DOCSLIB.ORG

PWP Cover Page.Pub

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
PWP Cover Page.Pub The EU, Civil Society and Conflict Transformation in Western Sahara: The Failure of Disengagement MICROCON Policy Working Paper 13 Hakim Darbouche and Silvia Colombo June 2010 Correct citation: Darbouche, H. and Colombo, S. 2010. The EU, Civil Society and Conflict Transformation in Western Sahara: The Failure of Disengagement. MICROCON Policy Working Paper 13, Brighton: MICROCON. First published in 2010 © Hakim Darbouche and Silvia Colombo 2010 ISBN 978 1 85864 932 3 Cover photo: Smara refugee camp, Tindouf. © Paulo Nunes dos Santos. For further information, please contact: MICROCON: A Micro Level Analysis of Violent Conflict, Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9RE Tel: +44 (0)1273 872891 Email: [email protected] Web: www.microconflict.eu The EU, Civil Society and Conflict Transformation in Western Sahara: 1 The Failure of Disengagement Hakim Darbouche2 and Silvia Colombo3 MICROCON Policy Working Paper 13 Abstract: The protracted Western Sahara dispute, which has for over three decades pitted Morocco against the Sahrawi independentistas of the Polisario Front, epitomises the impotence of state-led conflict resolution efforts. The European Union (EU) has voluntarily remained withdrawn from the processes of transformation of this southern neighbourhood conflict, unable to surpass the politics of its inherent inter-governmentalism. This paper examines the alternative role played by local civil society organisations (CSO) in the transformation of the Western Sahara conflict. It analyses the input of a methodologically-informed selection of Moroccan and Sahrawi CSOs with a view to identifying the potential of more effectual EU involvement in the dispute, notably through cooperation with the relevant CSOs. The findings of this study point to the overwhelmingly fuelling role played by local CSOs in this particular conflict, but identify ways in which more peace-building civil actors could be empowered by the EU. These CSOs are often of grass-root origins with little or no links to the establishments on both sides of the conflict. 1 The authors are grateful to Jacob Mundy for his comments on an earlier draft. They also thank for their feedback all participants to the MICROCON workshop organised by IAI in Rome on 19 June 2009. 2 Europe in the World Centre, University of Liverpool. Email: [email protected]. 3 Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome. Email: [email protected]. 1 1. Introduction “Africa’s last colony”, “the forgotten conflict” of the (western) Mediterranean, and the “frozen conflict” on the European Union’s southern neighbourhood are but the most common objective euphemisms for the Western Sahara dispute, which for more than three decades has pitted the kingdom of Morocco against the Sahrawi nationalist movement, incarnated by the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguiat El Hamra y de Rio de Oro (the Polisario Front). For ninety years after the Berlin Conference of 1884, Western Sahara – a stretch of desert land roughly the size of Britain – was under Spanish colonial rule. During this period, a succession of Franco-Spanish treaties delineated the territory’s contemporary international borders (Omar 2008: 43). However, the failure of the outgoing Franco regime to uphold the right of the indigenous Sahrawi people to self-determination in 1975/6, as stipulated by UN deliberations from 1965, and the instinctive expansionist claims of the Alaouite regime in Morocco, led to a prolonged confrontation typical of any tale of botched decolonisation. Between 1965 and 1973, the UN General Assembly adopted eight resolutions calling on the administering power to “take all necessary measures” to ensure the overdue decolonization of what was then commonly referred to as the “Spanish Sahara” (Theofilopoulou 2006). When Spain finally decided in 1974 to organize a referendum on self-determination for the Sahrawi people, the prospect of independence for this “Non-Self-Governing Territory” was deemed unacceptable by Morocco’s late king Hassan II. In response, Morocco sought legal advice from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) by way of confirming that its “southern provinces” were not terra nullius prior to Spanish colonization. Though in its Advisory Opinion of 16 October 1975 the ICJ held that legal ties of allegiance between Moroccan sultans and some Sahrawi tribes had existed, it confirmed that these were insufficient to establish historical and legal ties of territorial sovereignty between Western Sahara and the kingdom of Morocco.4 Having interpreted the Court’s recognition of the existence of tribal allegiance in his favour, King Hassan decided shortly afterwards to command 350,000 4 See ‘Western Sahara: Advisory opinion of 16 October 1975’, available at: http://www.icj- cij.org/docket/files/61/6195.pdf?PHPSESSID=f8c21767d912633ed2c0ee0d0f4c65e8 (accessed 8 November 2009). 2 civilians and 80,000 troops to march into Western Sahara in what was dubbed “the Green March” (Maghraoui 2003). Consequently, what was clearly for Morocco a symbolic attempt at recovering the territory amounted to a declaration of war for the indigenous pro-independence movement and a grave provocation for the Sahrawis’ main regional ally, Algeria. This violation of the regional order by Morocco was exacerbated by Spain’s decision, with US complicity, to duck out of its responsibility by secretly concluding in Madrid in November 1975 a deal with Morocco and Mauritania, which de facto transferred administrative powers over the territory to these two countries (Mundy 2006). In the war that ensued, the Polisario army scored important early successes, notably in forcing Mauritania to relinquish its territorial claims to the southern parts of Western Sahara in 1979, and imposing itself on the Moroccan regime as an inevitable interlocutor for any ceasefire or peace negotiations (Zoubir 1990). Indeed, bilateral talks began in 1988 and culminated in a UN- brokered ceasefire in 1991. Though withdrawn militarily as a result of the successful erection by Morocco of an effective defensive wall (“the Berm”),5 which consolidated its control of around 80% of the territory, the Polisario engaged in these negotiations from a relatively strong diplomatic position. Its de facto Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) had been recognized by over seventy countries and, most importantly, granted full-membership status by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1984, leading to Morocco’s voluntary withdrawal from that organization. Meanwhile, no state has recognized the kingdom’s proclaimed sovereignty over Western Sahara (ICG 2007a). From 1991 onwards, the UN Security Council became firmly seized by the Western Sahara question and sought its resolution through the organization of a “free and fair referendum” on self-determination, to which both parties had agreed. To this end, it mandated a UN mission (Mission des Nations Unies pour l’Organisation d’un Référendum au Sahara Occidental, MINURSO) to inter alia identify eligible voters in both the occupied territories and the Sahrawi refugee camps of Tindouf, in southwest Algeria, where tens of thousands of Sahrawis (est. 160,000) opposed to Moroccan occupation had fled since the start of hostilities (San Martín and 5 See Appendix 1. 3 Allan 2007). It was this daunting task, however, that proved detrimental to the peace process in Western Sahara, as all UN-sponsored peace “plans”, from the Settlement Plan of 1991 to James Baker’s Plans I (2001) and II (2003),6 turned into battles between the protagonists over the modalities of the elusive referendum. More recently, in an apparent attempt to break the resulting deadlock, the Moroccan regime has put forward a “historic proposal” for autonomy in Western Sahara,7 which it considers the only acceptable basis for further talks with the Polisario. For the latter, however, Morocco’s calculated overture is considered a non-starter as it intrinsically excludes the option of independence.8 This has meant that the five rounds of UN-sponsored talks between the two parties in 2007-2009 since the emergence of this nouvelle donne have yielded no tangible results (San Martín et al. 2006; Ruiz-Miguel 2007; Darbouche and Zoubir 2008). In light of the stubborn protraction of the impasse, Polisario leaders have recently ratcheted up their bellicose rhetoric, warning that force seems to be the only means by which they can achieve their self-determination objective. The Western Sahara conflict has predominantly featured state actors, including the Polisario Front and its de facto SADR government-in-exile. Regionally, the main protagonists have been Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania and Libya, while core international players have included Spain, France and the United States. As such, the role played in this conflict by CSOs, if any, has had little visibility. The aim of this paper is to investigate the role played by local CSOs in the transformation of the Western Sahara conflict. It will do so with the additional aim of identifying how the EU could be more effectively involved in the dispute, in particular through cooperation with relevant local CSOs. To this end, eight CSOs from each side of the conflict (Morocco and Western Sahara) are examined, with a view to analysing a) their activities; b) their impact on conflict transformation; 6 The former US Secretary of State was nominated personal envoy of the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to the conflict between 1997 and 2004. For details on his proposed peace plans, see (Solà-Martín 2007). 7 ‘Moroccan
Load more

Recommended publications
  • War and Insurgency in the Western Sahara
    Visit our website for other free publication downloads http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/ To rate this publication click here. STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the U.S. Army War College and is the strategic-level study agent for issues relat- ed to national security and military strategy with emphasis on geostrategic analysis. The mission of SSI is to use independent analysis to conduct strategic studies that develop policy recommendations on: • Strategy, planning, and policy for joint and combined employment of military forces; • Regional strategic appraisals; • The nature of land warfare; • Matters affecting the Army’s future; • The concepts, philosophy, and theory of strategy; and, • Other issues of importance to the leadership of the Army. Studies produced by civilian and military analysts concern topics having strategic implications for the Army, the Department of Defense, and the larger national security community. In addition to its studies, SSI publishes special reports on topics of special or immediate interest. These include edited proceedings of conferences and topically-oriented roundtables, expanded trip reports, and quick-reaction responses to senior Army leaders. The Institute provides a valuable analytical capability within the Army to address strategic and other issues in support of Army participation in national security policy formulation. Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press WAR AND INSURGENCY IN THE WESTERN SAHARA Geoffrey Jensen May 2013 The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Plan for Self-Determination for the People of Western Sahara
    United Nations S/2007/210 Security Council Distr.: General 16 April 2007 Original: English Letter dated 16 April 2007 from the Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council I have the honour to write to transmit to you the proposal of the Frente Polisario for a mutually acceptable political solution that provides for the self- determination of the people of Western Sahara (see annex). I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council. (Signed) Dumisani S. Kumalo Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Republic of South Africa 07-30876 (E) 170407 *0730876* S/2007/210 Annex to the letter dated 16 April 2007 from the Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council [Original: English and French] Proposal of the Frente Polisario for a mutually acceptable political solution that provides for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara I. The Conflict of Western Sahara is a decolonisation question: 1. Included since 1965 on the list of the Non-Self-Governing territories of the UN Decolonisation Committee, Western Sahara is a territory of which the decolonisation process has been interrupted by the Moroccan invasion and occupation of 1975 and which is based on the implementation of the General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) regarding the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. 2. The UN General Assembly and the Security Council have identified this conflict as a decolonisation conflict between the Kingdom of Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO whose settlement passes by the exercise by the Saharawi people of their right to self-determination.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 Western Sahara As a Hybrid of A
    ORE Open Research Exeter TITLE Western Sahara as a Hybrid of a Parastate and a State-in-exile: (Extra)territoriality and the Small Print of Sovereignty in a Context of Frozen Conflict AUTHORS Fernandez-Molina, I; Ojeda-García, R JOURNAL Nationalities Papers - The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity DEPOSITED IN ORE 30 October 2018 This version available at http://hdl.handle.net/10871/34557 COPYRIGHT AND REUSE Open Research Exeter makes this work available in accordance with publisher policies. A NOTE ON VERSIONS The version presented here may differ from the published version. If citing, you are advised to consult the published version for pagination, volume/issue and date of publication Western Sahara as a Hybrid of a Parastate and a State-in-exile: (Extra)territoriality and the Small Print of Sovereignty in a Context of Frozen Conflict Irene Fernández Molina, University of Exeter Raquel Ojeda-García, University of Granada Abstract This paper argues that the “declarative” parastate of the SADR claiming sovereignty over Western Sahara is better understood as a hybrid between a parastate and a state-in-exile. It relies more on external, “international legal sovereignty”, than on internal, “Westphalian” and “domestic” sovereignty. While its Algerian operational base in the Tindouf refugee camps makes the SADR work as a primarily extraterritorial state-in-exile de facto, its maintaining control over one quarter of Western Sahara’s territory proper allows it to at least partially meet the requirements for declarative statehood de jure. Many case-specific nuances surround the internal sovereignty of the SADR in relation to criteria for statehood, i.e.
    [Show full text]
  • Western Sahara Mission Notes
    Peacekeeping_4_v11.qxd 2/2/06 5:06 PM Page 118 4.142.4 Western Sahara The United Nations Mission for the Referen- efforts to implement the referendum proposal, dum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) under- the Secretary-General appointed former US went a moderate restructuring in the course of secretary of state James Baker as his Personal 2005, in the context of deteriorating compli- Envoy. Baker was asked to work with the par- ance with agreements reached by Morocco and ties to the conflict to assess whether the settle- the Frente Popular para la Liberación de ment plan could be implemented in its exist- Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (Polisario). ing form, or whether adjustments could be Meanwhile, the political stalemate over the made to make it acceptable to both Morocco future of Western Sahara continued. In October and Polisario. 2005, the Secretary-General appointed Peter Following a number of initiatives aimed at Van Walsum as his Personal Envoy in a new breaking the deadlock, Baker presented in Janu- effort to break the deadlock. ary 2003 the “Peace Plan for Self-Determination MINURSO was established in 1991 in of the People of Western Sahara.” The Plan accordance with “settlement proposals” that provided for a five-year interim period during called for a cease-fire and the holding of a which governance responsibilities would be referendum on self-determination. In 1988, shared between Morocco and Polisario, fol- both the government of Morocco and the lowed by a choice of integration, autonomy, or Polisario agreed to the plan in principle.
    [Show full text]
  • Western Sahara: Status of Settlement Efforts
    Order Code RS20962 Updated September 29, 2006 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Western Sahara: Status of Settlement Efforts Carol Migdalovitz Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Summary Since the 1970s, Morocco and the independence-seeking Popular Front for the Liberation of Saqiat al Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario) have vied for control of the Western Sahara, a former Spanish territory. In 1991, the United Nations arranged a cease-fire and proposed a settlement plan that called for a referendum to allow the people of the Western Sahara to choose between independence and integration into Morocco. A long deadlock on determining the electorate for a referendum ensued. Since 2001, the U.N. has unsuccessfully suggested alternatives to the unfulfilled settlement plan, particularly one formulated by James Baker. Latterly, the U.N. has called on the parties to negotiate. An end to the impasse is not in sight, and it has affected Algerian-Moroccan bilateral relations and wider regional cooperation. The United States supports U.N. efforts and a solution that would not destabilize its ally, Morocco. Congress supports a referendum and is frustrated by delays. This report will be updated if developments warrant. See also CRS Report RS21579, Morocco: Current Issues, and CRS Report RS21532, Algeria: Current Issues. History The territory now known as the Western Sahara became a Spanish possession in 1881. In the mid-1970s, Spain prepared to decolonize the region, intending to transform it into a closely aligned independent state after a referendum on self-determination. Morocco and Mauritania opposed Spain’s plan and each claimed the territory.
    [Show full text]
  • Algeria and Morocco in the Western Sahara Conflict Michael D
    University of South Florida Scholar Commons Graduate Theses and Dissertations Graduate School January 2012 Hegemonic Rivalry in the Maghreb: Algeria and Morocco in the Western Sahara Conflict Michael D. Jacobs University of South Florida, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd Part of the American Studies Commons, and the International Relations Commons Scholar Commons Citation Jacobs, Michael D., "Hegemonic Rivalry in the Maghreb: Algeria and Morocco in the Western Sahara Conflict" (2012). Graduate Theses and Dissertations. http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/4086 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Hegemonic rivalry in the Maghreb: Algeria and Morocco in the Western Sahara conflict by Michael Jacobs A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Arts Department of Government and International Affairs College of Arts and Sciences University of South Florida Major Professor: Earl Conteh-Morgan, Ph.D Committee 1: Mark Amen, Ph.D Committee 2: Prayutsha Bash, Ph.D Date of Approval July 5, 2012 Keywords: Northwest Africa, Sahrawi, Polisario Front, stability Copyright © 2012; Michael Jacobs Table of Contents Chapter 1: Conceptualizing Algeria in the Western Sahara Conflict 2 Chapter 2: The regionalization
    [Show full text]
  • Western Sahara Is There Light at the End of the Tunnel? Issaka K
    Western Sahara Is there light at the end of the tunnel? Issaka K. Souaré ISS Paper 155 • November 2007 Price: R15.00 Introduction the most tenacious and durable, was called the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y Río de In its Resolution 40/50 adopted in December 1985, Oro (the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Saguia the General Assembly of the United Nations argued el-Hamra and Rio de Oro, or the Polisario Front for that ‘the question of Western Sahara is a question of short). Despite a 1975 ruling of the International Court decolonisation, which remains to be completed on the of Justice (ICJ 1975:12)3, arguably refuting Moroccan basis of the exercise by the people of Western Sahara and Mauritanian claims of ancient sovereign ties with of their inalienable right to self-determination and the territory, the two countries sent in their troops to independence.’ This definition has prevailed over the the phosphate-rich Western Sahara and effectively years and it has led many to consider Western Sahara occupied it. as the remaining African territory to be ‘decolonised’ after the regaining of their independence – in the Thus, having been formed in 1973 to fight Spanish 1960s and 1970s – of almost all the colonialism, the Polisario Front turned other African territories occupied by the its guerrilla war against Morocco and different European powers in the late Mauritania, while also escorting a 19 th and early 20th centuries. (see for The dispute over significant number of indigenous Sahrawi example Washington, 2005;
    [Show full text]
  • Frente Polisario) (Western Sahara
    -.. , ... NationsUnies IIEADQUARTERS ' SlliGE NEW YORK, NY 100"/ Distr. RESTRICTED CRS/2011 /CRP, 12 ORIGINAL: ENGLISH THIRD INTERNATIONAL DECADE FOR THE ERADICATION OF COLONIALISM Caribbean regional seminar on the implementation of the Third International Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism: goals and expected accomplishments Kingstown, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 31 May to 2June 2011 STATEMENT BY Mr. Ahmed Boukhari Frente Polisario(Western Sahara) -,. Statement by Ahmed Boukhari Representative of the Frente POLISARIO Seminar of the UN Special Committee of decolonization (C-24) I{ingstown, 31 may- June 3, 2011 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines The Frente POLISARIO wishes to set out its views to the Special Committee on Decolonization as it holds its annual regional seminar in Kingstown, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, from 31 May to 2 June. At the beginning of the Third International Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism, and just two months after the fiftieth anniversary of the adoption by the General Assembly of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said ~Colonial situations are completely outdated and must be addressed with renewed vigor and creativity." It is the responsibility of the Special Committee on Decolonization and the General Assembly to ensure that 2011 is a decisive year in international efforts to grant the Saharawi people their long-overdue right to self-determination. In order to do this, four issues are crucial and need to be taken into account by the Special Committee efforts to ensure the im plementation of the pending decolonization process of the last African colony on its agenda.
    [Show full text]
  • Western Sahara
    Western Sahara Alexis Arieff Analyst in African Affairs February 15, 2011 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RS20962 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Western Sahara Summary Since the 1970s, Morocco and the independence-seeking Popular Front for the Liberation of Saqiat al Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario) have vied for control of the Western Sahara, a former Spanish territory. In 1991, the United Nations arranged a cease-fire and proposed a settlement plan that called for a referendum to allow the people of the Western Sahara to choose between independence and integration into Morocco. A long deadlock on determining the electorate for a referendum ensued. The U.N. then unsuccessfully suggested alternatives to the unfulfilled settlement plan and later called on the parties to negotiate. In April 2007, Morocco offered an autonomy plan for the region. The two sides have since met on several occasions under U.N. auspices, but have made no progress due to their unwillingness to compromise. Informal talks were reconvened between November 2010 and January 2011 by U.N. Special Envoy Christopher Ross. In November 2010, Moroccan security forces dismantled a Sahrawi protest camp near the Moroccan-administered regional capital, Laayoune, sparking violent confrontations and criticism from rights advocates. The Western Sahara issue has affected Algerian-Moroccan bilateral relations, Moroccan relations with the African Union, and regional cooperation on economic and security issues. The United States supports the U.N. effort and has urged the parties to focus on autonomy—a solution that would not destabilize its ally, Morocco.
    [Show full text]
  • MAGHREB ROUNDTABLE Center for Strategic and International Studies Washington, D.C
    MAGHREB ROUNDTABLE Center for Strategic and International Studies Washington, D.C. May 2006 SPEAKER FINDING A WAY OUT: THE CRISIS IN WESTERN SAHARA John Damis is a professor of Po- litical Science and International On April 28, Professor John Damis urged Morocco to articulate a realistic and forthcoming Relations and Director of the plan to settle the long-simmering dispute over the Western Sahara. Damis, who spoke at Middle East Studies Center at the CSIS Middle East Program’s sixth Maghreb Roundtable, argued that international Portland State University. Damis support was crucial to resolving the conflict, although doing so remained a low priority on has conducted extensive field- the international agenda. The United Nations Secretary General’s recent report reflects a work on the Western Sahara, more favorable position toward Morocco, Damis argued, yet bold Moroccan action re- and from 1993-94 served as a mains vital. consultant to the Identification Commission of the United Na- The territory of the Western Sahara was in dispute even before Spain ended its colonial tions Mission for a Referendum in occupation in 1975. Local Sahrawi tribes called for independence and created an armed the Western Sahara (MINURSO). movement which became known as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el- Previously, he worked as a for- Hamra and Rio de Oro, or Polisario. Morocco also claimed sovereignty over the territory, eign affairs analyst for the De- arguing that Spain was occupying Morocco’s southern provinces. When King Hassan II of partment of State. He is the au- Morocco launched the Green March in 1975 in the days after Spain’s harried departure, thor of four books and mono- the Algerian-backed Polisario launched a guerilla war against Moroccan forces.
    [Show full text]
  • The Un Mediation in the Western Sahara Scenario
    Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche Cattedra di Diplomacy and Negotiation THE UN MEDIATION IN THE WESTERN SAHARA SCENARIO RELATORE Prof. Pasquale Ferrara CANDIDATO Elia Trevisan Matr. 631962 CORRELATORE Prof. Francesco Francioni ANNO ACCADEMICO 2017/2018 2 INDEX INTRODUCTION 1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND a. The Origins of the Dispute b. The Madrid Accords and the Western Sahara War c. From the UN Settlement Plan onward 2. MEDIATION a. Theoretical Background b. Mediation Styles 3. JAMES BAKER (1997-2004) a. James Baker’s Appointment And The Spirit Of Houston b. The Framework Agreement c. The Peace Plan d. Overall Assessment 4. PETER VAN WALSUM (2005-2008) a. The Beginning Of A New Mediation Style b. The Parties’ Proposals c. The Manhasset Negotiations d. Overall Assessment 5. CHRISTOPHER ROSS (2009-2017) a. The Appointment and the Informal Meetings b. The Continuing Stalemate c. A New Approach d. Overall Assessment e. The Situation Nowadays CONCLUSIONS BIBLIOGRAPHY ANNEXES ABSTRACT 3 4 INTRODUCTION: The conflict over Western Sahara has interested bunches of experts of international relations and diplomacy since the end of the war between Morocco and the Polisario Front in 1991. In this scenario, the United Nations plays a key role in trying to mediate and to solve, once for all, such dispute, which is still going on after almost thirty years. The question at the basis of this thesis comes out rightly from these attempts of mediation made by different Personal Envoys of the UN Secretary-General throughout the years. Indeed, the aim of this paper is precisely that of answering to the following question: which mediation style have been mainly adopted by each of these Personal Envoys? Anyway, as it will be explained later, these mediators have often adopted more than one style, combining different strategy in order to achieve a mutually acceptable, definitive and long-lasting solution for the dispute over the final status of Western Sahara.
    [Show full text]
  • Cycles of Crisis, Migration and the Formation of New Political Identities
    June 2012 • 25 Cycles of crisis, migration and the formation of new political identities in Western Sahara Alice Wilson du CEPED s Centre Population et Développement UMR 196 CEPED, Université Paris Descartes, INED, IRD Working Paper http://www.ceped.org/wp Contact • Corresponding Author: Alice Wilson Division of Social Anthropology, University of Cambridge [email protected] Alice Wilson is a Junior Research Fellow at Homerton College, University of Cambridge, affiliated to the Division of Social Anthropology. She is a social anthropologist with research interests in the political and economic anthropology of North Africa and the Middle East. She has worked on statehood, tribes and sovereignty, specifically in the case of the state-in-exile of Western Sahara’s liberation movement. She holds a PhD in Social Anthropology (University of Cambridge, 2011). An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Journée d’études of Équipe 2, CEPED, on the theme of crisis and migration in the global south, held at the Université Paris Descartes on 9th December 2011. Citation recommandée • Recommended citation Wilson A., « Cycles of crisis, migration and the formation of new political identities in Western Sahara », Working Paper du CEPED, number 25, UMR 196 CEPED, Université Paris Descartes, INED, IRD), Paris, June 2012. Available at http://www.ceped.org/wp CEPED • Centre Population et Développement UMR 196 CEPED, Université Paris Descartes, INED, IRD 19 rue Jacob 75006 PARIS, France http://www.ceped.org/ • [email protected] Les Working Papers du CEPED constituent des documents de travail portant sur des recherches menées par des chercheurs du CEPED ou associés.
    [Show full text]