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SOCIAL MOVEMENTS in NEW DEMOCRACIES: SPECIALIZATION and OWNERSHIP a Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate School of the Univers

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SOCIAL MOVEMENTS in NEW DEMOCRACIES: SPECIALIZATION and OWNERSHIP a Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate School of the Univers SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: SPECIALIZATION AND OWNERSHIP A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Notre Dame in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Cecilia Pe Lero ___________________________ Michael Coppedge, Director Graduate Program in Political Science Notre Dame, Indiana November 2018 Ó Copyright by CECILIA PE LERO 2018 All rights reserved SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: SPECIALIZATION AND OWNERSHIP Abstract by Cecilia Pe Lero The restoration of democratic regimes in the Philippines and Brazil in the 1980s provided an opportunity to redefine the relationship between the state and social movements. As movements carried their advocacies into the new democratic regimes, activism became about how movements could shape nascent democratic institutions to expand and regularize movement access, while simultaneously preparing the movement itself to take part in institutional decision-making. These new opportunities and institutions thus necessitated new repertoires of contention. This dissertation seeks to add to our understanding about these processes by answering two questions: How have social movements navigated the new democratic space? and, What determines the kinds of repertoires social movement actors adopted? Through the in-depth process tracing of four social movement campaigns, which included my personal attendance at meetings, fora, and strategy sessions, as well as over eighty interviews, I make two arguments to explain how social movement actors in the Philippines and Brazil chose their repertoires. First, social movement organizations Cecilia P. Lero working on a given issue carve out specialized niches for themselves in terms of skills, target sector, areas of influence, and political ideology. Thus, when social movement organizations work together on a particular issue or campaign, a division of labor develops that can allow the movement to approach the issue on a variety of strategic fronts. Second, social movement organizations in democratic Philippines and Brazil emphasized framing their strategies and tactics in terms of sectoral ownership and decision via collective processes. Sectoral ownership, or framing a campaign or advocacy as being the demand of the affected sector itself, is important for social movement organizations to compete with both the state as well as other organizations as the “legitimate” representative of the people. Relatedly, collective decision-making processes are emphasized in order to provide a quasi-formal veneer to this claim of legitimate representation, as well as to act as a parallel to the democratic processes that movements urge the state to follow. Thus, the hope is that internal processes both put pressure on the state to adopt democratic policy-making processes, while simultaneously preparing social movement members to eventually participate in such state processes. For my Daddy, to whom I promised I would be a doctor. He left us just a few months before I got to fulfill that promise. ii CONTENTS FIGURES .............................................................................................................................v ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................................ vi CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORY ...................................................1 1.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 1 1.2 Literature review .................................................................................................................. 9 1.2.1 What determines organizations’ repertoires of contention? ........................... 9 1.2.2 External factors ............................................................................................ 10 1.2.3 Internal factors ............................................................................................. 14 1.2.4 Factors in the social movement field ........................................................... 17 1.2.5 Social movements in Brazil’s and the Philippines’ transition to democracy 22 1.2.6 Context of mobilization and democratic transition ...................................... 23 1.3 Theory .................................................................................................................................. 28 1.3.1 Specialization and mutualism among organizations .................................... 29 1.3.2 Division of labor among social movements organizations .......................... 37 1.3.3 Movements’ role in democratic consolidation and expansion ..................... 43 1.4 Cases ..................................................................................................................................... 46 1.5 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 55 CHAPTER 2: THE COCONUT LEVY .............................................................................57 2.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 57 2.2 History of the Coco Levy ................................................................................................ 58 2.3 Pre-2012 mobilizations about the Coco Levy ............................................................. 63 2.4 Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED), et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines and Ensuing Initiatives .................................................................... 65 2.5 Formation of KILUS Magniniyog .................................................................................. 69 2.6 Designing the KM-71 campaign .................................................................................... 72 2.7 Mechanics of the KM-71 march ..................................................................................... 77 2.8 The marchers reach Manila ............................................................................................. 82 2.9 Analysis ............................................................................................................................... 86 2.9.1 Division of labor .......................................................................................... 86 2.9.2 Sectoral ownership ....................................................................................... 91 CHAPTER 3: THE AMVACA PEOPLE’S PLAN ............................................................93 3.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 93 3.2 History of the Philippine informal settler movement ................................................ 96 3.3 People’s plan as a framework ....................................................................................... 100 3.4 The million dollar fund .................................................................................................. 103 iii 3.5 Establishing Kilos Maralita and AMVACA .............................................................. 104 3.6 Organizing AMVACA .................................................................................................... 106 3.7 Getting the people’s plan approved ............................................................................. 111 3.8 Discussion ......................................................................................................................... 114 CHAPTER 4: CABACEIRAS ......................................................................................... 119 4.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 119 4.2 History of agrarian reform movement in Brazil ....................................................... 122 4.3 The state of Pará as a location of conflict .................................................................. 127 4.4 The occupation of Cabaceiras ....................................................................................... 131 4.4.1 Stage 1: Beginning and early months of the Cabaceiras occupation ......... 132 4.4.2 Stage 2: Working with institutional actors ................................................. 138 4.4.3 Stage 3: Defending and implementing the dispropriation ......................... 143 4.5 Discussion ......................................................................................................................... 146 CHAPTER 5: APEOESP .................................................................................................150 5.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 150 5.2 Labor movements and the history of teacher unions in Brazil .............................. 152 5.3 Foundation of the APESNOESP .................................................................................. 154 5.4 First mobilizations ........................................................................................................... 156 5.5 APENOESP under dictatorship .................................................................................... 160 5.6 Restructuring the APEOESP from within .................................................................. 162 5.7
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