be limited.
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3. The Single Pension Scheme (SPS) Act 2012
3.1 The SPS Act 2012 failed to accurately provide for those in the fast accrual sectors. The failure to provide an equivalent model of integration by providing either for the continued facility of “ ” q f f e of the SPC, or an equivalent Public Service Retirement age of 70 (to qualify for SPC) essentially denied the fast accrual sector the full entitlement and equivalence provided for in the other Public Sector bodies. FOI documents released to RACO clearly identify that the final benefit anomaly was highlighted by Defence Sector Management to DPER at the time of drafting the Single Pension Scheme Act 2012. The failure of the employer to provide in the provisions of the SPC Act 2012 for the necessary and equivalent measure for those forced to retire in advance of the SPC are questionable. 3.2 The limited consultation between the parties (Department of Defence and DF Representative Associations) prior to the introduction of the Public Service Pensions (Single Scheme and Other Provisions) Act 2012 focused purely on the movement to a career average earnings model of superannuation accrual. The provision of the supplementary pension, as agreed ‘ ’ R 421 f f ussions in spite of ff ’ f f R’ f withdrawal under new legislation. As Trustees of the DF Superannuation Scheme, this situation is most concerning. 3.3 Of great disappointment to the Association is the failure of Defence Sector Management to fully disclose all material facts in relation to the changes introduced by the Single Pension Scheme 2012 and, additionally, the ongoing failure of the Minister and Defence Management in progressing solutions in addressing the indisputably flawed nature of the New Entrant DF Superannuation Schemes. The approach by the Defence Sector is in stark contrast to G ’
4. Review of Barriers to Extended Participation in the Workforce: 4.1 R’ R 2017 f Sector with the exception of the Defence Forces and some other Fast Accrual Cohorts. 4.2 R’ R f F que conditions of military service. In this report, the Department of Defence stated that; • Historically, retirement ages in the Defence sector have differed when compared to Public Service norms in order to address particular needs in that sector; • However, a number of issues are currently being raised by staff in relation to retirement age in light of recent Public Service pension developments; • In particular, the gap between the compulsory retirement age and the age of entitlement to the State Pension is a concern; • While it was likely that there would be a need to reconsider compulsory retirement ages for this sector in the future, it was considered that a standalone review to be carried out in the context of the operational considerations of the Defence Forces would be the appropriate way to proceed; • D/Defence will provide objective justification for the decision not to include the Defence Forces in the review at this point based on unique sectoral considerations including operational matters.
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4.3 The Department of Defence recorded position in this report unquestionably assumes sectoral responsibility in addressing the mandatory retirement age and addressing of the SPC anomaly. Additionally, when this Working Group and report was discussed during the most recent Pay Negotiations in 2017, DPER, at a special meeting convened to address the issue of DF “ f F q of service would be left to determine their own arrangements by Minist ” 06 J 2017). 4.4 The Department of Defence have yet to conclude their review. It is believed that this forms f j j ‘R4’ f G ’ H L ‘ f F ’ This was to have reported by 04 July 2020.
5. RACO’s Position
5.1 R ’ f f f the SPC, sectoral superannuation arrangements that recognise and provide for mandatory early retiremen f f f ‘ ’ R 421 for New Entrants Post 2013 – supplementary pension equivalent in value to SPC. 5.2 The Public Service Pensions Act of 2012, Section 15, provides additional powers to the Minister to provide, where necessary, secondary legislation for pre-existing arrangements (for example, a supplementary pension) where not inconsistent with the scheme. This facility of the Minister was also referenced at pay talks in 2017. 5.3 In contrast to how DF New Entrants have been treated in the SPS Act 2012, our Members observe the urgency with which Government and DPER has resolved this issue for Public f G ’ R f Compulsory Retirement in the Workforce (November 2017) saw the related (but less severe) issues of other Public Servants addressed by extension of retirement ages to meet the payment age of the SPC. Our sectoral members seek equivalence. 5.4 Conciliation Council Report 421:- It is the position of the Association that the unique f F ‘ ’ R 421 changed in any way and consequently the provision of supplementary pension, where qualifying, should in no way be impacted by the introduction of the Public Service Pensions Act 2012. CCR 421 is a stand-alone sectoral agreement providing for the recognised unique conditions of mandatory retirement at ages below the qualifying age for receipt of the SPC. 5.5 Th f 2017 “ ‘ ’ f workers who are forced to retire age 65 and then have to wait a year to receive the State ” H “ G the Workplace Relations Commission has now been tasked with drawing up a new code of practice for f ” 01 J 2017 The situation of DF New Entrants is indisputably more severe in nature and quantum and no credible facility to address the flawed nature of New Entrant Superannuation has been progressed.
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Annex H: Amárach Research Report on Turnover Intent of Post 2013 Officers
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Annex I: RACO Case for Long Service Incentives for Captains and Comdts (HLIP)
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Annex J: RACO Case for the Reinstatement of Specialised Instructor Allowance (HLIP)
1. Specialised Instructor Allowance was introduced following the recommendation of the Independent Monitoring Group (IMG) on the Doyle Report. In the Report to the Minister for Defence, “The Challenge of a Workplace” (2002) Report concluded that “attention needs to be given to the quality of education and training of those who instruct and train others particularly recruits”. In the subsequent report “Response to the Challenge of the Workplace” (2004) it was recommended that a specialised instructor training be provided, and a new post of Specialised Instructors be created with a suitable Instructors allowance. Specialised Instructor Allowance was paid to those instructors, who had successfully completed the Specialised Instructor’s Course and were tasked with instructing inductee leaders. 2. In addressing the IMG issues the allowance was focused on establishments that concentrated its efforts on institutions responsible for training the general training trainers, or “teaching the trainers”. They were therefore considered to have a key role in presenting models of best practice in the area of training and are best placed to act as drivers of positive change. It applied to the following institutions: The Cadet School (and Air Corps & Naval Service equivalents), the Brigade Training Centres (and Air Corps & Naval College equivalents) and the NCO Training Wing, Military College, Defence Forces Training Centre. 3. Specialised Instructors Allowance was introduced to entice instructors to the appointments and reward them financially for the additional hours required in a training installation, while improving human resource management and workplace culture. The allowance assisted with attracting and retaining suitable personnel, this reduces litigation, redress of wrong cases, and Ombudsman cases which occurred in the Defence Forces and the cost of resources that would have to be devoted to such matters. 4. Before the Haddington Road agreement, Specialised Instructor Allowance was payable to Officers at a rate of €5,455 a year and enlisted ranks at €95.22 weekly or €4,969 per annum. In 2013, payments of Specialised Instructor Allowance to officers ceased. For enlisted personnel the allowance was reduced by 10% to €85.70 a week or €4,472 per annum. This resulted in a saving of €261,840 annually on officer’s allowances and €28,315 annually on the reduction of the enlisted ranks allowance. This has caused a disparity in training installations between officer and enlisted instructors. 5. Specialised Instructor Allowance ceased on the 30 Jun 2013 and was bought out in 2014 to compensate officers that were in receipt of it at the time it ceased. Crucially, none of the officers
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that received the compensation payment are currently serving in these appointments. Since the removal of Specialised Instructor Allowance from officers the nature, intensity, responsibilities or demand, placed on officer instructors has not changed. Moreover, as a result of the retention crisis, which has resulted in the increased level of recruitment, the delivery of induction training has become more onerous. The officer instructors are responsible for the planning and organisation of all activities, they must be present to supervise and ensure the activity is executed correctly to meet learning outcomes and safety standards. They conduct outside normal working hours lectures and exercises. They assess and document students’ performance and recommend whether they should pass or fail. Yet, they do not receive any remuneration for the addition workload and responsibility. The training and education of cadets, recruits, Ptes, NCOs and officers is an integral part of the personal and professional development of personnel in the Defence Forces and therefore the personnel in institutions tasked with facilitating this education and development should be awarded appropriately. 6. The majority of these institutions are currently under strength in officer staff numbers. The workload and hours required to ensure that students on theses course receive the required level of training places significant demands on officer instructors. Given that the same conditions exist that saw the merits of the recognition and introduction of this allowance in the first instance, the fact that the allowance continues to be paid to non-commissioned officers and in recognition of the additional demands now being placed on these institutions and staff due to the increased recruitment demands of the Defence Forces, it is proposed that Specialised Instructor Allowance be reintroduced to Officers serving in the units that previously received the allowance as in Table 1 Below.
Table 1 Establishment of Specialised Instructor Officers
Service Lt Col Comdt Capt Lt Total 1 Bde 1 2 2 5 2 Bde 1 2 4 7 DFTC 5 6 4 16 Total Army 1 7 10 10 28 Total AC 2 6 4 12 Total NS 1 3 3 2 9 Total DF 2 12 19 16 49
Source: Admin Inst CS4.
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7. In addition to the original 49 appointments that receive Specialised Instructor Allowance it is recommended that in addition Specialised Instructor Allowance should also be paid to all qualified officers administering all Recruit and 2 to 3 Star Courses. Table 2 indicates the approximate cost of reintroducing Specialised Instructor Allowance. It is based on the 2013 rate of €5,455 per annum. The additional cost of induction training is based on 14 recruit platoons a year and a 25-week training process. and instructing in the Officer training Wing and Command and Staff School. a. The Pl Comd of a recruit Platoon is responsible for the planning, running and supervising of the new inductee. They must monitor and document the new entrants’ performance and access their ability to continue in military service. b. The Officer Training Wing (OTW) conducts the Junior Command and Staff Course which qualifies Capt to become Comdt, while the Command and Staff School (C & S School) qualifies Comdt for promotion to Lt Col. In the role of Comdt they will be a company commander and as a Lt Col they will be a unit commander. Both roles will be responsible for the human resource management in a unit and are key enablers for positive change. The OTW and C & S School therefore provide an important role in presenting models of best practice in the area of training and are best placed to act as drivers of positive change.
Table 2 Additional Cost of Reintroduction of Specialised Instructor Allowance No of Appointments Total Cost Original Specialised Instructor Appointments 49 €267,295 Officer Training Wing Instructors 7 €38,185 Command and Staff School Instructors 8 €43,640 Pl Comd Recruit & 2-3* Training 14 €41,122* Total 78 €390,242
* Calculated on 28 weeks. 17 weeks Recruit training and 11 weeks 2 to 3*Star Course
8. Given that the same conditions exist that saw the merits of the recognition and introduction of this allowance in the first instance, the fact that the allowance continues to be paid to non-commissioned officers and in recognition of the additional demands now being placed on these institutions and staff due to the increased recruitment demands of the Defence Forces, a claim for the payment of the allowance for officers is advanced. 9. The majority of these institutions are currently under strength in officer staff numbers. The workload and hours required to ensure that students on theses course receive the required level of training places significant demands on officer instructors.
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10. Officer instructors are responsible for the planning and organisation of all activities, they must be present to supervise and ensure the activity is executed correctly to meet learning outcomes and safety standards. They conduct Outside Normal Working Hours lectures and exercises. They assess and document students’ performance and recommend whether they should pass or fail. They plan and conduct exercises of varying degrees of risk, signing off on risk assessments. Yet, they do not receive any remuneration for the addition workload and responsibility. The training and education of cadets, recruits, Ptes, NCOs, and officers is an integral part of the personal and professional development of personnel in the Defence Forces and therefore the personnel in institutions tasked with facilitating this education and development should be awarded appropriately.
“The responsibilities of an Instructor are above the normal required of such a grade and are qualification based. The allowance ensures the attraction and retention of suitably qualified personnel to instructor posts. The loss of this in-house capability to maintain instructional output would result in the requirement to procure these services from external military providers at an exceptionally high cost.” – DOD Justification to DPER, review of Allowances, 2013.
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Annex K: RACO Food for Thought Paper on Intelligence
National Level
• Military Intelligence is tasked with producing forward-looking intelligence on a number of areas, including counter espionage, counter terrorism, Defence Forces overseas’ operating environments, and other international developments. For a relatively small unit, this remit is very wide ranging. Moreover, some on-Island responsibilities overlap with AGS tasks. Not only is this an unnecessary duplication of work, but it also raises the possibility of circular reporting, and competition between two state organisations. A review of national intelligence architecture is needed to better divide responsibilities for intelligence production between the DF and AGS. • There is no formal process for the development of national-level intelligence requirements, responsive to the government’s strategic objectives. • A Director of National Intelligence is required to manage the national level Intelligence Cycle. This would lead to a more joined up approach by Military Intelligence, AGS and other agencies that acquire relevant information, including the DFA, which would better respond to political-level intelligence requirements. • Any changes to intelligence architecture should be underpinned by legislation.
Defence Forces
• The unit is very small relative to most other European nations. • The DF does not have a dedicated, professional intelligence corps. This means that highly-skilled officers, often trained at great cost overseas, are required to move on to secure promotion, leading to a significant loss of corporate knowledge. • Intelligence production requires the collation and analysis of a variety of information, including economic, political, security and other environmental factors. While DF officers can familiarize themselves with some of these issues, this is a sub-optimal solution which will almost certainly diminish the accuracy of reporting, particularly on strategic-level developments overseas. • The unit spreads itself too thin relative to its establishment in an attempt to cover all thematic (counter espionage, counter terrorism) and geographic areas (DF overseas deployments, and international developments) that fall within its area of intelligence responsibility.
Recommendations
• A full independent review of Ireland’s military intelligence structure is required, which would likely call for some of changes outlined below: o Consider the creation of a professional intelligence corps. Clarify Military Intelligence’s intelligence area of responsibility, while also significantly increasing its establishment. o Failing this, the employment of potentially former DF officers in a reserve or permanent capacity would ensure that skills and corporate knowledge are not lost. o Improve the connection between DF intelligence production and political/national-level intelligence requirements.
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Defence Forces Operational Outputs 2020
Operation Type Operation Commitment Land Operations Aid to the Civil Power Operations in support of An Garda Síochána 133 operations Military Guard Portlaoise Prison Continuous 24/7 Military Guard Central Bank Continuous 24/7 Military Guard Irish Industrial Explosives Continuous 24/7 Military Guard Government Buildings Continuous 24/7 Sea Operations Fisheries boarding 307 operations Fisheries detentions 16 SAR Ops 14 operations Naval Service Dive Section Search and Recovery operations 3 operations Air Operations Maritime Surveillance Patrols 140 flights
Emergency Aeromedical Services 344 flights Inter-hospital Air Ambulance 45 flights Garda Air Support Unit Continuous 24/7 Overseas Operations United National Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) Over 650 Individual deployments United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), Syria Over 260 Individual deployments European Union Training Mission (EUTM) Mali 40 Individual deployments Operational HQ of the EU Naval Force Mediterranean 3 HQ staff deployed (EUNAVFORMED) Operation Force HQ Staff with the EU Battlegroup (EUBG) 2020, Germany 10 HQ Staff deployed State Ceremonial Military and State ceremonial 20 events Presentation of Ambassadorial Credential of Office to Uachtaráin 6 events na hḖireann
Source: Defence Forces Press Office 30 December 2020
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“To Champion the Wellbeing of our Members”
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