Freud Or Nietzsche
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FREUD OR NIETZSCHE: THE DRIVES, PLEASURE, AND SOCIAL HAPPINESS by Donovan Tateshi Miyasaki A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Department of Philosophy University of Toronto © Copyright by Donovan Tateshi Miyasaki 2004 Freud or Nietzsche: The Drives, Pleasure, and Social Happiness By Donovan Tateshi Miyasaki A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Department of Philosophy University of Toronto © Copyright by Donovan Tateshi Miyasaki 2004 ABSTRACT Many commentators have remarked upon the striking points of correspondence that can be found in the works of Freud and Nietzsche. However, this essay argues that on the subject of desire their work presents us with a radical choice: Freud or Nietzsche. I first argue that Freud’s theory of desire is grounded in the principle of inertia, a principle that is incompatible with his later theory of Eros and the life drive. Furthermore, the principle of inertia is not essentially distinct from his later theory of the death drive. Consequently, Freud’s theory of desire can only be interpreted consistently as a monism of the death drive. I then analyze Nietzsche’s attempt to ground his theory of desire in the concept of the will to power. I argue that Nietzsche’s view of desire is fundamentally opposed to the key elements of Freud’s theory of desire: the principle of constancy, the Freudian definition of the drive, and the pleasure principle. Next, I explicate the stakes of this opposition by analyzing the social consequences of each view for morality and justice. I argue that the Freudian subject seeks to dominate the social other, and that there is an insurmountable conflict between the satisfaction of desire and the demands of social life. Consequently, Freud’s view allows only for a negative ii conception of the social good in which morality is defined as the intrinsically impossible task of eliminating evil, and justice can be achieved only through the equal distribution of instinctual frustration. Finally, I argue that in Nietzsche’s theory of desire there is no essential conflict between individual desire and social life. The Nietzschean subject desires to manifest power in the form of activity that is independent of external agents, not to dominate the other. Consequently, Nietzsche’s view allows for the possibility of a positively defined concept of the social good in which morality is the affirmation and enhancement of every subject’s happiness, and justice can be achieved through the promotion and protection of an equality of power among subjects. iii CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.................................................................................................... vii INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 1 PART I. THE FOUNDATION OF THE THEORY OF DESIRE 1. INERTIA AS THE GROUND OF DESIRE IN FREUDIAN THEORY............................. 9 The Principle of Biological Inertia in Freud’s Theory of Desire....................................... 9 The Principle of Psychical Inertia in Freud’s Theory of Desire...................................... 14 Inertia, the Pleasure Principle, and the Reality Principle ................................................ 18 Inertia and Freud’s Drive Theory .................................................................................... 22 2. THE WILL TO POWER AS THE GROUND OF DESIRE IN NIETZSCHE .................. 26 The Will to Power and Atomism ..................................................................................... 26 The Will to Power and Freud’s Principle of Psychical Inertia ........................................ 32 The Will to Power and the Pleasure Principle ................................................................. 38 The Will to Power and Freud’s Drive Theory ................................................................. 42 3. THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF EROS IN FREUD’S THEORY OF DESIRE ........................ 47 What is Eros?................................................................................................................... 48 The Absence of Eros in the Freudian Theory of Sexual and Social Bonds..................... 49 The Incompatibility of Eros with Freud’s Theory of Desire ........................................... 62 iv Freud’s Monism of the Death Drive ................................................................................ 70 PART II. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE THEORY OF DESIRE FOR SOCIAL THEORY 4. RADICAL PESSIMISM AND ITS CONSEQUENCES IN FREUD’S SOCIAL THEORY...................................................................................... 81 Two Attempts at a Solution to Radical Pessimism in Freud’s Social Theory................. 81 The Libidinal Relation as Domination............................................................................. 90 The Aim of Inertia in Relation to Social Life............................................................... 90 The Origin of Primary Narcissism............................................................................... 96 The Pleasure-Ego and Love....................................................................................... 102 The Social Bond: A Parody of Eros............................................................................... 114 Neighbours and Enemies ........................................................................................... 115 Justice, Equality in Sacrifice, and Envy..................................................................... 120 Morality, Bad Conscience, and the Primacy of Evil.................................................. 125 5. THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF NIETZSCHE’S THEORY OF THE DRIVE AS WILL TO POWER......................................................................... 130 The Will to Power as Domination ................................................................................. 130 Distinguishing the Will to Power as Force and as Relation...................................... 130 Distinguishing Domination as the Essence of the Will to Power and as Social Domination....................................................................................... 136 The Aim of Desire and the Criteria of Satisfaction and Frustration......................... 142 The Nietzschean Social Subject..................................................................................... 152 v Pleasure, Pain, and the Love of One’s Enemies........................................................ 152 Noble Values and the Possibility of a Noble form of Morality.................................. 164 The Possibility of Good Conscience .......................................................................... 177 The Possibility of a Noble Form of Social Justice..................................................... 184 CONCLUSION..................................................................................................................... 192 Freud or Nietzsche: Which “Nietzsche”? ...................................................................... 192 Critical Consequences for Contemporary Philosophy and Psychoanalysis................... 195 Critical Consequences for Freudian Theory .................................................................. 198 WORKS CITED ................................................................................................................... 201 vi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I wish to thank the University of Toronto for providing financial support during the completion of this dissertation. I would also like to thank my advisors Amy Mullin, André Gombay, and Rebecca Comay for their helpful comments and suggestions. Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends, especially Barbara and Mela, for their patience and encouragement. vii INTRODUCTION Another thing I loathe to hear is an infamous “and”: the Germans say “Goethe and Schiller” — I am afraid they say “Schiller and Goethe” . Don’t people know this Schiller yet? — There are even worse “ands” . Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols Although there is a significant body of literature comparing Freud and Nietzsche’s work, the greater part of this literature has highlighted their similarities at the expense of their differences. In the rare cases where the differences between Freud and Nietzsche’s views have been given attention, they have often been treated as relatively inconsequential. It has not generally been appreciated just how profound their differences are. Moreover, in those cases where specific incompatibilities between the two thinkers’ views have been recognized, the explicit consequences of their disagreements have not been sufficiently explored. Finally, comparisons of Freud and Nietzsche’s views have been primarily focused on the topics of the unconscious, repression, and sublimation. Few commentators have compared Freud and Nietzsche’s views of desire, the drives, and pleasure in significant detail. It is the purpose of this essay to remedy these deficiencies by providing a thorough analysis of the radical differences between Freud and Nietzsche’s theories of desire, the drives, and pleasure. I shall argue that their views on the subject are antagonistic to the point of opposition. On the issue of desire, we are presented with a choice: Freud or Nietzsche. Furthermore, I shall attempt to make explicit what is at stake in the confrontation of their views of