The Experience and Meta-Awareness of Pleasure

14 To Be Happy and to Know It: The Experience and Meta-Awareness of Pleasure JONATHAN W. SCHOOLER AND IRIS B. MAUSS he refrain of an old favor ite children’s song goes happiness, delight, or satisfaction.” Thus, if there is no T“if you’re happy and you know it, clap your feeling, an experience simply cannot be pleasurable, at hands.” Implicit in this popular lyric is the curious least not as the term is commonly understood. What observation that at least in principle one might be then could it mean for an individual to experience plea- happy but not know it. Although embedded in the sure if they were not aware of it? folk wisdom of popular culture, the possibility that Although the notion of unconscious pleasure seems people might not necessarily know whether or not to undermine the very meaning of the term, we argue they are happy is often overlooked in scienti, c dis- that it is still possible that individuals could experience cussions of happiness and pleasure. While research- pleasure without being aware of it. We approach this ers who study subjective well-being acknowledge problem by distinguishing between experiential con- that there are limitations to self-report measures, sciousness (i.e., the contents of ongoing experience) they generally take individuals’ assessments of and meta-awareness (i.e., one’s explicit awareness of their happiness at face value. As Myers, one of the the contents of consciousness) (Schooler, 2001,2002; foremost purveyors of this research observes: “By Schooler et al., 2003; Schooler and Schreiber, 2004). de, nition, the , nal judge of someone’s subjective Central to this distinction is the claim that we can well-being is whoever lives inside that person’s skin. have experiences (experiential consciousness) without ‘If you feel happy’ noted Jonathan Freedman (1978) being contemporaneously aware of the nature of those ‘you are happy—that’s all we mean by the term’ ” experiences (meta-awareness). Recent neuroscienti, c (Myers, 2000). evidence lends some support to this notion: the brain There are, of course, a number of good reasons why may register valenced responses to events (e.g., sublim- we might want to trust individuals’ ability to decipher inally presented stimuli) for which the hedonic reac- their experience of pleasure. First, who could possibly tion is not consciously experienced (e.g., Winkielman be a better arbiter of the hedonic quality of subjective and Berridge, 2004). experience than the person who is having that experi- The dissociation of experiential and meta-awareness ence? Moreover, surely nothing could be more necessary is illustrated by the case of mind-wandering during for survival than an ability to accurately evaluate which reading. All readers are familiar with the experience experiences are reinforcing and which are not. Finally, of suddenly realizing that despite the best of intentions, and perhaps most importantly as illustrated in the above one’s mind has wandered, and one has no idea what one quote, there is a certain de, nitional self- evidence to our has been reading. What is so striking about this expe- ability to assess the pleasure that we derive from experi- rience is that although one consciously experiences ences. The dictionary de, nes pleasure as “a feeling of the contents of the mind-wandering episode, one fails 244 114-MlKringelbach-Ch14.indd4-MlKringelbach-Ch14.indd 224444 33/16/2009/16/2009 55:08:48:08:48 PPMM 245 To Be Happy and to Know It to notice that one’s mind has wandered. Otherwise, of pleasure, namely the experience of = ow and the one would have either stopped reading or stopped in= uence of forced meta-awareness on judgments. daydreaming. The fact that both activities continue demonstrates the absence of awareness that one is day- Experience of Flow dreaming even though that is precisely what is occu- pying one’s minds at the time. In short, the common One of the most e? ective ways of assessing the occur- everyday experience of mind-wandering during read- rence of pleasure in everyday life is the experience- ing illustrates that we can have an experience without sampling technique in which participants are equipped being explicitly aware (i.e., meta-conscious) of the fact with a pocket computer that intermittently probes that we are having that experience. them regarding what they are doing and how much Recent laboratory studies demonstrated the ubiq- they are enjoying it (Csikszentmihalyi and LeFevre, uity of mind-wandering during reading, and by exten- 1989). Using this methodology with over 1000 par- sion the ease with which individuals can be unaware of ticipants, Csikszentmihalyi and LeFevre (1989) found the contents of their own experience (Schooler et al., that many of most pleasurable moments occur when 2004). Participants read passages and were asked to press individuals are in what Csikszentmihalyi terms a state a button every time they caught their mind-wandering of “= ow.” The = ow state occurs when one is deeply (“zoning out”). On average, people caught themselves absorbed in a task that is both highly challenging yet zoning out , ve times during a 45-min period. In addi- also accomplishable. What is so striking about research tion, participants were intermittently probed and asked on the = ow states is the fact that it indicates that indi- whether at that particular moment they had been zon- viduals’ most positive experiences occur when they are ing out. Despite the fact that a central component of not thinking about themselves, but are rather deeply this task was to actively monitor mind-wanderings, on absorbed in the activity itself. Indeed the = ow state is more than 11% of the probe trials, participants were so absorbing that individuals do not have the atten- still caught zoning out. Moreover, the frequency of tional resources to explicitly notice that they are happy these unaware = ights of thought was a strong predictor at the time. As Csikszentmihalyi (1999) puts it: of ultimate comprehension. This , nding suggests that “Strictly speaking, during the experience [of = ow] the individuals who were zoning out without aware- people are not necessarily happy because they are too ness during the sampling procedure similarly failed involved in the task to have the luxury to re= ect on to notice other zoning-out episodes that were never their subjective states. Being happy would be a distrac- caught at all. Thus, these individuals were ultimately tion, an interruption of = ow. But afterwards, when unprepared to answer questions about text that was the experience is over, people report having been in as read when their mind was elsewhere. positive a state as it is possible to feel” (p. 825). If individuals can have conscious, lucid, and perhaps Thus, the conclusion of one of the most exten- even quite pleasurable mind-wandering experiences sive investigations of individuals’ actual experiences during reading without meta-awareness of what they of happiness suggests that people experience the are thinking about, then it seems quite plausible that greatest pleasure when they are not re= ecting on the many other experiences, including pleasurable ones, fact that they are happy. Importantly, however, as may also occur in the absence of explicit appraisal. If Csikszentmihalyi notes, as soon as individuals in a = ow so, then the notion that individuals might often lack state direct their attention to their hedonic state, they explicit awareness of their states of pleasure shifts from readily report that they were experiencing pleasure. a logical impossibility to a phenomenon that may occur In other words, the = ow state illustrates a “temporal all the time. Indeed, when we consider the available dissociation of meta-awareness” (Schooler, 2002), in evidence, it seems that many of our most pleasurable which an individual goes for a period of time without experiences occur with little meta-awareness of the taking explicit stock of what they are experiencing. fact that we are experiencing pleasure. However, as soon as the experiential state is explicitly considered, the experience of pleasure is readily acknowledged. Dissociations Between Experience The observation of temporal dissociations And Meta-Awareness of Pleasure between having an experience and explicitly noticing that experience raises the possibility of another type Two phenomena are particularly well suited to illustrate of dissociation between experience and meta-aware- dissociations between experience and meta-awareness ness, termed as “translation dissociation” (Schooler, 114-MlKringelbach-Ch14.indd4-MlKringelbach-Ch14.indd 224545 33/16/2009/16/2009 55:08:48:08:48 PPMM 246 Pleasures of the Brain 2002) in which in the process of re- representing the the posters and then rated them. Participants in the quality of an experience to oneself, one distorts or control condition simply rated the posters without omit critical elements of the experience, thereby re= ection. Participants were then given the opportu- misconstruing it. Although clearly more controver- nity to select a poster and take it home. Two weeks sial than temporal dissociations, a variety of , ndings later, participants were contacted and asked vari- suggest that individuals may sometimes misrepre- ous questions to assess their postchoice satisfaction, sent the quality of their own subjective experience including how much they now liked the poster and to themselves. whether they had hung it up. Wilson et al. found that participants who had selected posters in the re= ection Impact of Reﬂ ection on the condition were less satis, ed with their choices and less Assessment of Pleasure likely to have hung them up than participants who had simply gone with their gut. The fact that participants If the process of re-representing an experience to one- who engaged in re= ection were ultimately less satis, ed self could in principle lead to errors in characteriz- with their selections suggests that re= ection did not ing the experience, then it follows that encouraging change the pleasure they experienced.

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