African Union VMUN 2017 Background Guide 1

VANCOUVER MODEL UNITED NATIONS

the sixteenth annual conference | January 20-22, 2017

Dear Delegates,

Alvin Tsuei My name is Rosa Rahimi and I am honoured to serve as the Director of the African Secretary-General Union at VMUN 2017. I am currently in grade 11 at York House School, and I have participated in Model UN since grade 8. As a competitive debater and public speaker, I have come to truly enjoy and appreciate the fast-paced world of a Model UN conference. I look forward to meeting all of you, who will undoubtedly, make

this committee an unforgettable experience. Chris Pang

Chief of Staff The topics this year for AU are engaging and complex: the Rise of Al-Shabaab and the Western Sahara Conflict. Both of these topics affect member states of the AU, all Eva Zhang of whom are juggling their sovereign interests with interests that will advance the Director-General African Union’s goals. Delegates are encouraged to thoroughly research these topics, in order to better understand their national positions and to find solutions for these Arjun Mehta multifaceted problems that will benefit the AU at large. Director of Logistics The first topic is the Rise of Al-Shabaab. For decades, Somalia has suffered the volatile symptoms of a failed state, turning the nation into a breeding ground for terrorism, piracy, and militant aggression. Al-Shabaab has been a leading force Graeme Brawn behind all of these troubles, exerting its power and values throughout Somalia – USG General Assemblies while also procuring recruits, international allies, and economic capital. Despite previous AU efforts to limit Al Shabaab’s influence, it has continued to flourish and Ryan Karimi expand beyond Somali borders. Delegates must address the constantly evolving USG Specialized Agencies nature of Al Shabaab, while working to find a solution that can effectively combat organization. Mary Dong The second topic is the Western Sahara Conflict. For decades, the region of the USG Conference Western Sahara has been violently contested between Morocco and the indigenous

people of the Sahara – represented by the Sahrawi Democratic Republic. On both Ken Hong sides, the conflict has resulted in human rights violations, economic consequences, USG Delegate Affairs and fragmented political alliances. With the AU’s growing influence in the region, the time is ripe to pursue a new avenue towards stability and resolution. Should the Isabelle Cheng Western Sahara Conflict be resolved; the benefits to the AU would range from USG Delegate Affairs natural resource extraction to re-enforcing diplomatic ties with Morocco. Delegates must acknowledge the pressing nature of this conflict, acknowledge the legitimacy of Jason Qu both sides, and work towards a resolution that will establish and preserve stability. USG Finance All this information may seem quite overwhelming at first, so please do not hesitate Jan Lim to contact me if you have any questions. On behalf of the dais, I would like to USG Marketing welcome you to AU 2017!

Sincerely,

Rosa Rahimi, African Union Director | VMUN 2017

African Union VMUN 2017 Background Guide 1

African Union Position Paper Policy

What is a Position Paper?

A position paper is a brief overview of a country’s stance on the topics being discussed by a particular committee. Though there is no specific format the position paper must follow, it should include a description of your positions your country holds on the issues on the agenda, relevant actions that your country has taken, and potential solutions that your country would support.

At Vancouver Model United Nations, delegates should write a position paper for each of the committee’s topics. Each position paper should not exceed one page, and should all be combined into a single document per delegate.

For the African Union, position papers are mandatory, especially for a delegate to be considered for an award.

Formatting

Position papers should: — Include the name of the delegate, his/her country, and the committee — Be in a standard font (e.g. Times New Roman) with a 12-point font size and 1-inch document margins — Not include illustrations, diagrams, decorations, national symbols, watermarks, or page borders — Include citations and a bibliography, in any format, giving due credit to the sources used in research (not included in the 1-page limit)

Due Dates and Submission Procedure

Position papers for this committee must be submitted by midnight on January 8th, 2017.

Once your position paper is complete, please save the file as your last name, your first name and send it as an attachment in an email, to your committee’s email address, with the subject heading as your last name, your first name — Position Paper. Please do not add any other attachments to the email or write anything else in the body.

Both your position papers should be combined into a single PDF or Word document file; position papers submitted in another format will not be accepted.

Each position paper will be manually reviewed and considered for the Best Position Paper award.

The email address for this committee is [email protected].

African Union VMUN 2017 Background Guide 2

Table of Contents The Rise of al-Shabaab ...... 4 Overview ...... 4 Timeline ...... 4 Historical Analysis ...... 5 Current Situation ...... 7 UN and International Involvement ...... 9 Possible Solutions ...... 9 Bloc Positions ...... 10 North Africa ...... 10 Somalia and Nigeria ...... 11 AMISOM Members ...... 11 Somaliland and Eritrea ...... 11 Discussion Questions ...... 11 Additional Resources ...... 12 Bibliography ...... 12 Conflict in the Western Sahara ...... 14 Overview ...... 14 Timeline ...... 15 Historical Analysis ...... 16 Current Situation ...... 19 Past UN/International Involvement ...... 23 Controversies ...... 24 Possible Solutions ...... 24 Bloc Positions ...... 26 Algeria, Libya, and the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic ...... 26 Countries who support Morocco’s claim ...... 26 Maghreb States ...... 26 Supporters of the Sahrawi Claim ...... 26 Neutral States ...... 27 Discussion Questions ...... 27 Additional Resources ...... 27 Bibliography ...... 27

African Union VMUN 2017 Background Guide 3 African Union Topic A The Rise of al-Shabaab Overview

Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, more commonly known as Al Shabaab or “The Youth”, is the largest militant organization fighting to oust the Somali government. Since its departure from the former Islamic Courts Union, where it served as the organization’s military wing, Al Shabaab has formed into an independent militant group and has been engaged in combat with the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The organization’s militia consists of conscripts, paid fighters, foreign fighters, clan militias, and ideologues who utilize guerilla warfare tactics against the FGS, AMISOM, and non-governmental agencies. They use these tactics in an effort to gain territory in Somalia, where they hope to establish a society governed by their rigid interpretation of Sharia law. Although based in Somalia, Al Shabaab has launched several high-profile operations in East Africa, including the 2013 Westgate Mall attack in Nairobi and the 2014 attack against a tourist restaurant in Djibouti, along with several suicide bombings in the region. In accordance with the organization’s commitment to the proliferation of global jihad, they primarily target Westerners, Christians, journalists, aid workers, peace activists, and notable members of civil society. Not only has Al Shabaab posed a threat to East African stability, but it has shown itself to be a cause for concern in Western communities where it has active recruitment efforts. As a result of this recruitment and the attacks on Western civilians, numerous governments have placed high bounties for the capture of high-level Al Shabaab officials. In 2009, Al Shabaab formally declared its allegiance to al-Qaeda in a video titled "At Your Service Osama" and has been working with the group in an effort to frame the Somali struggle as part of a global jihad. Despite these close ties between Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda, internal divisions between nationalist and jihadist factions within Al Shabaab threaten the future of these two groups. Regardless of the organization’s internal struggles, Al Shabaab continues to retaliate against international pressure in the form of suicide bombings, hostage taking, and political assassinations. Effectively dismantling this organization will require a multifaceted solution that goes beyond militaristic action and acknowledges the economic, social, and political climates that have contributed to the organization’s rise within the past decade.

African Union VMUN 2017 Background Guide 4 Timeline

1997: The first leader of Al Shabaab, Aden Hashi Ayro, joins the Islamic Courts Union and develops Al Shabaab as the military wing of the ICU.

2003-2005: As a faction of the ICU, Al Shabaab claims responsibility for numerous attacks on international aid workers and activists in Somaliland (a northwestern region of Somalia).

December 31 2006: The Islamic Courts Union is effectively dissolved and Al Shabaab splinters from the group to form an independent militant organization.

March 26, 2007: Al Shabaab claims responsibility for a suicide bombing on Ethiopian soldiers in the Somalia’s capital city of Mogadishu. This is both the group’s first independent attack since leaving the ICU and the first suicide attack in Mogadishu.

May 2008: Aden Hashi Ayro is killed in a U.S. missile strike and Ahmed Abdi Godane takes his place as Al Shabaab’s top leader. Following this change in leadership, the organization struggles to set and follow any specific agenda.

October 29, 2008: Al Shabaab simultaneously executes five suicide attacks against UN and government targets, as a part of a broader campaign carried out in revenge for Ayro’s death.

2009: Al Shabaab officially declares allegiance to Al Qaeda in a video titled “At Your Service Osama”; Al Qaeda neither accepts nor declines the organization’s support.

August 2011: Al Shabaab withdraws from Mogadishu, claiming that the move was a tactical retreat; however, the Somali government claims that its own troops, together with AMISOM, had forced the group into retreat.

2012: Al Qaeda officially accepts the allegiance of Al Shabaab and many media outlets report that the two organizations have begun collaborating.

September 21, 2013: Al Shabaab gains international notoriety after it claims responsibility for the Westgate Mall mass shooting in Nairobi, Kenya; the attack targeted non-Muslims and casualties included a number of Westerners, politicians, journalists, and diplomats.

September 1, 2014: Ahmed Abdi Godane is killed in a US airstrike and Ahmad Umar takes his place as the organization’s leader.

May 22, 2015: The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) releases a video appealing for Al Shabaab, as East Africa’s most prominent jihadi group, to revoke its allegiance to al-Qaeda and pledge allegiance to IS.

February 8, 2016: A strike by the Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) on a graduation ceremony for Al Shabaab recruits kills several of the group's leaders. Among those killed was Mahad Karate, who led the Al Shabaab intelligence unit, Amniyat.

Historical Analysis

There is speculation about the existence of Al Shabaab prior to serving as the military wing of ICU, with reports circulating that the organization’s first leader, Aden Hashi Ayro lead a small group of militants in Somalia under the designation of Al Shabaab. Regardless of Al Shabaab’s alleged origins, truly understanding

African Union VMUN 2017 Background Guide 5 the organization means understanding the nature of its predecessor and “father organization” – the now defunct Islamic Courts Union.

Islamic Courts Union

The Islamic Courts Union (ICU) was an organization that consisted of a loose formation of Islamic judicial systems, which temporarily restored a degree of civil order in the anarchic nation of Somalia. Unlike most organizations who seek to obtain power in failed states, the ICU did not consist of a single political ideology; it was a coalition of interests that “ranged from the best of the moderates to the worst of the militants.” Al Shabaab fits into the latter of that distinction, considering that it served as the main armed wing of the organization and was responsible for the multiple killings of international workers in the autonomous territory of Somaliland, on behalf of the ICU.

As the ICU grew, it overtook strategically important territories in southern Somalia, including the capital city of Mogadishu. Once the ICU took control of these areas, it established courts to prosecute both petty crimes and serious offences in an effort to crack down on the rampant disregard for the law that had plagued Somalia for decades. In order to be effective in their enforcement of Islamic law, the courts carried out harsh punishments that were both criticized by several human rights groups (ie. cutting off limbs, public execution) and lauded by the international community for bringing a sense of law and order to a nation that had been wrought with violent crime. This success was short lived for the ICU, who began to clash with Ethiopian and Somali government forces in the Battle of Jilib on December 31, 2006, which ultimately resulted in defeat for the ICU, forcing it to abandon its strongholds in Somalia and retreat towards Kenya. By this time, the ICU “had been effectively demolished as an organization” and its military wing, Al Shabaab, broke away to form an independent militant group.

An Independent Al-Shabaab

The Ethiopian military occupation of Somalia following the retreat of the ICU served as a catalyst to further radicalize Al Shabaab, pushing the organization to adopt guerilla tactics in an effort to seize territory in central and southern Somalia. New Islamist-national fighters joined the ranks of the organization and increased Al Shabaab’s membership from a few hundred to an estimated 9,000 in less than two years. As a result of this growth, Al Shabaab quickly established itself as the most radical and powerful militant faction in Somalia.

By late 2007, troops from Burundi and Uganda formed a contingent called the African Union Mission to Somalia or AMISOM; the primary objective of these troops was to stabilize Somalia and minimize the influence of Al Shabaab. At this time, Al Shabaab began to stray away from other former ICU offshoots and it closely aligned itself with Al Qaeda in an attempt to connect its cause to the broader global jihadist movement. Al Shabaab’s growth between 2007 and 2008 was defined by its denouncement of the ICU, its alliance with Al- Qaeda, and its newfound focus on fighting AMISOM forces. In May of 2008, Al Shabaab faced an obstacle that was arguably greater than the looming threat posed by AMISOM, when the organization’s leader, Aden Hashi Ayro, was killed in an American drone strike. Following his assassination, Al Shabaab launched a violent campaign to avenge Ayro’s death – focusing primarily on attacks against US and UN targets in Somalia; these attacks were unprecedented in their degree of violence, even for an infamous terrorist organization. During this campaign, which lasted until the end of 2009, Al Shabaab executed five suicide attacks against UN targets, bombed an AU peacekeeping base, and launched several guerilla-style attacks on Somali government officials.

In January 2009, Ethiopian troops withdrew from Somalia in accordance with a 2008 UN-backed agreement between Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government and the ARS, which also stipulated the deployment of UN peacekeepers. Following the Ethiopian withdrawal, Al Shabaab claimed it was responsible for expelling the troops from Somalia and subsequently began focusing its attention on forcing other foreign troops out of Somalia. At this time, the former leader of the ICU, Sheikh Sharif, became the president of the Transitional

African Union VMUN 2017 Background Guide 6 Federal Government (TFG), implemented Sharia law, and was widely credited for providing some stability in the country. With Sharif as president and the departure of Ethiopian troops, Al Shabaab lost basis for much of its popular support, considering that the organization had depended on the goal of introducing Shariah law and forcing out the Ethiopians. As such, in an effort to undermine the TFG and reinforce its relevance, Al Shabaab established governing structures in the territories under its control, providing social services as well as collecting taxes. In an effort to rid the country of foreign influences, Al Shabaab shut down the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and banned its broadcasting in 2010, accusing the station of promoting an anti-Muslim colonialist agenda. In the same year, Al Shabaab set up the Al Kataib News Channel—in Arabic and English rather than in the Somali language—through which the group has attempted to recruit foreign fighters, threaten nearby countries, and discourage support for AMISOM.

Following this shift in strategy, Al Shabaab continued to utilize new methods of enforcing its power when it adopted the practice of “sea jihad” – or piracy. In 2010, Al Shabaab turned to piracy to finance its efforts to topple the Somali government. Al Shabaab’s approach to piracy has been twofold: taxing ransoms collected by Somali pirates and dispatching its own fighters to attack and hijack ships. Though the trend amongst Somali pirates has been to board the ship that seems easiest to attack, Al Shabaab chiefly avoids ships from Muslim countries and primarily focuses its attacks on American vessels. In the same year, Al Shabaab launched an offensive against the TFG from the beginning of Ramadan (the Muslim holy month), which left more than 500 people dead and 20,000 people displaced. Prior to the celebration of the end of Ramadan, Al Shabaab marked the end of this offensive by bombing the Mogadishu airport – leaving two AU troops, two civilians, and five militants dead.

Four months after, in the face of eroding popular support and military weakness, Al Shabaab claimed responsibility for its first known attack outside of Somalia: three coordinated bombings in the Ugandan capital of Kampala that killed at least 76 people. In spite of these high-profile, often international attacks, Al Shabaab’s power continued to wane in 2011, when Al Shabaab was forced to withdraw from the capital city Mogadishu. Al Shabaab claimed the move to be a tactical retreat; however, the Somali government claimed that its own troops, along with AMISOM forces, had caused the retreat. This expulsion from Mogadishu caused Al Shabaab to lose key territorial and economic resources, such as access to seaports.

Though this loss had the potential to obliterate the little power Al Shabaab continued to hold in Somalia, the group once again evolved and adopted a new set of strategies to establish and maintain control. During the East African drought of 2011, Al Shabaab cut off the water supply in cities held by Somali government forces; this has been an effort to demonstrate the inefficiency of the TFG, along with the power and presence Al Shabaab continues to wield . Additionally, the organization blocked the flow of humanitarian aid to these cities, leaving them desperate and willing to cooperate with Al Shabaab, instead of the Transitional Federal Government.

In 2012, Al Shabaab pledged its official allegiance to Al Qaeda, a move that garnered international attention and fear amongst those who worried what Al Shabaab would look like when given access to Al Qaeda’s resources. In the following year, Al Shabaab carried out its most high-profile attack at the Westgate shopping mall in Kenya, where 68 people were killed – all of them non-Muslim and many of them with ties to Western governments. Al Shabaab’s higher profile in Western media consequently made it an even larger target for military action, as was proven when the organization’s leader, Ahmed Abdi Godane, was killed in another American air strike. Following Godane’s death, Ahmad Umar was named as the organization’s new leader; very little information is available about Godane and his legitimacy was a leader is said to be questioned amongst various factions of Al Shabaab. This internal fragmentation and clouded vision has hindered the organization from reaching many of its goals in the past two years.

Current Situation

Al-Shabaab’s current situation has been shaped by three primary factors: shifting strategies to compensate for

African Union VMUN 2017 Background Guide 7 territorial loss, an unstable leadership structure, and alliances with other terrorist organizations. Though the AMISOM mission lead by the African Union has proven to be successful in preventing Al Shabaab’s territorial gain; the organization continues to thrive in Somalia and has made other East African nations a target for its extremist activity. However, despite the formation of powerful new alliances and proven initiative to gain notoriety in the region for violent attacks, Al Shabaab’s present leadership structure is unstable, decentralized, and poses a threat to the organization’s future. Effectively combatting the organization initially seemed like a straightforward task for the African Union, but cutting off territory from Al Shabaab has seemingly triggered an evolution for the organization, as it now seeks new mechanisms to establish its dominance in the region.

The initial success of the AU Mission to Somalia has been mired by Al Shabaab’s ability to pivot and retaliate against the African community by targeting nations that have contributed troops to the AMISOM mission. Once the organization realized that gaining territory in Somalia would be more difficult than before, Al Shabaab’s leadership made the strategic choice to adopt a new series of violent tactics to establish Al Shabaab’s notoriety and dominance in the region. These tactics include vehicular bombings, suicide bombings, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), shootings, hit and runs, political threats, and the assassination of notable political and civil society figures. In order to maximize their impact, Al Shabaab has allied with many of its former rival organizations, such as Hizbul Islam; making the organization stronger and more capable of carrying out regular attacks beyond Somalia’s borders.

Following in the trend of high-profile, targeted attacks, Al Shabaab recently assassinated Dr. Liban Osman, the nephew of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud. The incumbent president is responsible for strengthening the campaign against Al Shabaab and the group targeted Osman to send his administration a retaliatory message. Since 2014, Al Shabaab’s attacks on high-profile professionals in Mogadishu have increased exponentially, and as noted by the BBC’s Kati Isse, “incidents like these discourage professionals from the diaspora from returning to Somalia”. The implications of this may not seem severe, but disincentivizing professionals from working in Somalia will have dire implications on the nation’s development in the long-term.

After being forced out of the port city of Kismayo in 2012, Al Shabaab suffered a severe financial loss, as the port city provided the group with major profits from charcoal exports. In response to this, Al Shabaab revised its economic structure and began a more organized effort to collect protection fees and taxes from businesses, citizens, and organizations in the territories where it maintained control. Al Shabaab has also has taken a central role in the ivory and sugar trades operating in East Africa. According to the Nairobi-based watchdog organization Journalists for Justice, Al Shabaab, along with Kenyan and Somali defence forces, has been generating millions of dollars in revenue by smuggling sugar into Kenya. As of July 2016, Al Shabaab has since taken back the port city of Kismayo, and now utilizes its access to charcoal and sugar to make an estimated $12.2 million dollars per year. The irony of the situation is glaringly obvious: both Kenya and Somalia have spent millions in an effort to suppress Al Shabaab, while simultaneously giving the organization a means to fund its insurgency. Regaining access to Kismayo was a vital strategic move for Al Shabaab, which will ensure that the organization can remain financially stable and able to pursue its militant ventures. Not only will this practically benefit the organization, but it also serves as an ideological victory which is “symbolically important because [Kismayo] was one of the major towns retaken from al-Shabaab and underlines the resilience and longevity of the group”. Al Shabaab’s resilience is unparalleled amongst militant groups operating in Somalia, considering that it has lost control of key strongholds and yet, has been able to regroup in rural areas and subsequently strike and take back control. As of August 2016, Al Shabaab has been in the ‘regroup’ phase of its insurgency cycle, as it continues to take control of rural areas by using guerilla tactics to fight AMISOM forces.

Relations with ISIS and Al Qaeda

Internal conflict amongst Al Shabaab leadership has begun to threaten the organization on a larger scale, especially when regarding the international organizations that Al Shabaab has been affiliated with. Informally since 2008, and officially in 2012, Al Shabaab pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda and has worked with the

African Union VMUN 2017 Background Guide 8 organization to further its Islamist ideals in Somalia. Working with Al Qaeda has given Al Shabaab the opportunity to recruit abroad, train its members in Al Qaeda camps, and use the intelligence and resources that Al Qaeda of which is in possession. Despite this beneficial relationship, many Al Shabaab members have questioned the organization’s ties to Al Qaeda, pressuring Al Shabaab to abandon its commitment to global jihad in favour of Islamist nationalism dedicated to the Somali state. Beyond these ideological splinters, there are also members of Al Shabaab who wish to pledge their allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Since 2014, ISIS has been making overtures towards Al Shabaab, urging the organization to disavow its allegiance to Al Qaeda and align itself with ISIS. Though some saw this as a possibility, Al Shabaab’s leadership remains vehemently opposed to ISIS and the organization reportedly executes those who show loyalty towards the Islamic State. Despite this, a small faction of fighters under an Al Shabaab commander in the Puntland region did declare their allegiance to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and many Somali extremists and foreign jihadists have turned away from Al Shabaab in favour of ISIS. Alexander Meleagrou Higgins of King's College London best summed up the present ideological fragmentation that Al Shabaab currently faces with the following statement: “In the end, most people in Shabab are interested in Somalia. The leadership that is allied with Al-Qaeda clearly sees itself as part of the global jihadi struggle, but that’s not what gets them local recruits.”. If Al Shabaab fails to address this problem, these internal splinters forming within the group could serve as a vulnerable point that could be capitalized on by those seeking to eliminate the power and control of Al Shabaab.

UN and International Involvement

The United Nations has adopted a number of resolutions in an effort to combat the rise of Al Shabaab, which have varied in their degree of efficacy and practicality. Numerous press statements have been authorized by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), condemning terrorist attacks that Al Shabaab has taken responsibility for in Mogadishu; among them SC/1422 and SC/12388 in June 2016. Evidently, these statements have done little to combat the power or influence of the organization. More substantive resolutions implemented by the UN include Resolution 2232, which authorized the member states of the AU to maintain the deployment of the AU Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), an effort primarily focused on combating Al Shabaab. The resolution was unanimously adopted by the Security Council. Months later, on November 9 2015, the UNSC passed Resolution 2245 in response to a massive spike in support requests from both UNISOM and AMISOM. The nature of the resolution was similar to 2232, with the only difference being a greater allocation of resources to both missions. These missions have been successful in the effort to reduce Al Shabaab’s territorial holdings, which in turn, has resulted in less control and power for the organization to wield over the Somali people. It must be noted, however, that these missions are responsible for inciting a new wave of hatred for nations that participate in the missions, which has made them the target for Al Shabaab’s fatal attacks.

Of all the UNSC permanent members, the United States has taken the mostcentral role in ensuring the downfall of Al Shabaab, through the use of drone strikes. American drone strikes have been responsible for the death of key figures in the organization’s leadership, amongst them Aden Hashi Ayro (Al Shabaab’s first leader), Ahmed Abdi Godane (Ayro’s successor), and Adnan Garar (the mastermind behind the Westgate Mall attack). The efficiency of these drone strikes continues to be contested by the international community, however their precision has been praised and their impact on the organization’s leadership structure has left Al Shabaab increasingly unstable and vulnerable to internal conflict between members who fail to recognize a constantly shifting leadership structure.

Possible Solutions

Finding an effective solution to combat the rise of Al Shabaab is no easy task, especially when one considers the organization’s proven ability to evolve in response to formidable opposition. For example, the AMISOM

African Union VMUN 2017 Background Guide 9 mission proved to be successful when it took back Somali territory from the clutches of Al Shabaab; in response, Al Shabaab coordinated numerous terrorist attacks, assassinations, and began to target the entire region of East Africa. When considering the most effective way to eliminate the power of Al Shabaab, a multi- faceted approach is necessary and must acknowledge the political, economic, and social power of the organization within Somalia, East Africa, and the global jihadist movement.

Extending the AU Mission to Somalia is one potential solution that has already proven to be effective in diminishing Al Shabaab’s military power and territorial holdings. When placed in the broader framework of eliminating the organization, the AMISOM mission is vital in the effort to reduce Al Shabaab’s capacity to operate as a terrorist organization. Ever since Al Shabaab expanded its mission beyond Somalia and began attacks in the East African region, the African Union has been forced to reevaluate the degree of risk posed by the organization to African stability. Acknowledging this threat means creating a larger incentive for the AU to effectively target the organization by delegating nations to contribute troops and resources. Furthermore, the AU could work to strengthen its relations with Somali paramilitary groups such as Ahlu Sunna Waljama’a and the Rashkamboni Front by providing the necessary resourcesto further coordinate attacks on Al Shabaab.

Beyond reducing Al Shabaab’s military prowess, it is vital to acknowledge the economic power that keeps the organization at a functioning capacity. Al Shabaab receives its resources (i.e. money, weapons, training) from a number of sources, making it especially difficult for the AU to cut off its supply completely. The UN has claimed that several countries, including Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Djibouti, and Eritrea, have provided Al Shabaab with machine guns, money, missiles and training; additionally, Hezbollah and Al Qaeda-linked jihadists have been found making the same contributions. Imposing sanctions as a unified African bloc on these nations has the potential to be substantive enough to force these countries to cease contributing to Al Shabaab, especially when it comes to nations who are in unstable economic situations and need to maintain their ties with the AU. When pursuing this solution, member states must be wary of AU nations that presently have vested interests in Al Shabaab and have an incentive to see the group succeed.

Resources obtained from other states and terrorist organizations are not the only way that Al Shabaab maintains its status as the most notorious terrorist group operating in East Africa. The organization has managed to become somewhat economically self-sufficient by raising millions of dollars in cash from extortion schemes, illegal taxation, and the collection of other fees from unsuspecting civilians and tourists. Actions taken by the AU to seize these assets have the potential to destabilize the group within a matter of months.

By effectively exploiting the divisions that exist within members of the organization, the AU can dismantle the organization’s internal structure. This means appealing to the factions that exist within Al Shabaab, including clans that have been forced to fight for the organization, Somali nationalists, and foreign fighters who have come to support the mission to establish jihadist rule in Somalia. Not only should the AU consider capitalizing on these divisions, but the union must also consider mechanisms to reduce the organization’s ability to recruit and train fighters. A bulk of al-Shabaab’s growth as a terrorist organization has relied on its recruiting tactics, which have infiltrated Western communities and will be difficult to effectively intercept. The public relations arm of AlShabaab includes the utilization of social media, reality television, and hip-hop music. Coordinating an effort to reduce the influence of these tactics and possibly replacing them with more attractive opportunities for young Somali men has the potential to deter them from contributing to Al Shabaab. Additionally, working in cooperation with the governments of Iraq and Afghanistan to infiltrate Al-Qaeda training facilities that are used to train high-level operatives for their work within the organization can effectively reduce the number of capable fighters available for the organization in the long run.

Bloc Positions

North Africa Countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya have been accused of providing support for Al Shabaab in the

African Union VMUN 2017 Background Guide 10 form of money, arms, and safe haven for high-ranking officials within the organization. The present degree of their involvement with Al Shabaab is unknown; it could range from merely turning a blind eye to Al Shabaab’s participation in smuggling arms and the presence of internationally wanted terrorists in their countries, to tangible economic contributions. These nations have been hesitant to provide contributions in efforts to combat Al Shabaab; however, the unknown nature of their present involvement indicates that they have the potential to participate in AU missions – provided that the incentive is compelling enough to bypass their relations with Arabian Peninsula states, many of whom are supporters of Al Shabaab.

Somalia and Nigeria Somalia and Nigeria both have an incredibly large vested interest to eliminate Al Shabaab’s influence from the East African region. Not only does Somalia serve as a breeding ground for recruits, but it has the largest incentive to deal with the group effectively, in order to diffuse the threat it poses to the authority of the already unstable federal government. Though Al Shabaab is not active in NIgeria, the organization has close ties with the Nigerian terrorist group Boko Haram; the two groups coordinate the sharing of funds, training, and explosives. In recent years, the Nigerian government has demonstrated its willingness to provide vital resources in the fight against Al Shabaab, since Nigeria will ultimately benefit from Al Shabaab’s destabilization.

AMISOM Members Uganda, Burundi, Ethiopia, and Kenya are all presently involved in the AU Mission to Somalia and have each provided more than 3,000 troops to participate in the mission. Since February 2007, these nations have made a commitment to bring stability to Somalia by supporting transitional governmental structures, assisting with national security, and contributing to the Federal Government of Somalia’s forces in their battle against Al- Shabaab. As a result of the mission, these nations and their troops have been subject to numerous fatal attacks from Al Shabaab; this has created an even greater incentive for them to strengthen the mission and ensure that Al Shabaab is eradicated. Despite their commitment to the elimination of Al Shabaab, claims of corruption and collusion with Al Shabaab amongst AMISOM troops has indicated that the operation might require additional oversight from the AU.

Somaliland and Eritrea Both nations have been accused of providing substantive support to Al Shabaab since the group’s division from the ICU in 2006. The Government of Eritrea has allegedly provided more than $80,000 USD to Al Shabaab per month, along with several arms shipments and the provision of safe haven for Al Shabaab members. The Islamic Secessionary State of Somaliland has participated in similar activities, with several reports indicating the Somaliland’s government has given Al Shabaab financial and militaristic support in an effort to help Al Shabaab take over the Somali region of Puntland. In return for safe haven and military resources, Al Shabaab worked to ensure that the incumbent political party in Somaliland won its most recent election. Evidently, these nations, along with their respective allies, will deter efforts to dismantle the organization and they are likely to propose more lenient efforts to cooperate with Al Shabaab.

Discussion Questions

1. What are Al Shabaab’s present areas of weakness, and how can they be best exploited?

2. Have certain methods of combatting Al Shabaab’s power been more effective than others?

3. What role has the AU played in the effort to fight Al Shabaab? Have these efforts been successful?

4. Do AU states with a vested interest in the proliferation of Al Shabaab pose a threat to the AU’s efforts to eliminate the organization?

5. What are the primary economic, militaristic, and territorial factors that have contributed to Al

African Union VMUN 2017 Background Guide 11 Shabaab’s success thus far?

6. How has connecting with the broader global jihadist movement influenced the evolution of Al Shabaab as a militant organization? Have these connections been beneficial to the organization?

Additional Resources

Detailing the economic structure of Al Shabaab and how to effectively dismantle it https://globalecco.org/financing-al-shabaab-the-vital-port-of-kismayo

Key questions about Al Shabaab answered http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabab/p18650

A 20-minute Vice News documentary outlining the rise of Al Shabaab and its growing presence in Kenya https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KcwokHau8Xk

BBC Overview: Who is Somalia’s Al Shabaab? http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15336689

An article outlining the present state of the AU Mission to Somalia http://www.dw.com/en/au-in-somalia-underfunded-and-overwhelmed/a-19320842

Bibliography

"Adopting Resolution 2232 (2015), Security Council Authorizes Ongoing African Union Deployment in Somalia, Extends Mandate for United Nations Assistance Mission." United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases. N.p., 28 July 2015. Web. 17 July 2016.

"Al Shabaab." TRAC. N.p., n.d. Web. 17 July 2016.

"BBC NEWS | Africa | Profile: Somalia's Islamic Courts." BBC News. BBC, 06 June 2006. Web. 14 July 2016.

Burke, Jason. "Al-Shabaab Militants Retake Somali Port." The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 05 Feb. 2016. Web. 17 July. 2016.

Elgot, Jessica. "Al-Shabaab Attack on Mogadishu Hotel Kills 14 Civilians." The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 27 Feb. 2016. Web. 22 July 2016.

Gaffey, Conor. "ISIS or Al-Qaeda? Somalia's Al-Shabab Divided Over Allegiance." Newsweek. N.p., 25 Dec. 2015. Web. 22 July 2016.

Houreld, Katharine. "Somali Militant Group Al-Shabaab Formally Joins Al-Qaida." The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 09 Feb. 2012. Web. 17 July 2016.

"Kenya: Al-Shabaab – Closer to Home." International Crisis Group. N.p., 25 Sept. 2014. Web. 15 July 2016.

Kuo, Lily. "The Kenyan Military May Be Indirectly Funding Al-Shabaab Attacks on Kenya." Quartz. N.p., 14

African Union VMUN 2017 Background Guide 12 Nov. 2015. Web. 22 July 2016.

"Mapping Militant Organizations." | Mapping Militant Organizations. N.p., n.d. Web. 21 July 2016.

Masters, Jonathan, and Mohammad Aly Sergei. Council on Foreign Relations. Council on Foreign Relations, 13 Mar. 2015. Web. 15 July 2016.

"National Counterterrorism Center | Groups." National Counterterrorism Center | Groups. N.p., n.d. Web. 20 July 2016.

Ngugi, Mukoma Wa. "How Al-Shabaab Was Born." The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 04 Oct. 2013. Web. 17 July 2016.

Njini, Felix. "African Union Seeks Gulf Funding to Boost Al-Shabaab Fight." Bloomberg.com. Bloomberg, 3 June 2016. Web. 17 July 2016.

Pflanz, Mike. "Al-Shabaab Profile: A History of Somalia's Insurgent Movement." The Telegraph. Telegraph Media Group, 3 Apr. 2015. Web. 17 July 2016.

"Somali President's Nephew Killed in Al-Shabab Attack." BBC News. N.p., 7 Oct. 2015. Web. 20 July 2016.

African Union VMUN 2017 Background Guide 13 African Union Topic B Conflict in the Western Sahara Overview

Africa’s last colony, a territorial dispute, and a forgotten war. These are all terms that have been used to describe the Western Sahara conflict, an ongoing struggle between the indigenous people of the Western Sahara and the Moroccan Government that has destabilized the region and has resulted in thousands of casualties and human rights violations. No issue has divided members of the African Union (AU) like the dispute over the Western Sahara, a territory rich with phosphate located south of Morocco. Since it was colonized by Spain in the 1800s, the indigenous people of the Sahara (known as Sahrawis) have sought the right to self-determination, an internationally recognized principle that gives the original inhabitants of a land the right to decide how their land is to be governed and used. First, Spain withheld the Sahrawi right of self- determination by colonizing the Western Sahara; after, Morocco annexed the territory and withheld this right once more. Being denied the right to control their indigenous territory triggered anger and resentment amongst Sahrawis, many of whom united to form the Polisario Front, a guerilla organization who violently targeted Moroccan forces in an effort to take back territory in the Sahara and administer Sahrawi control in those regions. The new regions would be under the power of the newly formed Sahrawi Arab Democratic Government (SADR). Polisario Front and Moroccan forces fought for more than 16 years in the Western Sahara War, a violent conflict that enlisted the involvement of Mauritania, Algeria, and numerous external state actors. Eventually, a UN-brokered ceasefire brought the war to an end in 1991 when the Polisario Front had secured 1/3 of the Sahara’s least economically viable territory. The SADR negotiated with the UN to ensure that a referendum would be held to decide the future of the Sahara, but a lack of compromise from both parties kept this referendum from ever being held. Instead, Morocco begins to develop infrastructure in its territories of the Western Sahara in order to extract valuable natural resources, build its national economy, and foster international relations with world superpowers who would come to support its claim to the Sahara. At the same time, more than an estimated 125,000 Sahrawis live in refugee camps where they are subject to abuse and vulnerable to Islamic radicalization. Though the AU has voiced its support for the SADR by giving it full member status and calling on Morocco to agree on holding a referendum, internal divisions within the AU have kept the union from taking any substantive action to solve the issue. This inaction has been echoed by the UNSC, where attempts to take action have been stalled by France and the USA’s use of veto power, which is motivated by their economic relations with Morocco.

Not only is this conflict a territorial dispute, but it is a matter of regional security that has created a climate of instability and tension in the North African region. These issues have also s hindered the region’s efforts at economic and political development. This makes it of utmost importance to the AU, a regional body which presently has the largest incentive to solve the conflict, in order to pursue development in the region and avoid the onset of another war.

African Union VMUN 2017 Background Guide 14

Source: Cartografare Il Presente

Timeline

November 28, 1884: At the Berlin Conference of 1884, Spain is officially granted its claim to the Western Sahara (known then as Spanish Sahara) and colonizes the territory.

March 2, 1956: In accordance with UN Resolution 1540 “Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples”, France and Spain withdraw their protectorates* from Morocco and grant the nation its independence. This does not include the territory of the Western Sahara.

July 1, 1957: The President of Mauritania (then a part of French West Africa), Mokhtar Ould Daddah claims the Western Sahara as Mauritanian territory.

November 12, 1957: Morocco raises its claim to the Western Sahara at the United Nations, claiming that the territory belonged to Morocco prior to Spanish colonial rule.

May 10, 1973: The Polisario Front is formed and establishes itself as the sole representative of the Sahrawi people, with the express intention of militarily bringing an end to Spanish colonization.

African Union VMUN 2017 Background Guide 15

June 1975: In an effort to delay a referendum, King Hassan of Morocco takes the territorial dispute between Morocco, Spain, Mauritania, and the Polisario Front to the International Court of Justice. The court rules that the indigenous Sahrawi people of the Western Sahara have a right to self-determination, and that they should be allowed to settle the issue of sovereignty through a referendum.

November 6, 1975: King Hassan launches the Green March with 350,000 Moroccans crossing into the Western Sahara, armed solely with Qurans and the Moroccan flag. They call for the “return of the Moroccan Sahara” and annex the territory on behalf of Morocco.

November 14, 1975: Spain transfers control of the Western Sahara to Morocco and Mauritania under the Madrid Accords.

February 27. 1976: Polisario guerrilla fighters, backed by Libya and Algeria, proclaim the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), with a government-in-exile based in Algeria.

February 1976 - September 1991: Polisario fighters and Moroccan troops engage in guerilla warfare for 16 years in the Western Sahara War.

August 5, 1979: Mauritania signs a peace treaty with the Polisario front, renounces its claim from the Western Sahara, and withdraws from the war. Morocco annexes Mauritania’s share of Western Saharan territory.

1982: The SADR is granted membership in the Organization of African Unity (OAU), where it is recognized as the government of the Western Sahara. In protest, Morocco withdraws from the organization.

September 6, 1991: A UN-brokered ceasefire comes into effect between the Polisario front and Moroccan forces and the war comes to an end. The ceasefire agreement is contingent on a Moroccan promise to hold a referendum on Western Sahara’s sovereignty within the next six month. Disagreements surrounding voter eligibility prevent the referendum from being held.

2001: The Baker Plan is proposed, which would grant autonomy for the Saharawis under Moroccan sovereignty, a referendum in four years, and voting rights for both Moroccan settlers and indigenous Sahrawis. The Polisario Front and Algeria reject this proposal.

2003: The UN Security Council endorses a proposal to make Western Sahara a semi-autonomous region of Morocco for a transition period of five years, followed by a referendum on whether the territory should become independent, semi-autonomous, or integrated with Morocco. Polisario agrees to this plan, but Morocco rejects it.

Historical Analysis

Western European powers scrambled to colonize every inch of Africa during the 18th and 19th century. In wake of this, the Berlin Conference was held in 1984 to regulate colonizations and avoid conflict between imperialist powers. During the conference, France and Spain both sought to claim land in Morocco and agreed to negotiate on establishing the borders of their colonies. By 1912, Morocco and the Spanish Sahara were declared as respectively French and Spanish.

Unlike the Moroccan population, the indigenous people of the Sahara refused to accept French and Spanish colonial expansion, and they violently resisted European occupation. After a series of military operations in 1936, Spain and France successfully destroyed resistance and established stable occupation in their respective territories. Evidently, the two nations were satisfied with this outcome and reaped the economic rewards,

African Union VMUN 2017 Background Guide 16 which included access to an abundance of phosphate and offshore oil deposits; however, the creation of the United Nations in 1945 meant that international standards surrounding colonialism had changed. As outlined in UN Charter and in Resolution 1540, colonialism went against the principles of international peace and security, and UN member states were expected to give up their occupied territories.1 In accordance with these new international standards, France and Spain withdrew their protectorates from Morocco and granted the nation its independence in 1956. Immediately following this, France and Spain called on the new Moroccan government to pursue ‘Operation Ecouvillon”, which destroyed Saharan resistance by blocking aid and essential supply routes to the Saharan people; in return, Morocco received the southern Tarfaya province. It must be noted that though Spain gave up its claim to Morocco, it continued to exercise full sovereignty over the Western Sahara. Subsequently in 1957, Morocco raised a centuries-old claim in the United Nations, stating that the land of the Western Sahara was its own and that it belonged to the nation prior to European colonial rule. The neighbouring country of Mauritania filed a similar claim to the territory in the same year.

In 1963, the United Nations added Western Sahara to its list of non-self-governing territories (where it still remains) and the General Assembly agreed that a referendum on self-determination should take place in 1966. Under the principle of self-determination, the indigenous Sahrawi people would be given the right to decide how their territory would be governed. In order to avoid this referendum, Spain removed the designation of “colony” from Western Sahara and replaced it with “province”, a move which was met by massive, Sahrawi-led protests and violent repression from Spanish troops.

In an effort to better mobilize the cause of Sahrawi independence, the movement for Western Saharan independence, called Frente Popular de Liberacioń de Saguia el Hamra y Rio de Oro ( Polisario Front,) was founded in 1973. At this time, the Polisario Front was the sole representative of the Sahrawi people and it sought to use all militaristic means necessary to bring an end to Spanish occupation and grant the Sahrawi people their independence.

Responding to international pressure, Spanish authorities held a census in preparation for the UN proposed referendum. In anticipation for this referendum, the UN sent a delegation to investigate the political situation of the Western Sahara and found overwhelming support for Sahrawi independence, with very little support for the possibility of Moroccan or Mauritanian rule. In an effort to delay the referendum he was bound to lose, King Hassan of Morocco took the four-way territorial dispute (between Morocco, Spain, Mauritania, and the Polisario Front) to the International Court of Justice in the Hague. As requested by UN Resolution 3292, the ICJ had to give an advisory opinion on the following questions:

“At the time of colonization by Spain, was the territory of the Western Sahara belonging to no one (terra nullius)?

And should the majority opinion be “no” –

2. Were there legal ties between Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity?2”

In response to the first question, the court voted unanimously that at the time of colonization (defined as November 28, 1884), the territory was not terra nullius, and that it did belong to the indigenous Sahrawi people who were defined as “ethnically and culturally different from the Moroccan people”. 3

The second question has a more complicated response: on a 14-2 vote, it was found that Morocco had legal ties to the land and 15-1 that Mauritania had a legal ties to the land. However, the ICJ also determined that despite

1 http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c18943.htm 2 http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=323&p1=3&p2=4&case=61&p3=5 3 ibid

African Union VMUN 2017 Background Guide 17 having legal ties to the Western Sahara, these legal ties did not constitute a right for either country to exercise ownership over the territory. Ultimately, the court upheld the right to Sahrawi self determination and supported holding a referendum to decide the Western Sahara’s sovereignty.4

In spite of this, Mauritania and Morocco did not adhere to the ICJ’s decision and decided that their legal ties to the territory were enough to constitute ownership of the land. To avoid the possibility of any referendum or compromise, King Hassan ordered the Green March in 1975, where over 350,000 unarmed Moroccans marched into Western Sahara territory under the protection of Moroccan troops.5 Spanish forces held their fire and the Moroccans annexed the territory after Spanish authorities withdrew from the territory under the Madrid Accords; which mandated that Morocco and Mauritania would be given administrative control over the Western Sahara. The accords ensured that Spain would continue to have a stake in state-owned resource extraction companies, and they granted Morocco the northern two-thirds of the Western Sahara and Mauritania the southern third. Algeria and the Polisario Front were vehemently opposed to the accords, and Algeria dispatched a delegation to Madrid in an effort to convince the Spanish government not to sign. In response to being ignored and undermined, the Algerian government began to support the Polisario Front militarily and diplomatically in 1975. This included supplying arms, providing refuge to fighters, and supporting the Front through radio broadcasts and briefly, by funding a separatist group in the Spanish-owned Canary Islands. At this time, Algeria expelled over 45,000 Moroccan citizens living within its borders – a move which was widely criticized by human rights organizations.

Following its newfound support from both Algeria and Libya, the Polisario Front created the Sahwaran Arab Democratic Republic and proclaimed itself to be the rightful government of the Western Sahara. It should be noted that the SADR is technically not a sole political party or ideology, but rather that it functions as an actual government with 11 constituencies and 53 elected members (all from the party of the Polisario Front) that meet as the Sahrawi National Council, either in refugee camps or in the town of Tifariti. The creation of the SADR also marked the beginning of a 16-year guerilla insurgency led by the Polisario Front against Moroccan troops, known as the Western Sahara War. Fearing the onslaught of war, thousands of Sahrawis fled the Western Sahara for refugee camps in Algeria – many of which were bombed with napalm and white phosphorous during Moroccan bombing raids. This use of chemical weapons on civilians constitutes a war crime under the Geneva Convention. During this time, an approximate 1,500 Sahrawi civilians were “disappeared” by Moroccan forces and mass graves of their bodies continue to be uncovered in the 21st century. As highlighted in an Amnesty International; report, “The men, women, and even children who ‘disappeared’ in Western Sahara came from all walks of life. Many were detained because of their alleged pro- independence activities, support for the Polisario Front, and opposition to Morocco’s control of the Western Sahara. Others, including elderly people and children, ‘disappeared’ because of their family links with known or suspected opponents to Moroccan government policy in Western Sahara”.6

Since the Polisario Front could not directly match the military strength of Morocco, SADR troops utilized guerilla warfare tactics that were successful enough to withdraw Mauritania from the war in 1979. Mauritania’s contributions to the war had become a source of internal disorder and instability for the nation, and as such, Mauritania signed a peace treaty with the SADR on August 5, 1979 and officially recognized the SADR. This evidently ruptured Mauritania’s relations with Morocco, who subsequently annexed the southern territory held by Mauritania.

Until the late 1980s, Morocco was able to fend off Sahrawi attacks by building a large sand wall around the strategically and economically important parts of the Western Sahara which were protected by roughly the same amount of troops as the entire population of the Western Sahara. Effectively, the war was at a stalemate,

4 Ibid 5 http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/moroccans-march-western-sahara-green-march-1975 6 Amnesty International report, 1999

African Union VMUN 2017 Background Guide 18 though the Polisario Front was able to economically and militaristically strain Morocco by using artillery strikes and sniperattacks. As time went on, participation in the war became an unsustainable option for both parties, and as such, the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) was called in to administer a ceasefire in 1991. The ceasefire agreement was centred around the promise for a referendum to be held regarding the status of the Western Sahara; however, it was initially stalled over disagreements surrounding voter rights. Attempts in 2001 and 2003 to restart the referendum process have also failed; the first being rejected by the Polisario Front for replacing sovereignty with autonomy, and the second rejected by Morocco for granting the option of independence in a referendum.

Current Situation

The UN brokered ceasefire between the SADR and the Moroccan government has remained in place since 1991; but that is not to say that the conflict has come to an end. The persistence of both parties and their claim to the Western Sahara have created a tense climate in the region that has only been magnified by the proxy participation of countries like the United States, France, Algeria, and Iran. Present issues in the region include human rights abuses on both sides, the extraction of economic resources, and the continuous desire for Sahrawi self-determination – which has created the imminent and constant threat of a return to war. Since 1975, Morocco has yet to change its stance on sovereignty over the region, currently maintaining their belief of the SADR to be: an illegitimate organization, a separatist movement (given the Moroccan origins of some of its leaders), and a puppet under the control of Algeria. The SADR continues to view itself as a national liberation movement with the right to claim sovereignty under the pretences of self-determination.

First, Second, and Third Independence Intifadas

The independence intifadas were a series of violent and nonviolent demonstrations led by the Sahrawis, in protest of the Moroccan government’s annexation of the Western Sahara.

The First intifada began in 1999 and lasted until 2004. The death of King Hassan II, who had pledged democracy and reform triggered the first wave of protests in September 1999, when Sahrawi students and former political prisoners held a sit-in at al-Zamlah Square, in the capital city of Laayoune. They argued for an end to the “disappearance” of prominent political activists and for compensation for the indigenous Sahrawis, who were having their natural resources exploited by the Moroccan government with no remuneration. Shortly after, they were joined by Sahrawi mine workers and the Sahrawi National Association of Unemployed University Graduates. Moroccan officials responded to the protests by beating and arresting demonstrators; some Sahrawis were reportedly driven out into the desert and left there. The First Intifada was significant for two reasons: it highlighted the often ignored issue of Sahrawi human rights and it showed that Sahrawis were capable of dissenting, protesting, and stating their demands under Moroccan rule.

The Second Intifada, also known as the Independence Intifada, was a series of riots and demonstrations of civil disobedience led by pro-independence Sahrawi activists. During the demonstrations, journalists and diplomats had limited access to the territory, and many were expelled after interviewing activists. Hundreds of civilians were arrested and subject to police brutality, before being put on trial and sentenced to prison. Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the European Parliament condemned these actions taken up by Moroccan authorities. MINURSO Force Commander, General Eseqbuyota Okita described the events with the following, “...it reminded me of the forced removals of black people by the Apartheid Regime in the 1950s. The Saharawi people’s protest was met by severe repression by the Moroccan forces, where they exposed to beaten and bulldozers for demolition their houses.".

The Third Intifada is more commonly known as the Gdeim Izik protest camps, which are explained at depth in the Human Rights Abuses section of this backgrounder.

African Union VMUN 2017 Background Guide 19

Human Rights Abuses

Both Morocco and the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic have accused each other of human rights violations inflicted on populations under their respective control, this primarily being in Polisario-controlled refugee camps and in Moroccan-controlled parts of the Western Sahara.

Human rights violations in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara

As of 2016, Morocco has been condemned by 16 international human rights organizations for its treatment of the indigenous Sahrawi people. The international democracy watchdog, Freedom House, released a report detailing the human rights abuses that Sahrawi people and their supporters have been subjected to.7 They include the imprisonment of journalists that have criticized Morocco’s territorial integrity, repressive measures against pro-Sahrawi demonstrators, and the prohibition against Sahrawis forming political associations (i.e labour organizations) or non-governmental associations to support their own people. Amnesty International has echoed these claims, reporting on evidence that numerous pro- Sahrawi demonstrators have been detained, imprisoned without trial, and tortured during interrogation.8 On March 20, 2010, the Sahrawi human rights activist Rachid Sghir was beaten by Moroccan police after giving an interview to BBC; in September of that year, a delegation of Sahrawis attending the international symposium on the existence and rights of the Sahrawi people in Algeria were also beaten by police upon their return to Laayoune (the largest city in Western Sahara). In October 2010, thousands of Sahrawis fled Laayoune for the outskirts of Lemesid (a small oasis town in Western Sahara), where they raised a campment in protest of discrimination against Sahrawis in Moroccan- controlled territory and the spoliation of the Western Sahara’s natural resources by Moroccan and American companies.9 The camp grew to hold more than 20,000 people and the Moroccan Army subsequently encircled the camp with a wall of sand and stones, blocking all access to the camp and refusing entry to Spanish politicians and foreign journalists. Prior to the camp’s encirclement, an SUV entering the camp and holding Sahrawis was machine-gunned by Moroccan soldiers, killing a 14-year old boy and wounding five others. The boy’s dead body was taken and buried by Moroccan authorities, without an autopsy or the consent of his family.

Human rights violations of the Polisario Front

Until 2004, the Polisario Front was criticized for holding more than 1,000 Moroccan prisoners of war, well after the end of the Western Sahara war. The treatment of these prisoners in POW camps and the intentions of the Polisario Front were widely questioned by the international community, and Morocco used the imprisonment of its nationals as a justification for the human rights abuses it inflicted upon the Sahrawi people. However, all of these prisoners were released, in healthy condition by 2004. There have also been accusations levelled at the Polisario Front regarding its use of child soldiers, specifically young Sahrawi children who have been recruited at a young age and sent to school to be trained in guerilla tactics and to be indoctrinated with Polisario ideology. In 2005, a UNHCR programme to send Sahrawi refugee children abroad for schooling in Cuba was criticized as a front for the SADR to indoctrinate children with communist ideals and train them as armed combatants. These accusations were also levelled when the programme shut down in 2008. Now, the primary cause for concern regarding human rights is the treatment of refugees in Polisario- controlled refugee camps. These camps have an uncounted population of increasingly hopeless young people (Algeria and the Polisario won’t allow a census to be taken), who are being targeted by recruits for a wide network of terrorist and criminal gangs. The recent uptick in this recruitment has caught the attention of the

7 https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2005/morocco?page=22&country=6795&year=2005 8 http://web.amnesty.org/report2006/mar-summary-eng 9 http://www.wsrw.org/a105x1632

African Union VMUN 2017 Background Guide 20 international community, especially that of Europe and the US, who have finally begun to recognize the danger that an inadequately governed space in North Africa can pose to regional security.

Source: The Economist

Regional Stability

Morocco and Algeria, along with Tunisia, Libya, and Mauritania form a region in Northwest Africa known as the Maghreb. Initially a historical-cultural designation, the Maghreb is now considered to be Africa’s most economically progressive bloc with the highest potential for development.10 Despite the tumultuous period of the Arab Spring, the region’s possibility for wide-scale economic and social growth is unprecedented in Africa. However, Morocco and Algeria, the most stable states in the region, have failed to provide the high degree of joint leadership and cooperation required to achieve these goals; this has largely been the case because of Algeria’s staunch support for sovereign Sahrawi rule and an unwillingness to exert the influence it has over the SADR to encourage the creation of a compromise. For as long as these nations stay away from the negotiation table, all Maghreb nations will continue to suffer.

Manhasset Negotiations

The Manhasset Negotiations were a series of talks between the Moroccan government and representatives of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, with the participation of Algerian and Mauritanian delegates.The talks took place in four rounds between 2007 and 2008 in Manhasset, New York. The talks were led by then-UN Envoy Peter Van Walsum, who sought to achieve a “just, lasting, and mutually acceptable political solution, which [would] provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara. In and of itself, this mandate was inherently contradictory: self-determination could never be a mutually acceptable solution, considering that Morocco has rejected every opportunity for the Sahrawi people to pursue a referendum with the option of full independence. Following the failure of these negotiations, the United States lost the little political will that it had to administer these talks and largely ignored the issues of the Western Sahara.

In the UN Security Council, the United States and France have both been largely at fault for vetoing attempts to find a UN-mandated solution for the Western Sahara. Morocco has been an important economic and

10 http://www.mei.edu/content/solving-western-sahara-—-what-now-remains

African Union VMUN 2017 Background Guide 21 political force in the pocket of both nations, and they have prioritized their respective domestic interests over the possibility of stabilizing the Western Sahara. Neither nation sees the Sahara problem to be of strategic importance or of significant urgency, to warrant any action on an international scale. Not only does this inaction create a vacuum that the AU has the ability to fill , but it demonstrates a level of blatant disregard for the present state of the Western Sahara. Not only are some of the world’s worst refugee camps isolated in the Sahara, but allowing the situation to drag on will undoubtedly have dangerous future implications that will compromise the entire political and economic stability of the North African region – along with the international interests that are presently vested in the region.

Economic Activity in the Western Sahara

The territory Morocco occupies in the Western Sahara is the most economically lucrative part of the region, rich with phosphate deposits that have been extracted by domestic and international corporations over the past two decades. The UN and the International Court of Justice have denounced these activities, as determined in 2002 by the UN Under-Secretary General for Legal Affairs who saw the exploitation of Western Sahara’s natural resources to be “a violation of the international law principles applicable to mineral resource activities in Non-Self Governing Territories”. In other words – the UN has effectively supported the right of the Sahrawi people to choose how their land and its resources are used for financial gain; however, this right is a principled idea at best and cannot be enforced without the mutual agreement of both parties. As such, the Office Cherifien des Phosphates (OCP), a Moroccan government-owned mining company presently controls one of the world's largest mines located in the occupied Western Sahara, reaps in millions of dollars each day, and spends this money at the discretion of the Moroccan government – not the Sahrawi people. Notably, the OCP is a multi-billion dollar donor to the Clinton Global Initiative and has spent millions of dollars lobbying the US government to ensure that the US prevents any international intervention on the issue of the Western Sahara.

Proponents of Moroccan resource extraction in the region point to wide-scale infrastructure development projects funded by Morocco in the Western Sahara, claiming that the phosphate money is being allocated to better the lives of Sahrawi people. In actuality, this has not been the case. Most of the infrastructure development in the occupied territory has not been designed to improve the standard of living for Sahrawi people. Instead, this money has been used to finance an elaborate internal security system of military bases, police facilities, prisons, and surveillance, and related repressive apparatuses; housing construction and financial support for Moroccan settlers; and airport, seaport, and other transportation facilities designed for the sole purpose of accelerating resource extraction. Sahrawi people living in occupied territories have no political will to influence these decisions, and most are socio-economically disenfranchised, living as second- class citizens on the land that has been withheld from them for nearly a century. Many Sahrawis now work as labourers for these resource extraction companies that have been given a license from the Moroccan government to mine in the Sahara – such as Kosmos Energy (US), ONHYM (Morocco) and San Leon Ltd (Ireland).

In recent years, the oppression of the Sahrawis has become twofold: not only are they being locked out of the financial opportunities held in the resources of the Western Sahara, but there have been numerous cases of Sahrawi labourers having their labour rights violated by these extraction companies. Presently, the economics of the Western Sahara can be interpreted from two vastly different perspectives; the indigenous people of the Sahara don’t have access to education, are forced into low level labour work, and subsequently have their rights violated. Yet, at the same time, the Moroccan government has been making billions of dollars through licensing contracts and state-sanctioned phosphate extraction, while using the vast resources of the Sahara as an opportunity to foster powerful international relationships with the USA, France, Ireland, and the UK.

African Union VMUN 2017 Background Guide 22 Past UN/International Involvement

The UN has played a pivotal role in the conflict in the Western Sahara since the organization’s inception in 1945 – when it mandated that all states had the right to pursue self-determination and be free from colonial rule. To this day, its involvement in the region plays an integral part in maintaining relative peace between Moroccan forces and the SADR.

Settlement Plan, 1991

UN Security Council resolution 725, which was adopted unanimously, called for Morocco and the Polisario Front to enter a ceasefire and end 16 years of violent conflict. The plan was grounded in the promise of a referendum for the Sahrawi people and resulted in the dispatch of MINURSO delegations to monitor the state of peace between both parties, on their respective territory. The Settlement Plan was based on an earlier peace proposal by the Organization of African Unity (now the AU), and although it was successful in enacting a ceasefire, the referendum was never held and subsequent talks based on the Settlement Plan never resulted in substantive action.

Houston Agreement, 1997

The Houston Agreement is indisputably the closest that Morocco and the SADR came to an agreement regarding the organization of a referendum in the Western Sahara. Led by UN Special Envoy James Baker, the talks applied the framework of the 1991 Settlement Plan to hold a referendum monitored by the UN. However, Morocco’s King Hassan II died in 1999 and his successor, King Mohammed VI dropped Morocco’s support for an independence referendum.

The Baker Plan

UN Special Envoy to Western Sahara, James Baker, was responsible for drafting a plan to implement a mutually acceptable solution for the Western Sahara conflict. The first draft of his plan in 2000, called Baker I, offered the people of the Western Sahara autonomy within the Moroccan states. Other than defence and foreign policy, the Sahrawi people would be free to make all decisions surrounding governance. This plan was accepted by Morocco, but rejected by Algeria and the Polisario Front. Algeria countered this proposal by suggesting that the territory be divided between Morocco and the Sahrawis – but this was not accepted by Morocco. The second version of this plan was proposed in 2003 and was known as Baker II, this plan proposed Saharan self-rule under a Western Sahara Authority for five years, with a referendum on independence to follow. Both Moroccan settlers and indigenous Sahrawis would have the right to vote in this referendum, although the five year interim government would be elected solely by indigenous Sahrawis. Algeria and the Polisario Front reluctantly accepted this plan as a foundation for negotiations with Morocco, but Morocco rejected the plan, stating that it would not agree to any referendum that included the option of independence.

Baker resigned in protest of this inaction, the second UN envoy to Western Sahara to do so. He claimed there was no feasible way to peacefully solve the situation in the Western Sahara without either party having the will to compromise. Moroccan officials were happy with his resignation, calling it the result of “the tenacity of Moroccan diplomacy”.

UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara

Established in 1991 under UNSC Resolution 690, the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) is a UN peacekeeping mission with the following mandates: monitor the UN-brokered ceasefire, identify and register qualified indigenous voters, oversee the exchange of prisoners of war, monitor the

African Union VMUN 2017 Background Guide 23 confinement of Polisario and Moroccan troops to their designated locations, and organize a free and fair referendum for the Sahrawis to choose between Moroccan integration and independence.

Since 1991, the MINURSO mandate has been extended 41 times and currently, there are two sets of MINURSO delegations – those in the Moroccan-controlled Sahara and those in the Sahrawi-controlled region and in Sahrawi refugee camps in Algeria.

MINURSO is the only UN peacekeeping mission currently operating without a mandate to monitor and uphold international standards of human rights, despite numerous reports of human rights abuse on the Sahrawi population. The possibility to enact this mandate has been denied by France’s veto power on the Security Council. In May 2010, the Polisario Front suspended its contacts with the MINURSO because of the mission’s inability to protect the rights of Sahrawis and its failure implement the promised self-determination referendum.

Controversies

Ban Ki-Moon Controversy

In March 2016, the Western Sahara conflict made international headlines after a period of relative obscurity when UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon visited Sahrawi refugee camps in Algeria and described Morocco’s presence in the Western Sahara as an “occupation”. The Moroccan government saw this as a violation of the UN’s neutrality, claiming that the use of the word “occupy” implied that the Western Sahara did not rightfully belong to the Moroccan state. Following these comments, Morocco expelled 84 members of the MINURSO mission, withdrew its US$3 million annual contribution to the mission, and closed a military liaison office for MINURSO. Angry demonstrators took to the streets of Morocco, insulting Ban Ki-Moon and burning his picture in protest of him abandoning his “neutrality, objectivity, and impartiality”.

These actions prompted the AU’s envoy for Western Sahara to warn the United Nations that the conflict in the Western Sahara would inevitability re-ignite if steps were not taken to find a settlement. He described the present state of the territory by saying, “Western Sahara may be seen as a small problem, but let us not forget that a spark can light an entire forest on fire”.

Ikea Controversy

In September 2015, Moroccan authorities blocked the opening of Ikea’s first store in the country because of the Swedish parliament’s vote to recognize the statehood of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. Morocco considered placing an embargo on the import of all Swedish goods because of this decision, demonstrating that it prioritized the issue of the Western Sahara over its economic and political interests. This controversy is one of many recent examples that demonstrate the quiet volatility of the conflict that continues to influence foreign policy and trade.

Possible Solutions

Not only would finding a solution to the Western Sahara benefit the Sahrawi people and the stability of North Africa, but a mutually agreed-upon decision has the potential to reintroduce Morocco to the African Union. Morocco is currently the only African nation to not have membership in the AU, and as such, both parties are missing out on the mutual benefits of economic and political partnership. When discussing, debating, and proposing solutions to the conflict, delegates are reminded to consider the principled justifications that the SADR and Morocco have unwaveringly stood by for more than fifty years. This means that delegates must highlight the importance of compromise and pursue the solutions that have the most nuance and

African Union VMUN 2017 Background Guide 24 understanding of these respective motivations, while also having the practical capacity to be implemented and peacefully sustained in the long-term.

Holding a referendum

Since 1991, the people of the Western Sahara have been promised a referendum to decide on the governance of their land under the principles of self-determination that were validated by the International Court of Justice in 1976. This referendum has not been held for a variety of excuses: voter eligibility, administering the referendum, and the options of the referendum. The SADR wants full independence to be an option, while at best, Morocco only supports the option of autonomy under Moroccan rule. Negotiating the terms of a referendum and ensuring that one be held is vital when pursuing a diplomatic solution to this conflict.

Autonomy under sovereignty

The prospect of Sahrawi autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty is an idea modelled after the autonomy of Catalonia, Basque, and Andalusia in Spain. Essentially, the Sahrawi people would have the ability to administer regional laws and governance in the Western Sahara, but Morocco would continue to lay claim to the land of the Sahara. Morocco has agreed to this power-sharing model, however the Sahrawis remain adamant about pursuing independence. Finding or creating an incentive for the SADR to agree to this model will be vital if delegates choose to pursue it. However, the long-term downfalls must also be noted: in the circumstance where the Sahrawis feel that their regional power in undermined, this has the potential to trigger conflict and violent secession.

AU Intervention

The African Union has vocalized its support for the SADR since accepting the exiled government as a full- member in 1982. However, the AU has failed to take substantive action in the region due to the respective alliances of AU member states to Algeria and Morocco; instead, the AU has widely ignored the Western Sahara and the threat that it poses to regional African stability. If AU member states decide to recognize the urgency of the Western Saharan issue, the possibility of intervention in the region could become a reality and the AU could establish an international zone in the Western Sahara – following the model of the Tangier International Zone between 1923 and 1956. This would ensure stability amongst both parties, and the AU could work to appease the needs of the SADR and Morocco until a solution is reached. During this period, the AU must work to ensure that private international interests are excluded from the peace-process, and that the Sahrawi people receive a more just allocation of their resources. In order to ensure cooperation amongst North African states, the AU would be advised to funnel money into a sub-saharan transnational effort to promote regional unity.

Trade embargoes

If negotiations between Morocco and member states of the AU are not fruitful, the union could impose embargoes and sanctions on trade with Morocco – specifically targeting the resources of the Western Sahara. This option would likely have economic ramifications that would force Morocco back to the negotiation table and ready to make concessions; however, pursuing this avenue will not be a consensus decisions amongst AU states, particularly those with bilateral trade relations with Morocco. It should also be noted that Morocco’s powerful economic allies in Europe and North America would likely work to keep the nation afloat, and as such, trade embargoes would not effectively threaten Morocco’s economic stability immediately. Instead, the process would be arduous and have lasting economic and political impacts on AU states that severed their ties with Morocco.

Transitional power

African Union VMUN 2017 Background Guide 25 The model of a five-year transition from Moroccan administration to full Sahrawi rule in the Western Sahara is the model favoured by most Sahrawis. When this transitional model was proposed as an option for the 1991 referendum, the Moroccan government opposed its inclusion entirely. In order to implement this power structure and give the Sahrawis full territorial power, the AU would have to pursue one of these options: mandate it be held and enforce this through embargoes or AU troops, negotiate with Morocco to have it included in a referendum, or make a concession (ie. allow Moroccan companies to mine for phosphorus in the Sahara) in order to have Morocco agree to the transitional power model.

Bloc Positions

Algeria, Libya, and the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic All three nations are staunch proponents of the Sahrawi claim to sovereignty in the Western Sahara and have shown an unwavering allegiance to this claim, refusing to compromise for anything less than complete independence from Moroccan rule. The SADR was founded on the principle of achieving Sahrawi self- determination, and to this day, it continues to advocate for the opportunity for Sahrawis to decide how their land is governed. Algeria has allocated countless resources to support the SADR’s fight against Moroccan forces, both during the Western Sahara War when it provided arms, training, and safe haven for guerilla fighters, and after the war when it allowed the SADR to set-up refugee camps and its government-in-exile in Algeria. On a smaller scale, Libya has also provided resources to the SADR in its fight to claim the Sahara. These nations will play a pivotal role in solving this conflict, as they will represent the interests of the Sahrawi people and advocate for their demands in a way that most member states will not have an incentive to do so. If effective, they will rally enough support for the Sahrawi claim to make the prospect of self-determination worthwhile for the AU to pursue.

Countries who support Morocco’s claim The following countries have vocalized their support for Morocco’s claim to the Western Sahara: Sudan, Central African Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Gabon, Niger, Togo, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Senegal, and Gambia. These nations have political, diplomatic, and economic ties to Morocco that they would not like to risk when taking a stance on the Western Sahara. As such, they stand by Morocco’s territorial claim to sovereignty and will work to halt any AU action that might compromise this. These nations do not have enough of an incentive to risk their relationship with Morocco for the mere principle of “self-determination”; therefore, they will advocate for Morocco’s claim to the AU and the AU must respond by either working around their advocacy or by giving them an incentive to support the AU’s actions. Since Morocco is not a member-state of the AU, these nations must do their best to represent Morocco’s interests when addressing this topic.

Maghreb States Tunisia, Mauritania, Egypt are all members of the territorial bloc known as the Maghreb. As the only Maghreb states who do not hold a direct stake in the Western Sahara conflict, they support the fastest and most stable solution that can be brought to the region. This is because Algeria, Libya, and Morocco are all also members of the Maghreb, and the tensions between these states has hindered the Maghreb from growing to its full diplomatic and economic potential. The right solution could change this, allowing Maghreb states to develop into full-scale powerhouses in continental Africa. These nations should work to advocate for the most practical, non-partisan solution to the conflict that will result in the most unity amongst all Maghreb states.

Supporters of the Sahrawi Claim South Africa, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Ghana, Burkina Faso, Equatorial Guinea, Madagascar, Swaziland, Seychelles, Kenya, and the Republic of the Congo have all directly recognized the Sahrawi right to self determination. These nations will work in conjunction with the SADR, Libya, and Algeria to ensure that this right is acknowledged and upheld by the AU. They will likely support the implementation of a solution that upholds Sahrawi self-determination and governance, and they will work to convince more neutral states to

African Union VMUN 2017 Background Guide 26 follow this path. Note: there are a handful of AU member-states that recognize the SADR as a nation, but do not directly support its claim to the Western Sahara. These countries would fall under the same bloc, with the exception that in a trade-off, they would prioritize regional security over a solution that favours the Sahrawi claim.

Neutral States A number of AU states (amongst them Somalia, Eritrea, Benin, and Angola) have chosen to remain neutral on the issue of the Western Sahara, in an effort to maintain their relations with both Morocco and Algeria. These states will be of strategic importance to other blocs, looking to strengthen their influence and ability to enforce decisions in the AU. Neutral states will decide their stance based on two primary objectives: what they perceive to benefit the AU and what will benefit their domestic needs.

Discussion Questions

1. Is there a likelihood for violence to emerge between the SADR and Morocco in the near future? If yes, what are indicators of this?

2. Are there feasible compromises that can be made by both parties in this conflict to reach a solution? What compromises would be likely?

3. What steps does the AU have to take in order to best solve this conflict?

4. Should the AU prioritize finding a solution that can be easily implemented, or sustainable in the long- term?

5. How has the Western Sahara conflict impacted regional stability in Africa? Can and should the AU prioritize mitigating this instability?

Additional Resources

Secret report from the UN High Commission for Refugees detailing the present state of human rights in the Western Sahara https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/Sahara-Update/conversations/topics/1783

Short video providing a useful overview of the conflict https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4SakRNO_SMY

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