CITY,VOL. 15, NO.5,OCTOBER 2011 The neoliberal political– economic collapse of and the spatial fortification of institutions in , 1998–2010 Themis Chronopoulos

This paper demonstrates how social and political conflict is inscribed in urban space by focus- ing on the neoliberal political–economic collapse of Argentina, which was a conflict-ridden process with ordinary people protesting against institutions responsible for the neoliberaliza- tion of the economy. These affected the architecture of banking and government institutions, especially in Buenos Aires, which is the political and financial center of Argen- tina. Facing popular unrest and continuous political mobilizations, these institutions decided to physically fortify themselves and in the process displayed their vulnerability and illegiti- macy. The fact that spatial fortification became a permanent feature of state institutions but only a temporary feature of international banks, raises questions about the way that neoli- beralism operates and the way that blame for neoliberal failures is allocated. It also provides hints about the unsatisfactory political–economic outcome that emerged after the collapse, despite the fact that orthodox was at least rhetorically abandoned.

Key words: spatial fortification, Buenos Aires, resistance in the neoliberal city, neoliberal collapse, neoliberal urbanization, banks, government buildings

n 2001–2002, enraged protesters inun- by protesters had a long history of enacting, dated the streets of Buenos Aires attack- promoting and implementing free market Iing the buildings of private and public reforms in Argentina. On 20 December institutions with government entities and 2001, President Fernando De la Ru´ a, multinational banks becoming the most himself, resigned in the midst of a violent common targets. The demonstrators were uprising that left at least 21 people dead. angered with the continuation of neoliberal The president escaped the House of Govern- economic policies by the Fernando De la ment, whose surroundings had been Ru´ a Administration (1999–2001) at a time engulfed with furious protesters, in a heli- of a severe and prolonged economic reces- copter (La Nacio´n, 2001a).1 sion and resented the confiscation of their Known as the 2001–2002 crisis of Argen- bank deposits so that the financial system tina, the events that transpired immediately could stay afloat. The institutions attacked before and after De la Ru´a’s resignation can

ISSN 1360-4813 print/ISSN 1470-3629 online/11/050509–23 # 2011 Taylor & Francis http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13604813.2011.595107 CHRONOPOULOS:THE NEOLIBERAL POLITICAL – ECONOMIC COLLAPSE OF ARGENTINA 511

Figure 1 A fortified Bansud branch on Callao Avenue in Microcentro. Owned by Mexican Banamex, Bansud became one of the most indebted banks in Argentina during the neoliberal collapse of 2001–2002. In January 2002, (which became a subsidiary of Citigroup in 2001) acquired Bansud from Banamex (Photograph: Themis Chronopoulos, 2002). be more precisely defined as a political–econ- economic crisis of Argentina started in 1998 omic collapse. The problem with employing when the country went into and did the term crisis for 2001–2002—a term that not end before 2003 when Ne´stor Kirchner most observers have used (Grimson and was elected president and the Argentine Kessler, 2005; Chronopoulos, 2006; Epstein, economy displayed signs of continuous 2006)—is that since at least the 1960s, Argen- growth.3 David Harvey (2005) has argued that tina has found itself in a continuous economic neoliberal institutions have been especially crisis; indeed, the management of the economic skillful in the management and manipulation crisis nationally and internationally has been of crises; however, the management of the the main preoccupation of Argentina’s govern- 1998–2003 crisis in Argentina failed, with the ing regimes.2 More than this, the neoliberal neoliberal political–economic system collap- sing in 2001–2002. Of course, the collapse of

neoliberalism in Argentina did not prevent what Harvey (2005) has termed ‘accumulation by dispossession’ under which there were transfers of ownership from middle- and working-class people to upper-class popu- lations whose resources allowed them to over- come the negative effects of the crisis. The parameters of the political–economic collapse in Metropolitan Buenos Aires were staggering.4 In May 2002, the unemployment rate reached 22%. By October 2002, 42.3% Figure 2 Metal barricades (2 × 2m2) protecting the of households and 54.3% of the population House of Government before a rally in found themselves below the poverty line. (Photograph: Themis Chronopoulos, 2002). Although the poverty rate among individuals 512 CITY VOL. 15, NO.5 had persistently lingered above 20% in the failures is allocated. It also provides hints 1995–2000 period, it did not cross the 30% about the unsatisfactory political–economic mark before May 2001 (INDEC, 2003). outcome that emerged after the collapse, During this period, neighborhood meal despite the fact that orthodox neoliberalism centers that had arisen in Greater Buenos was at least rhetorically abandoned.5 Aires in the 1990s to feed indigent families This paper represents an intervention in the were overwhelmed, while the number of literature of neoliberal urbanization. In recent barter clubs and other alternative exchange years, human geographers and urban scholars systems increased substantially (Grimson and have viewed the growing proliferation of for- Kessler, 2005). The numbers of cartoneros, tified enclaves and gated communities to be people gathering recyclables in urban areas in one of the most important manifestations of order to survive, also grew and so did the urban neoliberalism (Brenner and Theodore, numbersofpeoplewhobegantostayovernight 2002; McKenzie, 2005; Pow, 2009). Even on the streets of the City of Buenos Aires scholars who do not directly associate forti- because they lacked the resources to travel fied enclaves with neoliberal restructuring back to Greater Buenos Aires (Chronopoulos, consider the development of residential forti- 2005; Schamber and Sua´rez, 2007). fication to reflect a reaction to late-20th- The primary goal of this paper is to demon- century processes that have been associated strate how social and political conflict is with neoliberalism. These processes include inscribed in urban space by focusing on the rise of inequality, the desire of socioeco- the neoliberal political–economic collapse nomic exclusivity, the redefinition of national of Argentina, which was a conflict-ridden and local governments, the privatization of process with ordinary people protesting public space and the fear of crime (Blakely against institutions responsible for the neoli- and Snyder, 1997; Caldeira, 2000; Low, beralization of the economy. These protests 2003; Atkinson and Blandy, 2005; Glasze affected the architecture of these public and et al., 2006). While attention to this type of private institutions, especially in Buenos spatial fortification is important, since resi- Aires, which is the political and financial dential fortified enclaves have become the center of Argentina (Figures 1 and 2). Facing new urban and suburban planning norm in popular unrest and continuous political many parts of the world, this literature has mobilizations, these institutions decided to seldom explored the growing fortification of physically fortify themselves and in the public and private institutions. The fortifica- process displayed their vulnerability and ille- tion of institutions has been taken for granted gitimacy. Although neoliberal entities because there have never been completely attempted to discredit the protesters as youth- unsecured financial institutions or government ful, misinformed and radical, this failed. Given buildings and because the fortification of such the history of public and private repression in institutions can be explained as a response Argentina, a few confused or radical young to (real or imagined) security and terrorist people would never be able to directly chal- threats. Moreover, many scholars have lenge powerful political–economic insti- focused on the shrinkage of public space, tutions. What actually happened is that a which can be part of institutional fortification, sizable cross section of the population but not necessarily the exact same process revolted against neoliberalism and its most (Sorkin, 1992; Mitchell, 1995; Kohn, 2004; potent spatial manifestations. The fact that Ne´meth and Hollander, 2010). My argument spatial fortification became a permanent is that institutional fortification also represents feature of state institutions but only a tempor- a response to the growing resistance of the neo- ary feature of international banks, raises ques- liberal management of the economy. As the tions about the way that neoliberalism case of Buenos Aires shows, institutional forti- operates and the way that blame for neoliberal fication is one of the methods that the public CHRONOPOULOS:THE NEOLIBERAL POLITICAL – ECONOMIC COLLAPSE OF ARGENTINA 513

Figure 3 BBVA Banco France´s in Florida Street. Demon- Figure 5 HSBC in Florida Street. HSBC chose to have a strators attacked this bank with hammers, but the metal for- stronger type of metal shell in this location than other tification held. Spain’s BBVA acquired Banco France´s, one banks. Britain’s HSBC acquired Midland Bank in 1992 of the largest private banks in Argentina, in 1996. In the and most of its holdings of Banco Roberts in Argentina. following year, the group took over Banco de Cre´dito In 1997, HSBC took over the rest of Banco Roberts, estab- Argentino (Photograph: Themis Chronopoulos, 2002). lishing an important foothold in Argentina. The messages spray-painted onto the fac¸ade of this bank include ‘CHOR- and private sectors associated with neoliberal- ROS’ (thieves), ‘LADRONES’ (thieves), ‘ASESINOS’ (mur- ism employ in order to manage popular dis- derers) and ‘DELINQUENTES’ (officials who have misappropriated money). There is also a message against content during economic crises. Eduardo Duhalde who at the time had been appointed caretaker president. The message reads ‘DUHALDE ASE- The fortification of banks SINO CHORRO NARCO DEBES IRA LA HORCA’ (Duhalde, murderer, thief, drug dealer, should be hanged) (Photograph: Themis Chronopoulos, 2002). On Friday, 15 February 2002, hundreds of protesters participated in cacerolazos outside the branches of private banks in Microcentro (downtown Buenos Aires).6 Many of the pro- testers had brought with them hammers, screwdrivers and other instruments in order to break and disassemble the metallic protec- tive structures of the banks. As their march proceeded in a busy section of the city, some demonstrators broke the glass windows of a Banco Galicia branch while others tried but failed to remove the metal plates from the exterior of a Citibank branch. Other bank Figure 4 BankBoston branch in Callao Avenue in branches were also attacked (Pa´gina 12, Microcentro after an attack by demonstrators. BankBoston 2002a). Three days later, on Monday, 18 Feb- (under its previous names) had a presence in Argentina for ruary 2002, the actions escalated with most of the 20th century. In 2004, Bank of America pur- even larger crowds attacking bank branches chased the merged bank of BankBoston and Fleet Bank and armored vehicles transporting money and in 2006 it sold the Argentine BankBoston operations to South Africa’s Standard Bank. On the fac¸ade of the with hammers, axes, firebombs, burning bank one can see spray-painted the words, ‘RATAS’ tires, stones and graffiti. The branches targeted (rats), ‘CHORROS’ (thieves in slang) and ‘YANKEES’, included those of Mexican BanSud (Figure 1), which functions as a derogatory way to refer to people Spanish BBVA Banco France´s (Figure 3), US from the USA. During this period, the USA was blamed BankBoston (Figure 4), British HSBC for the exploitation of Argentina, and US institutions and businesses became objects of contention (Photograph: (Figure 5), Italian Banca Nazionale del Themis Chronopoulos, 2002). Lavoro (Figure 6), US Citibank (Figure 7), 514 CITY VOL. 15, NO.5

Figure 6 A fortified Banca Nazionale del Lavoro branch in Callao Avenue in Microcentro. Italian Banca Nazionale del Lavoro had been operating in Argentina since 1960. HSBC acquired its Argentine operations in 2006 (Photograph: Themis Chronopoulos, 2002).

Figure 7 Citibank in Florida Street. Graffiti messages such as ‘NO HAY BANCOS’ (there are no banks), ‘LADRONES’ (thieves), ‘FORROS’ (cheaters) and ‘DUHALDE’ (as complicitous to the bank’s actions) can be seen in the reinforced steel fac¸ade of the bank. US Citibank has been operating in Argentina since 1914 under various names. The bank participated in the privatization of ENTel, the public telecommunications monopoly, in 1990, and acquired Banco Mayo in 1998 (Photo- graph: Themis Chronopoulos, 2002). CHRONOPOULOS:THE NEOLIBERAL POLITICAL – ECONOMIC COLLAPSE OF ARGENTINA 515

Argentine Banco Galicia (Figure 8), British Lloyds Bank, Canadian Scotia Bank Quilmes (Figure 9) and Spanish Banco Rı´o. Publicly held Argentine banks were mostly spared.7 In the aftermath of the demonstrations, the fac¸ades of many foreign banks located in downtown Buenos Aires were damaged. Demonstrators also managed to invade a few banks and destroy them (Pa´gina 12, 2002b). There were efforts to characterize these protest actions as irrational and the work of Figure 8 Banco Galicia branch in Corrientes Avenue in misled radical youths. This attempt to Microcentro. Despite its name, Banco Galicia is one of the portray collective action and civil violence oldest private Argentine banks. In the 1990s, the owners as irrational has a long history in social of Banco Galicia refused to sell it to foreign institutions. theory and political culture: it is, however, During the neoliberal collapse of 2001–2002, the Govern- overstated (Rule, 1988; Tilly, 1978). Argenti- ment of Argentina provided a generous bailout to Banco ´ Galicia, which had suffered debilitating losses. During this na’s main business newspaper, Ambito Finan- period, the bank also became an object of contention for ciero, developed a discourse that separated protesters (Photograph: Themis Chronopoulos, 2002). the peaceful middle-class deposit holders who organized cacerolazos outside banks from the communist youths who had been

Figure 9 A shut down Scotiabank Quilmes branch. The messages written on the shutter of the bank include ‘TERROR- ISTAS’ (terrorists) and ‘HAGA PATRIA MATE UN BANQUERO’ (be patriotic, kill a banker). Canadian Scotiabank acquired Argentine Banco Quilmes in 1997. After Scotiabank withdrew from Argentina, Banco Macro acquired its branches (Photo- graph: Themis Chronopoulos, 2002). 516 CITY VOL. 15, NO.5

Figure 10 A fortified BankBoston branch located right next to stores without any fortification (Photograph: Themis Chronopoulos, 2002).

infiltrating these events and were trying to of the banks regardless of original intention damage banks (A´ mbito Financiero, 2002b). or political affiliation (Ethnographic Research, In fact, caretaker President Eduardo 2002). Moreover, during this period, foreign Duhalde (2002–2003) promised to crack banks were involved in a power struggle down on radicals who were smashing banks with the government over economic policy. with hammers and assured them that he was Many of the protesters were aware of this not a weak president (A´ mbito Financiero, struggle and were opposing the complete take- 2002a). The reality of the situation was, of over of Argentina’s financial sector by these course, more complicated. Attacks against institutions. bank branches would not have been tolerated For the majority of the urban population of even a few months before; the fact that they Argentina, international banks represented occurred so frequently signified the loss of the most visible aspect of the neoliberaliza- legitimacy of these banking institutions tion of the economy. Besides increasingly among portions of the Argentine population. dominating finance in Argentina, multina- Although some members of radical or- tional bank branches began to also dominate ganizations participated in these protest high-profile commercial areas by taking over actions, the majority of people demonstrating the centers of smaller cities and expanding were middle and working class. Many of into numerous middle-class neighborhoods of them were unemployed or underemployed larger cities. By the late 1990s, there were so because of the economic downturn, many of many bank branches concentrated in central them had money trapped in the banks, and locations of Buenos Aires that many tourists many of them participated in the smashing felt that it resembled the center of a Western CHRONOPOULOS:THE NEOLIBERAL POLITICAL – ECONOMIC COLLAPSE OF ARGENTINA 517

European city where private banking has However, the government promoted the become dominant for decades. However, measure as a mechanism designed to save many ordinary porten˜os witnessed this swift the banks along with their depositors. Most banking expansion with suspicion and disbe- deposit holders failed to understand how lief, especially when the branches replaced the was going to save them, if their popular coffee shops and stores located near money remained trapped in the banks; but subway stations and major thoroughfares in they did associate the corralito with the their neighborhoods. The spatial effect of this well-being of banks, especially multinational multinational bank involvement in Argentina ones. To make things worse, multinational was staggering and unavoidable even for the banks adopted a confrontational attitude majority of the population, which continued toward depositors. Instead of hiring more to have no bank accounts or other business bank tellers to meet increased demand, most relations with banks (Themis Chronopoulos, branches slowed down customer service and Ethnographic Research, 2003 and 2005). Con- hired additional security guards, which trarytoclaimsbybankexecutivesthatattacks many deposit holders considered to be goon on their branches represented a general trend squads. Fearing trouble, the banks also of lawlessness that could be demonstrated by allowed only a few people inside their pre- the vandalism of other facilities, neighborhood mises at a time, meaning that most people people generally targeted international banks had to wait for three or four hours under and left adjacent commercial establishments the hot summer sun in order to receive their unscathed (Figure 10). weekly allowance of 250 pesos. Sometimes International financial institutions were branches discontinued service and shut transformed into objects of popular contention down for reasons that appeared to be in December 2001 when Economy Minister dubious to people waiting outside; the announced the corralito, excuses for closing early included shortages which limited the amount that depositors in cash, unruly clients or computer problems. could withdraw from their bank accounts to Before long, demonstrations outside bank 250pesosperweek(latertoberaisedto300). branches were led by indignant depositors Cavallo claimed that this measure was an who were joined by neighborhood people efforttoavoidarunonthebanks,halt who also had grievances against these private and restore confidence in the banks, even if they had no money in them financial sector. However, the corralito (Ethnographic Research, 2002 and 2003). amounted to the collapse of the existing mon- Most deposit holders felt betrayed by mul- etary system of Argentina, which since 1991, tinational banks. Before convertibility the had been based on the principle of convertibil- great majority of the population had no ity between the US dollar and the Argentine money in banks because Argentina suffered peso on a one-to-one basis8 (DeLaTorre from high inflation rates. Instead, individuals et al., 2003). A few months after the corralito, and families spent their pay immediately on convertibility was abandoned with the peso food and other basic needs and changed set to a fixed rate of 1.4 pesos to the dollar whatever money they had left into US before being allowed to freely float. As the dollars, which they stored in their homes corralito remained in place and new (Ethnographic Research, 2002). With con- measures regarding were vertibility, inflation was tamed and the announced in 2002, the anger of deposit value of the peso remained stable in relation holders increased. to the dollar. Multinational banks engaged The global banks of Argentina attempted in advertising campaigns in which they pre- to dissociate themselves from the corralito tended that deposits in their branches in arguing that it was a government measure Buenos Aires were as safe as deposits in that was taken without their input. their branches in London, New York City 518 CITY VOL. 15, NO.5 or Madrid. They explicitly stated that in the (Ethnographic Research, 2002 and 2003). event of a financial crisis, their headquarters Reporting on this story and capital flight, would provide all necessary liquidity to the mass media maintained that by 2001 their subsidiaries and local branches (Mar- foreign-owned banks had made all the shall, 2008). More than this, they pointed profits they could, so they sent them home, out that deposits in pesos were fully and preparing to close shop (Marshall, 2008). In easily convertible to dollars or other curren- January 2002, federal judges Norberto Oyar- cies, reminded people that crime rates had bide and Marı´a Servini de Cubrı´a began to been rising and that their money was safer investigate capital flight from Argentina. in banks than in their homes, and represented They ordered raids on the central offices of themselves as customer-friendly entities that HSBC, BBVA Banco France´s, Banco Rı´o, were more efficient and caring than publicly BankBoston, Citibank and Banco Galicia; held domestic banks. Finally, multinational confiscated videos from highway toll oper- banks offered various prized financial pro- ators; seized records from armored vehicle ducts to people willing to open accounts companies; and examined the logs of the such as credit cards, certificates of deposit, airport authorities of Ezeiza, Jorge small loans, checks and debit cards, not to Newbery, Don Torcuato and San Fernando mention various gifts handed out when indi- (La Nacio´n, 2002a). Senior officials of these viduals opened accounts (Themis Chrono- banks were prohibited to leave the country poulos, Ethnographic Research, 2002 and and were questioned by the judicial auth- 2003). These marketing narratives gave the orities. Even former Economy Minister wrong impression to people who had never Domingo Cavallo was jailed for over three been courted by banks before; the reality months for irregularities during his term in was that the international headquarters of office (Marshall, 2008). banks entered the Argentine market in Although in the end, there were almost no order to make money, not to assist depositors successful prosecutions against international in case of a crisis. Throughout the constant bank officials, it is definitely the case that draining of banking deposits in 2001, it foreign-held banks sent record amounts of became obvious that banks in Argentina money to their home countries in 2001, in were not receiving additional liquidity from effect causing the monetary collapse. their headquarters. If anything they repa- Deposit holders and other bank protesters triated larger amounts of dollars than ever widely believed that this had been the case before (Marshall, 2008). and this is why in their demonstrations The repatriation of record amounts of they depicted bank officials as thieves dollars became the subject of intense conver- (Ethnographic Research, 2002 and 2003). sations among depositors and protesters and Another issue that mobilized protesters further fueled their anger; some of these con- was the connection of international banks versations approximated the level of conspi- with the last military government of Argen- racy theories. Many individuals recounted tina. During one of the marches to the the situation in central Buenos Aires, a few House of Government on 20 December days before the corralito was announced, 2001, security guards of HSBC opened fire when hundreds of armored trucks driving from the bank’s central offices to the crowd from the offices of foreign banks in down- that had gathered outside, killing 23-year- town Buenos Aires to the airport caused old Gustavo Benedetto. The judiciary investi- extreme vehicular congestion that was defi- gating the killing acquired a video from the nitely noticed by the government. These bank, which showed that about 50 shots trucks were transporting US dollars to Amer- came from inside the bank, and that Lieute- ican Airlines planes, which flew them to the nant Jorge Varado, chief of security for safety of the USA and Western Europe HSBC, had shot Benedetto. Varado was a CHRONOPOULOS:THE NEOLIBERAL POLITICAL – ECONOMIC COLLAPSE OF ARGENTINA 519 retired elite military officer who was active 1980s and Argentina did not represent an during the military dictatorship of 1976–83. exception (Fryer, 1987). Foreign banks In the 1995–2001 period, multinational began to reenter the market of Argentina in banks hired thousands of former military 1992 when the Adminis- men to provide security to their central tration (1989–99) restructured the Argentine offices and branches (Cları´n, 2002; Klein, debt and provided various favorable invest- 2003). Attacks against foreign-held banks ment incentives to banks. intensified after Benedetto’s killing. Many people protesting outside bank International financial institutions have of branches felt that the international banks course a longer history in Argentina and had become so powerful that they were com- many people familiar with that history of promising the political sovereignty of Argen- international development also viewed tina. Indeed, from December 1994 to foreign banks with suspicion. Until the December 2001, foreign banks raised their early 1970s, Latin American countries participation in the Argentine banking received foreign aid in the form of loans and sector from 18 to 61% (IMF, 2000; Bank grants from international agencies such as for International Settlements, 2001; the US Agency for International Develop- Salomon, Smith, Barney, 2001; Moguillansky ment, the World Bank, the Inter-American et al., 2004). They took advantage of the Development Bank, the Export–Import 1994–95 Tequila effect on the Argentine Bank, or directly from the US government. economy, when the near collapse of the This changed when oil-rich countries that Mexican peso rattled the Argentine banking had taken advantage of the 1973 oil crisis system. Determined to maintain convertibil- deposited their growing reserves of petrodol- ity right before his reelection campaign of lars in private banks in the USA and Western 1995, and encouraged by the IMF and the Europe. Flushed with money, the banks World Bank, which promised to support the sought new clients for loans and found privatization of provincial banks, President them in the developing world, especially in Carlos Menem ordered the reorganization Latin America (Sampson, 1981). Convinced of the banking system (Clarke and Cull, that sovereign governments seldom go bank- 2002). Reorganization meant the establish- rupt and encouraged by the experiences of ment of more rigid capital requirements, and New York City, which enacted which in turn amounted to the privatization sweeping neoliberal reforms after the mid- of most state-owned provincial banks, the 1970s, the banks lent more money to Latin shutting down of four dozen of the weak America than all the international agencies banks, and the offering of generous subsidies put together (Harvey, 2005). In the case of and guarantees to foreign financial insti- Argentina, these banks handsomely bank- tutions willing to invest in Argentina rolled the military government of 1976–83 (Alston and Gallo, 2002). Multinational despite its political illegitimacy, its human banks, which at the time were facing rights violations and its failure to comprehen- increased competition because of financial sively enact free market reforms. In 1975, deregulation in their home countries, Argentina’s total external debt stood at $7.8 invested in Argentina because their financial billion; by 1982 it had ballooned to $43.6 officers viewed this emerging market to be billion and much of this increase was due to providing an opportunity for easy profits. the lending policies of private financial insti- Indeed this is what happened. Lacking the tutions (Basualdo, 2006). This involvement capitalization and reputation of their foreign of US and Western European banks in Latin counterparts, Argentine national banks lost America backfired after the Mexican crisis some of their local and multinational corpor- of 1982; most countries suspended the servi- ate clientele to international banks. They also cing of their external debt for much of the lost numerous smaller creditworthy business 520 CITY VOL. 15, NO.5 and personal clients, who were lured by the would withdraw from Argentina if the gov- offers of multinational banks (Gnos and ernment did not pursue policies favorable to Rochon, 2004–2005; Clarke et al., 2000). As the private sector, shut down its operations international banking institutions began to in Argentina in mid-April 2002. Its Canadian dominate banking in Argentina, they also headquarters refused to recapitalize the bank increased their bargaining power in relation (La Nacio´n, 2002b). Ten days later, Banco to the government, intimidating the adminis- Santander of Spain announced that it would tration of Fernando De la Ru´a (1999–2001). not put any additional funds in its Argentine They ultimately contributed to the collapse subsidiary Banco Rı´oand that it would close of convertibility by moving too much its branches when it ran out of money (Alga- money out of the country. n˜ araz, 2002). Spanish Prime Minister Jose´ After De la Ru´a’s overthrow, international Marı´a Aznar defended Banco Santander’s banks became involved in a power struggle announcement, declaring that no one could with the Argentine government and this is force Spanish banks and other companies to one of the main reasons that protests stay in Argentina given its economic situ- outside bank branches became more violent. ation. On 19 May 2002, French Cre´dit Agri- In mid-January 2002, a group of the largest cole´, which owned banks Bersa, Bisel and international banks, led by Emilio Ca´rdenas Suquia in Argentina, made a surprise who was president of HSBC’s operations in announcement that it was withdrawing Argentina, proposed the dollarization of the from Argentina as well. Given that the Sco- economy. Ca´rdenas announced that if the tiabank Quilmes withdrawal had posed government pursued dollarization, Argenti- serious problems to the economic system of na’s foreign banks would recapitalize them- Argentina, many observers expected the selves, in effect ending the corralito. The withdrawal of Cre´dit Agricole´to be the last IMF supported the foreign banks and prom- straw before the government would have to ised assistance if the government chose the reopen negotiations with the dollarization dollarization route. Dollarization would ulti- camp. However, the federal government mately allow international banks to comple- was now better prepared to deal with tely take over Argentina’s financial system foreign bank withdrawals from Argentina and to absorb the remaining Argentine and made Cre´dit Agricole´’s banks subsidi- banks, which had no sources of external capi- aries of the national public bank Banco de la talization. Former President Menem, impor- Nacio´n Argentina. As all three banks began tant members of the and even to fully operate a couple of weeks later, the the judiciary came out in favor of the plan. Argentine government adopted a tougher Almost immediately, there was the creation stance toward international banks (Marshall, of the pesofication camp, which opposed 2008). The dollarization camp was comple- the dollarization plan. Supporters of pesofi- tely defeated in 2003, when Menem failed to cation included all the public and private be elected president. Argentine-held banks along with members Suffice it to say that protests outside banks of the federal government including Presi- heated up after the announcement of the Ca´r- dent Duhalde (Marshall, 2008). Their argu- denas plan in mid-January; large mobiliz- ment was that Argentina had to reclaim ations against international financial control of its monetary system by reducing institutions followed closely developments its reliance on the dollar. of this conflict. The power struggle between As the pesofication camp appeared to have the dollarization and the pesofication plans the upper hand, some foreign banks took was to an extent a battle between proponents actions that had the potential of destabilizing of neoliberalism and proponents of hetero- the Argentine economy even more. Scotia- dox capitalism. The neoliberals attempted to bank Quilmes, which had warned that it manipulate the economic crisis to their CHRONOPOULOS:THE NEOLIBERAL POLITICAL – ECONOMIC COLLAPSE OF ARGENTINA 521 benefit, but failed. And contrary to accounts around the perimeter of Plaza de Mayo, in that the Argentine government retaliated order to prevent the protesters from entering against these banks in an unreasonable it (La Nacio´n, 1998b). As the economy dete- manner, Duhalde was under intense pressure riorated in 1998 and political mobilizations by ordinary people who were out in the became more frequent and violent, the streets every day and were threatening to authorities began to use metal barricades topple his government. The continuous pol- around the Congress and the House of Gov- itical mobilizations precluded a settlement ernment more often. Before major demon- favorable to the international banks and strations, the police would set up the international finance organizations. barricades and remove them in the days that followed. However, by 2000, metal barri- cades would remain outside government The fortification of government buildings for longer periods than before. In institutions July 2000, Ricardo Cordero wrote a letter to the editor of La Nacio´n in which he com- In 2001, as the contin- plained about the quasi-permanent ‘unplea- ued to deteriorate, protest actions outside sant riot fences’ that surrounded the House government buildings in Buenos Aires of Government. Cordero argued that these became more massive, acrimonious and fences suggested to tourists ‘third world, vio- regular. In particular, demonstrators made lence, institutional insecurity, and lack of collective claims on the state outside two peace’ (2000). The more frequent employ- imposing buildings: the House of Govern- ment of perimeter barriers reveals the ment and the Congress (El Palacio del Con- growing opposition that the federal govern- greso de la Nacio´n Argentina), which ment was facing because of its neoliberal houses the legislative branch of Argentina. policies. In December 2001, the demonstrations inten- This opposition to neoliberal reforms ori- sified, with President De la Ru´a resigning ginated in the provinces of Argentina. The during the uprising of 20 December. first large-scale uprising in the 1990s involved Although spatial fortification became a about 5000 residents of the northern city of more common attribute of Buenos Aires Santiago del Estero, which is the capital and during the 1990s, security barricades did not government seat of the province with the become a permanent feature of the exterior same name. On 16 December 1993, demon- of government buildings before December strators burned the Government House, the 2001. For example, as late as September Legislature, the Courthouse and a dozen 1998, there were no such barricades outside private residences of some of the most impor- government institutions on a regular basis. tant local politicians and public officials. The At the time, the teachers union CTERA was protesters who had endured unpaid salaries planning a protest action under which its and pensions for three months were demand- members would pitch tents and occupy ing immediate pay and the end of political Plaza de Mayo, the square located in front corruption (Auyero, 2004). To be sure, this of the House of Government. A federal popular rebellion was in a distant province; judge sided with President Carlos Menem yet, it exhibited the extent to which govern- and Mayor of the City of Buenos Aires Fer- ment power was tenuous in Argentina, and nando De la Ru´a and ruled that CTERA the possibility of such uprisings in Metropo- was prohibited to set up a tent city in Plaza litan Buenos Aires. After all, the government de Mayo because it could undermine the of President Rau´l Alfonsı´n(1983–89) ended a integrity of the area, which is a national his- few months early in 1989 after supermarket toric site. The Menem Administration had looting that started in Rosario, Santa Fe, the federal police install protective barriers spread to areas of Greater Buenos Aires 522 CITY VOL. 15, NO.5

(Robinson, 1989; Acun˜ a, 1995). As poor powerholders and demanded that govern- economic performance continued, Menem ment officials negotiated with them directly who replaced Alfonsı´n also faced a wave of (sometimes government officials would food riots in February 1990, though this arrive in helicopters to participate in such wave was contained before spreading negotiations). One of the early victories of (Auyero, 2007). the movement included the insti- After 1993, political mobilizations by tution of unemployment subsidies by the unemployed and underemployed people government (Sitrin, 2006). Gradually some living in the provinces intensified. What piquetero groups along with labor organiz- became known as the piquetero movement ations assumed the means of production by emerged with thousands of people blocking taking over workplaces that were going to major transportation arteries and making shut down. Although this phenomenon was claims to the government. In fact, what hap- not as widespread before the political–econ- pened was a convergence of town uprisings omic collapse, in the 2001–2003 period, (puebladas) like the one of Santiago de workers formed cooperatives and took over Estero and the blocking of highways hundreds of ‘failing’ workplaces while neigh- (Svampa and Pereyra, 2003). One of the first borhood people largely supported them and comprehensive road blockades occurred even defended them whenever the police around the towns of Cutral-Co´ and Plaza tried to reclaim those spaces (Lavaca Collec- Huincul of the province of Neuque´n in tive, 2007; Rebo´n, 2007). In the days that pre- June 1996. Protesters demanded meaningful ceded De la Ru´a’s resignation, picketers also employment in an area where unemployment forced large supermarket chains to distribute was close to 30% and more than half of the food to the poor, though looting of food population lived below the poverty line. stores also occurred (Auyero, 2007). Until 1992, the government-held petroleum In Metropolitan Buenos Aires, most pique- company functioned as the economic, social tero organizations were located in the and cultural lifeline of the area. However, working-class neighborhoods of Greater the Menem Administration privatized the Buenos Aires and their development petroleum company and the new owners coincided with the disappearance of work shut down the Cutral-Co´ facilities. The and the establishment of more intense Pero- blockade succeeded after the majority of the nist clientelist networks. This new version population of Cutral-Co´ and Plaza Huincul of clientelist politics in Greater Buenos mobilized in 1996; the governor of Aires during the neoliberal era originated in Neuque´n signed an agreement with the 1989 when Eduardo Duhalde became demonstrators, which promised public Menem’s vice presidential running mate, works that would generate employment, the and was credited with helping to deliver the delivery of food, and the reconnection of vote of the Province of Buenos Aires to the electricity and gas to thousands of families Peronists9—unless the Peronist candidate is who had been unable to afford it (Auyero, able to receive a large proportion of the 2003). vote from the heavily populated and politi- In the years that followed, the frequency of cally organized working-class districts that such mobilizations increased and spread to surround the City of Buenos Aires, s/he has the provinces of Rı´oNegro, Santa Cruz and almost no chance of prevailing. Duhalde, a Tierra del Fuego in the south of the strongman of Lomas de Zamora, a district country, Co´rdoba and Santa Fe in the in the southern zone of Greater Buenos center, and Jujuy, Salta, Corrientes, Chaco Aires, was a populist political entrepreneur and others in the north (Auyero, 2007). The who cultivated clientelist networks with majority of these movements was usually low-income populations in Greater Buenos independent of political parties and local Aires. However, Duhalde was not fond of CHRONOPOULOS:THE NEOLIBERAL POLITICAL – ECONOMIC COLLAPSE OF ARGENTINA 523

Menem’s neoliberal reforms and resigned in Metropolitan Buenos Aires (Svampa and from his post as vice president in 1991 in Pereyra, 2003). order to run for the governorship of the Pro- During this period, many middle- and vince of Buenos Aires. Duhalde was also upper-class viewed the piquetero planning to run for president in 1995, movement with suspicion. They subscribed though it was clear that Menem wanted to to the culture of poverty ideas, which blame change the constitution so that he could poor people for their socioeconomic con- seek reelection himself. Duhalde and dition, believed that these groups were Menem came to an understanding under manipulated by Peronist politicians, and which the federal government heavily thought that picketers sought handouts and funded social and public works programs to not work (Svampa and Pereyra, 2003; be carried out by the Fondo de Reparacio´n Oviedo, 2004; Sitrin, 2006). The movement, Histo´rico del Conurbano Bonarense. its goals, its political affiliations and the Duhalde was given full control of this organ- sources of poverty were, of course, not as ization; in return he did not oppose Menem’s simple. efforts to change the constitution. Each year, The frequent use of barricades outside gov- Duhalde used the hundreds of millions of ernment institutions in the City of Buenos pesos (at the time equal to US dollars) for Aires emerged in 1998 and achieved a quasi- public works in an effort to solidify the Pero- permanent quality as the economy continued nist Party’s hold of the province and to pos- to deteriorate and demonstrators including ition himself for higher office.10 His wife, picketers began to march in the downtown Hilda Chiche Gonza´lez de Duhalde, headed of the city. Although the federal police a food distribution program to poor residents experimented with different types of barri- of the province called Plan Vida operated by cades, the decision was to settle with metal neighborhood women known as manzarenas. barricades whose size was approximately The workers, volunteers and beneficiaries of 2 meters × 2 meters (Figure 2). These barri- this plan were expected to deliver the vote cades were easier to carry than heavier and to the Peronists during elections. This larger ones and besides, as the police discov- patronage system began to fall apart when ered, demonstrators could easily tip taller President Menem reduced its funding, barricades over. The barricades were used because Duhalde would not agree to around important government buildings, another change in the constitution so that such as the House of Government and the Menem could run for a third consecutive pre- Congress in order to avoid their invasion by sidential term in 1999 (Lewis, 2009). As por- demonstrators. In many cases, police in riot tions of the Peronist clientelist networks gear stood in front of the barricades and con- established by Duhalde broke down and many fronted demonstrators while non-riot police people continued to lose their jobs because of stayed behind the barricades ready to the privatization of public companies and the defend them in case the riot police failed. closure of factories unable to compete interna- There were also other combinations of tionally, piquetero organizations became an defense including the police force in its even more potent mobilizing force in Greater entirety staying behind the barricades using Buenos Aires (Svampa and Pereyra, 2003; tear gas, mace and other methods in order Oviedo, 2004). The first piquetero organizations to make demonstrators go away. The day formed in La Matanza and in the southern zone that De la Ru´a resigned, the barricade of Greater Buenos Aires (Oviedo, 2004). Their defense largely held, though this only repertoires of contention were influenced from occurred after a heavy-handed counterattack those of picketers in the provinces and by the of the police against protesters and because late 1990s they could be found blockading of the news that the president was resigning tens of bridges, highways and other roadways (Ethnographic Research, 2002 and 2005). 524 CITY VOL. 15, NO.5

During this period, there was a merger of to enter it, the police used rubber bullets, piquetero groups with middle-class neigh- tear gas and water hoses and pushed them borhood organizations. Whether it was away. Protesters participating in a cacerolazo outside banks or outside government build- outside Congress were also able to invade it; ings, one could hear chants saying ‘piquete, they removed some desks and chairs, threw cacerola, la lucha es una sola’,which them into the street and burned them. roughly meant ‘blockades and pan-beatings Demonstrators also destroyed numerous represent the same struggle’. The point of banks near the House of Government and this message was that the closure of streets the Congress. The next day, the walls of the was the work of picketers who were House of Government were filled with graffiti usually low income while cacerolazos were with messages that rejected the interim gov- usually the protest manifestations of ernment of Rodrı´guezSaa´. Many of the exist- middle-class people, but that these groups ing barricades had been overturned and some had now come together. Indeed, in many of them had been fully bent. About 12 police demonstrations of this period, one could fre- officers were injured. These new attacks of quently see truly diverse crowds with people government buildings ended the presidency from different spatial, social, cultural, politi- of Rodrı´guezSaa´who could no longer count cal and income backgrounds coming on the support of his fellow governors and together (Oviedo, 2004; Sitrin, 2006). This resigned (La Nacio´n, 2001d; Carabajal, 2002). alliance signified the radicalization of the By Monday, 31 December, the federal middle classes of Metropolitan Buenos police had fortified the perimeter of these Aires and the possibility of widespread government institutions even more. The social change. police used three sets of metal barricades in After De la Ru´a’s resignation, the Argen- front of the House of Government rather tine Congress appointed the Governor of than one thinking that this measure would San Luis Adolfo Rodrı´guezSaa´to the office make it impossible for protesters to success- of the president. Rodrı´guez Saa´ who was fully fight the police in all of them and already not immensely popular among reach the building (La Nacio´n, 2001d). Even- Argentines made two strategic mistakes. tually, the federal police settled with using The first was that he publicly appeared with two sets of barricades around the House of former president Menem who enthusiasti- Government (Figure 11) with one of them cally approved his presidency and stated being away from the building and covering that Rodrı´guez Saa´ should govern until De most of Plaza de Mayo (Figure 12). Since a la Ru´a’s term officially expired in 2003 (La sizable avenue passed through the front of Nacio´n, 2001b). The second was that he Congress (Figure 13), the usage of more sets appointed a cabinet whose chief was the of barricades was not practical there (Ethno- unpopular former mayor of Buenos Aires graphic Research, 2005). However, the Presi- Carlos Grosso (La Nacio´n, 2001c). dent of the Chamber of Deputies Eduardo On Friday, 29 December 2001, demonstra- Caman˜ o ordered the placement of sturdy tors took to the streets of Buenos Aires and barriers at all entrances of Congress (Pente- started to attack the Congress and the nero, 2001) while the authorities calculated House of Government once again. That that with adequate police presence, the possi- Saturday morning and while Rodrı´guez Saa´ bility of demonstrators being able to over- was out of town, demonstrators were able come the barriers and then successfully to subdue the barricade defenses in front of climb the steps or walkways of the building the House of Government and Congress. In was not realistic (Figure 14) (Themis Chron- the House of Government, protesters set a opoulos, Ethnographic Research, 2005). fire near the entrance and hurled stones and In 2003, Peronist Ne´stor Kirchner was other objects at the building. As they tried elected president after Menem decided to CHRONOPOULOS:THE NEOLIBERAL POLITICAL – ECONOMIC COLLAPSE OF ARGENTINA 525

Figure 11 The first interior metal barricade in front of Figure 13 The Argentine Congress surrounded by the House of Government (Photograph: Themis Chrono- metal barricades (Photograph: Themis Chronopoulos, poulos, 2002). 2002).

Figure 12 The second exterior metal barricade in front Figure 14 The front of the Congress building (Photo- of the House of Government dividing Plaza de Mayo graph: Themis Chronopoulos, 2002). (Photograph: Themis Chronopoulos, 2002). stand down in the runoff election rather than Metropolitan Buenos Aires in the largest experience a humiliating defeat. A decline in national mobilization against the Kirchner the number and intensity of demonstrations Administration until then; a few thousand during the first few months of the new also held a rally outside Congress. At the administration gave the false hope that the time, the picketers were demanding the re- security barricades outside government institution of 250,000 unemployment grants buildings would be removed. However, this and opposed a labor reform proposal debated did not happen. Government buildings were in Congress (La Nacio´ n, 2004a). However, filled with graffiti when security was the turning point in social conflict occurred a relaxed in the spring and summer of 2003– few months later when the Legislature of the 2004. Piquetero organizations also escalated City of Buenos Aires debated the modification their mobilizations and on 13 February of the Code of Urban Coexistence (Co´digo de 2004 there was violence during one demon- Convivencia Urbana). stration in Avenida 9 de Julio, which is the The Code of Urban Coexistence was passed widest avenue in the City of Buenos Aires. by the first autonomous (from the federal A week later, picketers set roadblocks in government) City of Buenos Aires Legislature many parts of the country including in 1998. Seeking to further its independence 526 CITY VOL. 15, NO.5 from the federal government and trying to integration (Svampa and Pereyra, 2003). curb police corruption, the city legislature Although many piquetero organizations established a local judiciary and replaced were completely absorbed by the govern- heavy-handed federal police edicts with the ment, to the extent that their leaders were Code of Urban Coexistence. The federal offered posts in the state and they advocated government and many conservative citizens the complete withdrawal of protesters from found this code to be deficient because it the streets, independent piquetero organiz- decriminalized prostitution, transvestism, ations that belonged to the left of the political loitering, vagrancy and public drunkenness spectrum as well as others that remained loyal (La Nacio´n, 1998a). However, this became to Duhalde’s lieutenants continued to the law of Buenos Aires and the police who mobilize. The authorities reacted by using remained under the control of the federal strict interpretations of the law in order to government grudgingly followed it.11 limit their repertoires of social protest. Hun- Pressured by conservative elected officials, dreds of demonstrators were detained for the Legislature of Buenos Aires began to problematic reasons that did not stand in debate the amendment of the Code of the courts, though delays in processing Urban Coexistence in 2004 and this generated these cases because of a clogged up justice contentious opposition. Besides proposals to system meant that the demonstrators spent re-criminalize loitering, prostitution and significant time in prison (Torres, 2006; public drunkenness, the new code would Svampa and Pereyra, 2003). Regardless, this potentially address protest actions and pick- policy of repression failed to control political eter roadblocks. On 16 July 2004, a demon- mobilizations or popular manifestations stration against the reform of the code by outside government institutions. prostitutes, street vendors, transvestites, As these political mobilizations continued, picketers and others outside the building of the fortification of government buildings in the city legislature turned violent. The build- Buenos Aires became permanent. In 2005, the ing was damaged, many people were injured federal government decided to build a perma- and 23 protesters were arrested (La Nacio´n, nent perimeter fence around the House of 2004b). In the weeks that followed, picketers Government and the adjacent Colo´n park organized numerous rallies in front of the (Rocha, 2005). Although this fence had been City Legislature, the Congress and the installed by 2007 (Figure 15), metal barricades House of Government protesting the pro- continued to divide Plaza de Mayo (Figure 16), posed amendments of the Code of Urban Coexistence and demanding the release of the jailed protesters from the 16 July events (La Nacio´n, 2004c). Although the Code of Urban Coexistence was eventually amended and the federal gov- ernment adopted its own stricter stance against demonstrators, the picketers and other groups continued their mobilizations and this rendered the metal barricades outside government buildings necessary. For example, piquetero groups set up a camp and blockaded the House of Government for 48 hours in August 2005 (Torres, 2006). The Kirchner Administration attempted to Figure 15 Permanent metal fences in front of the House co-opt, discipline or isolate piquetero organ- of Government (Photograph: Ce´sar Edgardo Soto Cepeda, izations depending on their willingness of 2010). CHRONOPOULOS:THE NEOLIBERAL POLITICAL – ECONOMIC COLLAPSE OF ARGENTINA 527

Figure 16 The exterior set of metal barricades in front of Figure 17 Permanent metal fences in front of Congress the House of Government dividing Plaza de Mayo still exist (Photograph: Ce´sar Edgardo Soto Cepeda, 2010). (Photograph: Ce´sar Edgardo Soto Cepeda, 2010).

that constrain unfettered capital accumulation’ providing the first line of defense. That year, (2005, p. 102). Most scholars view this con- Ne´stor Kirchner’s wife, Cristina Ferna´ndez de testation as an everyday form of resistance Kirchner was elected president. However, her similar to that advanced by James Scott; con- decree in early 2008 to raise the export taxes of stant struggle by subordinate populations agricultural products to 44%, sparked four that falls short of ‘outright collective defiance’ months of protests, which included cacerolazos (1985, p. xvi). This resistance is present in the similar to those of 2001–2002 in many neigh- activities of participatory networks such as borhoods of Buenos Aires including the front Indymedia and its local independent journalist of the House of Government (Svampa, 2008). organizations in many parts of the world This further solidified the permanence of barri- including Argentina (Chatterton and cades outside the House of Government. Gordon, 2004); in cultural productions such Despite complaints that these barricades were as the film Tar Angel and its treatment of ugly, prevented the free movement of ped- immigration in the neoliberal city (Gilbert, estrians and compromised the historic value of 2005); and the successful opposition against Plaza de Mayo, there is no expectation that the privatization of public services by trade the government is going to remove them unions such as Sintraemcali in southwest (Videla, 2010). Permanent fences were also Colombia (Mathers and Novelli, 2007). What installed around Congress, making access is implied in most of these accounts is that to the building more difficult (Figure 17). despite its global dominance, neoliberalism is continuously challenged through small and sustained acts of opposition. Spatial fortification and resistance in the In the years that followed the neoliberal col- neoliberal city lapse of 2001–2002 in Argentina, various Buenos Aires institutions followed different As Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore have routes vis-a`-vis fortification. On the one argued, neoliberalization is a process contested hand, government institutions continued to by various sectors of society: ‘Neoliberaliza- fortify and by the end of the first decade of tion, understood as the attempt to impose the 21st century, security fences had become market-based regulatory arrangements and permanent. On the other hand, global financial sociocultural norms, is aggressively contested institutions gradually removed the metal and by diverse social forces to preserve non- wooden fac¸ades from their branches and market or “socialized” forms of coordination achieved a representational sense of normality. 528 CITY VOL. 15, NO.5

To be sure, after the crisis, the government of behind the continuous and permanent fortifi- Argentina restructured the banking sector cation of government institutions. and many international banks withdrew from the country; the result was the strengthening Acknowledgements of Argentine public (and private) banks, at least temporarily (BCRA, 2002, 2003, 2004, Special thanks go to Ce´sar Edgardo Soto 2005). However, the continuous fortification Cepeda, Gabriela Garreffa, Jorge Manuel of government institutions reflects the Reboredo, Noemı´ Nicastro Oliveira, Magali growing antagonistic relationship between Camblong, Florencia Siri, Pablo Olender, sectors of the population and the state. The Judith Conde and Eleonora Amisano for continuous fortification of government insti- their valuable assistance. tutions reveals the fact that ordinary people still expect the state to manage the economy and that the state is ultimately blamed for econ- Notes omic problems. Global institutions are blamed as well; however, they have the option of with- 1 The House of Government (Casa de Gobierno) is drawing from countries of the global south the seat of the executive branch of the . This is where the office of the president is when the management of the political–econ- located. The House of Government is also called omic crisis fails. As global institutions fade (Pink House) and presidential palace away, the state is left behind bearing all the (even though the president does not reside there). In responsibility and blame. order to avoid confusion, in this paper only the term In the case of Argentina, the political–econ- House of Government is utilized. 2 To be sure, there have been years when Argentina omic system that emerged after 2001–2002 was appeared to have distanced itself from the economic unsatisfactory. Although all the presidential crisis, at least officially. However, those years administrations after De la Ru´ a openly criti- represent notable exceptions with the 1991–97 cized neoliberalism and the international insti- period viewed as the longest one, though even this tutions supporting it, actual policy continued requires qualification; there was a run on the peso in 1992 that the government was able to manage, to be business-friendly without a meaningful bank failures and an erosion of the foreign reserves redistribution of resources. Since 2004, the in 1995 because of the Mexican Tequila effect, and annual economic growth has been in the neigh- bouts of high unemployment and poverty rates for borhood of 8–9%. However, much of the much of the period. growth has been achieved because the private 3 The economy began to grow again in 2002. However, the financial system was not fully sector has received generous government sub- functional, the economy had contracted too much sidies and because unsustainable practices of because of the collapse and there were too many resource extraction and agricultural pro- uncertainties. The economic recovery was not duction are allowed to continue without credible before 2003. 4 The spatial terminology regarding the Buenos Aires minding environmental degradation. More- area is as follows. Buenos Aires or City of Buenos over, the proceeds of this economic growth Aires refers to the Ciudad Auto´noma de Buenos have been grossly maldistributed with 62.5% Aires, which is a political subdivision that includes of income going to the wealthiest 30% of the only the city. Greater Buenos Aires refers to Gran population (rates that have surpassed those of Buenos Aires, which includes a number of political subdivisions located in the Province of Buenos Aires the 1990s). Meanwhile, the unofficial and prob- (Provincia de Buenos Aires) and surround the City of ably more accurate inflation rate has been two Buenos Aires. Metropolitan Buenos Aires includes to three times higher than the official annual- both the City of Buenos Aires and Greater Buenos ized inflation rate, which is 9.3%. Finally, Aires, areas that are administratively different, but low-paying informal, service and exploitative nonetheless are socially and economically connected (though not in a straightforward and easy jobs have constituted the great majority of manner). The City of Buenos Aires contains a new employment (Svampa, 2008). This persist- significant number of middle- and upper-class people ent social suffering helps to explain the reasons with northern neighborhoods being more affluent CHRONOPOULOS:THE NEOLIBERAL POLITICAL – ECONOMIC COLLAPSE OF ARGENTINA 529

and southern neighborhoods being more low 10 This practice was also dishonest with a high income. Greater Buenos Aires varies widely, though percentage of the funds going to corrupt the great majority of its population is working class. contractors, government officials and political 5 This paper is to a great extent based on organizations. ethnographic research. Influenced by the way that 11 The insistence of the federal government to keep the cultural anthropologists, human geographers, police under its control has frequently generated social historians and urban sociologists have been friction between the government of Buenos Aires conducting research, I began to design and and the federal government, and is the topic of implement ethnographic and archival projects in unresolved constitutional questions. Besides the New York City neighborhoods in the mid-1990s. Code of Urban Coexistence, there are federal My methodology included spatial analysis penal and other laws that apply in the Republic that accompanied by the reading and making of maps; the police enforce. interviews, conversations and observations recorded in notebooks; the sequential photography of neighborhoods and the subsequent cataloging and studying of these photographs; and the reading References of primary and secondary writings about these neighborhoods in libraries and archives. I decided Acun˜a,M.L. (1995) Alfonsı´n y el poder econo´mico: El to do the same in Buenos Aires after the 2001 fracaso de la concertacio´n y los pactos corporativos overthrow of President De la Ru´a. My goal was to entre 1983 y 1989. Buenos Aires: Corregidor. study the spatial effects of the economic crisis. The Algan˜araz,J.C. (2002) ‘El Banco Rı´oso´lo tendrı´a plata findings of this paper are based on first-hand para operar 3 meses’, Cları´n 30 April. observations of protest actions; the overhearing of Alston, L. and Gallo, A. (2002) ‘The political economy of conversations among demonstration participants bank reform in Argentina under convertibility’, Jour- before and after the contentious events; the nal of Economic Policy Reform 5(1), pp. 1–16. photography of institutions that were the objects of A´ mbito Financiero (2002a) ‘Cierra jornada piquetera en contention; and short snowball interviews. In the Plaza de Mayo’, A´ mbito Financiero, 20 February. years that followed 2002, I continued to conduct A´ mbito Financiero (2002b) ‘Hablo´ Duhalde: Violencia en short interviews in order to fill gaps. In 2006, I protestas es inadmisible’, A´ mbito Financiero 20 published an article on cartoneros, which was February. derived from research conducted during the same Atkinson, R. and Blandy, S. (2005) ‘International per- period. In designing this present paper, the selection spectives on the new enclavism and the rise of gated of photographs and the use of captions for them, has communities’, Housing Studies 20(2), pp. 177–186. been the most difficult part. Photographs seldom Auyero, J. (2003) Contentious Lives: Two Argentine speak for themselves and they usually hide as much Women, Two Protests, and the Quest for Recognition. as they reveal. However, after presenting these Durham, NC: Duke University Press. photographs in talks in Argentina and in the USA Auyero, J. (2004) ‘What are they shouting about? The and receiving feedback, I decided that they also means and meanings of popular protest in contem- represent an important part of visual history that porary Argentina’, in F. Fiorucci and M. Klein (eds) may be suffering from my interpretations (both visual The Argentine Crisis at the Turn of the Millennium: and verbal), but can nonetheless help us understand Causes, Consequences and Explanations, pp. 127– the relationship of political–economic power and 149. Amsterdam: Aksant. spatial fortification. Auyero, J. (2007) Routine Politics and Violence in Argen- 6 Cacerolazos are usually demonstrations in which tina: The Gray Zone of State Power. New York: people bang pots, pans and other utensils. Cambridge University Press. However, during 2001–2002 in Argentina, the Bank for International Settlements (2001) ‘The banking term began to include other types of protest actions industry in the emerging market economies: with demonstrators using drums, wood, metal, competition, consolidation and systemic stability’, BIS soda cans, car keys and other devices to make a Papers,No.4. noise. Basualdo, E. (2006) Estudios de historia econo´mica 7 The only Argentine bank that was regularly attacked Argentina: Desde mediados del siglo XX a la actua- was the sizable and privately held Banco Galicia. lidad. Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI Editores. 8 In 1991 the price of the US dollar was fixed to BCRA (Banco Central de la Repu´blica Argentina) (2002) 10,000 Argentine australs. In 1992, the austral was Boletı´n Monetario y Financiero. Edicio´n Anual. Bue- replaced by the peso with 10,000 australs nos Aires: BCRA. becoming one peso. BCRA (2003) Informe sobre Bancos, Diciembre. Buenos 9 Clientelism in Argentina has a long and Aires: BCRA. complicated history that is outside the scope of this BCRA (2004) Informe sobre Bancos, Diciembre. Buenos paper. Aires: BCRA. 530 CITY VOL. 15, NO.5

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