DOCSLIB.ORG

Bolstering the Russian Ground Forces, the Cossack Way

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Bolstering the Russian Ground Forces, the Cossack Way EURASIA Bolstering the Russian Ground Forces, the Cossack Way OE Watch Commentary: Since the Russian Federation has always been a continental power, almost all of its wars and conflicts have been primarily fought on the ground. Therefore, the Russian Ground Forces have long been considered the most important branch of the Armed Forces, though proponents of the strategic nuclear forces and aerospace defense may differ with this assessment. The accompanying excerpted article from Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer lays out the case for augmenting the Russian Ground Forces with Cossack formations. According to the article, the Russian Ground Forces currently have approximately 280,000 personnel, but in the event of an armed conflict, 200,000 to 350,000 servicemen would be required in each military district adjacent to the front. Although Russia does possess other militarized forces, such as the National Guard and FSB Border Troops, these forces are an insufficient number to support a major conflict. Russia is tinkering with an operational reserve system, but it appears at this time that it has little functionality at best. Since greatly increasing the size of the Russian Ground Forces seems unlikely, the author proffers the solution of augmenting the Ground Forces with Cossack formations, much as the Cossacks augmented the imperial army in Tsarist times. These forces would provide an economical alternative to a large standing army and would also be valuable for securing the rear, an important point considering the General Staff’s view that war does not occur just at the front, but throughout the breadth of the defense. Due to the changing character of war, Cossack bands may be called upon to defeat enemy special operations forces operating behind enemy lines, or to suppress domestic dissent fomented by enemy propaganda and social media. End OE Watch Commentary (Bartles) “Rumors have circulated throughout the country about the latest change of the model of the military- administrative division of Russia’s territory…” CLICK ON AN ISSUE TO DOWNLOAD! OEWATCH Check out back issues of FMSO’s Operational Environment Watch dating back to 2011. They provide translated selections with background from a diverse range community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/ Foreign Military Studies Office of foreign media that our analysts Volume 8 Issue #11 OEWATCH November 2018 FOREIGN NEWS & PERSPECTIVES OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT and expert contributors believe will give security professionals an added 1RL257E Krasukha-4 Electronic Warfare System EURASIA INDO-PACIFIC AFRICA 3 Russian Combined Arms Armies Plan Electronic Warfare 24 Made-in-China 2025 49 Yemen’s Civil War Fails to Discourage Horn of Africa Refugees Battalions 26 A Look at the PLA’s Youth Aviation Programs 50 Cameroon Prison Break Signals Rising Anglophone Insurgency 5 Russian MoD Considers a “Pocket” Iskander 27 Recruit Training Extended for New PLA Recruits to Increase 51 South Sudan’s Civil War Death Toll Reaches 400,000 6 The S-500 “Prometheus” Air and Missile Defense System Is Readiness 52 Nigeria’s Chukwu on Cross-Border, Counter-Boko Haram Coming! 28 The Growing Face of China’s Civil-Military Integration Operations 8 More Muscle for the Northern Fleet Initiative 53 Environmental Crimes Reportedly Leading Funding Source for 9 Increasing Russia’s “Brown-Water” Navy 29 Poor Training and Insufficient Personnel Hamper Chinese Terrorists 11 Why Russians Fight in Syria Maritime Militia Development 54 Military Intervention for Ebola Outbreak in DRC 12 Increased Economic Strains for Russian Military Personnel 30 Chinese-Nepalese Anti-Terror Training Causing Concern in 55 With Tight Budgets, South Africa’s Military Strains to Meet 13 Military Benefits of the Caspian Sea Convention for Russia’s India Mandates Power Projection Capabilities 31 India Upgrades Its MiG-29s 56 Partisanship Alleged in Promotion of Malian Generals 14 The Joint Tajik-Uzbek Effort to Demine the Border 32 Singapore Unites Southeast Asia to Counter Terrorism 57 Will Corruption in South Sudan Torpedo Peace Plan? 15 Gauging Armenian and Azerbaijani Military Exercises 33 Is It Too Late for the Maldives to Lift Itself Out From Under 16 Moscow Pushes Own Approaches to Cyber Security on Rest China’s Hold? of CSTO 34 Vietnam Begins Peacekeeping Mission in South Sudan LATIN AMERICA 58 A Bolsonaro Brazil and the FSP 17 Russian De-dollarization: Economic Counter-Attack? 59 Mexican President-Elect Plans to Extend Federal Security 18 Polish Perspective on Russian Disinformation Campaigns Presence 19 Social Media Restrictions for Russian Security MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AFRICA 35 Iranian Government Details Ahvaz Terrorist Incident 60 Worse to Come in Venezuela dimension to their critical thinking 20 NATO Arctic Exercise Draws Russian Response 36 Yemen: Houthis Claim Increased UAV Use 60 Overton Window Shift on Venezuela 21 French Naval Vessel Sails Northern Sea Route 37 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Confirms Use of Armed 61 Chinese Medical Aid to Venezuela 21 Russian Coast Guard Expanding in the Arctic Drones in Syria 62 ELN and FARC Seek Sanctuary 22 India and the Arctic? 38 Iran to Build New Missile System? 63 Colombia May Return to Aerial Fumigation of Coca Fields 23 Bulgarian Fighter Aircraft Acquisition 39 Turkey Tests Anti-torpedo Torpedo 64 Protests Disturb Peace Commonly Associated with Costa Rica 40 Turkish Naval Special Forces 65 Student Marches as a Form of Struggle 41 The Turkish-Russian Alliance in the Middle East 43 Russia and China Help Egypt’s Space Industry Move Forward 44 Supreme Leader’s Advisor: United States Common Enemy of Iran and China 45 Turkish and Iranian Cooperation to Fight Terrorism 46 Turkey Challenges Republic of Cyprus’s Drilling Plan 48 The “Soft War” on Hezbollah approved for public release; distribution is unlimited about the Operational Environment. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/p/oe-watch-issues (continued) OE Watch | March 2019 5 EURASIA Continued: Bolstering the Russian Ground Forces, the Cossack Way Source: Konstantin Sivkov, “Нагайка в помощь «Армате» (A Whip to Help the Armata),” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer, 5 February 2019. https://vpk-news.ru/articles/48094 Through Defense Ministry efforts the impression has formed that our Ground Forces conform to all requirements; however, a comparison of their current composition with figures of previous periods forces a person to ponder…Thus, our Ground Forces had 670,000 to 780,000 persons during 1994-1995, while according to Internet data, they have 280,000 today. At that time there were around 70 divisions; today there are 8 plus 27 tank and motorized rifle brigades, which corresponds approximately to 25 estimated divisions… In Russia’s Military Doctrine and the list of missions facing the Armed Forces, we will single out those in which a key role is set aside for the Ground Forces. Hence it follows that for defense of the country, the Ground Forces above all must be capable of supporting RF Armed Forces strategic deployment, territorial defense, and a crushing defeat of the enemy in likely wars and armed conflicts. In these conflicts and wars the Ground Forces’ proportion of the overall numerical strength of the grouping involved can be from 40-50 to 70-80 percent depending on the area of outbreak and nature of the enemy. Accordingly, our Ground Forces must field a grouping that is from regimental to divisional in scale in 1-5 days for resolving border incidents. In the course of a week or two they must send a corps- or army- level grouping to the armed conflict area. In 1-3 months they must form a grouping equivalent to one or two Great Patriotic War fronts…it turns out that the numerical strength of our Ground Forces should be 450,000-550,000. These very rough estimates give an idea of the order of magnitude. The Rear as the Front The primary territorial defense missions are to combat sabotage teams, destroy terrorist groupings and bandit forces, and secure and defend facilities of great political, economic, and spiritual importance to the state. The district zone of responsibility may have several thousand very important facilities (from 1,500-2,000 to 3,000-3,500)…the necessary personnel for resolving territorial defense missions will average from 200,000 to 350,000 servicemen, and this is within just one district adjacent to the front… Naturally, other security structures will be involved in territorial defense missions, but only Rosgvardiya, The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), and Federal Security Service (FSB) do not have the requisite armed force elements. According to open-source data, Rosgvardiya has around 340,000 persons. There are no valid data as to strictly how much of a military component there is -- operational units and formations (particularly a special-purpose division and brigades), special rapid-response detachments (SOBRs), and special-purpose militia detachments (OMONs). By analogy with the Ground Forces and excluding militarized security, it can be assumed that their overall strength is a maximum of 150,000-200,000 and the forces are distributed to eight districts. Each district accounts for an average of 20,000-25,000 servicemen. The Rosgvardiya grouping will be built up through maneuver in the region adjacent to the front, but all the same it is a matter of doubling these forces at the maximum -- no one will relieve Rosgvardiya of the performance of missions in other areas of the country. With the outbreak of a border or armed conflict, the RF Armed Forces Ground Forces together with Rosgvardiya in the zone adjacent to the front still can create the necessary grouping for territorial defense, and this is on condition of performing partial mobilization as a minimum. But even in this case capabilities for missions in the interior of the country no longer will remain. But in a local war in the border zone, even with full mobilization, all the main forces of the Armed Forces Ground Forces will be used in the zone of combat operations, the Rosgvardiya personnel and servicemen of rear-service units of the Armed Forces are insufficient for territorial defense.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Analyzing the Russian Way of War Evidence from the 2008 Conflict with Georgia
    Analyzing the Russian Way of War Evidence from the 2008 Conflict with Georgia Lionel Beehner A Contemporary Battlefield Assessment Liam Collins by the Modern War Institute Steve Ferenzi Robert Person Aaron Brantly March 20, 2018 Analyzing the Russian Way of War: Evidence from the 2008 Conflict with Georgia Contents Acknowledgments ........................................................................................................................................ 1 Executive Summary ...................................................................................................................................... 3 Introduction .................................................................................................................................................. 9 Chapter I – History of Bad Blood ................................................................................................................ 13 Rose-Colored Glasses .............................................................................................................................. 16 Chapter II – Russian Grand Strategy in Context of the 2008 Russia-Georgia War ................................... 21 Russia’s Ends ........................................................................................................................................... 22 Russia’s Means ........................................................................................................................................ 23 Russia’s Ways .........................................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Analysis of Russian Ground Force Deployment Capabilities and Limitations
    C O R P O R A T I O N Russia’s Limit of Advance Analysis of Russian Ground Force Deployment Capabilities and Limitations Ben Connable, Abby Doll, Alyssa Demus, Dara Massicot, Clint Reach, Anthony Atler, William Mackenzie, Matthew Povlock, and Lauren Skrabala www.rand.org/t/RR2563 Analysis of Russian military capabilities reveals stark limitations in Russia’s ability to safely and effectively deploy and sustain ground forces around the world. Notional deployment scenarios highlight a lack of readily deployable forces and transportation assets and limited freedom of movement. Collectively, these challenges suggest a modern Russian force that is far less deployable than the Soviet military it replaced. RESEARCH QUESTIONS ? • How far can Russia deploy a capable ground force, and at what cost? • How would such variables as distance, terrain, political accessibility, and the availability of logistics assets affect a Russian ground force deployment, and how does the impact of these factors change as different demands are placed on the force? • Which scenarios would be the most taxing for Russia’s overall military operational capacity and global deployment capability? KEY FINDINGS ✭ Russian ground forces have a sharply limited effective deployment range • Russia’s deployment capability near its western and southwestern borders is significantly better than elsewhere, a product of robust lines of communication, transport infrastructure, and air defense, as well as easier-to-negotiate terrain. • Far deployments (more than two countries away or across large bodies of water) are particularly challenging for Russian ground forces, with capability gaps and poor support for basing, overflight, and naval access leaving them vulnerable to interdiction.
    [Show full text]
  • Foreign Military Studies Office
    community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/ PENDING PUBLIC RELEASE/APPROVAL - QUESTIONS: 757-501-6236 Foreign Military Studies Office Volume 9 Issue #10 OEWATCH October 2019 FOREIGN NEWS & PERSPECTIVES OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT EURASIA 28 New Chinese Aircraft Carrier to Carry 50 Percent More 3 Sinking the Armata? Fighters AFRICA 4 Where is Strelkov Aiming? 30 China and Kazakhstan Upgrade Ties 59 Urban Deployment Reveals South African Military Deficiencies 5 Northern and Eastern Military Districts Get S-300V4 Air 32 China and Russia Sign Heavy Helicopter Deal 60 South Africa’s Xenophobic Violence: Foreigners as Scapegoats Defense Systems 34 China Reports the Launch of Unmanned ‘Mini-Aegis-Class for Failing Economy 7 Russian Ground Forces’ Air Defense: A Look At Russia’s Destroyer’ 61 Somalia’s Newest Military Commander Also Its Youngest Threat-Based Military 35 Contrasting Chinese and Foreign Media Accounts on 62 African Union Raises Concerns Over Foreign Military Bases in 8 The Modernization of Russian Coastal Defense Missiles Xinjiang Africa 10 Mines Seen as Key Capabilities for Russian Naval and Coastal 37 Papuans Hope for Independence, but is it Possible? 63 Regional Rivalries Heat Up as AMISOM Leaves Somalia Defense 39 Another Counter-Terrorism Operation in Palu, Indonesia 64 China’s Investment in African Aviation 12 Russia Developing On-Orbit Fueling Technologies 40 India to Create New Chief of Defence Staff Position 65 International Connections to Guinea-Bissau Drug Trafficking 13 Public Protests and “Hybrid War” 66 Borno Governor
    [Show full text]
  • Russia's Strategic Mobility
    Russia’s Strategic Mobility: Supporting ’Hard Pow Supporting ’Hard Mobility: Strategic Russia’s Russia’s Strategic Mobility Supporting ’Hard Power’ to 2020? The following report examines the military reform in Russia. The focus is on Russia’s military-strategic mobility and assess- ing how far progress has been made toward genuinely enhanc- ing the speed with which military units can be deployed in a N.McDermott Roger er’ to2020? theatre of operations and the capability to sustain them. In turn this necessitates examination of Russia’s threat environ- ment, the preliminary outcome of the early reform efforts, and consideration of why the Russian political-military leadership is attaching importance to the issue of strategic mobility. Russia’s Strategic Mobility Supporting ’Hard Power’ to 2020? Roger N. McDermott FOI-R--3587--SE ISSN1650-1942 www.foi.se April 2013 Roger N. McDermott Russia’s Strategic Mobility Supporting ‘Hard Power’ to 2020? Title Russia’s Strategic Mobility: Supporting ‘Hard Power’ to 2020? Titel Rysk strategisk mobilitet: Stöd för maktut- övning till 2020? Report no FOI-R--3587--SE Month April Year 2013 Antal sidor/Pages 101 p ISSN 1650-1942 Kund/Customer Försvarsdepartementet/ Ministry of Defence Projektnr/Project no A11301 Godkänd av/Approved by Maria Lignell Jakobsson Ansvarig avdelning/Departement Försvarsanalys/Defence Analysis This work is protected under the Act on Copyright in Literary and Artistic Works (SFS 1960:729). Any form of reproduction, translation or modification without permission is prohibited. Cover photo: Denis Sinyakov, by permission. www.denissinyakov.com FOI-R--3587--SE Summary Since 2008, Russia’s conventional Armed Forces have been subject to a contro- versial reform and modernization process designed to move these structures be- yond the Soviet-legacy forces towards a modernized military.
    [Show full text]
  • Making Sense of Russian Hybrid Warfare: a Brief Assessment of the Russo–Ukrainian War
    No. 112 MARCH 2017 Making Sense of Russian Hybrid Warfare: A Brief Assessment of the Russo–Ukrainian War Amos C. Fox Andrew J. Rossow Making Sense of Russian Hybrid Warfare: A Brief Assessment of the Russo–Ukrainian War by Amos C. Fox Andrew J. Rossow The Institute of Land Warfare ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY AN INSTITUTE OF LAND WARFARE PAPER The purpose of the Institute of Land Warfare is to extend the educational work of AUSA by sponsoring scholarly publications, to include books, monographs and essays on key defense issues, as well as workshops and symposia. A work selected for publication as a Land Warfare Paper represents research by the author which, in the opinion of ILW’s editorial board, will contribute to a better understanding of a particular defense or national security issue. Publication as an Institute of Land Warfare Paper does not indicate that the Association of the United States Army agrees with everything in the paper but does suggest that the Association believes the paper will stimulate the thinking of AUSA members and others concerned about important defense issues. LAND WARFARE PAPER No. 112, March 2017 Making Sense of Russian Hybrid Warfare: A Brief Assessment of the Russo–Ukrainian War by Amos C. Fox and Andrew J. Rossow Major Amos C. Fox is currently a student at the Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. His previous assignments included troop commands and staff positions in the 4th Infantry Division, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and the U.S. Army Armor School. Major Andrew J.
    [Show full text]
  • Volume 16, Issue 1 2014
    Baltic Security and Defence Review ________________________________________________________ Volume 16, Issue 1 2014 Baltic Security and Defence Review is the bi-annual publication of the Baltic Defence College © 2014, Baltic Defence College, All rights reserved ISSN 1736-3772 (print) 1736-3780 (online) Editorial Board Editor: Dr. James S. Corum, Dean, Baltic Defence College Deputy editor Mr. James Rogers, Baltic Defence College Harold E. Raugh, Jr., Ph.D. Command Historian, V Corps Lt. Col. John Andreas Olsen PhD, Norwegian Air Force, Dean, Norwegian Defence University College Dr. Augustine Meaher, Department of Political and Strategic Studies, Baltic Defence College Dr. Hannu Kari, Finnish National Defence University Dr. Maja Ericksson, Swedish National Defence Academy Erik Mannik, International Centre for Defence Studies Dr. Olaf Mertelsmann, Tartu University Dr. Margarita Seselgyte, Vilnius University Lithuania Dr. Zaneta Ozolina, University of Latvia Layout: Oliver Toots Cover and print: www.ecoprint.ee Electronic version of the Baltic Security and Defence Review can be accessed on the website of the Baltic Defence College at www.baltdefcol.org All articles of the Baltic Security and Defence Review are also available through the International Relations and Security Network (ISN) at www.isn.ethz.ch All inquiries should be made to the Baltic Defence College, Riia 12, 51013 Tartu, Estonia, ph: +372 717 6000, e-mail: [email protected] Disclaimer: The Baltic Defence College publishes the Baltic Security and Defence Review as a journal
    [Show full text]
  • The Development of Russian Military Policy and Finland
    AND FINLAND AND FINLANDAND FINLAND AND FINLAND MILITARY POLICY MILITARY POLICYMILITARY POLICY MILITARY POLICY Stefan Forss, Lauri Kiianlinna, Pertti Inkinen & Heikki Hult Stefan Forss, Lauri Kiianlinna, Pertti Inkinen & Heikki Hult Stefan Forss, Lauri Kiianlinna, Pertti Inkinen & Heikki Hult THE DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIAN Stefan Forss, Lauri Kiianlinna, Pertti Inkinen & Heikki Hult THE DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIAN THE DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIAN THE DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIAN National Defence University Department of Strategic and Defence Studies Series 2: Research Reports No 49 National Defence UniversityNational Defence University Department of Strategic and Defence StudiesDepartment of Strategic and Defence Studies Series 2: Research Reports No 49Series 2: Research Reports No 49 National Defence University Department of Strategic and Defence Studies Series 2: Research Reports No 49 Stefan Forss, Lauri Kiianlinna, Pertti Inkinen & Heikki Hult The Development of Russian Military Policy and Finland Series 2: No 49, 2013 .maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu. .maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu..maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu. .maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu. w ww w ww wwww ww +358 299 800 +358 299 800+358 299 800 +358 299 800 Tel. strategianlaitos@mil. Tel. Tel. [email protected]@mil. Tel. strategianlaitos@mil. National Defence University Department of Strategic and Defence Studies P.O.Box 266, 00171 HELSINKI Suomi Finland National Defence UniversityNational Defence University Department of StrategicDepartment of Strategic and Defence Studiesand Defence Studies P.O.Box
    [Show full text]
  • Russian Ground Forces Posture Towards the West Russian Ground Forces Posture Towards the West
    Research Paper Charles Dick Russia and Eurasia Programme | April 2019 Russian Ground Forces Posture Towards the West Russian Ground Forces Posture Towards the West Summary • The loss of former satellites and significant Soviet territories as a consequence of the break-up of the USSR left Russia feeling unjustly dispossessed, humiliated and vulnerable to a West that in subsequent years came to be regarded once again as an enemy. • Long neglected, the Russian military could neither contribute to a reassertion of ‘great power’ status, nor even guarantee the diminished country’s security. Under President Putin, however, a far-reaching and costly programme of military reform, rationalization and modernization has made the army formidable again, especially in Russia’s west and southwest. The military is again prepared for defence, and to help implement a revisionist programme. • Even more important than qualitative upgrading is the army’s doctrinal modernization. It is readying itself conceptually for a spectrum of conflict from nuclear through limited conventional to ‘new generation’ war, in which the military component is only a part, and not necessarily the most important. Deception and dissimulation are essential elements of Russian management of conflict, especially in its (often decisive) initial period. • Russia’s preference is not to telegraph, through its peacetime dispositions, possible wartime intentions that could provoke NATO counter-preparations. Thus, with the inevitable exception of in Kaliningrad oblast , major forces are not held threateningly close to the Baltic states. For Russia, the ongoing Ukrainian conflict necessitates an intimidatory forward deployment that allows for a rapid response in time of crisis. Similarly, the unrest characterizing the Caucasus region, and Russia’s hostility towards Georgia, require a forward military presence.
    [Show full text]
  • Trends in Russia's Armed Forces: an Overview of Budgets and Capabilities
    C O R P O R A T I O N Trends in Russia’s Armed Forces An Overview of Budgets and Capabilities Keith Crane, Olga Oliker, Brian Nichiporuk For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR2573 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-1-9774-0195-3 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2019 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface This report documents research and analysis conducted as part of a project entitled Security in Europe in the Wake of the Ukraine Crisis: Implications for the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Russian Armed Forces: Military Modernization and Reforms
    July 20, 2020 Russian Armed Forces: Military Modernization and Reforms Since Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, Russia has technological challenges, it remains unclear whether Russia undertaken extensive efforts to modernize and upgrade its will be able to fully produce and deploy these systems. armed forces. In the years ahead, these efforts are expected to continue focusing on modernizing military equipment, as Personnel well as improving combat readiness and coordination Russia’s official authorized personnel strength is 1,013,628. across service branches. Command and control, electronic The Russian Ministry of Defense in late 2019 stated the warfare, recruitment of professional soldiers, force structure Armed Forces were 95% staffed, while experts estimate the changes, and logistics also are likely to be priorities for actual number is lower. Two major goals of the reforms development. Some Members of Congress have expressed started in 2008 were a reduction in personnel strength and a interest in understanding the extent of Russia’s military focus on professionalization. Opposition from the military modernization and reform efforts as they assess the nature and recruiting realities meant those goals were scaled back. of Russian threats to the United States and its allies and Subsequently, Russia has relied on a hybrid mix of draftees partners in Europe and other regions. on one-year conscription terms and volunteers under term contracts. Professional (contract) soldiers are prioritized for State Armament Plan Priorities front-line combat and elite units. The Navy and Aerospace Russia’s military modernization priorities are detailed in Forces have higher levels of professional personnel due to 10-year plans called State Armament Plans (GPVs).
    [Show full text]
  • Russia's Limit of Advance: Analysis of Russian Ground Force Deployment Capabilities and Limitations
    C O R P O R A T I O N BEN CONNABLE, ABBY DOLL, ALYSSA DEMUS, DARA MASSICOT, CLINT REACH, ANTHONY ATLER, WILLIAM MACKENZIE, MATTHEW POVLOCK, LAUREN SKRABALA Russia’s Limit of Advance Analysis of Russian Ground Force Deployment Capabilities and Limitations For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR2563 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-1-9774-0241-7 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2020 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface This report documents research and analysis conducted as part of the project Defeating Rus- sian Deployed Joint Forces, sponsored by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Options for Fielding Ground-Launched Long-Range Missiles
    CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE Options for Fielding Ground-Launched Long-Range Missiles FEBRUARY 2020 At a Glance The Department of Defense (DoD) has expressed concern that potential adversaries such as Russia and China could prevent the United States from easily gaining air and naval superiority in future conflicts, which could hinder its ability to prosecute military campaigns in certain scenarios in the Baltic region or the South China Sea. The Congressional Budget Office identified several existing weapon systems that DoD could adapt relatively rapidly, at a cost of about $1 billion to $6 billion (in 2020 dollars) for seven batteries, to give U.S. ground forces some limited long-range capabilities in those scenarios: • Option 1: A Cruise Missile for Attacking Land Targets. DoD could procure and field a ground-launched Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile– Extended Range (JASSM-ER). Option 1 has the lowest estimated up-front cost, $1.3 billion, of the four options CBO examined, but the JASSM-ER would have minimal value in either a South China Sea or a Baltic scenario. • Option 2: An Antiship Cruise Missile. DoD could procure and field a ground-launched Long-Range Antiship Missile (LRASM) at an estimated up-front cost of $2.2 billion. The LRASM could be quite valuable in a South China Sea scenario but would have much less value in a Baltic scenario, where Russian naval forces present less of a threat. • Option 3: An Air Defense Missile. DoD could procure and field a ground- launched Standard Missile 6 (SM-6), as well as an air and missile defense radar for each battery, at an estimated up-front cost of $4.6 billion.
    [Show full text]