Sub-National Report for Western Sahara: Events, Forecasting and Analysis S

Sub-national Report for Western Sahara: Events, Forecasting and Analysis s

Sub-national Report for Western Sahara: Events, Forecasting and Analysis

FINAL REPORT

Report Prepared by: Liz St. Jean

With support from: David Carment Adam Fysh Stewart Prest

Copyright: not to be cited, duplicated or circulated without permission

Feedback is welcome, and may be sent to [email protected] http://www.carleton.ca/cifp

Events are accurate as of April 30, 2006

Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) Project, July 2006 The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University Sub-national Report for Western Sahara: Events, Forecasting and Analysis

PART A: OVERVIEW 3

1. NOTE 3 2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4 3. EVENT TRENDS SUMMARY 6 4. FORECASTING 8

PART B: DETAIL 9

5. PROFILE 9 6. STAKEHOLDERS 11 7. SUB-NATIONAL RISK INDICATORS 13 7.1. SUMMARY 13 7.2. RISK INDICATORS BY CLUSTER 14 8. EVENTS DATA: TRENDS AND ANALYSIS 18 8.1. SUMMARY 18 8.2. PRIMARY DRIVERS 19 8.3. SECONDARY DRIVERS 21

PART C: ANNEX 22

9. SUMMARY OF DATA 22 10. TREND LINE CHARTS 23 10.1. ALL EVENTS 23 10.2. STABILIZING EVENTS 24 10.3. DESTABILIZING EVENTS 25 11. MAPS 26 12. BIBLIOGRAPHY 27 12.1. EVENT SOURCES 27 12.2. BIBLIOGRAPHY 28 13. METHODOLOGY 32 13.1. DESCRIPTION OF EVENTS MONITORING 32 13.2. DESCRIPTION OF EVENTS DATA COLLECTION 34

Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) Project, July 2006 2 The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University Sub-national Report for Western Sahara: Events, Forecasting and Analysis

Part A: Overview

1. Note

About this Report decided to adopt some elements of GEOPOL to meet the needs of policy This sub-national report has been makers, the academic community and the produced by the Country Indicators for private sector. The CIFP project as it Foreign Policy (CIFP) for use by non- became known has since then operated governmental organizations, businesses, under the guidance of principal academics, Canadian policy-makers, and investigator David Carment of Carleton other parties concerned with the current University and has received funding from and future state of sub-national regions. DFAIT, IDRC and CIDA. The project This Events Monitoring Profile is based on represents an on-going effort to identify a fusion of CIFP Risk Assessment and and assemble statistical information Events Monitoring methodologies.1 conveying the key features of the political, economic, social and cultural About the Author environments of countries around the world. Liz St. Jean is a research analyst for CIFP. Her area of study is international conflict The cross-national data generated through management, with a focus on CIFP was intended to have a variety of humanitarian intervention. Her current applications in government departments, research examines the factors involved in NGOs, and by users in the private sector. decisions regarding the use of force in The data set provides at-a-glance global peace operations. She has studied overviews, issue-based perspectives and economics as well as international country performance measures. Currently, relations at the University of British the data set includes measures of Columbia. She spent a year working on an domestic armed conflict, governance and independent research project that political instability, militarisation, religious involved three months in Northern and ethnic diversity, demographic stress, Uganda, and a month in Rwanda. economic performance, human development, environmental stress, and About CIFP international linkages.

CIFP has its origins in a prototype The CIFP database currently includes geopolitical database developed by the statistical data in the above issue areas, in Canadian Department of National Defence the form of over one hundred in 1991. The prototype project called performance indicators for 196 countries, GEOPOL covered a wide range of political, spanning fifteen years (1985 to 2000) for economic, social, military, and most indicators. These indicators are environmental indicators through the drawn from a variety of open sources, medium of a rating system. In 1997, including the World Bank, the United under the guidance of Andre Ouellete, Nations Development Programme, the John Patterson, Tony Kellett and Paul United Nations High Commissioner for Sutherland, the Canadian Department of Refugees, the Stockholm International Foreign Affairs and International Trade Peace Research Institute, and the Minorities at Risk and POLITY IV data sets from the University of Maryland. 1 For information on the structural risk assessment, see Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (2001) Risk Assessment Template, Available: http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/docs/studra1101.pdf.

Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) Project, July 2006 3 The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University Sub-national Report for Western Sahara: Events, Forecasting and Analysis

2. Executive Summary

Profile the future of the territory continues to • Western Sahara is a disputed territory be the focus of all political events. that was the cause of a fifteen year war between Morocco and the Frente Baseline analysis Polisario, in support of the Sahrawi Arab • Western Sahara is a medium-risk region Democratic Republic (SADR). The with a score of 6.09. The main source of dispute is currently without violence, but risk for the Western Sahara region is has existed as a stalemate since a peace largely due to the ongoing political plan was brokered in 1991. stalemate between Morocco and the • The stalemate exists because the two SADR regarding control over Western sides have not yet been able to agree to Sahara, resulting in governance and a format for the referendum that the militarization problems. The region also plan calls for. This situation has led to has a development, and there tensions both sides issuing a multitude of between Moroccans and Saharawis. inflammatory statements as well as jockeying for support among the Event Trends international community. • Events were monitored between 10 • Morocco has been widely criticized due October 2005 and 30 April 2006. to the poor living conditions and human • The baseline analysis shows that the rights standards for Saharawis. underlying structure is destabilizing, but Conversely, Morocco denounces the the trend analysis concluded there is a Frente Polisario as a terrorist moderately positive trend, belying the organization. common belief that Western Sahara • The friction between Morocco and the exists in stalemate. The improving trend Saharawi people, particularly the Frente is mainly caused by a fall in the Polisario, has remained constant, and magnitude of destabilizing events.

Figure 1. Chart of trend lines for all events and the count of events by week

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Primary drivers of event trends Scenarios • Governance and Political Stability • Most likely case: the situation appears witnessed mass demonstrations to be a stalemate, but tensions and accompanied by brutal dispersions in the outright violence slowly lessen. first portion of the monitoring period. • Best case: The international community This, however, subsided towards the gives renewed attention to the conflict latter half and was accompanied by a just as Morocco, its neighbours and the rise in stabilizing events in the form of SADR engage in conciliatory gestures conciliatory statements and gestures by • Worst case: the political stalemate both Morocco and SADR; continues amidst inflammatory rhetoric, • International Linkages was balanced although the conflict does not ratchet up between a moderately positive trend violently. among destabilizing events and a moderately negative trend among Conclusion stabilizing events. This corresponds to • The moderate improvement in Western the events over the past six months: Sahara is subtle, owing to a lessening of typically destabilizing incidents between tensions rather than an intensification of internal and external Western Sahara confidence-building measures stakeholders accompanied by stabilizing • While the situation may appear to actions at the broader international remain as a ‘stalemate’, the situation is level. improving and could in fact be taken advantage of by the international community.

Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) Project, July 2006 5 The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University Sub-national Report for Western Sahara: Events, Forecasting and Analysis

3. Event Trends Summary

Overall

General Trend ƒ International Linkages is an area of concern as it is currently balanced ƒ There was a general fall in the between two moderate trends, one magnitude of destabilizing events. negative and one positive. This could ƒ The main source of the trend lies in be taken advantage of by reversing the Governance and Political Stability the negative trend among stabilizing and International Linkages clusters, as events. However, should the the majority of activity occurred moderately positive trend among around local and international political destabilizing events instead be stakeholders. reversed, it could damage the overall positive trend.

Primary Drivers

Primary drivers are those clusters that International Linkages contain more than twenty-five events. These clusters are the main areas of General Trend activity in the region, with the greatest contribution to the overall trend. ƒ General international encouragement of talks between SADR and Morocco ƒ MINURSO presence continues Governance and Political ƒ International criticism by human rights Instability groups levelled against Morocco’s record in Western Sahara General Trend ƒ Tensions over international oil companies drilling off-shore with a ƒ Protests and complaints against Moroccan license Morocco on human rights issues. ƒ Morocco extends some conciliatory measures towards Saharawi human rights groups ƒ Mass demonstrations across Western Sahara against Morocco ƒ Lessening of destabilizing rhetoric and mass protests

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Secondary Drivers

Secondary drivers are those clusters with Environmental Stress less than twenty-five monitored events. These clusters provide supplementary ƒ Torrential rains on two occasions with information to the overall analysis. highly negative repercussions for refugees and regional movement Armed Conflict Demographic Stress ƒ Tensions continue, although they do not result in any major confrontation ƒ Continuation of high growth rate and between SADR and Morocco high urban population, and youth bulge combined with lack of Militarization educational, economic or leisure opportunities for youth. ƒ Frente Polisario commits to reducing landmines in the region Human Development

Population Heterogeneity ƒ A number of donor pledges to assist Saharwis, but the low human ƒ Continuation of low risk, but development indicators persist. simmering tensions between the Saharawi people and Moroccan settlers Events are accurate as of April 30, 2006 Economic Performance

ƒ Despite some positive events, such as initiation of oil contracts, there is still an overall poor performance.

Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) Project, July 2006 7 The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University Sub-national Report for Western Sahara: Events, Forecasting and Analysis

4. Forecasting

Most Likely Case subside long enough for talks to begin. Although neither side is willing to concede, In the most likely case Western neither side walks away, and Morocco Sahara will experience moderate makes a conciliatory gesture by releasing improvement but it is unlikely to fall a number of political prisoners. There is a to a lower risk category. renewed effort to provide economic opportunities for Saharawi citizens, and Morocco continues to have stable (if poor) humanitarian assistance increases. relations with SADR, Frente Polisario, and Algeria. However, confidence-building Worst Case measures are taken under the auspices of international agencies, and there is no In the worst case, Western Sahara recurrence of an overtly destructive will deteriorate slightly, but it will relationship. Demonstrations continue, but remain in the medium-risk category. there are fewer incidents of police brutality. Morocco releases some human The stalemate between Morocco and rights activists, though more remain SADR and Frente Polisario continues, with jailed. International actors continue to both sides expressing inflammatory apply only small degrees of pressure on opinions, but neither side resorts to all out the parties, and pro-SADR actors continue violence, though it may be threatened. their weakly destabilizing statements. The cycle of demonstrations and violent Although agencies struggle, they obtain police response continues, contributing to the minimal amount necessary to aid the deteriorating relationship between the Saharawis. Violent incidences dwindle and Saharawi population and Moroccan the overall situation is marked by the authorities. Morocco increases the number absence of mass violence. of security personnel in the region, and hampers MINURSO’s ability to observe Best Case events. International attention continues to wane, and SADR grows increasingly In the best case, Western Sahara will anxious to gain international sympathy, experience moderate improvement pressuring allies to make supportive, but and will move towards a lower risk destabilizing, statements. The EU agrees score and category. to take up the Morocco fishing license, leading to demonstrations in Western Moroccan, SADR, and Frente Polisario Sahara, and the Frente Polisario issue officials dampen their inflammatory veiled threats against EU fishing boats. language, and Morocco achieves a Humanitarian assistance continues to rapprochement with Algeria. Renewed diminish, and there is a drought in the international attention, particularly from region, worsening the food security of the U.S. and EU pressures both sides to Saharawis. enter new talks, and demonstrations

Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) Project, July 2006 8 The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University Sub-national Report for Western Sahara: Events, Forecasting and Analysis

Part B: Detail

5. Profile

Western Sahara is a disputed territory in the UN dispatched a peacekeeping mission Northern Africa. Originally a Spanish (United Nations Mission for the colony, it was promised self-determination Referendum in Western Sahara or in 1966, but this did not materialize. MINURSO) to monitor the referendum. Consequently, the paramilitary group However, the referendum did not Frente Polisario formed in 1973 in an transpire due to contention between attempt to gain independence by force. Morocco and Saharawi officials over voter Following two years of conflict with the registration lists. Morocco has pushed for Frente Polisario, Spain withdrew in 1975; voter lists that include Moroccan citizens however, Moroccan King Hassan II led who reside in Western Sahara, and what became known as the “Green Saharawis have resisted the inclusion of March”, where he brought 350,000 the settlers. This political stalemate has Moroccan citizens to resettle in Western led to both sides issuing a multitude of Sahara, claiming the territory as a inflammatory statements as well as legitimate part of Morocco. A few months jockeying for support among the later, Moroccan troops joined the settlers. international community. The SADR, Mauritania also laid claim to a portion of considered the political arm of Frente Western Sahara, and despite a ruling by Polisario, runs Western Sahara and enjoys the International Court of Justice that strong support from the Saharawi supported self-rule for Western Sahara, in Diaspora, particularly within Italy and 1976 the Madrid Accords were signed by Spain. In 1984 SADR became a member Spain, Morocco, and Mauritania, which of the OAU, now the African Union (AU), divided Western Sahara between Morocco and the UN has consistently supported and Mauritania. The Frente Polisario SADR’s request for a referendum, responded violently, claiming they were although it does not officially recognize it fighting on behalf of an independent as a state. SADR has also increasingly Western Sahara state, the Sahrawi Arab found support from states outside of Democratic Republic (SADR). A civil war Africa, and is recognized as a legitimate ensued, causing Mauritania to withdraw in state by approximately forty countries. 1979. Moroccan forces continued to clash Morocco has tense relations with the AU, with the Frente Polisario, who successfully as it withdrew in 1984 over the AU’s engaged in guerrilla warfare tactics, inclusion of SADR, and the relationship causing Morocco to consolidate its power between Morocco and Algeria is within the ‘useful triangle’, an area that particularly strained, due to Algeria’s includes major towns and phosphate support for the Frente Polisario. Beyond deposits. Fighting continued until 1989 Africa, Morocco enjoys general, if when the two sides fell into an informal subdued, support from the US, France, UK ceasefire, and the United Nations (UN), and Spain, none of which wish to see with the assistance of the Organization of Morocco engage in another civil war to African Unity (OAU), was able to broker a gain Western Sahara. Morocco has also peace plan, which came into force in been a key African ally to the U.S. ‘war on 1991. terror’ and has thus gained political capital among U.S. decision makers. The UN peace plan called for a formal ceasefire, a prisoner exchange, and an Morocco has been widely criticized due to independence referendum among Western the poor living conditions and human Saharans. The target date of the rights standards for Saharawis. The referendum was set for 1992, and in 1991 Western Sahara conflict has produced a

Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) Project, July 2006 9 The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University Sub-national Report for Western Sahara: Events, Forecasting and Analysis large number of refugees who reside in Algeria, and Morocco restricts resettlement to those Saharawis who do not have a nationalistic background and formally agree that Western Sahara should be part of Morocco.2 Morocco also attempts to control Western Sahara through military occupation, repression of demonstrations, detention of activists and movement restrictions. Morocco has justified this activity by arguing that the Frente Polisario is a terrorist organization, which SADR vehemently denies. In general, the friction between Morocco and the Saharawi people, particularly the Frente Polisario, has remained constant, and the future of the territory continues to be the focus of all political events.3

2 Minorities at Risk (2004) Assessment for Saharawis in Morocco http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/assessment.a sp?groupId=60003 2. 3 For a more detailed background, see especially Minorities at Risk (2004); Freedom House (2005) Country Report: Western Sahara http://www.freedomhouse.org/inc/content/pubs/fiw/ inc_country_detail.cfm?country=6886&pf; United Nations Department of Peacekeeping (2005) Western Sahara – MINURSO – Background http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/minurso/ba ckground.html. Hereafter referred to as UNDPKO; Uppsala Peace and Conflict Data Project (2005) Conflict Summary http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/conflictSummary.ph p?bcID=67; and Middle East Report Online (2004) Stubborn Stalemate in Western Sahara http://www.merip.org/mero/mero062604.html.

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6. Stakeholders

There are eight main stakeholders that activities against Saharawis and its stance are affected by changes in the Western on the referendum. It is difficult for the Sahara political environment. Each international community to be neutral, stakeholder is composed of a variety of and statements that support – or at least actors that have their own grievances and seem to support – one side over the other interests. The four internal stakeholders have a destabilizing effect. There is also include the SADR leadership, the an emerging friction due to SADR’s Moroccan government, the Frente opposition to the EUs agreement with Polisario, and the Saharawi people. In Morocco that allows the EU to fish off addition, there are four external Western Saharan shores. Diaspora, stakeholder groups: international missions refugees and other sympathetic groups and agencies that are working within have also worked to raise international Western Sahara, Diaspora, refugees and awareness of the situation in Western other sympathetic groups, regional actors Sahara. Their efforts have so far largely such as Spain and the AU, and been ignored by Moroccan officials, but international agencies that have a political also contribute to the tense relationship stake in Western Sahara. between Morocco and SADR. International agencies with field operations have The main source of tension exists between attempted to provide humanitarian aid the Moroccan government and the SADR, and/or monitor the security situation. the Frente Polisario and the Saharawi However, MINURSO has a small number people, although Morocco also has tense of personnel, and there is little funding for relations with neighbouring Algeria. The development and humanitarian assistance SADR-Moroccan hostility is reinforced by due to a lack of international attention. each side seeking international backing for Overall, despite the ongoing ceasefire, its position regarding the referendum. tensions are simmering; inflammatory SADR constantly strives to achieve new comments have become commonplace, and strengthened recognition from states but they could also provide a source for a in the international system, and Morocco trigger event causing a resumption of works to find support for its stringent active hostilities.

Table 1. Internal Stakeholders 1. SADR leadership - President Mohamed Abdelaziz - Prime Minister Abdelkader - Working to achieve independence Taleb Oumar from Morocco - Saharawi Coordinator with the United Nations – Mr. Khadad 2. Moroccan - King Mohamed VI - Working to keep Western Sahara Government within Morocco, likely due to the large phosphate deposit4 - Not as focused on Western Sahara as King Hassan II - Royal Armed Forces - Known to forcibly disperse - Moroccan police demonstrations - Allegedly arrest, beat and torture civilians, particularly human rights

4 Uppsala Peace and Conflict Data Project 1.

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activists 3. Frente Polisario - Paramilitary group in - Working to achieve independence (Frente Popular Para Western Sahara, Saharawi from Morocco la Liberación de refugee camps in Algeria - Previously used violent methods to Sakiet el Hamra y Rio target Moroccan security forces de Oro or Polisario Front) 4. Saharawi People - Ethnic group in SADR - Majority strongly in favour of independence from Morocco

Table 2. External Stakeholders 5. International - MINURSO: UN Mission for the - Has monitored the situation in missions, agencies Referendum in Western Western Sahara since 1991 (field level) Sahara; currently includes 227 personnel - Aid agencies such as UN High - Provide humanitarian aid for Commissioner for Refugees, Saharawi population, refugees World Food Program 6. Diaspora, refugees - Algerian National Committee and other of solidarity with the - Active in their support for SADR, sympathetic groups Saharawi people (CNASPS) often staging demonstrations - Diaspora, particularly within outside of Moroccan embassies Spain and Italy - Saharawi refugees, largely - Estimated 165, 000 refugees5 located in refugee camps in - Desire to return, largely Algeria supportive of an independent Western Sahara 7. Regional actors - Spain - Prime Minister José - Implicit support for Morocco Luis Rodríguez Zapatero - Algeria (President Bouteflika) - Actively supports Polisario Front - African Union - SADR represented in AU - Tense relations with Morocco 8. International - United Nations (Peter van - Pressure on Morocco to allow agencies (political Walsumis, personal envoy independence level) of the Secretary General) - European Union - Has pursued a fishing agreement with Morocco; SADR wants the agreement revoked

5 War on Want.

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7. Sub-National Risk Indicators

7.1. Summary

Medium risk (6.09)

According to CIFP risk analysis, Western demonstrations, and Morocco and the Sahara is a medium risk region with an Frente Polisario both claim that the other assessment of 6.09.6 This analysis is is in violation of the peace agreement. based on an assessment of nine clusters that affect a country’s risk for future The second cluster that is worrisome is conflict: History of Armed Conflict, Governance and Political Stability. The Governance and Political Instability, cluster has a high risk rating overall, Militarization, Population Heterogeneity, which is due to the widespread human Economic Performance, International rights abuses, restricted freedoms, Linkages, Environment, Demographic inability to resolve the territorial dispute, Stress, and Human Development.7 and widespread discontent with Moroccan control of the territory. Militarization The following sections look at the risk likewise scores a high risk rating, due to assessment for each cluster, including the large amount of military spending by stabilizing factors, destabilizing factors Morocco and the high degree of military and potential spoilers for each cluster tensions between Morocco and Frente area. The analysis finds that each area Polisario. poses some measure of problem to the region, though the main areas of concern International Linkages is a final source of for Western Sahara are History of Armed risk, due to the fact that both parties Conflict, Governance and Political continually seek support from Instability, Militarization and International international actors. The result has been Linkages. tension between Morocco and Algeria in particular, but also the broader AU. The History of Armed Conflict is an area of international community has thus far been concern for Western Sahara because of unable to come to any consensus over the the destabilizing role that the Morocco- best approach to resolving the conflict, Frente Polisario conflict had upon the and some actors are hesitant to apply too region. There are still large numbers of much pressure on Morocco, especially Saharawi refugees living in camps in since it has become an ally in the ‘war on Algeria, the territory is divided between terror’. Although grassroots solidarity Morocco and Frente Polisario control, and movements may eventually prove the ongoing tensions between the parties stabilizing by pressuring Morocco towards has led to mass demonstrations, which is a more conciliatory approach, in the labelled as an intifadah against Morocco. meantime they are a destabilizing force in Security forces frequently use violent terms of the friction between the internal measures to put down the Saharan stakeholders.

Overall, these structural indicators point 6 This is based on a thirteen point scale and by to a region fraught with tensions and comparing available data to the risk assessment of destabilizing factors. The single strongest Morocco, which is 5.11. For Morocco’s risk assessment, see Country Indicators for Foreign stabilizing factor, the fact that the Policy (2006) Conflict risk assessment report, ceasefire has generally been maintained forthcoming. since 1991, could be reversed given the 7 For more information about the clusters and their right combination of destabilizing events. application to risk analysis see Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (2001) Risk Assessment Template

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7.2. Risk indicators by cluster controlled by SADR; regions are divided by Moroccan built walls, or ‘berms’16 7.2.1. History of Armed Conflict - Both sides claim the other violates the 17 military agreement Potential spoilers Medium risk (3.60) - Frente Polisario returns to violent methods to achieve independence Stabilizing Factors - Surge in violent police and military - Implementation of confidence building repression of demonstrations 8 measures - Visitation program between families in 7.2.2. Governance and Political Western Sahara and refugee camps Instability - Frente Polisario releases prisoners of war9 - General maintenance of ceasefire10 High risk (7.15)

Stabilizing Factors Destabilizing Factors - Some conciliatory gestures by King - The civil war resulted in a number of Mohamed18 problematic issues between Morocco and - Has allowed limited activity by Saharawis, including refugees and Saharawi human rights groups prisoners of war11 - Formed Equity and Reconciliation - Intifada characterized by mass Commission to resolve the question of demonstrations against Morocco begin in the hundreds of “disappeared” May 200512 Saharawis - Moroccan police and/or military - Has pardoned some political prisoners frequently respond to anti-Moroccan - King Mohamed beginning to place demonstrations with overwhelming negotiations within a political context force and arrests13 instead of security19 - Prisoners have staged hunger strikes14

- Morocco has worked to resettle Moroccan Destabilizing Factors citizens in Western Sahara and - Inability to resolve territorial status, Saharawis in Morocco15 disagreements over voter registration - Western Sahara is divided into regions lists for the referendum20 controlled by Morocco and those - Morocco viewed as rebuffing attempts to hold referendum21

8 Freedom House 1. 9 War on Want. 10 UNDPKO 2. 16 International Campaign to Ban Landmines (2003) 11 Frente Polisario claims that Morocco holds 150 Western Sahara Landmine Report. Available: prisoners, although Morocco denies having any http://www.icbl.org/lm/2003/western_sahara.html Saharawi combatants. Freedom House 1-2. (Accessed 12 May 2006) 1. (Hereafter referred to as 12 Amnesty International. (2005) Morocco and ICBL) Western Sahara. Available: 17 Note that this complaint is doubly listed under the http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/morocco_and Militarization cluster. United Nations Secretary _western_sahara/document.do?id=ar&yr=2005 General (2005) Report of the Secretary-General on (Accessed 8 May 2006). the situation concerning Western Sahara. 1 and The Economist. (22 Sept 2005) Give it Another S/2005/254, 2. Hereafter referred to as UNSG Try. Available: (2005). http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_i 18 Freedom House, 1-3 and Amnesty International 1. d=4432949 (Accessed 10 May 2006). 1. 19 Economist Intelligence Unit. (2006) Country 13 Freedom House 2 and Amnesty International 1. Report Morocco. np. 14 War on Want. 20 UNDPKO 2. 15 Freedom House 1. 21 War on Want.

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- Wide variety of Saharawian grievances, - Tensions between Morocco and Frente largely due to Morocco’s repressive Polisario, each side claims the other has measures, including22 violated the military agreement32 - Intimidation of Saharawi people - Landmine problem33 - Illegal movement - Occasional landmine victim - Demonstrations repressed, often - Moroccan and Polisario forces have violently used landmines extensively in the past - Military occupation - Frente Polisario denies current use and - Occasional use of air power accuses Morocco of deploying landmines - Banning of the SADR flag23 - Highly restricted freedom of expression, Potential spoilers association and assembly; frequent - Frente Polisario increases its military politically motivated arrests by Moroccan capability authorities24 - Morocco pours a multitude of soldiers - Reports that human rights activists are into the region targeted for beatings, arrest and 25 torture by Moroccan security forces 7.2.4. Population Heterogeneity - Reports of Polisario restrictions in and 26 near Algerian Tindouf refugee camps Low risk (2.67) - Morocco controls local elections; only those with pro-Moroccan views are Stabilizing Factors 27 elected - Low ethnic diversity34 28 - Frequent anti-Moroccan demonstrations 29 - Trial of demonstrators viewed as unfair Destabilizing Factors - Tensions between Saharawis and Potential spoilers Moroccan settlers35 - Moroccan refusal to accept a pro- independence referendum result Potential spoilers - Upsurge in hostility between Saharawi 7.2.3. Militarization and Moroccan citizens

High risk (8.74) 7.2.5. Economic Performance

Stabilizing Factors High risk (6.56) - Both sides have agreed to cooperate with

MINURSO on landmine problem30 Stabilizing Factors

- Large phosphate deposits, rich fishing Destabilizing Factors 36 areas, offshore oil deposits - High degree of spending on military31 - Subsidies, development assistance from Morocco37

22 List taken from Minorities at Risk (2004) 1. Destabilizing Factors 23 War on Want. 24 Freedom House 2. 25 Amnesty International 1. 32 Note that this complaint is doubly listed under the 26 United States Department of State. (2005) History of Armed Conflict cluster. UNSG (2005). Western Sahara Human Rights Report. Available: 33 ICBL 1-3. http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61702.ht 34 Minorities at Risk (2004) 1. m (Accessed 12 May 2006).3. 35 United Nations Secretary General (2006) 2. 27 Freedom House 2. 36 Central Intelligence Agency. (2006) World 28 Freedom House 2. Factbook: Western Sahara. Available: 29 U.S. Department of State (2005) 2. http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/w 30 ICBL 1. i.html (Accessed 10 May 2006). 31 Terry Bell and John J. Gazo (2006) Conflict risk 37 Economist Intelligence Unit and U.S. Department assessment report. of State (2005) 1.

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- Poor labour laws and lack of activity38 Africa in 2004, causing a flare in tensions - Poor economic conditions (lower than between Morocco and Algeria47 Morocco’s); economic activities regulated - Growing international campaign of by Morocco; dispute over Morocco’s solidarity, especially within Europe48 signed agreements over international oil - Increasing international criticism over exploration off Saharan shores39 Morocco’s human rights record49 - Refugees in Algeria rely entirely on - Low international interest in the conflict50 humanitarian assistance40 Potential spoilers Potential spoilers - Rapid, heavy-handed and/or clumsy - Economic crisis attempts by international actors to pressure one or both sides to submit to 7.2.6. International Linkages the other’s demands

Medium risk (6.24) 7.2.7. Environmental Stress

Stabilizing Factors High risk (7.00) - Continuance of MINURSO mandate - Morocco and Frente Polisario agree to UNHCR and MINURSO package of Stabilizing Factors confidence building measures41 - Lack of ongoing environmental crises - U.S. may be prepared to intervene diplomatically to resolve the issue42 Destabilizing Factors - Lack of arable land combined with water Destabilizing Factors scarcity; not party to any environmental - Resignation of UN Special Envoy Baker in agreement51 2004 due to inability to broker peace43 - Secretary General Kofi Annan regularly Potential spoilers expresses concern about the region44 - Natural disaster, drought - UN General Assembly special committee 45 unable to agree over “Baker Plan II” 7.2.8. Demographic Stress - Journalists activists have been expelled 46 for meeting Saharawi activists Medium risk (6.33) - Further international recognition of SADR

as a legitimate state, including South Stabilizing Factors - Low population density52

Destabilizing Factors 53 38 Freedom House 3. - High population growth rate (2.9%) 39 Central Intelligence Agency. (2006). 40 United Nations Development Fund for Women Potential spoilers (UNIFEM). Western Sahara. http://www.womenwarpeace.org/western_s/western - Population explosion, including a surge in _sahara.htm 2. Hereafter UNIFEM. the youth bulge 41 Freedom House 2. See History of Armed Conflict for details. 42 Economist Intelligence Unit. 47 Amnesty International 1. 43 Freedom House 1. 48 War on Want. 44 Freedom House 2. 49 See for instance Amnesty International. 45 The Baker Plan would have made Western Sahara 50 Economist Intelligence Unit. a semi-autonomous region within Morocco for a “four 51 Central Intelligence Agency. (2006). or five year transition period. After that, a 52 Population and Development Database (2006) referendum would let residents choose Western Sahara. independence, continued semiautonomy, or http://www.alsagerschool.co.uk/subjects/sub_conten integration with Morocco.” Freedom House 2. t/GEOgraphy/Gpop/HTMLENH/COUNTRY/eh.htm 46 Freedom House 2. 53 Population and Development Database.

Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) Project, July 2006 16 The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University Sub-national Report for Western Sahara: Events, Forecasting and Analysis

7.2.9. Human Development

High risk (7.66)

Stabilizing Factors - Initiation of women’s peace building activities54

Destabilizing Factors - Poor human development indicators, such as birth rate of 47 per thousand55 - High gender inequality56 - Limited access to medical facilities57 - Refugees live in conditions characterized by poor health and sanitation, food insecurity and family separation58

Potential spoilers - Major problems with service provision

54 UNIFEM 3. 55 Population and Development Database. 56 Freedom House 3. 57 ICBL 2. 58 UNIFEM 2.

Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) Project, July 2006 17 The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University Sub-national Report for Western Sahara: Events, Forecasting and Analysis

8. Events Data: Trends and Analysis

8.1. Summary

Table 3. Overall statistics Governance and Political Instability was a Total Average Average score key source of destabilizing events for number of event as a percent of Western Sahara, owing to the ongoing events score total possible (9) tensions between Morocco and the SADR, All 400 -1.8 -20% Frente Polisario and general Saharawi Stabilizing 102 3.6 40% population. It thus demonstrated a Destabilizing 298 -3.6 -40% negative overall average score. The

trends, however, were moderately Table 4. Overall event trends Stabilizing Destabilizing positive, pointing towards an improving All events events events situation. Moderately Status Quo Moderately positive positive International Linkages possessed the Weekly largest number of events. It too displayed aggregate the relatively negative average event score, but the trend rested at a status quo level. This occurred because despite the Between 7 October 2005 and 3 May 2006, worsening relations in the region and 400 events were recorded for the Western between Morocco and human rights Sahara region. The overall statistics from groups, there was an offsetting positive this period confirm that Western Sahara trend at the broader international level. remains a risky region, as the average is a substantial -1.8 (-20%). This shows that Overall, it would appear that Western on average events tend to be destabilizing Sahara continues to be a destabilized and at a moderate level. Yet despite this region with a moderately positive trend. highly negative environment, the same Because this trend is caused by a events indicate overall improvement; the decrease in destabilizing events, it may trend shows that there has been some appear to exist in stalemate. However, an reduction in the potential for the outbreak increase in the number or magnitude of of conflict and possible movement towards stabilizing events with a further decrease an environment conducive to peace- in the number and magnitude of building efforts. destabilizing events could possibly lead to an improved situation. With proper The primary drivers of events in Western support, the international community Sahara are within the Governance and could assist Western Sahara achieve such Political Stability and International a situation. Linkages clusters. Events are accurate as of April 30, 2006

Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) Project, July 2006 18 The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University Sub-national Report for Western Sahara: Events, Forecasting and Analysis

8.2. Primary Drivers Primary drivers are those clusters that contain more than twenty-five events. These clusters are the main areas of activity in the region, with the greatest contribution to the overall trend.

8.2.1. Governance and Political - Body for Equity and Reconciliation find burial Instability locations of some disappeared Saharawis - Mass independence demonstrations across Western Sahara Table 5. Governance and Political Instability - Accusations against Morocco for taking illegal statistics immigrants and leaving them in the Western Total number Average Average score Sahara desert of events score % of possible 9 - Political prisoners stage hunger strikes All 176 -3 -29% - Frente Polisario and SADR both reject Stabilizing 24 3.7 41% Moroccan offer of autonomy Destabilizing 152 -3.8 -40% - Saharawi property damaged - Widespread arrests, particularly of human Table 6. Governance and Political rights activists and in response to Instability event trends demonstrations Stabilizing Destabilizing - Complaints over judicial treatment of All events events events Saharawis arrested during demonstrations Moderately Moderately Moderately - Morocco prevents Saharawi from entering Saharan town Weekly positive positive positive - Saharawis lose jobs aggregate - King Mohamed visits Western Sahara, stirring tensions and discontent - Morocco and SADR continue to voice their Events in Western Sahara continue to opposing views of the future status of demonstrate that the region has quite a Western Sahara risky political environment, as the average - Frente Polisario rejects UN calls for negotiating with Morocco conflict indicator statistics demonstrate. However, the events also show that despite the overall problems, the situation 8.2.2. International Linkages has weakly-to-moderately improved over the past six months. This is largely due to Table 7. International Linkages statistics a fall in the number and magnitude of Total number Average Average score destabilizing events; demonstrations were of events score % of possible 9 initially widespread, but over the past few All 180 -1.2 -13% months have tended to decrease in Stabilizing 58 3.4 38% numbers. If stabilizing events were to rise Destabilizing 122 -3.4 -37% as well, this cluster would likely see significant improvement. Table 8. International Linkages event trends Stabilizing Destabilizing Overview of Stabilizing Events All events - Body for Equity and Reconciliation find burial events events locations of some disappeared Saharawis Status Quo Moderately Moderately - Some action against police officers accused of Weekly negative positive

killing a Saharawi aggregate - Release of human rights activist Aminetou Haidar - Morocco offers conciliatory measure to end one hunger strike The relatively average strong negative - Peaceful commemoration of SADR’s 30th value for events in International Linkages anniversary demonstrates the cluster’s poor - King Mohammed offers discussion performance in Western Sahara. According to the trend statistics, however, Overview of Destabilizing Events

Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) Project, July 2006 19 The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University Sub-national Report for Western Sahara: Events, Forecasting and Analysis the situation sits at the status quo, balanced between a moderately positive - Multiple international states, parliaments, trend among destabilizing events and a NGOs express solidarity with SADR moderately negative trend among - Accusations between Morocco and Algeria as to who left the migrants in the Western stabilizing events. This corresponds to the Sahara desert events over the past six months; they - International criticism of Morocco’s human were largely indicative of the typically rights record, treatment of Saharawis destabilizing incidents that occur between - International demonstrations internal and external stakeholders - Frente Polisario pushes for more accompanied by stabilizing actions at the international denunciations of Morocco’s broader international level. actions - Frente Polisario threatens oil company that Overview of Stabilizing Events received licences from Morocco - UN GA expresses need to resolve Western - Morocco pushes for international community, Sahara issue Algeria to support Western Sahara within - Regional actors claim need to find solution to Morocco the dispute - Calls Baker Plan “dead” - MINURSO mandate continues - Diplomats, journalists denied access to - Some attempts to improve relations between Saharawi towns Morocco and Algeria - SADR, Frente Polisario requests the UN - International observers allowed at Saharawi expand MINURSO’s mandate to include trial protection of civilians, intervention - Kofi Annan encourages talks between the two - Emerging split in AU over Western Sahara parties - Sudan supports Morocco’s sovereignty - Controversial oil firm withdraws its Morocco- - Disagreement among EU members regarding authorized bid the fishing agreement with Morocco - Frente Polisario rejects Kofi Annan’s proposal Overview of Destabilizing Events on restarting the peace process

Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) Project, July 2006 20 The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University Sub-national Report for Western Sahara: Events, Forecasting and Analysis

8.3. Secondary Drivers Secondary drivers are those clusters with less than twenty-five monitored events. These clusters provide supplementary information to the overall analysis.

8.3.1. Armed Conflict 8.3.4. Population Heterogeneity

The Armed Conflict cluster exhibited a Population heterogeneity continues to be a highly negative overall average, cluster of low importance to the structural consistent with the tensions that exist risk factor. This is indicative of the high between Morocco and the Saharawis. degree of cohesiveness among There were only a handful of events, Saharawins. It also shows that although however, so unless renewed conflict there may be tensions between Saharawis breaks out, this cluster is more likely to and Moroccans in Western Sahara, this provide trigger events rather than become tension has not yet caused destabilizing a future source of major destabilization. events. However, this area should continue to be monitored, given that the 8.3.2. Economic Performance tensions do exist.

Economic Performance in Western Sahara 8.3.5. Environmental Stress tended to experience stabilizing events. This was due to the SADR’s initiation of oil On average, this cluster demonstrated a licensing negotiations with international somewhat high magnitude of destabilizing firms, which is likely to bring about events. This was caused by the two increased economic activity in the region. incidents of torrential rains that had Yet the region continues to demonstrate negative repercussions for refugees and overall poor performance, as per the movement in the region. structural assessment, and so this cluster is unlikely to be a contributor to any 8.3.6. Demographic Stress major improvement in the Western Sahara. It could, however, produce a Demographic stress continues to be a trigger event through growing popular significant structural risk factor due to the dissatisfaction with the economic continued problems of a high growth rate conditions. in conjunction with a lack of educational, economic or leisure opportunities for 8.3.3. Militarization youth.

The Militarization events possessed highly 8.3.7. Human Development positive values, and so it appears as though an increase in events in this Human development events were cluster could offer Western Sahara some generally positive and relatively high, due stabilization. These events come in the to the fact that reported events included a form of Frente Polisario’s increased work number of donor pledges and arrival of to reduce the number of landmines in humanitarian aid deliveries. Western Sahara.

Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) Project, July 2006 21 The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University Sub-national Report for Western Sahara: Events, Forecasting and Analysis

Part C: Annex

9. Summary of Data

Table 9. Overall data All events Stabilizing events Destabilizing events Risk indicator Trend Avg. Trend Avg. Trend Avg. Medium risk (6.09) .4 -1.9 .06 3.6 .35 -3.8

Table 10. Data for primary drivers All events Stabilizing events Destabilizing events Cluster Risk indicator Trend Avg. Trend Avg. Trend Avg. Governance and Political High risk (7.15) .30 -2.8 .12 3.7 .23 -3.8 Instability International Linkages Medium risk (6.24) .08 -1.2 -.11 3.4 .16 -3.4

Table 11. Data for Secondary Drivers Cluster Risk indicator Armed Conflict Medium risk (3.60) Economic Performance High risk (6.56)

Militarization High risk (8.74) Population Heterogeneity Low risk (2.67) Environmental Stress High risk (7.00)

Demographic Stress Medium risk (6.33)

Human Development High risk (7.66)

Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) Project, July 2006 22 The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University Sub-national Report for Western Sahara: Events, Forecasting and Analysis

10. Trend Line Charts

10.1. All events

Figure 2. Chart of trend lines for all events and the count of events by week

Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) Project, July 2006 23 The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University Sub-national Report for Western Sahara: Events, Forecasting and Analysis

10.2. Stabilizing events

Figure 3. Chart of trend lines for stabilizing events and the count of events by week

Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) Project, July 2006 24 The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University Sub-national Report for Western Sahara: Events, Forecasting and Analysis

10.3. Destabilizing events

Figure 4. Chart of trend lines for destabilizing events and the count of events by week

Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) Project, July 2006 25 The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University Sub-national Report for Western Sahara: Events, Forecasting and Analysis

11. Maps

Figure 5. Map of Western Sahara from United Nations Organization for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance

Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) Project, July 2006 26 The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University Sub-national Report for Western Sahara: Events, Forecasting and Analysis

12. Bibliography

12.1. Event Sources

Events were obtained using Google Alerts (http://www.google.com/alerts), which provided a daily summary of news reports for the search term ‘Western Sahara. The news reports originated from a wide variety of local and international sources, including:

ƒ ABC News ƒ NewKerala.com - Ernakulam, Kerala, ƒ African News Dimension - India Johannesburg ƒ News24 ƒ Afrol News - Oslo, Norway ƒ Noticias - Spain ƒ Agenzia Giornalistica Italia ƒ Oil & Gas ƒ AKI - Rome ƒ Oilonline ƒ Al Jazeera ƒ OilVoice ƒ AllAfrica.com ƒ Opendemocracy ƒ Amnesty International ƒ People's Daily Online ƒ ArmyTimes.com ƒ Prague daily monitor ƒ BBC monitoring ƒ Pravda ƒ China Post ƒ Press Gazette - UK ƒ Cleveland Plain Dealer - Cleveland, OH, ƒ Radio Free Europe USA ƒ Reliefweb ƒ CNN.com ƒ Reporters without borders ƒ Committee to Protect Journalists ƒ Reuters ƒ CRI - Beijing, China ƒ Sahara Press Service ƒ Czech news agency ƒ Scotsman UK ƒ Daily Star, Lebanon - Google alert ƒ Seattle Post Intelligencer ƒ EiTB - Spain ƒ Spain Herald ƒ Expatica - Netherlands ƒ Special Broadcasting Service - ƒ Financial times Australia ƒ FishUpdate.com ƒ Stuff.co.nz - New Zealand ƒ Forbes ƒ Swissinfo ƒ Gulf Times - Qatar ƒ Telecom Paper ƒ Hinesberg Journal ƒ Thanh Nien Daily ƒ Institute for War and Peace Reporting - ƒ Town Hall-Washington London ƒ Turkish Press ƒ International Herald Tribune ƒ UN News Centre ƒ Islamic Republic News Agency - Tehran ƒ United Press International ƒ ISN ƒ Voice of America ƒ Middle East Online ƒ War on Want - London ƒ Morocco Times ƒ Washington File ƒ NBC ƒ Washington Post ƒ New York Times ƒ Western Sahara weekly news - allafrica ƒ World Peace Herald - Washington ƒ Xinhua

Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) Project, July 2006 27 The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University Sub-national Report for Western Sahara: Events, Forecasting and Analysis

12.2. Bibliography

Government websites

Kingdom of Morocco. See: http://www.mincom.gov.ma/english/e_page.html

Statistics

Central Intelligence Agency factbook. See: https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/wi.html

Deforestation Rates in Western Sahara. See: http://rainforests.mongabay.com/stats/Western_Sahara.htm

Morocco Direction de la statistique. See: http://www.statistic-hcp.ma/

Population and Development Database (2006) Western Sahara. See: http://www.alsagerschool.co.uk/subjects/sub_content/GEOgraphy/Gpop/HTMLENH/CO UNTRY/eh.htm

United Nations Children’s Fund. See: http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/morocco_statistics.html

United Nations Statistics. See: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/databases.htm

World Bank. See: http://devdata.worldbank.org/external/CPProfile.asp?PTYPE=CP&CCODE=MAR

References and other sources

Amnesty International. (2005) Morocco and Western Sahara. Available: http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/morocco_and_western_sahara/document.do?id =ar&yr=2005 (Accessed 8 May 2006).

British Broadcasting Corporation. (2006). Regions and territories: Western Sahara. Available: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/country_profiles/3466917.stm (Accessed 10 May 2006).

Central Intelligence Agency. (2006) World Factbook: Western Sahara. Available: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/wi.html (Accessed 10 May 2006).

Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (2001) Risk Assessment Template. Available: http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/docs/studra1101.pdf (Accessed 13 May 2006).

--. (2006) Sub-national Report for The State Union of Serbia and Montenegro: Events Scenarios and Analysis. Forthcoming.

Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) Project, July 2006 28 The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University Sub-national Report for Western Sahara: Events, Forecasting and Analysis

--. (2006) Conflict Risk Assessment Report. Forthcoming.

Economist. (22 Sept 2005) Give it Another Try. Available: http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=4432949 (Accessed 10 May 2006).

Economist Intelligence Unit. (2006) Country Report Morocco.

European Union. Morocco. See: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/morocco/intro/index.htm

Food and Agriculture Organization. See: http://www.fao.org/countryprofiles/index.asp?lang=en&ISO3=MAR

Freedom House (2005) Freedom in the World: Western Sahara. Available: http://www.freedomhouse.org/inc/content/pubs/fiw/inc_country_detail.cfm?country= 6886&pf (Accessed 12 May 2006).

Global Policy Forum. See: http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/wsahara/wsindex.htm

Human Rights Watch. See: http://hrw.org/doc?t=mideast&c=morocc

International Campaign to Ban Landmines (2003) Western Sahara Landmine Report. Available: http://www.icbl.org/lm/2003/western_sahara.html (Accessed 12 May 2006)

International Crisis Group. Recent Reports: Western Sahara. Available: http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1272&l=1 (Accessed 8 May 2006)

--. (2005) Western Sahara Conflict History. Available: http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=conflict_search&l=1&t=1&c_count ry=116 (Accessed 8 May 2006).

International Committee of the Red Cross: Morocco. See http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/morocco?OpenDocument

KOSIMO conflict barometer. See http://www.hiik.de/en/ConflictBarometer_2004.pdf

National Democratic Institute. See http://www.ndi.org/worldwide/mena/morocco/morocco.asp

Middle East Report Online (2004) Stubborn Stalemate in Western Sahara. Available: http://www.merip.org/mero/mero062604.html (Accessed 10 May 2006).

Minorities at Risk. See: http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/

--. (2004) Assessment for Saharawis in Morocco. Available: http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=60003 (Accessed 11 May 2006).

Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) Project, July 2006 29 The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University Sub-national Report for Western Sahara: Events, Forecasting and Analysis

Polity IV (2003) Morocco report See: http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/Mor1.htmCIFP

Population and Development Database (2006) Western Sahara. See: http://www.alsagerschool.co.uk/subjects/sub_content/GEOgraphy/Gpop/HTMLENH/CO UNTRY/eh.htm

Terrorism Knowledge Base (2006) Group Profile: Polisario Front. See: http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=4205 (Accessed 11 May 2006).

Transparency International. (2005). Corruption perceptions index. Available: http://www.transparency.org/policy_and_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2005 (Accessed 11 May 2006).

United Nations Children’s Fund. Morocco. http://unicef.org/infobycountry/morocco.html

United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM). Western Sahara. See: http://www.womenwarpeace.org/western_s/western_sahara.htm

United Nations Development Group (UNDG). (2001) Common Country Assessment. Available: http://www.undg.org/access-file.cfm?cat=162&doc=5462&file=6977 (Accessed 13 May 2006).

United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Morocco Factsheet. See: http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_MAR.html

--. Country page. See: http://www.pnud.org.ma/

United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR). See: http://www.unhcr.org/cgi- bin/texis/vtx/country?iso=mar

--. (2004) Global Report 2004. See: http://www.unhcr.org/cgi- bin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.pdf?id=42ad4dab25&tbl=PUBL (Accessed 13 May 2006).

--. (2006) Global Appeal 2006. See: http://www.unhcr.org/cgi- bin/texis/vtx/publ/opendoc.pdf?tbl=PUBL&id=4371d19711 (Accessed 13 May 2006).

--. (2003) Statistical Yearbook. See: http://www.unhcr.org/cgi- bin/texis/vtx/statistics/opendoc.pdf?tbl=STATISTICS&id=41d2c1870&page=statistics

United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) See: http://www.minurso.unlb.org/

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). Morocco. See: http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/dbc.nsf/doc104?OpenForm&rc=1&cc=esh

United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS). Morocco. See: http://www.unaids.org/EN/Geographical+Area/by+country/morocco.asp

United Nations Secretary General (2005) Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara. S/2005/254

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United States Department of State. (2005). Background Note: Morocco. Available: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5431.htm (Accessed 12 May 2006).

--. (2005) Western Sahara Human Rights Report. Available: http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61702.htm (Accessed 12 May 2006).

Uppsala Peace and Conflict Data Project. Conflict Summary. See: http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/conflictSummary.php?bcID=67

War on Want. See: http://www.waronwant.org/?lid=396

World Health Organization (WHO). See: http://www.emro.who.int/morocco/

World Bank. See: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/MENAEXT/MOROCCOEXTN/ 0,,menuPK:294545~pagePK:141159~piPK:141110~theSitePK:294540,00.html

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13. Methodology

13.1. Description of Events Monitoring

Event trends are assessed using the slope is calculated based on the highest score of time-series trend lines that are for that conflict indicator statistic. For provided by plotting event data over a instance, an average Ca+Es+Ce can score given period of time. First, based on the as high (or low) as +/- 9, so a score of context of the region as described by the +/- 2 achieves a percentage of +/- 22%. Background, Stakeholders and Risk Positive percentages are indicative of an Indicators sections, events are identified environment that on average experiences as being generally stabilizing or stabilizing events, as there are either destabilizing59 and given a sign of either more stabilizing events or more strongly +1 (stabilizing) or -1 (destabilizing). valued stabilizing events. Negative Events are then coded on a scale of 1 to 3 percentages indicate the opposite, an for three dimensions: the degree to which environment characterized by they can be linked to the risk of future destabilizing events. The closer the peace or conflict – Causality (Ca); percentage comes to +/- 100% the better whether the event is typical or constitutes (or worse) events tend to be. an acceleration of events – Escalation (Es); and the degree to which the event The second avenue of analysis is via trend affects relevant stakeholders– Centrality lines to observe whether the events (Ce). Causality and Escalation are coded demonstrate any positive or negative based on a qualitative analysis of the trend over time. The conflict indicators are event considered within the context of the plotted against time – usually six months region’s risk indicators. Centrality is coded – and trend lines are generated, based on using a quantitative analysis of the ordinary least squares regression, and proportion of stakeholders affected by the compared in two different ways. The first event. comparison, the individual event trend line, plots the conflict indicators of each A conflict indicator statistic is then event over time. This is useful in that it calculated by summing the three indicates whether and to what degree the dimensions of an event (Ca+Es+Ce), and individual event conflict indicators have a multiplying it by the sign to provide a positive or negative trend over time. stabilizing indicator of +3 to +9 and a However, it does not account for an destabilizing indicator of -3 to -9. The increase or decrease in the total number analyst can use this conflict indicator to of events, so the second trend analysis is explore summary statistics as well as that of the weekly aggregate. To attain trend lines of the region’s events. this trend line, the conflict indicators are first summed by week; for instance, if one Summary statistics provide the analyst week has four events with the conflict with an overview of the average event indicators of +2, +2, -2 and -2, the scores. The total number of events and overall weekly aggregate would be 0, the the average conflict indicator statistics are stabilizing weekly aggregate would be +4 calculated, including sub-calculations by and the destabilizing weekly aggregate sign. For the average scores, a percentage would be -4. The weekly aggregate is then plotted over time to produce a trend line that incorporates the theory that an 59 Note that in some unique cases an event will be increase or decrease in total number of coded as both stabilizing and destabilizing.

Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) Project, July 2006 32 The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University Sub-national Report for Western Sahara: Events, Forecasting and Analysis events should matter in addition to their In the analysis, both stabilizing and changing value. That is, one would destabilizing trend lines reflect presume that a rapid increase in the improvements through positive slopes, number of stabilizing events would indicating the reduction in conflict indicate an improving trend, even if the vulnerability. On the other hand, negative conflict indicators for the individual events slopes denote a deteriorating situation – remain largely unchanged. an increase in conflict vulnerability. The degree of improvement or deterioration is Taken together, these two trend analyses identified as status quo, moderate, or provide an overview of the general event strong, based on the slope and according developments over the previous months. to the following chart:

Table 12. Matrix of Trend Magnitudes and associated symbols Trend Strongly Moderately Status Moderately Strongly Magnitude Negative Negative quo Positive Positive Below Between Between Between Over Slope size -1 -1 and -.1 -.1 and .1 +.1 and +1 +1

Symbol

Finally, scenarios are created for best the trend for the future. Events are then case, worst case and status quo surmised based on these trends in order situations, based on an analysis of overall to provide a conjectured future case. and cluster summary statistics and trends. The best and worst cases consider the Each case concludes by estimating the trends among stabilizing and destabilizing region’s future capacity to absorb events. The best case assumes that the damaging events and take advantage of strongest of the positive trends will hold peace-building opportunities by for the future time period, and the worst forecasting the best, worst or status quo case assumes that the strongest of the trends. The conclusion will also state the negative trends will occur. This holds likelihood that the region will approach a regardless of whether the positive (or higher or lower risk level; this analysis is negative) trend occurs among based on whether the current risk level is destabilizing (or stabilizing) events. For already near a lower or higher category instance, if there is strongly positive trend and the magnitude of the trend under among destabilizing events, this trend consideration. For example, a medium- would be used to extrapolate events for risk region of 3.6 with a strongly positive the best case scenario. If there is a trend line is likely to move into the low strongly negative trend among stabilizing risk level. Alternatively, a medium-risk events, this trend would be used for the region of 6.4 with a weak trend line is worst case. The status quo, on the other unlikely to move into the low risk level, hand, will extrapolate future tendencies but it could move into a high risk level based on the overall trend. For instance, if with a moderately deteriorating trend. there is moderate overall improvement, then the status quo assumes that this is

Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) Project, July 2006 33 The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University Sub-national Report for Western Sahara: Events, Forecasting and Analysis

13.2. Description of Events Data Collection

Events were collected in one of two analysts as daily emails (if news events methods for this study. were found for that day) which were then coded into a Microsoft Access Database In most cases, the news-parsing using the methodology described above. technology of Google-Alerts (www.google.com/alerts) was employed The other method by which data was to scan and collect daily reports of events gathered for this study was to collect the data reported by the international press data post-facto. Some sub-national about the particular sub-national region of regions’ data was collected only partially interest. Search terms were identified by using Google-Alerts so a more robust the sub-national region itself and as a reassessment of the monitoring time result of the stakeholder analysis (if one period was required. To do this, analysts actor or group tended to garner a employed a LexisNexis search for the significant amount of press but not monitoring period and using the same necessarily reported in the same news search parameters as had been used with stories as the name of the sub-national Google-Alerts. The events collected using region); in some cases, alternate spellings this methodology are identical in type to and transliterations were used as search the daily digest-type – the only difference terms to ensure a more robust set of data. is the timing in which the analysts coded News reports were then delivered to the events was not continuous.

Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) Project, July 2006 34 The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University