• Abstract and Figures
• Public Full-text

Tidal Wave It took sheer courage, and lots of it, for each bomber crew to press on into a huge cloud of flak at Ploesti. By Walter J. Boyne he Aug. 1, 1943 air raid on Only the indomitable bravery of the a carefully thought out charge into the Ploesti, Romania, had an ambi- Ploesti airmen under fire rescued the mouth of almost certain death. tious goal: Shorten World War attack from failure. What might have In wartime, heroism is often over- TII by knocking out much of Germany’s been an utter disaster was turned into looked in the press of events. That was petroleum production in a single blow. an admittedly costly American vic- not so with Ploesti, for a cascade of Called Operation Tidal Wave, the attack tory that established new standards for decorations proved how much the AAF by five United States Army Air Forces combat initiative, aggressiveness, and leadership understood the risks and ap- bomber groups on Ploesti was well- tenacity. preciated the sacrifice. planned and well-rehearsed. The raid called forth thousands of acts Five Medals of Honor were awarded It was undermined by an incorrect of heroism, most of them unrecorded, from the mission that day, more than in premise and faulty intelligence. The lost in the fiery crashes of B-24s disin- any other single air action. There was a American forces operated under the tegrating under the heavy German fire. profusion of other medals as well, but the illusion that a single strike could do ir- There was one common denominator, most important accolade shared by the reparable damage to a major target. More however, easily measured. That was the survivors was the permanent acknowl- immediately, American intelligence sheer courage necessary for each bomber edgement that they had accomplished an totally underestimated the strength and to press on to its target, flying into a huge important and dangerous mission. skill of the combined German-Romanian black hurricane of anti-aircraft fire. Ploesti, a city of 100,000, was ringed resistance and the ability of German This was no impetuous attack, no by seven major refineries that produced intelligence. spur of the moment decision, but rather about one-third of Germany’s oil and 74 AIR FORCE Magazine / December 2007 one-third of its aviation fuel. Air Force the mission, and selected Maj. John L. sion was so important that Ent confided planners recognized from the start that Jerstad as operations officer. that “if nobody comes back, the results it would be an extremely difficult target. There would be fewer than 200 bomb- will be worth the cost.” It was located far from feasible bases ers for the 2,300-mile round-trip mis- German strategy was based on experi- and well-defended. sion. ence and helpfully stimulated by the only The impetus for the attack came from In one way the raid was unlike most previous American attack on Ploesti. the very top, for it was agreed upon by of those fought in Europe. The American When the United States declared war Prime Minister Winston Churchill and forces were quartered in the Libyan on Nazi-occupied Romania and Hungary President Roosevelt at the Casablanca wasteland in austere, uncomfortable on June 5, 1942, a decision was made Conference in January 1943. accommodations and unhygienic condi- to attack Ploesti. On June 12, 1942, 12 No one asked the commander of tions. The defending Germans, happy B-24s raided Ploesti—the first American Ninth Air Force, Maj. Gen. Lewis H. not to be on the Eastern Front, were bombing raid on a European target. The Brereton, if the mission was feasible. enjoying the Romanian summer, where damage to the oil refineries was minimal He was simply ordered to do it. Brere- food, liquor, women, and gasoline were but all 12 bombers landed safely—six in ton selected Brig. Gen. Uzal G. Ent to readily available. Iraq, two in Syria, and four in Turkey, oversee preparations for the raid, and Dysentery was rife in the American where the aircraft were seized and the also had the services of Col. Jacob E. camp, striking even the top leaders, crews interned. Smart, a trusted advisor to Gen. Henry while on the German side the greater That raid was a gift to Col. Alfred H. “Hap” Arnold. hazard was from hangovers. Gerstenberg, the wily Luftwaffe officer It was Smart who proposed a low-level commanding Ploesti’s defenses. At a mission, an extraordinary departure Unfounded Optimism time when every gun and fighter was from the cherished AAF doctrine of Under Smart’s guidance, the Ameri- required either for the Eastern Front or high-altitude precision bombing. cans planned a low-level attack to evade the air defense of Germany, Gersten- Smart—who was later shot down, German radar and allow a simultaneous berg used the importance of the Ploesti spent 11 months as a prisoner of war, assault against the seven key targets. petroleum output and its vulnerability and ultimately retired as a four-star gen- The time over target for the attacking to Allied air raids to obtain massive eral—felt there was no choice. Analysis wave was to be so brief that the bomb- defensive reinforcements. indicated that at least 1,400 heavy bomb- ers were intended to be en route home Gerstenberg connected the important ers were necessary to achieve success before the flak could respond or fighters refineries circling Ploesti with a ring of with a high-altitude raid, and these were scrambled. piping that allowed him to isolate dam- not available. He opted for the one tactic This optimistic view was clouded age and facilitate repairs. that might work—a surprise low-level at- when an Axis prisoner revealed that He then placed another ring around tack. Col. Edward J. Timberlake planned Ploesti was heavily defended. The mis- the city. This one comprised 237 separate 88 mm and 105 mm anti-aircraft guns. There were also hundreds of batteries of 37 mm and 20 mm cannons, balloons, light flak towers, and countless machine gun installations. Gerstenberg camouflaged his anti- aircraft guns in buildings and haystacks. His piece de resistance was a train able Opposite, thick oil smoke rises over Columbia Aquila refinery. Left, an unidentified Ninth Air Force aircrew member fastens up his flak suit before the Operation Tidal Wave mission. AIR FORCE Magazine / December 2007 75 to move through the target area pulling speeds, close to the ground, in turbulent the Romanians would leave their guns freight cars laden with concealed anti- air, is dangerous. Navigating unfamiliar unmanned during the attack. aircraft batteries. terrain while coming in low might make On a more practical level, the five For interception, Gerstenberg had 52 the enemy anti-aircraft gunner’s job more groups practiced low-level formation Messerschmitt Bf-109s and 17 twin- difficult, but it also exposed the aircraft flying, including two mock missions engine Messerschmitt Bf-110s within to every sort of ground fire, from pistols involving the entire task force on July 20 miles of Ploesti. Half of the 109s to 105 mm cannon. 28 and 29. On the second mission, the were flown by German and half by Practice low-level strikes attacked task force destroyed the entire target in Romanian pilots. Also available were enemy installations in Sicily. Both the just two minutes, boosting morale. other German and Romanian aircraft, new low-level bombsight and the tactics Then, a crew shortage threatened. along with Bulgarian units. seemed effective. Extra efforts by maintenance personnel Even more important, Gerstenberg Engineers also laid out dummy made additional aircraft available for the had established a radar interception net targets in the desert around Beng- mission at the same time that dysentery along with an efficient signal detection hazi, complete with scale replicas of forced several men off flying status. The unit in Athens which was monitoring the refineries. A detailed sand-table problem was compounded when Hap Ninth Air Force transmissions. These model of Ploesti was constructed and Arnold sent orders forbidding Brereton, were fed to the equivalent of a mod- a series of oblique sketches of the Timberlake, and Smart from flying on ern combined air operations center, a targets was made so that the aircrews the mission. It took a judicious shuffling sophisticated fighter command head- would recognize them on their ap- of available personnel to make up the quarters in Bucharest. There the route proach. There were models of specific deficiencies. of the “secret mission” was tracked soon buildings within the five refineries in In the early morning hours of Aug. 1, after takeoff. Ploesti; the refinery at Campina, 18 the strike was launched with 178 Con- In short, Gerstenberg had been pre- miles northwest of the city; and one solidated B-24s taking off from Libya, paring for years to defend Ploesti. His at Brazi, five miles to the south. These their sand-scoured engines straining to antagonists had six weeks to prepare seven major targets were assigned to get them airborne. to attack it. elements of the five groups. There were 1,764 crewmen—and Yet American preparation was thor- an Englishman, RAF Squadron Leader ough. A low-level attack offers definite Soapsuds George C. Barwell—who was there advantages, such as greater bombing Famous Hollywood journalist and unofficially and welcome for his gun- accuracy. It also makes it more difficult publicity man John Reagan “Tex” Mc- nery expertise. for fighters to attack and gives enemy Crary made a training film called “Soap- One aircraft crashed shortly after anti-aircraft gunners less time to fire. suds” (the original code name for the takeoff, incurring the first of the day’s Low-level assaults also have distinct mission), which gave a good representa- many casualties.

Load more

  6

Copy Link