Lords of War: Maximilian I of Bavaria and the Institutions of Lordship in the Catholic League Army, 1619-1626
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Lords of War: Maximilian I of Bavaria and the Institutions of Lordship in the Catholic League Army, 1619-1626 by James Oliver Stutler Department of History Duke University Date:_______________________ Approved: ___________________________ Thomas W. Robisheaux, Co-Supervisor ___________________________ Kristen B. Neuschel, Co-Supervisor ___________________________ John J. Martin ___________________________ Dirk Bonker Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of History in the Graduate School of Duke University 2014 i v ABSTRACT Lords of War: Maximilian I of Bavaria and the Institutions of Lordship in the Catholic League Army, 1619-1626 by James Oliver Stutler Department of History Duke University Date:_______________________ Approved: ___________________________ Thomas W. Robisheaux, Co-Supervisor ___________________________ Kristen B. Neuschel, Co-Supervisor ___________________________ John J. Martin ___________________________ Dirk Bonker An abstract of a dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of History in the Graduate School of Duke University 2014 Copyright by James Oliver Stutler 2014 ABSTRACT This dissertation is a study of lordship and its expression through the Catholic League army’s institutions during the early years of the Thirty Years War. It draws on letters, reports and other chancery documents from the Bavarian State Archive to examine how duke Maximilian I of Bavaria (r 1597-1651) and his officers re-negotiated their respective command privileges within the army so as to better accommodate each other’s practices of lordship through its operations. In exchange for their continued investment in his military power the duke’s officers, that is, his military contractors, bargained to preserve, and then expand, customary lordly prerogatives within their commands. More broadly the dissertation argues that Maximilian’s negotiations with his contractors reflected deeper struggles among the Holy Roman Empire’s nobilities over how to incorporate their own lordship within the evolving structures of the imperial state. Nobles who fought in Maximilian’s service staked their wealth and landed power on his success in securing a preeminent position relative to the monarchy and, with it, their own place among the empire’s governing elite. In the process the dissertation probes and questions the role historians have usually assigned military contractors within wider processes of state-formation in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe and, in particular, the Holy Roman Empire. It views contractors not as profiteering mercenaries who pursued war for gain at the state’s expense, but rather as elites who sought to invest in modes of power-sharing that would preserve and strengthen their military role in governance. iv Contents ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................... iv INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................... 1 Military Contractors, the Thirty Years War and the “Devolution” in Warfare ....................... 10 Sources & Institutions: Maximilian, Military Contractors, Lordship and the State ................ 34 Chapters & Summary: Maximilian, Officers and Negotiations, 1619-1626 ........................... 51 CHAPTER 1: MAINTENANCE AND SPOILS, 1619-1620 ........................................................ 59 Maximilian’s Lordship: War Council and Commissioners ..................................................... 63 Officers Resist: Petitions, Mischief and Open-Table Maintenance ........................................ 68 “Good Regiment”: Discipline, Jurisdiction and Punishment .................................................. 75 “Public Enemies”: Partisans, Plunder and Constitutional Authority ....................................... 83 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 91 CHAPTER 2: RECOMPENSE AND COMMANDS, 1621 .......................................................... 95 February Reforms: War Council and the General War Commissariat .................................... 97 Shortage in Coin: Maintenance, Arrears and Deferred Reimbursement ............................... 101 Opportunity to Command: Resistance to Disbandment and Reformation ............................ 106 Mischief and Infractions: Reputation, Violence and the Pressure for Support ..................... 117 Amberg Regime: Occupation, Good Policy and the Search for Discipline .......................... 128 Concessions and Compromise: Maintenance, Restraint and Enlarged Commands .............. 133 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 143 CHAPTER 3: CRISIS AND INVESTMENT, 1622 .................................................................... 146 Reluctant Investors: Recruitment, Competition, and Service Terms in the Cavalry ............. 151 v Tentative Cooperation: Objection, Tension and Negotiation in Tilly’s Field Army ............ 161 Protest and Agitation: Continued Unrest and Near-Mutiny in Anholt’s Field Army ........... 165 Investors by Force: Hazard and Harassment during the Musters in Bohemia ...................... 172 Wallenstein’s Challenge: Rivalry over Maintenance and Reputation in Bohemia ............... 177 Reduced Commands: Coerced Musters and Injured Reputations in Bohemia ...................... 184 Assistance Councilors: Search for Accord and Compliance ................................................. 191 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 196 CHAPTER 4: PARTISANS AND PREROGATIVES, 1622 ...................................................... 200 Evasion and Collusion: Commissioners, Discipline and Incomplete Enforcement .............. 202 Tactics for Control: Partisans, Conspicuous Violence and Supremacy in Erbach ................ 207 Lapsed Grievances: Misconduct, Damages and the Policy of Denial in Limburg ................ 213 Privileges and Rewards: Command Integrity and Interference in Leiningen ....................... 216 Custody and Jurisdiction: Disputes and Escalation between Officers and Authorities ......... 224 CHAPTER 5: CONTRIBUTIONS AND MANAGEMENT, 1623-1626 ................................... 233 Rejections and Warning: Pressure, Resistance and Mutiny in Anholt’s Army ..................... 234 Management and Autonomy: Maintenance, Recruitment and Succession ........................... 243 Contributions in Hessen: Toward lasting Solutions .............................................................. 250 Final Negotiations: Bargains of 1624 .................................................................................... 256 Imperial Contributions: Legality, Legitimacy and Pretext for Plunder ................................. 263 Material Bonds: Reputation, Desertion and the Preservation of Followings ........................ 270 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 276 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................ 279 vi BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................................ 281 BIOGRAPHY .............................................................................................................................. 293 vii INTRODUCTION In early May, 1621, eager recruits began to trudge from afar into Geiselhöring, a small north-Bavarian market town nestled in Straubing’s hinterlands along the Danube. May might have fallen late in the spring recruitment season, but duke Maximilian I of Bavaria (r 1597-1651) had delayed further musters in the hope that the “winter king,” Frederick V of the Palatinate (r 1610-1623) could be persuaded to reconcile with emperor Ferdinand II (r 1619-1637) and lay down arms. Instead Frederick’s general, Ernst von Mansfeld, held the Upper Palatinate against Catholic League troops and threatened to engulf the entire central highlands in further costly campaigns. Rather than draw down his forces Maximilian now found himself raising new regiments to join the second field army he was amassing around Straubing. Once mustered the new troops would cross the Danube into the forested Palatine hills, subdue the rebel towns and castles one by one, block Mansfeld’s retreat westward and give Maximilian’s general, Johann Tserclaes von Tilly, time to push through the mountains from Bohemia and complete the outlaw’s encirclement. In three years’ fighting the Catholic League’s war efforts had become familiar stories to Geiselhöring’s people. Straubing, seat to the duke’s northernmost regional administrator [Rentmeister], frequently served as a staging area for Bavarian arms. Its surrounding villages and markets hosted prospective soldiers who awaited muster into the new regiment being created under colonel Friedrich von Gaisberg, military contractor and captain of the duke’s household guard. Georg Meisl, a local journeyman tailor, had enlisted three years before, during the League’s first