Rampart Report-Extended
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R A M P A R T R e c o n s i d e r e d The Searc h for Real Refo rm Seven Years Later Blue Ribbon Panel Chair Additional Staff Rampart Review Constance L. Rice Kenneth Berland Jenna Cobb Panel Panel Members John Mathews Jan L. Handzlik Pilar Mendoza Laurie L. Levenson Margaret Middleton Stephen A. Mansfield Natasha Saggar Carol A. Sobel Rishi Sahgal Edgar Hugh Twine Regina Tuohy Panel Members Emeriti Erwin Chemerinsky Andrea Ordin Maurice Suh Executive Director Kathleen Salvaty Lead Investigator Brent A. Braun Additional Investigators Eusebio Benavidez Morris D. Hayes Jack Keller Pete McGuire Michael Wolf Special Hon. James K. Hahn Linder & Associates Gerald Chaleff Hon. Jack Weiss Thanks Warren M. Christopher Hon. Debra W. Yang *** Los Angeles Police Johnnie L. Cochran, Jr. Roberta Yang Akin Gump Strauss Foundation Hon. Steve Cooley Gregory A. Yates Hauer & Feld LLP Los Angeles City David S. Cunningham III Personnel Department Hon. Rockard J. Delgadillo All of the dedicated Burke, Williams Donna Denning LAPD officers and & Sorenson, LLP Technical Threat Richard E. Drooyan employees who gave Analysis Group, Inc. Paul Enox their time and insight Gibson, Dunn Shelley Freeman to this Panel in & Crutcher LLP *** James J. Fyfe order to improve Howrey LLP Bonifacio Bonny Garcia the department. LAPD Office of the Michael J. Gennaco Lindahl, Schnabel, Inspector General Gigi Gordon Kardassakis & Beck LLP Michael P. Judge Latin American Law E. Richard Larson Nossaman Guthner Enforcement Association Barrett S. Litt Knox Elliott LLP Law Enforcement John Mack Association of Asian Pacifics Cheryl White Mason O’Melveny & Meyers LLP Winston K. McKesson Hon. Cindy Miscikowski Orrick, Herrington Los Angeles Police Rose M. Ochi & Sutcliffe LLP Protective League Anthony Pacheco Oscar Joel Bryant Paul, Hastings, Janofsky R. Samuel Paz Foundation & Walker LLP Ramon L. Quintana Gilbert T. Ray *** Sidley Austin LLP Hon. Ed P. Reyes Chief William J. Bratton Lael Rubin Skadden, Arps, Slate, Anthony Asadullah Samad Meagher & Flom LLP *** Alex Sanchez Corina Alarcon Silvia Saucedo The James Irvine Hon. Lee Baca Alan J. Skobin Foundation Andre Birotte, Jr. Michael J. Strumwasser *** Merrick Bobb Richard Tefank Rick J. Caruso Karen Wagener Samuel Walker This report is dedicated in memoriam to Edgar Hugh Twine Rampart Reconsidered Contents i Contents 1 Introduction 18 Conclusion II.2. The “Thin Blue Line” Model Seeds Proactive Policing that Delivers 9 The Road Ahead Containment and Suppression of Violence in High Crime Areas, but Not Public Safety 9 I. THE RAMPART RECOVERY 19 Conclusion II.3. 12 Conclusion I.1. Aggressive, Untargeted Proactive Policing Destroys Public-Police Trust The New Rampart Leadership and Crime Fighting Model Would Have Prevented CRASH Misconduct from Metastasizing into a Crisis 20 Conclusion II.4. The City Bears Responsibility for Failing to Provide Resources 13 Conclusion I.2. for a Citywide Public Safety Model The New Rampart Leadership and Crime Fighting Model Had the Following Key Attributes 20 Conclusion II.5. The City Has Failed to Heed the 40-Year-Old McCone Commission 13 Conclusion I.3. Warning to Fix the “Sickness in the Center of Our City” that Fuels The New Rampart Leadership and Crime Fighting Model Had Public-Police Friction and Riots the Following Leadership Qualities 21 Conclusion II.6. 14 Conclusion I.4. Public and Private Institutions Have Not Done Enough to Stabilize The New Rampart Leadership and Crime Fighting Model Had Distressed Communities the Following Conditions Precedent 22 Conclusion II.7. 15 Conclusion I.5. Communities and Families Have Not Done Enough to Confront The New Rampart Leadership and Crime Fighting Model Is Not and Counter the Culture of Violence and Destruction Overtaking Some the Norm Throughout LAPD Poor Neighborhoods 15 Conclusion I.6. 22 Recommendation II.1. The New Rampart Leadership and Crime Fighting Model Is Unlikely to Last In Order to Increase Trust and Public-Police Cooperation, LAPD Should 16 II. EXTERNAL BARRIERS TO REPLICATING THE Transition from Proactive/Suppression Policing to the High Road Policing RAMPART TRANSFORMATION Demonstrated in the Rampart Division Turnaround 17 Conclusion II.1. 23 Recommendation II.2. Los Angeles Has An Under-resourced, “Thin Blue Line” Policing Model The City and LAPD Should End “Thin Blue Line” Policing and Develop a Blueprint for Funding and Providing Citywide Public Safety ii Rampart Reconsidered Contents 23 Recommendation II.3. 35 Conclusion III.7. The City Should Fulfill the McCone Commission Mandate to End The Office of Inspector General Is the Only LAPD Entity with “The Spiral of Failure” that Seeds Public-Police Conflict the Potential Capacity to Effectively Enforce LAPD Accountability over the Long Term 23 Recommendation II.4. Public and Private Institutions Must Find and Fund More Effective 35 Conclusion III.8. Solutions for Improving Conditions in Poor, High Crime Communities The OIG Currently Operates Under Constraints that Prevent It from Functioning as the Potent Check It Should Be 23 Recommendation II.5. Residents of High Crime Communities Must Take Responsibility for 36 Conclusion III.9. and Receive Resources Needed to Counter the Culture of Violence Discipline Decisions by the Chief of Police Are Important Tools for Implementing the Policing Showcased by the New Rampart Model 24 III. THE INTERNAL BARRIERS TO REPLICATING THE RAMPART TRANSFORMATION: CHANGES NEEDED IN 37 Conclusion III.10. LAPD EVEN IF THE EXTERNAL BARRIERS REMAIN The Federal Court and the Consent Decree Are Central to Department Advancement and Transformation 24 Conclusion III.1. Current Reforms, While Significant, Are Not Sufficient to Prevent 38 Recommendation III.1. Corruption Recurrence, Fix Longstanding Problems or Take the Rampart LAPD Leaders Need to Forge a Clear Consensus among Officers Transformation Department-wide to Permanently Transition to the High Road Policing Showcased in Rampart Division Turnaround 25 Conclusion III.2. Supervision Has Improved in Specific Divisions but Not Sufficiently 39 Recommendation III.2. to Prevent Scandal Recurrence The Police Commission Should Significantly Expand the Independence and Resources of the Inspector General 27 Conclusion III.3. Investigation Quality Has Improved Significantly, but Remains Uneven 39 Recommendation III.3. LAPD Leaders Should Continue to Use Discipline as a Tool for 27 Conclusion III.4. Implementing the Policing Showcased by the New Rampart Model Cultural Factors that Contributed to the CRASH Mindset Remain 39 Recommendation III.4. 30 Conclusion III.5. Federal Court Enforcement of the Consent Decree Should Continue In Addition to Internal Barriers Posed by Unresolved Problems the Current Focus on Achieving “Real Reform” to Remedy the Underlying Stemming from the CRASH Scandal, Deeper Cultural Dynamics within Causes of the CRASH Crisis LAPD also Block Solutions to LAPD's Longstanding Problems 40 Recommendation III.5. 34 Conclusion III.6. An Expedited Joint Action Taskforce Should Chart Actions Needed to Move LAPD Can Fix Itself When Change Agent Officers Drive the LAPD to High Road Policing Transformation Process Rampart Reconsidered Contents iii 46 The Road Behind 54 Conclusion I.9. LAPD’s Rampart Task Force Failed to Design an Investigation 50 I. LAPD Appropriate for a Complex, Multi-Defendant Police Corruption Case 50 Conclusion I.1. 54 Conclusion I.10. LAPD Leaders Knew of Renegade Policing, Exclusive of Drug Crimes, As the Rampart Task Force Grew, Many Investigators Did Not Have in Rampart Division and its CRASH Gang Unit Years Before CRASH Adequate Skills and Experience to Conduct Investigations into a Complex Crisis Erupted Police Corruption Scandal 50 Conclusion I.2. 54 Conclusion I.11. Other CRASH Units Had Similar Renegade Subcults LAPD Failed to Assign Case Responsibility to One Individual and Used a Team Approach that Diluted Focus, Direction and Results 50 Conclusion I.3. LAPD Leaders Did Not Adequately Address Specific Warnings of 55 Conclusion I.12. Illegal Policing Tactics by Rampart CRASH Officers before the Scandal In Conducting the Polygraph Examination of Rafael Perez, LAPD’s Erupted Publicly Polygrapher Employed Flawed Techniques that Undermined the Validity of the Examination 51 Conclusion I.4. Fraternization and Conflicts of Interest Undermined Effective 55 Conclusion I.13. Supervision and Accountability in Rampart Division LAPD’s Failure to Offer Administrative Immunity Limited Effectiveness of Investigations 51 Conclusion I.5. Whistleblowers Who Intercepted and Challenged Rampart CRASH Officers 56 Conclusion I.14. Were Punished or Ignored Conflicts of Interest Undermined the Investigations 52 Conclusion I.6. 56 Conclusion I.15. Evidence Controls Lacked Adequate Safeguards to Prevent Theft LAPD Focused Disproportionately on Pursuing the Board of Inquiry and Administrative Investigations to the Detriment of Criminal Investigations 53 Conclusion I.7. LAPD Failed to Approach the Investigation of Drug Theft 57 Conclusion I.16. as a Police Corruption Case with Systemic Implications The Department’s Disproportionate Focus on Pursuing Administrative Cases Resulted in Contamination of Criminal Investigations 53 Conclusion I.8. Internal Leaks Jeopardized the Investigation of Rafael Perez 58 Conclusion I.17. Most LAPD Rampart Task Force Investigators Did a Professional Job Investigating Perez' Allegations of Police Misconduct, Despite Challenges iv Rampart Reconsidered Contents 58 Conclusion I.18. 66 Recommendation I.1. A Small Number of LAPD Investigators on the Rampart Task Force