Constitutional Law 1 Constitutional Law A
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW A fundamental principle of statutory interpretation is that when a statute can be read in two ways, one raising constitutional issues and the other interpreting the language as affecting matters clearly within the constitutional reach of Congress, the latter interpretation should prevail so that the constitutional issue is avoided. FSM v. Boaz (II), 1 FSM R. 28, 32 (Pon. 1981). When interpreting a statute, courts should try to avoid interpretations which may bring the constitutionality of the statute into doubt. Tosie v. Tosie, 1 FSM R. 149, 157 (Kos. 1982). While courts will not refuse to pass on the constitutionality of statutes in a proceeding in which such a determination is involved, needless consideration of attacks on their validity and unnecessary decisions striking down statutes will be avoided. Legislative acts are presumed to be constitutional; where fairly possible a construction of a statute will be made that avoids constitutional questions. Truk v. Hartman, 1 FSM R. 174, 180-81 (Truk 1982). Courts should avoid, where possible, selecting interpretations of a statute which may bring into doubt the constitutionality of that statute. In re Otokichy, 1 FSM R. 183, 190 (App. 1982). Constitutional issues should not be decided if the statute in question may be interpreted in such a way as clearly to conform with constitutional requirements. Suldan v. FSM (I), 1 FSM R. 201, 205 (Pon. 1982). A court should not decide a constitutional issue when there remains a possibility that an administrative decision will obviate the need for a court decision. Suldan v. FSM (I), 1 FSM R. 201, 205 (Pon. 1982). The Constitution does not contemplate that FSM citizens must first petition any person or body outside the Federated States of Micronesia as a condition to consideration of their constitutional claims by courts established under this Constitution. In re Iriarte (II), 1 FSM R. 255, 267 (Pon. 1983). An unconstitutional statute may not be redeemed by voluntary administrative action. Suldan v. FSM (II), 1 FSM R. 339, 357 (Pon. 1983). Unnecessary constitutional adjudication is to be avoided. Suldan v. FSM (II), 1 FSM R. 339, 357 (Pon. 1983). If construction of a statute by which a serious doubt of constitutionality may be avoided is fairly possible, a court should adopt that construction. Suldan v. FSM (II), 1 FSM R. 339, 357-58 (Pon. 1983). CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 Article III, sections l and 2, of the FSM Constitution are self-executing and do not contemplate, or imply the need for, court action to confirm citizenship where no challenge exists. In re Sproat, 2 FSM R. 1, 7 (Pon. 1985). If a dispute properly may be resolved on statutory grounds without reaching potential constitutional issues and without discussing constitutional principles, the court should do so. FSM v. Edward, 3 FSM R. 224, 230 (Pon. 1987). No clause in the FSM Constitution is equivalent to the eleventh amendment of the United States Constitution, which generally bars citizens from using United States federal courts to seek monetary damages against states. Edwards v. Pohnpei, 3 FSM R. 350, 361 (Pon. 1988). When dealing with statutes, before discussing constitutional issues a court must first address any threshold issues of statutory interpretation which may obviate the need for a constitutional ruling. Michelsen v. FSM, 3 FSM R. 416, 419 (Pon. 1988). As a matter of constitutional law, the authority to exercise executive, legislative and judicial powers came to the Federated States of Micronesia under the FSM Constitution, by operation of law, not through delegation of Trust Territory functions. United Church of Christ v. Hamo, 4 FSM R. 95, 103 (App. 1989). The appellate court will not decide a constitutional issue if not raised below and because unnecessary constitutional adjudication is to be avoided. Jonah v. FSM, 5 FSM R. 308, 313 (App. 1992). The Chapman rule, which holds that a constitutional error can be found harmless only when it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, is suitable for the FSM. Jonah v. FSM, 5 FSM R. 308, 314 (App. 1992). A statute is repealed by implication by a constitutional provision when the legislature, under the new constitutional provision, no longer has the present right to enact statutes substantially similar to the statute in question. FSM v. Jano, 6 FSM R. 9, 11 (Pon. 1993). In the absence of any authority or compelling policy arguments the court cannot conclude that a law, the enforcement of which entails a harsh result, is unconstitutional, and can only note that the creation of potentially harsh results is well within the province of the nation’s constitutionally empowered legislators. Mid-Pacific Constr. Co. v. Semes, 7 FSM R. 102, 104 (Pon. 1995). A court should avoid unnecessary constitutional adjudication. Louis v. Kutta, 8 FSM R. 228, 229 (Chk. 1998). Acts of Congress are presumed to be constitutional. Chuuk v. Secretary of Finance, 8 FSM R. 353, 374, 387 (Pon. 1998). CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 3 Article I, section 1 of the Constitution defines the FSM’s national boundaries, and section 2 defines the states’ boundaries in the event marine resources revenues should accrue to the state wherein the resources are found, but the Constitution’s framers did not intend to confer ownership of marine resources, or revenues derived from such resources, when they defined the state boundaries. Offshore marine resources, and the division between national and state power with respect to these resources, are addressed in other articles of the Constitution. Chuuk v. Secretary of Finance, 8 FSM R. 353, 367-68 (Pon. 1998). The constitutional government works not to override custom, but works in cooperation with the traditional system in an atmosphere of mutual respect. Senda v. Semes, 8 FSM R. 484, 497 (Pon. 1998). Micronesian custom, and the constitutional legal system established by the people of the FSM, flow from differing (not necessarily inconsistent) premises and purposes. These two systems, then, can be seen as supplementary and complementary, not contradictory. Each has a valuable role to perform, independent of the other. Senda v. Semes, 8 FSM R. 484, 499 (Pon. 1998). The right guaranteed in the Chuuk Constitution to move and migrate within the State and the right in the FSM Constitution to travel and migrate within the Federated States, do not protect travel or migration outside these boundaries. Chipen v. Losap Election Comm’r, 9 FSM R. 46, 48 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 1999). A municipal ordinance restricting absentee voting in municipal elections to persons in the state of Chuuk is not unconstitutional. Chipen v. Losap Election Comm’r, 9 FSM R. 46, 48 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 1999). Internal waters are those waters on the landward side, or inside, of the baselines of the territorial sea. The exclusive economic zone starts twelve nautical miles seaward of the baseline and extending outward for another 188 nautical miles. A desire to maximize the area that might be included within the baselines, subject to the FSM’s international treaty obligations, cannot be interpreted as a recognition of state ownership of the ocean resources 12 to 200 nautical outside of those baselines when drawn. Chuuk v. Secretary of Finance, 9 FSM R. 424, 430-31 (App. 2000). The framers’ intent that the equidistance method be used to establish fair and equitable marine boundaries between the states in the event marine resource revenue should accrue to the state wherein the resources are found does not indicate state resource ownership because the Constitution explicitly provides for an event when such revenues would accrue to the state ─ when ocean floor mineral resources are exploited. Chuuk v. Secretary of Finance, 9 FSM R. 424, 431 (App. 2000). When the Constitution defined state boundaries, the Constitution’s framers did not intend to confer on the states the ownership of the exclusive economic zone’s resources or all the revenues derived from them. Chuuk v. Secretary of Finance, 9 FSM R. 424, 431 (App. 2000). When a government has the power to collect money, it has the power to disburse that money at its discretion unless the Constitution or applicable laws should provide otherwise. Chuuk v. Secretary of Finance, 9 FSM R. 424, 431 (App. 2000). CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 4 The Constitution’s broadly stated express grants of power to the national government contain within them innumerable incidental or implied powers, as well as certain inherent powers. Chuuk v. Secretary of Finance, 9 FSM R. 424, 431 n.2 (App. 2000). Because regulating the ownership, exploration, and exploitation of the exclusive economic zone’s natural resources is a power expressly and exclusively delegated to the national government and because the incidental power to collect assessments levied pursuant to that delegated power is indisputably a national power, the power to disburse those funds is also a national power, except where the Constitution provides otherwise (such as in Article IX, section 6). Thus even were the states the underlying owners of the exclusive economic zone’s resources, such a conclusion would not entitle the states to the exclusive economic zone’s revenues except where the Constitution so provides. Chuuk v. Secretary of Finance, 9 FSM R. 424, 431-32 (App. 2000). Fishing fees are not assessed under the national government’s constitutional authority to impose taxes on income. They are levied instead under the national government’s constitutional authority to regulate the ownership, exploration, and exploitation of natural resources within the marine space of the Federated States of Micronesia beyond 12 miles from island baselines. Chuuk v. Secretary of Finance, 9 FSM R. 424, 434 (App. 2000). Fishing fees are not income taxes because the national government’s power to impose them does not derive from its power to tax income.