Südosteuropa 57 (2009), H . 2/3, S . 191-216
DEMOCRACY AND MARKET ECONOMY
ELITSA MARKOVA, BOYAN ZAHARIEV
Bulgaria: European Union Membership and Democratic (Un-)Accountability
Abstract. This article is based on the Bulgarian country report of the Bertelsmann Transfor- mation Index (BTI) 2010 . Generally, we follow the structure of the BTI country report . Thus, we focus on the domains of democracy, the functioning of the market economy and the management of the state . In some cases, however, we have merged together or omitted less important sections of these domains . Our main conclusion is that the pace at which Bulgaria is catching up with the EU standards in all domains – the functioning of democratic institu- tions, the market, social safety nets and overall governance – has slowed down in spite of the country’s accession to the EU in 01 January 2007 . While we present the evidence of this slow-down as seen through the lens of the standard BTI indicators, we have also tried to explain why this slow-down has occurred .
Elitsa Markova is a PhD student in Political Studies at the University of Sofia and an analyst at the European Policies Initiative of the Open Society Institute – Sofia . Boyan Zahariev is director of the Governance and Public Policies Programme at the Open Society Institute – Sofia and member of the Networkof Independent Social Inclusion Experts .
History and Characteristics of Transformation
The process of transformation to democracy and market economy in Bulgaria has been slow and incoherent .1 As a consequence, structural economic reforms have been delayed . In comparison to other Central nda Eastern European coun- tries, Bulgaria had a relatively weak dissident movement before 1989 . Moreover, in 1989 former Communist political elites declared their intention to avoid social cataclysm by embarking upon a gradual transition to democratic government and a market economy via a smooth process of reform 2.
1 This text has been finalized prior to the parliamentary elections in Bulgaria of 5 July 2009 . Its substantial argument remains valid; yet, it does not refer in any detail to events pertaining to the post-election period . 2 R . J . Crampton, The Oxford History of Modern Europe: Bulgaria, Post-Communist Bul- garia, 1989-2005 . Oxford 2007, 389-394, 393f . 192 Elitsa Markova, Boyan Zahariev
The popular disappointment with the “traditional parties” that dominated political life in the 1990s led to populism and the emergence of new political actors between 2001 and 2007 . In the 2001 elections, the political movement of the former monarch Simeon Saxe-Cobourg-Gotha (Saxkoburggotski), the National Movement Simeon II (Natsionalno dvizhenie Simeon II3, NMSII; now renamed the National Movement for Stability and Progress), won a landslide victory . Yet the NMSII government’s performance caused increasing disaffection among citizens and led to a decline in support for the NMSII and an increasing fragmentation of party structures and loyalties . Bulgaria’s most recent general elections, which took place on 25 June 2005, yielded the most complex outcome in the country’s post-communist history . Seven political forces overcame the 4 % election threshold . The Bulgarian Socialist Party (Balgarska sotsialisticheska partia, BSP) re-emerged as the strongest political party and formed a coalition government with NMSII and the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (Dvizhenie za prava i svobodi, MRF), a party representing the interests of the ethnic Turkish and Muslim minorities in Bulgaria 4. During the first years of Bulgaria’s membership in the European Union, the course of democratic and economic reform was dictated by its continuing efforts to catch-up with European standards . Although there is clear evidence that this process slowed down after the goal of accession was achieved on 01 January 2007, the EU has continued to exert influence on Bulgaria . The EU’s Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM), for example, has influenced the reform of the judiciary, as well as the fight against organized crime and corruption . Still, the extent to which CVM oversight has led to concrete results remains to be seen . Although a number of indicators point to strengthened economic stability, Bulgaria’s economic growth has not helped to improve the country’s governance . In 2007 and 2008, political corruption and the inability of the judiciary to deliver concrete results and thus meet citizens’ expectations deepened social frustration and public mistrust in the established democratic institutions . At the same time, this corruption damaged Bulgaria’s international image . The second part of the new government’s term has seen an unprecedented number of street protests and an emerging feeling that a new civil society exists in Bulgaria . This increase in political activism was spurred by the young generation, which has grown up alongside a twenty-year-long transition to democracy and market reform . The ruling coalition has survived seven motions of no confidence in the National Assembly and claimed this success as a sign of democratic stability in contrast to the political turbulence in other new EU member states . Yet this
3 For all transliterations we follow the rules of the Bulgarian Transliteration Act . 4 Venelin Ganev, History, Politics and the Constitution: Ethnic Conflict and Constitutional Adjudication in Postcommunist Bulgaria, Slavic Review 63 (2004), n . 1, 66-89, 66; Stefan Krause, Winds of Change Sweep Bulgaria, in: Peter Rutland (ed .), The Challenge of Integration . An- nual Survey of Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union . New York 1998, 244-251, 244 . Bulgaria 193 claim remains highly controversial . Furthermore, the continuing erosion of the classical left-right cleavage has led to the emergence of new opposition formations outside the parliament .
Democracy
Stateness
While contract killings have occurred in the period under review, the threat to state authority posed by organized crime has not increased compared to previous years . As noted in the June 2008 report of the EU Commission, prob- lems have been encountered at all levels in the fight against organized crime .5 The Bulgarian Constitution defines Bulgaria as a one-nation state that respects the differences existing among Bulgarian citizens with regard to their ethnicity, mother tongue, and religion . National authorities nsisti that Bulgaria’s model of interethnic relations, based on respect for civil society and pluralist democracy, is successful . Yet the definition of citizenship and the issue of dual citizenship have both been the subjects of heated political debate and bargaining among the partners in the ruling coalition 6. In June 2007, the Bulgarian Parliament rejected an amendment introduced by the nationalistic Ataka Party (Partia “Ataka”), which proposed that Bulgarian citizens should not to be able to be citizens of any other country at the same time .7 The draft of this amendment stipulated exceptions for Bulgarians in Greece, Macedonia, Serbia and Romania as well as Bulgarians from Bessarabia (Moldova and parts of Ukraine) and the Crimea, but it did not grant a similar exception for Bulgaria’s ethnic Turks . Bulgaria’s Constitution prohibits religious discrimination but designates East- ern Orthodox Christianity as the “traditional” religion . However, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church is a weak political actor and does not participate actively in public debates on policies such as bioethics or abortion .
5 Commission of the European Communities, On Progress in Bulgaria under the Co-ope- ration and Verification Mechanism, 23 June 2008, 20, available at
Political Participation
Both the elections to the European Parliament and the local elections held on 20 May and 28 October 2007 respectively were characterized by low turnouts, vote buying, businesses seeking local political representation and the mobili- zation of voters along ethnic lines . Ethnically-driven voter mobilization even included the organized transportation of voters to the polling stations . Whereas the bussing of voters from Turkey has become customary in Bulgarian elections, election day “tourism” from Macedonia is a relatively new development . In 2007, however 2,800 voters traveled from Macedonia to Bulgaria in order to vote in the towns of Sandanski and Blagoevgrad 8. In 2007, the Parliament amended the electoral law to make the right to vote contingent upon permanent residence in Bulgaria . According to this amendment, voters were required to have a permanent residence in Bulgaria three months prior to the elections for the European Parliament and ten months prior to the local elections . These provisions sought to exclude from the vote Bulgarian expatriates in Turkey who had been forced to leave their home country before November 1989 . Prior to the implementation of this new legislation, many of these expatriates returned to Bulgaria in order to vote for the MRF each elec- tion day 9. The most significant and worrisome feature of the latest local elections, how- ever, was widespread vote buying . On 18 October 2007, the Bulgarian parlia- ment adopted changes to the penal code that increased punishments for vote buying, and implemented sanctions for citizens who sell their votes . Despite these reforms, vote manipulation remains a serious issue . Bulgarian NGOs es- timate that the money spent buying votes in 2007 exceeded 100 million euros .10 Prosecutors launched more than 20 investigations under the newly-amended penal code, but a fine was imposed in only one case11 . The Bulgarian Constitution prohibits the formation of political parties along ethnic lines 12. The Movement for Rights and Freedoms maintains that it is not an ethnic party and claims that it promotes only a minimalist minority rights
8 Shock From the Scope of “Bulgarian” Vote Buying, Mediapool, 29 October 2007, available at
13 See for instance Bernd Rechel, State Control of Minorities in Bulgaria, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 23 (2007), n . 3, 352-370 . 14 Ahmed Yussein, On the “Ethnic” Character of the MRF, 22 October 2006, on the web- site of the MRF, available at
17 Freedom House, Freedom of the Press – Bulgaria 2008, available at
Rule of Law
Amendments to the Constitution in 2006 and 2007 altered the division of competencies between the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) and the executive . In particular the SJC’s budgetary powers were restricted and it was made ac- countable for its performance . The SJC is an independent body supervising the governance of the judiciary . A government official chairs the SJC and more than one third of its members are elected by parliament 24. The constitutional amendment of February 2007 aimed to strengthen the judiciary’s accountability without compromising its independence . In particular, the amendment further qualified magistrates’ immunity from criminal prosecution and introduced a requirement that the SJC report annually on the activities of judicial bodies to the Parliament .25 The first hearings on annual reports by the chief judges in the Supreme Court of Cassation, the Supreme Administrative Court and the Prosecutor General took place in 2008 . Yet the Parliament showed very little interest in these pro- ceedings, and the reports had no further policy relevance 26. An independent Inspectorate to the Supreme Judicial Court was intended to play a key role in the supervision of the judiciary’s integrity . In reality, however, the Inspectorate never received the powers it needed to live up to this expectation . The Inspectorate’s chief power lies in the fact that it is one of several authorities able to propose disciplinary sanctions against magistrates and the administrative heads of bodies within the judicial system . In the first five months of 2008, nine procedures against magistrates were proposed, compared to 17 proceedings for the entire year of 2007 27. The Inspectorate to the Supreme Judicial Court sent only two of these proposals for disciplinary sanctions to the
23 Marinela Liptcheva-Weiss, Umstrittene Mythen,DW-World , 25 April 2007, available at
SJC, and the SJC has yet to rule in either of these cases .28 Considering that there are 1,821 professional judges, 1,558 prosecutors and 546 investigating magis- trates in Bulgaria, these numbers can be interpreted as a weak performance . For years, the Bulgarian judiciary has been in a state of constant reform, procedural change and institutional revamping, but the results of these pro- cesses have been modest . It looks as if the root cause of the malfunctions in the judiciary lies not so much in its institutional set-up as in the unwritten norms and values of the actors vested with judicial authority . In view of the judicial system’s weaknesses, the EU Commission introduced the Special Cooperation and Verification Mechanism to track post-accession rogressp in this area in Bul- garia and Romania, . Despite the high level of concern with Bulgaria’s judiciary system, however, a World Bank report has indicated that overall, Bulgaria’s judiciary system is comparable to other European countries’ judiciaries in terms of resource indicators important for judicial functioning 29. After the publication of the EU Commission’s 2008 report, the Bulgarian government adopted a schedule of urgent measures and actions intended to eliminate the causes of the Commission’s criticism . An Action Plan with progress indicators in the field of judicial reform was prepared in accordance with the European Commission’s June 2007 report . The Ministry of Justice has continued to develop a new Strategy for Judicial Reform and the government has targeted its efforts at changing the Constitution and the Law for the Judi- ciary . Specifically, reforms are sought in the enforcement of judgments, the commercial register, the use of information technologies in the judiciary and public access to its institutions .30 Corruption scandals led to the resignations of the Minister for Economy and Energy, Rumen Ovcharov, and the Interior Minister, Rumen Petkov, in 2007 and 2008 respectively 31. In July 2008, the EU Commission suspended the payment of 500 million euros from the pre-accession funds because it had observed numer- ous financial irregularities and conflicts of interest . The first and most prominent scandal that provoked the suspension of pre-accession funds involved Vesselin Georgiev, head of the state-owned National Road Infrastructure Fund (NRIF) and his brother, Emil Georgiev, to whom NRIF had assigned building contracts
28 Ibid . 29 The World Bank, Bulgaria . Resourcing the Judiciary for Performance and Accountability . A Judicial Public Expenditure and Institutional Review, July 2008 (Report No . 42159-BG), available at
32 Bulgaria Road Agency, Corrupt Officials Remain Jailed, Former Director to Follow, novinite.com, 15 May 2008, available at
Stability of Democratic Institutions
Bulgaria is a parliamentary democracy and the constitutional powers vested in the prime minister and the government endow these institutions with signifi- cant influence . The President has limited competencies, mainly in foreign policy and defense, though he does also hold the right to veto legislation . Despite this paucity of formal power, President Georgi Parvanov, a former BSP leader who was elected for a second term in 2006, has managed to position himself in the political process in such a way as to exert informal influence on decision making . The Bulgarian Parliament has had difficulty coping with MPs’ practice of voting on behalf of colleagues not present in the plenary hall . Though the Con- stitutional Court proclaimed this practice non-constitutional as early as 2003, the Court’s ruling has had little effect on the MPs41 . Recently, a new technology that monitors the exact number of deputies present before a vote was introduced to the parliament . The new system requires MPs to vote with their own cards only . However, a survey on parliamentary decision-making showed that ses-
38 Claudia Ciobanu, The Attack on Bulgarian Gays at their First Gay Parade March Is Symptomatic of Widespread Opposition to the Movement, 17 October 2008, available at
Political and Social Integration
Bulgaria’s party system has been characterized by continuing fragmenta- tion and organizational instability . In 2007 and 2008, discussions about early elections, changes to the Constitution, amendments to the Political Parties Act and the adoption of a new political model dominated the political agenda . In the intermediate turbulent period before and following the accession to the EU, the ability of the party system to articulate and aggregate societal interests and mediate between society and the state has been put to test . Business lead- ers started creating their own parties . The new law-and-order party, “Citizens for an European Development of Bulgaria” (GERB) led by Boyko Borrisov, the mayor of Sofia, emerged as the strongest political force in the European and local elections . Whereas traditional right-wing parties lost further ground, the extremist right-wing party Ataka stabilized its electoral support despite its leaders involvement in various scandals . Of those citizens eligible to vote, 45 % declared that they had changed their vote compared to the last elections . Populism has entered the political scene due to the continued erosion of the traditional parties’ credibility . As a consequence, the dividing lines between “left” and “right”, but also between nationalist and pro-European sentiments have become blurred 44. Societal interests are relatively well represented in Bulgaria’s political system . The country has established an institutional framework of social dialogue and social partnership at all levels . Interest group participation in politics is not yet regulated by lobbying restrictions, because as of the beginning of 2009 the
42 Grazhdanski control nad parlamentarizma, available at
National Assembly still had not voted on the draft law regulating lobbyist ac- tivity . There is a common confusion between lobbyist activities and advocacy, the latter being performed extensively by non-governmental organizations . Concerns about the bargaining behaviour of the trade unions have also persisted and unions are often suspected of concluding secret deals with the government . The concept of Democracy is undisputed among the Bulgarian population today, and political protests do not call the constitutional framework into ques- tion . Nevertheless, Bulgarian citizens’ decreasingtrust in democratic institutions, including parliament, the government and political parties, should be taken seriously . This development displays a deep disappointment in mainstream political elites and a distorted political culture, rather than mistrust in democ- racy per se . According to the latest Eurobarometer survey, 34 % of Bulgarians believe that EU membership contributes to democracy in the country and 37 % consider democracy to be the value that best represents the EU . A clear major- ity of Bulgarian citizens have more trust in the EU (58 %) than in their own government (15 %) .45 By 2008, the number of registered NGOs in Bulgaria had increased by nearly 53 % since 2003 . Bulgarian NGOs have been donor-dependent for a long period of time . Following Bulgaria’s entry into the EU, NGOs had to undergo a process of transformation that including re-formulating their strategies and representa- tion patterns . New opportunities for service-provision are often in conflict with watch-dog activities, a quandary that undermines NGOs’ credibility .
Market Economy
Institutional Framework
Bulgaria’s business environment was improved by the removal of some of the obstacles to registration and licensing, yet other aspects of the institutional framework, like property registration, construction permits and investor pro- tection have deteriorated . There are fundamental concerns about the applica- tion of the EU public procurement rules, especially where large infrastructure projects are concerned 46. Most recently, the bidding procedure for the Trakia Highway was ruled unfair and called a breach of the European Commission’s non-discrimination principle .47 Corruption, inefficient bureaucracy and the
45 Eurobarometar 70 . Natsionalen doklad Bulgaria . 08,20 available at
48 Ruslan Stefanov, Hidden Economy Index (Presentation) . Round Table: the Grey Econ- omy in Bulgaria: Trends and Challenges . Sofia 2008 . The Hidden Economy Index does not make direct assumptions about the share of the hidden economy in the Gross Value Added or the GNP . Instead, it uses 10 value indexes . See also Anton Marinov, Hidden Economy in the Rural Regions of Bulgaria, International Review on Public Marketing 5 (2008), 71-80, 71f . 49 Center for the Study of Democracy, Crime without Punishment (above fn . 45), 59-62 . 50 Law on the Protection of Competition, State Gazette 102, 28 November 2008 . 51 Memo from the Discussion in the Civil Society and Media Committee of the National Assembly of the Amendments to the Law on Access to Public Information, 28 May 2008, available at
53 Dimitar Chobanov, Priemaneto na evroto: varianti i vazmozhnosti, 02 January 2009, available at
Socioeconomic Performance
Bulgaria’s pattern of economic development used to eb characterized by high growth rates accompanied by high inflation rates . Growth has been fuelled for the most part by strong domestic consumption and investment, but the quality of much of this growth is unclear . It seems that much of the recent economic growth in Bulgaria has been a result of economic bubbles like the huge con- struction boom . In recent years, Bulgaria has been one of the few countries to increase its share in international trade, but the effects of the financial and economic crisis have led to a considerable reduction in growth forecasts . In fact, the Bulgarian economy is quite vulnerable because it is extremely dependent on foreign investment, and the import of energy 58. Bulgarian inflation was partly driven by the price convergence that occurred once the country joined the EU . The increase in excise duties caused by har- monization with EU excise duty rates also contributed to inflation . In addition, price dynamics on the international market including increases in the prices of oil and natural gas, also led to increased prices at home . Credit decreased rapidly to the point where it is almost completely frozen . Thus, the challenge is no longer to reduce credit expansion but rather to revive credit activity . This puts pressure on the CBA that is partly offset by the government’s fiscal reserve . Bulgaria may face a tough choice between currency devaluation, which would have a devastating short-term effect on borrowers (typically lending in euro) and a prolonged economic slow-down, which would be exacerbated by the sluggish performance of the export sector 59. The financial crisis triggered a rapid withdrawal of portfolio investments from Bulgaria and a drop of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the country . Fiscal performance has been very solid with consecutive state budget surpluses and constantly shrinking public debts . Liberalisation of the economy, however, has expanded external deficits . Reduced FDI will lead to a reduction in the current account deficit, but it will do so at the expense of a sharp drop in GDP .60 Unemployment in Bulgaria steadily decreased from 10 .1 % in 2005 to 5 .0 % in the fourth quarter of 2008 . The employment rate of the population aged 16-
58 Bulgarian Ministry of Economy and Energy, Energy Strategy of Bulgaria till 2020 (Draft), 9 . 59 Edward Hugh, Cliff Hanging in Bulgaria, Eastern Europe Economy Watch, available at
64 also rose steadily and reached 64 .3 % in 200861 . The first official poverty line came into effect on 1 January 2007 . For 2008, the poverty line was calculated at a monthly income of 166 BGN, a figure correspondingto the Eurostat definition of poverty (60 % of the equivalized median income) . Notably, the official pov- erty line was lower than the poverty line of 185 .21 BGN calculated on the basis of a consumer basket by the Institute for Social and Trade Union Research 62. There are also large disparities in regional GDP . According to 2006 data, more than 40 % of Bulgaria’s GDP was produced in only one of the six plan- ning regions – the capital region . The least developed North-Western Region contributed little more than 4 % to total output63 . Throughout the period under examination, Bulgaria enjoyed high rates of economic growth and improved economic performance, but the value of gross domestic product per capita re- mained the lowest among EU countries, roughly one third of the Union’s average measured on the basis of purchasing power parities . The Bulgarian government has deviated from anti-poverty policies and moved to a neo-liberal economic model . Reform of policy spheres that are crucial for Bulgarian citizens’ quality of life – including health, education and social protection – remains incomplete because these spheres were outside the scope of the pre-accession agenda and were therefore neglected . In late 2008 and early 2009, Bulgaria’s economy and industrial base suffered unexpected losses from the global financial crisis as well as the gas dispute between Russia and the Ukraine . The large surplus in the state budget melted away as funds were allocated to necessary social security buffers and unex- pected gaps in the budget . Accession to the EU has boosted the confidence of foreign companies, which in the last couple of years invested more money in Bulgaria than ever before . Following the world economic slow-down, however, Bulgaria is likely to face lower foreign demand and a drop in capital inflows, which has been an important source of the country’s high growth rate so far . Furthermore, the significant amount of suspended EU pre-accession funds, which had already been dedicated to contracted projects and strategically planned infrastructure initiatives, has to be covered by budgetary resources and paid by Bulgarian citizens .
61 NSI, Key Indicators for Bulgaria, 03 April 2009 .Data on the labour market is also available on the website of the Bulgarian Employment Agency, available at
Welfare Regime
In 2007 and 2008, the government reduced the duration of social assistance benefits from 18 to 12 and finally to 6 months . These measures were intended to push long-term and non-registered unemployed people to seek jobs, but the reductions in social assistance put some of the most vulnerable groups like the Roma in a very difficult situation . Since 2000, labor migration to old EU member states has provided a surrogate safety net in townships that were effected by deindustrialization in the 1990s . Remittances havected a as another kind of social transfer from the wealthier EU member states to Bulgaria 64. There are reasons to believe that the financial crisis will put the sustainability of this particular safety net to test .65 In January 2008, a new 10 % flat tax on personal income was introduced66 . This is one of the lowest tax rates on personal income in the world . Although this measure was adopted to stimulate the economy, its social consequences raise some concerns 67. There is yet no assessment of either the economic or the social impact of the flat tax, so no conclusions can be made at this stage . In the 1990s, Bulgaria introduced the three pillar pension system modeled and promoted worldwide by the World Bank . Currently, the pension system is organized on a pay-as-you-go basis with two small capital accumulating pillars in the form of mandatory and optional additional contributions to private pen- sion funds . Pensions constitute a significant source of revenue for households in Bulgaria, and their share in average household budgets increased by 26 .2 % between 2005 and 2007 . In comparison to pensions, thero forms of social transfer play an insignificant role in household revenue68 . A large number of Bulgarian citizens continue to be excluded from the hospital and pre-hospital care due to their loss of health insurance rights . The health care system still suffers from structural problems that negatively affect the access to
64 Anelia Damyanova / Boryana Pencheva / Vesela Dzhilizova et al ., 2006 – Convergence and EU Funds . Economic Report for the President of the Republic of Bulgaria . Sofia 2006, 149, 151 . Based on the analysis of data from previous studies, the report comes to the conclu- sion that for most of the long-term migrants and for 30-40 % of the short term migrants the immediate purpose of the migration is to solve material problems . 65 Official statistics on income and transfers from abroad show that compared to 2008 transfers from abroad have declined . In the first 4 months of 2009, private transfers dropped by 28 .2 million euro (12 .6 %), while income from foreign employment of Bulgarian residents has dropped by 90 million euro (18 .8 %) . Bulgarian National Bank, Issue “Balance of Pay- ments”: January – April 2009 . Sofia 2009, available at
Sustainability
The Environment Protection Act was introduced in 2002 and has been amend- ed many times, most recently in December 2008 . Legislation on water and waste management is in place and in line with the acquis communautaire . Bulgaria has ratified the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol . An analysis of environmental democracy noted that the biggest short- coming in Bulgaria’s information policy and media coverage was the lack of consideration of long-term health and environmental impacts 70. Investment in both secondary and higher education is below the EU aver- age . The Bulgarian National Innovation System is still in the initial stage of its development and displays significant shortcomings compared to the best European practices . In comparison to other member states, Bulgaria is lagging behind in almost all aspects of innovation performance . According to the lat- est European Innovation Scoreboard (EIS) of 2007, public R&D expenditure is 0 .38 % of GDP, while the EU-27 average is 0 .65 % usiness. B R&D expenditure in Bulgaria is only 0 .11 %, while the EU-27 average is 1 .17 % . Bulgaria still does not have a national R&D intensity goal . There are baseline projections for increases in the R&D budget but firm targets have not yet been set . In general, Bulgaria
69 Robert Anderson / Branislav Mikulić / Greet Vermeylen et al ., Second European Qual- ity of Life Survey: Overview . Luxembourg 2009, 51 . In this survey, Bulgaria gets the lowest score among the EU 27 on all three dimensions in the rating of the quality of health and care services . These services include health, childcare as well as care for elderly people . 70 Csaba Kiss / Michael Ewing (eds .), EnvironmentalDemocracy: An Assessment of Access to Information, Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Mat- ters in Selected European Countries . Budapest 2006, 114, available at
Management
Level of Difficulty
Structural constraints on governance are moderate . Living standards remain low for the majority of the population . The recent gas crisis, which occurred at the beginning of January 2009 and lasted for almost three weeks, showed that Bulgaria is near to totally dependent on Russian gas and has practically no en- ergy alternatives .72 Interethnic relations continue to be present in the Bulgarian political debate and in the media . However, ethno-political mobilization has not significantly affected the relations between ethnic Bulgarians and ethnic Turks or Muslims in society, which continue to be characterized by relative tolerance and interethnic exchange 73.
Steering Capability
The reform agenda in Bulgaria has often been driven by external actors . In the 1990s, the first of these actors was the IMF . The IMF was gradually replaced by the EU, which started to play a strong role in setting Bulgaria’s reform agenda during the years leading up to the country’s attainment of full EU membership in January 2007 . There were some expectations that after Bulgaria became an EU member, the country’s political elite would be emancipated from the EU Commission, but this has not been the case . Instead, the regular reports of the EU Commission became more critical and more outspoken than ever before following Bulgaria’s accession to the EU 74. This situation has created incentives for members of the political elite, including the president and some ministers, to
71 Marin Petrov / Teodora Georgieva / Ruslan Stefanov (eds .), Innovations .bg . Bulgarian Innovation System in the Global Economic Crisis . Sofia 2009, 15 . The report finds “very mod- est progress” in innovation policy over the last 4 years . 72 Energy Strategy of Bulgaria till 2020 (above fn . 57), 9 . 73 Marko Hajdinjak, Thou Shall Not Take the Names Ethnic or Minority, and I Will Bless Thee . Political Participation of Minorities in Bulgaria . Policy Analysis . Sofia 2008, 19 . This report, published by the International Center for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations, compares the situation in Bulgaria to that in the former Yugoslav republics in its concluding remarks . The author finds that the model of interethnic relations in Bulgaria “proved strong enough to defy all the attempts made by a number of political actors to play on the nationalist cards, especially in the pre-election periods” . 74 Five reports of the EU Commission on progress in Bulgaria are available at
Resource Efficiency
Bulgaria’s public administration continued its poor performance after the country’s accession to the EU . Efforts to reform the public administration have been targeted at reducing the number of civil servants but little has been done to curb corruption or improve performance . Since 2006, the Stanishev government has been following a decentralization strategy . A Decentralization Council at the Council of Ministers coordinates the implementation of this strategy . It aims to transfer powers and resources from
75 Catherine Day: We Wish Bulgaria to Show Results, Vesti, 28 November 2008, available at
78 Council of Ministers, Strategy for Decentralization . 2006, Section 3 .2, 11 . 79 Corruption and Institutional Efficiency . Public Discussion Organized by Transparency International, Sofia 14 February 2008, 5 . 80 Antonii Galabov, Technilogii na vlastta,Podlupa , 01 June 2009, available at
April 2008 when Prime Minister Sergei Stanishev replaced four ministers and introduced a deputy premier to control EU aid 81.
Consensus-Building
Liberal market economy and the social disparities it creates are generally ac- cepted by the elites and the public as a reality of life, not a set of principles that should be balanced with values of social solidarity . Instead, Social Solidarity is usually associated by the older generation with the Communist era . Criticism from the EU, aimed at fostering reform, is largely welcomed by the public and by political actors . The government makes clear efforts to take the necessary corrective measures . The rates of trust in the European Union are high despite the nationalist and populist rhetoric against it .82 Cleavages in Bulgarian society have occurred mainly as a result of increas- ing social disparities and ineffective social inclusion policies . Ethnically driven conflicts have not played a major role in the formation of social cleavages . To the extent that it does exist, Bulgarian nationalism is anti-Turkish and anti-Roma . Nationalist framing strategies operate indirectly by criticizing the inefficiency of anti-corruption measures and social inclusion policies . Such criticism is intended to create the perception of social injustice which is, paradoxically, shared by Bulgarian citizens of all ethnicities . Reconciliation continues to be an issue of evolving political and institutional culture, not a matter of relevance to the broader public . In 2008, for political aims there were efforts to re-open the painful discussion on the so-called “Re- vival process” against Bulgarian ethnic Turks . The long-delayed opening of the archives of the Bulgarian state security services seems to have been the most frequently recurring reconciliation issue in 2007 and 2008 . The lack of political will to open these files has a long history and has severely impeded the con- solidation of democracy . Selective information leaks and blackmail for political purposes have not been uncommon in recent years . Painful and controversial as it was, the discussion has gradually become trivial, laying the groundwork for the voicing of gross generalizations while depleting the social resources necessary for reflective engagement with the past .83
81 Republic of Bulgaria Council of Ministers, A Deputy Prime Minister Will Be in Charge of the EU Funds . Ruling Coalition Council Approved Structural and Personnel Cabinet Changes, 22 April 2008, available at International Cooperation The Bulgarian political leadership makes use of international assistance for its own reform policies . The government has clear aims of democratic and economic development . There is a roadmap specifying the steps that will be necessary to reach these aims and defining the inputs this process will require from international partners and donors . Under the EU’s Cooperation and Verification Mechanism, Bulgaria has committed itself to achieve benchmarks in judicial reform, the fight against corruption and the fight against organized crime 84. During Bulgaria’s first years of EU membership, however, the coun- try’s leadership demonstrated insufficient progress in its abilities to apply international know-how and to make strategic use of European advice in order to move forward with reform . For the time being, the EU Commission consid- ers support to be more effective than sanctions, and it is not likely to invoke the safeguard provisions set out in the Accession Treaty 85. However, it is clear that the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism will be maintained for some time to come . This move is broadly welcomed in Bulgaria as well, although the freezing of pre-accession assistance has provoked harsh, defensive reac- tions from Bulgarian authorities . The freeze has cost Bulgaria more than 220 million euros of pre-accession assistance . The Bulgarian Prime Minister called the freeze unfair and claimed that it did not correspond with reality . He also blamed the foreign and domestic media for concentrating on the bad image of the country while neglecting its progress . Bulgarian authorities have repeated their assertion that all peer reviews of the country have been positive and that the results of monitoring missions and checks have been satisfactory . At the same time, public support for the EU grew rapidly while mistrust in the Gov- ernment increased to 73 % 86. The Bulgarian government acts as a credible and reliable partner in the in- ternational arena . However, Bulgaria has suffered from a severe decrease of confidence in its ability to act as a full-fledged member of the European Union . Bulgaria is increasingly behaving as a country that necessitates mechanisms that put it under special scrutiny . It has become infamous within the European bg/bg/web/guests/index/11>, 14 July 2009 . The debate and the poll showed that society was divided almost equally on the issue of the importance of opening the files of the secret services . 84 Report on the Progress Made by Bulgaria in Addressing the Specific Benchmarks in the Areas of Judicial Reform and the Fight against Corruption and Organised Crime 01 Janu- ary 2007 – 01 March 2008, 26 March 2008, available at Union and it is expected that its behavior will have implications for the EU’s enlargement policy . The dramatic loss of confidencein Bulgaria, widely reported on in the international media, is related to the inability of Bulgarian authorities to curb high level political corruption and to implement the rule of law . The political leadership in Bulgaria actively and successfully builds and ex- pands cooperative international relationships and promotes regional and inter- national integration . Bulgaria relies mainly on EU instruments and continuing U .S . involvement, but it has cooperated well withlack B Sea region countries and participated in other international activities as well 87. Bulgaria is very supportive of its Western Balkan neighbours’ bids for accession to the EU and cautiously supportive of Turkey’s EU bid . Bulgaria has very good relations with Serbia, and it supported the signing of an EU Stabilization and Association Agreement with Serbia on 29 April 2008 . On 19 March 2008, Bulgaria became the 32nd state to formally recognize Kosovo’s independence in a joint declaration with Croatia and Hungary, although there was no political or public consensus for this act .88 The Black Sea continues to be a key area of interest for Bulgaria . However, Bulgaria has claimed that the domination of Turkey and Russia, the two “re- gional superpowers”, leaves little space for smaller states in this region, even within the EU framework . Russia is a key factor in the development of Bulgar- ian policy in the Black Sea region . This is due to the close ties between Russia and the current Bulgarian government and president . The two countries’ close energy and business connections also lead to Russian influence on Bulgarian policy in the region . The Bulgarian government has intensified its cooperation with Russia, particularly in the energy sector, which will inevitably have direct or indirect implications on Bulgaria’s future foreign policy 89. Strategic Outlook The difficulties that Bulgaria has faced within itsrst fi two years of EU member- ship and the effects of the global financial crisis have increased the significance of domestic politics and policy formulation . Although the EU has continued to 87 Marin Lessenski, Not Your Grandfather’s Eastern Bloc . The EU New Member States as Agenda Setters in the Enlarged European Union . Sofia 2009 (EuPI – European Policies Initiative, OSI- Sofia), 36-37, available at Building of a knowledge-based society. Public spending on education and R&D should be increased decisively and measures to renovate curricula and design a long-term policy for human resource improvement and innovation should be enacted . Other long-term priorities such as welfare and health reforms should be addressed . Increasing solidarity in Bulgarian society . Bulgaria needs to put more focus on the equitable access to the benefits of economic growth and EU membership for all Bulgarians . The country must strengthen its social safety nets and invest more to secure equity in education and the provision of health care for all .