1325_A1-A7.qxd 11/30/07 1:17 PM Page 1 310-567/B428-S/11005 Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972 1. Memorandum Prepared by the Ambassador to Germany (Lodge)1 October 31, 1968. GERMANY 1. Even though divided, modern Germany is much the strongest country in Europe (excluding the Soviet Union) as regards population, gross national product, steel production, organizing ability, vitality, general dynamism and military potential. It must thus be the core of the defense of Europe. 2. The political leadership of Germany is, however, not as strong. The Chancellor2 seems to have a hard time thinking his way through his relationship with France on the one hand and with the United States on the other. He appears torn between being firm on the one hand and following Willy Brandt’s policy of “détente” on the other. (The diffi- culty of practicing “détente” unilaterally without any cooperation from the other fellow must make his task even harder!) When the access routes to Berlin were being harassed at the time of my arrival in May, I was never pressed by the Chancellor to take strong steps of the kind which many were then urging.3 It was always easy to keep abreast of 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 681, Country Files, Europe, Germany, Vol. I. Top Secret. Lodge signed and dated the memo- randum by hand. Richard Nixon, then Republican candidate for President, was in New York on October 31 for a nationally televised campaign rally at Madison Square Garden. Lodge may have given Nixon the memorandum before attending the rally. (Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, p. 322) On November 9, “while returning to his post in Bonn,” Lodge stopped in Key Biscayne to “brief the President-elect on the situation in Europe.” (The New York Times, November 10, p. 73) No evidence has been found to in- dicate whether the two men discussed this memorandum at that or any other time. 2 Kurt Georg Kiesinger (CDU). 3 On March 10 the East German Government announced the first in a series of travel restrictions to Berlin as a means to protest the failure of the West German Gov- ernment to outlaw the neo-Nazi National Democratic Party (NPD). Kiesinger was still debating how to respond to this campaign when Lodge presented his credentials on May 27. After meeting Kiesinger on June 21, Lodge commented: “The Chancellor’s failure to be concrete on what he wanted us to be ‘firm’ about leads me to the view that he was ‘making a record’—putting himself in a position to say that he had ‘told’ us.” (Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XV, Document 276) 1 1325_A1-A7.qxd 11/30/07 1:17 PM Page 2 310-567/B428-S/11005 2 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XL the Chancellor whose words were very carefully hedged. Indeed I have not yet had a strong or deeply felt demand made on me following upon the invasion of Czechoslovakia.4 (None of the above means that the Chancellor should make more clear cut declarations in public. Every German Chancellor, no matter how decisive he may be, must be highly discreet in public.) 3. Contributing to the Chancellor’s indecision is the chill in the American attitude towards Germany which began in 1961 and which has now produced the current lack of German confidence in our com- mitment to help defend them against aggression. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, as well as intensifying their desire for American re- assurance, also dealt a severe blow to German self confidence. This— and their weak leadership—may explain their half-hearted reactions mentioned in paragraph 2 and their neglect of their own military strength. At the Washington end is the clamor to pull out our troops and the frequently expressed doubts about Germany’s importance to our security. The net of it all is a downward spiral as regards German- American relations with all that they mean to our entire Atlantic pos- ture and to our survival. 4. I think it is only prudent to assume that a broad Soviet aim is to take over Germany gradually and make of it another Finland. This would of course be done without an actual invasion: the mere prox- imity of huge Soviet armies can get results here as they have elsewhere. If they are successful in bringing Germany into the Soviet orbit, nei- ther the United Kingdom, as an offshore archipelago, or France, as part of a coastal strip, would count for much. The Soviet Union, for the first time, would in this event be stronger than the United States. We would then await their decision concerning our fate. 5. There is also no doubt that the Soviet Union has some very strong cards to play. Emotions here about East Germany and Berlin un- derstandably run deep. A Soviet offer, therefore, to unify East and West Germany and to locate the capital of the newly unified state in Berlin would be very difficult for any German government to resist, even if the price were to be the neutralization of Germany. I hasten to say that there is no sign whatever of such an offer being made and that this statement is made for illustrative purposes only. Indeed the Soviets may never have to pay so high a price: if the Germans truly believe that we no longer consider them vital to our security, a tacit appease- 4 For a memorandum of conversation between Lodge and Kiesinger on September 5, including discussion of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia the previous month, see ibid., Document 285. 1325_A1-A7.qxd 11/30/07 1:17 PM Page 3 310-567/B428-S/11005 Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972 3 ment of the Russians will surely take place. Twice in our lifetime Ger- mans and Russians have reached agreement.5 6. If, as I believe, it is a vital American interest to keep West Ger- many from going into the Soviet orbit, then it is a vital American in- terest not only to keep NATO going, but also to energize and vitalize it. Under these circumstances there are a number of concrete measures which the President Elect should consider, as follows: a) A trip to Berlin. b) A statement that he favors extending NATO after 1969 and will ask the Senate to pass a resolution to this effect. c) A commitment to send to Germany on permanent duty two brigades of the 24th Division and to maintain existing troop levels for a three to five year period. This would be part of a “package deal” in which the Germans agree to make a three to five year “offset” com- mitment to pay for our expenses in Germany which hurt us so much because of their effect on our international balance of payments. The present administration has never been willing to make such a “pack- age deal” and the haggling which we have had to do about the so- called “offset” question has been a cancer eating away at our relations. It was, I believe, the factor which resulted in the overthrow of Chan- cellor Erhard.6 7. If the concrete measures suggested in paragraph 6 were effec- tuated, an upward spiral would ensue which would be of great bene- fit to our security. 8. I have checked the above estimate of the situation with regard to Germany with eminent men who cannot be suspected of German “localitis” and they concur. 5 Reference is to the Rapallo Treaty of April 16, 1922, and the “Hitler–Stalin Pact” of August 23, 1939. 6 On November 30, 1966, 2 months after President Johnson refused to soften the terms of the “offset” agreement and 1 month after the Free Democratic Ministers left his Cabinet, Ludwig Erhard resigned as West German Chancellor. 1325_A1-A7.qxd 11/30/07 1:17 PM Page 4 310-567/B428-S/11005 4 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XL 2. Telegram From the Mission in Berlin to the Department of State1 Berlin, January 8, 1969, 1520Z. 20. Subject: Meeting With Ambassador Abrasimov. From Ambas- sador Lodge. 1. At meeting today in East Berlin with Ambassador Abrasimov, discussion focussed on Germany, Berlin, and US-Soviet relations. De- spite our differences, particularly over holding the forthcoming Bun- desversammlung in West Berlin, we talked for nearly two hours in a cordial atmosphere. Even on the Bundesversammlung, Abrasimov’s statements seemed to show a certain amount of restraint. 2. I raised the subject of Berlin by saying I hoped that nothing would happen here which would prejudice general relations between Washington and Moscow. 3. Replying that this depended entirely upon “you,” Abrasimov launched an attack on the decision to hold the Bundesversammlung in West Berlin, including the role of US “permission” in the decision. He said that this represented a provocation against the USSR and the GDR, and that it could not be excluded that they would react strongly to the provocation. Abrasimov said that their patience in the past with regard to illegal FRG activities in West Berlin should not be taken as acquies- cence but rather as a reflection of the Soviet desire to promote peace and quiet in Europe. Abrasimov returned to this theme repeatedly dur- ing the discussions but at no time did he imply that the Soviets would do more than they did at the time of the CDU conference.2 4. In reply I reviewed our position on the Bundesversammlung and again stressed my hope that nothing would be done here to jeop- ardize US-Soviet relations.