Royal Australian Navy Sea Power Centre Working Paper No. 2 STRUGGLING FOR A SOLUTION: THE RAN AND THE ACQUISITION OF A SURFACE TO AIR MISSILE CAPABILITY Peter Jones and James Goldrick January 2000 ii Copyright Commonwealth of Australia 2000 This work is copyright. Apart from any use as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part may be reproduced by any process without written permission from the Department of Defence Announcement statement—may be announced to the public. Secondary release—may be released to the public. All Defence information, whether classified or not, is protected from unauthorised disclosure under the Crimes Act 1914. Defence Information may only be released in accordance with the Defence Protective Security Manual (SECMAN 4) and/or Defence Instruction (General) OPS 13-4—Release of Classified Defence Information to Other Countries, as appropriate. Requests and inquiries should be addressed to the Director, Sea Power Centre, HMAS CRESWELL, JERVIS BAY NSW 2540. National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry Jones, P.D. (Peter D.). Struggling for a solution – the RAN and the acquisition of a surface to air missile capability. ISBN 0 642 29530 1 1. Australia. Royal Australian Navy. 2. Antiaircraft guns - Australia. 3. Surface to Air Missiles - Australia. 4. Australia - Defences. I. Goldrick, James. II. Australia. Royal Australian Navy. Sea Power Centre. III. Title. (Series : Working paper (Australia. Royal Australian Navy. Sea Power Centre); no. 2). 358.174820994 iii Disclaimer The views expressed are the authors’ and not necessarily those of the Department of Defence. The Commonwealth of Australia will not be legally responsible in contract, tort or otherwise for any statement made in this publication. Royal Australian Navy Sea Power Centre The Royal Australian Navy Sea Power Centre (SPC - formerly the Maritime Studies Program) was established to undertake activities which would promote the study, discussion and awareness of maritime issues and strategy within the RAN and the defence and civil communities at large. The aims of the SPC are: to promote the awareness among members of the RAN and wider Defence community of maritime strategy, maritime issues and the role maritime forces play in the security of national interests; and to contribute to the development of public awareness of the need for sea power in the defence of Australia and her sovereign interests. Comment on this Working Paper or any inquiry related to the activities of the Sea Power Centre should be directed to: Director Sea Power Centre HMAS CRESWELL JERVIS BAY 2540 Australia Telephone: +61 2 4429 7948 Facsimile: +61 2 4429 7969 E-Mail: [email protected] Sea Power Centre Working Papers The Sea Power Centre Working Paper series is designed as a vehicle to foster debate and discussion on maritime issues of relevance to the Royal Australian Navy, the Australian Defence Force and to Australia and the region more generally. iv About the Authors Peter Jones is a Captain in the RAN currently serving as the Director Strategy and Futures in Navy Headquarters. He holds BA and MA degrees and is a Principal Warfare Officer sub-specialised in gunnery. Peter Jones joined the RAN College in 1974. Major sea appointments include HMAS IPSWICH, HMAS CANBERRA, HMAS SYDNEY as Executive Officer and HMAS MELBOURNE as Commanding Officer in 1998-99. He has served in charge of the RAN’s Tactical Development Cell, as Research Officer to the Chief of Navy and on exchange with the Canadian Forces. James Goldrick is a Captain in the RAN currently serving as the Director of the Sea Power Centre. He holds a BA and an M.Litt and is a Principal Warfare Officer sub-specialised in anti-submarine warfare. Major sea appointments include HMAS CESSNOCK as Commanding Officer, HMAS Perth as Executive Officer and HMAS SYDNEY as Commanding Officer in 1996-98 and again in 1999. He has also served as OIC Warfare at the RAN Surface Warfare School, as a Research Fellow at the US Naval War College and on exchange with the Royal Navy. STRUGGLING FOR A SOLUTION: THE RAN AND THE ACQUISITION OF A SURFACE TO AIR MISSILE CAPABILITY1 Peter Jones and James Goldrick Introduction By the end of the 1950s, the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) was facing a number of conflicting demands on its limited resources. For the previous decade the RAN had concentrated on developing and then maintaining a small fixed wing carrier capability, first in what could be described as a ‘light strike’ role and latterly for anti-submarine warfare (ASW). The remainder of the active fleet was composed of a handful of destroyers and frigates, which were intended to provide escorts for the carrier and for merchant shipping in the protection of sea communications role. The duties of the RAN, broadly speaking, were to contribute towards the collective security arrangements in South East Asia in situations short of global war and, in the latter event, to contribute to the theatre capability for the protection of Australian and Allied shipping from the Soviet submarine forces. These duties had evolved from a combination of strategic and financial realities. They reflected what were likely to be the principal strategic demands on maritime Australia in both peace and war, but they also reflected the limitations on capability that had resulted from the government's insistence on restraining defence expenditure in favour of national development. In particular, the theatre ASW role meant that higher levels of capability in other warfare areas, such as anti-air (AAW) and anti-surface, were simply not required because the Australian units would be expected to operate well away from such threats or under the US/UK maritime air umbrella. This relatively comfortable situation was changing rapidly by the end of the 1950s. The capabilities of the Chinese submarine force seemed to be increasing substantially under Russian tutelage. The attitude of Indonesia was distinctly anti-western and tensions were rising with the Netherlands over the ownership of Dutch New Guinea. Indonesia was acquiring not only submarines but also modern surface combatants from the Soviet Union via 1 This is an expanded and developed version of a paper ‘Buying the DDGs’ by Peter Jones which first appeared in T.R. Frame, J.V.P. Goldrick & P.D. Jones (eds) Reflections on the Royal Australian Navy, Kangaroo Press, Kenthurst, 1991, pp. 316- 29. 2 SPC Working Paper No. 2 Poland, some of which carried heavier armament than any RAN surface unit.2 Furthermore, the Indonesians were also on their way towards acquiring bombers configured for maritime strike operations from the Soviets. The key difference between this situation and all the RAN’s previous experience was that there was a very real prospect emerging that circumstances might require the fleet to operate under high threat conditions without any support from the United States Navy at all and with the possibility that the Royal Navy might be so occupied elsewhere within the archipelago as to be unable to provide cover for the RAN.3 There was little prospect of substantial support from the Royal Australian Air Force, whose bomber force was relatively small and in any case would have many calls on it for land strike operations. The fighter force simply did not possess the range to operate at any distance from the Australian mainland. To all these developments the RAN had few immediate answers. Its only substantial anti-surface capabilities were in the 4.5 inch gunned destroyers and the handful of SEA VENOM aircraft, which also had the major responsibility for anti-air defence of the fleet. One solution would be the acquisition of a larger and more modern aircraft carrier, which could operate sufficient numbers of strike and attack aircraft to neutralise the Indonesians. But the scale of defence funding was such that this was unlikely to be a practicable proposition. Even the most optimistic assessment of the cost of a replacement for the MELBOURNE and her air group with a refurbished British vessel and new aircraft suggested that the cost would be 25% more than the RAN’s entire annual budget.4 This realisation with the Australian defence community generally was placing increasing pressure on the RAN’s maintaining a carrier force at all, given the extent to which it demanded resources. The situation was acknowledged in the 2 ‘Sino-Soviet Military Aid Programs’, US Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) Review vol. 14, no. 9, September 1959, p. 406. 3 For the first internal defence appreciation of this situation, see the strategic paper cited by Commodore H.J. Donohue ‘The Evolution of Australian Strategic Defense Thinking’ Dora Laves (ed.), Evolving Pacific Basin Strategies: the 1989 Pacific Symposium, National Defense University, Washington DC, 1990, p. 286. 4 Eric J. Grove, “‘Advice and Assistance to a very independent people at a most crucial point’: the British Admiralty and the Future of the RAN 1958-60” David Stevens (ed.), Maritime Power in the Twentieth Century: the Australian Experience, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1998, p. 137. Struggling for a Solution 3 February 1957 Review of Defence which focused on the structure of the armed forces.5 Nevertheless, the global war requirements for theatre ASW had not disappeared completely and this role retained its force structure priorities. The possibilities of conflict with Indonesia did not mean that the threat of global war or the requirement to prepare for it had completely disappeared. The RAN was therefore faced with the dilemma of creating new capabilities to deal with the surface and air threat at the same time as it attempted to sustain its existing commitments. The solution eventually adopted, much of which is outside the scope of this paper, proved practicable in the longer term because of a mix of improved funding and technological innovation.