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Volume 16, Issue 1 2014 Baltic Security and Defence Review ________________________________________________________ Volume 16, Issue 1 2014 Baltic Security and Defence Review is the bi-annual publication of the Baltic Defence College © 2014, Baltic Defence College, All rights reserved ISSN 1736-3772 (print) 1736-3780 (online) Editorial Board Editor: Dr. James S. Corum, Dean, Baltic Defence College Deputy editor Mr. James Rogers, Baltic Defence College Harold E. Raugh, Jr., Ph.D. Command Historian, V Corps Lt. Col. John Andreas Olsen PhD, Norwegian Air Force, Dean, Norwegian Defence University College Dr. Augustine Meaher, Department of Political and Strategic Studies, Baltic Defence College Dr. Hannu Kari, Finnish National Defence University Dr. Maja Ericksson, Swedish National Defence Academy Erik Mannik, International Centre for Defence Studies Dr. Olaf Mertelsmann, Tartu University Dr. Margarita Seselgyte, Vilnius University Lithuania Dr. Zaneta Ozolina, University of Latvia Layout: Oliver Toots Cover and print: www.ecoprint.ee Electronic version of the Baltic Security and Defence Review can be accessed on the website of the Baltic Defence College at www.baltdefcol.org All articles of the Baltic Security and Defence Review are also available through the International Relations and Security Network (ISN) at www.isn.ethz.ch All inquiries should be made to the Baltic Defence College, Riia 12, 51013 Tartu, Estonia, ph: +372 717 6000, e-mail: [email protected] Disclaimer: The Baltic Defence College publishes the Baltic Security and Defence Review as a journal of research and commentary on security issues in order to facilitate academic discussion. The views presented in the articles are those only of the authors, and do not represent any official views of the three Baltic States, or their armed forces, or of the Baltic Defence College Baltic Security & Defence Review Vol 16, Issue 1, 2014 Contents Russian Armed Forces Military Reforms and Capability Development (2008-2012) By Major Kaspars Mazitans ............................................................................................. 5 Military integration between Russia and South Ossetia: quo vadis? By Dr. Grazvydas Jasutis ................................................................................................ 46 Danish Peacekeepers in the Republic of Serbian Krajina (Croatia), 1992-1995 By Mr. Jakob Brink Rasmussen ..................................................................................... 70 The Need for a European “Poor Man´s Revolution in Military Affairs and the Fragile Geopolitical Fabric of Europe By Dr. Konstantinos Grivas .......................................................................................... 125 Overview of the Guard and Reserve Forces of the Baltic Sea Countries at the Beginning of the Twenty-first Century By Colonel (Retired) Milton Paul Davis ........................................................................ 163 Arctic – the New “Great Game” or Peaceful Cooperation? By Colonel (Retired) Risto Gabrielsson and Colonel (Retired) Zdzislaw Sliwa, PhD .... 203 Assessing Professional Military English Language Skills in Sweden and its Neighbouring States By Ms. Annette Nolan .................................................................................................. 234 The League of Nations and the Baltic. The case of the planned plebiscite and international force for Vilnius By Mr. Enrico Magnani ................................................................................................ 254 3 Baltic Security & Defence Review Vol 16, Issue 1, 2014 Notes from the Editor – Volume 16, Issue 1 2014 Dear Reader, This is the last issue of the BSDR that I will edit as I am moving on to another academic venue. We continue to get a large number of submissions for the journal and in this issue we have some interesting articles on Russian military issues. We also have some articles that pertain to military theory and doctrine in a European context and some articles on Baltic area armed forces. We also have two interesting articles on Baltic regional military history. We wish to serve the security studies community, and especially the academic community in this region, by offering academics and professionals in the security studies field an opportunity to publish with us. While having a special focus on Baltic issues, we are also interested in discussing broad issues of European regional security, as well as furthering academic discussion concerning stability operations and current issues on Eastern European security. I wish best of luck to the new Baltic Defence College Dean who will take over as editor in the fall. James S. Corum PhD LTC USAR ret. Call for Articles for the Baltic Security and Defence Review The Baltic Security and Defence Review is a peer reviewed academic journal published twice a year by the Baltic Defence College, a staff college for the three Baltic States located in Estonia. The language of the journal is English. The journal focuses on current security issues and military history – with an emphasis on security issues as they affect the Baltic States. We welcome scholars to submit academic articles of 6,000 –12,000 words in length with endnotes (Chicago style) on subjects dealing with: European Security and NATO issues, small state security issues, current security issues of the Baltic Region, the military history of the Baltic region, as well as articles on stability operations. All inquiries and submissions should be made to the Baltic Defence College, Riia 12, 51013 Tartu, Estonia, ph: +372 717 6000, fax: +372 717 6050, e-mail: [email protected]. 4 Baltic Security & Defence Review Vol 16, Issue 1, 2014 Russian Armed Forces Military Reforms and Capability Development (2008-2012) By Major Kaspars Mazitans* Introduction The lessons learned from the Russian-Georgia war on August 2008 provided a new opportunity for Russian Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov (the Minister of Defense from 2007 to 2012) to announce, in October of that year, the launch of a program of military reform. Shortly before the war in June 2008, the political masters of the Kremlin replaced the conservative Chief of the General Staff General Yuriy Baluyevsky (Chief of the General Staff from 2004 to 2008) with General Nikolai Makarov (Chief of the General Staff from 2008 to 2012). General Nikolai Makarov was the commander of the Siberian Military District with little influence on the Russian Army’s development or on the higher officers of General Staff. In order for General Makarov to remain Chief of the General Staff, he had to support all of Serdyukov’s military reforms. The Kremlin had tried to reform the Russian Armed Forces off and on since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 2006, Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin said, “An effective response to the terrorists needs to put together a task force of at least 65,000 men. And in all the Land Forces in combat ready units – there are only 55,000, and they are scattered throughout the country. The Army has 1.4 million men, and yet there is no one to wage the war.”1 Until 2008, the personnel of Russian armed forces numbered 1.35 million in peace time with an augmentation to 4.2 million in war time, but the augmentees required a one year preparation period. The aim was to reduce the number of personnel * Major Kaspars Mazitans is working at the Joint Headquarters of Latvian National Armed Forces and is a former student of the Baltic Defence College Joint Command and General Staff Course 5 Baltic Security & Defence Review Vol 16, Issue 1, 2014 down to one million by 2012. The big, slow, conservative, old-fashioned and cost-ineffective Russian military system was like a dinosaur in the computer age. The Russian-Georgia war in 2008 showed that the Russian Armed Forces were not ready for modern warfare. During the war the Russian Armed Forces were organized and acted like a Cold War era structure with a lack of a modern command and control system, modern equipment and technology, and especially lacking in space and computer technology support. In September 2008, President Medvedev announced that military reform would include creating permanent combat-ready units, creation of a new and modern command and control system, improving the military education and training system, reequipping the armed forces, and improving social benefits for the military.2 The Objectives of the Russian Military Reforms 2008-2012 On 14 October 2008 Russian Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov announced the beginning of a new period of military reform. The goal of the reforms was to create modern, well-trained armed forces, equipped with the latest weapons and military equipment. In the background of the military reforms were several factors that have had direct impact on Russian Armed Forces sustainability and combat readiness.3 At first there was the command and control system (C2). There were different levels of headquarters and decision makers involved. During the Russia–Georgia War the commands came through three different levels of headquarters: the General Staff, the Military District headquarters and the 58th Army headquarters. The Russian force consisted of some infantry and airborne regiments.4 All these redundant C2 organs were too big and inefficient. For an armed force of 1.35 million, there were 52,000 officers in different level headquarters. At the same time the actual combat-ready troops numbered no more than 100,000 personnel. It meant that for every two combat ready soldiers and officers there
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