The Experience and Meta-Awareness of Pleasure

14 To Be Happy and to Know It: The Experience and Meta-Awareness of Pleasure

JONATHAN W. SCHOOLER AND IRIS B. MAUSS

he refrain of an old favor ite children’s song goes happiness, delight, or satisfaction.” Thus, if there is no T“if you’re happy and you know it, clap your feeling, an experience simply cannot be pleasurable, at hands.” Implicit in this popular lyric is the curious least not as the term is commonly understood. What observation that at least in principle one might be then could it mean for an individual to experience plea- happy but not know it. Although embedded in the sure if they were not aware of it? folk wisdom of popular culture, the possibility that Although the notion of unconscious pleasure seems people might not necessarily know whether or not to undermine the very meaning of the term, we argue they are happy is often overlooked in scienti, c dis- that it is still possible that individuals could experience cussions of happiness and pleasure. While research- pleasure without being aware of it. We approach this ers who study subjective well-being acknowledge problem by distinguishing between experiential con- that there are limitations to self-report measures, sciousness (i.e., the contents of ongoing experience) they generally take individuals’ assessments of and meta-awareness (i.e., one’s explicit awareness of their happiness at face value. As Myers, one of the the contents of consciousness) (Schooler, 2001,2002; foremost purveyors of this research observes: “By Schooler et al., 2003; Schooler and Schreiber, 2004). de, nition, the , nal judge of someone’s subjective Central to this distinction is the claim that we can well-being is whoever lives inside that person’s skin. have experiences (experiential consciousness) without ‘If you feel happy’ noted Jonathan Freedman (1978) being contemporaneously aware of the nature of those ‘you are happy—that’s all we mean by the term’ ” experiences (meta-awareness). Recent neuroscienti, c (Myers, 2000). evidence lends some support to this notion: the brain There are, of course, a number of good reasons why may register valenced responses to events (e.g., sublim- we might want to trust individuals’ ability to decipher inally presented stimuli) for which the hedonic reac- their experience of pleasure. First, who could possibly tion is not consciously experienced (e.g., Winkielman be a better arbiter of the hedonic quality of subjective and Berridge, 2004). experience than the person who is having that experi- The dissociation of experiential and meta-awareness ence? Moreover, surely nothing could be more necessary is illustrated by the case of mind-wandering during for survival than an ability to accurately evaluate which reading. All readers are familiar with the experience experiences are reinforcing and which are not. Finally, of suddenly realizing that despite the best of intentions, and perhaps most importantly as illustrated in the above one’s mind has wandered, and one has no idea what one quote, there is a certain de, nitional self-evidence to our has been reading. What is so striking about this expe- ability to assess the pleasure that we derive from experi- rience is that although one consciously experiences ences. The dictionary de, nes pleasure as “a feeling of the contents of the mind-wandering episode, one fails

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to notice that one’s mind has wandered. Otherwise, of pleasure, namely the experience of = ow and the one would have either stopped reading or stopped in= uence of forced meta-awareness on judgments. daydreaming. The fact that both activities continue demonstrates the absence of awareness that one is day- Experience of Flow dreaming even though that is precisely what is occu- pying one’s minds at the time. In short, the common One of the most e? ective ways of assessing the occur- everyday experience of mind-wandering during read- rence of pleasure in everyday life is the experience- ing illustrates that we can have an experience without sampling technique in which participants are equipped being explicitly aware (i.e., meta-conscious) of the fact with a pocket computer that intermittently probes that we are having that experience. them regarding what they are doing and how much Recent laboratory studies demonstrated the ubiq- they are enjoying it (Csikszentmihalyi and LeFevre, uity of mind-wandering during reading, and by exten- 1989). Using this methodology with over 1000 par- sion the ease with which individuals can be unaware of ticipants, Csikszentmihalyi and LeFevre (1989) found the contents of their own experience (Schooler et al., that many of most pleasurable moments occur when 2004). Participants read passages and were asked to press individuals are in what Csikszentmihalyi terms a state a button every time they caught their mind-wandering of “= ow.” The = ow state occurs when one is deeply (“zoning out”). On average, people caught themselves absorbed in a task that is both highly challenging yet zoning out , ve times during a 45-min period. In addi- also accomplishable. What is so striking about research tion, participants were intermittently probed and asked on the = ow states is the fact that it indicates that indi- whether at that particular moment they had been zon- viduals’ most positive experiences occur when they are ing out. Despite the fact that a central component of not thinking about themselves, but are rather deeply this task was to actively monitor mind-wanderings, on absorbed in the activity itself. Indeed the = ow state is more than 11% of the probe trials, participants were so absorbing that individuals do not have the atten- still caught zoning out. Moreover, the frequency of tional resources to explicitly notice that they are happy these unaware = ights of thought was a strong predictor at the time. As Csikszentmihalyi (1999) puts it: of ultimate comprehension. This , nding suggests that “Strictly speaking, during the experience [of = ow] the individuals who were zoning out without aware- people are not necessarily happy because they are too ness during the sampling procedure similarly failed involved in the task to have the luxury to re= ect on to notice other zoning-out episodes that were never their subjective states. Being happy would be a distrac- caught at all. Thus, these individuals were ultimately tion, an interruption of = ow. But afterwards, when unprepared to answer questions about text that was the experience is over, people report having been in as read when their mind was elsewhere. positive a state as it is possible to feel” (p. 825). If individuals can have conscious, lucid, and perhaps Thus, the conclusion of one of the most exten- even quite pleasurable mind-wandering experiences sive investigations of individuals’ actual experiences during reading without meta-awareness of what they of happiness suggests that people experience the are thinking about, then it seems quite plausible that greatest pleasure when they are not re= ecting on the many other experiences, including pleasurable ones, fact that they are happy. Importantly, however, as may also occur in the absence of explicit appraisal. If Csikszentmihalyi notes, as soon as individuals in a = ow so, then the notion that individuals might often lack state direct their attention to their hedonic state, they explicit awareness of their states of pleasure shifts from readily report that they were experiencing pleasure. a logical impossibility to a phenomenon that may occur In other words, the = ow state illustrates a “temporal all the time. Indeed, when we consider the available dissociation of meta-awareness” (Schooler, 2002), in evidence, it seems that many of our most pleasurable which an individual goes for a period of time without experiences occur with little meta-awareness of the taking explicit stock of what they are experiencing. fact that we are experiencing pleasure. However, as soon as the experiential state is explicitly considered, the experience of pleasure is readily acknowledged. Dissociations Between Experience The observation of temporal dissociations And Meta-Awareness of Pleasure between having an experience and explicitly noticing that experience raises the possibility of another type Two phenomena are particularly well suited to illustrate of dissociation between experience and meta-aware- dissociations between experience and meta-awareness ness, termed as “translation dissociation” (Schooler,

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2002) in which in the process of re- representing the the posters and then rated them. Participants in the quality of an experience to oneself, one distorts or control condition simply rated the posters without omit critical elements of the experience, thereby re= ection. Participants were then given the opportu- misconstruing it. Although clearly more controver- nity to select a poster and take it home. Two weeks sial than temporal dissociations, a variety of , ndings later, participants were contacted and asked vari- suggest that individuals may sometimes misrepre- ous questions to assess their postchoice satisfaction, sent the quality of their own subjective experience including how much they now liked the poster and to themselves. whether they had hung it up. Wilson et al. found that participants who had selected posters in the re= ection Impact of Reﬂ ection on the condition were less satis, ed with their choices and less Assessment of Pleasure likely to have hung them up than participants who had simply gone with their gut. The fact that participants If the process of re-representing an experience to one- who engaged in re= ection were ultimately less satis, ed self could in principle lead to errors in characteriz- with their selections suggests that re= ection did not ing the experience, then it follows that encouraging change the pleasure they experienced. Rather these extensive elaboration of an experience might be par- , ndings suggest that re= ection actually undermined ticularly apt to introduce such distortions. In fact, a people’s ability to decipher the pleasure that they had number of studies suggest that re= ection can interfere actually experienced and which they re-experienced with people’s ability to assess their experience. For after the impact of self-re= ection had worn o? . example, in a study by Wilson and Schooler (1991), The above , ndings provide just a sampling of the participants sampled , ve di? erent strawberry jams. In numerous studies that indicate that self-re= ection may the re= ection condition, participants were then asked impair people’s ability to decipher the hedonic value to re= ect on their evaluation, listing the reasons why of experience. Other studies have found similar e? ects they felt the way they did about each jam. All partici- of self-re= ection on people’s ability to judge the plea- pants were then asked to rate the , ve jams. The cor- sure they derive from courses (Wilson and Schooler, relations between participants’ jam ratings and expert 1991), beverages (Wilson and et al., 1984), and even judges’ ratings (provided by Consumer Reports) were relationships (Wilson et al., 2000). Moreover, addi- then assessed. Wilson and Schooler found that whereas tional studies have found that when self-re= ection is control subjects provided ratings that were closely minimized by forcing individuals to make very quick aligned with that of the experts (r=.51), the judgments hedonic judgments, assessments become realigned of the participants who analyzed their reasons were with actual experience. For example, Wilson and completely unrelated (r=.16) to those of the experts. Lindsey (as reported in Wilson et al., 2000) had par- Within the current context, the , ndings of Wilson ticipants evaluate the quality of their relationship with and Schooler can be interpreted as suggesting that a signi, cant other (romantic partner). Some partici- re= ection caused participants to “lose touch with their pants engaged in self-re= ection, analyzing their rea- feelings,” providing ratings that did not correspond to sons for their evaluations, whereas other simply gave the actual pleasure that they, and others unbiased by an overall rating. As in prior studies, they found that re= ection, derived from the jams. self-re= ection reduced people’s ability to adequately One possible concern with Wilson and Schooler’s gauge the quality of their relationship, as revealed by , ndings is that it used experts’ opinions as its nor- the fact that those who analyzed their reasons were mative basis for assessing the quality of participants’ less able to predict the quality of their relationship at hedonic judgments. Failing to agree with an expert a later date, relative to the control subjects who did does not necessarily mean that one’s opinions are not engage in self-re= ection. Importantly, however, unre= ective of the pleasure that one derives from an Wilson and Lindsey included an additional condi- experience. In other words, participants in the self- tion in which, following self-re= ection, participants re= ection condition might simply have had di? er- made very quick (2s) evaluations. In this condition, ent hedonic experiences, which were equally well the correlations between participants’ ratings of their captured by their self-reports. A follow-up study by relationship, and their later-reported ratings, were as Wilson et al. (1993) however argues against this inter- high as it was for participants who did not engage in pretation. In this study, participants examined various self-re= ection at all. Apparently, when self-re= ection di? erent art posters. Participants in the re= ection con- is discouraged, individuals are able to get a more direct dition analyzed why they felt the way they did about “read-o? ” of their actual subjective state.

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Assessing Accuracy of can be somewhat discrepant. Accordingly, if self- Meta-Awareness reports are generally in line with underlying hedonic experience, then measures that are found to consis- The suggestion that people can be inaccurate in tently covary with self-reported hedonic state may be characterizing their hedonic experience raises the assumed to serve as a reasonable proxy for underlying important question of whether there might exist some hedonic experience. Once such independent proxies independent method for assessing individuals’ hedonic of hedonic experience are identi, ed, we will be able state, and, by extension, for assessing the degree to to examine situational and individual = uctuations in which individuals’ meta-awareness of their hedonic the accuracy of meta-awareness by assessing the con- states is “accurate.” In principle, one way of gauging ditions under which self-reports show greater versus the accuracy of individuals’ meta-awareness of their less coherence with other measures. This would open own a? ective state is to assess the extent to which interesting avenues for further research because we the self-reported hedonic experience correlates, or could then examine the correlates and the potential coheres, with behavioral or physiological measures functions of accurate meta-awareness. of a?ect (Schooler and Schreiber, 2004). Such an approach is premised on the notion that behavioral Challenges in Finding Coherence measures such as facial behavior, facial electromyog- between Self-Report and Covert raphy (EMG), or autonomic physiological responses Measures such as heart rate or skin conductance, can provide an accurate gauge of underlying hedonic response. If such Unfortunately, much of the past research on coherence measures could be shown to re= ect actual hedonic between self-reports and other potential measures of experience, then it could be assumed that the greater hedonic response have observed only weak correla- the coherence between self-report and other covert tions between self-report and physiological measures measures of hedonic state the greater the accuracy of (Hodgson and Rachman, 1974; Mandler et al., 1961; meta-awareness. Stemmler, 1992; Weinstein et al.,1968). Studies that There is, of course, a fundamental logical challenge have assessed experiential, behavioral, and physiolog- to validating the use of behavioral and physiological ical measures in the context of various a? ective states measures as a yardstick for assessing individuals’ meta- have similarly found relatively modest correlations awareness of their underlying experience (Gilbert, (Bradley and Lang, 2000; Hubert and de Jong-Meyer, 2006). The only way to demonstrate that such mea- 1991; Lang, 1988; Rachman, 1978) (for a review, sures tap actual hedonic experience is to show that see Barrett, 2006). In general, links between self- they systematically covary with self-reports, or with reported hedonic experience and facial behavior have situations that reliably di? er in the type of self-reports been strongest (Ekman et al.,1980, 1990; Rosenberg that they invoke. But if self-reports are themselves sus- and Ekman, 1994), but again, , ndings are incon- pect, then how can we ever establish the validity of an sistent across studies (Adelmann and Zajonc, 1989; alternative measure? If the claim were that self-reports Blumberg and Izard, 1991; Bonanno and Keltner, rarely if ever adequately capture the hedonic quality 2004; Reisenzein, 2000; Ruch, 1995) (for a review, of an experience, then this concern would clearly be see Fridlund et al., 1987). Even with sensitive EMG inescapable. However, the argument is not that self- measures of facial behavior, correlations between self- reports have never any bearing on underlying expe- reports of hedonic experience and facial behavior are rience. On the contrary, there are clearly situations in only low to moderate (Brown and Schwarz, 1980; which it is self-evident that people’s capacity to self- Cacioppo et al.,1988; Lang et al.,1993). Still more report their hedonic state is quite reasonable. Who, challenging for the use of covert a? ective measures for example, would question that when someone cries for appraising the accuracy of meta-awareness is the out in pain after hitting their , nger with a hammer fact that some studies have found no (Edelmann and that they are indeed su? ering, or when a child squeals Baker, 2002; Fernandez-Dols et al., 1997; Fridlund, in glee after receiving a long-begged-for gift that she 1991; Jakobs et al., 2001; Mauss et al., 2004) or even is experiencing genuine pleasure? The more modest negative associations between self-reports of hedonic claim that we are making is that, under some speci- experience and other measures (Buck, 1977; Lacey, , ed circumstances (as, for example, when individuals 1967; Lang, 1988). engage in extensive re= ective analysis), the correspon- Thus, at , rst blush, it seems that indirect measures dence between self-reports and underlying experience of hedonic response o? er little promise for providing

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a yardstick by which to assess the accuracy of meta- The alternative approach is to investigate within- awareness of hedonic experience. However, this individual correlations among responses across time. conclusion—at least in its general form—might be In this approach, one would expect greater behav- premature. After all, one systematic review of coher- ioral and physiological responding in time periods ence studies by Ruch (1995) suggests a range of pos- when an individual self-reports greater hedonic sible , ndings. Across 25 studies, correlations between experience relative to time periods when the same funniness ratings and facial expressions of amusement individual self-reports less hedonic experience. As ranged from –.30 to nearly 1.0. Also, a nonnegligible several researchers have noted, the within- participant number of studies have reported substantial correla- design is often more sensitive to detecting coher- tions between self-reported hedonic experience and ence than the between-participants design because other measures (Casey, 1993; Chovil, 1991; Gross it minimizes sources of between-individual variance et al., 2000; Lazarus et al., 1966). This range of , nd- (Lazarus et al., 1963; Pennebaker, 1982; Reisenzein, ings suggests that perhaps methodological features of 2000; Rosenberg and Ekman, 1994; Ruch, 1995). In prior studies substantively in= uenced their outcomes. addition, between-individual analyses might be con- Indeed, some prior studies feature methods that may ceptually irrelevant to the question of how tightly have made it diP cult to detect associations between responses are associated (Buck, 1980; Cacioppo self-reported experience and other measures. Four et al., 1992; Lacey, 1967; Stemmler, 1992). Within- of these methodological factors appear particularly individual as compared to between-individual relevant. associations more closely denote accuracy of meta- awareness in the sense that self-reported hedonic Factors That May Reduce Coherence experience should be associated with other measures between Self-Reports and Other within individuals and across time. Measures The fourth factor that a? ects indices of coherence consists of the timing of measures and their The , rst factor that could have contributed to the var- temporal resolution. When measuring self-reported iability in coherence estimates found in prior research hedonic experience, researchers have often relied on is the intensity of hedonic state induced. The likely retrospective and aggregated ratings because rather than target state has to be suP ciently intense in order to assessing emotional experience online and moment- , nd coherence among responses (Davidson, 1992; by-moment (Gottman and Levenson, 1985; Rosenberg Rosenberg and Ekman, 1994; Tassinary and Cacioppo, and Ekman, 1994). However, assessing experience 1992). Thus, some of the low estimates of coherence ratings after a hedonic event might lead to measure- may have been due to the fact that only weak hedonic ment error due to processes such as memory biases states were induced. or defensive mechanisms (Barrett, 1997; Kahneman, The second factor that in= uences coherence esti- 2000; Rosenberg and Ekman, 1994). Thus, low asso- mates is which measures are assessed and how well ciations between self-reported experience and other they are matched to the hedonic state under investi- measures might be the result of suboptimal measures gation. For example, some studies investigating plea- of self-reported experience. Additionally, prior stud- sure have found surprisingly low correlations between ies have sometimes neglected to take into account self-reported feelings of pleasure and laughter (e.g., varying lags among measures of emotional respond- Bonanno and Keltner, 2004). However, laughter may ing. This also might arti, cially decrease indices of re= ect amusement or relief from a negative emo- coherence because it might lead one to miss responses tion rather than pleasure, and thus, might not be an outside the window under investigation, especially if appropriate index of pleasure. This example illustrates the responses involved are short-lived (e.g., Kettunen that it is important to carefully select one’s response et al., 2000). measures. The third important methodological factor is Finding Greater Coherence between whether coherence has been assessed at the between- Self-Reports and Other Measures individual or the within-individual l e ve l . I n t he b e t we e n - individual approach, an individual who reports Together, these methodological factors might have greater hedonic experience than other individuals resulted in the inconsistent and relatively low coher- would also be expected to exhibit greater behavioral ence , ndings in prior studies. A recent study addressed and physiological responses than other individuals. these methodological considerations in four ways

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(Mauss et al., 2005). First, it assessed a positive hedonic Another recent study argued that perhaps these state (amusement) induced at relatively high intensity outcome measures were not sensitive enough to detect levels using a well-validated , lm. Amusement is a pos- group di? erences. This study thus used a similar itive hedonic state especially conducive to detecting design to ascertain whether providing continuous rat- coherence because it appears to recruit behavioral as ings of one’s hedonic experience alters brain activation well as physiological responses (Ruch, 1995). Second, associated with emotional responding (Hutcherson the study sampled several important responses sys- et al., 2005). Findings suggested that providing con- tems, including self-reported experience, behavior, tinuous ratings of hedonic experience did not signif- and autonomic physiological responses (cardiovascular icantly alter activation of brain areas associated with responding and skin conductance). Third, the study amusement experience (e.g., temporal cortex, insula). employed a within-individual design by assessing It may be that after some practice continuous ratings responses to a , lm continuously across time. Fourth, using the dial do not require participants’ attention. issues of resolution and timing were addressed by Together, these studies suggest that continuous ratings assessing self-reported amusement experience moment- using a rating dial provide a viable method for assess- by-moment using a variant of the rating dial method ing meta-awareness. introduced and validated by Levenson and Gottman So how closely then does this continuous mea- (1983) (see also Gottman and Levenson, 1985). This sure of meta-awareness track other, more indirect method m i n i m ized mea surement er ror i n sel f-reported measures of amusement? Results from the study amusement experience. In addition, it ensured that described above indicated average disattenuated cross measures of self-reported experience, of behavior, and correlations of .89 between self-reported and facially of physiological responses were matched with respect expressed amusement, of .25 between self-reported to temporal resolution. Lastly, it enabled a time-series amusement and cardiovascular activation, and of .57 approach that took into account varying lags among between self-reported amusement and skin conduc- measures. tance level (Mauss et al., 2005). In other words, when While the rating dial method thus provides a assessed across time and when taking into account lags number of advantages when assessing self-reported between measures, meta-awareness shared moderate emotion experience, it raises an important concern. to high amounts of variance with other measures. Before we turn to the main results, this concern needs These results suggest that, when using appropriate to be addressed. As noted above, instructing partici- methods, facial behavior and some measures of auto- pants to report on their hedonic states may alter those nomic physiological responding (most notably skin hedonic states themselves under certain conditions. conductance level) converge with an index of hedonic Might providing continuous reports of experienced experience. In other words, when adequate meth- amusement thus distort the very phenomenon under ods are used, these indirect measures of a? ect may observation? In order to address this question, the indeed provide an alternative window on individuals’ study assessed two groups of participants. One group hedonic experience. provided continuous reports of amusement (“Adjust Importantly, beyond these average indices of the dial so as to indicate how much amusement you coherence, this study suggests that even under ideal feel at each moment.”) as well as “traditional” ret- conditions individuals vary considerably with respect rospective ratings of amusement after the , lm clip to how closely their meta-awareness tracks other (“What was the greatest amount of amusement you measures of hedonic experience. For example, dis- felt during the , lm clip”?). The other group only attenuated cross-correlations between self-reported provided retrospective ratings of amusement after amusement and facial amusement behavior ranged the , lm clip. By comparing retrospective ratings, from 0.21 to 1.32, and disattenuated cross-corre- facial behavior, and physiological responses between lations between self-reported amusement and skin the two groups, it could be assessed whether provid- conductance level (SCL) ranged from -0.22 to 0.96 ing continuous ratings distorted the experience of across individuals. What are we to make of varia- amusement. Results revealed that the two groups did tions in coherence between self-reports and other not di? er signi, cantly with respect to retrospective measures? Could it be, as intimated above, that those amusement experience, facial behavior, or autonomic individuals who show greater coherence are more physiological responding (Mauss et al., 2005), sug- meta-aware of their underlying experience, and gesting that providing ratings with the dial did not that the accuracy of individuals’ meta-awareness has alter participants’ actual hedonic state. functional implications?

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Do Variations in Coherence between Hayes et al., 2006; Mauss et al., 2007). Collectively, Self-Reports and Physiological these studies suggest that individuals who are more Measures of Pleasures Reﬂ ect “in touch” with (i.e., more meta-aware of) their Differences in Accuracy of feelings may experience socioemotional bene, ts. Meta-Awareness? Accordingly, if coherence between self-report and covert indices of emotions taps the accuracy of indi- A recent study by Sze et al. (2007) suggests that viduals’ meta-awareness of their emotions, then we variations in coherence between self-report and would expect a relationship between coherence mea- indirect measures may indeed re= ect variations sures and socioemotional functioning. in individuals’ meta-awareness of their hedonic Although very little research has directly explored state. Speci, cally, these researchers found that this issue, a recent study o? ers preliminary evidence Vipassana (body-awareness) meditators as compared that coherence between self-reports and indirect to advanced dancers and demographically matched measures of positive emotions may indeed be asso- controls exhibited greater coherence between ciated with greater socioemotional functioning. In self-reported hedonic states and heart rate during 150 participants, we assessed coherence between emotionally evocative , lm clips. In Vipassana med- emotional behavior and self-reported hedonic itation, practitioners are trained to increase aware- state during an amusing , lm clip, using a within- ness of physical sensations in the body. These results participants approach (Mauss et al., in preparation), suggest that teaching individuals to attend to their individuals di? ered widely in accuracy of their internal state increases the accuracy of their meta- meta-awareness. Participants’ well-being (depres- awareness and thus the coherence between indirect sion symptoms, subjective well-being, and perceived measures and self-reports. stress) was assessed 2 years later to examine whether individual di? erences in accuracy of meta-awareness Is Accurate Meta-Awareness Adaptive? would predict well-being. Indeed, greater coherence between self-reports and indirect measures was asso- Theoretically, it seems reasonable that greater accu- ciated with greater well-being. In addition, in line racy of meta-awareness of hedonic states (i.e., greater with the idea that individuals who possess accurate coherence of self-reported with indirect measures) meta-awareness might communicate their emotions would be associated with greater socioemotional more e? ectively, the association between coherence functioning. Indeed, a variety of lines of research and well-being was mediated by social support. The support such a relationship. For example, the emo- conclusion that accurate meta-awareness might be tion regulation literature suggests that in order to adaptive is consistent with the studies described e? ectively regulate one’s emotions, one must be able above, which suggested that when dissociations to both promptly notice and correctly identify one’s between consciousness and meta-awareness are emotional experiences (Barrett et al., 2001; Gross and induced by forcing individuals to extensively re= ect Thompson, 2007). Similarly, from a communication on their experiences, they make less apt choices and perspective, individuals who possess accurate meta- judgments (Wilson et al.,1984; Wilson et al.,2000; awareness might communicate their emotional states Wilson and Schooler, 1991). better to others, which might in turn produce pos- In sum, although more research in this area is itive and avoid negative social outcomes (Ciarrochi clearly needed, the extant literature on coherence sug- et al., 2002; Mayer et al., 2004; Roter and Ewart, gests that: (1) when adequate methodological consid- 1992). Research also suggests that avoiding meta- erations are taken into account, indirect measures of experience of hedonic states (as is the case in repres- hedonic states reasonably cohere with self-reported sion or experiential avoidance) is generally associated measures; (2) individuals vary widely in the degree to with negative outcomes for well-being, social out- which their self-reports correspond to their indirect comes, and health (Gratz et al., 2006; Kashdan et al., measures of emotion; (3) higher levels of coherence 2006; Marx and Sloan, 2005). In contrast, acceptance, appear to re= ect greater emotional meta-awareness; reappraisal, and some automatic forms of emotion and (4) more accurate meta-awareness might be gen- regulation—emotion regulation strategies that bring erally adaptive. Together these , ndings suggest that in line conscious and meta-aware experience of emo- coherence measures may provide a useful tool for tions—appear to be generally associated with posi- assessing = uctuations in the accuracy of individuals’ tive outcomes (Gross, 1998; Gross and John, 2003; meta-awareness of their hedonic state.

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Some Implications of Dissociations have just exercised (Van Boven and Loewenstein, Between Experience and 2003). With respect to sorrows, people overestimate Meta-Awareness of Pleasure how upset they will feel following their team losing a football game, receiving negative feedback about their The claim that there are = uctuations (both across situ- performance on a test, and failing to receive tenure ations and individuals) in accuracy of meta-awareness (Wilson et al., 2000). o? ers a potentially fresh perspective on variety of The distinction between experience and meta- domains of hedonic experience. We brie= y consider awareness may help to illuminate one of the most puz- two such domains: (1) failures to pursue = ow and (2) zling aspects of a? ective forecasting errors, namely, failures in a? ective forecasting. why it is that people do not learn? For example, Wilson et a l. (2000) found that ind iv idua ls rel iably overestimate how long they will remain upset following the loss of a If Flow Feels So Good, Why Don’t home team. They interpreted this , nding as suggesting People Pursue It More Often? a process of “focalism” whereby people fail to take into One puzzling , nding in research on = ow is that account the larger context in which this particular neg- although individuals generally experience maximum ative event occurred, and thus, overweigh its impact on pleasure when they are engaged in = ow experiences, their lives. Although Wilson et al.(2000) provide com- their leisure time preferences do not re= ect this fact, as pelling evidence that an excessive focus on the impact individuals tend to devote their leisure time to passive of a single event contributes to many a? ective forecast- activities, such as watching television, that do not pro- ing errors, this account fails to explain one important mote = ow. The riddle that Csikszentmihalyi ponders thing. If (as seems certain) everyone who cares about is why, if = ow states are so positive, do people not seek their home team has experienced big game losses, why t hem out more rel iably (Csi k szent m i h a ly i a nd L eFev re, do they fail to learn how quickly other events distract 1989). Within the present context, the answer to this them from the pain of the loss? From the present per- question seems relatively straightforward. People fail spective, one reasonable explanation is that individuals’ to seek out = ow experiences because they lack meta- frequent lack of meta-awareness of their hedonic states awareness about the fact that such experiences are prevents them from noticing how quickly they move the most positive. The absence of re= ection during on, and thus, from factoring the richness of their lives = ow, though it may enhance individuals’ experience into their predictions. of the moment, may also undermine their ability to The distinction between experience and meta- remember what a wonderful time they are having. As awareness also raises potential concerns about how to a consequence, individuals may tend to seek out expe- interpret a? ective forecasting , ndings. Importantly, riences that they have come to believe will make them a? ective forecasting errors are revealed by discrepan- happy (perhaps through cultural immersion) rather cies between what individuals predict they will feel than in engaging in the behaviors that actually have prior to an event, and what they report experiencing made them happy. after the event. However, if the veracity of individuals’ self-reports of their hedonic responses can vary, Failures in Affective Forecasting then discrepancies between predicted and experienced a? ect may not only stem from errors in the a? ective People’s frequent failure to pursue = ow despite the forecast, but may also result from errors in reporting pleasure that they derive from such experiences illus- the hedonic experience itself. For example, one poten- trates one of the many situations in which individuals tial method for overcoming the hardship of a negative inadequately anticipate the hedonic quality of future experience may be to downplay how upsetting it is. experiences. A large body of work reveals numerous Accordingly, people’s seemingly exaggerated forecasts situations in which people show a remarkable lack of of the magnitude and duration of negative response to insight regarding the pleasures and displeasures that lea r n i ng t h at t hey d id pa r t ic u l a rly bad ly on a te st, m ig ht will be gleaned from future events. In general, peo- be at least partially due to participants not wanting ple tend to overestimate both joys and sorrows. With admit to themselves the displeasure they are actually respect to joys, people overestimate the happiness experiencing. If underreporting of experienced a? ect they will gain from increased earnings (Kahneman contributes to a? ective forecasting discrepancies, then et al., 2006), a favorable dormitory room (Dunn et al., the inclusion of behavioral and physiological measures 2003), or how much they will enjoy a drink if they of hedonic experience (such as those described earlier)

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might reveal covert evidence of hedonic responses that a reframing of the sheer fear that you actually expe- are more in tune with people’s predictions then their rienced as you plummeted down the ramp. And if it self-reports. is the meta-awareness that is remembered, should we Although the distinction between experience live our lives to maximize the actual = eeting plea- and meta-awareness raises the possibility that self- sure of experiences, or the more enduring, if = awed, reports may exaggerate a? ective forecasting errors, retrospective appraisal of it? Although resolving the it also suggests that in some cases self-reports might relative merit of maximizing the experience versus actually underestimate the magnitude of such errors. meta-awareness of pleasure is clearly a diP cult task, Speci, cally, one hypothesized source of dissociations recognizing that there may be sizable di? erences between experience and meta-awareness are faulty between the two is certainly an important , rst step. theories about how people think they ought to be feeling (Schooler and Schreiber, 2004). If this is the case, then it seems quite possible that people would References consult the very same theories they use to gener- ate their predictions about how they will feel in the Adelmann, P. K. and Zajonc, R. B. (1989) Facial e? erence future, when they actually come to make appraisals and the experience of emotion. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 40, of their current state. 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(1988) Speci, c forms of facial EMG response index fact that you can attend to a pleasure as it as it happens emotions during an interview: From Darwin to the con- somehow give it greater value, even if it is of lesser tinuous = ow hypothesis of a? ect-laden information pro- sheer hedonic quality? Or is the memory of an intense cessing. J.Pers.Soc. Psychol.54, 592–604. pleasure, even if it was not acknowledged as such at the Cacioppo, J. T., Uchino, B. N., Crites, S. L., Snydersmith, M. A., Smith, G., Berntson, G. G. and Lang, P. J. (1992) time, ultimately of greater importance? Furthermore, Relationship between facial expressiveness and sym- if you did not actually attend to the quality of the pathetic activation in emotion: a critical review, with pleasure at the time, how con, dent can you be that it emphasis on modeling underlying mechanisms and indi- really was as good as it is remembered? As you recall vidual di? erences. J.Pers.Soc.Psychol. 62, 110–128. Casey, R. J. 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