UNIVERSITY of CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO Famous
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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO Famous Amateurs in a Professional’s Race: The Causes and Consequences of Celebrity Politics A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science by Justin Forest Reeves Committee in charge: Professor Ellis Krauss, Co-Chair Professor Matthew Shugart, Co-Chair Professor Stephan Haggard Professor Megumi Naoi Professor Yasuhiko Tohsaku 2015 Copyright Justin Forest Reeves, 2015 All rights reserved. The dissertation of Justin Forest Reeves is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically: Co-Chair Co-Chair University of California, San Diego 2015 iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Signature Page . iii TableofContents.................................. iv ListofFigures ................................... viii List of Tables . x Acknowledgements ................................. xii Vita ......................................... xiv AbstractoftheDissertation . xv 1 Introduction............................. 1 1.1 Introduction . 1 1.2 Explaining Celebrities in Office . 2 1.3 Research Questions . 3 1.4 Outline of Dissertation and its Contributions . 4 1.5 Defining Celebrity Candidates . 6 1.6 CelebrityCandidacyinJapanandElsewhere . 8 2 HeuristicHierarchyandtheElectoralValueofFame. 12 2.1 Introduction . 13 2.2 When Fame Matters Over Other Candidate Attributes and HowVotersUseIt ...................... 15 2.3 Case Selection . 18 2.4 Research Design . 21 2.5 Results . 24 iv 2.6 RulingOutAppearance. 29 2.7 Familiarity E↵ect Not Mediated by Viability Inferences . 30 2.8 Analysis of Response-Time Suggests MEE Mechanism . 32 2.9 Discussion . 33 3 Running the Right Race: Voting Rules and Celebrity Candidate Entry................................. 35 3.1 Introduction . 36 3.2 Electoral Systems, the Personal Vote and When Candidate AttributesMatter....................... 36 3.3 Celebrity Entry: Incentives for Parties and Candidates . 39 3.4 Case Selection: the Japanese House of Councillors and the FinnishEduskunta ...................... 42 3.5 Measuring Celebrity: Celebrity Candidate Construct and Operationalization . 44 3.6 ResearchDesign: HouseofCouncillors . 45 3.7 Research Design: Eduskunta . 47 3.8 Results:Japan ........................ 48 3.9 Results:Finland........................ 52 3.10 Discussion . 57 4 Seeking Credible Outsiders: The Impact of Political Corruption on Candidate Evaluations and Celebrity Support . 59 4.1 Introduction . 60 4.2 Corruption Scandals and Vote Choice . 61 4.3 Trust and the Relevance of Celebrity Attributes . 64 4.4 Scandal and Voter Support for Celebrity Candidates . 67 4.5 Research Design and Case Selection . 69 v 4.6 SurveyAssignmentandResults . 76 4.7 The Protest Vote . 87 4.8 Discussion . 89 5 Active Amateurs and the Clown Myth: Evaluating the Perfor- mance of Elected Celebrities . 91 5.1 Introduction . 92 5.2 Legislative Studies and the Boundary Between Backgrounds and Behavior . 93 5.3 Star Stigma and the Burden of Non-political Fame. 95 5.4 Measuring Celebrity Activism and Independence . 97 5.5 Results: LegislativeActivism. 102 5.6 Results: Legislative Independence . 112 5.7 Discussion . 123 6Conclusion..............................125 6.1 Future Work on Electoral Systems, Voting Behavior, and Legislative Behavior . 126 6.2 FutureWorkonCelebrityPolitics . 127 AppendixA Chapter2 ........................ 130 AppendixB Chapter4 ........................ 133 B.1 ValenceIssuesUsedInExperiment . 134 B.2 Scandals used in experimental treatment . 135 B.3 Type 2 Protest Voter Test . 137 B.4 Support for Celebrity Candidates after scandal Anecdotes . 138 AppendixC Chapter5 ........................ 141 vi C.1 Selected Todai-Asahi 2013 Survey Instruments . 142 Bibliography . 147 vii LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1.1: Celebrity Candidacy in Japan’s Upper House . 10 Figure 2.1: Percentage of Respondents Approving of Di↵erent Candidate Back- grounds . 19 Figure2.2: CharacteristicsofSurveyRespondents . 21 Figure2.3: ExampleSmallBallotSet(1of8) . 23 Figure2.4: ExampleLargeBallotSet(1of8) . 23 Figure2.5: AggregateSupportRatesonSmallBallots . 26 Figure 2.6: Aggregate Support Rates on Counterpart Large Ballots. 27 Figure 2.7: Aggregate Support Rates on Celebrity Large Ballots . 27 Figure 2.8: Individual Celebrity-vs-Counterpart Support Rates on Small Ballots 28 Figure 2.9: Individual Celebrity-vs-Counterpart Support Rates on Large Ballots 28 Figure 2.10: Large Ballot Celebrity Support by Familiarity Controlling for Viability 31 Figure 2.11: Supporters vs Non-supporters Response Time Comparison by Group 32 Figure 3.1: Predicted Probability of Candidate Celebrity Status, Prefectural Tier 49 Figure 3.2: Predicted Probability of Candidate Celebrity Status, National Tier byPeriod............................... 50 Figure 3.3: Predicted Probability of Candidate Celebrity Status, National Tier by Election Year . 51 Figure 3.4: Predicted Probability of Candidate Celebrity Status by Size of PartyList............................... 54 Figure 4.1: Rates of Celebrity Candidacy in the House of Councillors and Major PoliticalScandals........................... 65 Figure 4.2: Celebrity Sample ballot 1 of 8 (translated from Japanese)....74 Figure 4.3: Counterpart Sample ballot 1 of 8 (translated from Japanese)... 74 viii Figure 4.4: Scandal Treatment Prompt (translated from Japanese)...... 75 Figure 4.5: Aggregate Celebrity Support in Treatment Group and Control Group 1 . 78 Figure 4.6: Individual Celebrity Support in Treatment Group and Control Group 1 . 79 Figure 4.7: Political, Celebrity, and Mere Outsider Candidate Support in Treat- ment Group and Control Group 1 . 80 Figure 5.1: Box-and-whiskers plots by type of outcome (celebrity vs. Non-celeb)104 Figure 5.2: Upper House PMB Percentage of All Bills and Passage Rate Per Term ................................. 106 Figure 5.3: Policy Space Estimates for LDP and DPJ Candidates & Legislators, Todai-AsahiSurvey2013. 115 Figure 5.4: Frequency Distributions of Self-Identified Ideology Placement, by Party ................................. 116 Figure 5.5: Ideological Distance Between Celebrity and Non-Celebrity Candi- dates & Legislators, by Party . 119 Figure 5.6: Distribution of Issue Focuses Leading Up to Election . 121 FigureA.1: CelebritiesUsedinExperiment . 131 Figure A.2: Candidate Background Information on Ballots . 132 Figure B.1: Valence Issue Rank Question (translated from Japanese)..... 134 ix LIST OF TABLES Table1.1: CelebrityCandidacyinFinland . 9 Table 1.2: Philippine 2010 General Elections: Celebrities as a Percentage of all Candidates by Office . 10 Table 2.1: Celebrity Candidates in the House of Councillors 1962 – 2013 . 20 Table2.2: ExperimentalTreatmentConditions . 22 Table 2.3: Covariate Balance across Experimental Conditions . 25 Table 2.4: Respondent Familiarity with the Celebrity Given . 30 Table 3.1: Post-war Structure of Japan’s House of Councillors . 43 Table 3.2: Logistic Regression of Candidate Celebrity Status on Party List Size 53 Table 3.3: Candidate Share of List Preference Votes with Indicator Variables 56 Table4.1: ScandalExperimentTreatmentConditions . 75 Table 4.2: Covariate Balance across Experimental Conditions . 76 Table 4.3: Logistic Regression of Celebrity Support on Scandal Information . 83 Table 4.4: Logistic Regression of Celebrity Support on Scandal Information, byCorruptionImportanceSubgroups . 84 Table 4.5: Logistic Regression of Celebrity Support vs Counterpart Support on Corruption Importance . 85 Table 4.6: Logistic Regression of Support for Incumbent Insider vs Amateur MereOutsiderAcrossAllGroups . 86 Table 5.1: Summary of Legislative Activism Variables, Celebrities . 100 Table 5.2: Summary of Legislative Activism Variables, Non-Celebrities . 100 Table 5.3: The E↵ects of Celebrity Status on Legislative E↵ort by Outcome . 103 x Table 5.4: Abstentions of Upper House Celebrity Candidates (Feb 3rd to July 10th, 2015) . 114 Table 5.5: Determinants of Candidate & Legislator Dissimilarity with Co- partisans................................ 120 Table 5.6: Celebrity Status on Individualistic Campaigning . 122 Table B.1: Sample Distribution of Valence Issue Relative Importance . 134 Table B.2: Logistic Regression of Celebrity Support on Protest Vote Interactions137 xi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Iameternallygratefultoeveryonewhohasassistedmethroughoutthisproject and along my way through graduate school in general. It goes without saying that none of my achievements could have been realized without the generous encouragement, support and advice of key individuals whom I am blessed to know. First and foremost, each member of my dissertation committee has played acrucialroleinthedevelopmentofthisprojectandmydevelopmentasascholar. Matthew Shugart’s encyclopedic election knowledge and fetishistically thorough ex- ploration of political institutions have been an inspiration to me both prior to and throughout my graduate career. Ellis Krauss, with his forty plus years of studying Japan and Japanese politics, has also been a wonderful and encouraging mentor throughout my (still inchoate) maturation as a budding Japan scholar. Megumi Naoi has coached me along from the beginning of the dissertation with both theoretical and methodological challenges/suggestions, and an ever present eye towards the practical. Steph Haggard’s insights and feedback, particularly with respect to the decision theory literature, pushed me in unexpected directions that ended up being critical to the project. Yasuhiko Tohsaku seems, at first blush, an odd addition