(CPC) Outreach Journal #1096

USAF Counterproliferation Center (CPC) Outreach Journal

Issue No. 1096, 03 January 2014 Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal! As part of the CPC’s mission to develop Air Force, DoD, and other USG leaders to advance the state of knowledge, policy, and practices within strategic defense issues involving nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, we offer the government and civilian community a source of contemporary discussions on unconventional weapons. These discussions include news articles, papers, and other information sources that address issues pertinent to the U.S. national security community. It is our hope that this information resources will help enhance the overall awareness of these important national security issues and lead to the further discussion of options for dealing with the potential use of unconventional weapons. The CPC is seeking submissions for its annual General Charles A. Horner award, which honors the best original writing on issues relating to Air Force counter-WMD and nuclear enterprise operations. The deadline for submissions is March 31, 2014. For more information, please visit our web-site. The following news articles, papers, and other information sources do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the Air University, U.S. Air Force, or Department of Defense. Reproduction for private use or commercial gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. All rights are reserved.

FEATURED ITEM: Performance Metrics for the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture: Abbreviated Version. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2013. http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=18424 The National Academies conducted a study for the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office on quantative approaches for evaluating the effectiveness of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA), specifically in the context of assessing the feasibility of using performance measures and quantitative metrics and recommending approaches for evaluating the overall effectiveness of the GNDA.

Outreach Journal Feedback or sign-up request: [email protected] U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS 1. U.S. Nuclear Weapon Plans to Cost $355 Billion over a Decade: CBO Report 2. US Nuclear Missiles are a Force in much Distress 3. Compromise Bill Could Make Nuclear Warhead Cost Study ‘Less Painful’ 4. Letter Seeks Delay on ICBM Study

U.S. COUNTER-WMD 1. Defense Bill Trims Funding for SBIRS, Boosts Some Missile Defense Accounts

U.S. ARMS CONTROL 1. US Uranium Laser Enrichment Technology Threatens Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 2. Surveillance Network Built to Spot Secret Nuclear Tests Yields Surprise Scientific Boon

ASIA/PACIFIC 1. North Korea may be Producing Fuel Rods 2. Kim Jong-un Warns of Sudden War 3. China’s Nuclear Bomber Can Hit US Military Bases: Report 4. Kim Jong Un Stacking Military with Allies to Consolidate Power 5. China Plans Military Reform to Enhance its Readiness 6. Japan's Nuclear Capability Matches US: Chinese Daily 7. Kim Seeks ROK Ties, Warns US of Nuclear 'Disaster'

MIDDLE EAST 1. Iran MPs Want Higher Uranium Enrichment in Case of New Sanctions 2. Arak’s Plutonium Not Usable for Bombs: Salehi 3. Iran Develops New Generation of Uranium Centrifuges 4. Iranian Official Calls for Direct Talks with US 5. Rouhani Optimistic as Talks on Iran Nuke Deal Resume 6. Ships Return to Dock as Syria Chemical Weapons Deadline Missed 7. Iran Appoints Supervisors for Negotiating Team with World Powers 8. Iran, 6 Powers ‘to Continue Contact Through Jan.’

INDIA/PAKISTAN 1. India Test-Fires Nuclear-Capable Agni-III Missile 2. N-Facilities: India, Pakistan Exchange List

COMMENTARY 1. Strategic Bombers: MVP of the Nuclear Triad 2. Russia, Iran, Judo Diplomacy, and Ballistic Missile Defense 3. Missile-Defense System Can't Be Allowed to Decay 4. Don't Toss the Bomb 5. We Cannot Tolerate 'Rot' in Nuke Force 6. Opposition to B61 Threatens Nuclear Reductions, Deterrence

The Chicago Tribune U.S. Nuclear Weapon Plans to Cost $355 Billion over a Decade: CBO Report By David Alexander, Reuters December 20, 2013 WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The Obama administration's plans for the U.S. nuclear weapons complex, including modernization of bombs, delivery systems and laboratories, will cost the country about $355 billion over the next decade, the Congressional Budget Office said on Friday. That is nearly $150 billion more than administration's $208.5 billion estimate in a report to Congress last year, an analyst at an arms control group said, and since the modernization effort is just beginning, costs are expected to greatly increase after 2023. The budget office said President Barack Obama had requested $23.1 billion for U.S. nuclear forces in the 2014 fiscal year, including $18 billion to maintain the weapons and supporting laboratories as well as the submarines, bombers and missiles to deliver the weapons. In the decade to 2013, the administration's plans to modernize and maintain submarines, bombers and missiles will cost about $136 billion, the CBO said in a 25-page report. Weapons labs, weapons and naval reactors will cost $105 billion, and the United States will spend another $56 billion on command and control systems. Adding expected cost growth of $59 billion raises the total to $355 billion over a decade.

The Washington Post US Nuclear Missiles are a Force in much Distress By Robert Burns, Associated Press December 21, 2013 WASHINGTON — The hundreds of nuclear missiles that have stood war-ready for decades in underground silos along remote stretches of America, silent and unseen, packed with almost unimaginable destructive power, are a force in distress, if not in decline. They are still a fearsome superpower symbol, primed to unleash nuclear hell on a moment’s notice at any hour of any day, capable of obliterating people and places halfway around the globe if a president so orders.

Issue No.1096, 03 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 3 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama But the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles, or ICBMs, is dwindling, their future defense role is in doubt, and missteps and leadership lapses documented by The Associated Press this year have raised questions about how the force is managed. The AP revealed one missile officer’s lament of “rot” inside the force, and an independent assessment for the Air Force found signs of “burnout” among missile launch crews. The AP also disclosed that four ICBM launch officers were disciplined this year for violating security rules by opening the blast door to their underground command post while one crew member was asleep. After one of the Air Force’s three ICBM groups failed a safety and security inspection in August, GOP Rep. Howard “Buck” McKeon of California, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, said it was time for the Air Force to refocus on its ICBM responsibilities and to “recommit itself from the top down” to safe nuclear operations. Air Force leaders say the nuclear mission already is a priority and that the missiles are safe and secure. Gen. Mark Welsh, the Air Force’s top officer, told the AP in November that since 2008, “the No. 1 focus area, the No. 1 priority for the U.S. Air Force has been to restore and strengthen the nuclear enterprise.” Once called America’s “ace in the hole,” the ICBM is the card never played. None has ever been fired in anger. Some say that proves its enduring value as a deterrent to war. To others it suggests the weapon is a relic. Its potential for mass destruction nonetheless demands that it be handled and maintained with enormous care and strict discipline for as long as U.S. leaders keep it on launch-ready status. Today it is the topic of a debate engaged by relatively few Americans: What role should ICBMs play in U.S. defense, and at what financial cost, given a security scene dominated by terrorism, cyberthreats and the spread of nuclear technologies to Iran and North Korea? The Congressional Budget Office on Friday estimated that strategic nuclear forces would cost the Pentagon $132 billion over the next 10 years, based on current plans. That would include $20 billion for the ICBM force alone. It does not include an estimated $56 billion for the 10-year cost of communications and other systems needed to command and control the whole nuclear force. One prominent American who has questioned the future of ICBMs is Chuck Hagel, the current secretary of defense. As a private citizen in 2012 he endorsed a report that outlined a phased elimination of nuclear weapons, to include scrapping U.S. ICBMs within 10 years. The report by a group called Global Zero said the ICBM “has lost its central utility” in nuclear deterrence. Since becoming Pentagon chief in February, Hagel has not commented on the future of ICBMs. In remarks last month welcoming a new commander of U.S. Strategic Command, he highlighted the enduring value of nuclear weapons but also cited “troubling lapses” in professionalism within the nuclear force. He was not specific, but aides said he was alluding to a range of recent breakdowns in discipline and training. One of the most glaring examples of ill-discipline is the case of Maj. Gen. Michael Carey, who was fired in October from his job as commander of the ICBM force. An Air Force investigation of Carey that was released Thursday said that while leading a U.S. delegation on a three-day trip to Russia last summer, he drank heavily, partied with “suspect” local women, insulted his Russian hosts, complained about his bosses and lamented in public settings the low state of morale in the ICBM force. At the core of the ICBM problem is the reality that the U.S. sees less use for nuclear weapons and aims to one day eliminate them, possibly starting with the missiles. The trend is clear, advanced by President Barack Obama’s declared vision of a nuclear weapons-free world. Last summer Obama directed the military to come up with new non-nuclear strike options, not as a substitute for the weapons but as a key to reducing their role.

Issue No.1096, 03 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 4 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama Thus the nuclear mission, not just the number of weapons, is narrowing. So apparently is the attraction of being a nuclear warrior. Pairs of young officers are assigned to ICBM launch centers for 24-hour shifts. They keep a computer-linked eye on the 10 missiles for which they are responsible, waiting for a potential launch order and fighting little but boredom. Some are on their first Air Force assignment. Most were “volunteered” for the duty. Many find it unsatisfying. John Hamre, a former deputy secretary of defense and now president and chief executive of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a centrist think tank, says young Air Force officers sense the mission is in decline. “We are seeing a difficult time sustaining cutting-edge morale at a time when the overall signals coming from the top are that the nuclear deterrence force is no longer a priority,” Hamre said. “How do we recruit front-line talent into a field when senior civilian and military leadership never talks about the mission? Young professionals look up for signals. They are seeing the right words, but there isn’t energy behind them.” Eugene Habiger, a retired Air Force four-star general who headed Strategic Command from 1996 to 1998, puts it this way: “It’s a real problem to keep those young men and women interested in going on alert three or four times a month for 24 hours at a time when it’s hard to explain to them who the enemy is. It doesn’t have the allure that it did during the height of the Cold War when you felt like you were doing something.” The current ICBM, known as Minuteman 3, has been in service since 1970. The Air Force operates 450 of them and has suggested cutting to 400 as part of adapting to the new strategic arms treaty with Russia by 2018. ICBMs are one leg of a strategic “triad” of nuclear weapons delivered by long-range bomber aircraft, submarines hidden at sea and land-based missiles. Together they are said to form the backbone of deterrence, or the ability to convince any potential nuclear attacker that it would lose more than it might gain. That was accepted orthodoxy during the Cold War, when the fear of nuclear Armageddon was ever-present. But that day is past. “The relative importance of the ICBM leg of the triad has diminished in recent years, and its utility for meeting future security challenges is up for debate,” Evan Braden Montgomery wrote in assessing the future of America’s strategic nuclear force. His analysis, published Dec. 5 by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, questioned the “strategic relevance” of the ICBM force, noting that because the missiles would have to fly over Russia to reach most other potential targets in East Asia and the Middle East, Moscow could mistake such a strike for an American attack on its territory. Montgomery nonetheless concluded that the ICBM force should not be eliminated. Tom Nichols, an author and professor of national security affairs at the Naval War College, foresees the strategic nuclear arsenal possibly being cut to “low hundreds” of deployed warheads in coming years from its current total of nearly 1,700. A firm believer in the value of ICBMs, Nichols says that whatever their number as part of a smaller force, the Pentagon should consider taking a portion of the missiles off high alert, meaning those would no longer be ready to launch quickly. “It would reduce a lot of stress” on those who operate and manage them, he said. http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/us-nuclear-missiles-are-a-force-in-much-distress/2013/12/21/24c1e7e2- 6a46-11e3-997b-9213b17dac97_story.html Return to Top

Global Security Newswire Issue No.1096, 03 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 5 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama Compromise Bill Could Make Nuclear Warhead Cost Study ‘Less Painful’ By Douglas P. Guarino, Global Security Newswire December 23, 2013 A legislative compromise should make it "less painful" for Washington to study the cost of modernizing its nuclear arsenal, one congressional source says. At issue is an Energy Department plan to create interoperable nuclear warheads capable of multiple tasks. The first such weapon that Energy contractors would develop would be called the IW-1, envisioned as having the ability to replace both the Air Force W-78 warhead -- currently fitted on ground-based ballistic missiles -- and the Navy W-88 warhead, used on submarine-based missiles. In Congress, the plan has prompted concerns from both sides of the aisle, with lawmakers suggesting that the Obama administration should first compare its cost to that of an alternative plan under which it would simply refurbish the existing two warheads. The Navy has also raised objections to the plan based on cost and timing concerns. Meantime, congressional sources have suggested that the administration might put off the project for approximately five years due to increasing budget constraints. In light of these issues, both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees proposed earlier this year to require a cost comparison as part of the defense authorization bill for fiscal 2014. The White House has protested both proposals, claiming the studies themselves would cause new problems. A "Statement of Administration Policy" that the White House released in November said it "strongly objects" to the study initially proposed by the original Senate bill, arguing it would "significantly delay completion" of an ongoing modernization-feasibility assessment and increase its costs. Lawmakers nonetheless included a cost-comparison requirement in compromise legislation brokered between House Republicans and Senate Democrats. However, the language in the conference bill is different and requires a less rigorous cost analysis than either House Republicans or Senate Democrats initially proposed, the congressional source said. The Capitol Hill aide lacked permission to speak publicly about the matter and requested anonymity for this article. The intent of the new language "was to make it less painful" for the administration to conduct the studies, while at the same time demanding analyses detailed enough to show which option is the most cost effective, according to the source. Under the House-Senate conference report, the Nuclear Weapons Council -- a joint panel of the Energy and Defense departments -- must perform a "comparative analysis" that looks at the cost of refurbishing both the W- 78 and W-88 warheads separately, versus replacing them both with the IW-1. The original Senate version of the legislation would have required a more detailed comparison by the Defense Department's director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation. The original House measure would have required an even more rigorous analysis of feasibility, design definition and cost estimation to be conducted by the Energy and Defense Department's through the Nuclear Weapons Council. "The House provision would have given 100 percent, the [Senate] provision would have given 80 percent," the congressional source said. "This gives 70 percent -- which is enough. If you're in this business you can usually get a pretty quick read early on -- at 60 or 70 percent -- which way things are going." The legislative compromise has prompted a mixed reaction from arms control advocates.

Great Falls Tribune – Great Falls, MT Letter Seeks Delay on ICBM Study Senators ask it wait until after DOD funds approved By Jenn Rowell, Tribune Staff Writer December 27, 2013 Montana Democratic Sens. Jon Tester and Max Baucus, along with six other senators, sent a letter earlier this month to Department of Defense officials seeking assurances the department won’t fund an environmental assessment on active Minuteman III silos until after Congress completes 2014 DOD appropriations legislation. This week, President Barack Obama signed the compromise version of the National Defense Authorization Act, which permits the DOD to begin an environmental study related to the current force of 450 ICBMs, a third of which are assigned to Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana. The compromise version would withhold 50 percent of the funds for the environmental study until the defense department gives Congress a plan that includes various options for the nuclear force structure under New START, including Hagel’s preferred option. The bill also requires the commander of Strategic Command to provide Congress an assessment of those options, including Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel’s recommendation. That commander reports to Hagel and is unlikely to contradict him. The environmental assessment has been a sticking point for Congress this year, and both houses have moved to pass legislation stalling the study that the Air Force is required, by existing federal law, to conduct before making any changes to the structure of the ICBM force. “Prior to taking any action, the department should await a formal decision by Congress on Fiscal Year 2014 funding. We recognize that a continuing resolution creates difficult circumstances for the Department to effectively manage its responsibilities. However, we also do not believe that such a resolution should be construed

Space News.com Defense Bill Trims Funding for SBIRS, Boosts Some Missile Defense Accounts By Mike Gruss December 27, 2013 WASHINGTON — U.S. President Barack Obama signed into law Dec. 27 a compromise U.S. defense authorization bill that largely honors the U.S. Air Force’s 2014 funding requests for space programs while providing additional funds to shore up the nation’s missile defense capabilities. The 2014 National Defense Authorization Act sets overall funding limits for defense programs, including space and missile defense. Specific funding levels for the individual programs will be decided by congressional appropriations committees in 2014. The measure reverts to the Air Force’s request for all of its major space programs with one notable exception: The Space Based Infrared System missile warning satellite program, for which lawmakers authorized $934 million, a $30 million decrease from the request. The bill cites modernization delays in making the cut. In the missile defense arena, the bill adds $50 million to the $315 million request for Ballistic Missile Defense sensors for enhanced target discrimination capabilities. U.S. Navy Vice Admiral James Syring, the head of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), has said repeatedly that improving target discrimination technologies, long identified as a weakness in U.S. missile defenses, is among the MDA’s top priorities. The bill also includes $20 million for site evaluation and environmental impact studies for a proposed third interceptor site for the Ground-based Missile Defense system. The current U.S. territorial shield features two sites: Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif., and Fort Greely, Alaska. U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel announced in March that the MDA would increase the number of interceptors at Fort Greely and begin looking for a third site in the United States, something Republican lawmakers have been pushing for more than a year. In September, the MDA announced it had identified five potential sites for a third interceptor facility, all of which are in the eastern half of the United States.

The Voice of Russia – Russia US Uranium Laser Enrichment Technology Threatens Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty By Sergey Duz 26 December 2013 The uranium laser enrichment technology that has been given a new impetus in the US is capable of knocking the bottom out of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The technology consists in uranium isotope separation with laser stimulation (SILEX). Optimists put a great deal of trust in this and pessimists warn about negative consequences. Gas diffusion and centrifuge treatment remain the principal ways of industrial uranium enrichment. The basis of the method is the difference in weight between the isotopes of non-fissionable uranium-238 and fissionable uranium-235. As for the laser method, it is based on the difference of isotope response to electromagnetic excitation. Starting with the 1970s, the US has been taking great efforts to design effective laser enrichment systems. They did not manage to overcome technical difficulties and the idea was put on the shelf. Now the US is trying to re- energise it. General Electric and Hitachi have set up a joint venture and are building a plant to separate isotopes with laser stimulation. Champions of the technology are convinced that it will become a revolution. The enrichment efficiency is allegedly up to 16 times as high, while capital investment and power cost are much lower. Skeptics, however, point out that profits for the end consumer are not going to be very high because the cost of enrichment is only 5% of the nuclear energy consumption cost. Director of the Power Engineering and Safety Centre Anton Okhlopkov is speaking: "The US is by no means the first country to have invested in the uranium laser enrichment technology. The Soviet Union and then Russia pursued research to that end in the past, only to conclude that the technology can be effectively used in a laboratory environment, but is no good for use on industrial scale. Whatever cost value gains have been made in a lab will be lost in switching over to industrial production." The basic problem about the SILEX technology is that it may prove largely helpful to the forces that are engaged in nuclear proliferation. SILEX theoretically makes it more likely for such forces to get hold of nukes. In any event, the new technology brings up some difficult problems for the non-proliferation regime guarantors to consider and settle, because NPT is essentially out of line with the realities of this day and age. Experts point out several NPT challenges, above all, the conflicting nature of the system of international relations and the growing gap between a majority of world nations and the group of the more technologically and militarily advanced countries, which provides for a free use of force by the leaders and urges the outsiders to see nuclear weapons as the most effective means of containment. Scientific and technological progress is yet another challenge to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, since it helps bridge the gap between the countries that can and that cannot manufacture their own nuclear weapons. SILEX is a graphic illustration of the last challenge, so all apprehensions for the technology in question are quite justifiable. This is what a member of the Foreign and Home Policy Council, Vladimir Averchev, says about it in a comment. "Technologies have a decisive role to play in weapons development. Technologies challenge politicians each time they enter a new stage of development, which is often the case with strategic armaments, specifically the incessant competition of offensive and defensive weapon systems. This is also true of the uranium laser

The Washington Post Surveillance Network Built to Spot Secret Nuclear Tests Yields Surprise Scientific Boon By Joby Warrick January 1, 2014 VIENNA — It records sounds that no human ear can hear, like the low roar of a meteor slicing through the upper atmosphere, or the hum an iceberg makes when smacked by an ocean wave. It has picked up threats invisible to the human eye, such as the haze of radioactive particles that circled the planet after the Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan in 2011. The engineers who designed the world’s first truly planetary surveillance network two decades ago envisioned it as a way to detect illegal nuclear weapons tests. Today, the nearly completed International Monitoring System is proving adept at tasks its inventors never imagined. The system’s scores of listening stations continuously eavesdrop on Earth itself, offering clues about man-made and natural disasters as well as a window into some of nature’s most mysterious processes. The Obama administration hopes the network’s capabilities will persuade a reluctant Senate to approve a nuclear test-ban treaty that stalled in Congress more than a decade ago. Meanwhile, without the treaty and wholly without fanfare, new stations come on line almost every month. “We can pick up whale sounds, and ice sheets cracking,” said Thomas Muetzelburg, a spokesman for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), the Vienna-based group that operates the network. More importantly, he said, “we can reliably detect nuclear tests.” The monitoring system is a latticework of sensors — including radiation detectors and machines that measure seismic activity or low-frequency sound waves — spread out across 89 countries as well as the oceans and polar regions. Like a giant stethoscope, it listens for irregularities in Earth’s natural rhythms, collecting and transmitting terabytes of data to a small office in the Austrian capital. The network was designed to help enforce the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, which outlawed explosive testing of nuclear weapons. But while the treaty has never entered into force — the United States and seven other countries have declined to ratify it, in part because of concerns over verification — the monitoring network has steadily grown over the years, from a handful of stations in 2003 to more than 270.

Issue No.1096, 03 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 10 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama The network has emerged as one of the most compelling arguments for the treaty, advocates say. Arms-control officials in the Obama administration have cited the network’s advances in arguing for a new push for Senate ratification of the nuclear test ban, despite opposition from prominent Republicans who argue that the pact undermines U.S. interests. “There has been a growing realization, especially after Fukushima, that the International Monitoring System has improved to an impressive level,” Rose Gottemoeller, the State Department’s assistant secretary for arms control, verification and compliance, said in an interview. “It became clear that the time is right to go out and talk about these accomplishments and what the treaty can do for U.S. national security.” The test-ban treaty has not come up for a vote in the Senate since 1999, when it was soundly defeated. The vote embarrassed the Clinton administration and drew criticism from countries around the world, including Russia, which is among the pact’s 161 signatories. At the time, the United States had already halted testing of its nuclear weapons under an undeclared moratorium that began in 1992. Still, most Republicans and many Democrats opposed the treaty on the grounds that it offered false security; at the time, there was no global system in place that could reliably detect cheating. The International Monitoring System was designed to address those concerns. Construction began on the first listening stations in 2000, and dozens were operating by 2006, when the network experienced its first major test — an underground detonation that signaled North Korea’s emergence as a nuclear weapons power. The country’s communist government would conduct two additional nuclear tests, in 2009 and last February. “We detected the announced 2006 test even though only 60 percent of the network was in place,” said Muetzelburg, the CTBTO official. He said 21 of the system’s stations registered that event, compared with 94 seismology stations detecting North Korea’s test in 2013. As it turned out, the network’s listening posts did more than simply pick up the tests’ underground shock waves. Numerous stations also picked up trace amounts of radioactive xenon, a gas emitted in nuclear explosions. From studying the xenon plume, scientists could even calculate how long North Korea waited to open the sealed entrances to its underground test chambers. Arms-control experts say the North Korean tests show that the monitoring system is up to the challenge for which it was designed — deterring secret nuclear weapons tests. While today’s advanced computers can conduct simulations of a nuclear explosion, few countries would seek to field a nuclear arsenal — or modernize an existing one — without testing whether the technology works, according to a senior European diplomat involved in arms- control negotiations. “This actually works in the favor of the United States, because it effectively freezes its nuclear advantages in place while inhibiting other countries from developing nuclear weapons,” said the official, who insisted on anonymity because he was not authorized to discuss the matter. Arms-control advocates worry that a failure to approve the treaty will eventually result in increased competition among countries seeking to acquire nuclear weapons or upgrade their arsenals. If all hope for passage dies, support for the monitoring network — which costs more than $120 million annually in member-state dues to maintain — will probably dry up as well, proponents say, leading to the loss of a scientific asset with benefits to the entire planet. In the past two years alone, advocates note, the network has contributed to scientists’ understanding of a variety of natural disturbances. When a deadly tsunami damaged Japan’s Fukushima nuclear reactor, the network’s sensors tracked the spread of airborne radioactive contamination across the Pacific Ocean to North America and beyond. And last year, when an asteroid exploded over Russia’s Chelyabinsk province, the system’s monitors were able to track the trajectory and size of the space rock as it plummeted toward Earth. Current and former U.S. officials who have followed the network’s evolution say its capabilities are impressive, but they acknowledge that it may not be enough to sway doubters in Congress. While President Obama has promised

The Boston Globe North Korea may be Producing Fuel Rods By Choe Sang-Hun, New York Times December 25, 2013 SEOUL — Satellite imagery suggests that North Korea may have begun producing fuel rods for its recently restarted nuclear reactor, a US-based research institute said in a report published Tuesday. The signs of new activity at North Korea’s main nuclear complex in Yongbyon, north of Pyongyang, follow the country’s repeated assertions that it is strengthening its capabilities to produce nuclear arms. North Korea, which has conducted three nuclear tests since 2006, the most recent in February, has used spent fuel rods from the reactor as a source for plutonium, a key component for nuclear weapons. The 5-megawatt reactor was restarted earlier this year after a six-year hiatus. Its ability to produce plutonium again depends in part on how quickly North Korea can supply it with new fuel rods. North Korea is believed to have only 2,000 fuel rods in its inventory, a quarter of the 8,000 needed for a full load of fuel. The US-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins University reported Tuesday on its website, 38 North, that a building in Yongbyon retooled to produce fresh fuel rods for the reactor appeared to be operational. The institute said it had reached that conclusion by analyzing commercial satellite images of the complex. An old building once used to make fuel rods for the graphite-moderated reactor has been converted into a uranium-enrichment plant, which North Korea showed to visiting US nuclear specialists in 2010. North Korea said it was enriching uranium to make a type of fuel needed for a separate light-water reactor it was building in Yongbyon. But highly enriched uranium can replace plutonium as fuel for nuclear weapons. http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/world/2013/12/25/experts-say-north-korea-may-producing-fuel-for-nuclear- reactor/iyuw9OQzc9dpVQbjqnDx1J/story.html Return to Top

The Chosun Ilbo – South Korea December 26, 2013 Kim Jong-un Warns of Sudden War North Korean leader Kim Jong-un on Wednesday warned that war could break out "without any prior notice," the official KCNA news agency reported.

Press TV – Iran China’s Nuclear Bomber Can Hit US Military Bases: Report Friday, December 27, 2013 China’s new nuclear bomber can launch strategic missile attacks against US military facilities and those of its allies in the Western Pacific, according to Chinese state media. H-6K strategic bombers have already been deployed with the 8th and 10th air divisions of the People's Liberation Army’s Air Force, Watch China Times reports. The strategic bomber can attack the Japanese mainland with CJ-10 cruise missiles without even leaving Chinese airspace. With a range of between 1,500 and 2,000 kilometers, the CJ-10 meets the requirements of the PLA Air Force to target US military bases and those of its allies in the Western Pacific, according to the report. The report notes that “the long-range cruise missile has become a crucial part of China’s nuclear arsenal.” An H-6K would be able to take off from the air base of the PLA’s 10th air division in Anqing, Anhui province and “strike at all US military bases in South Korea.” In November, Chinese media released a map showing the locations of major US cities and how they would be impacted by a nuclear attack launched from China’s strategic submarine force. In addition, major cities in India, Russian, Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines are within the range of the Chinese nuclear bomber. The United States is gravely concerned about China’s new long-range nuclear bomber. The US-China Economic and Security Review Commission warned in its annual report in November that China is "rapidly expanding and diversifying" its ability to strike US bases, ships and aircraft throughout the Pacific, even places like Guam that were previously out of reach. http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/12/27/342227/chinas-new-bomber-can-nuke-us-bases/ Return to Top

The Asahi Shimbun – Japan Issue No.1096, 03 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 13 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama Kim Jong Un Stacking Military with Allies to Consolidate Power By Akihiko Kaise and Akira Nakano, The Asahi Shimbun December 31, 2013 SEOUL--North Korean officials and media lavished praise over a milestone in Kim Jong Un’s leadership, sending signals that the purge related to his executed uncle has extended to the military. Since becoming supreme commander of the Korean People’s Army two years ago on Dec. 30, Kim has replaced an estimated 40 percent of top military officers and brought in younger officials who are loyal only to him. Kim now appears to be further tightening his grip on power through the military after ordering the execution of his uncle Jang Song Thaek earlier in December for supposedly trying to overthrow the state. An editorial in the Dec. 30 digital version of the Rodong Sinmun, mouthpiece of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea, touched upon the second anniversary of Kim’s becoming supreme commander. “Regardless of who it is, anyone who stands in the way of the great figure of Mount Baekdu must be resolutely punished by delivering a crushing blow,” the editorial said. Mount Baekdu is considered sacred in North Korea because it is believed to be the birthplace of Kim Jong Il, Kim Jong Un’s father who died two years ago. The reference appears to be a warning to those linked to Jang. “There continues to be a recalling and purging of those with close ties to Jang,” South Korean Unification Minister Ryoo Kihl-jae said at the National Assembly on Dec. 30. North Korea’s state-run Korean Central News Agency ran a report on Dec. 29 about a meeting the previous day to “celebrate the greatness of the supreme commander.” One participant described Kim Jong Un as “the supreme commander of the ‘military first’ policy who will lead us to victory in our confrontation with the enemy.” Another called him “the sole center of military solidarity and the sole center of leadership.” The participants included Choe Ryong Hae, director of the General Political Bureau of the Korean People’s Army, Ri Yong Gil, chief of the General Staff of the army, and Defense Minister Jang Jong Nam. All three were promoted to their posts by Kim. A meeting was held in Pyongyang on Dec. 29 to report on the two years since Kim was named supreme commander. Those attending included high-ranking officials of the military, Workers’ Party of Korea and the government. Choe’s speech called for loyalty to Kim. It also included a warning to the United States and South Korea: “If the enemy should drop even a single firework on our territory, we will annihilate the invaders.” After a long career in the Workers’ Party, Choe quickly climbed the political ladder with the emergence of Kim as North Korea’s leader. He was promoted to his present post in April 2012. Three months later, Ri Yong Ho was dismissed as chief of the General Staff. Both the chief of the General Staff and the defense minister were subsequently replaced on a frequent basis. “Jong Un has strengthened his hold on the military by bringing in a younger generation through personnel changes that have gone through three and four stages,” said Kim Yeon-su, an associate professor at the Korea National Defense University in Seoul. Kim Seong-min, a defector who served in North Korea’s military and now resides in Seoul, noted that many of the military officers being promoted, such as Ri Yong Gil, were once in front-line units. The promotion of such officers clearly shows a gradual elimination of military officers who had come under the influence of Jang Song Thaek, according to Kim Seong-min.

The Japan News – Japan China Plans Military Reform to Enhance its Readiness

By The Yomiuri Shimbun January 2, 2014 China is planning to reorganize the People’s Liberation Army by transforming the current seven military regions into five “military areas,” which would allow the military to immediately respond to emergency situations, The Yomiuri Shimbun has learned. According to China’s senior military officials and other sources, each of the five areas will have a joint operations command for ground, naval and air forces, and the second artillery corps (the strategic missile corps). The reform aims to enhance the PLA’s offensive capability to secure air and naval supremacy in the East China Sea—which includes the Senkaku Islands in Okinawa Prefecture—and the South China Sea by transforming itself

The Korea Times – South Korea January 2, 2014 Japan's Nuclear Capability Matches US: Chinese Daily By Chung Min-uck Japan’s nuclear weapons capability equals that of the U.S., a media outlet for the China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) reported Wednesday. “Japan’s six nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities can annually produce 9 tons of plutonium and this ability could be used to make 2,000 nuclear weapons,” the PLA Daily reported. “The production capacity is comparable to U.S.” It quoted an expert as saying, “Japan could possibly be producing two to five nuclear devices respectively worth 500,000 to 1 million tons in secret. Not only in terms of the quality, but also its nuclear yield very much surpasses that of North Korea and Iran.”

China Daily – China Kim Seeks ROK Ties, Warns US of Nuclear 'Disaster' January 02, 2014 By Zhao Yanrong (China Daily USA) Kim Jong-un, the leader of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, called for closer ties with the Republic of Korea in a televised New Year's message on Wednesday, but warned the United States of a "massive nuclear disaster" if war breaks out again on the peninsula. The speech emphasized Kim's domestic and international policies - the so-called Byungjin policy, which puts economic development and nuclear weapons development on equal footing, observers said. In a 25-minute speech, broadcast on DPRK television and radio on the first morning of 2014, he said it was time "to end abuse and slander" that was only doing harm. "We will make aggressive efforts to improve relations between the North and the South," Kim said. "The South side should also come forward." Kim vowed to develop the country's economy in the New Year, with emphasis on increasing food production. The Unification Ministry in the ROK said that Kim mentioned the creation of an atmosphere to improve inter- Korean relations, while also criticizing the ROK. But even as Kim called for better relations with the ROK, he had sharp words for the US. "If war breaks out again in this land, it will bring about a massive nuclear disaster and the US will never be safe," Kim said. "We are faced with a dangerous situation in which a small, accidental military clash can lead to an all-out war." Shi Yuanhua, director of the Center for Korean Studies under the Institute of International Studies of Fudan University in Shanghai, said nuclear weapons remain at the core of the DPRK's national strategy.

RT (Russia Today) – Russia Russia’s Second Next-Gen Nuclear Sub Enters Service December 23, 2013 On Monday, the Russian Navy’s second Borey-class nuclear-powered submarine, the Aleksandr Nevsky, has entered service. The sub is part of a next-generation class that will be the backbone of Russia’s sea-based nuclear deterrent for decades to come. The ceremony marking the submarine’s entry into service was initially scheduled for Dec. 21, but was postponed by two days. Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu was the highest-ranking government official present at a navy shipyard in the northern city of Severodvinsk, for the ceremony of the Aleksandr Nevsky raising her new flag. “The St. Andrew’s flag raised today is the boat’s combat emblem, which symbolizes her readiness to defend this nation’s interests in seas and oceans,” Shoigu said. The submarine had been undergoing sea trials since October 2010 and completed them in September. It was also involved in test-firing Bulava intercontinental ballistic missiles, the designated nuclear weapon for all Borey-class subs. “We had some 14 sea voyages. The boat proved to be quite reliable. She is also very fine in terms of speed and maneuverability,” Vasily Tankovid, Captain first class of the Aleksandr Nevsky, told RT. Aleksandr Nevsky is the first series-built submarine of the class. Its predecessor, the first-in-class sub Yury Dolgoruky, has been part of the Navy since January. “Aleksandr Nevsky has completed all its trials. All the specifications laid out in the project have been fully confirmed,” said Nikolay Semakov, chief engineer at the Sevmash shipyard, which builds Borey-class subs. “I can assure you that the Navy is getting a modern boat on a par with its foreign counterparts.” Two additional Borey-class submarines are currently in the making, with Vladimir Monomakh undergoing sea trials and expected to enter service next year and Knyaz Vladimir currently being built. As many as eight submarines of the class may eventually be brought into service. Five of them, starting with the Knyaz Vladimir, will feature a significantly upgraded version of the Borey design. They can carry 20 of the solid- propellant Bulava ICBMs, as opposed to 16 for the original version. The Borey-class subs are 170 meters long, can dive up to 450 meters and travel at speeds of up to 29 knots (54 kilometers per hour) when submerged. In addition to the ballistic missile launchers the subs are equipped with 533-millimeter torpedo tubes and carry RPK-2 Viyuga anti-submarine missile systems. Issue No.1096, 03 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 18 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama Each vessel has a crew of 107 sailors and officers, and are fitted with a floating rescue chamber to evacuate all personnel in an emergency. http://rt.com/news/russia-nuclear-submarine-nevsky-613/ Return to Top

RT (Russia Today) – Russia Russia Successfully Tests latest ‘YARS’ Intercontinental Ballistic Missile December 24, 2013 The latest modification of the Yars intercontinental ballistic missile complex has been successfully launched from a military site in Russia’s north. The system might become the backbone of the announced reincarnation of the “nuclear train” program. The Tuesday launch of RS-24 Yars took place at 07:00 GMT at Plesetsk military site in Russia’s Archangelsk region. The missile’s warheads hit targets as far as Kura Test Range in Russia’s Kamchatka Peninsula in the Pacific region, Strategic Missile Forces spokesman Igor Yegorov reported. The three-stage Yars missile is Russia’s newest mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) complex. The system was first tested in 2007. Though most of its characteristics are classified, open information suggests that it can deliver at least four thermonuclear warheads weighing 300 kilotons each to a target located 11,000 kilometers away. The complex is solid-fuel based, and its boost phase is much shorter compared to previous generation missiles. RS- 24 Yars has “adaptive” missile shield piercing capacity and its warheads are maneuverable – making it highly unlikely to be intercepted. A silo-based version of the RS-24 Yars was tested for the first time ever on Tuesday. In 2014, silo-based RS-24s are expected to replace previous generation Topol missiles in Kozelsk, Russia. Two additional missile units, Teikovo and Tatishchevo, have already been armed with mobile versions of the Yars complex. Yars on rails Russia’s Strategic Missile Forces announced last week that it is preparing to revive railroad-based missiles. The military said it expects a blueprint of the modernized “nuclear train” to be presented as early as the first half of 2014. RIA Novosti reported that the system will be yet another modification of RS-24 Yars. Russia used to possess the ICBM Molodets railroad-based missile system (NATO designation: SS-24 Scalpel), disguised as an ordinary freight train and inherited from the Soviet Union. Altogether, there were 12 trains with 36 missiles. With Russia’s extremely vast railroad system, detection and preemptive destruction of that system was extremely difficult. Within the framework of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-II) with the US - signed by former Russian President Boris Yeltsin and former US President George H. W. Bush in 1993 - the SS-24 Scalpel system was decommissioned, and all launching platforms were destroyed by 2007. The ‘New START’ treaty signed by then-Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and US President Barack Obama in 2011 does not limit the use of railway-based systems. In 2012, Russia reconsidered the development of a new version of a railway-based strategic missile system. “We see the future missile as solid-fueled, with multiple warheads – with RT-24 Yars as a prototype. We are talking of modifying missiles that are to weigh 47 tons. To compare, a missile in the old nuclear train weighed 110 tons,” the commander of the Strategic Missile Force, Lt. Gen. Sergey Karakayev, said, as quoted by RIA Novosti. Issue No.1096, 03 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 19 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://rt.com/news/yars-missile-russia-launch-729/ Return to Top

RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency New Russian Attack Sub to Join Navy on Dec. 30 26 December 2013 MOSCOW, December 26 (RIA Novosti) – Russia’s first Project 885M Yasen-class attack submarine, the Severodvinsk, will be handed over to the navy on December 30, a defense industry source told RIA Novosti on Thursday. The submarine, designated as Graney-class by NATO, has been under construction at the Sevmash shipyard in northern Russia since 1993. “The acceptance act for the first Yasen will be signed at Sevmash on December 30,” the source said. Media reports previously said the navy’s main command refused to commission the nuclear-powered Severodvinsk over unspecified technical problems. However, Sevmash said in October that the submarine had completed four rounds of additional sea trials since May and that all such trials were a success. The Severodvinsk is one of eight Yasen-class attack boats ordered by the Russian navy. The second and third subs of the series, the Kazan and the Novosibirsk, are being built under the updated Project 885M Yasen-M design. The Severodvinsk has a submerged displacement of 13,800 tons, length of 119 meters, speed of 31 knots, and can dive to 600 meters. It has a crew of 90 including 32 officers. The submarine has been designed to launch cruise missiles with conventional or nuclear warheads to a range of up to 3,000 miles (5,000 kilometers), as well as effectively engage other submarines, surface warships and land-based targets. Its main armament consists of 24 Oniks (SS-N-26) and Kalibr (SS-N-27) cruise missiles, self-guided torpedoes and mines. http://en.ria.ru/military_news/20131226/185952910/New-Russian-Attack-Sub-to-Join-Navy-on-Dec-30.html Return to Top

RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency Russia Test-Fires ICBM to Target in Kazakhstan 27 December 2013 MOSCOW, December 27 (RIA Novosti) – The Russian Space Forces test-launched a Topol RS-12M intercontinental ballistic missile on Friday, a Russian Defense Ministry spokesman said. The launch took place at 9:30 p.m. Moscow time (17:30 GMT) from the Kapustin Yar testing range in southern Russia’s Astrakhan Region. The simulated warhead hit a designated target at a test range in Kazakhstan, spokesman Col. Igor Yegorov said. The RS-12M Topol (NATO reporting name SS-25 Sickle), a single-warhead intercontinental ballistic missile, entered service in 1985. It has a maximum range of 10,000 kilometers (6,125 miles) and can carry a nuclear warhead with a yield of up to 550 kilotons.

The National – U.A.E. Iran MPs Want Higher Uranium Enrichment in Case of New Sanctions Agence France-Presse December 25, 2013 TEHRAN -- Iranian legislators presented a bill to the parliament’s presiding board on Wednesday which could oblige the government to enrich uranium to 60 per cent if new sanctions are imposed. “If the other negotiating parties ratchet up the sanctions, impose new sanctions or violate our country’s nuclear right, this bill will immediately oblige the government to ... launch the Arak heavy water reactor and produce 60 per cent enriched uranium,” the Iranian ISNA news agency quoted lawmaker Mehdi Mousavi-nejad as saying. Under the landmark deal struck on November 24, Iran agreed to roll back or freeze parts of its nuclear drive for six months in exchange for modest sanctions relief and a promise by Western powers not to impose new sanctions. Under the accord, Iran pledged to limit uranium enrichment to 5 per cent. It will also neutralise its stockpile of medium-enriched material, which is relatively easy to convert to the weapons-grade level of 90 per cent or above. Iran is also committed not to make further advances at its Fordo, Natanz and Arak facilities. The US administration hopes the interim agreement can buy time for the negotiation of a comprehensive accord and build trust on both sides, but several US lawmakers have called for tougher sanctions, arguing that they can wring more concessions from Tehran. The Iranian bill, signed by 100 parliamentarians, was presented to the presiding boards but has yet to be approved by the 290-member parliament. A small heavy water research reactor at the Arak site is of concern because Tehran could theoretically extract weapons-grade plutonium from its spent fuel if it also builds a reprocessing facility. Iran agreed not to build such a facility. Western powers suspect Iran’s nuclear activities mask military objectives, despite repeated denials from Tehran, which insists its programme is entirely peaceful. Experts from Iran and the P5+1 — Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States plus Germany — have been holding difficult negotiations on the implementation of the nuclear accord. The negotiations have been temporarily suspended because of Christmas holidays. http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/iran-mps-want-higher-uranium-enrichment-in-case-of-new- sanctions Return to Top

Press TV – Iran Arak’s Plutonium Not Usable for Bombs: Salehi Friday, December 27, 2013 The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) says the Arak heavy water plant in central Iran is incapable of producing plutonium used in the process of making nuclear weapons.

The Times of Israel – Israel Iran Develops New Generation of Uranium Centrifuges MPs push for bill to legislate enrichment of fissile material to 60% purity — 12 times the limit agreed to last month By Ilan Ben Zion December 27, 2013 The head of Iran’s atomic energy organization on Thursday said that the Islamic Republic has designed a new generation of uranium centrifuges, and that they are ready to be manufactured after testing. Ali Akbar Salehi, the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization’s chief, gave no indication to Iranian media when production of the new centrifuges would take place, nor were specific details about their capacity mentioned. According to Salehi, Iran currently possesses 19,000 centrifuges, 1,000 more than his predecessor said the country had in August. Iran’s Islamic Republic News Agency quoted Salehi saying that Iran is proud to be among the few countries “that are capable of conducting the full fuel cycle of the nuclear fuel production from discovery to mining and from there to turning uranium to nuclear fuel.” Earlier in December, an AEO spokesperson said Iran provided the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) information about the new line of centrifuges, which PressTV quoted him saying “has a higher capacity” than previous generations of equipment used in the country’s nuclear program.

The Chicago Sun-Times.com – Chicago, IL Iranian Official Calls for Direct Talks with US Associated Press (AP) December 27, 2013 TEHRAN, Iran (AP) — The top foreign adviser to Iran’s supreme leader on Friday called for separate talks directly with the United States amid the multilateral negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program. The remarks Friday by Ali Akbar Velayati signaled a high-level endorsement of the policies of President Hassan Rouhani, who has been been sharply criticized by hardliners over the landmark nuclear deal that Iran reached with world powers last month and over other contacts with the U.S. Velayati said Iran benefits by talking separately with each of the so-called “5+1” powers — the grouping of the United States, Russia, France, Britain, China and Germany, with which it negotiated the interim nuclear deal and with which it is still to work out a permanent accord. Each has separate interests, he said in comments on television that were also carried on the semi-official Mehr news agency. “We aren’t on the right path if we don’t have one-on-one talks with the six countries,” he said. ‘We have to talks with the countries separately. ... It would be wrong if we bring the countries into unity against us, since there are rifts among them over various international issues.” Hard-liners have blasted the nuclear accord as a surrender to Western pressure and have criticized Rouhani over phone conversation he had with President Barack Obama in September when Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif met with his American counterpart. U.S. officials have also said Iran and the Americans met in secret for months ahead of the nuclear deal. Under the accord, reached in Geneva, Iran is to limit its uranium enrichment for six months in return for an easing of some sanctions, pending negotiation of a permanent deal. Experts from Iran and the world powers will hold a new round of talks Monday in Geneva on implementing the interim accord, one of Iran’s senior negotiators, Abbas Araghchi, and Maja Kocijancic, the spokeswoman for EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton said Friday. The United States and its allies accuse Iran of seeking to build a nuclear weapon. Iran denies the charge saying its program is only for peaceful purposes, including power generation and developing medical treatments. Iran’s nuclear chief Ali Akbar Salehi said late Thursday that the country is building a new generation of centrifuges for uranium enrichment but they need further tests before they can be mass produced. His comments appeared aimed at countering hard-liner criticism by showing the nuclear program is moving ahead and has not been halted by the accord.

The Times of Israel – Israel Rouhani Optimistic as Talks on Iran Nuke Deal Resume Experts from P5+1 and Iran meet in Geneva after recent disagreements over implementation of November 24 agreement By Lazar Berman and Associated Press (AP) December 30, 2013 Expert-level talks between Iran and six world powers resumed Monday in Geneva, after a break for the Christmas holiday, with Iran’s president expressing optimism they would soon bear fruit. The talks, which come amid fears that the sides may be unable to reach agreement over implementing a high- profile nuclear deal, will last only a day, officials on both sides said. Before the brief suspension, Iranian negotiators met with representatives from the United States, China, Britain, France, Russia and Germany, from Thursday through Sunday to discuss the on-the-ground implementation of the guidelines established in the November 24 interim agreement. The deal calls for Iran to curb enrichment and open up nuclear sites to inspection in exchange for eased sanctions. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani was reported as saying that the deal would be implemented in the next two months, according to the semi-official Fars News which quoted a member of the Iranian parliament who had attended a meeting with Rouhani. “Mr. Rouhani referred to the Geneva negotiations and said the negotiations will yield positive results in the next one to two months and then we can have development in the country’s economy,” Jabbar Kouchakinejad told the news agency. However, Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi told Iranian state television on Sunday that the talks have run into trouble. He said there are “incorrect interpretations” in settling a protocol to implement the deal. “Priorities should be decided to make it clear what actions should be first and what should be done later,” Araqchi said. “But the principle of simultaneous actions by both sides is a main dominant standard in the talks.” Araqchi also referred to a parliamentary proposal that would force his government to increase uranium enrichment to 60 percent if new sanctions are levied, saying it must be implemented if it is approved. The proposal is viewed as a response to a US Senate plan to impose more restrictions on Iran. “The decision is up to the parliament,” said Araqchi. Lawmakers proposed the bill Wednesday and so far some 200 lawmakers reportedly have endorsed it. It has yet to be put on the parliament’s agenda.

RT (Russia Today) – Russia Ships Return to Dock as Syria Chemical Weapons Deadline Missed December 31, 2013 Norwegian and Danish ships that had been ready to transport Syria's chemical weapons from the country had to return to port in Cyprus, as the deadline for the removal of deadly toxins from Syria has not been met over “war, bad weather and bureaucracy.” Syria agreed to transport its most hazardous chemicals, including around 20 tons of mustard nerve agent, from the country’s main port of Latakia by December 31. The weapons were planned to be destroyed abroad away from the war zone. However, the Norwegian frigate and Danish warship which were deployed to transport these weapons, and left Cyprus port of Limassol on Saturday, had to turn back Tuesday as containers with weapons failed to arrive for collection in the Syrian port, Norwegian Defense Ministry spokesman Lars Hovtun said. “We are still on high alert to go into Syria," Hovtun told the AFP news agency. "We still don't know exactly when the orders will come." However, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapon (OPCW) itself didn’t comment much on the whole situation about the delay, particularly on how much it will last. The international chemical watchdog’s officials remain optimistic toward the weapons removal operation, pointing only to the “delay in customs,” no more. “OPCW is comfortable in the knowledge that all the work is about to be completed,” said the Special Coordinator of the OPCW-UN Joint Mission, Sigrid Kaag. According to Kaag, Damascus needs to plan for “any eventuality in the journey from different sites to Latakia and in Latakia itself" as there is “a very complex management exercise over and above the fact that it is a chemical weapons program that has to be destroyed at a time that a country is at war." Still, OPCW doesn’t lose hope about safely removal of the Syria’s deadly chemical weapons as Kaag sees a “very strong” progress in the operation and there is "a clear determination by all parties to achieve success." However, the situation in Syria often hampers the efforts to regulate the conflict and to dispose of the hazardous material. On December, 20, a heated battle was underway just meters away from a chemical facility in Syria

FARS News Agency – Iran Wednesday, January 01, 2014 Iran Appoints Supervisors for Negotiating Team with World Powers TEHRAN (FNA) - Iran appointed two supervisors to better control and coordinate the decisions taken by the Iranian team of negotiators during the talks with the Group 5+1 (the US, Russia, China, Britain and France plus Germany), a lawmaker announced on Wednesday. “Given the results obtained in the first stage of the Geneva agreements, a decision was made to add two more individuals to the team of officials (who supervise the nuclear negotiators) to specify each and every detail for the negotiating team,” member of the parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Commission Mohammad Esmayeel Kosari told FNA today. Kosari said under the new conditions, the Iranian negotiating team operates through coordination with the supervising team. “This measure has been adopted because the negotiations didn’t move in our interest much in the first stage.” Kosari said from now on the Iranian "team of negotiators should first coordinate its actions with the above- mentioned team of supervisors when dealing with such issues as (uranium) enrichment" during the talks with the world powers. On November 24, Iran and the Group 5+1 sealed the six-month Joint Plan of Action to lay the groundwork for the full resolution of the West’s decade-old dispute with Iran over its nuclear energy program. In exchange for Tehran’s confidence-building bid to limit certain aspects of its nuclear activities, the Sextet of world powers agreed to lift some of the existing sanctions against Tehran and continue talks with the country to settle all problems between the two sides. The sequence of these moves appeared to be a sticking point in the expert talks, with divisions focusing on how much prior notice Iran will give Western governments that it is meeting its end of the deal before they lift the agreed sanctions. The technical talks started on December 9 but Iran broke them off briefly after the United States blacklisted an additional 19 Iranian companies and individuals under its existing sanctions.

Press TV – Iran Iran, 6 Powers ‘to Continue Contact Through Jan.’ Thursday, 02 January 2014 A senior Iranian diplomat says Iran and six world powers will continue their contact next week to resolve remaining issues prior to January 20, the date set to begin implementing the interim nuclear deal earlier sealed between the two sides in Geneva. “Contacts between the two sides will continue at the political level in the course of next week and we hope, with their finalization, the first step will come into force soon,” said Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International Affairs Abbas Araqchi on Wednesday. While stating that “good progress” has been made at the expert-level talks between Iran and the six countries, Araqchi said that several issues, “on which there is no common understanding,” still remain between the two sides. Araqchi was a member of the Iranian nuclear negotiating team during the talks with the six world powers - Russia, China, France, Britain, the US and Germany - that led to the landmark deal in November 24, 2013 in the Swiss city of Geneva. Later, experts from Iran and the six countries launched talks to devise a mechanism to implement the interim deal. The expert-level talks concluded December 31, 2013.

The Economic Times – India India Test-Fires Nuclear-Capable Agni-III Missile By Press Trust of India (PTI) December 23, 2013 BALASORE: India today successfully test-fired its nuclear-capable Agni-III ballistic missile with a strike range of more than 3,000 km as part of a user trial by the Army from Wheeler Island off Odisha coast. "The test-fire conducted by Strategic Force Command (SFC) of the Army was totally successful. Data analyses showed the trial met all parametres," DRDO Spokesman Ravi Kumar Gupta told PTI over phone. The indigenously developed surface-to-surface missile was flight-tested from a mobile launcher at launch complex- 4 of the Integrated Test Range at about 1655 hrs, defence sources said. The entire launch operation of the missile, having a strike range of more than 3,000 km, was carried out by SFC with logistic support by Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). "It was the second user trial in the Agni-III series carried out to establish the 'repeatability' of the missile's performance," a DRDO official said. Though the first developmental trial of Agni-III carried out on July 9, 2006 could not provide desired result, subsequent tests on April 12, 2007, May 7, 2008 and February 7, 2010 as well as the first user trial on September 21, 2012 from the same base were all successful. For data analysis, the entire trajectory of today's trial was monitored through various telemetry stations, electro- optic systems and sophisticated radars located along the coast, and by naval ships anchored near the impact point, the sources said. The Agni-III missile is powered by a two-stage solid propellant system. With a length of 17 metres, the missile's diameter is 2 metres and launch weight is around 50 tonnes. It can carry warhead of 1.5 tonne which is protected by carbon all composite heat shield. The sleek missile, already inducted into the armed forces, is equipped with hybrid navigation, guidance and control systems along with advanced on-board computer. The electronic systems are hardened for higher vibration, thermal and acoustic effects, a DRDO scientist said. http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-12-23/news/45510376_1_sleek-missile-agni-wheeler-island Return to Top

The New Indian Express – India N-Facilities: India, Pakistan Exchange List By Express News Service 02nd January 2014

The Diplomat – Japan OPINION/Commentary Strategic Bombers: MVP of the Nuclear Triad Calls for the retirement of America’s nuclear-capable bombers make little strategic sense. By Lt Col Thomas C. Kirkham, USAF December 21, 2013 As the United States contemplates how to address China’s recently declared Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), the importance of America’s nuclear-capable bombers is once again on the rise. Recent efforts by advocacy groups like the CATO Institute, Union of Concerned Scientists, and Federation of American Scientists to carpet-bomb the nation’s capital with deeply flawed studies advocating dangerous reductions in the nuclear arsenal and the elimination of the ICBM and bomber legs of the nuclear triad may prove shortsighted. In advocating the elimination of the triad’s bomber leg, these detractors of the nuclear arsenal are advancing a false proposition, which suggests that strategic bombers are no longer relevant to nuclear deterrence and deterring Chinese aggression. Such arguments are, however, utterly false and, in fact, they advocate a very dangerous proposition. The reality is, strategic bombers are as relevant to nuclear deterrence today as they were at the height of the Cold War. Simply stated, they provide the nation unparalleled flexibility, a high degree of responsiveness, and the only means of signaling during an escalating confrontation. Flexibility If recent experience is any guide to the future, the timing and locations of international crises – like the declaration of China’s ADIZ – will prove extremely difficult to predict. This means that the mobility strategic bombers provide (flying through the ADIZ soon after its declaration) ensures the president has flexibility in his options. This flexibility far exceeds that of either ICBMs or SSBNs. Strategic bombers can carry a wide variety of weapons, from conventional to nuclear and from traditional gravity bombs to long-range standoff weapons like air-launched cruise missiles. Also important is the fact that strategic bombers carry the only variable yield nuclear weapon, which means the president can use a low yield nuclear weapon instead of being constrained by the large yields of intercontinental or submarine launched ballistic missiles. Additionally, bombers eliminate the need to overfly Russia or China, should the target be elsewhere, and they are the only recallable delivery platform. Responsiveness

Issue No.1096, 03 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 29 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama To the extent that an attack against an adversary is a function of politics, the military tools employed to support it must be responsive to the president and his need for flexible attack options. Strategic bombers can fly airborne alert, ready to proceed to any target at a moment’s notice, or deploy forward as a coercive measure as the president seeks to deescalate a conflict, which has occurred twice in East Asia during 2013. Although SSBNs and ICBMs are also responsive, their application in a crisis is very limited and offers the president very few options in an escalation/de-escalation scenario. Given the bomber’s ability to cover great distances quickly, free of the obstructions of surface terrain, the only real challenge they face are anti-aircraft defenses, which are yet to detect the United States’ stealth bombers. Because they are mobile and can carry a wide array of weapons, an adversary’s ability to plan a defense against American bombers is exceedingly difficult. Should the United States learn that an adversary has deployed his anti-aircraft forces in just the right place to defend against incoming bombers, the mission can be changed and weapons can be reprogrammed in mid-flight as attacking bombers go around the threat. The same cannot be said of either ICBMs or SLBMs. They simply do not have the flexibility or responsiveness of the bomber force. Signaling The final characteristic of the bomber force that makes it the nation’s single best nuclear weapons delivery platform is its ability to signal adversaries of American intent, a particularly important characteristic in the current dispute with China. For deterrence to be effective, it is imperative that a nation be able to send a clear message to the country that is about to be on the receiving end of an American attack. Nothing demonstrates American resolve better than putting fully loaded strategic bombers on alert or deploying them to a forward base as the spy satellites of a target nation pass overhead. The ability to signal in a nuclear crisis is a characteristic found only in the bomber force. By their very nature, SSBNs and ICBMs are designed to be stealthy and hidden from view. Consequently, their utility in an escalation/de-escalation scenario is extremely limited. In fact, the range of missions in which either could be employed and the kinds of attacks and weapons effects they could create are very limited. Although initially flushing submarines from port or increasing the alert posture of the ICBM force could signal American concern during a crisis, little more can be done with these weapons systems after that to send a clear message to an adversary. In terms of signaling, strategic bombers also enhance the effectiveness of coercive threats. Absent the ability to clearly communicate both the will and the capability to carry out an attack, coercion does not work. Therefore, to be an effective tool in crisis management, strike assets need to be employable in ways that visibly communicate one’s capability, resolve, and restraint. Only nuclear capable bombers can effectively perform this function. Thus, it is strange to see organizations that claim to understand how best to maintain an effective nuclear deterrent, while also expressing concern about Chinese aggression, advocating a nuclear force composed of ballistic missile submarines alone. It is simply poor strategic logic. The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author. They do not reflect the official position of the US Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or Air University. http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/strategic-bombers-mvp-of-the-nuclear-triad/ Return to Top

The Weekly Standard.com OPINION/The Blog Russia, Iran, Judo Diplomacy, and Ballistic Missile Defense By JONATHAN BERGNER December 27, 2013

Issue No.1096, 03 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 30 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama Russia has become the world's leading practitioner of judo diplomacy. In its simplest terms, the discipline of judo teaches its adherents to use an opponent's movement to unbalance him and throw him to the ground. Unbalanced opponent. Takedown. Victory. Consider the recent situation in Syria. With the U.S. diplomatically unbalanced because of fuzzy red-lines and "unbelievably small" military strikes in need of unlikely congressional approval, Putin stepped in and brokered a chemical weapons agreement, simultaneously catapulting Russia back into relevance and undermining the U.S. position in the Middle East. In a pattern that should now be recognizable, Russian leaders are seeking again to use diplomatic judo to achieve their strategic objective of limiting the U.S. ballistic missile defense initiative in Eastern Europe. We should not let them. The U.S. plans to protect its assets, personnel, and allies in Europe using the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA)—a system utilizing the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system and including two land-based interceptor sites in Romania and Poland, each to be equipped with 24 variants of Standard Missile-3 interceptors when they are fully deployed (in 2015 and 2018, respectively). It is these land-based sites to which Russia has long objected, and it has unsuccessfully sought official guarantees that any European missile defense shield not be used to target its strategic missile forces. For their part, the U.S. and NATO have always maintained that the EPAA shield is designed to deal with the threat posed by short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles from rogue regimes such as Iran. Considering Russian objectives and tactics, it was not altogether surprising that with the ink barely dry on the interim nuclear agreement with Iran, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov wasted no time opining about the future of U.S. BMD sites in Europe: “If the Iran deal is put into practice, the stated reason for the construction of the defense shield will no longer apply.” In other words, the U.S. did such a good job neutralizing the potential threat of Iranian nuclear weapons, European BMD is no longer necessary. With all due respect to Mr. Lavrov, this analysis misses the mark. First, and most importantly, Iran maintains a robust and active ballistic missile program focused on modernizing its missile force by increasing range and improving accuracy. Iran already possesses a multitude of short and medium range missiles, and its moderate success in producing multi-stage space launch vehicles suggests that Iran is conceptually moving closer to having an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) capability. Even if the ayatollahs were to decide never to build a nuclear weapon, these types of missiles are capable of carrying conventional, chemical, or biological warheads. Iran foregoing nuclear weapons does not obviate the need for a missile defense shield. Second, it is far from clear that the interim nuclear agreement will lead to a final nuclear agreement, or that a final agreement will guarantee that Iran will not acquire a nuclear weapon. It seems likely that Iran will be allowed to continue to enrich uranium under any final agreement the Obama administration would broker, leaving Tehran with a nuclear weapons breakout capability. There is also legitimate concern that under any deal, Iran will continue to pursue weapons in secret. The value of a BMD shield is that we do not have to resolve such questions in advance for a shield to benefit U.S. security. Finally, in addition to preparing a workable defense against Iran’s growing ballistic missile and potential nuclear capability, advancing the EPAA would have real and positive impacts now. It would signal both U.S. resolve and capability to enemies as well as allies and would add a complication to Tehran’s ongoing nuclear weapons decision-making calculus. BMD introduces uncertainty about the success of any potential attack and thereby reduces both its likelihood and the efficacy of threats. U.S. systems do not need to be infallible; their existence is enough to alter a country's cost/benefit analysis in threatening to use ballistic missiles, or even in developing these weapons in the first place. The U.S. should stay the course and fully fund the planned first three phases of EPAA deployment. Overblown rhetoric from Moscow notwithstanding, the highly capable family of SM-3s to be deployed (including the Block IA,

Fitchburg Sentinel and Enterprise – Fitchburg, MA OPINION/Editorial Missile-Defense System Can't Be Allowed to Decay Sentinel & Enterprise December 27, 2013 One of the more disturbing stories we've encountered recently concerned the deteriorating morale and physical condition of this country's nuclear missile-defense system. An Associated Press report cited security lapses and the difficulty in recruiting top-flight personnel to man and maintain this key part of our nuclear deterrent, which helped preserve the peace during the Cold War with the Soviet Union. In place since 1970, these missiles no longer serve the same purpose because our defense priorities have changed since the fall of communism and the rise of Islamic extremism. Also, the missile-defense system's enduring success has created another set of problems. The monotony of baby-sitting these awesome instruments of all-out destruction presents the potential for a careless mistake that could lead to catastrophic consequences. This was substantiated in the Associated Press story, which revealed one missile officer's lament of "rot" inside the force, and an independent assessment for the Air Force that found signs of "burnout" among missile-launch crews. The policy of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) isn't the subject of casual conversation. Rather, we'd rather wish all those silos in remote locations housing intercontinental ballistic missiles calibrated to strike a particular target in Russia or elsewhere be relegated to a Tom Clancy novel. Well, all that unimaginable potential for Armageddon -- 450 Minuteman 3 ICBMs -- exists, matched by an opposing land missile force in Russia. That's why it's so important to keep this arsenal in top condition, while the military develops a long-range role for this aging hardware. Whatever that might be, it will certainly be a diminished one. President Obama and Pentagon planners give more weight to the two other arms of our nuclear triad -- submarines and long-range bombers. The Air Force has already proposed cutting the land-based force to 400 as part of a new strategic-arms treaty with Russia.

The National Interest.org OPINION/Commentary Don't Toss the Bomb By Adam Lowther and Hunter Hustus January 2, 2014 Steven Pifer’s recent challenge to our December 4 National Interest article “When Fewer Nukes Means More Danger” deserves a response. While we appreciate Pifer’s willingness to challenge our positions and offer a nuclear minimalist perspective, his objections largely stem from the same myths and misunderstandings of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence that have long been the central theses of the nuclear arms control movement. Comparing Apples and Oranges Pifer begins by challenging our primary position—that further nuclear weapons reductions fundamentally change the deterrence dynamic—with an argument about numbers, suggesting “…the United States and Russia each have at least ten times as many nuclear weapons as the country with the third largest nuclear arsenal.” He then states “…the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals currently each number about 4,500 total nuclear weapons (operational strategic, operational non-strategic, and reserve/non-, deployed)” and reiterates his recommendation for an arsenal of 2,000-2,500 nuclear weapons, first proposed in a 2012 book Pifer co-wrote with Michael O’Hanlon. Pifer presses his point by suggesting that China and France, the countries with the third and fourth largest arsenals, possess about 300 and 250 weapons each, less than ten percent of the US stockpile. He then proceeds to compare apples and oranges by switching from total stockpile numbers to the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons agreed upon in the New START Treaty. Currently, the United States and Russia are moving to 1,550 operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons on about 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles (ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers). Instead, Pifer restates his and O’Hanlon’s proposal of 1,000 and 500, respectively. Our problem with these numbers is that the total arsenal size must serve the deployed force as well as provide a “hedge” against non-compliance or unforeseen events. This becomes problematic as the number of warheads decrease further. There simply is not enough slack remaining in the stockpile to account for potential challenges that may arise during a time when the United States is refurbishing increasingly older weapons. The size of other nuclear powers’ arsenals factor into a determination of the appropriate size of the U.S. arsenal, but they are but one factor and do not play the arithmetic role implied by Pifer. The argument we put forward is that deterrence at lower numbers is a non-linear problem. The decrease in size creates its own dynamic. The Cold War is Over When reading the work of nuclear abolitionists and minimalists, they all too often focus on the bilateral Russo- American relationship and the diminution of the threat posed by Russia. The logic often goes thusly: Russia is less of a threat than the former Soviet Union; thus the United States needs to reduce its nuclear arsenal. What they rarely discuss is the multiple mutual and multilateral deterrence relationships that emerge from an increasing Issue No.1096, 03 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 33 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama number of nuclear weapons states, which may be competitors or adversaries of the United States. This point is worth reiterating. The United States must maintain the capability—and will—to deter multiple adversaries simultaneously. Admittedly, nuclear deterrence during the Cold War was simpler. The Soviet Union posed the sole threat to American sovereignty. This made decision making decidedly easier than it is today. Rather than continuing to focus on Russia, it is time arms control advocates realize the Cold War is over. Other adversaries will emerge who see nuclear weapons not as archaic weapons without utility, but as the great equalizer they are. In no other area of defense would Americans tolerate the purposeful weakening of American military power. Never would a president go before the American people and argue that American air, sea, space, land, and cyber power should be limited in capability and size to that of our adversaries. Instead, Americans expect the United States to field forces that are superior to our adversaries in capability and number. Yet when it comes to nuclear weapons, some are willing to accept equality or even inferiority. While we do not consider ourselves “deterrence conservatives,” if that means reflexively shuddering at the thought of further reductions, we do urge those advocating for reductions to start with strategy, not intuition and numerology. Even if we shared Pifer’s intuitive position—and we do not—we find little solace in arriving at numbers and structures without adequate modern analysis, which is not driving the current debate. For us, numbers are less important than comprehending the impact (tactical, operational and strategic) of lower numbers, before we step into an abyss. Extended Deterrence In his rebuttal to our previous article, Pifer writes, “Extended deterrence (and assurance) in particular depends on far more than numbers. It concerns the confidence that allies have, especially in a crisis, that the United States will be prepared to employ its full military arsenal, including nuclear weapons, in their defense.” Here, we are in agreement. The only problem with Pifer’s argument is that, to NATO member-governments, the issue is more complex. NATO has repeatedly communicated its desire to remain a nuclear alliance with the burden-sharing that entails, indicating they do not find an American nuclear umbrella that is solely based in the United States credible. While the situation in Asia is distinctly different, both Japan and Korea expect credible American guarantees. Absent the presence of nuclear capable bombers at Andersen Air Force Base on Guam and ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) patrolling the Pacific, American extended deterrence in Asia would not remain credible. In fact, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) has already registered its concerns about further reductions in the size of the American arsenal. Contrary to Pifer’s thinking, at least some American allies think numbers do matter. Empty Threats Finally, Pifer writes, “As tension peaked on the Korean Peninsula last spring, the U.S. Air Force flew B-52 and B-2 heavy bombers over South Korea. The overflights sent Pyongyang a pointed public reminder of U.S. capabilities and of the fact that South Korea lies under the U.S. nuclear umbrella.” While we agree with Pifer’s view of air power’s strategic effect, sending nuclear-capable B-2s to South Korea as a deterrence signal only works if the signal is credible. Not since the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty has a nation arbitrarily disarmed in the vain hope that weakness would prove stabilizing. It did not work then, and if the United States continues to reduce its nuclear arsenal solely to satisfy the moral and philosophical preferences of some, the next B-2 flight over Korea may not have the intended effect. Conclusion Our basic argument is simple: deterrence at lower numbers is a non-linear problem. As arsenal sizes decrease, the deterrence problem becomes more complex in a non-linear fashion. That is why less is not just less, less is different.

Sun Journal – Lewiston, MA OPINION/Our View Editorial We Cannot Tolerate 'Rot' in Nuke Force Editorial Board Friday, January 3, 2014 Today, when we think about nuclear weapons, we think of rogue states such as Iran and North Korea. Or, perhaps, we worry about a terrorist attack here involving a nuclear weapon, such as the much-discussed “suitcase bomb.” But several events in 2013 show we need to pay more attention to the safety and security of our own nuclear weapons. In November, the U.S. Air Force relieved Maj. Gen. Michael Carey for “personal misbehavior” in a foreign country, namely excessive drinking, sexual escapades and gambling. It later turned out that Carey was on assignment in Russia when he went on a bender. Of course, this wouldn’t be the first time a military official went off the rails in a foreign land. But Carey isn’t just any general, he is the man responsible for 450 nuclear missiles at land stations across the U.S. He is an official responsible for safely maintaining our nation’s most destructive weapons and setting an example for the thousands of soldiers beneath him. Only days after Carey was disciplined, the Navy demoted Vice Adm. Tim Giardina and relieved him of his post as second in command of U.S. nuclear forces. Giardina was accused of using fake gambling chips at a casino in Iowa. All this follows the publication of a book in 2013 by Eric Schlosser tracing incidents of nuclear mishaps back to the 1940s. The list of accidents is remarkably long and includes nuclear bombs inadvertently dropped over the U.S. or destroyed in accidents. A variety of other nuclear weapons have been lost at sea. Schlosser concentrates his book on an incident that happened in 1980 in a missile tube near Damascus, Ark., when a technician accidentally dropped a wrench, which fell 80 feet before piercing the missile’s fuel tank. The area was evacuated and the rocket eventually exploded, throwing its massive warhead about 100 feet from its tube. Amazingly, the device did not explode or release radiation. Schlosser makes the point that the U.S. has courted nuclear disaster any number of times over the past 60 years, sometimes escaping either by luck or God’s grace. This track record is even more frightening when we consider that India, Russia, Pakistan and North Korea also maintain nuclear warheads, but have even fewer resources for protecting and maintaining them. But the problem in the U.S. should not be underestimated. In November, The Associated Press reported on burnout, low morale and “rot,” as one officer put it, inside the U.S. nuclear force. As the U.S. and Russia gradually reduce their stockpiles of weapons, nuclear warfare is no longer seen as a viable career path for the military’s best officers.

The Hill – Washington, D.C. OPINION/Congress Blog January 03, 2014 Opposition to B61 Threatens Nuclear Reductions, Deterrence By Thomas Karako President Obama pledged that so long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will retain a safe, secure, and effective deterrent. Leading up to New START, recommendations of the Strategic Posture Commission and the Nuclear Posture Review have helped to shape a remarkable shared bipartisan and bicameral understanding of the technical requirements for modernizing the U.S. nuclear enterprise. Unfortunately, the road to a sustainable deterrent is now threatened by misguided cuts to the life extension program (LEP) to the B61 nuclear bomb. As the only deployed gravity bomb and the only bomb envisioned for the future stockpile, the B61 represents a unique and valuable strategic asset. The Department of Defense calls it “the cornerstone of long term US extended deterrence to our allies.” The program also represents a critical first step in future modernization efforts. The Obama administration has laid out a reasonable strategy for the future, a prudent path for consolidating the stockpile from twelve weapon types to five. This future “3+2” force would consist of three missile warheads, one (B61) gravity bomb, and one cruise missile. In June, Senate Appropriations slashed the B61 LEP on the supposition there were less costly alternatives. Appropriators were apparently unaware that the Nuclear Weapons Council exhaustively examined the alternatives and rejected them as too costly, riskier, and inadequate to the military mission. Both House and Senate Armed Services committees authorized funding at or above the president's request of $537 million, as did House Appropriations. Costing $10 billion over ten years, the New York Times in May editorialized on the B61’s apparent "profligacy." But the more profligate course would be to accept Senate Appropriations cuts—squandering a billion dollars already spent, failing to address the underlying problem, and allowing delays to further compound cost. Sequestration already contributed to the program’s slipping behind schedule; additional delays will make things worse. Opponents of modernization impede President’ Obama’s goal of a smaller stockpile with fewer types of nuclear weapons. Failure to complete the B61 LEP will require the U.S. to keep rather than retire the large B83 (the only

Issue No.1096, 03 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 36 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama megaton-class weapon in the stockpile), and maintain four B61 variants instead of one. A smaller force of refurbished bombs will decrease risk, increase safety, enhance deterrence, and enable substantial reductions of both weapons and quantity of nuclear material. Planned updates to the bomb’s tailkit have been criticized on the grounds it creates "new" capabilities. In fact, updates would merely bring non-nuclear components up to late-20th century standards—e.g., replacing vacuum tubes with modern circuits, and replacing an analog-only interface with one compatible with digital aircraft (such as the F-35, soon to be America’s only nuclear-capable fighter). The obsolete and expensive parachute also needs to be replaced with smart bomb-like guidance. Greater accuracy permits a lower yield, which in turn significantly reduces the amount of nuclear material and increases safety. Others allege that the B61's mission is limited to Europe and that stationing B61s there no longer makes sense. In fact, NATO reaffirmed the utility of forward-deployed weapons in 2010 and 2012. The capability, however, transcends Europe. Among others, it reassures Pacific allies, especially after the retirement of the nuclear-armed Tomahawk missile. High profile flights of B61-capable bombers to South Korea in early 2013 helped to defuse tensions with Pyongyang and satisfy Seoul’s desire for tangible and visible demonstrations of extended deterrence. Most notably, in his revised nuclear employment guidance from June 2013, President Obama specifically reaffirmed the military requirement for forward-deployable weapons. Allies from Riyadh to Ankara to Tokyo are watching. The Defense Department warns that "Failure to fully fund the B61 LEP will be viewed by NATO and other allies as a weakening of the overall US extended deterrence commitment, potentially prompting certain allies to pursue their own nuclear program." Turkey is exploring new relationships with China. Rumored to have funded Pakistan’s nuclear program, the Saudis maintain nuclear- capable ballistic missiles purchased from China. Japan and South Korea each have robust nuclear technical expertise; failures of US leadership must not tempt them to exercise it. The small Senate minority which opposes modernization must face stubborn facts and heed the warnings of Strategic Command, the Secretaries of Defense and of Energy, and larger bipartisan and bicameral consensus. In September, four past commanders of Strategic Command jointly wrote to Senate Appropriators to express their grave concern about proposed cuts to the B61. In November, Secretaries Hagel (Defense) and Moniz (Energy) wrote to Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) urging her to release her funding block. Now Congress must act. The B61 is vetted and ready. Its completion is necessary to meet deterrence requirements, assure allies, stem further proliferation, and allow prudent reductions to the stockpile. Karako is the director of the Center for the Study of American Democracy at Kenyon College, and a former fellow with the House Armed Services Committee. http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/homeland-security/194310-opposition-to-b61-threatens-nuclear- reductions Return to Top

ABOUT THE USAF CPC The USAF Counterproliferation Center was established in 1998 at the direction of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Located at Maxwell AFB, this Center capitalizes on the resident expertise of Air University, while extending its reach far beyond - and influences a wide audience of leaders and policy makers. A memorandum of agreement between the Air Staff Director for Nuclear and Counterproliferation (then AF/XON), now AF/A5XP) and Air War College Commandant established the initial manpower and responsibilities of the Center. This included integrating counterproliferation awareness into the curriculum and ongoing research at the Air University; establishing an information repository to promote research on counterproliferation and nonproliferation issues; and directing research on the various topics associated with counterproliferation and nonproliferation.

Issue No.1096, 03 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 38