The Neoliberal Political–Economic Collapse Of
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CITY,VOL. 15, NO.5,OCTOBER 2011 The neoliberal political– economic collapse of Argentina and the spatial fortification of institutions in Buenos Aires, 1998–2010 Themis Chronopoulos This paper demonstrates how social and political conflict is inscribed in urban space by focus- ing on the neoliberal political–economic collapse of Argentina, which was a conflict-ridden process with ordinary people protesting against institutions responsible for the neoliberaliza- tion of the economy. These protests affected the architecture of banking and government institutions, especially in Buenos Aires, which is the political and financial center of Argen- tina. Facing popular unrest and continuous political mobilizations, these institutions decided to physically fortify themselves and in the process displayed their vulnerability and illegiti- macy. The fact that spatial fortification became a permanent feature of state institutions but only a temporary feature of international banks, raises questions about the way that neoli- beralism operates and the way that blame for neoliberal failures is allocated. It also provides hints about the unsatisfactory political–economic outcome that emerged after the collapse, despite the fact that orthodox neoliberalism was at least rhetorically abandoned. Key words: spatial fortification, Buenos Aires, resistance in the neoliberal city, neoliberal collapse, neoliberal urbanization, banks, government buildings n 2001–2002, enraged protesters inun- by protesters had a long history of enacting, dated the streets of Buenos Aires attack- promoting and implementing free market Iing the buildings of private and public reforms in Argentina. On 20 December institutions with government entities and 2001, President Fernando De la Ru´ a, multinational banks becoming the most himself, resigned in the midst of a violent common targets. The demonstrators were uprising that left at least 21 people dead. angered with the continuation of neoliberal The president escaped the House of Govern- economic policies by the Fernando De la ment, whose surroundings had been Ru´ a Administration (1999–2001) at a time engulfed with furious protesters, in a heli- of a severe and prolonged economic reces- copter (La Nacio´n, 2001a).1 sion and resented the confiscation of their Known as the 2001–2002 crisis of Argen- bank deposits so that the financial system tina, the events that transpired immediately could stay afloat. The institutions attacked before and after De la Ru´a’s resignation can ISSN 1360-4813 print/ISSN 1470-3629 online/11/050509–23 # 2011 Taylor & Francis http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13604813.2011.595107 CHRONOPOULOS:THE NEOLIBERAL POLITICAL – ECONOMIC COLLAPSE OF ARGENTINA 511 Figure 1 A fortified Bansud branch on Callao Avenue in Microcentro. Owned by Mexican Banamex, Bansud became one of the most indebted banks in Argentina during the neoliberal collapse of 2001–2002. In January 2002, Banco Macro (which became a subsidiary of Citigroup in 2001) acquired Bansud from Banamex (Photograph: Themis Chronopoulos, 2002). be more precisely defined as a political–econ- economic crisis of Argentina started in 1998 omic collapse. The problem with employing when the country went into recession and did the term crisis for 2001–2002—a term that not end before 2003 when Ne´stor Kirchner most observers have used (Grimson and was elected president and the Argentine Kessler, 2005; Chronopoulos, 2006; Epstein, economy displayed signs of continuous 2006)—is that since at least the 1960s, Argen- growth.3 David Harvey (2005) has argued that tina has found itself in a continuous economic neoliberal institutions have been especially crisis; indeed, the management of the economic skillful in the management and manipulation crisis nationally and internationally has been of crises; however, the management of the the main preoccupation of Argentina’s govern- 1998–2003 crisis in Argentina failed, with the ing regimes.2 More than this, the neoliberal neoliberal political–economic system collap- sing in 2001–2002. Of course, the collapse of neoliberalism in Argentina did not prevent what Harvey (2005) has termed ‘accumulation by dispossession’ under which there were transfers of ownership from middle- and working-class people to upper-class popu- lations whose resources allowed them to over- come the negative effects of the crisis. The parameters of the political–economic collapse in Metropolitan Buenos Aires were staggering.4 In May 2002, the unemployment rate reached 22%. By October 2002, 42.3% Figure 2 Metal barricades (2 × 2m2) protecting the of households and 54.3% of the population House of Government before a rally in Plaza de Mayo found themselves below the poverty line. (Photograph: Themis Chronopoulos, 2002). Although the poverty rate among individuals 512 CITY VOL. 15, NO.5 had persistently lingered above 20% in the failures is allocated. It also provides hints 1995–2000 period, it did not cross the 30% about the unsatisfactory political–economic mark before May 2001 (INDEC, 2003). outcome that emerged after the collapse, During this period, neighborhood meal despite the fact that orthodox neoliberalism centers that had arisen in Greater Buenos was at least rhetorically abandoned.5 Aires in the 1990s to feed indigent families This paper represents an intervention in the were overwhelmed, while the number of literature of neoliberal urbanization. In recent barter clubs and other alternative exchange years, human geographers and urban scholars systems increased substantially (Grimson and have viewed the growing proliferation of for- Kessler, 2005). The numbers of cartoneros, tified enclaves and gated communities to be people gathering recyclables in urban areas in one of the most important manifestations of order to survive, also grew and so did the urban neoliberalism (Brenner and Theodore, numbersofpeoplewhobegantostayovernight 2002; McKenzie, 2005; Pow, 2009). Even on the streets of the City of Buenos Aires scholars who do not directly associate forti- because they lacked the resources to travel fied enclaves with neoliberal restructuring back to Greater Buenos Aires (Chronopoulos, consider the development of residential forti- 2005; Schamber and Sua´rez, 2007). fication to reflect a reaction to late-20th- The primary goal of this paper is to demon- century processes that have been associated strate how social and political conflict is with neoliberalism. These processes include inscribed in urban space by focusing on the rise of inequality, the desire of socioeco- the neoliberal political–economic collapse nomic exclusivity, the redefinition of national of Argentina, which was a conflict-ridden and local governments, the privatization of process with ordinary people protesting public space and the fear of crime (Blakely against institutions responsible for the neoli- and Snyder, 1997; Caldeira, 2000; Low, beralization of the economy. These protests 2003; Atkinson and Blandy, 2005; Glasze affected the architecture of these public and et al., 2006). While attention to this type of private institutions, especially in Buenos spatial fortification is important, since resi- Aires, which is the political and financial dential fortified enclaves have become the center of Argentina (Figures 1 and 2). Facing new urban and suburban planning norm in popular unrest and continuous political many parts of the world, this literature has mobilizations, these institutions decided to seldom explored the growing fortification of physically fortify themselves and in the public and private institutions. The fortifica- process displayed their vulnerability and ille- tion of institutions has been taken for granted gitimacy. Although neoliberal entities because there have never been completely attempted to discredit the protesters as youth- unsecured financial institutions or government ful, misinformed and radical, this failed. Given buildings and because the fortification of such the history of public and private repression in institutions can be explained as a response Argentina, a few confused or radical young to (real or imagined) security and terrorist people would never be able to directly chal- threats. Moreover, many scholars have lenge powerful political–economic insti- focused on the shrinkage of public space, tutions. What actually happened is that a which can be part of institutional fortification, sizable cross section of the population but not necessarily the exact same process revolted against neoliberalism and its most (Sorkin, 1992; Mitchell, 1995; Kohn, 2004; potent spatial manifestations. The fact that Ne´meth and Hollander, 2010). My argument spatial fortification became a permanent is that institutional fortification also represents feature of state institutions but only a tempor- a response to the growing resistance of the neo- ary feature of international banks, raises ques- liberal management of the economy. As the tions about the way that neoliberalism case of Buenos Aires shows, institutional forti- operates and the way that blame for neoliberal fication is one of the methods that the public CHRONOPOULOS:THE NEOLIBERAL POLITICAL – ECONOMIC COLLAPSE OF ARGENTINA 513 Figure 3 BBVA Banco France´s in Florida Street. Demon- Figure 5 HSBC in Florida Street. HSBC chose to have a strators attacked this bank with hammers, but the metal for- stronger type of metal shell in this location than other tification held. Spain’s BBVA acquired Banco France´s, one banks. Britain’s HSBC acquired Midland Bank in 1992 of the largest private banks in Argentina,